POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF SRI LANKA

Political History of Sri Lanka:

Political life in Sri Lanka is open and vigorous, with a wide range of views represented among the political parties, many of which have their roots deep in the pre-independence era. In the time since independence, considerations of religion, language, and culture have largely displaced ideology as the issues around which multi-ethnic Sri Lanka's political life evolves. In the last decade, ethnic struggleand violencebetween the government, dominated by majority Sinhalese, and militant minority Tamil separatists has dominated the political process. The United National Party (UNP) was the main party of the independence movement, and its widely respected leader, D. S. Senanayake, as head of a coalition of which the UNP was the chief unit, became Ceylon's first prime minister after independence. He won a major victory in 1952 and continued in power until he died in 1956. The divided opposition failed to agree on a leader until 1951, when Solomon Bandaranaike left the UNP to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Over the years, the SLFP became the island's other major political party, advocatinglike the UNPa non-aligned foreign policy, with the UNP friendlier to the West, the SFLP, to the former Eastern bloc. Both find their support from within the majority Sinhalese community, and like most other parties, both are led mostly by high caste Sinhalese. Shortly before the 1956 elections, Bandaranaike formed the People's United Front (Mahajana Eksath PeramunaMEP), composed of his own SLFP, the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja (LSSP), and a group of independents. The MEP called for the extension of state control, termination of British base rights, nationalization of tea and rubber plantations, and a foreign policy of strict nonalignment. In the elections, the MEP won 51 seats, and Bandaranaike became

prime minister, holding power until September 1959 when he was assassinated by a Buddhist monk. In elections March 1960, the UNP won 50 of the 151 seats at stake, the SLFP, 46 seats, and other parties, the remaining 55. UNP leader Dudley Senanayake failed to muster a majority, and new elections were called for July. In this second round of polling, the UNP won a majority of the popular vote but only 30 seats. The SLFP, led by its slain leader's widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, won 75, and with her supporters on the left, she was able to form a government, becoming the first woman in the world to hold office as prime minister. She committed her government to pursuing continuation of her husband's agenda, including nationalization of enterprises. In the 15 years that followed, the UNP and the SLFP alternated in power for periods no longer than seven years. In 1965, Dudley Senanayake became prime minister after the UNP won 66 of the 151 legislative seats, but the SLFP's Sirimavo Bandaranaike was returned to power in the 1970 elections as the head of a coalition that included the Trotskyite LSSP and the pro-Soviet Ceylon Communist Party (CCP). In response to an insurrection fomented in 1971 by the Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna (JVP), a militant Sinhalese party in the south, Bandaranaike imposed a state of emergency on the island that lasted for 6 years. She pushed through a new constitution in 1972. By 1977, Banderanaike's public image had declined. No longer supported by her former coalition partners, she was humiliated at the polls by J. R. Jayewardene's UNP which was returned to power with 51% of the popular vote and 142 of (the then) 168 seats in parliament. The moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which had swept Tamil areas of the north and east, became the major opposition party in parliament with 16 seats and the SLFP representation in the house fell to a bare eight seats. Jayewardene's sweeping victory enabled him to fulfil the UNP's campaign pledge to introduce a French-style presidential system of government. Forsaking the now-eclipsed office of prime minister, he set out as president to use his new powers to open the economy and to make a new effort to reconcile with the increasingly disaffected Tamil minority. In the local elections and parliamentary by-elections of May 1983, the UNP strengthened its commanding position by gaining control of a majority of municipal and urban councils and winning 14 of 18 parliamentary seats contested. The CCP and two other leftist groups, the People's Liberation Front and the New Socialist Party, were banned in 1983 on charges of playing a role in the ethnic riots which swept the island in July; leaders of the Communist Party were subsequently arrested. In August 1983, TULF members of parliament, after several fruitless years of negotiations with Jayewardene aimed at devolving power to local levels, were confronted with a constitutional amendment aimed at them by the UNP's two-thirds majority that required all MP's to pledge their allegiance to a unitary state. They abandoned parliament, and by now most have been killed, as the leadership of the Tamil movement fell into the hands of those advocating violence and complete independence as the only sure ways to protect Tamil ethnicity. The TULF was decimated in parliamentary

elections in February 1989, which saw the emergence of several small Tamil parties with reputed ties to the rebels. In presidential elections held in December 1988, Prime Minister Premadasa beat the SLFP's Sirimavo Bandaranaike in a close race marred by ethnic violence. He was sworn in as Jayewardene's successor on 2 January 1989. In February, he led the UNP to a strong victory in parliamentary polling, capturing 125 of the 225 seats under a new proportional voting system; he then named Dingiri Wijetunga as prime minister. These elections also saw the debut of the United Socialist Alliance (USA), a new political grouping set up in 1987 and composed of the SLFP's former coalition partners on the far left, including the CCP, the LSSP, and the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP); the USA took 4 seats, while the SLFP won 67. In the summer of 1991, Premadasa beat back a sudden challenge to his position by leading members of his party in parliament, suspending the parliament for a month to delay debate on a motion they had filed to impeach him for abuse of his authority. But in a rising tide of violence and assassinations of governmental officials across the island, President Premadasa himself became a victim of a Tamil bomber on 1 May 1993. The Parliament unanimously elected Prime Minister Wijetunga as his successor on 7 May 1993. A "snap" election called six months early by President Wijetunga as part of his campaign for reelection himself in November 1994 backfired on 16 August 1994 when the voters rejected the UNP by a small margin. In its place, they elected to office a seven-party, leftist coalitionnow dubbed the People's Alliance (PA)led by the SLFP's Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratungamother and daughter, 80 and 49 years of age, respectively. More vigorous but less experienced, the younger Kumaratunga promptly became prime minister. The results of the elections, by seats won, were as follows: People's Alliance, 105; United National Party, 94; Eelam People's Democratic Party, 9; Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 7; Tamil United Liberation Front, 5; People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, 3; Sri Lankan Progressive Front, 1; and the Upcountry People's Front, 1. Kumaratunga won election on the promise of ending the civil war. Her offers of limited regional autonomy for Tamils within the Sri Lankan state were initially turned down by the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabakaran (most of the moderate Tamil leaders have been assassinated). Her attempts at a military solution were also unsuccessful until a cease-fire and peace talks emerged in 2002. Citing parliament's rejection of her proposals for strengthening the prime minister's powers and for granting regional autonomy to the Tamils, Kumaratunga called for presidential elections ahead of schedule in December 1999. The race between the president and her UNP rival, Ranil Wickremasinghe, was close. However, three days before polling, Kumaratunga was injured in an assassination attempt, bringing out a sympathy vote. She was returned to office with 51.1% of the votes compared to her opponent's 42.7%. In November 1994, presidential elections were held. UNP leader Gamini Dissanayake fell victim to the island's endemic violence and his widow Srima Dissanayake was appointed to run against the younger Kumaratunga. While the latter's political party won only a slim plurality and had to govern by coalition, in the presidential race

she won a commanding majority (63%36%) and, upon becoming president, appointed her mother prime minister. In the parliamentary elections held 7 December 2001, Wickremasinghe's United National Party took 109 seats, and united with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress's (SLMC) 5 seats to take control of parliament. Kumaratunga's People's Alliance coalition took 77 seats, and the People's United Liberation Front, uniting with the PA, took 16 seats. The Tamil United Liberation Front took 15 seats, the Eelam People's Democratic Party took 2 seats, and the Democratic People's Liberation Front secured 1 seat.

