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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
BY ALMULA TRED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN EUROPEAN STUDIES
JUNE 2008
Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.
Prof. Dr.Mustafa Trke Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke Assoc. Prof. Dr. lhan Uzgel Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayegl Kibarolu (METU) (Ankara Univ.) (METU)
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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.
Signature
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ABSTRACT
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TOWARDS LEBANON: EXPANSION WITHOUT FURTHER ENLARGEMENT
Tredi, Almula Master of Science, Graduate School of Social Science Department of European Studies Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke
June 2008, 99 pages This thesis analyzes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards Lebanon. The thesis looks into early European initiatives to demonstrate growing EU ambitions towards the Mediterranean region. Lebanon is examined with its specificities in historic context and EUs sending troops to UNIFIL army after the July 2006 war. As the 2004 enlargement brought the EU closer to Lebanon, and as the EU tends to play a growing international role, particularly in the Mediterranean region, the EU saw the Israeli attack on Lebanon as an opportunity to increase its engagement in Lebanon, thereby increasing its influence in the region. The thesis argues that the ENP is the newest foreign policy tool both to answer the concerns of EU in the Mediterranean region and to raise the EUs profile in the region. Keywords: ENP, Lebanon, Action Plans, Taif Accord, UNIFIL.
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AVRUPA KOMULUK POL T KASI VE LBNAN: DAHA FAZLA GEN LEMEDEN YAYILMA
Tredi, Almula Yksek Lisans, Sosyal Bilimler Enstits, Avrupa almalar Blm Tez Yneticisi : Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke
Haziran 2008, 99 sayfa Bu tez, Lbnana ynelik Avrupa Komuluk Politikasn (AKP) incelemektedir. Tez, Akdeniz blgesine ynelik olarak artan AB isteklerini ortaya koymak amacyla, ilk Avrupa giriimlerini incelemektedir. Lbnan kendine zg tarihi koullar iinde aratrlmakta ve Haziran 2006 sava sonras ABnin UNIFIL ordusuna gnderdii asker, ABnin lkede etkisini arttrmaya ynelik bir eylemi olarak bir deerlendirilmektedir. AB, 2004 srailin genilemesiyle Lbnana daha lkeye yaklamakta ve uluslararas arenada ve zellikle Akdeniz blgesinde glenen rol oynama eilimindeyken, Lbnana saldrsn, mdahalesini kolaylatracak ve bu sayede blgede etkisini arttracak bir frsat olarak alglamaktadr. Tez, AKPyi ABnin, hem 2004 genilemesinden doan endielerine yant veren, hem de blgede varln glendiren en yeni d politika arac olarak ortaya koymaktadr. Anahtar Kelimeler: AKP, Lbnan, Eylem Planlar, Taif Anlamas, UNIFIL.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express her deepest gratitude to her supervisor Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research. The author would also like to thank her mother Belgin Tredi, father Bedri Tredi and her beautiful sister Asena for their encouragement under any circumstances.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PLAGIARISM.iii ABSTRACT................iv Z........v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS..viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.x CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION........1 2. THE EUS INITIATIVES TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION..............................................................................................................6 2.1. A Trade Oriented Initiative:GMP......6 2.2. Renovated Mediterranean Policy:RMP............................11 2.3. A Turning Point in Euro-Mediterranean Relations:EMP.13 2.4. Lessons Learnt For a New Policy, ENP...21 3. LEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN STRANGLEHOLD AND NASCENT EUROPEAN PRESSURE..23 3.1. Internal dynamics shaping the countrys profile..23 3.1.1. 3.1.2. A Pivotal Part of Constitution and the Lebanese Political System: Meaning of National Pact...23 Other Crucial Developments:Palestine Presence, 1975 Civil War and Taif Accord..27 3.2. Stranglehold of External Dynamics: Syria and Iran.35 3.3. Lebanon After Israels 2006 Intervention: Cycles of Instabilities41 3.4. The EUs involvement in the UNIFIL: Eager to demonstrate presence in Lebanon46 4. EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: THE ESSENCE OF THE ENP TOWARDS LEBANON ...............56 4.1. The Formation of European Neighbourhood Policy.56 4.1.1. The Main Operational Framework of the ENP: Action Plans62 viii
4.1.2. 4.2.
Alignment with EU Acquis by Enhanced Relations: Lebanon Action Plan..............64 Assessing the ENP Towards Lebanon...71
5.CONCLUSION...85 BIBLIOGRAPHY..90
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CFSP EC EEC EMP ENP ENPI ESDP ESSP EU FTA GDP GMP MEDA MEPP NATO Common Foreign and Security Policy European Community European Economic Community Euro-Mediterranean Partnership European Neighbourhood Policy European Neighbourhood and Partnership Initiative European Security and Defence Policy European Security Strategy Paper European Union Free Trade Area Gross Domestic Product Global Mediterranean Policy Mediterranean Economic Development Area Middle East Peace Process North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Palestine Liberation Organization Renovated Mediterranean Policy Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States United Nations United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United States of America
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union created such circumstances that international sytem lost its bipolar character and turned into a unipolar structure, thus the US emerged as the only hegemon disseminating Western values such as democracy, liberal economy and human rights as its own values to the whole world. This period also presented a historic opportunity to reintegrate Europe culturally, politically, and economically.1 In addition to the new international conjucture, some observers have cast around for a counter-hegemonic alternative and found the European Union.2 In fact, utilizing the opportunities of the new conjucture, the EU enlarged into Central and Eastern Europe and began to help neighbouring countries develop economically and democratically while promoting stability and security throughout the continent and fostering a genuinely pan-European integration. 3 As the EU differs in important respects from other international actors, its uniqueness emerges from its set-up and character of goals and values, configuration of political instruments used and its peculiar institutional construction.4 Besides the EU recognizes its global responsibilities, but accepts a greater burden only in its neighbourhood.5 This thesis examines that the EU, as an ambitious international actor, endeavours to enhance its efficacy and manipulate the immediate environment to its advantage with its latest foreign policy tool, the European Neigbourhood Policy (ENP).
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union:An Introduction to European Integration, (Macmillan:New York, 2005), p. 185.
2
Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The European Union As a Global Actor, (Routledge:London and New York, 2006), p. 223.
3
Ole Egstrm and Michael Smith, The European Unions Roles in International Politics:Concepts and Analysis, (Routledge:Oxford, 2006), p. 2.
5
Ibid., p. 52.
After the 2004 enlargement, approximating geographically to the EUs borders, the Mediterranean region and the EUs rising interest towards it will be analyzed through historical perspective. As the regions deep economic relations with Europe, colonial past, inherent unresolved conflicts, social unrest and poor economic conditions are believed to pose risks and threats to European security, they will be assessed with their overall impact on Europes Mediterranean perception. This perception seems inseparable from the European Security Strategy Paper (ESSP), the EUs declaration of global challenges and key threats emerged in the post cold-war environment. Whereas the Mediterranean carries such importance for the EU, what kind of strategies or policies did the EC/EU develop to involve concerning the region? How did historical events affect its concerns and interests? What did former initiatives towards Mediterranean teach the EC/EU to fill the gaps in its new policies ? Do these policies prove the increasing European interest? What is the importance of Venice Declaration of June 1980? In the second chapter, the EUs increasing interest towards the region will be analysed through the answers to these questions. To answer these questions and make sense of this long-term question, it is beneficial to observe the EUs interest through its continuities, transformations and tendencies over different historical periods. This thesis analyzes the ENP towards Lebanon while taking into account Lebanons complex society divided by different sects. Lebanon, as the main subject of this thesis, is chosen especially because of the fact that she presents a small portion of Middle Eastern states sample and is geographically situated in a strategic conjuncture where she is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea. Thus in terms of relations with the EU, Lebanon is a sensational country with its complex structure. Lebanon and its conflictual history is one of the most studied subjects. However most analyses are based on assumptions centering on its weak state structure and relations with Syria. Because of the EUs relatively weak structure and the US dominant power over the region, there is an important gap in studies on EC/EULebanon relations in general. After the 2004 enlargement approximating geographically to the EUs borders, Lebanon is regarded as a centre for destabilizing factors to the EUs security more so than before and in this context transforming it to a stable state and eliminating the sources of risk with the ENP tools emerge as an 2
important objective. In the present era, security relates not only to the military aspect but also to cultural, immigrational and economic factors that impinge on security. Moreover, as the stable neighbourhood is a necessity for Europes own security and 2004 enlargement brings Lebanon closer to EU, a conflictual Lebanon gains importance in this respect. What kind of destabilizing factors from Lebanon are expected for the EU, and what policies does the EU develop to manipulate or transform Lebanon to a secure state? When examining Lebanon, it is found beneficial to dwell upon the 2006 Israel attack which resulted in terrible loss of human life and massive physical destruction in Lebanon and how this event reflected on EU agenda. Since Europes wealth, stability and security depend to a considerable degree, on what is happening in neighbouring areas such as the Middle East, the 2006 Israel attack on Lebanon represents a challenge and an opportunity to which the EU gave an immediate and eager response under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In the context of extended meaning of security, what is the importance of the 2006 Israel attack on Lebanon? What was the reaction of the EU? Can this war be regarded as an opportunity to raise EUs profile and presence in the region? In the third chapter of the thesis, as a significant case in the region, Lebanon and its internal/external dynamics affecting the state structure will be analysed. When one examines Lebanons conflictual history, destabilizing factors emerge clearly and what Europe perceives as a threat to its security is well understood. To answer the above-mentioned questions, a historical perspective presenting todays difficulties in Lebanon will be conducted. The formation of the ENP and motives behind this initiative with diverging opinions of scholars will be presented in the fourth chapter. As different and more extensive than the early initiatives towards Mediterranean, the ENP and its expected objectives will be highlighted. Besides, the main operational framework of the ENP, the action plans in general and Lebanon action plan particularly will be examined. At present, the degree of the ENPs success is not clear. Moreover, it is not this thesis aim to measure or determine the success of the ENP. What is important for the thesis is to demonstrate the willingness of the EU to reshape its neighbourhood. Furthermore, action plans will be essential to present the ENPs agenda of
transforming neighbours. What do the action plans include? Do they reflect a rather ample dose of EU self-interest? In 2002, the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi offered to share everything but institutions aiming to extend to the neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union.6 As the EUs ability to exert influence over its neighbours is diminished since EU membership is not offered to partners, the EU, however, still aims to transform the immediate environment to its advantage, since the European Security Strategy Paper represents the importance of neighbouring areas stability for the EUs own security. As mentioned above, security relates not only to the military aspect but also to factors of culture, immigration and economy that impinge on security. Lebanon poses great potential risks to EUs security not only in political and military areas, but also in terms of immigration. Lebanon, also providing an appropriate case to create destabilizing factors with the 2006 Israel war, is one of the best countries to introduce the transformative agenda of ENP in the region. Moreover, through the fourth chapter, the question of whether action plans are representatives of the EUs external governance capability over the neighbours will be asked. Lebanon, one of the centres for illegal immigration especially after 2006 war, a hot-bed for terrorism and having both pro-Western and pro-Syrian inclinations inside will be investigated through the offers of the ENP. More than questioning the ENPs further success, the thesis aims to examine the EUs willingness for an extended role as a potential competitor in Lebanon with its newest foreign policy tool, the ENP. Is the ENP a substantiation of growing EU interest in the region? Furthermore, can it be regarded as a tool for further enhancing its relations with Lebanon in the long term? As 2006 Israel attack on Lebanon increased the importance of the EUs military engagement in the region, reshaping the countrys legislative and administrative structures in line with ENP action plans and actively engaging in military operations in line with European Security Strategy are woven together in a strong web of linkages.
A Wider Europe-A Proximity Policy As the Key to Stability, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the EC, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm (accessed on 12.06.2006)
Primary resources on the EU, its Mediterranean strategies, Lebanon and ENP were compiled during the preparation of the thesis. EU Council Presidency Conclusions, Commission Communications, Lebanon Action Plan and other relevant official EU declarations were widely used. Moreover, relevant literature such as books, articles, newspapers, and journals were all used as other resources. Because the thesis examines recent developments, it was extensively benefited from internet research.
CHAPTER 2 THE EUS INITIATIVES TOWARDS THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 2.1. A Trade-Oriented Initiative: Global Mediterranean Policy The Second World War and its aftermath caused dramatic effects not only on world politics but also on the European dominance in the Middle East where the US influence gradually began. However, as the US represented itself as the only de-facto power for preserving Western interests in the region, the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) emerged as an alternative opportunity for developing a peacefully business climate and economy as to developing Mediterranean countries. Encouraged by aspirant non-member Mediterranean countries, the EC actively began establishing external economic policy links with most of its Mediterranean nonmember neighbours during the 1960s. The resulting string of agreements were initially confined to trade: the EC provided unilateral free access to the European market for industrial goods and limited concessions for specific agricultural products originating from the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNC).7 This period consisted of partly arbitrary ad hoc responses to local trade problems, and reflected different economic and political interests of the EC members vis--vis Mediterranean countries. This initial generation of contractual links was further expanded in the 1970s to include economic and financial cooperation intended to back economic development and stimulate cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. In this sense, Lebanon and the European Community first established contractual relations in 1977 by signing a Co-operation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Lebanese Republic , which entered into force in November 1978.8
A Survey of Europes Mediterranean Policy, Dr. G. Vanhaeverbeke, Trans European Policy Studies Association, Brussels, March 1997, available at http://www.euromedseminars.org.mt/seminar02/papers/vanhaeverbeke.htm, (accessed on 3rd January 2008).
Generally speaking, the EC's relations with Mediterranean region followed a traditional pattern of combining trade concessions with financial cooperation and conventional aid arrangements. The rationale of the relations was not only rooted in economic but also in political considerations typical for the prevailing cold war preoccupations: every available policy instrument was also conceived as a way to neutralize Soviet influence in the area.9 Thus, Europe's relations with the Mediterranean region was designed as a mean to stabilize political regimes against possible Soviet infiltrations or take-overs. This seemed particularly to be the rationale behind ECs Mediterranean policies including signing the association agreements with Turkey and Greece in 1962-64. However relations between the EC and the Mediterranean non-member countries possessed a disorderly character, and the EC was criticized for following an incoherent approach to the region. Thus, the EC launched its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) at the Paris Summit of October 1972. The GMP aimed to promote closer trade and financial relations between the EU and non-member Mediterranean countries more systematically. In fact, the EC raised the GMP concept from the Association Clauses of the Treaty of Rome and it was quite naturally targeted at the peace between Israel and the Arab World. The Israeli-Arab conflict was indeed, seen to be at the heart of the new threat perception, which was no longer of a military but of an economic nature (energy security). Between 1974-78, Europe's Mediterranean policy was directed at quite a different security perception: the threat of the "oil" weapon", of oil supplies being cut off.10 The 1973 war and the subsequent Arab use of the oil weapon had heightened a deep sense of vulnerability, particularly as Europe depended for 80 per cent of its energy supplies on the region as compared to only 12 per cent for the United States.11 Besides this energy crisis, the fall of dictatorships in Portugal and Greece and death of Franco in Spain opened up the prospect of a further enlargement of the Community towards the south and therefore
8
Ibid. Ibid.
10
11
Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, (Routledge:London, 2004), p. 154.
turned the EECs Mediterranean policy into a policy addressed mainly to the Arab world.12 Actually, from its birth until 1972, the EC did not consider the Mediterranean to be a homogenous region and negotiated instead trade agreements with most of the riverain countries on a bilateral basis. However, the EC addressed the area for the first time as a region in 1972-1974, when it launched the GMP in 1972.13 It represented a crucial shift from the ECs bilateral relations with each country in the region to a multilateral approach in which the Mediterranean Basin is treated as a single region.14 The GMP was also used as instrumental to conduct relations with the EC and Mediterranean countries on the immigration basis. Although global may not have been the most appropriate label, the new approach nevertheless sought to address the Mediterranean more systematically. Regarding the initial period of Europe and Mediterranean relations, Federica Bicchi states: the EEC maintained highly differentiated bilateral relations with most of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. Agreements varied under all respects, ranging from the generous provisions granted to Greece and Turkey, in 1961 and 1963 respectively, to the limited trade agreements concluded with Egypt and Lebanon in 1972. However, in the early 1970s, the EC gradually came to adopt a more stringent definition of Mediterranean. It was codified in the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), which for the first time addressed all riverain countries as belonging to a single region, the Mediterranean. On the basis of the GMP, the EC negotiated a new generation of agreements including the same core provisions. From then onwards, in Eurospeak the Mediterranean was no longer a generic geographical expression. It indicated instead a specific group of countries, deemed to be roughly homogeneous among themselves and with which the EC had legally binding agreements. From the perspective of the EC/EU, a new region was born.15
12
Loukas Tsoukalis, The EEC and the Mediterranean: Is Global Policy a Misnomer?, International Affairs, Vol.53, No.3., July, 1977.
13
David M.Wood and Birol Yeilada, The Emerging European Union, Third Edition, (Pearson Longman: New York, 2004), p. 201.
15
14
As it is clear from Bicchis words, the GMP could be deemed successful when noting that it succeeded to create a new understanding of Europe, at least. The EC acknowledged the importance of economic development in the Mediterranean, from which the EC would also benefit,16 however trade provisions alone were not viewed as sufficient. The EC was decisive to protect its agricultural sector against outside competition, a decision which European farmers greatly enjoyed. Since industrial products of the non-member Mediterranean countries received easy access to EC markets while agricultural products were not included in the GMP because of CAP17, there was an unbalanced situation to the disadvantage of non-member Mediterranean countries. Wood and Yeilada added that even in industrial products, key exports of non-member Mediterranean countries-textiles, paper and paper products, machine tools, and cars- faced quota restrictions because the EC labeled these as sensitive industries that required Community protection.18 Beside its inadequacy in trade related issues, the GMP was criticized for putting all the Mediterranean non-members on the same ground and set the same limited agenda with all of them. Raffealla A.Del Sarto claimed that the GMP certainly aimed at increasing the ECs influence through the distrubution of trade privileges to trade dependent countries where the involvement of the superpowers low and added that this policy gave priority to European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries and the former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific clearly enjoying a higher advantage than the Mediterranean.19 Actually, all the remaining countries of the area had in the past been either directly colonised or brought under the sphere of influence of European countries. Daniel Enonnchong Egbe asserted in his thesis that the Treaty of Rome was instrumental in the formation of the GMP because it enabled EEC members to Mediterranean for
16
Raffaella A.Del Sarto, Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2006), p. 57.
17
Wood and Yeilada, op.cit., p. 203. Ibid. Del Sarto, op.cit., p. 57.
18
19
maintain close ties with former colonies in the aftermath of de-colonisation. 20 But during the times of the GMP, the area was politically and strategically dominated by the two-superpowers, as the former colonialists play a secondary role. This is a crucial factor reducing effectiveness of the GMP. Another factor affecting the GMPs success was the concessions for Mediterranean agricultural exports. When the Community further enlarged to its southern flank, it considerably reduced its requirements for some of the similar Mediterranean import products, thus harmed the trade balances of non-member Mediterranean countries. Loukas Tsoukalis stresses that the GMP is only about trade and aid. He underlined that the EEC started with rather unrealistic assumptions about the globality of its approach and the actual contents of its policy.21 In addition to Tsoukalis critics, Wood and Yeilada further commented that the economies of the EC and non-member Mediterranean countries were not yet sufficiently compatible to promote the desired level of trade.22 Conventional wisdom suggests that the question of migrant workers from nonmember Mediterranean countries were another problem remaining after the GMP. Actually, flow of workers reached its peak in 1980 and there were over 6 million guest workers
23
did not want to do, and their families in the EC. Being welcomed at one time before in the EC, migrant workers began to face serious problems after economic recessions in the EC. As a measure for these huge number of immigrant workers, governments of the member states adopted strict controls on the influx of guest workers and refugees. People of member states began to get restless with these growing number foreigners and militant right-wing extremists in the recipient countries began to attack these workers and their families, causing many deaths and injuries. Despite roundly made critics, it is clear that from the beginning both the EEC and the Mediterranean countries had conflicting interests with respect to establishing
20
Daniel Enonnchoung Egbe, The Global Mediterranean Policy: Transformation of EU-Mediterranean Countries Relations During 1976-1998, University of Missouri Unpublished PhD Dissertation, December 2000, p. 18.
21
22
23
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closer economic cooperation.24 Although lacking of satisfying results for each party, the GMP can be regarded as the beginning stage of the future EuropeanMediterranean relations in the Cold War years and it is an important step to be taken by further EU initiatives to Mediterranean region. It is also worth remembering that the GMP added an institutional dimension to the growing awareness in the EC of the need for protecting West European security interests in the Mediterranean region.25 2.2. Renovated Mediterranean Policy Whereas Second World War and its aftermath had engendered the US influence in the Middle East, the end of the Cold War gave birth to Europes willingness to reestablish its dominance and desire for an extended role in the Middle East region. As Arab-Israeli conflict was the indissoluble matter of this region, the Venice Declaration of June 1980 was to represent the high point in European attempts to promote a distinct and common European stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.26 The declaration asserted that just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.27 Though the Venice Declaration of 1980 still constitutes the basic principles of European Foreign Policy towards the peace process28, in terms of securing an immediate opening for a more assertive European role in the peace process, it was to prove a failure. Contrary to the superpower identity of the US, European Community was following a different course. Throughout the early 1990s, the EC continued to signal
24
Egbe, op.cit., p. 25. Ibid., p. 40. Dannreuther, op.cit., p. 154. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/decl/index.htm#10 , (accessed on 28.12.2007). Dannreuther, op.cit., p. 155.
25
26
27
28
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the importance of human rights and democracy in its foreign policy29, and stressed their vitality in its issues. As a result of Europes priorities to human rights and democracy issues and Venice Declaration of June 1980 reflecting its stance towards Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab states were gratified by the support given to them by the Europeans and were keen to have a counterweight to the United States perceived uncritical support of Israel.30 However the ECs southern enlargement increased the self-sufficiency of the EC in typically Mediterranean agricultural products, such as olive oil, fresh vegetables, and citrus fruits, thus reducing the trade preferences of Maghreb and Mashreq countries in exporting these goods to the EC.31 This economic marginalization paved the way for declining in real per capita income of any developing region, along with a widening trade deficit in Maghreb and Mashreq countries. Besides, on the economic level, the Mashriq and Maghreb states did not enjoy complete freedom of access to the Community market for their industrial goods and agricultural products32. After the end of the Cold War, due to the growing economic and political considerations not only for non-member Mediterranean countries but also for the EC states, the GMP was revised and led to the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in 1990. As a Communication from the Commission to the Council, Redirecting the Communitys Mediterranean Policy, namely Renovated Mediterrenean Policy firstly reaffirmed the importance that the Community attaches to its longstanding ties with non-member Mediterranean countries and reiterated the view that owing to geographical proximity and the closeness of all types of relations, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean non-member countries are key factors in the stability
29
Duygu Dersan, Dynamics and Evolution of European Unions Middle East Policy, Unpublished MSc Thesis, The Gradute School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, June 2006, p. 39.
30
31
32
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and prosperity of the Community itself.33 In the Communication it is also strongly pointed out that the Commission considers in general that relations between the Community and non-member Mediterranean countries must make a qualitative and quantitative leap which is to commensurate with the political, economic and social issues at stake in the region, the regions expectations of the Community, and the Communitys responsibilities in that part of the world. 34 Emphasizing the Communitys responsibility in that part of the world is a differing and an ambitious statement of Europe in the region after the Cold War. However to what extent the EU fullfilled its commitments in this Communication needs to be examined. What remains as a deficiency in the Global Mediterranean Policy seems similar to those of the Renovated Mediterranean Policy. It is widely accepted that the RMP failed to support and encourage regional cooperation and closer integration. Besides historical animosities among the states in the region, never-ending political tensions, the unwillingness of the states to share their resources with the neighbours within the framework of development assistance programs35 are leading causes for the RMPs failure in fulfilling the expectations. However, this policy is important in demonstrating the increasing European interest towards the region in an era that political developments in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev further hastened the transformation of the international system. 2.3. A Turning Point In Euro-Mediterranean Relations:Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November 1995, marked the starting point of the EuroMediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the 15 member states of the European Union
33
Commission Document, COM (90) 812, 1 June 1990, p. 2. Ibid. Dersan, op.cit., p. 42.
34
35
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and 12 partners in the Mediterranean region (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey).36 Following the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995, the main action consisted of negotiating a new set of bilateral agreements with the partner states, replacing the prior generation of cooperation agreements with the much more extensive and ambitious Euro-Med Association Agreements.37 One of the accomplishments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the allocation of substantial funds, amounting EUR 9 billion, to the Mediterranean region called the MEDA programme which is the most important financial tool of the Barcelona Process.38 Regarding the economic and financial area, this financial tool was aimed to facilitate economic transition and the development of open, competitive markets and foster political and social reforms in the Mediterranean partners. Euro-Mediterranean association agreement for Lebanon and an interim agreement were signed in 2002 and the agreement was ratified by the Lebanese Parliament on 2 December 2002. Without any specific differentiation, agreement provided an agenda to promote political dialogue, democracy, and human rights. It includes commitments on judicial cooperation and the respect for the rule of law, and requires the parties to fulfill international rules on money laundering, on combating organised crime and drugs, and on migration and re-admission issues. On the economic and trade front, it commits both sides to further liberalise bilateral trade and also enhances economic and financial cooperation.39 The historic importance of the Mediterranean was tremendous, either as an early cradle for the Western culture or for the exchange of goods, but at the same time it was an area of constant struggle for superiority. The region witnessed seven thousands years of human and cultural development from ancient Egypt all the way
36
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed, (accessed on 3.01.2008). Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and Open Issues, CEPS Working Documents, No.220, March 2005, p. 1. The Barcelona Process, Five Years On, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/brochures/barcelona-5yrs_en.pdf 3.01.2008).
39 38 37
available (accessed
at on
14
to current times.40 The Mediterranean was a centre for strategic opportunities due to the rather short lines of communication, which were connecting not only traders and markets, but also nations, states and cultures.41 Besides Mediterraneans importance, the post-Cold War period was the initial period of a new area which was full of unknown threats, new implications and a strong need to improve new strategies for crucial regions like the Mediterranean. A widespread cognitive uncertainty about new international challenges and an interest in championing a European initiative for the Mediterranean gave birth to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships political and security base. Thanks to these two political motivating factors, member states were involved in a process of interaction, exploring and debating different interpretations and possible solutions to the perceived problems. In this process they converged towards a common understanding of Euro-Mediterranean relations, which also resonated with their domestic debates. Such an understanding constituted a new common European interest. On that basis, they agreed to launch a new common European Foreign Policy initiative.42 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona laid the foundations of a new regional relationship and thus represented a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations.43 The motivation for the Barcelona Process came from several directions concurrently. Roland Dannreuther claims that in relation to the Middle East Peace Proces (MEPP), the EUs attempts to gain a substantive role go back to the 1970s and there has since then been a consistent resolve and determination for Europes distinctive voice and policy preferences to be included in any process towards a peace settlement.44 Dannreuther adds that the EUs more coherent and strategic
40
Andrea K.Riemer, Yannis A.Stivachtis (eds.), Understanding EUs Mediterranean Enlargement: The English School and The Expansion of Regional International Studies, (Peter Lang: New York, 2002), p. 13.
41
Ibid. (accessed on
42
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=ies, 28.12.2007).
43
15
actorness in the MEPP was strenghtened by the adoption of a comprehensive regional strategy, named EMP or Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Process included security concerns, but approached them through a comprehensive security paradigm which saw the roots of conflict as primarily due to the failure of economic development, regional economic integration and the lack of respect for human rights and democracy.45 Richard Youngs assesses that the Barcelona Process was predicated on the expectation that economic liberalization, political reform, cultural understanding and strategic stability would be mutually reinforcing and political liberalization, combined with deeper economic interaction and social cooperation, would enhance well-being, stability and Europes own security.46 Sheila Carapico looks for the motivation firstly in the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), after which the European Community hoped to enhance markets and investments in foreign countries close to home. Secondly, Carapico claims that French and British colonial legacies and Italian, Spanish and Greek Merchant empires underlie particular interests that those countries hoped to advance via Euro-Med engagement.47 Moreover, the willingness of Northern European companies to provide direct outlets to the Mediterranean region is another motivating factor behind the EMP. Apart from economic motives, George Joffe agrees that the unspoken primary purpose of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership was to stem migration by fostering economic development.48 For the Barcelona Process, Emerson claims that relations between the EU and its partners were relatively cordial and constructive, thus provided a plausible foundation for a deepened relationship.49 He also adds that the EMP displayed
44 45
Richard Youngs, The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A new or Disingenious Strategy?, EWC, 2002/10, p. 42.
47
46
Sheila Carapico, Euro-Med:European Ambitions in the Mediterranean, Middle East Report, No.220, Autumn, 2001, p.25.
48
16
relatively good institutional performance by comparison with alternative schemes in the region and elsewhere. It has reduced uncertainity and lenghtnened the shadow of the future.50 There are three main fields of activity within the Barcelona Process: the political and security partnership, the economic and financial partnership, and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. Heart of the merit is that the EU combined all three chapters into one comprehensive policy acknowledging that financial, economic, cultural, and security issues can not be effectively tackled seperately.51 The most noticeable chapter of the three were economic and financial partnership. As states, at the heart of the EUs gradualist approach was the overwhelmingly preeminent emphasis on economic reform.52 With the prospective free trade area constituting by far the most significant substantive element of the EMP, there was clearly considerable hope and expectation invested in a spillover from market reforms to political liberalization.53 Rather than challenging the US policies in the Middle East and North Africa, EMP is seen as a complementary European policy for the south and east of the Mediterranean. Ultimate goal of this partnership is creating a large regional free trade zone open to imports and foreign investment that is totally coherent with US interests. Nevertheless, the EU was almost universally berated for its insistance on a process of trade liberalization strongly skewed to its own advantage and the friction that emerged in relation to the EUs lack of generosity in opening up its agricultural and textile markets was well documented.54 While the expressions of internationalism, feminism, environmentalism, human rights activism and sympathy for Palestinian victims of Israeli occupation are inherently embedded in European foreign policy, Europeans are contented to see and present themselves as possessing a moral leadership that disdains US militarism and
49 50
51
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/brochures/barcelona-5yrs_en.pdf, 24.12.2007).
52
53
54
17
imperialism.55 Partnership in social, cultural and human affairs which is the third component of Barcelona Process gains importance in this sense. However, the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs among the two others were not very well-organized and had little potential for joint actions, demonstrating instead the EU members lack of unity and lack of political will towards the region. 56 It is also accepted that this kind of spirit for social, cultural and human affairs was insufficiently frank in political dialogue on human rights, terrorism and migration.57 Furthermore, both shores lacked a common purpose, and the relationship primarily rested on fear. Europe, especially, was afraid of terrorism, weapons proliferation and migration from North Africa. 58 The EMP, comprising of two complementary dimensions as bilateral and regional is especially important for providing a common forum bringing different cultures together. However, most observers and scholars would agree that the EMP did not live up to expectations the initiative raised when it was launched in November 1995.59 One failure is mentioned for the persisting economic challenges with which Mediterranean countries struggle : underdeveloped infrastructures, low incomes, state-controlled economies, small FDI, low competitiveness, falling percentages of EU imports, weak economic growth, high population growth, deficits in basic social services etc. Beside economic challenges, another factor related to economy has been the absence of an economic elite in this region who can push for the opening up of domestic markets to competition and pressure the predominantly introspective and security obsessed regimes.
55 56
Reinvigorating Europe's Mediterranean Partnership: Priorities and Policies, available at http://www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/publications/pdf/ncre0105_lister.pdf , (accessed on 03.01. 2008).
57
Ibid. Ibid.
58
59
Raffaella A. Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, From EMP to ENP: Whats at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, March 2005, p. 23.
18
Not only economic challenges, but also historically rooted undemocratic political systems, poor governance, bad human rights records, regional conflicts and political violence remained as political challenges even though they were intended to be diminished and eliminated totally by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The EMP has also suffered from high-level political problems such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Algerian civil war and the frailty of the EUs common foreign and security policy. The European Commission explains the failure of the EMP owing to the obstacles raised by the deadlock of MEPP. Deadlock and slow advances in the Middle East Peace Process, albeit seperate from the Barcelona Process, have had a retarding effect on regional cooperation in general. 60Youngs also stresses that the EUs leverage over democratic change was significantly diminished by its own reluctance to agree to Mediterranean states demands on other issues-trade, migrants rights, a reduction of EU pressure for southern states to readmit migrants, cooperation on terrorism, the presence in European countries of exiles accused of violent acts.61 It is generally accepted that the EUs reluctance generated lack of trust and mutual compromise among the Mediterranean partners. Moreover, reluctance of southern partners in negotiation and ratification of the foundational agreements and implementation the reforms adversely affected the effectiveness of the process. Pursuing economic integration, enlargement and common foreign policy initiatives, the EU tried to carve out a new sphere of potentially vast influence in what it calls the Euro-Mediterranean basin.62 Furthermore clearly, the relationship between the 15 EU members and their 12 Mediterranean partners was based on a hierarchical North-South or core-periphery dynamic.63 Cultural and social prejudices (Arabs generalize about the West as much as Westerners generalize about Islam.)64 remained and with the exception of Israel, there are vast disparities in wealth between the parties. The EMPs political intentions were vague and tentative
60
European Commission, The Barcelona Process: Five Years On 1995-2000, Luxembourg:Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000, p. 15.
61
62
63
64
19
alongside the extensive and detailed timetables for economic liberalization; the substance of the democratic principles to be encouraged was not specified beyond a list of fundamental freedoms; and, sitting uneasily with the common commitment to political liberalization, the principles of non-intervention were affirmed, according each partner the right to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system. 65 Heller points out that the EMP reflected neither a common identity nor common values and its members do not share a cultural tradition, language, religion or even history of administrative unity66. Actually, this criticism is oriented to the EMPs inherent feature stemming from its extensive scope of geographical area. In June 2000 the European Commission argued that after its first five years the Barcelona process was basically correct in its conception and policies, but needed reinvigorating (European Commission 2000)67 and issued a report, The Barcelona Process, Five Years On:1995-2000. In this report, even the EU Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, was forced to acknowledge, with some underestatement, that problems exist
68
of a compelling vision for the region, the political disunity and institutional weaknesses of the EU69 were noted as the basic reasons for the failure of EMP. Moreover, economic objectives envisioning the establishment of a free trade zone by 2010 have not developed a significant momentum. Consequently, as a means for a more coherent and strategic role of the EU towards the MEPP, the EMP was not successful. Even though the EUs latest foreign policy tool, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is regarded as only complementary to the EMP, it is actually more of an ambitious and long-term project and must be dwelled upon with its extensive agenda in this context.
65
Mark A.Heller, Prospects for Creating a Regional Security Structure in the Middle East, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.26, 2003, p.131.
67
66
68
69
20
2.4. Lessons Learnt For A New Policy, ENP From the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s, Europes objective for establishing relations with Mediterranean region was simply to forge bilateral trade agreements. As a series of bilateral trade agreements were signed, these provided for one-way trade concessions, notably access to the EC for agricultural products from Mediterranean countries, and established their eligibility for EC economic aid. As the term global may not have been the most appropriate label, the GMP nevertheless sought to address the Mediterranean more systematically and can be regarded as the beginning stage of the future European-Mediterranean relations. Despite its merely trade-oriented structure, the GMP is important for it stimulated cooperation between the Europe and Mediterranean region for the first time systematically and it provided a single and coordinated framework for the existing bilateral trade and cooperation agreements. In December 1990 the EC adopted a New Mediterranean Policy, intended to reinforce existing trade and aid agreements with support for economic reforms such as liberalization and structural adjustment. However, the RMP failed to support and encourage regional cooperation and closer integration. Besides historical animosities among the states in the region, never-ending political tensions, the unwillingness of the states to share their resources with the neighbours within the framework of development assistance programs70 were existing matters for the failure of the RMP. However, the GMP and the RMP are noteworthy developments to indicate Europes increasing interest towards the region. As the GMP was reflecting the concerns of bipolar world and Soviet threat, the RMP was motivated by the end of the Cold War. Both of them have political considerations along with strong economic incentives. The EMP is a more comprehensive and ambitious policy compared to previous initiatives. With the EMP, the EU combined all three chapters into one comprehensive policy acknowledging that financial, economic, cultural, and security issues can not be effectively tackled seperately. Actually it was innovative with its scope of three baskets; political, economic and social. EMP not only symbolized the EUs strategic approach to the Mediterranean but also reflected the Unions
70
21
commitment to promotion of liberal values.71 The EMP has a bilateral and a multilateral/regional dimension. While it aimed to promote development and reforms through Association Agreements and financial aid with its bilateral dimension, regional dialogue and conflict resolution for the Arab-Israel dispute were on the agenda with its multilateral dimension. These closely interrelated dimensions would surely affect each other in terms of their success. However, the EMP has suffered from high-level political problems such as the ArabIsraeli conflict and the Algerian civil war and the frailty of the EUs common foreign and security policy. Moreover political cooperation has been stymied by the lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process. Consequently, the EUs inadequate capacity to contribute resolution to ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and its lack of effective instruments for enhancing peace and prosperity adversely affected each other. The ENP, which was developed after these above-mentioned initiatives, tries to eliminate and reduce effects of the obstacles standing in front of the former policies. Whereas to what extent these obstacles have been eliminated is another subject to be enquired, it is found beneficial to add that each former European initiative towards Mediterranean has contributed to extend the scope of the agenda and success of ENP. The ENP focuses on the fact that the EU is pursuing separate but interrelated logics in its new framework for relations with its neighbours. The first is the logic of stabilization associated with the need for secured and properly managed external EU borders, the second one is the logic of promotion and transition that might reduce the socio-economic gap for the EUs outer frontiers. 72 In this respect, the ENP supports neighbouring countries transition with an integrative approach.