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 Political Parties in Sri Lanka:

 Political Summary of Sri Lanka:

The political framework of Sri Lanka operates within a presidential representative democratic republic. This consists of the President of Sri Lanka holding both the position of head of state and head of government (and of a multi-party system). Executive power is exercised by the government whereas legislative power is vested duly - within the government and parliament. Since decennia, the party system is dominated by the socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party and conservative United National Party. As illustrated within the Conflict section of this Wiki, the political differences between the SLFP and UNP are essentially political manifestations of cultural differences between the Sinhala and Tamil cultural majority and minorities respectively. Both the SLFP and UNP embrace democratic values, international nonalignment and encouragement of Sinhalese culture. Currently, past differences between both parties on foreign and economic policy have narrowed. Main differentiation is found through the UNP's embrace for a broader role for capitalism whereas the SLFP environ a broader role for the state. The President is elected under a six-year term and acts as head of state, head of government and commander in chief of the armed forces. However, the President may be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Parliament with the concurrence of the Supreme Court. Parliament consists of 225 members elected under a six-year term. Legislative session and/or the dissolution of Parliament may be done at any time by the President provided it has served for one year. Although Parliament reserves the power to make all laws, it has remained a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

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 Politics and Society in Sri Lanka:

Like other nations in the South Asia region, Sri Lanka has a diverse population. Various communities profess four of the world's major religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity. The major ethnic groups include not only the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils, who compose 74 and 12.6 percent of the population, respectively, but also Indian Tamils (5.5 percent of the population) who view themselves as separate from the Sri Lankan Tamils, as well as "Moors" or Muslims (7.1 percent), "Burghers" and other people of mixed European and Sri Lankan descent (0.4 percent), Malays (0.4 percent), and tiny percentages of others including the aboriginal Vedas, who are considered to be the island's original inhabitants. The society also possesses a caste system similar to that of India's. Caste in Sri Lanka is politically important for two reasons. First, members of the national political elite tend to be members of the higher status castes. Since independence the overwhelming majority of the prime ministers and the one president have been members of the Sinhalese Goyigama (cultivator) caste. Also, voters tend to support people of their own caste, though caste identification rarely becomes a campaign issue because electoral districts tend to be homogeneous in terms of caste and the major parties generally put up candidates of that caste. Among Sinhalese, there is also a historically significant distinction between people who live in the coastal and lowland areas and those who live in the mountainous central part of the island, the area that constituted the Kingdom of Kandy before its conquest by the British in the early nineteenth century. During the British colonial period and to a lesser extent in independent Sri Lanka, the two groups, which possess somewhat different cultures and ways of life, frequently perceived their interests to be divergent. During the 1920s, for example, the Kandyan National Assembly advocated a federal state in which the Kandyan community would be guaranteed regional autonomy. Apart from religion, ethnicity, and caste, there are social differences that emerged as a result of British colonialism. Despite a history of popular support for Marxist parties, especially the Trotskyite Ceylon Equal Society Party (Lanka SameSamara Party--LSSP), economically based classes in the European sense are poorly developed in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, well-defined elite groups, including families with planter, merchant, and professional backgrounds, continued to be important in the late 1980s despite the redistributive policies of recent governments. Marks of their special status included not only wealth but education in the island's most prestigious schools or overseas, fluency in English, and a higher degree of Westernization than among other Sri Lankans. In a 1985 survey of government party parliamentarians since 1970, political scientist Robert Oberst discovered not only that there was a disproportionate number of graduates of a handful of elite schools among UNP and SLFP legislators, but also that elite secondary school graduates were more likely to assume ministerial posts and play a central role in the passage of bills than nonlife school graduates. Nonlife graduates tended to be backbenchers with limited influence.

In a society as diverse as Sri Lanka's, social divisions have had a direct and weighty impact on politics. In the late 1980s, the ethnically, linguistically, and religiously based antagonism of the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils overshadowed all other social divisions: the civil war that resulted, especially since mid-1983, seemed to bode a permanent division of the country. Yet in the routine operation of day-to-day politics, allegiances based on family, caste, or region also continued to be of major importance. As in India, matters of religion, ethnicity, region, and language have become public rather than private issues. Persons have typically viewed personal advancement not only in terms of individual initiative but also in terms of the fortunes of their ethnic, caste, or religious community. In India, however, there are so many different groups, spread out over the country like a vast mosaic, that no single group has been strong enough to seriously destabilize the national-level political system. Dissident movements, such as the Sikh militants in the north western Indian state of Punjab have tended to be limited to a single region. India's ruling party, Congress (I), preserved national unity by forming electoral coalitions with disparate groups such as high-caste Hindus, Muslims, and untouchables and balancing them off against other groups loyal to opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, however, both the nature of diversity and the attitude of the government have been different. Within the island's much smaller geographical area, politics have become polarized because the politically prominent groups are few in number and clearly defined in terms of language, custom, religion, and geographical region. Successive governments moreover, have never attempted to adopt an impartial role in relation to ethnic rivalries. Concrete economic and social equity issues have played a major role in the ethnic antagonisms of Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils since independence. Ethnic rivalry, however, draws upon older and deeper roots. Each community views itself as possessing a unique and superior culture, based on religion, language, and race. The integrity of this culture is perceived to be threatened by the encroachments of the other group. Both Sinhalese and Tamils, occupying relatively well-defined geographical areas (the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Northern Province and parts of the Eastern Province, but with vulnerable enclaves in large cities; and the Sinhalese in the central and southern parts of the island), regard themselves as besieged minorities. The Sinhalese perceive themselves as the only group of "Aryans" and Buddhists in an overwhelmingly Dravidian and Hindu region (including the populous state of Tamil Nadu and other parts of southern India), while the Tamils see themselves as an endangered minority on the island itself. During the 1980s, this state of mutual paranoia sharpened the ethnic boundaries of both groups and intensified economic and social conflicts.

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Political System of Sri Lanka:

A political system is the complete set of institutions, political organizations, and interest groups, the relationships among those institutions, and the political norms and rules that govern their activities. Thus, it integrates the various parts of a society into a viable, functioning entity. It also influences the extent to which government intervenes in business and the way in which business is conducted both domestically and internationally. The ultimate test of any political system is its ability to hold a society together. Politics of Sri Lanka takes place in a framework of a presidential representative democratic republic, whereby the President of Sri Lanka is both head of state and head of government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and parliament. Since decennia the party system is dominated by the socialist Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the conservative United National Party. The Judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. The Politics of Sri Lanka reflect the historical and political differences between the two main ethnic groups, the majority Sinhala and the minority Tamils, who are concentrated in the north and east of the island. Constitutional development independence in 1948, Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, was a Commonwealth realm, with the monarch represented by the Governor General. The Parliament was bicameral, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. In 1971, the Senate was abolished, and the following year, Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka, and became a republic within the Commonwealth of Nations, with the last Governor General becoming the first President of Sri Lanka. Under the first republican Constitution, the unicameral legislature was known as the National State Assembly. In 1978, a new Constitution was adopted, which provided for an executive President, and the legislature was renamed Parliament. Political conditions Sri Lanka's two major political parties -- the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) -- embrace democratic values, international nonalignment, and encouragement of Sinhalese culture. Past differences between the two on foreign and economic policy have narrowed. Generally, the SLFP envisions a broader role for the state, and the UNP a broader role for capitalism. Sri Lanka has a multi-party democracy that enjoys surprising stability given the high levels of political violence, especially that which occurred under the UNP regime of 1977-1993. Recent elections have seen decreasing election violence between the SLFP and the UNP, compared to the period 1977-1994. Elections have been cleaner, without the rampant impersonation and vote-rigging which characterized the 1982 Presidential Election, the notorious Referendum of the same year, the Presidential Election of 1988 and the General Election of 1989.

The president (Mrs. C.B. Kumaratunaga, SLFP) dissolved the parliament in February 2004 after a two year term (though the parliament was elected for a six-year term.) The

election was held on 2 April 2004. The SLFP in alliance with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) secured the most seats by a single party but failed to achieve a majority. One of the ironies of the alliance was that the Presidents husband had in fact been assassinated by a member of the JVP. As a result of the alliance they lost the very first vote in parliament; that of appointment of the speaker. As a result the parliament did not pass a single bill from February to May. The President, directly elected for a six-year term, is head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. The election occurs under the Sri Lankan form of the contingent vote. Responsible to Parliament for the exercise of duties under the constitution and laws, the president may be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Parliament with the concurrence of the Supreme Court. The President appoints and heads a cabinet of ministers responsible to Parliament. The President's deputy is the prime minister, who leads the ruling party in Parliament. A parliamentary no-confidence vote requires dissolution of the cabinet and the appointment of a new one by the President. Legislative branch. The Parliament has 225 members, elected for a six year term, 196 members elected in multi-seat constituencies and 29 by proportional representation. The president may summon, suspend, or end a legislative session and dissolve Parliament. Parliament reserves the power to make all laws. The primary modification is that the party that receives the largest number of valid votes in each constituency gains a unique "bonus seat" (see Hickman, 1999). The president may summon, suspend, or end a legislative session and dissolve Parliament any time after it has served for one year. Parliament reserves the power to make all laws. Since its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has remained a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Parliament was dissolved on February 7, 2004 by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Elections were held on April 4 and the new Parliament convened on April 23 and elected Mahinda Rajapaksa as the Prime minister. Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected to the post of president on November 17 2005.