Sevilay Kahraman, The European Neighbourhood Policy: The European Unions New Engagement Towards Wider Europe, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs,Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 10. 72 Ibid., p. 26.
71
22
CHAPTER III LEBANON BETWEEN SYRIAN STRANGLEHOLD AND NASCENT EUROPEAN PRESSURE 3.1. Internal Dynamics Shaping the Countrys Profile 3.1.1 A Pivotal Part Of Constitution and the Lebanese Political System:
Meaning Of National Pact 1943 The area including modern Lebanon has been, for thousands of years, a melting pot of various civilizations and cultures. Originally home to the Phoenicians, and then subsequently conquered and occupied by the Assyrians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the Ottoman Turks and most recently the French, Lebanese culture has over the millennia evolved by borrowing from all of these groups. However, mostly the French domination is examined as the last and most penetrating power in the Lebanon. As Fred Halliday claims, imperialism, conceived of as a system of external domination, formal or informal, certainly played a part whether it be understood as the historic legacy of colonial rule and capitalist penetration, with all its disruptive impact , or as the subsequent exercise of Western power in the region, both directly and through local allies.73 In 1920, as Lebanon was free of Ottoman rule, the League of Nations gave France a mandate over Lebanon and the era of French rule which lasted for the next several decades was introduced. It was also a period of two world wars paving the way for basic developments that have a lasting effect on Lebanese system. Firstly, expansion of the countrys borders brought mainly Sunni and Shiite Muslims into a system that had been dominated by Maronites and Druze. The Christian Communities that coexisted on Mount Lebanon have sought to preserve their ethnic difference, both in the past, from the Sunni-dominated empires, and in the present,
73
Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, (I.B.Tauris Publishers, 1996), p. 17.
23
through Maronite rejection of Arab nationalism.74 Secondly, the 1926 Constitution was adopted and it has remained partly intact up to the present. Lebanons population is the most religiously diverse in the region. 17 sects or confessions are recognized, although the exact composition of the current population is not known because no national census has been conducted since 1932. The first Lebanese president after independence was Bishara al-Khoury, elected in the summer of 1943. Khoury was Maronite and had good relations with the Sunni Muslim Community, including the renowned Sidon-Beirut based Sulh family. Riad Sulh was choosen by Khoury to be his first Prime Minister, and he had proposed a new Christian-Muslim governing formula in 1942. The National Pact-according various sects politically- proposed by Sulh, although unwritten and unofficial, has become a pivotal part of the constitution and the Lebanese political system. 75 It was a kind of system for power sharing agreed on in the 1943 National Pact. It is claimed that the Lebanese Civil War that sparked in 1975 arose from the long and unresolved crisis within the country that had been developing ever since independence from France in 1943. The 1943 arrangement allocated public offices among confessional groups according to demographic and political weight.76 The presidency was always reserved for a Maronite, the prime ministership for a Sunni, and the parliamentary speakership for a Shii. This tradition still continues in todays Lebanon. Maronites monopolized sensitive military and internal security posts however; on balance, they were by far the most powerful group. Still Lebanon succeeded in avoiding conflict by freezing differences over identity and by neutralising foreign intervention in Lebanese politics. The Christians agreed not to tie Lebanon too closely to France and the West and the Muslims not to seek Lebanons unity with other Arab states, especially Syria.
74
Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing:Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, (Irish Academic Press: Dublin, 2005), p. 18.
75
Ibid., p. 20.
76
Simon Haddad, Cultural Diversity and Sectarian Attitudes in Post-War Lebanon, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 28, No:2, April 2002, p. 210.
24
There are many rival interpretations of the meaning, causes and consequences of Lebanons National Pact.77 Many scholars assess the National Pact as temporary and see it as the result of a Muslim-Christian cooperation for independence from French rule. This assessment also shows the weakness of this agreement. Because those who brokered the Pact and their successors became completely reliant on its consociational framework for the fullfilment of their economic interests and positions of power, though the Pact was meant to be only a temporary mechanism.78 Due to the fact that Lebanon is a precarious republic, regional and communal identifications are often stronger than national ones. Primacy is given to the family, village, and espacially sects. The religious community is also often a geographic, social, cultural, political and even economic unit. National identity understanding is weak. The central government has always adopted an extreme non-interventionist laissez-faire approach, providing minimal services and offering little direction. As a result, in many basic areas various sects provided their own system, especially in economic and educational areas. However, before the outbreak of the civil war, Lebanon was the only Arab state with an enduring democratic experience compared with other countries in the Middle East.79 The political and judicial system permitted Lebanons confessional groups to coexist, but that system also kept them apart by legitimizing sectarian differences. While the various sects meant geographic seperation, regional inequalities had secterian dimensions, for example the Shii community has been the poorest because it was concentrated in southern Lebanon, the most underdeveloped part of the country. According to the surveys, the Christians constituted a majority of the population, and it was on this basis that they obtained the offices of the presidency and the commander of the armed forces, and the largest share of posts in government services. However, over time some of their leaders began to fear for their ascendancy, observing the growing power of Arab nationalism beyond their borders
77
78
79
Simon Haddad, The Relavance of Political Trust in Postwar Lebanon, Citizenship Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2002, p. 203.
25
and then, after 1967, the even more menacing increase of Palestinian power within.80 After Christians observed that it was ineffective to try to contain PLO activities by Lebanese army, they began to place greater reliance on their own sectarian counterpower in the shape of Christian-based militias. The main problem with this 1943 system was that it took inadequate account of change, internal or external. It could not escape from being the independence days temporary agreement. Besides, Kerr stressess that consociational tensions became exacerbated when external events altered the equilibrium, events such as the creation of the state of Israel, which had posed a challenge to Lebanons foreign policy symmetry. The National Pact stipulated that the Christians of Lebanon would forego European protection and all military pacts with Western powers, while the Muslims agreed to set aside any pan-Arab desires and accept Lebanons existing neutral in Arab-Israeli conflicts. While Christians geographical boundaries.81 The problem arose in 1948 as to whether Lebanon should remain viewed neutrality as being inclusive of Arab-Israeli conflicts, Muslims took the opposite view.82 In addition, Muslims were frustrated by the Republics second president, Chaumons -another French schooled Maronite politician- approach to the Baghdad Pact of 1955, his refusal to break off diplomatic relations with Britain and France in 1956, and, most importantly his signing up to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957.83 Those attempts were clearly inconsistent with the spirit of the unwritten National Pact and constitution giving priority to the neutrality of Lebanese state. The acceleration of the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1967-particularly its Palestinian dimension-and the launch of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1970s increased the load on the Lebanese political system, which divided its masses and subsequently destroyed the elite consensus and Lebanons proclaimed ideological neutrality.84
80
Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Third Edition, (Routledge:London, 2004), p. 175.
81
82
83
26
Furthermore, the National Pact failed to foster and produce national leaders whom are needed in a country as divided as Lebanon. It prevented the emergence of national leaders and stunted any nation-building programme, as it merged and papered over so many different national aspirations. 85 It also ignored demographic changes, and disproportionately favoured the Maronite and Sunni communities. As time went by, due to different birth rates and other socio-economic factors, the governing coalitions grew increasingly unrepresentative of the changing Lebanese population.86 In 1975, the National Pact finally collapsed with the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon owing to the fact that it was a result of the unhappy sectarian groups as a consequence of the inflexibility of National Pact towards social and economic developments in the early 1970s. The argument that looking for a common pattern or cause in the conflicts that ravaged the Middle East in recent decades is futile87 is also valid for the Lebanon case. Because Lebanon has different societies and a distinct political character, it would be misleading to show a single external or internal factor affecting Lebanon. Moreover, the external factors must be incorporated into the regional picture so that it would be clearer to understand the dynamics underlying the structure of Lebanon.
3.1.2.
Taif Accord At the end of the 19th century, large numbers of people living in the Middle East had claims to be called Arabs, for linguistic, cultural and historical reasons. They were also heirs to a common culture and a common historical experience based on memories of the Arab and Ottoman Empires.
88
84
Haddad, The Relevance, p. 205. Ibid., p. 134. Kerr, op.cit.,p. 136. Halliday, op.cit., p. 15. Owen, op.cit., p. 57.
85
86
87
88
27
one of a number of possible identities at this time, and usually much less important than that of a belonging to a particular family or tribe or region, it managed to create the notions of patriotism, national rights when encountered the state of Israel. When the neighboring Arab states moved against Israel in 1948, they claimed to be fighting in concert, to uphold their brotherly commitment to the Arabs of Palestine.89 Besides this support for the Palestinians in their struggle against both the British and the Jewish settlers, growing importance of newspapers, films, foreign travel to other Arab countries were the other contributors for the increasing Arab consciousness. The state of Israel officially came into existence in May 1948, towards the end of a bitter civil war between the Arab and Jewish populations of Mandatory Palestine, which in turn was triggered off by the precipitate British military withdrawal.90 Israels Arab neighbours were unwilling either to sign a peace treaty or to normalize relations and were thus left with the choice of preparing for war or seeking some kind of unofficial modus vivendi. Lebanon which had a special interest in securing its independence from Syria took the latter path, while Syria was in the former path. Conflict between Israel and Arab states was also responsible for a Middle Eastern arms race, a series of wars, and the Israel occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Egypts Sinai peninsula in 1967, as well as numerous lesser clashes. 91 The shocking Arab defeat in 1967 prompted a rapid growth of Palestinian guerilla organizations in Lebanon and Lebanons weak central government was powerless to control them. The Palestinians and its increased number of guerilla activities also directed Israeli raids to the bases established in Lebanon and Jordan. But for Lebanon, problem was exacerbated after most of the Palestinian guerillas expelled from Jordan in 1970 and came to Lebanon. When Muslims generally supported and welcomed them as potential allies, Maronites were in deep anger and viewed them as disruptive and likely to upset the countrys precarious balance. Besides Palestinian presence, internally the demographic balance shifted in favour of the Muslim, while
89
90
91
28
within each community new social forces emerged that did not accept the dominance of their respective elites.
92
increased Arab nationalism in the country, uncontrolled social change creating class and confessional conflicts complicated and accompanied the presence of Palestinian problem. External forces often had done much to worsen divisions, by playing off one group against another, by provoking forms of nationalism that exalted one groups past and so antagonized anothers, and by stimulating the divisive search for genuine national values. 93 Palestinian presence was dangerous not only because it invited a harsh Israeli response, but also the twin appeal that the Palestinian leadership was willing and able to make, both to the regimes and to their people.94 As a result, a number of Arab regimes did their very best to split the movement, to marginalize its leadership or to make their own political arrangements with the Israelis without reference to the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), but the PLO made skillful use of avoid falling under the influence of any one potentially hostile regime.95 In Lebanon, the PLO was not merely a foreign factor, and it soon became an extension of the Sunni community in the absence of a Lebanese-Sunni militia that could match the Christian forces.96 Anyway, expedited by a massive Palestinian military build-up in the country, Lebanons religious, social, economic and ideological tensions ultimately exploded in a protracted civil war. (1975-90)
97
the
disagreements between the various Arab states to find new allies for itself and to
No
one knows whether a Lebanese civil war would have broken out without the armed presence of the Palestinians, but this variable undoubtedly pushed the National Pact
92
Halliday, op.cit., p. 17. Ibid., p. 38. Owen, op.cit. , p. 67. Ibid. Kerr,op.cit.,p. 142. Haddad, Cultural Diversity, p. 292.
93
94
95
96
97
29
to breaking point over the armys neutrality. 98 As one can guess, the conflict was not only a Christian-Muslim strife, but it had several dimensions. The Lebanese civil war was a result of the long maturing of social contradictions within the country, as the power bloc established in the 1940s came under increasing pressure from underprivileged groups.99 The war in Lebanon was fought over a number of issues including the balance of power in government, the role of the armed Palestinian groups, the redistribution of wealth, and Lebanons foreign policy orientation,100 as mentioned above. The conflict exposed the precariousness of the Lebanese political system and the disintegration of the Lebanese population. In fact Lebanons religiously and ideologically divided political system failed to cope with the consequences of an armed Palestinian presence, Arab meddling in its internal affairs, and overbearing Israeli punishment.101 The civil war was greatly complicated and prolonged by extensive outside interference. Palestinian cross border attacks on Northern Israel prompted Israel to invade Lebanon twice: in 1978 when the Israeli army launched a partial military campaign in Southern Lebanon and held a piece of land which remained occupied until May 2000, and in 1982 when the Jewish state launched a massive military invasion to destroy PLO military and political power bases in Lebanon. 102 Syria, the neighbour, has never fully accepted Frances division of the Levant and harbors an irredentist claim to Lebanon. Because geographic, historic, cultural, economic and even familial links between the two countries are close, Syria became entangled in Lebanons problems. It has tried to stop the fighting and prevent the countrys partition, and it also tried to prevent any other regional power from gaining influence there.103
98
Kerr, op.cit.,p. 144. Halliday, op.cit., p. 39. Haddad, Cultural Diversity, p. 292. Haddad, The Relevance, p. 204. Ibid. Haddad, Cultural Diversity, p. 293.
99
100
101
102
103
30
With the collapse of the central governments authority and the rapid disintegration of the Lebanese army, Lebanon became a regional battleground. In 1975, the country had plunged into complete chaos and civil war and during the fifteen years that followed, Lebanon would become an anarchic country that existed by name only-dominated by Israeli and Syrian armies as well as local warlords and their militias.104 During the war, some 60.000 to 100.000 out of a population of approximately 3 million lost their lives, an additional 200.000 were wounded and some 250.000 fled the country. Large areas, including much of Beirut and the countrys infrastructure, lay in ruins. On the other hand Israel, worried about the intensity of Palestinian activity originating in Lebanon, retaliated by launching two large-scale military invasions in 1978 and 1982.105 In June 1982, Israel launched a massive invasion, occupying virtually the entire southern half of the country . Israeli invasion of the country in 1982 was actually for a military defeat of the Palestinians and the brief attempt to engineer the establishment of a friendly regime dominated by the Lebanese forces and controlled by the newly elected president, Bashir Gemayel. Even though politically unsuccessful, Israels invasion triggered off a series of changes in the internal balance of power between Christian, Shii and Druze militias that were to make their own major contribution to the further disintegration of Lebanons fragile social system.106 A militant group named Hizbullah emerged from the radicalization of the Shii population as a result of the Israel invasion. This group was supported by Iran with a wide a range of welfare and educational activities and it adopted an extreme form of revolutionary activism with the aim of converting Lebanon into an Islamic state. Before Israels invasion, the Egyptians had already signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and at the same time Lebanon was building up its military capacity to confront Israel and to a degree Palestinian resistance movement in such a way that its
104 Ghassan Abdallah, Lebanons Political System: An Analysis of the Taif Accord, Unpublished Dissertation for the PhD Degree, University of Houston, December 2003, p. 13.
105
106
31
policies became subservient to the requirements of Syrian security. All of these made it easier for Israel to affect Lebanese policies and exercise its power in Lebanon. During the intervention, West Beirut, the capital, was heavily bombarded and tens of thousands killed or made homeless. The Lebanese governments authority did not extend much beyond Beirut in early 1985. Actually, the official US antipathy to Palestinian nationalism provided the conditions in which the invasion took place107. Israel was encouraged by the attitude of the US, stemming from the fact that the US fixed the Palestinian movement in the global context of its conflict with the Soviet Union. From September 30 to October 22, 1989 most of the remaining members of the Lebanese parliament met in Taif, in Saudi Arabia to debate a political reform plan drafted by the Arab League and produced the National Reconciliation Charter, commonly known as the Taif Agreement.108 The Taif Agreement was also known as the Document of National Understanding and it constituted a major onset in Lebanons modern history. It ended the Lebanese civil war and established the internal conditions of peace. The Taif Agreement reaffirms that Lebanon is an independent, sovereign country with an Arab identity and a parliamentary democracy where different communities coexist.109 When it came to the institutions of government, it called for equal representation among Christians and Muslims in parliament and essentially it wrought a change in the political structure to take account of the new power balances among the communities: the decline of the Maronites and the advance of the Sunnis and the Shiites.110 The Taif Agreement attempted to reform the political system that had caused several years of civil strife. Although abolishing the sectarian system had been mentioned in the Lebanese constitution of 1926 and National Pact, it initiated more
107
Sheila Ryan, Israels Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.11, No.4, Summer-Autumn 1982, p. 23.
108
Reine El-Achkar, Lebanon and Hezbollah: From Militia to Political Party, Dissertation for degree of M.A., University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2006, p. 35.