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 Political Ideology in Sri Lanka:

Political Ideology: A political ideology is the body of goals, theories, and aims that constitute a socio-political program (e.g., liberalism or conservatism). Pluralism indicates the coexistence of a variety of ideologies within a particular society. Although shared ideologies create bonds within and between countries, differing ideologies tend to split societies apart. The two extremes on the political spectrum are democracy and totalitarianis

Democracy: A democracy represents a political system in which citizens participate in the decision-making and governance process, either directly or through elected representatives. Contemporary democracies share the following characteristics: freedom of opinion, expression, press, religion, association and access to information; freedom to organize; free elections; an independent and fair court system; a nonpolitical bureaucracy and defence infrastructure; and citizen access to the decisionmaking process. The defining characteristic of democracy is freedom. Measures of political rights and civil liberties have been developed to assess levels of freedom; a country may be rated as free, partly free, or not free.

Totalitarianism: Totalitarianism represents a political system in which citizens seldom, if ever, participate in the decision-making and governance process; power is monopolized by a single agent and opposition is neither recognized nor tolerated. In theocratic totalitarianism, religious leaders are also the political leaders. In secular totalitarianism, the government maintains power through the authority of the state. Other variants of totalitarianism include authoritarianism and fascism.

Democracy in Sri Lanka:

General Election, April 8 2010: On April 8, Sri Lankans went to the polls to elect a new parliament. This was the first general election since the defeat of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in May 2009. It was the first general election in almost thirty years which effectively covered the whole nation. In terms of seats won it was a resounding victory for the governing coalition (main party the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) headed by President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The UPFA (United Peoples Freedom Alliance) are certain of 144 seats (some results are still awaited as I write); the main opposition coalition the UNF (United National Front) won 46 seats; the DNA (Democratic National Alliance) consisting of a rump of the Marxist JVP (Peoples Liberation Front) and supporters of retired general Sarath Fonseka won five seats. Fonseka himself won a seat in a Colombo ward. Presidential Election, January 26, 2010: The United National Front (UNF) which opposed incumbent president Rajapaksa was a motley crew of 18 parties. The UNF chose General Fonseka as their common candidate. The main parties in the UNF were the UNP (United National Party) a long-established party which had formed the first post-colonial government in 1948; the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Peoples Liberation Front), whose fanatical anti-western stance led to comparisons with Pol Pot just a couple of decades ago when they staged two bloody revolutions in pursuit of an extreme Marxist Sinhala nationalist agenda; the TNA (Tamil National Alliance), which had been the LTTEs proxy in parliament. The incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa won 60% of the vote. Fonseka and his supporters tried to put a positive spin on this saying that the general had only been in politics for 40 days compared to Rajapaksas 40 years but had gained 40% of the vote. There were accusations, mainly from the JVP element of the alliance, that the vote had been rigged through computer fraud. Veteran opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe graciously conceded that the vote was fair. There was election violence and misuse of government resources but most reasonable people would accept that Rajapaksa was undoubtedly the peoples choice. Fonsekas reputation is based on his part in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers but ironically he bested Rajapaksa in voting in the Tigers former strongholds in the north and east. Surprisingly, he lost in his own home territory of Ambalangoda.

Sarath Fonseka: Before the presidential election, rumors had been flying around about the possibility of a military coup. There were newspaper reports that India was on standby after hearing from the Sri Lankan government that a coup was imminent. India denied this. There was an attempted military coup in 1962 which was easily quashed. Lingering fears of a coup against the government led to major changes in Colombos security, with soldiers of the Sinha regiment, Fonsekas regiment, who were guarding sensitive installations being replaced by soldiers of the Gajaba regiment, the regiment of the new army commander, Lt General Jagath Jayasuriya. Fonsekas team that served at the Chief of Defence Staff office was disbanded and transferred around the country. After his defeat Fonseka was accused of plotting to overthrow the government and assassinate the president. He was arrested and fought the parliamentary election from custody in a naval base. The charges brought against him at a court martial did not include plotting a military coup. I am not a great fan of counterfactual history but I would speculate that military coup would have been highly likely if Fonseka had won the presidency. The coalition that promoted and supported his candidacy was so fragile that it would have fallen apart and he would find excuses for taking over. Serge Halimi wrote in the January issue of Le Monde diplomatique Political combat sometimes stresses personal antagonisms and obsessive antipathies too much. The need for an all-out attack on an opponent makes for diverse alliances motivated solely by the desire to destroy the common enemy. But once that enemy has been brought down, the problems begin. What next? To make political decisions, the grey areas which in opposition had made an alliance possible have to be dispelled, and that brings disenchantment. In this case the opponent was not brought down but disenchantment followed anyway. Mangala Samaraweera was a member of the current governing party, the SLFP, but became the opposition UNFs mastermind and kingmaker. He was the chief strategist instrumental in getting the SLFPs Mahinda Rajapaksa elected as president in 2005 and one of the crucial elements in his fixing was to win the support of the JVP. The former revolutionaries had re-invented themselves as a legitimate parliamentary party and joined a coalition with then President Chandrika Kumaratunga despite the fact that they had killed her husband. The current JVP strongly pressed for a military defeat of the Tamil Tigers. They made strange bedfellows in the UNF with the Tiger supporting-TNA. The JVP have always hated UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe for being too accommodating to the Tigers and for unleashing death squads upon their comrades in 1989. There are rumours that Ranil was directly involved in torturing JVP cadres. During the presidential campaign the JVP announced they would accept Ranils as caretaker prime minister if Fonseka won. Mangala decided the best strategy was to focus on concerns that many have about nepotism, corruption, human rights and media freedom. Fonseka is on a sticky wicket (cricket is the main adhesive factor in this fissiparous nation) mouthing platitudes about human rights and press freedom. Fonseka is certainly no Aung San Suu Kyi. He is inexperienced as a politician and his minders could not control what he said. The UNF carefully drafted Fonsekas resignation letter when he stepped down from his post as Chief of Defence Staff and released it to the world. He made substantive amendments to the draft and

released his own version. According to Kumar David in the Sunday Island newspaper, The alterations are all retrogressive, reactionary and militaristic; unwelcome by democrats and unacceptable to Tamils. In 1990, there were large-scale massacres of Tamil youths in the Amparai District which was under Fonsekas command. His hand was suspected in some attacks on journalists. Tamils, Muslims and Burghers have taken exception to derogatory remarks he made about minorities in October 2008. His accusations of corruption and nepotism against Rajapaksa were strongly countered. The president said no one could even open a wayside eatery without the Rajapaksas being accusing of buying it. The Asian Tribune alleges that Fonsekas son-in-law living in the USA became a multi-millionaire because of the war and had used his family connections to submit false evidence to win tenders with the Sri Lankan security forces. The Tribune alleges a few Generals and others got involved in the deals under the instruction of Gen Fonseka and covered up the issue. The court martial charges relate to arms procurement and political activity while serving in the army. Fonseka called for a Freedom of Information Act and a parliamentary bill to ensure the safety of journalists. He was no champion of press freedom before becoming a candidate. In order to stop anti-democratic outbursts by army officers on state-run TV networks, the Defence Ministry ordered that armed forces commanders would require prior approval for media interviews. When Fonseka was army commander, a journalist paid the price for reporting a controversial and derogatory reference Fonseka made to South Indian politicians and activists during the final phase of the Eelam War IV. To avoid a possible diplomatic row over the irresponsible comment, the newspaper editor was removed from his post. Mangala also is not a convincing champion of press freedom. He was President Chandrika Kumaratungas media minister and in his dealings with the press employed her personal security personnel (the gang of underworld thugs with which she surrounded herself). The Sri Lanka Sunday Times described his activities when media minister as a witch hunt. One of the reasons Fonseka did not reach a high military rank earlier is that there were persistent rumours about his character, misconduct, bullying and arrogance. According to the Colombo grapevine (no-one has any secrets from domestic workers) he repeatedly threw food around when in a drunken rage and forced his staff to cook the whole lot again in the small hours of the morning. He was popular with the rank and file of the army but heartily detested by other officers. His personal courage and military acumen are much admired but his huge ego caused friction. In an interview with Business Today in December 2008 he said Wherever I served, in whatever capacity, I did my job. I never failed. There was a long-standing rivalry between Fonseka and Wasantha Karannagoda, then chief of the navy. Fonsekas difficult personality is said by some to have got in the way of organizing the campaign against the Tigers. Coordination should have been the task of former Air Force Chief and Chief of Defence Staff Donald Perera but Fonseka ignored Perera. Battle-hardened Brigadier Rajaguru remarked: If we go front there is Johnny