109
110
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ambitious steps towards this goal. Farid el-Khazen claims that the Taif Agreement has two components: political reforms and sovereignty, however it has not been fully implemented and the component of sovereignty having to do with Syrian-Lebanese relations and Syrian military presence in Lebanon has been completely ignored.111 While the agreement includes significant foreign policy and security provision, it mandates the outlawing of militias and the confiscation of their arms112 except two Lebanese parties (Hezbollah and, to a lesser extent, Amal, both Shia-based). Khazen stresses that these exceptions were made because there were no political decisions for the Lebanese army to enter Palestinian camps or disarm militia forces. Gradual elimination of the sectarian system and the provisions calling for Syrian withdrawal from the country were in fact difficult to implement since they were constituting the main elements of Lebanon reality. G.Abdallah inquiries two main challenges in the post-Taif period. First, internally, political legitimacy has to be restored, and second, a supportive international environment has to be established to promote reconstruction, economic development and security.113 Abdallah assesses the latter challenge as formidable because he thinks that external actors such as the US are reluctant to support Lebanon full-heartedly without certain conditions. There are many scholars considering the Taif Agreement only partly successful. The Taif Agreement is considered successful owing to its bringing peace to Lebanon. However, this does not mean this agreement was fully successful. In his thesis, Abdallah stresses that there has been no progress towards dismantling the system of confessional representation and claims that the problems that caused the 1975 civil war are yet to be resolved. S.Haddad explains that the Taif Agreement acknowledged Syrias, who maintains an undisclosed number of troops, special relations with Lebanon and it has in reality transformed the post-war Lebanese entity into a Syrian satellite.114 Syria has imposed many bilateral treaties on Lebanon and tried to integrate the two countries political and economic life. Haddad gives
111
Tore Bjrgo, Root Causes of Terrorism, (Routledge: London and New York, 2005), p. 183. Abdallah, op.cit.,p. 24. Ibid., p. 27. Haddad, The Relevance,p. 205.
112
113
114
33
examples for Syrian control such as combining military and intelligence ubiquitousness, economic penetration, a sizeable Syrian civilian presence, control of the Lebanese military command, and meticulous screening of domestic office aspirants in an essentially patronage system, where political appointments and personal loyalties appear to coincide.115 According to another view, Taif failed because the Lebanese continued to be the victims of their own divisions and competing geopolitical interests in the Middle East116 Kerr agrees with Haddads view and claims that Taif ushered in a new era of internationally legitimized and unfettered Syrian hegemonic control in Lebanon. In the post-Taif period, the Syrian hegemonic control seems to be a consequence of the US reluctancy to support Lebanon. The US encouraged Israels invasion of Lebanon in 1982 because it fixed the Palestinian issue related with the USSR. This time, owing to support given by Syria during the Gulf War, the US easily accepted extensive Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. After the Taif Agreement internal relations also changed. In particular, the Shia, seen as the clear winners, gained a share of power that was more proportionate to their demographic strength for the first time and in general, the Muslim community as a whole benefited from Taif at the expense of the Christians, especially the Sunnis vis-a-vis the Maronites.117 Actually, the Christians lost more with the Taif Agreement not only in terms of political gains but also for the inextricable dependence of Lebanon on Syria since the Taif Agreement left Lebanon under de facto Syrian control. Although the agreement ended sectarian violence in Lebanon, it failed to ensure the countrys independence and also disrupted the internal equilibrium among communities and the most striking aspect of the implementation of the agreement was that Christian grievances were continuously being ignored.118
115
116
117
118
Simon Haddad, A Survey of Maronite Christian Socio-Political Attitudes in Postwar Lebanon, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 12, No.4, 2001, p. 467.
34
3.2.Stranglehold of External Dynamics: Syria, Iran. Since the French mandate period, Syrian Arab nationalists neither established diplomatic ties with Lebanon nor accepted it as a seperate entity. It basically perceived Lebanon artifically seperated from Syria by the external forces. Beside this historic perception, Syria continuously regarded Lebanon as an indivisible part of its national security concerns. This was related to the fact that activation of a military front in Lebanon would divert Israeli forces that would have otherwise been deployed in the Golan Heights. Syria also supported Palestinian militias which caused chaos and instability of the vulnerable political system of Lebanon. Ghassan Abdallah claims that one of the reasons for Syria's close support to the PLO was linked to inter-Arab rivalries, with a particular intention to challenge Egypt's ascendancy in the Arab world. Whereas Lebanon did not prefer to take an obvious supportive stance to the PLO, but actually stay silent to its activities, Syria obviously supported the PLO for its hegemonic concerns in Arab world. Despite the continued differences on the Palestine issue continued absence of diplomatic ties between the two countries, relations between Lebanon and Syria began to improve in the 1970s.119 There are many reasons explaining the improvements in relations. Among many of them, many scholars attach great importance to the presence of relations between Lebanons president Faranjiyyah and the Asad family in Syria. With the abovementioned security concerns of Syria, president Asad supplied the PLO with weapons and helped them establish a stronghold in the southern part of the country along the border with Israel. Drawing considerable leverage from his relations with the PLO and the Shiis (as well as from pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon, like the Baath Party), and gaining high prestige from his role in the 1973 war, Hafiz al-Asad become the most influential external factor in Lebanese politics in 1974 and 1975.120 Moreover, after the civil war erupted in Lebanon in 1975, motivated by
119
120
35
the common belief that Syria and Lebanon were indivisible in terms of security, Syria did not retard to intervene politically and militarily to Lebanon. Asad urged Lebanon to implement new reforms aiming to establish a more equitable power sharing mechanism between Muslim and Christians. Nevertheless, Patrick Seale claims that Asad destroyed the Lebanons political equation worse than before. To rule Lebanon as he aspired to do, he had to smash the confessional system, but smashing the system meant smashing the Christians.121 Indeed, the Taif Agreement which concluded the devastating civil war in Lebanon and signed under the Syrian dominance was an effective political tool smashing Christian effects in the country. As it has already been mentioned, one of the accomplishments which the Taif Agreement realized was the institutionalization Syria's occupation of Lebanon. Simon Haddad claims that the implementation of the Taif Agreement under close Syrian supervision turned out to be selective and controversial, increasing discord in a highly segmented Lebanese society. As a result of this supervision, he reiterates that parliamentary elections failed the task of political normalization and prepared very badly for the envisaged national reconciliation and integration.122 During Taif, the Syrians did not seek to either annex Lebanon or radically transform its political, economic, and social systems, all that the Syrians did was to define the political rules of the game for the Lebanese players and, more precisely, lay down the boundaries that could not be crossed.123 The Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination which formalized Syrias role in post-Taif Lebanon was signed on May 12, 1991. It stipulated that two states agreed to work for the highest possible level of coordination in all matters of political, economic, security and cultural policy and established a joint institutional framework to achieve that end.124 According to Najem, this treaty was a critical departure from the historic neutrality of Lebanese foreign policy vis--vis the West
121
Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria : The Struggle for the Middle East, (B. Taurus: London, 1988), p. 280. Haddad, The Relevance, p. 206. Abdallah, op.cit., p. 91.
122
123
124
36
and the Arab/Islamic world. 125 A Defence and Security Pact (August 1991) followed the Treaty of Brotherhood. Over time, Syrias interest in Lebanon, quite independent of its desire for leverage in the Arab-Israeli dispute, have steadily increased. Najem explains that Lebanese and Syrian economies have become increasingly tied together over the course of the past decade. In addition to this, it should also be noted that the individual members of the Syrian political elite have developed extensive personal business interests in Lebanon throughout the period, which they will no doubt wish to use every means at their disposal to protect.126 Besides, Syrias economic and political control of Lebanon was becoming a vital component of internal Syrian politics. In this context, a variety of Syrian-Lebanese agreements dealing with economic and social issues ensued enveloping Lebanon.127 While the Syrian government and their allies in Lebanon have stressed constantly the role of the Syrian army in bringing back normalcy to Lebanon, Syrian success in rehabilitating Lebanon led to an overhaul in the approach of most Western countries to the role they had played.128 Owing to the fact that Syria maintained the order in Lebanon, international community clearly accepted the Syrian hegemony in this country. However, Lebanese people viewed such a close alignment with Syria inconvenient and not only Maronites but also vast majority of Lebanese Muslims have also been deeply concerned about the nature and extent of Syrias continuing role in Lebanon. The European Commission and some individual countries were outspoken in their criticsm of developments in the early 1990s, particularly the Treaty of Brotherhood and the 1992 elections, which many external observers perceived to have been rigged by Syria in order to produce a compliant Lebanese parliament.129 Nevertheless, the EC has done very little in terms of pressuring Syria to rethink its
125
Tom Pierre Najem, Lebanon and Europe:The Foreign Policy of a Penetrated State, The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, p. 218.
126
Ibid., p. 226. Abdallah, op.cit., p. 92. Ibid., p. 95. Najem, op.cit., p. 225.
127
128
129
37
policy with respect to Lebanon due to its relatively low ability to exert influence on Syria, the predominance of US policy and the ECs lack of policy coordination and enforcement mechanism.130 The Taif Agreement disbanded Lebanons various militias remaining from the civil war period, but it also unexpectedly helped increase Hezbollahs power. Hezbollah operatives were allowed to keep their weapons for the purpose of protecting Lebanon from Israeli incursion from the South. Hezbollah, meant Party of God, is a Shiite Lebanese based militant organization formed after Israels invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s.131 During Israels invasion of Lebanon, Lebanese officials were far too occupied with their own struggle for power to be interested in to the Shiites living in poverty in the south of the country. Hezbollah exploited the weakness and ignorance of the Lebanese state. With Irans help, it embarked on an ambitious enterprise to build a social welfare infrastructure for the Shiite community.132 Shiite societys severe life conditions provided appropriate ground Iran to export its revolution. They funded millions of dollars and aid to Hezbollah. Hezbollah worked on agricultural acitivities, focused on health issues and provided educational support. Whereas Hezbollah were paying attention to making available social service resources to the poor, Westerners were becoming suspicious of Hezbollahs affairs and perceived it as recruitment tool. Hezbollahs endeavours returned to Iran as the allegiance of the Shiite population of Lebanon. Moreover, Iranian funds paved the way for rapid growth of Hezbollahs military wing, which devoted itself primarily to the expulsion of the American and European multinational force (MNF) in Beirut and the defeat of occupying Israeli forces.133 As it was mentioned above, Syria had an interest in sponsoring paramilitary attacks against Israel so long as it refused to withdraw from the Golan Heights. Hezbollahs objectives were aligned with Iranian and Syrian interests.
130
131
132
133
38
Syria allowed Hezbollah to maintain its hold on the region of the Baalbeck, while Iran continued to supply Hezbollah with money and training.134 In the 1990s Hezbollah continued its attacks on Israeli troops in the self-declared Israeli security zone inside Lebanon and in Israel itself. As a result, severe Israeli reprisal attacks, especially in 1993 and 1995, obviously aimed to pressure the Lebanese government to act against the Hezbollah themselves. They also intended to demonstrate to the Israeli people that they were willing and able to take action to protect the northern Israeli border.135 Israeli troops were withdrawing from South Lebanon in May 2000, and this actually weakened the Syrians need to be there while many Lebanese-especially Maronites- began to regard Syrian presence unnecessary. Najem maintains that it was not in the interest of either Syria or Hezbollah to let the matter rest at that end. Nonetheless, Syria had new supporters in Lebanon such as Hezbollah and many Sunnis. Reine el-Achkar benefits from an important interview made by a Lebanese journalist with Hassan Nasrallah (the Secretary General of Hezbollah). According to answers given by Nasrallah, Hezbollah clearly regards Syrian presence necessary for domestic stability of Lebanon and also sees it as a protective shield against Israel. Nasrallah states that due to the two countries historical, geographical, and social ties, Syria has influence in Lebanon that no one can eliminate.136 Hezbollah has also dedicated itself to the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and the removal of all non-Islamic influences from the country. As Hezbollah utilized the funding and support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it was in real harmony with Irans conviction of Hezbollah soundness of path, right in jihad and resistance. Naim Qassem, Hezbollahs deputy secretary, offers three reasons for laying the strong relationship between Hezbollah and Iran. 137 First, he explains that both Iran and Hezbollah believe in the jurisdiction of the Jurist-Theologian, and that Imam
134
135
136
137
39
Khomeini was himself that leader. Second, Irans choice of an Islamic republican system are in harmony with Hezbollahs principles. And lastly, Irans absolute rejection of superpower hegemony and safeguarding of independence are concerted. With respect to the contemporary situation, one crucial problem is that many scholars and policy-makers look at the dominant role which the Syrians now play in Lebanese politics and tend to assume that Lebanon really has no authentic foreign policy of its own.138 However, assessing Lebanon foreign policy only in terms of Syrian hegemony can generate some misunderstandings. Najem points that the internal forces which have historically shaped Lebanese foreign policy are still present and strongly relevant, in Lebanese society. Secondly, he claims that there is strong desire at the vast majority of the Lebanese people to pursue a foreign policy based on Lebanese interests. Last of all, he underlines the importance of the contemporary political and economic circumstances which have generated Lebanese foreign policy imperatives that are seperate from, and in some cases contrary to, Syrias interests. Najem also asserts that opponents of Syrian hegemony are ready for a more aggressive stance if given green light by the US. He adds that there have been indications of a desire to pursue policies which accord more with Lebanons independent interests than with Syrias interests.139 In this context, European increasing concern and interest in Lebanon would be welcomed and to some extent that would be regarded as serving to some of Lebanons political and economic concerns. In Lebanon, different communities historically tended to continue developing informal relations with their preferred international partners in the West and in the Arab world respectively. However, Lebanon has a high level of susceptibility to penetration by foreign actors. Syria, to an extent Israel and Iran, which exerts influence via ties with especially Shiite community and Hezbollah, are the main foreign actors penetrating Lebanons political system.
138
139
40
In this context, European Neighbourhood Policy can be evaluated as a counterbalancing political measure to strong Syrian and Iranian influences. Besides, in terms of economic area, ENP would be helpful to mitigate Lebanons exhausted economy with its special aid and reform programmes as Europe has long been Lebanons leading trade partner and Lebanon government was enthusiastic to establish economic ties with Europe although balance of trade has always heavily favored the European side. ENP can be a long term strategy to establish the hegemony of the EU in Lebanon not only as counterbalancing the US global power but also Syria and Iran as the most effective external actors in Lebanon.
3.3. Lebanon After Israels 2006 Intervention: Cycles of Instabilities. After the assassination of Lebanons Prime Minister Refik Harriri on 15th February 2005, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese took to the streets and called for an end to the Syrian influence in the country. Syria ceded to the pressure and withdrew its 14,000 military and intelligence personnel on April 27, 2005. At the time, many observers interpreted Syrias unexpectedly rapid withdrawal and the subsequent election of an anti-Syrian majority in the Lebanese parliament as a major setback for Syrias ambitions in the region, and some even predicted that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had been seriously weakened. However, Syria maintained significant assets in Lebanon: a mixed government in Lebanon comprising both pro- and anti-Syrian elements; a possible residual presence of Syrian intelligence assets in Lebanon; and Hezbollah, which has refused so far to relinquish its arms and apparently continued to support Syrias agenda by periodically attacking Israeli military positions near the Israeli-Syrian border.140 Besides, despite the success of the movement, according to Musbah al-Ahdab, Member of Parliament, Lebanon remains divided into two paths. The first path is what is now known as the March 14th alliance. The March 14 Alliance, is a coalition of anti-Syrian political parties and independents in Lebanon, led by Saad Hariri,
140
41
younger son of assassinated former prime minister of Lebanon Rafik Hariri, Samir Geagea president of the Lebanese Forces, and Walid Jumblatt.141 In addition to opposing Syrian influence, Alliances agenda includes the construction of state institutions, rebuilding the economy, emphasizing Lebanese sovereignty, and building immunity to the regional conflicts that have long permeated Lebanese society. The second path is comprised of the Hezbullah movement and the pro-Syrians. MP al-Ahdab claims that second paths agenda is to merely maintain Lebanon as a proxy battlefield for the Arab-Israeli conflict and as a staging ground for Syrian and Iranian agendas. 142 Owing to the fact that not all Shia support Hezbullah, nor are all Sunnis and Christians opposed to Hezbullah, Lebanese society became unified in its response to the July 12, 2006 conflict. The conflict began when Hezbollah militants fired rockets at Israeli border towns as a diversion for an anti-tank missile attack on two armored Humvees patrolling the Israeli side of the border fence.143 Of the seven Israeli soldiers, two were wounded, three were killed, and two were kidnaped and taken to Lebanon. Five more were killed in a failed Israeli rescue attempt. Israel responded with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon, which damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure. Hezbollah then launched more rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in guerrilla warfare from hardened positions. Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said the raid was "an act of war" and was set to meet with his cabinet to approve more military action in Lebanon.144
141
Taylor Luck, Post-War Status of Lebanons March 14th Movement, Middle East Institute, Event Summary, 21 September 2006. For a more detailed information about the March 14th Movement please see http://www.mideasti.org/summary/post-war-status-lebanons-march-14th-movement, (accessed on 12.01.2007 ). Israel authorizes 'severe' response to abductions, July 12, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast/index.html, (accessed on 05.01 2007 ).
144 143
Israeli troops move into Lebanon after Hezbollah attacks soldiers, July 12, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/07/12/israel-lebanon.html, (accessed on 06.02.2007 ).
42
Actually, after the onset of hostilities, the Lebanese government immediately began diplomatic efforts in order to end the crisis. As a part of these efforts, Lebanon Prime Minister Siniora put forward the Seven-Point Initiative at the Rome conference. Its components included the reimplementation of UNIFIL forces in the south and a return to the 1949 ceasefire. 145 In spite of these efforts, the conflict ensued until 14 August 2006, claiming the lives of over 1,000 Lebanese civilians, 163 Israelis, and an unknown number of Hezbullah militants.146 On 11 August 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end the hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments the following days, called for disarmament of Hezbollah, for withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, and for the deployment of Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon147. The Lebanese army began deploying in Southern Lebanon on 17 August 2006. The blockade was lifted on 8 September 2006. On 1 October 2006, most Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon, though the last of the troops continued to occupy the border-straddling village of Ghajar. 148 The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), created in 1978 initially to monitor an earlier Israeli withdrawal, has fluctuated in size over the years, comprising approximately 2,000 military personnel as of mid-2006. Resolution 1701 envisions increasing UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000, of which approximately 7,000 would come from Italy, France, Spain, and other European countries.149 As noted in the Economist, though the mission in Lebanon is run by the UN, not by the EU, the
145
Ibid.
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), Permanent Ceasefire to Be Based on Creation Of Buffer Zone Free of Armed Personnel Other than UN, Lebanese Forces.