and if we fall back there is Fonny. Johnny refers to the LTTEs anti-personnel mines and Fonny is Fonseka. Former Navy Chief Admiral (Rtd) Wasantha Karannagoda has sent a letter of demand seeking Rs. 500 million from Fonseka for making a statement defamatory of him in an interview on December 24 in which Fonseka said that when Karannagoda was asked to leave office in 48 hours he had cried like a small child. The Asian Tribune published the contents of a pamphlet that has long been circulating in the army about sex scandals surrounding him throughout his army career. The pamphlet mentioned 71 scandals so far and published the names of some involved. Even the Sunday Leader which supported Fonseka during the presidential election took up this theme in its February 14 edition. Faraz Shauketaly wrote: Somawansa Amarasinghe (JVP leader) was almost eloquent in his description of what he termed the humiliation and degrading treatment meted out to the General. That is almost rich for a man who leads a party that has been acknowledged to be one that inflicted immense terror on an unsuspecting public not so long ago. Yet he speaks of the anguish of the Fonsekas. What thoughts did Somawansa Amarasinghe have for the female victim during the time in the mid 1970s when Sarath Fonseka was charged for conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman, in charge number 0/050/536? It is said that the victim to-date suffers acute mental trauma caused by that incident. Her suffering continues to this date despite those events taking place on Christmas Day 1975. The charge sheet referred to concern the rape of a domestic worker on 25 December 1975, at the Army Training centre in Diayatalawa. Fonseka was Severely Reprimanded by Colonel S.C. Ranatunga. According to the Asian Tribune Many women soldiers were molested. A case in point is of Nanda Menike. Sarath Fonseka repeatedly raped this woman solider and fathered two children. Before leaving the Army he arranged pension and other benefits to her. For further details see: The Asian Tribune links the allegations in the pamphlet with the misdeeds of other celebrity miscreants like Tiger Woods and Bill Clinton. The pamphlet vividly illustrates Fonsekas pattern of sexual behaviour and how he had used his authority for relationships with those who were subordinates and under his command. It is alleged that several members of the fair sex who served under him had immoral liaisons with him because of his power and thus he had abused his authority. As this is common knowledge, when he retired his request for female soldiers and officers to serve him were outright rejected by the government. The Asian Tribune alleges that he also fathered children by molesting several innocent Sinhala women soldiers who worked for him. United National Party: A number of actors and sports personalities made a bid for parliament in this election. One starlet was asked why she chose the UNP. She replied that UNP politicians had always been gentlemen. This may be surprising coming from someone so young. The UNP generally seems to have become the party of the elderly. There are certain elements of the middle class who will always support the UNP however inept they are. Its a class thing. They feel that the UNP is the guardian of values of the westernised elite, whereas Rajapaksa is somewhat arriviste (in fact, he comes from the southern squirearchy and his family has long been involved in politics in Hambantota where Leonard Woolf was a colonial magistrate). He wears national dress and is

more comfortable with Sinhala than English, (although he has made valiant attempts to speak in Tamil) which allows them to consider him uncouth. He dismissed western criticism by saying: Why should I listen to people who dont wash their bottoms? One of the kindest things said about Ranil Wickramesinghe in the wake of this general election is that he is personally hapless. Most of Ranils favourites were rejected by the voters. He gained 230,000 preferential votes himself in Colombo but former JVP man Wimal Weerawansa made good his promise to win more votes than the UNP leader (he got 280,000). Accusations of nepotism against the current regime ring somewhat hollow when one considers that Ranil is the nephew of former prime minister and president, JR Jayawardene and the UNP is often referred to as the Uncle Nephew Party. Ranil has led the UNP for 16 years with ever-diminishing success. It is a mystery how he has managed to hang on. What lawyer and columnist Gomin Dayasri calls the Colombans a westernized, public-school-educated, neo-con elite favour Ranil and still run the UNP. Ranils critics believe he is still listening to advice from his Royal college friends. Prolific columnist Malinda Seneveriratne wrote: The on-the-ground business of getting people from armchair to polling booth was neglectedThe UNP leadership has consistently pandered to interests that were anathema to the majority community. Many UNP MPs crossed over to the government as a result of inducements of ministerial jobs with attendant perks. UNP meetings are opportunities for abuse to be hurled at Ranil. It would be a farce if he ended up running the country. Chief critic Johnson Fernando crossed over to the government and got a ministerial post. He was handsomely elected in a new constituency under the UPFA banner. The voters see Rajapaksa as the man who had the courage and firmness to press ahead until a military victory over the Tigers was certain. Ranil is the man who, when he was prime minister, agreed to a humiliating cease-fire which allowed the Tigers to regroup and re-arm, the man who know-towed to foreign interference by Norwegian peacemakers and compromised the nations sovereignty. Even when victory over the Tigers was nigh, Wickremesinghe was seen to be curmudgeonly about the governments achievements and passive in the face of international pressure to let the terrorists off the hook. Monaragala is the next district to where I live. By most measures it is agreed to be the poorest district in Sri Lanka. In spite of that there is still some residual support for the UNP. After some jiggery-pokery involving Tippex and the approved list of UNP candidates, Ranil personally took over the local campaign and instructed Monaragala not to vote for RM Bandara. Ranil was ignored and Bandara was duly elected. In the aftermath of a humiliating defeat Ranil announced: I am not resigning from the leadership. There is no reason for me to do so. We know from sources that people still have faith in me as leader. I feel no pressure to give up the post. Sources means a tight circle of privileged people out of touch with the rural masses.

JVP: Every year on April 5, the JVP marks the death anniversary of their leader Rohan Wijiweera who was killed by government forces in 1971. This year no-one turned up. JVP activists are unhappy and giving up politics and even leaving the country. The JVP recovered from the defeat by torture and death squad in 1989 to become a constitutional party that earned respect in many quarters for its grass-roots approach to the problems encountered by ordinary Sinhalese. It was seen as a party free of corruption. The decision to withdraw support from the Rajapaksa government and ally itself with an opposition focused on General Fonseka has cost it dear. In the previous parliament it had 39 seats. It now has three. The DNA was dominated by the old JVP and did badly. Signing up with Fonseka was their ruination and they lost their solid bases in Tissamarahama, Matara and Hambantota. The eleven JVPers who stuck to the alliance with the UPFA as the new NFF did better. NFF leader Wimal Weerawansa topped the Colombo list with 280,000 votes, beating UNP leader Ranil Wickramesinghe.