148
147
United Nations Economic and Social Council Topic Area B, 2007, Thessaloniki International Student Model UN, available at http://sites.mgkworld.net/thessis07/files/ecosoc_b.pdf, (accessed on 13.02.2008 )
149
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 15 September 2006, p. 4, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf , (accessed on 07.01.2008)
43
troops sent by the EU to join the UN Peacekeeping force in Lebanon were essential for a big and important European contribution. Thus, the decision to send troops by the EU was largely discussed collectively by the EU foreign ministers, who decided to meet Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, in Brussels.150 Taking into account the fact that the EU has mounted several peacekeeping operations of its own, one can realize that missions such as these are a visible expression of Europes eagerness to play a bigger role in the world.151 Though Hezbollahs military capabilities may have been substantially reduced, and re-supply from Syria and Iran could be hampered by the presence of international peacekeepers in Lebanon, Hezbollahs long-term potential as a guerrilla movement appears to remain intact after the July 2006 war. The conflict has challenged the U.S. policy towards Lebanon. In a broader sense, the war has threatened not only the long-term stability of Lebanon but has left the Bush Administration with a basic dilemma. On the one hand, the Administration is sympathetic to Israeli military action against Hezbollah and President Bush has spoken in favor of Israels right of self-defense. On the other hand, the fighting dealt a setback to the Administrations efforts to support the rebuilding of democratic institutions in Lebanon.152 Michael Hirsh, a commentator, suggested the two major agendas of Bushs presidency-anti-terrorism and the promotion of democracy - are in danger of colliding with each other in Lebanon.153 However, the EU has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities154, and this new crisis in Lebanon presented a chance to show its own ability and eagerness to make an impact in the region. Nevertheless it is debateful whether the EU is about to emerge as the great power that some have
150
The Economist, 26th August 2006, The European Union in the World: Abroad Be Dangers, p. Ibid. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf , (accessed on 03.01.2008) Michael Hirsh, The Legacy On the Line, Newsweek, July 24, 2006, p. 30.
22.
151
152
153
Anne Deighton and Victor Mauer, Securing Europe?:Implementing The European Security Strategy, Zur Sicherheitspolitik, 2007, No. 77, p. 21.
154
44
hankered after. Mr.Chirac once talked grandly of Europe balancing the United States, and of the EU being one pole in a multipolar world.155 The 2006 war split the nation and political system in two: most Shiites, who bore the brunt of Israels military onslaught, saw it as justification for Hezbollahs weapons as deterrence against a real threat; most others, who lamented the scope of destruction, saw it as proof that the main danger came from Hezbollahs recklessness. Not since the end of the civil war in 1990 had the country experienced such a deep and defining divide.156 Facing calls for Hezbollah disarmament and denunciations of its (allegedly foreign-inspired) adventurism in triggering the July 2006 war, the movement concluded that the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and its backers were hostile actors intent on cutting it down to size and further aligning Lebanon with the West.157 As a result, Hezbollah carried the fight squarely on the domestic scene, removing Shiite ministers, taking to the streets and pushing for the governments ouster. The sight of large numbers of Shiites taking to Beiruts streets alarmed many among the Sunni community who considered this a graphic display of a confessional power-play designed to weaken them.158 Considering that Hezbollah clearly possesses by far the most formidable arsenal and the only private strategic ones and that individual weapons adapted to urban combat are plentiful159 that spanned all confessional groups, another civil war possibility seems no longer unthinkable with the Lebanons fragile and sensitive to foreign intervention political structure. For overcoming such dilemmas, firstly it needs be handled with gradual deconfessionalisation and reform of justice and security systems. Besides, strenghtening Lebanese institutions and state structure that causes both paralysis and
155
156
International Crisis Group, Hezbollah and the Lebanese Crisis, Middle East Report No: 69, 10 October 2007, p. 10.
157
Ibid., p. 1.
158
International Crisis Group, Lebanon at a Tripwire, Middle East Report No:20, 21 December 2006, p.15.
159
Ibid., p. 17.
45
foreign intervention would be a sustainable solution for mollifying the Lebanese crisis. Paralysis in the peace in the region not only represents a threat to the significant European financial commitments to that process, but also threatens to undermine the much broader objectives and purposes of the ENP, which seeks to deal with the more general problems of regional instability and to stem the migratory flows and the export of terrorism and extremism, especially from North Africa. As a destructive and destabilizing factor, the war in Lebanon threatens to undermine these broader and more vital European interests, so Europes need for an enduring peace settlement has become urgent. As an unwieldy non-state and quasi-supranational body, the EU is a less proactive and more reactive policy-maker than classical nation states, and thus more deeply affected by the unpredictable turn of events.160 Moreover, July 2006 war in Lebanon is an effective external dynamic which can influence the feasibility of the ENP in this country. Whereas the EU was motivated to play an active role in the region, but had been excluded before in MEPP, this last crisis in Lebanon presented new opportunities to the EU to gain influence. Besides, the ENPs transformative agenda is in relation with the EUs growing capacity for political reconciliation and conflict resolution161, and thus any contribution by the EU to overcome destabilizing factors in Lebanon would result in possible increase of its influence. 3.4 The EUs Involvement in the UNIFIL: Eager to Demonstrate Presence in Lebanon. At the EU General Affairs and External Relations Councils meeting on 10 December 2007, it was declared that the Council welcomed the holding of the Annapolis Conference on the Middle East peace process and the joint understanding reached between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty before the end of
Roland Dannreuther, Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11, 2006, p. 193.
161
160
Ibid., p. 195.
46
2008.162 Moreover, the Council stated the EU's determination to accompany this new momentum by supporting the parties in their negotiations in a sustained and active manner and through working closely with international partners163. The statements underlying the EUs determination to support the process in an active manner are surely demonstration of the EUs willingness for an extended role in the region. Besides, the 2004 enlargement brought instable areas as neighbours to the EU, and it is quite clear that the EU would develop new strategies and policies to reduce the effects of potentially threatening instable regions. In this context, enlargement is a proximate motivation for the ENP. However, the policys roots are set down in the European Security Strategy, which as noted by Aliboni, points out that even in an era of globalization, geography is still important.164 When one examines the Wider Europe-Neighbourhood Communication of Commisssion in 2003, there can be found sentiments regarding the EUs needs to take more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes. Greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EUs willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries.165 Although not designed specifically with conflict prevention in mind, the ENP has been widely viewed as containing elements that are useful to resolve conflict situations.166 However, the EU needs its neighbours cooperation to tackle problems of illegal
162
Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations, 10 December 2007, 16327/07 (Presse 289), p. 2, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/97556.pdf , (accessed on 02.01.2008)
163
Ibid.
164
Roberto Aliboni, The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, p. 1.
165
Communication From Commission Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Brussels, 11.3.2003, COM(2003) 104 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf, (accessed on 21.12.2007)
Fraser Cameron, The European Neighbourhood Policy as a conflict prevention tool, EPC Issue Paper, No.47, June 2006, p. 5.
166
47
migration, terrorism and cross-border crime, as much as they need access to partial EU programmes.167 While the Lebanon Action Plan aims to promote strengthening political dialogue, trade relations, and reforms, as well as measures to prepare partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EUs internal market and in its domains of justice and home affairs, energy, transport, and environment, it also makes ample reference to conflict prevention. Likewise, the ENP Country Strategy Paper of Lebanon features references to territorial disputes and calls for a shared responsibility for conflict settlement. In its country report, the EU mentions about territorial conflicts and security situation in South Lebanon also citing Israel-Lebanon dispute over Hezbollah. 168 Until the ENP, the EUs Mediterranean policy had two dimensions: the Barcelona Process and the MEPP. Although the EMP has its roots in the MEPP169, a common sense that the Barcelona Process shall not be used as leverage in the MEPP stayed. Moreover, despite ambitious objectives of Barcelona Process such as a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestine conflict, disputes between Israel and Syria, conflict resolution and dialogue with a view to regional approachment in all fields, the EUs engagement in the MEPP has rather been modest, limited to nothing more than the personal attempts of Javier Solana or the special peace envoy and the role that the EU plays in the Quartet.170 The EUs attempts to gain a substantive role go back to the 1970s and there has since then been a consistent resolve and determination for Europes distinctive voice and policy preferences to be included in any process towards a peace settlement.171
167
Ibid., p. 17.
168
European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report Lebanon, COM (2005) 72 final, Brussels, 02.03. 2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/lebanon_country_report_2005_en.pdf, (accessed on 12.02.2008)
169
Perspectives of the Euro-med Partnership of the Barcelona Process, Speech given by Ambassador Dr. Herbert Krll, Austrian Presidency Euro-med Co-ordinator, Malta, 13.11.1998, available at http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/seminar05/papers/opening.htm, (accessed on 12.02.2008)
170
Ibid., p. 19.
48
Particularly since the mid-1990s, Europe has emerged as a more coherent and strategic actor towards the MEPP, a process from which it had earlier been excluded. Dannreuther claims that it was argued that Europes such role had been strenghtened by the adoption of a comprehensive regional strategy, as outlined in the EMP or Barcelona Process. However, many Europeans have felt the transatlantic cleavages triggered by the US Greater Middle East Initiative as an American threat to the EMP.172 While the 1973 war and the subsequent Arab use of the oil weapon created an increase of European interest in the region, Venice Declaration of June 1980 was to evidence the high point in European initiatives to promote a distinct European stance for Arab-Israeli conflict. The Venice Declaration in 1980 was the first genuinely official European statement of a strong political position on the Middle East.173 It recognised the Palestinians right to self-determination and called for an end to Israeli occupation. As a close neighbour to the Middle East, the EU has intense interdependency with the region, whereas the US is an outside actor viewing the region from a global perspective.174 Furthermore, European states feel immediately threatened by any disturbances, domestic or inter-state, in their wider Mediterranean environment.175 Nevertheless, in terms of providing an immediate opening for a more assertive European role in the peace process, the Declaration was to prove a failure.176 Relations were not to improve during the 1980s, even though the Arab states were contented by the support given to them by Europeans and considered this as a counterweight to the US support of Israel,
171 172
Dannreuther, European Union, p. 151. Aliboni, op.cit., p. 10. http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/r1276, (accessed on 04.01.2008)
173
174
Volker Perthess, Points of Difference, Cases for Cooperation: European Critiques of US Middle East Policy, Middle East Report, No.208, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Critical Assesments, Autumun 1998, p. 30.
175
176
49
However the collapse of communist bloc, end of the Cold War and UN coalition formed to expel Iraq from Kuwait appeared to offer the EU an opportunity to become involved in the peace process. Nevertheless Europes credentials for such a role were destroyed by a combination of Israeli-US distrust and incapacity to back the rhetorical support it provided for the Arab and Palestinian cause with any effective tools of leverage.177 During the 1990s, although Barcelona Process was formulated as an independent form from MEPP, it was regarded as a development that projected a more visible European presence in the peace process. Their connection was such that it was impossible to promote substantive advances in the EMP without there being a corresponding progress in the MEPP.178 Barcelona Process was also a reminder to the US counterparts that Europe has pursued democratic transformation of Arab states even before September 11 2001, and not only discovered the lack of democracy in the Arab world in the context of the US struggle against international terrorism.179 Whereas observers attract attention to the relation between Barcelona Process and Europes desire to take place in MEPP in the long term, it would not be exaggeration to assemble a similar relation between the ENP and the EUs prolonged ambition of extending its military ascendancy in the region. Here it is argued that the EUs increased contribution and interest to UNIFIL army in Lebanon would be complementary to the ENPs efforts to establish economic, political and cultural hegemony over Lebanon and the region. Under the ENP, greater integration into a huge area of co-prosperity is the inducement offered neighbouring countries, which are thus expected to reform to bring about domestic structural stability, international economic integration and peaceful inter-state relations. In the regions adjoining Europe, the ENP updates and upgrades the conflict prevention endeavours already embedded in the EUs overall
177
Ibid., p. 156. Ibid., p. 158. Volker Perthess, Europe Looks at Plan for a Greater Middle East, The Daily Star, 10.03.2004.
178
179
50
policy agenda.180 Moreover European Security Strategy Paper declared by Javier Solana expresses the same request: We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations.181 As it is understood from the above-mentioned documents, besides the political and economic leverages gained by the ENP instruments and objectives, the EU attempts to provide itself with the militarily instruments that allow it to be recognised as a hegemon or candidate for a hegemon in the long term in the region. However, as contributing to the conflict resolution in the neighbourhood is key to the achievement of EU objectives, this dimension of the ENP is found underdeveloped. Elsa Tulmets claims that recent interviews at the Commission reveal that the experience in the Western Balkans now also plays a major role in the context of neighbourhood.182 In fact, Western Balkans experience showed the EUs shortcomings in its external policy on European territory. Multiple conferences highlighting the weaknesses of the ENP, as it stands now, also push EU civil servants to reflect on past learning to perfect the ENP. This is done especially in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, which still represents a major weakness in the EUs capacity to deliver.183 The EU has a vested interest in seeking the settlement of these conflicts, this interest is also shared by its neighbours, if not by all of the parties to the conflicts.184 However, the conflict resolution dimension of the
180
Roberto Aliboni, The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, p. 2.
181
A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12.12.2003, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, (accessed on 12.01.2008).
182
Elsa Tulmets, Can the Discourse on Soft Power Help the EU to Bridge its CapabilityExpectations Gap?, European Political Economy Review, No. 7, Summer 2007, p. 204.
183
184
Nicu Popescu, The EU in Moldova-Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood, Institute for Security Studies: Occasional Papers, No.60, October 2005, p. 9.
51
ENP has been underdeveloped conceptually185, since it is the paradox that neighbours with conflicts on their territories have benefited the least from recent developments in ESDP. The EU has been less present and less visible in conflict settlement in its neighbourhood when compared to the Western Balkans and SubSaharan Africa. Thus, the EUs extensive contribution to UNIFIL army is a simple indicator of its desires for increasing the military side and complementing the politically and economically pro-active role foreseen in ENP documents and in European Security Strategy. ENP incorporates a stronger conditionality that goes hand in hand with the country-to-country approach while the EU seems committed to play greater role in world politics.186 Moreover, as Aliboni explains, intense and high-level integration makes any domestic and international crises affecting the neighbours especially relevant and significant for the EU as such crises, challenges and risks could either prevent attainment of the planned integration within the ENP or impinge more directly on EU security.187 While the EU is trying to establish a long-term increased operation over Lebanon, 2006 crisis between Israel and Lebanon can also secure an activist and prominent role to the EU and the EUs involvement in UNIFIL army can enhance the EUs profile in the region. The 2006 conflict involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians represents itself as a security risk. Former UN General Secretary Mr.Kofi Annan assesses the EUs commitment to provide over half of the troops for the enhanced 15000-strong UN force in Lebanon as EUs assumption of its responsibilities and showing its solidarity with the people of Lebanon. Aliboni stresses that in the 1990s, the EU planned to attach Barcelona Process to the Middle East Peace Process to help overcome the Arab-Israeli fracture. The predecessor of the ENP, the EMP, in itself was not supposed to lead to peace; its task was to facilitate the peace process by establishing a situation of structured
185
Ibid., p. 10. Del Sarto and Schumacher, op.cit., p. 25. Aliboni, op.cit., p. 3.
186
187
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cooperation and integration in the region. Aliboni also adds that the ENP framework will result in greater involvement of the EU in regional crises such as Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here, the EMPs relevance with Middle East Peace Process and the ENPs relevance to Arab-Israeli dispute-especially Israels 2006 Lebanon intervention-are combined with each other in terms of prospective intentions. Volker Perthess claims that differing from the US forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East, a common perspective for political, economic and social change in European neighbourhood that builds on the potentials in these countries and takes their societies along, respects dignity and realizes the links that exist between both political and economic underdevelopment, and unresolved regional conflicts is preferred by the EU in the context of ENP.188 The EUs political and military involvement in Lebanon under UNIFIL can be regarded as expanded by the ENP that brought the crisis closer to the EU. Actually, the ENP aims to provide structural stability in the long run, but in the meantime, it brings instabilities closer to the EU.189 In Lebanon there is absence of institutions or organizations of political change, and there is primordial ties which encompass ties of kinship, fealty, and religion providing alternative methods of democratic representation and political stability. These primordial ties create political blocs and fronts preventing the growth of civility and national loyalty. 190 In a person-based political climate, what Lebanon needs to do is to improve and lean towards on an institution-building approach. At this point, it is beneficial to point out that Europe generally puts more emphasis on institution-building, while the US focuses more on the persons in charge.191 According to Perthess, this stems from the US politics of nature that are much more personalized, and the prime decision-maker is much more important while Europe with its complicated institutional structure, individuals do not make so much of a difference.
188
Perthess, Points of, p. 1. Aliboni, op.cit., p. 5. Abdallah, op.cit., p. 131. Perthess, Points of, p. 2.
189
190
191
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At the EU General Affairs and External Relations Councils meeting on 10 December 2007, Council explicitly presented its concerns for current absence of a Head of State in Lebanon and underlined the importance of finding a solution. It is also stated that the solution can be achieved through dialogue and in spirit of consensus, full respect of the Lebanese democratic institutions and constitutional norms.192 In the case of past experiences and initiatives towards the Mediterranean, the EUs capabilities reached its limitations to provide security within the region. Moreover, as always in the EU, the members with a global projection are wary of any expansion of the EUs Middle Eastern projection because this would entail a stronger CFSP and, hence, some surrender of their global power to the Union.193 Neither the Barcelona Process, nor the desperate attempts of resolving the ongoing dispute in the Middle East have contributed to the security of the region. The problem lies in the fact that the EU did not transform its rhetoric of engaging in the security problems of these countries into concrete action. Commission also reiterates that the ENP has achieved little in supporting the resolution of frozen or open conflicts in the region, notwithstanding certain specific achievements.194 As a result of that, besides its support for promoting the internal transformations of states, it is seen that the ENP was basically designed as a tactical instrument for providing European security and interests in the region. Aliboni strongly recommends that the EU strengthen its Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy in order to succeed. He holds this conviction by the fact that if economic dimension of the ENP is not complemented by an effective political and military dimension, the EUs new geopolitical initiative could backfire that it could diminish rather than increase EUs security.195 Actually, the ENP needs to draw more from the EUs ESDP toolbox,
192
Council of the European Union, 10 December 2007, op.cit., p. 17. Aliboni, op.cit., p. 11.
193
194
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, COM(2006)726 final, 04.12.2006, p. 4, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf, (accessed on 04.02.2008) Aliboni., op.cit., p. 6.
195
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ranging from possible police contingents, rule of law missions, and security sector reform to civilian administration mission, and including military contribution to the peacekeeping operations in its neighbourhood.196 Consequently, as the EU must tackle the conflicts in its neighbourhood as part of a consistent, comprehensive, integrated and sustained approach197 of ENP, the EUs desired pro-active stance under UNIFIL after July 2006 war in Lebanon is a basic step to achieve this aim and also needs to be taken further by EU-led operations. As the EU reiterates the importance of stability in Lebanon for the whole region with reference to UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701 and 1757 and presents itself as an active player in encouraging constructive dialogue between the parties in the last General Affairs and External Relations Council, the ENP emerges as the best possible way for transforming the country with the help of the militarily enhanced and active EU.
196
197
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CHAPTER IV EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: THE ESSENCE OF THE ENP TOWARDS LEBANON 4.1. The Formation of European Neighbourhood Policy While international system has been facing drastic transformations in the 21st century which alter the strategic outlook of Europe, the EU has been seeking a new role for itself on the way to becoming a global actor. Being aware that it should develop a coherent and effective foreign policy, the EU put foreign policy at the heart of the draft European constitution. Conceived in 2003, the European Security Strategy identified the Unions role in the world and its geo-strategic interests. It declares that building security in our neighbourhood is one of three strategic objectives for the EU. In March 2003 the European Commission published its first official proposal for the neighbourhood policy namely Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. The Wider Europe Communication provided the general objectives based on an assessment of the EUs interests. In May 2004 the Commission adopted the Strategy Paper which provided the objectives and principles, the geographical scope, and the methods to be used in implementing the ENP. The Wider Europe concept was introduced by the Council and the Commission to describe the relations between the enlarged EU and its eastern neighbours. Nevertheless in the subsequent works and official papers the name of the policy was changed from Wider Europe to Proximity Policy to New Neighbourhood Policy, and finally to European Neighbourhood Policy.198 The ENP sets out a new framework for relations over the coming decade with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Southern Mediterranean countries that do not currently have prospects for membership. The ENP has been proposed as an alternative to membership which would satisfy the neighbours and Arabian Mediterranean partners raising their concerns about further marginalisation of the
198
Karen Smith, The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy, InternationalAffairs, No.81:4, 2005, p. 760.
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EUs southern periphery in its radar screen199 after 2004 enlargement, while keeping them outside the Union. Indeed, basic task for the EU is to establish a new form of engagement with neighbouring states, and to offer them a new relationship which is less than full membership but more than associate membership.200 The European Commission argues that several measures to enhance integration and liberalisation should be implemented gradually and progressively. There are diverging perceptions and opinions among the scholars and even officials regarding the motives and factors behind the ENP as well as converging ones exist. The 2004 enlargement has dragged the EU into a more active position on the global stage. After this widest enlargement, the EU found itself in a rather complex situation where it needed to simultaneously respond to the demands of its citizens and address its internal affairs while developing a comprehensive and consistent external policy, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy that regulates its relations with its new neighbours. Besides, altered regional and global parameters within which EU policy towards the Mediterranean takes place201 is another dimension affecting the EUs newest foreign policy tool. Sharon Pardo evaluates that it is exactly the long-term objective of the ENP moving towards an arrangement whereby the EUs relations with the neighbouring countries ultimately resemble the close political and economic links currently enjoyed with European Economic Area. Del Sarto and Schumacher emphasizes the similarities of the Neighbourhood Policy with the principles of EU external policies, as both aim at increased stability and security through cooperation. However, they also stress the novelty brought by the range and scope of the envisaged cooperation, which is to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. Within this framework, the ENP is
Michelle Pace, The EU Surrounded by a Ring of Friends: The Impact of the ENP on Europes South, Paper to be presented at the British International Studies Association 31st Annual Conference, University of College Cork, 18th-20th December, 2006, available at http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/pace.pdf, (accessed on 05.01.2008)
200 199
Kahraman, op.cit., p. 3.
201
Raffaella A.Del Sarto and Tobias Schumacher, From EMP to ENP: Whats at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, 2005, p. 18.
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straightforward about declaring its interests. These interests vary from effective control of borders to playing a greater role in conflict prevention and crisis management which was also reiterated in European Security Strategy Paper. ENP emhpasis is on promoting stability both within and between the neighbouring states, and economic and social development leading to increased prosperity and increased security on the borders of the EU which are surrounded by turbulent regions and failed states at present.202 In this context, perceived as a hot bed for terrorists especially after July 2006 war, Lebanon including instable factors deserves to be called as a turbulent region. Sevilay Kahraman states that the EU pursues two seperate but interrelated logics with ENP for its neighbours. The first is the logic of stabilization associated with the need for secured and properly managed external EU borders, the second one is the logic of promotion and transition that might reduce the socio-economic gap for the EUs outer frontiers.203 This assessment is clearly showing that EU concerns about the potential destabilizing factors at its enlarged borders and that ENP is an instrument for overcoming such dilemmas and serving for the EUs own security interests both economic and political. Andreas Marchetti claims that due to the fact that enlargement policy can no longer serve as the Unions first foreign policy choice in its vicinity, the EU tries to transfer some of its reform-prompting and stabilising tools to other policies and that the ENP seems to be the natural framework to take over this task by further attaching partners to the EU, even without a membership perspective.204 Marchetti analyzes that for ENP one of the major concrete incentives is the significant rise in funds made available to assist partners. Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) and MEDA programmes combined had a volume of
202
Duran imek, The European Neighbourhood Policy:An Assertive Initiative With Insufficient Means By The European Union, Unpublished MSc Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of METU, Ankara, December 2006, p. 31.
203
204
Andreas Marchetti, Consolidation in Times of Crisis: The European Neighbourhood Policy as Chance for Neighbours?, European Political Economy Review,No.7, Summer 2007, p. 16.
58
approximately 8.5 billion in the period 2000-2006, while for the ENPI, almost 11.2 billion are foreseen for 2007-2013.205 Michelle Pace agrees that due to structural asymmetries and the heavy dependence of Mediterranean partners on EU member states, one can argue that EUMediterranean relations correspond to a soft form of hegemony.206 Owing to the fact that the ENPs policy formulation process proceeded from late 2001 in the context of the events 9/11 and the ensuing war on terrorism, Michelle Pace considers that the main motivation behind it was actually security concerns. Espousing Paces argument for security challenges, Sandra Lavenex also attaches great importance to soft security risks constituting the background of the EUs enhanced engagement to the east and to the South.207 While the EU expects neighbouring states to line up with its own structures, beyond alleviating economical disparities, it aims at alignment in expected particularly in those issues identified as threats to mutual security. 208 Illegal immigration is identified as the most important priority among the soft security risks threatening the EUs security and is the one that needs to be tackled with the cooperation of neighbouring states. Robert Cooper, a British diplomat, mentions about post-modern imperialism which aims to bring order and organisation. He divides post-modern imperialism into two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy which is usually operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Second form of post-modern imperialism is directed towards instable neighbourhood that is hard to ignore in a globalized world. He considers that the post-modern EU offers a vision of cooperative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject209,
205
206
207
Sandra Lavenex, EU External Governance in Wider Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.11, No.4, August 2004, p. 681.
208
Ibid., p. 688.
59
obviously distorting the concept of imperialism. ENP is an ambitious project not only intended to resolve ongoing disputes and contribute to the security of the region but also aims to transform the region and integrate it to the international global economy for further enhancing EU-dominated relations in the long term. Elsa Tulmets attaches importance to the Commissions words declaring that the EU has to act as an attractive global player and to position itself on the international stage in a different manner than the US or Russia. The EU Commission reiterates in various documents that this can only take place through a process of adaptation and constant learning. Tulmets agrees that the ENP is a new policy discourse aiming at answering the expectations of the ENP countries and thus provides the EU with its label of soft power. She divides countries into three groups, with respect to their governmental, political positions and to their perspective of accession210, and among them Lebanon is the one which negotiated the Association Agreement and interested in enhancing its relations with the EU in various policy fields through the negotiation of more precise and politically engaging Action Plans. Lebanon is a part of the ENP but has no perspective of accession or has not expressed interest in EU membership so far. In February 2006 Directorate-General for the External Relations stressed that ENP was different from the US big bang strategy where everything is first destroyed and then rebuilt. Besides, Tulmets distincts the EU from the US as having a more patient approach. Venice Declaration of June 1980 is the basis forming the EUs differing Middle East policy and stance from the US. The ENP offers a privileged relationship with neighbours, which will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development as well as certain aspects of the EUs external actions.211 The EU offers its neighbours the possibility of participating in various EU
209
Robert Cooper, The New Liberal Imperialism, Observer Worldview, 07.04 2002. Tulmets, op.cit., p. 205. imek, op.cit., p. 32.
210
211
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programmes and incentives to reinforce political, security, economic and cultural cooperation. These incentives include: an extension of the internal market and regulatory structures; preferential trading relations and market opening; perspective for lawful migration and movement of persons; intensified cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats; greater EU political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management; greater efforts to promote human rights; further cultural cooperation and enhance mutual understanding; integration into transport, energy and telecommunication networks and the European research area; new instruments for investment promotion and protection; support for integration into the global trading system; enhanced assistance, better tailored to needs; new sources of finance.212 After stating these incentives, Pace contends that in the long term, there is also a promise of some economic and political integration. Above-mentioned areas are showing the EUs endeavours to transform its neighbouring countries political and economic structure in line with its own acquis. Elisabeth Johansson claims that due to the fact that the EU is a combination of the historical context in which the EC was created and that it has a hybrid supranational-intergovernmental polity and a cumulative treaty based legal order, many scholars simply regard it as an international actor promoting norms beyond its territority and thus regarded it as a normative actor. She considers that there are contradictions inherent in the EUs foreign policy vis--vis the ENP area. According to her, there are different motivations behind EU actions, such as commercial interests, parochial geopolitical interests, complex intra-Council trade-offs in regards to the southern or the eastern periphery and the ENP includes all of these normative, commercial, geopolitical and identity objectives. Johansson examples Manners words on six principal substantive and symbolic ways in which the EU promotes its values: contagion (EU as a source of attraction for third parties); informational (declarations, demarches), procedural (institutionalized relationships); transference (trade norms, political conditionality), overt diffusion (EC delegations) and cultural
212
Pace, op.cit., p. 8.
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filter (political learning).213 After quoting Manners words, Johansson stresses that the ENP allows both for substantive (political dialogue, trade norms, cooperation, financial and technical assistance) and symbolic (EU attraction, political learning) transmission of forms. The EU was in favor of bilateralism to influence individual countries internal and external policies. Differening from previous policies, with the differentiated bilateralism approach, the ENP also presents its basic feature to influence the partner states more effectively. Besides, the transformation of partner states in the direction of the EU acquis is planned to come about by Action Plans. Action Plans are undoubtedly the most convenient instruments of the ENP to transmiss its forms. 4.1.1. The Main Operational Framework of the ENP: Action Plans The ENP Action Plans, the backbone of the ENP, are tailor-made for each countrys needs in addition to being harmonious and complementary to other processes in which the countries participate, and they are negotiated with, rather than imposed upon, thus creating a greater sense of ownership by the neighbours.214 Based on the principle of differentiated bilateralism, the Action Plans are programmes of political and economic reforms designed to enfranchise the neighbour concerned by giving it ownership over its contours, substance and pace of implementation.215 While action plans cover a wide range of elements, the politicization of the sectoral issues clearly corresponds to the creation of foreign policy by the exportation of the EUs internal norms and values abroad, in addition to classical foreign policy tools.216 In the action plans, the EU sets out the values and
213
Elisabeth Johansson-Nogus, The (Non)Normative Power EU and the European Neighbourhood Policy:An Exceptional Policy for an Exceptional Actor?, European Political Economy Review, No.7, Summer 2007, p. 188.
214
Eneko Landaburu, From Neighbourhood to Integration Policy:are there concrete alternatives to enlargements?, CEPS Conference Revitalising Europe, Brussels, 23 January 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/060223_el_ceps_en.pdf, (accessed on 12.12.2007).
215
Sharon Pardo, Europe of Many Circles:European Neighbourhood Policy, Geopolitics, Vol. 9, No.3, Autumn 2004, p. 734.
216
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standards that the neighbours should adopt, with detailed objectives and precise priorities for action.217 They are cross-pillar, containing political and economic objectives relating to issues spaning all three pillars; in writing them, the Commission has to coordinate with member states, presidencies and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Representative. 218 According to the Council, action plans should be comprehensive but at the same time identify clearly a limited number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform.219 The mutually agreed Action Plans should represent a way to answer criticism about the asymmetry of economic agreements as well as about the unilateral character of conditionality. 220 Moreover, Pace is doubtful regarding the effectiveness of the action plans when one considers that they are jointly agreed upon by elites from authoritarian regimes who may not necessarily share the same interpretation of what common values actually mean in practice.221 She presents, as a proof to this idea, ten years of Euro-Mediterranean relations attesting how authoritarian regimes respond to EU pressures for democratization through cosmetic reforms as their primary value was protection of their power bases. Romano Prodi emphasizes that the policy aims at extending to the Mediterranean a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the EU.222 Nevertheless, Karen Smith stresses that the benefits on offer from the ENP are only vaguely summarized at the start of the action plans, and they are not directly connected to fullfilment of the huge number of objectives or even the most important
217
218
219
General Affairs and External Relations Council, European Neighbourhood Policy-Council Conclusions, 14 June 2004, press release 10189/04 (Presse 195), available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/80951.pdf, (accessed on 13.12.2007).
220
221
222
Building a Euro-Mediterranean area, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission at the opening of the 22nd "Giornate dellosservanza", Bologna, 17 May 2003, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/publication/euromed_report57.pdf, (accessed on 12.09.2007).
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priorities.223 She criticizes action plans for not providing a real incentive for reforms, a similar critic to that of Pace. However, Smith also thinks that action plans are striking for at least two other reasons. The first is the prominence within them of political objectives, including respect for specific human rights and democratic principles.224 Furthermore, action plans highlight another political objective as cooperation in the fight against terrorism and on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The ENP is to some extent indicator of the establishment of Europes rather loose hegemony, action plans also reflect a rather ample dose of EU self interest. Action plans are key political documents for the further development of the EUs relations with its neighbours on a bilateral basis and they cover two broad areas: first, commitments to specific actions, which confirm or reinforce adherence to shared values and to certain objectives in the area of foreign and security policy; secondly, commitments to actions which will bring partner countries closer to the EU in a number of priority fields. 225 Natali Tocci claims that the ENP aims to establish closer relations with third states both as an end and a means to contribute to structural change within and between these countries.226 Lebanon Action Plan will be examined in reference to this assessment. 4.1.2. Alignment with EU Acquis by Enhanced Relations, Lebanon Action Plan: On 19th September 2005, Prime Minister of Lebanon Fuad Siniora met with representatives of the international community, such as the US, the EU, and prominent Arabic countries at the UN Headquarters and declared them Lebanons
223 224
Elena Baracani, From the EMP to the ENP: A new European pressure for democratization? The Case of Morocco, Paper to be presented at the conference Europeanization and Democratization: The Southern European Experience and the Perspective for New Member States of the Enlarged Europe, University of Florence, 16th-28th June, 2005, available at http://hsf.bgu.ac.il/europe , (accessed on 3rd January 2008).
226
225
Nathalie Tocci, Does the ENP Respond to the EUs Post-Enlargement Challenges?, The International Spectator, Vol.1, 2005, p.12.
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agenda of essential political and economic reforms. He first explained that Lebanon was at the threshold of a new dawn and with the goodwill and support of the international community and the determination of the Lebanese people, they would have a real chance of achieving their goals.227 International community also replied to these efforts enthusiastically by promising help towards Lebanons independence, democracy and sovereignty while accepting that stability in Lebanon has an enormous effect on the entire Middle East region. In this context Lebanon welcomed the European Neighbourhood Policy initiative in its Decree of 27 January 2005, and the Lebanese government found it beneficial to intensify relations with the EU to act as an independent and sovereign state. As action plans are the key political documents in the ENP framework, Lebanon Action Plan will be dwelled upon with its specific characteristics and implications on further EU-Lebanon relations. A Strong Introduction for Enhanced Relations: In the introduction, it is strongly emphasized that Lebanons objectives should be met with the help of the EU and this action plan will be carried out in the context of the EUs common commitment to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It is also expected to advance the approximation of Lebanons legislation, norms and standards to those of the EU. Another stressed point is the building of solid foundations for further economic integration based on the adoption and implementation of economic and trade-related rules and regulations with the potential to enhance trade and investment with the EU228 through the action plan. In this part of the action plan, new partnership perspectives and a comprehensive set of priorities for action are agreed and presented by the EU and Lebanese officials. Among the perspectives, cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration, including through a stake in the EUs internal market, and the possibility for Lebanon to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and
227
Transcript of Press Conference on Lebanon, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, High-level Government Officials at United Nations Headquarters, 19 September 2005, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm10110.doc.htm, (accessed on 03.01.2008).
228
European Neighbourhood Policy-EU Lebanon Action Plan, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/lebanon_enp_ap_final_en.pdf , (accessed on 03.01.2008).
65
programmes are the prominent ones. Converging of economic legislation and reduction of trade barriers would surely stimulate investment and growth that Lebanon desperately needs especially after Israels 2006 attack. Besides aiming to integrate Lebanons economy to the EUs internal market, this document also intends to upgrade the scope and intensity of political cooperation through a regular political dialogue. To support the actions of Lebanon towards promised reforms, it is declared that there will be an increased financial support and reinforced participation in relevant Community programmes, promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links. Actions for an Aligned Lebanon: There are seven main titles forming the actions part. As all actions included are expected to facilitate the achievement of the objectives set in the Action Plan, the ones that are most closely related with the transformation process of Lebanon are examined. Whereas economic and social reforms appear necessary to ease Lebanons decayed economy and ruined infrastructure in the short term, a total alignment with the EU acquis in terms of both economic and political areas would turn out to the EUs advantage for further enhancing relations without full integration in the long term. As a newly emerging international actor, the EU endeavours to integrate Lebanon to its economic area, harmonise its judicial and administrative structures to its own, align its democratic principles including rule of law and to some extent human rights, as well as establishing a dialogue to maximise its benefits on migratory issues. The securitization of immigration issues in Europe became vitally important especially after 2004 enlargement. Since the issue of illegal immigration and asylum continues to be highly sensitive on the agenda of many governments and the public in the EU,229 there is a growing need for close cooperation and alignment of the implementation of immigratory issues in neighbouring countries. A lasting and effective influence of the EU over Lebanon needs to be ensured by Lebanons politic, economic and cultural cooperation with the EU and the EUs
229
Kemal Kirii, Recounciling Refugee Protection with Combating Irregular Migration: Turkey and the EU, Perceptions, Vol. 9, Number 2, Summer 2004, p. 16.