Minorities: Since 1947, there has been satisfactory representation for Muslims and Tamils in Colombo. Now there is only one Muslim member for Colombo. AHM Fowzie, UPFA member and petroleum minister who distinguished himself for inefficiency and alleged involvement in corrupt hedging deals, is the only Muslim member for Colombo. There are no UNP Muslim members for Colombo. The Tamil National Alliance has transformed itself into ITKA (Illanka Tamil Arasu Katchi) and won only 15 seats, compared with the TNAs 22. The UPFA won Nuwara Eliya, with its large population of plantation Tamils, from the UNF and the district now has seven Tamil MPs. Another district with a large population of plantation Tamils, Badulla, (where I live) did not elect a single Tamil MP. There was only one Tamil on the UNP list in Colombo- Prabha Ganesan. The UNP tried to woo the minorities but failed abysmally. Mano Ganesan, Prabhas brother, who allied his PDF party with Fonseka in the presidential election, lost his seat. There are signs that the dominant UPFA will become a national party with serious clout in the Tamil-majority areas of the north and east and that the TNA (ITAK) will decline without the muscle of the LTTE. The UPFA will probably extend its influence in the north through its ability to fund development and provide jobs and patronage. ITAK support will probably decline still further. I am sorry to be including women under the heading of minorities but that does seem to be how they are treated. Although women may indeed be a majority of the population they only gained ten seats. One of those elected was Rosy Sennanayake for the UNP. She was Miss World in 1985 and has been a Sri Lankan ambassador. Nepal has followed ground-breaking policies to ensure

that at least 33% of its legislature is female and India is to follow suit. Sri Lanka should give it a try. Low Turnout: Some have sought to question the validity of the governments mandate by pointing to the low turnout. There were a record number of candidates but voting itself was at a record low which indicates that the politicians were more interested than the electorate who will have to pay them. Sri Lanka has usually boasted a healthy turnout compared to most democracies around 75%. Even during the grisly times of the 1989 uprising when the JVP were killing people who tried to vote, the turnout was 63%. This time it was around 50% (still better than EU elections). In the north it was a mere 23%. In the Sunday Leader, Tisaranee Gunasekera wrote: Such a sense of cynicism and disassociation indicate a growing public perception of politics as a cornucopia for politicians and a burden to the general population. Some have blamed the apathy of the electorate on the impotence of the opposition the voters were happy enough with the government but it was futile for them to endorse the ruling party yet again and certainly no point in going out of the house to vote for the useless morons opposing the government. Certainly, there must have been an element of election fatigue. Taking a relaxed breath after the end of thirty years of war the people were immediately subjected to provincial elections. Soon after getting an early presidential election out of the way they have to roll up for a parliamentary election. Perhaps the public mood is echoing WC Fields response when told he cannot get a drink because it is Election Day: Thats carrying democracy too far. The low turnout was in the absence of terrorism and also the absence of the kind of violence that is common in elections here. There were far fewer casualties than in the presidential election. Most of the violence that did occur was of an intra-party nature with candidates of the same party fighting over the pecking order on the preferential lists, with old-stagers being resentful of young hopefuls. In my home territory of Badulla there was a pitched battle between rival representatives of plantation Tamils. UNP Range Bandara was hospitalized with serious injuries after being attacked by a gang of supporters of a rival UNP candidate, Shanta Abeysekera. The expectation of violence may have been off-putting to the voter even if it did not materialize. The timing of the election may have been a factor. Coming just before the Tamil and Sinhala New Year the shops were full while the polling booths were empty. Many people work far away from the areas in which they are registered to vote and they were unwilling to spend on fares to get home and back for the election and for the New Year. The voters may have decided that the election was issue-less. There are many important issues facing the country for the future but they were not being addressed during the campaign. The Sunday Leader editorial said: One chapter of the countrys history is now closed the flickering light of democracy has gone out. The ailing opposition, the clapped-out General, the

toothless UNP, will never be able to restore the peoples right to democracy. Instead, if it is ever to return it will have to take hold again in the hearts and minds of the people. Voters Verdict: Are the voters mindless morons to be manipulated by the politicians? Well, nine cabinet ministers were given their marching orders by the voters. Foreign minister Rohitha Bogallagama was booted out. The voters did not like Boggless arrogance and spendthrift ways and told him so. Boggles had crossed over from the UNP to the UPFA in search of preferment and perks and foreign travel. Another crossover, Minister of Justice Milinda Moragoda, lost his seat. Lakbima News said: This arch charlatan who had the audacity to pose as a decent politician after being found guilty by a court of engineering divestitures of cash-cow public enterprises for a song to private entities was a sophisticated con-man who was given the justice department when the Attorney General should have been investigating his own conduct. On the other hand, some dubious characters have been surprisingly endorsed by the electorate. Raisa Wickrematunge wrote in the Sunday Leader: From clandestine drug barons to outright thugs they are all there. The law-breakers will now lay out the law if the land. She listed a number of actress-abductors, passport forgers, thugs, renters and ball-squeezers. Mervyn Silva is a national treasure in Sri Lanka, popularly known as Mervyn the Vermin or Merve the Perve. He was Minister of Labour in the previous administration although he had not been elected. He was in parliament on the National List. This was intended to allow intellectuals into the legislature but has in practice been a way of getting cronies into the chamber. He calls himself Dr. But there is no evidence of an academic or medical career. He was involved in an ugly incident at a TV station when he did not like the way they were portraying him. His son, Malaka, bleached blond, muscle-bound, and tattooed, was involved in an incident at Colombos Irish pub, Clancys. The bouncers frisked him and told him he could not come in with his hand gun. The next night he returned accompanied by government SUVs and three-wheelers full of men with firearms, clubs and knives. Some say daddy was along for the ride. The mob trashed the club, Sopranos, next door to Clancys and went through the place stealing mobile phones from customers. Mervyn himself was proud to boast to President Chandrika Kumaratunga that he had squeezed the balls of a monk MP so hard that the man had to be hospitalized. Mervyn was elected by 151,085 of the people of Gampahas. Dynasty: Many have expressed concern that the Rajapaksa family are setting up a dictatorial dynasty. In the monthly magazine, Montage, Frederica Jansz wrote before the presidential election: Almost four years in the Presidency has made Rajapaksa believe that he is God or more likely that he is King. there is certainly evidence of a personality cult of Albanian Communist proportions. It is difficult to escape images of the president. In a park in Colombo there was a cut-out 100 feet high of Rajapaksa striding purposefully somewhere or other? Near where I live (which used to be UNP territory) large holes have been punched out of the face and groin area of these billboards. During the presidential campaign, one picture of Fonseka appeared occasionally it is perhaps unfortunate that he was in full military fig. For the general election pictures of

Fonseka behind prison bars were favoured. My representative of the voice of the people, Upali the driver, gestured with scorn at rare pictures of Ranil and Mangala: girl boys, he snorted. No children. Fonseka was once a hero for Upali. Now he points at Fonsekas posters and says: Very bad man. If president Sri Lanka finished. If Fonseka was president no doubt his family would be occupying positions of power just like the Rajapaksas and the Bandaranaikes. Fonseka and Mangala Samaraweera fought their campaigns mainly on the basis of their personal animosity towards Rajapaksa and his extensive family. It is true that the president has gathered much power to himself and his unelected brother Gotabhaya wields great influence as defence minister. Another previously unelected brother, Basil is important to the project as a strategist and adviser. A third brother Chamal is a government minister. The presidents nephew, Shashindran, was convincingly elected chief minister of Uva province. While this may be a matter of concern to commentators, it does not seem to trouble the voters. Mahinda Rajapaksa got 60% of the vote in the presidential election. In the general election, Basil got an astounding 425,861 preference votes. Three Rajapaksas were elected in Hambantota district: Mahindas son Namal got 147,566, elder brother Chamal 79,648 and cousin Nirupama 39,025. When I encountered Mahinda Rajapaksa at the Nuwara Eliya flower show in 2003, there was no indication that he had the capacity to establish a dictatorial dynasty. He had been a respected human rights lawyer from a political family in the Hambantota area. When i saw him, he was prime minister but had little power because he was side lined by the president Chandrika Kumaratunga who, from her lofty position as a member of the Bandaranaike dynasty, regarded him as a provincial upstart. (She worked against him in the 2010 election.) I was surprised on that day how little security he had. He did not gain the presidency easily but now has reached a position where the nation is transformed in his image. This has happened because he has played a canny political game but mainly because, whatever their personal feelings about him might be, people of all ages, classes, religious or ethnic groups are grateful to him because children can travel safely to school and one can shop without fear of being blown up. People living in the west might find it difficult to grasp just how great it feels that after thirty years of vicious war we have not experienced any terrorist incidents for over a year. Future of Democracy: The unassailability of the government and the ineptitude of the opposition is cause for concern for many but there has long been a body of opinion that dreams about strong government verging on dictatorship. One might hope that Rajapaksa success over the LTTE, his win over Fonseka and now his majority in parliament will allow a fresh start at exploiting the peace dividend. It is now a year since the LTTE was defeated. There are many issues to be addressed to develop the country and foster harmony to prevent further ethnic conflict.