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military capabilities to prevent conflict and protect peace in this problematic country. An opportunity to demonstrate the military influence of the EU during and after Israels attack over country was examined in the previous Chapter . Below, the most essential parts of the actions is analysed.
a.
This action covers to work together to promote the shared values of democracy and the rule of law including good governance and transparent, stable and effective institutions. To achieve this aim, one of the objectives is establishing a political dialogue between European Parliament and the Lebanese Parliament. This objective at least in the short term seems difficult to implement for Lebanese parliaments complex structure can clash over establishing political dialogue with the EU. Taking into account the Hezbollah factor which has a strong anti-Western and anti-Europe stance among the other various factions would be easier to apprehend the difficulty. This action also covers strenghtening institutions guareenting human rights and fundamental freedoms and cooperating in the fight against discrimination, racism, xenophobia and racial hatred discourse. This objective serves both Lebanon and the EUs interests to provide a peaceful climate for the country and foreigners. However, it would be comprehensive to have such an understanding of non-discrimination from the countrys internal dynamics but not imposed by outer forces, especially countrys former hegemons. Other important objectives for political dialogue and reform are cooperation on foreign and security policy, regional and international issues, conflict prevention and crisis management. Owing to its weak state structure, Lebanon is thought be a hot bed for terrorist organisations, and it actually brings about the destabilizing factors for the EU member states. These objectives are put into action plan for comforming EU citizens concerned about their security. The EU intends to further develop cooperation in the context of the Middle East Peace Process and support Lebanon to participate in training activities on conflict prevention, crisis and natural disaster management. Moreover, the EU purposes to strenghten EU-Lebanon cooperation on the fight against and prevention of terrorism and reinforce the role of the UN in the 67
multilateral fight agains terrorism, including thorough implementation of all relevant UNSC Resolutions and through signature, ratification and full implementation of all relevant UN Conventions.230
b.
In the economic and social reform part, Lebanon is expected to fullfill the requirements in exact time periods seperated as short and medium terms. Similar to those EU accession strategies, these two terms complement each other and at the end of the latter, macroeconomic conditions are planned to be restored, poverty is reduced, market driven strategies and measures to encourage private investment are achieved. c. Trade Related Issues, Market and Regulatory Reform:
This part reflects Europes ambition for creating an integrated economic area including that of Lebanon. It clarifies and regulates the main issues such as movement of goods, right of establishment, company law and services, movement of capital, regional cooperation, taxation and competition policy. These regulations are basically planning to liberalise Lebanon economy, integrate it to the world economy and enhance economic relations with the EU. First, the continuation of work towards the objective of WTO accession and identifying areas with export potential to the EU need to be implemented. Besides, Lebanese administration is required to strenghten its capacity on international trade relations. Second, it is imperative that Lebanon provide further progressive liberalisation of trade in agriculture, processed agricultural products and fisheries products. Another regulated area of this action is the further harmonisation and simplification of customs legislation and procedures in accordance with WTO rules. Since further harmonisation needs cooperation, developing EU-Lebanon cooperation with regard to combat irregularities and fraud in customs and related matters are noted fundamental as well. Still, under this action, Lebanon is required to review its
230
68
national legislation with a view to identify measures to facilitate establishment of companies, including foreign-owned companies.231 Moreover, ensuring the protection of foreign investment and exchanging views concerning liberalization of capital movements are other important actions which will be implemented jointly by the EU and Lebanon. Other important regulated areas are taxation and competition policy. Gradual approximation of the national tax legislation with the principles of EU acquis and adoption and enforcing the draft competition law are indicators of the EUs willingness to transform Lebanon into an economically well-integrated and aligned country to its own structure. As part of the reform of European Union assistance instruments, a single instrument, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument designed to target sustainable development and approximation to EU policies and standards. 232 For an effective funding mechanism, Lebanon is required to ensure cooperation with the relevant EU institutions and bodies in the management and control of EU funds. d. Cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security:
After 2004 enlargement, the EU needed to elaborate a more articulated relation with its new neighbours since policies on illegal immigration continue to be a major source of concern for EU governments. This awareness of the matter is found in several EU documents. With its new borders, the EU is obviously first and foremost interested in securing itself. The European Security Strategy233 Paper sets as a strategic objective that of promoting a ring of well governed countries...on the borders of the Mediterranean... Noting this fact, cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security is deemed especially important. Establishing a dialogue on migration issues with a view to maximise the benefits of migration both for Lebanon and the EU and exchanging information and cooperating on transit migration both aim to prevent illegal immigration into the EU and protect its security. The public in
231
232
233
A Secure Europe in a Better World - The European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12.12.2003, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, (accessed on 12.01.2008).
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many European countires feels threatened by immigration regarding the rise of extremism and fundamentalist terrorism and the climate created by the 9/11 and Madrid attacks.234 Upheaval in Lebanon after 2006 and a possible related increase in the number of illegal immigration are apparent inducements for the EU to develop new ways to control the movement of people. For a better regulated and efficient border management, developing a strategy for an integrated system of border management and improving the administrative capacity at border crossing checkpoints are the enumerated requirements under this action title. Furthermore, fight against organised crime, drugs, money laundering, combating terrorism -especially, implementing the counter-terrorism related UN Resolution and Conventions- and judicial cooperation are developed to mitigate EU concerns evoked by the enlarged borders and potential destabilizing factors. e. People to People Contacts:
In this part, efforts to reform and modernise education and vocational training systems in order to promote competitiveness, employability and mobility aiming to bring Lebanon closer to EU standards and practice235 are touched upon. Declaring these objectives, the EU actually presented its real ambition to have a long term and stronger link with Lebanon. No matter how hard to establish cultural links between these two completely different cultures, enhancing cultural cooperation emerges indispensible so as to strengthen relations in the future. As Michelle Pace claimed that the EUs relations with Mediterranean partners correspond to a soft form of hegemony formulated by power centres of Brussels and imprinted on the margins in the South, reshaping the culture of partner sates is best reflected in such Western dominated agendas. Pace examples the EUs mantra in the ENP with these words: Look, if you (neighbours) become more like us, or as close to us as possible, we will reward you.236
234
Kirii, op.cit., p. 17. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/lebanon_enp_ap_final_en.pdf , (accessed on 04.01.2008). http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/pace.pdf , (accessed on 23.04. 2008).
235
236
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Motivations behind the ENPs formation are stil debated. Some of the observers perceive it as a response to security challenges increased after the 2004 enlargement whereas some regard it as a tool to establish an integrated economic area with the economy of the EU. Among the various comments, the most related and necessary ones with the thesis are presented. When one examines the various claims, it is observed that all of them have the right findings to some extent. However, it would be more comprehensive to explain the ENP as it follows: The ENP, as the latest foreign policy tool of the EU, is developed according to both concerns of EU countries to set a frontier against destabilizing factors from the region and willingness to involve actively in the region as a plan to establish closer links for further enhanced relations in the long run. Thus this policy is also be regarded as a way for establishing EU hegemony in the region. Action plans are demonstrating these intricate objectives. In an increasingly globalizing world, claiming to be a global actor while challenging present hegemons, the EU tries to disseminate its values and increasing its effectiveness over its new neighbouring regions with the ENP. Transforming the strategically important countries economic and politic structures into EU lines, but at the same time reducing the effects of detabilizing factors are brought together in action plans. These action plans reflect both the EUs long term willingness to establish closer links with partners and concerns of destabilizing factors which threatens the EU territory and frightens the EU citizens. In this context, the ENP is actually an external governance strategy that aims at transforming Lebanon into an acquis-aligned country, which provides it with an ample scope of actions for enhancing its relations in the future.
4.2.Assessing the ENP Towards Lebanon European involvement in the Mediterranean region goes back to prehistoric times but in its modern form, it really stems from the colonial period, particulary from the French colonial possessions in North Africa.237 In this period, economic
237
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consequences of the colonial period raised the European awareness. This period also reflected European realisation that demographic pressures in the region required accelerated economic development if popular aspirations were to be met and increased labour migration flows into Europe were to be avoided.238 The early 1970s were the time of dtente, while in the early 1990s, the Soviet threat had declined, thus shifting Europes priorities and politicized the Mediterranean region. In the 1970s, terrorism and troublesome economic relations were the two new challenges that attracted the attention of member states, of public opinion and of the Commission.239 The issue of terrorism was observed as related with the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1970 and a majority of member states adopted new special provisions to target the phenomenon. 240 The Venice Declaration of June 1980, issued by the European Community was a milestone in the evolution of a unified European stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict.241 The Declaration prepared the ground for the distinctive European approach on Palestinian rights by stating that the Palestinian problem was not simply one of refugees, and that the Palestinian people must be placed in a position to exercise fully their right to self-determination and actually the Declaration gave notice of Europes aspiration for greater involvement in the region. 242 Venice Declaration stated that the EC would not accept any unilateral intiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and maintained that settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.243 European official stance towards Middle East conflict did not change during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and that the
238 239
Ibid., p. 1.
Federica Bicchi, Defining European Interests in Foreign Policy:Insights from the Mediterranean Case, ARENA Working Papers, WP 13/03, p. 13.
240
Ibid., p. 13.
241
Rosemary Hills, Europe and the Middle East: Power by Stealth?, International Affairs(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944- ), Vol.73, No.1, January 1997, p. 18. Ibid., p. 18. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/decl/index.htm#10 , (accessed on 30.12.2007)
242
243
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invasion prompted a European declaration calling on Israel to withdraw unconditionally. Moreover, the Palestinian intifada and Israels forceful response, which exploded on to the worlds television screens in December 1987, triggered adverse publicity and criticism for Israel in Europe.244 Indeed, in response to the Lebanon invasion in 1982, the Community decided to postpone the signing of an economic agreement relating to Israeli credits over the next several years and also froze certain joint activities.245 Different from the US Middle East policy, Declaration still forms the basis of the European stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular and to the region in general. With the end of the Cold War, Europes ambition to become a more prominent political actor and to fill the vacuum left by the Soviet/Russian withdrawal became even more insistent and determined.246 Dannreuther states that there is the expressed ambition of translating the economic strength and unity of Europe, as embodied in the European Union, into a corresponding political and strategic capability. 247 Beside the political ambitions of Europe over the region, in the 1990s, migration, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism rose to the top of the political and securitarian agenda of European governments and terrorism acquired a new momentum in connection with Islamic fundamentalism.248 Migration was the main problem perceived by the Europeans in their relations with the Mediterranean non members at the beginning of the 1990s, although the history of migration across the region was very long.249 As a consequence, European governments began to implement internal and external measures to control and limit immigration while deeply revising the provisions for granting asylum.250
244
245
Rory Miller, Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Israel, Israel Affairs, Vol.12, No.4, October 2006, p. 656.
246
Roland Dannreuther, Europe and the Middle East:Towards a Substantive Role in the Peace Process?, Occasional Paper Series,No. 39, August 2002, p. 3.
247
248
249
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Many scholars accept that the 2004 enlargement brought new relations of proximity and hence new problems for and new expectations of the EU. As the external borders of the Union have changed, the EU acquired new neighbours and these circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges.251 While the 2004 enlargement was rendering the EUs borders closer to potential areas of instability with its breadth and scope, the EU was aware that it couldnt continue to be reluctant towards its periphery and should develop an effective foreign policy instrument, the ENP. This is because the EU can not seal its borders and insulate itself completely from unstable and impoverished neighbours.252 Because the EUs new Mediterranean neighbours, in general, pose potential threats and resources of regional instability, enhanced relations with them to provide a secure international environment necessiate initially transforming them into stable regions both politically and economically. Since neighbours are a source of instability to the Union, the above-mentioned action plans and their promises are the main political instruments to provide leverage to the EU for containing the instabilities and transforming them into orderly states. The EUs non member Mediterranean neighbours are politically unstable, economically vulnerable and facing the complex task of building functioning democracy and market systems.253 The EUs latest foreign policy instrument, the ENP is set to reshape and develop neighbours poor economic and political situation while the neighbouring Arab states are distant from the European core, geographically, politically, culturally and economically.254 The economic objective of the ENP is to help the southern and eastern neighbours develop and modernise by anchoring their economies on the EU model of
250
Ibid., p. 15.
251
Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.05.2004, COM (2004), 373 Final, p. 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf , (accessed on 12.11.2007 ).
252
Jan Zielonka, How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union?, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.39, No.3, September 2001, p. 515. Tim Gould, The European Economic Area: a Model for the EUs Neighbourhood Policy?, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol.5, No.2, 2004, p. 177.
254 253
Gergana Noutcheva and Michael Emerson, Economic Regimes for Export: Extending the EUs Norms of Economic Governance into the Neighbourhood, CEPS Working Document, No.233/December 2005, p. 12.
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economic governance.255 Besides, presenting a common set of policy challenges and instability to the Union due to poor governance or economic failure, neighbours would pose direct consequences for the security of the EU itself. Thus the centrepiece of the EUs strategy is an offer to neighbours in return for concrete progress with economic and political reform, and aligment to EU rules, of a stake in the EUs Internal Market.256 Gould further claims that the EU would be prepared to offer further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital
257
freedoms was reduced to the promise of a stake in the EUs internal market.258 The ENP seeks to surround the enlarged EU with a ring of friends who share the EUs values and pursue security and other foreign policies that are broadly consistent with the EUs and offers its neighbours the kind of market access for reform grand bargain that was instrumental259 during the accession period. This incentive is beneficial not only in terms of prompting partner states for further alignment but also necessary to create a suitable and integrated economic area for enhanced relations with the EU. In this context, action plans are intended to ultimately bring most of the EUs trade with the new neighbours under the EUs common external tariff regime and seek to ensure that trade flows during this transition are governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) principles.260 Furthermore, the EU also puts forward other incentives including greater EU engagement in conflict prevention, joint efforts to combat common security threats such as organised crime, greater cultural
255
256 257
258
Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.05.2004, COM (2004), 373 Final, p. 3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf , (accessed on 12.11.2007 ).
259
Susanne Milcher and Ben Slay, The Economics of the European Neighbourhood Policy:An Initial Assessment, Centre for Social and Economic Research(Studia i Analizy), Warsaw, March 2005, p. 7.
260
Ibid., p. 8.
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cooperation and promotion of human rights, participation in EU programmes, and enhanced financial and techncial assistance. 261 Lebanon has a history of serving as an arena for proxy struggles and dangeorusly deepened communal divisions. Domestic politics is being dragged into wider contests while foreign actors are pulled into Lebanons domestic struggles.262 After the civil war, Lebanon in fact never healed its confessional rifts and society is still hopelessly fragmented along clan, family, regional, social and ideological lines while there are no genuinely sovereign, credible and strong state institutions; and above all, a corrupt patronage system has created vested interests in perpetuating both sectarianism and a weak central state.263 Besides, like many other non member Mediterranean neighbours, Lebanon also faces lower quality infrastructure, lower per-capita GDPs and much greater political risks that need to be transformed for further enhanced relations with the EU in the future. Thus, ENP aims to bring substantial efficiency and welfare gains to neighbouring countries via liberalised access to the single market and legal changes in the areas of customs and financial services intending to promote trade facilitation and business creation. 264 Moreover, better market access, combined with enhanced dialogue and cooperation on social and employment policies are planned to encourage reforms directed at reducing poverty and increasing the effectiveness of social assistance.265 The expectation is for partial and progressive alignment with EU legal norms in areas where it makes economic sense, suits the development level and serves the development goals of the neighbours.266 The economic dimension of the ENP can be seen as an attempt to export the EU norms of economic governance and the EU is urging Lebanon to benefit from its own economic experience and to align rules with its regulatory
261 262
International Crisis Group, Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm, Middle East Report No.48, 05.12. 2005.
263
International Crisis Group, Lebanon at a Tripwire, Middle East Report No.20, 21.12.2006. Milcher and Slay, op.cit., p. 13. Ibid. Noutcheva and Emerson, op.cit., p. 19.
264
265
266
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framework for creating joint prosperity through economic integration. 267 While the ENP intends to bolster the alignment and reforms of Lebanons economic infrastructures in accordance with EU standards, actually it purposes to provide mechanisms for further enhancing relations between the parties in the long term. Beside economic objectives, the EUs interests are centred on stability and cooperation, which are seen as the basic factors affecting security across the Mediterranean.268 The neighbouring countries also present the EU with a common set of policy challenges in managing migration and potential cross-border problems associated with organised crime, trafficking, the environment and public health.269 Although the draft Constitution and the Security Strategy Paper both underlie the will and determination of the EU to enhance its role as an international actor, many EU citizens are more concerned with matters of homeland security, energy supply, immigration and jobs rather than the EUs ability to promote peace and stability and induce prosperity in its immediate region.270 As a consequence of this perception, potential factors to create instability in the EUs homeland are regarded as principal matters to be dealt with. Sharon Pardo claims that the ENP is based on a metaphor in which the EU is the cosmos and the rest of Europe and the Mediterranean chaos. Evaluating Lebanon in chaos is to some extent, when taking into account its situation is accurate. Pardo explains enlargement as a tool to organise part of the chaos and make it part of the cosmos. The ENP was improved as an alternative to enlargement that would allow the expansionary dynamic of the EU to continue without the burden of acquiring new member states. While the 2004 enlargement increased the number and heterogeneity of the member states, further enlargement would mean the ineffectiveness of EU mechanisms. Necessity to overcome this enlargement fatigue engendered a new concept that made it possible for the EU to continue to expand without necessitating
267
Ibid., p. 24. Roberto Aliboni, European Security Across the Mediterranean, Challiot Paper 2, March 1991, p. Gould, op.cit., p. 174.
268
14.
269
270
Sabiha enycel, Sanem Gner, Sigrid Faath and Hanspeter Mattes, Factors and Perceptions Influencing the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Selected Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries, EuroMesco Research Project, October 2006, p. 3.