Rajapaksa has promised to abolish the executive presidency, but so did his predecessor. It is not easy to do because a two-thirds vote in parliament is required for constitutional changes. This has generally been thought impossible under proportional representation but Rajapaksa has almost achieved the requisite number of seats and has shown his skill in the past at forging coalitions and inducing crossovers. He could gain the five or so members required. Would abolition of the executive presidency be such a good thing? Some suspect that Rajapaksa wants to abolish it because he cannot serve any more terms as president and is plotting a Putinesque ploy to become executive prime minister in perpetuity. Abolition has been the clarion call of the opposition including the UNP despite the fact that it was the UNPs JR Jayewardene who introduced it and used it in an anti-democratic manner. Those in favour of abolition believe that too much power is vested in the president with too little control by the elected parliament. However, government minister Professor GL Peiris argues that under the present proportional representation system strong government is impossible without the executive presidency. If there had been no executive presidency the war certainly could not have been won. If there had been no executive presidency but a parliament composed of fractured political groups, then there would not have been a leadership to successfully direct the military operation. Peiris extrapolates this to other fields and says a reformed executive presidency has a better chance of achieving economic development than parliament. There has been a lot of frustration over the huge size of the cabinet which has been seen as costly and inefficient, with duplication of work, poor co-ordination of policy and overweening and incompetent ministers milking the taxpayer for their perks. Rajapaksa has promised to reduce the cabinet from over a hundred to 30 ministers. His previous administration did not have a secure parliamentary majority and had terrible struggles to even get budgets through parliament in order to fight the war. Rajapaksa became adept at forging alliances and inducing opposition MPs to join him. This was costly as the turncoats expected to be rewarded with the fruits of office. This was a strategy devised by brother. Basil and has been called Basilisation. The recent election result ensures a solid majority so few crossovers need to be induced. In order to prevent further separatist revolt it is seen to be important to ensure devolution of power to Tamil dominated areas. The 13th amendment to the constitution has been seen as the way forward on this but it has been in abeyance for some time. It was imposed by India and India is still promoting it. Not everyone, Tamil or Sinhalese agrees that it is the panacea. The 17th amendment provides safeguards for human rights and curbs on police powers. Linked in with this are concerns about press freedom and corruption. There are plans to retire elderly civil servants and streamline government departments.

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 Political Stability in Sri Lanka:

President Rajapaksa was re-elected to a second six year in term January by a sizeable majority. In April the ruling party united peoples freedom alliance won the parliamentary elections but fell just short of a two-third majority required for constitutional amendments. In September the constitution was changed to strengthen the presidents power including removing the presidential term limit, granting the president immunity and giving him final authority overall appointment to the civil service, the judiciary and police. However there has been some political unrest related to imprisonment of general fonseka with thousands protesting in Colombo in early Octomber to demand the release of the ex-army chief and the leader of the opposition. With the dawn of peace and political stability, Sri Lanka has become one of the most attractive investment centres in the world, External Affairs Minister Professor G. L. Peiris said. Addressing a meeting of the leading United States business magnates held at the Helmsley Hotel, New York, he said there are ample investment opportunities in the fields of industry, tourism, fisheries, infrastructure facilities and agriculture in Sri Lanka as never before and he requested the business magnates to reap maximum benefits out of these opportunities. This business meeting was organized jointly by Sri Lanka Embassy in Washington and Sri Lanka - United States Business Forum amid the 65th Session of the United Nations. The business forum was held with the participation of Secretary to the President Lalith Weeratunga and Minister Peiris. The key note address was delivered by the Minister. Minister Peiris said those who propose to invest in Sri Lanka can reap many economic and trade benefits through trade agreements signed between Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan. The Minister also said that the Sri Lanka Board of Investment, while providing service facilities to investors, is ready to offer attractive incentive allowances and tax relief. A number of major companies in the world, he said, have already come forward to invest in tourism, industries, services and infrastructure fields and he extended an open invitation to the business magnates who were present to come forward to invest in Sri Lanka.

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Trends in Political System:

Several factors have powered the democratization of the world. First, many totalitarian regimes failed to improve the economic lives of their citizens, who eventually challenged the right of the state to govern. Second, vastly improved communications technology weakened the ability of regimes to control peoples access to information. Third, many people who champion democracy truly believe that greater political freedom leads to economic freedom and higher standards of living. Although the world is experiencing general movements towards democracy and more open economies, this does not necessarily indicate an increasing homogenization of political systems. Not all nations embrace the concept of "democracy" as defined by Western standards.

Post-Independence Politics: Sri Lankan politics since independence have been strongly democratic. Two major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), have generally alternated rule. The UNP ruled first from 1948-56 under three Prime Ministers--D.S. Senanayake, his son Dudley, and Sir John Kotelawala. The SLFP ruled from 1956-65, with a short hiatus in 1960, first under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and then, after his assassination in 1959, under his widow, Sirimavo, the world's first female chief executive in modern times. Dudley Senanayake and the UNP returned to power in 1965.

In 1970, Mrs. Bandaranaike again assumed the premiership. A year later, an insurrection by follsowers of the Maoist "JanathaVimukthiPeramuna" (JVP, or "People's Liberation Front") broke out. The SLFP government suppressed the revolt and declared a state of emergency that lasted 6 years. In 1972, Mrs. Bandaranaike's government introduced a new constitution, which changed the country's name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, declared it a republic, made protection of Buddhism a constitutional principle, and created a weak president appointed by the prime minister. Its economic policies during this period were highly socialist and included the nationalization of large tea and rubber plantations and other private industries. The UNP, under J.R. Jayewardene, returned to power in 1977. The Jayewardene government opened the economy and, in 1978, introduced a new constitution based on the French model, a key element of which was the creation of a strong executive presidency. J.R. Jayewardene was elected President by Parliament in 1978 and by nationwide election in 1982. In 1982, a national referendum extended the life of Parliament another 6 years. The UNP's RanasinghePremadasa, Prime Minister in the Jayewardene government, narrowly defeated Mrs. Bandaranaike (SLFP) in the 1988 presidential elections. The UNP also won an absolute majority in the 1989 parliamentary elections. Mr.Premadasa was assassinated on May 1, 1993 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE" or "Tigers"), and was replaced by then-Prime Minister Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, who appointed RanilWickremasinghe Prime Minister. The SLFP, the main party in the People's Alliance (PA) coalition, returned to power in 1994 for the first time in 17 years. The PA won a plurality in the August 1994 parliamentary elections and formed a coalition government with Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Kumaratunga later won the November 1994 presidential elections and appointed her mother (former Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike) to replace her as Prime Minister. President Kumaratunga won re-election to another 6-year term in December 1999. In August 2000, Mrs Bandaranaike resigned as Prime Minister for health reasons, and RatnasiriWickramanayake was appointed to take her place. In December 2001, the UNP assumed power, led by Prime Minister RanilWickremasinghe. Chandrika Kumaratunga remained as President. In November of 2003, President Kumaratunga suddenly took control of three key ministries, triggering a serious cohabitation crisis. In January 2004, the SLFP and the JVP formed a political grouping known as the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA). In February, President Kumaratunga dissolved Parliament and called for fresh elections. In these elections, which took place in April 2004, the UPFA received 45% of the vote, with the UNP receiving 37% of the vote. While it did not win enough seats to command a majority in Parliament, the UPFA was able to form a government and appoint a cabinet headed by Prime Minister Mahinda

Rajapaksa. The JVP later broke with the SLFP and left the government, but has often supported it from outside. Presidential elections were held in November 2005, with Mahinda Rajapaksa becoming President, and RatnasiriWickramanayake becoming Prime Minister. President Rajapaksa stood for re-election 2 years before the end of his term, in January 2010, and was reelected by a margin of 18% over the opposition candidate, retired Army General SarathFonseka. The presidential elections were soon followed by a large victory for Rajapaksas UPFA coalition in April 2010 parliamentary elections, where it captured 144 out of 225 seats possible, just shy of a two-thirds majority. The remaining parliamentary seats were secured by the United National Front (60), the Tamil National Alliance (14), and the Democratic National Alliance (7).

Emerging Trends after the Presidential Election

Elections always leave their footprints to indicate emerging political and social trends of nations. The just concluded presidential election in Sri Lanka is no exception to this. The election has proved the limitations of poll forecasts. Even where these are done by unbiased agencies, the impact of swing factor in voting preferences affects the accuracy of forecasts. President Mahinda Rajapaksa had always remained the favourite at least among non-Tamil voters. As expected, he swept through some of the traditional opposition strongholds with high margins; this would indicate his lead was beyond the impact of any swing factor. Otherwise he would not have captured 17 of the 22 electoral districts. The popular vote for the President is perhaps in recognition of his leadership role in ending the 26-year old Tamil insurgency. Probably for the same reason 40.2 per cent of the voters (4,173,185) preferred General SarathFonseka, a political novice. It would be reasonable to place relative popularity of the two candidates on this count at 6:4 in favour of Rajapaksa. During the six months of peace after the war ended, President Rajapaksa could not clean up his administration and improve governance which came under severe criticism during the war. Presumably, the voting public were ready to overlook these aberrations and vote for another term of Rajapaksas rule because the General, supported by a jerry-built coalition, could not win their confidence in his political avatar. If we go merely by numbers, General Fonseka supported by both the UNP and the JVP, secured less votes than the UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe when he contested the last presidential poll without the JVP support. But if we go by the dismal performance of the opposition parties and strong showing of the ruling UPFA in the provincial council elections held before the presidential poll, for a beginner the Generals performance was commendable. Thanks to him, both the opposition parties also probably managed to save their face by putting him up as a common opposition candidate. Otherwise, either of the parties might not have matched General Fonsekas score.

However, in the north and east where the Tamils are in substantial numbers, votes polled were in favour of General Fonseka. Similarly electorates like NuwaraEliya, where plantation Tamils are in large numbers, preferred General Fonseka. The Generals Tamil votes were probably more in appreciation of his recognition of Tamil grievances than any other issue. The runaway victory of Rajapaksa shows the ruling coalition as of now could win a majority in the parliamentary poll. So if Tamils really want to improve the situation they will have to carefully plan their strategy in supporting either of the coalitions. It is going to be a hard choice between pragmatism and emotions. In the Tamil dominant Northern Provinces barely 20 percent of the eligible voters polled. The displacement of population due to the war, fear of revenge killings, and Tamil apathy to the election in which two architects of the Eelam War were fighting each other, probably reduced the voter turnout. In future elections in the north, we might not see more than 30 per cent voting unless the voters lists are updated taking into consideration internal and external migration of Tamil population. The election in the north and east has shown the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which supported Fonseka, continues to retain its influence over loyal section of Tamils voters. On the other hand Rajapaksas votes, particularly in the north, probably represent the limited influence of two Tamil parties Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) that had supported him. Similarly, the influence of Tamil MakkalVidutahaliPulikal (TMVP) led by Pillaiyan in the east could be ephemeral during the parliamentary poll. The election has exposed the limited reach of SLFP and the UNP among Tamils. They will have to work hard to make inroads into Tamil strongholds in the north. It is doubtful whether either party would gain any advantage by migration of Tamil parties leaders to the party ranks. So we can expect the Tamil parties to continue their piggy back ride on them in the parliamentary poll also. The TNA will face a big challenge in handling the pulls and pressures of parliamentary poll alliances. It has hardly any time to consolidate its position at the grass roots. It will also face more dissent in making hard choices. The marriage of convenience between the UNP and the JVP for the presidential election would be under serious threat as the parliamentary poll nears. There are more chances of it coming undone. This is going to make the options of TNA even more difficult. Muslim votes continue to be divided between the two main political coalitions. Probably the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) support was useful in helping Fonseka coming on top in the east. Whether it could do so when the opposition is not united in the parliamentary poll remains an open question. The election has demonstrated the Sinhala- Tamil divide as a hardy perennial in Sri Lanka politics. This cannot be wished away by homilies. With the parliamentary poll around the corner, President Rajapaksa will have to create a sense of trust and security among Tamil population by

positive action, particularly as he has been elected by massive Sinhala votes. Presumably this is what prompted the President immediately after the election to talk about his intention to meet Tamil aspirations (including constitutional amendment). However, four aspects of government conduct during and after the election are disturbing. These are: the personalisation of politics, witch hunting within the government including army, muzzling of free press and disregard for electoral rules of conduct. It was personalised politics that induced the psychological warfare against General Fonseka and key opposition leaders like Mangala Samaraweera. It started with hundreds of armed soldiers and policemen surrounding the hotel in which the General and his family, along with some political leaders were staying. The siege for nearly the whole day was show strength to buttress claims of Fonseka plotting a coup or to assassinate President Rajapaksa. It had its impact with the General in turn talking of a government plot to kill him. It did not end there. The humiliation of the General who led the army to victory six months back continued with a raid on his office and 15 retired army men of his staff were arrested for alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Rajapaksa and his family. The high drama is sure to have sent a clear warning to the opposition leaders not to take those in power lightly. This unhealthy trend could continue during the run up to the parliamentary poll. There had been strong allegations of interference of ministers and government officials in the poll process. There had also been a number of violations of Election Commissioners orders including armed violence, intimidation and misuse of government media during the campaign period. In one such instance Dr.JayalathJayawardena MP belonging to the UNP has accused the supporters of Deputy Civil Aviation Minister SarathGunaratne of trying to chase him and other UNP members away from the counting centre to create the necessary environment to rig the Presidential poll. After the election, the government has systematically tried to single out those considered as opposition supporters and take action against them. It has carried out the biggest ever purge in the military sacking those considered a direct threat to national security. According to media reports 14 military officers including five Major Generals have been issued letters of compulsory retirement. This witch hunt sets a political precedent that could create schism within the armed forces affecting its efficiency and morale in the long term. Media that had supported the General are also facing the flak. The editor of Lanka, a pro-JVP paper was arrested. The visa of a Swiss reporter, who asked a slightly embarrassing question at a press conference, was withdrawn till the President rescinded the order. The office of the website Lanka e news was sealed to prevent airing of critical comments. These are only a few of such incidents of threat to the media. As expected, these actions have drawn adverse international attention. Both the U.S. and the European Union have urged the Sri Lankan authorities to investigate reports of "irregularities" during the countrys recent election and ensure the safety of the defeated opponent. Leaders of opposition and civil society have also expressed their serious concerns.

But in the past the government has shown little concern or sincerity in handling complaints of governance and lawless conduct. The ruling coalition and the government have to change their style and create a peaceful environment for conducting the parliamentary poll by their actions. Unless they do this, the credibility of the poll and its conduct could become suspect.

Mega Trends 2010 The year 2009 had been a remarkable year of achievement for Sri Lanka. By May 2009 President Mahinda Rajapaksa managed to lead the country to eliminate the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Tigers (LTTE) founder leader Prabhakaran its entire leadership. But significantly, he failed to carry the nation as a united entity to handle post war problems of economic woes of the poor, human rights and humanitarian aberrations and ethnic distrust. So it was a dismal ending of a great year. Here is an assessment on three issues politics based on analysis of major events of 2009 to identify Sri Lankas major trends in 2010. Political Analysis: The remarkable year of 2009 ended in a sour note when the President allowed political expediency to take over and advanced the presidential poll by two years to January 26, 2010. When one of the chief architects of military victory General SarathFonseka challenged the presidents bid for a second term in office, the polity and people have been polarised. The nation is divided vertically when unity was the key to reap the dividends of peace. Thus we find the nation using irreplaceable resource of human endeavour on a political exercise instead of addressing vital national issues that have a strategic connotation on Sri Lankas future. The issues include kick starting the national economy to pay off war debts, upgrading human resources stunted during the war years, redress of historical grievances of minorities and rectifying human rights and humanitarian aberrations. The President is leading the race in the run up to the elections. However, General Fonseka, the common opposition candidate, is improving his competitiveness. He has revamped his campaign making a foray into Jaffna peninsula, a no-go area for any erstwhile army commander without escort for the last 25 years. Apparently Fonseka is determined to improve his trust quotient among Tamils which suspects his new found sympathy for Tamils plight. However, unless the former political ally of the LTTE The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) makes up its mind to support him he is unlikely to get no large scale Tamil support. With the government in power in a position to indirectly trade off favours, the TNA's much delayed decision may not be wholehearted even in the unlikely event of favouring Fonseka. Compared to the General, President Rajapaksa is better placed to win Tamil votes despite historical Tamil tilt towards the rival United National Party (UNP). Thus it would be reasonable to expect the President to win the mandate for a second term.

If that happens we can expect him to become even more assertive in the run up to the parliamentary poll. His aim would be to strengthen his coalition numbers in parliament as no single party by itself has a chance to get a absolute majority in the proportional representation system. So the year 2010 will probably see the deferring of contentious questions like abolition of executive presidency. Even with all good intentions, in the coming year we can expect no dramatic improvement in other hardy perennials human rights, Tamil autonomy, and enforcement of 13th and 17th amendments to the constitution. At best expect there would probably be cosmetic changes through a patchwork quilt of measures to buy time and space rather than paradigm changes because politically that would be more convenient.

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 Political Conditions in Sri Lanka:

Sri Lanka's two major political parties--the UNP and the SLFP--have historically embraced democratic values, international nonalignment, and encouragement of Sinhalese culture. However, the SLFP-led coalition government under President Rajapaksa, aided by emergency regulations, has consolidated political power in the executive and limited media freedom and the role of civil society in Sri Lankan politics. Sri Lanka has a multi-party democracy that enjoys considerable stability despite relatively high levels of political violence during its 26-year civil conflict. In May 2009, the government declared victory over the LTTE and the LTTEs longtime leader, VelupillaiPrabhakaran, was killed. The LTTEs terrorist activities had generally been aimed at destabilizing Sri Lanka politically, economically, and socially. Economic targets included the airport in July 2001, the Colombo World Trade Centre in October 1997, and the central bank in January 1996. In January 1998, the LTTE detonated a truck bomb in Kandy, damaging the Temple of the Tooth relic, the holiest Buddhist shrine in the country. After a lull following the 2002 ceasefire, LTTE-perpetrated terrorist bombings directed against politicians and civilian targets became more common in Colombo, Kandy, and elsewhere in the country. LTTE attacks on key political figures included the attempted assassinations of Social Affairs Minister Douglas Devananda in November 2007 and of Secretary of DefenseGothabayaRajapaksa in December 2006, the assassination of Army General Kulatunga in June 2006, the attempted assassination of Army Commander General Fonseka in April 2006, the assassination of Foreign Minister LakshmanKadirgamar in August 2005, the killing of the Industrial Development Minister by suicide bombing in June 2000, and the December 1999 attempted assassination of President Kumaratunga. The LTTE is also suspected of being behind the assassinations of two government ministers in early 2008. In the year following the defeat of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Government has faced widespread criticism on human rights issues. Shortly after his defeat in the January 2010 presidential election, retired Army General SarathFonseka was arrested and sequestered without facing formal charges. He eventually was charged with engaging in politics while still a serving military officer and corruption in military procurements and tried by two courts martial, which found him guilty in September 2010 and sentenced him to 30 months in prison and stripped him of his pension and all military honours. The Government of Sri Lanka received appeals from the international community that any action against the former Army general be pursued in accordance with Sri Lankan law and consistent with Sri Lankas political traditions, but many observers regarded Fonseka's prosecution and conviction as politically motivated. The Sri Lankan Government received praise for pardoning Tamil journalist J.S. Tissanayagam in May 2010, but concerns remain about the state of media freedom and the ability of Sri Lankans to express dissent against government policies and actions.

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Political Risk in Sri Lanka:

Political Risk: Political risk is the possibility that political decisions, events, or conditions will affect a country's business environment in ways that will cost investors some or all of the value of their investment or force them to accept lower than projected rates of return. Leading sources of political risk are: expropriation or nationalization, international war or civil strife, unilateral breach of contract, destructive government actions, harmful actions against people, and restrictions on the repatriation of profits, differing points of view, and discriminatory taxation policies. The following types of political risk range from the least to the most destructive.

1. Systemic Political Risk. Systemic political risk creates risks that affect all firms because of a change in public policy. However, such changes do not necessarily reduce potential profits. 2. Procedural Political Risk. Procedural political risk reflects the costs of getting things done because of such problems as government corruption, labor disputes, and/or a partisan judicial system.

3.

Distributive Political Risk. Distributive political risk reflects revisions in such items as tax codes, regulatory structure, and monetary policy imposed by governments in order to capture greater benefits from the activities of foreign firms. Catastrophic Political Risk. Catastrophic political risk includes those random political developments that adversely affect the operations of all firms in a country.

4.

Risk in Sri Lanka

In late August, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa lifted the strict wartime emergency laws that drew criticism from the West and India, saying peace since the end of civil war in 2009 made them unnecessary. End of the Emergency Sri Lanka, under pressure from Western nations and India, lifted laws that critics said were used to suppress political opponents, but the government said were necessary to finish off the Tamil Tigers. The United States and India are explicitly backing the island's main Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and pressurising Rajapaksa's government for reconciliation. TNA, a former Tamil Tiger political proxy emboldened by a July local poll victory, has threatened to pull out of reconciliation talks it says the government is not taking seriously. The government has accused the TNA of making unrealistic demands about the timeline for resolving a complex issue that has frustrated the nation for decades.

Rise Of the 'Grease Devils: A wave of panic over night time prowlers known as grease devils has set off bouts of vigilantism and clashes with security forces across Sri Lanka, many of them in areas populated by the Tamil or Muslim minorities. Five people including a police officer have been killed in more than 40 reported incidents, and the government has deployed the military in some areas, warning that anyone stoking the panic will be dealt with severely. Fonseka's Release: Though Fonseka is not an immediate political threat to Rajapaksa, the former general is still popular among many Sri Lankans for his outspoken criticism of the government. The U.S. had long called for Fonseka's release, calling him a political prisoner, while rights groups have accused both Fonseka and the president in shooting surrendering Tamil Tiger rebels in the final stage of the war. Fonseka is, however, capable of causing massive damage to Rajapaksas popularity, given that great numbers of Sri Lankans believe the former soldier could deliver in politics after helping to win the 25-year war. A politically savvy Rajapaksa has only remitted his sentence, ensuring Fonseka is unable to stand in an election in the next seven years. Undeterred by that, Fonseka has started public campaigns to meet his supporters, and discuss Rajapaksa's alleged policy lapses.

War Crimes, Rights Squeeze? In March, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution put forward by the United States urging the Sri Lanka government to implement the recommendations of an official Sri Lankan probe. That commission called for the prosecution of soldiers guilty of misconduct. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed in 2009 in the final months of Sri Lanka's 25-year civil war, a United Nations panel said last year, as government troops advanced on the ever-shrinking northern tip of the island controlled by Tamil forces fighting for an independent homeland. Washington wants to force Colombo to address allegations of war crimes as part of wider ethnopolitical reconciliation to forestall renewed conflict, while Sri Lanka wants more time to pursue its own domestic process. Rajapaksa's government says it is ready to implement selected recommendations, but not all of them. Adding to worries that the government is taking a heavy-handed approach to human rights, police shut down two anti-government news websites at the end of June, a move press groups said was intended to intimidate critics of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and which drew statements of concern from the U.S. and EU. The Tehran-Washington Oil Squeeze: Despite the tension with Washington, Sri Lanka has been given an extended waiver on imports of Iranian crude after it cut imports from Iran by up to 38 percent, switching to alternatives from Oman and Saudi Arabia. However, it will have to abide by certain conditions including further reducing imports during the six months to Dec. 31 if it wants the waiver to be extended. Oil Minister Susil Premajayantha has said Sri Lanka, which is dependent on crude imports, took steps to reduce Iran crude purchases during the first six months of 2012 to eight cargoes per year from 13, buying four cargoes from Oman and one from Saudi Aramco. He has also said the government will refurbish its onlydecades-old oil refinery to process oil from other origins. Last year, Sri Lanka imported 93 percent of its crude from Iran, so if a waiver is not agreed it could suffer badly from sanctions on Iran. The Rupee Question: In February, the central bank finally caved in to pressure from the International Monetary Fund and even inside the government, and stopped defending the rupee LKR= against depreciation. The central bank has said the rupee may stabilise around 130-131 to the dollar, lower than its earlier estimate of 125, but demand and supply will decide its value. Economists and currency dealers think the rupee should fall even further, and it is likely the bottom has not yet been hit. The currency touched a record low of 134.60 on June 28.

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