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further enlargement. In this context, the ENP provides for the broadest possible cooperation with regional and sub-regional chaos but does not envisage the Mediterranean countries fully-fledged integration with the EU.271 While one route for making part of the cosmos is transforming Lebanon into an EU-aligned country in the long term, and second one is using Lebanon as a buffer zone to keep at bay the destabilizing factors in the short term. As a consequence, this policy generates a strategy keeping Lebanon not too close to thretaen EU security and not too far to diminish the EU influence in the region. The EU needs to simultaneously respond to the demands of its citizens and address its internal affairs while developing a comprehensive and consistent external policy that regulates its relations with its new neighbours.272 Georg Vobruba contended that central motivating factor behind the ENP is the core of the EUs interest in safeguarding its own existence as a politically stable zone of economic prosperity. Vobruba ascertains two different perceptions of core as a consequence of its interests: on the one hand, neighbours are perceived as sources of various economic and political problems that damage the EUs extensive interest in stability and, on the other hand, they are considered as protective zones that can serve to keep at bay problems arising in the more distant periphery. 273 As the EU supports Lebanon to keep up the reform and aligment process to transform it into an EU aligned country, it encourages the inclusion in European Networks of all kinds: transport, research and education, energy, environment, culture and so on. When one examines the Lebanon Action Plan, it can be clearly noted that Lebanon is encouraged to take part in these areas. Besides, the EU fosters cross-border cooperation, and specifically concrete projects to link neighbouring regions across the EUs new border274 to overcome its own security dilemma and to comfort its citizens. Moreover, taken measures to protect its borders combines with strong pressure on the neighbours to manage their borders and reform their customs
271
272
Georg Vobruba, Expansion Without Enlargement, EUROZINE, available at www.eurozine.com (accessed on 11.01. 2008).
274
273
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services. Union seeks increased economic integration and closer political cooperation with neighbours which will be supported by financial and technical assistance and a new financial instrument.275 Basically, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is created for the objective of encouraging economic integration and political cooperation between the EU and the neighbours and addresses security and stability challenges posed by geographical proximity in this context. The ENPI also aims to add more coherence in technical assisstance, and provide more financial support for creating capacities for trade infrastructures and institutional and private sector developments.276 Europeans are frightened by the growing military capabilities of the region, but equally so by the growing immigration from these region, thus migration, like terrorism and religious tensions, is perceived as a consequence of profound social and cultural unrest to which attention must be paid in order to achieve security. 277 The ENP has brought new priorities into existing association relationships and has intensified webs of integration, not only in the traditional field of trade, but also formerly domestic domains such as justice and home affairs (JHA), energy, the environment, transport and, with some countries, also foreign and security policy.278 The ENP would give Lebanon like other neighbouring countries decidely closer relations with the EU compared with non-neighbouring countries, including the chance to integrate further economically in the vast EU market so as to achieve the four fundamental freedoms of movement-persons, goods, services and capital-in the long term.279 The status offered by the EU to ENP countries will be very similar to that of the countries presently party to the European Economic Area, a status that excludes political integration but provides for full economic integration and a
275
Kahraman, op.cit., p. 26. Milcher and Slay, op.cit., p. 17. Aliboni, European Security, p. 15.
276
277
278
Sandra Lavenex and Frank Chimmelfennig, Relations with the Wider Europe, JCMS , Vol. 44, 2006, p. 143.
279
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280
Mr.Prodi called this formation as everything but institutions.281 Del Sarto and Schumacher compare the Commissions rather generous and somewhat superficial offer of everything but institutions to a double-edged sword. Actually, the adoption of the enormous sized EU internal market acquis is extremely time-consuming and costly task for Lebanons producers that have to conform as it is in potical and administrative terms.282 Besides, Smith underlies that admitting some countries to membership and excluding others can produce an insiders and outsiders perception. Despite these cynical assessments for the so-called benefits of ENP, being excluded from membership status does not bother Lebanon. Apart from the 1987 Moroccan application for membership, no southern Mediterranean Arab country realistically aspires to entering the Union. As this is also valid for Lebanon, that ENP is not offering EU membership does not disturb Lebanon and its aspirations. Secondly, for Lebanon, offers of ENP are definitely highly attractive as its trade structures are directed almost entirely to the EU. Emphasises in ENP documents such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, market economy, sustainable development, stability, security, prosperity, joint response to common challenges (border management, prosperity gaps, crime, environment, health, terrorism, etc.) would contribute to carrying out fundamental changes in order to bolster the democratic structures of the country. Moreover, due to the fact that Lebanon is vital to the Bush administrations regional strategy for Israels security, Tehrans ambitions and the Syrian regimes core interests, the EUs ENP policy would be an option and a possible route to be taken in this balance of foreign forces. The EU, once declared Venice Declaration and still stands on it, seems to have a different path from the US coercive force. Moreover, the EU insists on the importance of Lebanese sovereignty and independence in its various documents and
280
Ibid.
281
A Wider Europe-A Proximity Policy As the Key to Stability, Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the EC, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/news/prodi/sp02_619.htm (accessed on 12.06.2006). Lebanons family-led manufacturing enterprises with less than ten employees amount to %88.
282
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declares each time that it respects Lebanons national interests. In this point, while Syria and Iran are constantly penetrating, foreign and close neighbours to Lebanese politics, the EUs full support will surely be welcomed not only by Lebanese Christians but also a vast majority that is unhappy about Syria and Irans interventions. The ENP not only prompts the EU to continue its efforts to increase its presence in world politics and to move towards a greater assertiveness, but also displays a new self-confidence regarding its role in regional and international politics. With the ENP, the EU openly acknowledges the unequal power relations between itself and its neighbours, while displaying the willingness to use this power for pursuing its foreign policy interests.283 Extending its transformative power over Lebanon by its regulatory acquis, the EU actually behaves as a global actor in its enlarged borders, with its own conceptions of roles and responsibilities as well as perceptions of threat and interdependence. Especially when noting that Lebanon has no prospect of membership, the attempt to extend the EUs legal boundary is not only a benevolent projection of acquired civilian virtues but also a more strategic attempt to gain control over policy developments through external governance.284 The EUs endavours to extend the regulatory scope of the acquis may be conceived of as a form of external governance in which internal and foreign policy goals come together. Furthermore as mentioned before, in return for effective implementation of reforms (including aligning national legislation with the EU acquis), the EU promises to grant closer economic integration with its partners.285 Rafaella Del Sarto criticizes the ENP that it was not designed to address socioeconomic problems in the EUs periphery in the first place. Consequently, the instruments of the ENP and the alleged incentives it offers are seen as ill-defined and inadequate for reading the explicit and implicit policy objectives. Sarto also seems very pessimistic about the tools and incentives for the ENP that are surrounded by a
283
284
285
Hiski Haukkala, The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon:The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy, A Paper presented to the Central and East European International Studies Association (CEEISA) Convention, Reflection on a Wider Europe and Beyond: Norms, Rights and Interests, University of Tartu, Estonia, 25-27 June 2006, p. 13.
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number of myths which do not hold up against a realistic investigation.286 Thus she claims that the ENP is incapable of contributing consistently to the socio-economic development of the Southern Mediterranean or be helpful in connecting the EUs neighbours to the centre in a sustainable way. However, the EU actually has no intention to recover the problems of Lebanon and contain them in an inclusive manner by the ENP. The ENPs long term aim is to create the economical and political conditions in the region for further enhanced relations with the EU and thus increasing the EUs influence, counterbalancing the US, Syria, Iran and to some extent, Israel. Consequently, it is not reasonable to criticize the ENP for being inadequate to manage partner states domestic problems. Nonetheless the problem is that the European laws are largely imposed from outside with little regard for local habits, tradition, preferences and resources, both human and material.287 Thus, as approximating values and standards are expected to help increase prosperity, it is doubtful whether direct imposed acquis coomunautaire would be an appropriate way for alignment for a country struggling with basic reforms. Smith stands on that the ENP may give the EU more leverage to influence nonmember neighbouring countries, nevertheless she adds that the ENPs capacity to make a significant impact on such countries could be dwarfed by the scale of the problems and the involvement of other actors, notably the US.288 As the EU creates firmer links to its periphery in order to stabilise it, it actively supports and strenghtens it, due to the fact that this sort of orientation is in the vital interest of the EU to acquire security and maintain or even gain a certain level of regional influence.289 With over fifty years of integration and crisis management experience, the EU seems to become one of the regions best prepared for the coming decades, and the ENP is just an expression of the Unions ability and determination
286
287
288
289
Andreas Marchetti, The ENP Foreign Policy at the EUs Periphery, Discussion Paper, Centre for European Integration Studies, ZIE, 2006, p. 29, available at http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c158Marchetti.pdf , (accesssed on 12.02.2008).
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to play an ever more important role.290 In the neighbouring region, there is a situation of chronic instability and also a historic existence of European interest in maintaining a strategic or geopolitical access to the region which includes the right to introduce military force at will. 291 Presently, EU efforts to establish and develop its military capability under UNIFIL in 2006 to be visible at least among the other forces. It is because effective security cooperation relies upon the EU taking affirmative impartial steps towards resolving the Mashreq countries conflict and reaffirming its stance towards Israel.292 The EU has generally not applied political conditionality, and political dialogue has tended not in close relation with democracy or human rights owing to the EUs fear of giving too much space to Islamic fundamentalists. Besides, the EU does not want to destabilize countries whose support for a Middle East peace agreement and action against terrorism and illegal immigration is important.293 Thus, for the Arab Mediterranean states, the economic benefits of regulatory convergence with the EU has to be the prime factor to persuade ruling elites to anchor their economic policies in the EU framework.294 As a consequence, the EU itself has been hesitant to pursue democratisation policies forcefully, and has emphasized economic reform, counting on a positive spill-over efect from the economic to the political domain. 295 The EUs pressures to transform Lebanon may result in instability and these efforts also depend on credible domestic actors that can accelerate the reforms. However, in Lebanon, especially Hezbollah which does not conform with the EUs conceptions of democratisation do not enjoy this credibility. While the real challenge to these regimes power bases stems from the role played by Islamist parties or movements, Hezbollah stands as a fundamental obstacle with its anti-Western and anti-Europe sentiments and actions.
290
Ibid. Aliboni, op.cit., p. 14. enycel, Gner, Faath and Mattes, op.cit., p. 3. Smith, op.cit., p. 770. Gergana and Emerson, op.cit., p. 19. Ibid., p. 20.
291
292
293
294
295
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Michael Emerson recommends that the EU restructure, reprioritise and reinforce its approach to the Mediterranean and Arab-Muslim world296, with links to the minorities within it and in this context Lebanon-EU relations should be handled by taken into consideration its special and vulnerable political and social system. Thus, economic, political and social progress, and harmony of the civilisations has to be the long term therapy for its own sake as well as for Lebanon. As the Venice Declaration of June 1980 forms the basis of European stance towards the region, Europe has all the makings of a major player there and has only to translate this into political clout.297 Indeed, in the long term, the ENP is not only a foreign policy tool for aligning Lebanon and integrating it into the EUs economic and to some extent, politic structure to enhance the relations, but also has an important mission to increase the EUs influence and strenghten its politic presence in the region counterbalancing Syria, Iran and US influences. Increasing the EUs influence in the region and in Lebanon also requires a military capacity to demonstrate its presence. The EUs sending troops to UNIFIL is a way of demonstrating its desires for being visible in the region.
296
Michael Emerson, The Wider Europe As the European Unions Friendly Monroe Doctrine, CEPS Policy Brief, No.27, October 2002, p. 17. Hills, op.cit., p. 17.
297
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CHAPTER V CONCLUSION This thesis had three main objectives. First, it aimed to analyze the continuities in the policies of the EU towards Mediterranean and to identify the EUs growing interest for enhanced relations with the region. Second, it intended to examine Lebanons characteristics and various factors affecting its structure, stability and agenda, and lastly, based on Lebanons specific features and relations with the EU, it attempted to inquire the ENP as the latest foreign policy tool of the EU for Lebanon and to outline the logical consequences of this relation with its changeable nature. In consideration of the long term nature of the EUs stance, an extensive historical analysis that highlights the continuity and increase of the EUs interest was initiated from 1970s. This study aimed to present the EUs latest foreign policy tool, the ENPs objectives of enhancing European efficiacy in the international system. Lebanon, as the case country, was regarded as a strategic country for strenghtening the EUs position in the Middle East context. EU countries willingness to participate in UNIFIL and to send troops after the July 2006 Israeli attack on Lebanon was perceived as the eagerness of the Union for a more effective military role in close relation with the long term objectives of the ENP. From the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s, Europes objective for establishing relations with Mediterranean region was simply to forge bilateral trade agreements. Actually, from its birth until 1972, the EC did not consider the Mediterranean to be a homogenous region and negotiated instead trade agreements with most of the riverain countries on a bilateral basis. As the term global may not have been the most appropriate label, the GMP nevertheless sought to address the Mediterranean more systematically and can be regarded as the beginning stage of the future European-Mediterranean relations. Despite its merely trade-oriented structure, the GMP is important for it stimulated cooperation between Europe and the Mediterranean region for the first time systematically and it provided a single and coordinated framework for the existing bilateral trade and cooperation agreements. 85
In June 1980, the EC declared the Venice Declaration asserting the importance of the finding solution to Palestinian problem. This initiative, still forming the basis of the EUs approach towards the Arab-Israeli dispute, is highly important to demonstrate the differing stance of the EU from that of the US, who is a strong supporter of Israeli politics. In the new conjucture brought by the collapse of communism and southern enlargement of the Union, the EU decided to develop a new policy named RMP. Though it did not turn out as effective as it was at first thought to be, it was another step that would be taken further by future initiatives of the EU. The RMP was developed owing to the EUs political and non-member Mediterranean partners economic considerations. It is widely accepted that the RMP failed to support and encourage regional cooperation and closer integration. Besides historical animosities among the states in the region, never-ending political tensions, the unwillingness of the states to share their resources with the neighbours within the framework of development assistance programs are leading causes for the RMPs failure in fulfilling the expectations. However, the RMP is important in identifying political, economical and social alternations in world politics and developed strategy and responses to them by the EU. The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November 1995, marked the starting point of the EuroMediterranean Partnership (the Barcelona Process), a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the 15 member states of the European Union and 12 partners in the Mediterranean region. As the historic importance of the Mediterranean was tremendous, either as an early cradle for the Western culture or for the exchange of goods, and at the same time an area of constant struggle for superiority, the EMP was the mostly materialized initiative of the EU to increase its actorness and presence in the Mediterranean region among the other former policies, namely GMP and RMP. One of the accomplishments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the allocation of substantial funds, amounting EUR 9 billion, to the Mediterranean region called the MEDA programme which is the most important financial tool of the Barcelona Process. There are three main fields of activity within the Barcelona Process: the political and security partnership, the economic and financial partnership, and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. 86
Although the EU combined all three chapters into one comprehensive policy acknowledging that financial, economic, cultural, and security issues can not be effectively tackled seperately, the most noticeable chapters of the three were economic and financial partnership. That preference was based on the belief that the roots of the conflict were primarily due to the failure of economic development and regional economic integration. Consequently, the historical background of EUMediterranean relations is given as a background to present in a logical and historical order for manifesting the EUs increasing interest towards the region. The thesis aimed to inquire Lebanon reality, and various dynamics creating it. Basic troubles inherent in internal dynamics are selected as 1943 National Pact, Palestinian refugees, Hezbollah and the Taif Agreement. While especially the National Pact and the Taif Agreement suffer from their lack of future strategies and standing as difficult obstacles for the unity of Lebanon, examining these internal dynamics reveal the fact that the EU should establish its strategy towards this country on a gradually expanding on long term basis. Syria and Iran, the most influential external dynamics, and their stranglehold in Lebanon are examined, and identified as the their connection with Hezbollah. Whereas all of them intensify the conflicts in Lebanon, the EU and its policy, the ENP can present an alternative for balancing the ambigious and unrestricted penetration of these external factors. Indeed, in the long term, the ENP is not only a foreign policy tool for aligning Lebanon and integrating it into the EUs economic and to some extent, politic structure to enhance the relations, but also has an important mission to increase the EUs influence and strenghten its politic presence in the region counterbalancing Syria, Iran and US influences. In this thesis it is also asserted that 2006 July War and following instabilities in Lebanon provided an opportunity to the EU to act as an efficient military actor complementary to its discourses supported by the ENP framework. As increasing the EUs influence in the region and in Lebanon requires a military capacity to demonstrate its presence, the EUs sending troops to UNIFIL is a way of demonstrating its desires for being visible in the region. As political and economic objectives were reflected in Lebanon Action Plan, a militarily engaged EU in the country would surely affect the effectiveness of the 87
ENP as it is linked to the priorities set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS). As mentioned before, ENP was not designed specifically with conflict prevention in mind, however it has been widely viewed as containing elements that are useful to resolve conflict situations. The strong need for the neighbours cooperation to tackle problems of illegal migration, terrorism and cross-border crime stays as well. The ENP, as the latest foreign policy tool of the EU, is developed according to both concerns of EU countries to set a frontier against destabilizing factors from the region and willingness to involve actively in the region as a plan to establish closer links for further enhanced relations in the long run. Thus this policy is also be regarded as a way for establishing EU hegemony in the region. Action plans are demonstrating these intricate objectives. These objectives are put into action plan for comforming EU citizens concerned about their security as well. The ENP and its motivations are analyzed from the various scholars differing opinions. Among them, there are many supportive arguments to this thesis argument which claims that the EU tries to establish a long term hegemony in Lebanon. The thesis focused on action plans which reflect a rather ample dose of EU self-interest. It also asserted that the ENP follows an inclusive approach towards Lebanon. The EU approximates this problematic region by enlarging and it becomes more interested in the problems related to this country. Besides, from the viewpoint of political leadership of Lebanon, it actually does not have a membership intention and the ENP is beneficial to create counterbalancing effects to Lebanons political and economical impasses. Moreover, it is lastly stressed that the EU utilizes the ENP as an external governance strategy to reshape Lebanons judicial and administrative structures. Thus transforming Lebanons structures in line with EU standards would make it easier for the EU to enhance stronger relations with Lebanon in the long term. This thesis tried to investigate the ENP and its potency for transforming Lebanon into the ring of friends with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations. This thesis also asserted that the ENP is the newest foreign policy tool of the EU for establishing its hegemony in the region in the long term. Various internal and external dynamics shaping the Lebanon reality were examined and they proved the difficulty of installing effective and strong relations under the ENP. 88
Among the various initiatives of the EU, the ENP, as the latest and most ambitious one, was utilized as an external governance strategy to affect Lebanons domestic and foreign policies. It is also claimed that the ENP would provide Lebanon decidely closer relations with the EU compared with non-neighbouring countries, including the chance to integrate further economically in the vast EU market so as to achieve the four fundamental freedoms of movement-persons, goods, services and capital-in the long term. Moreover, the ENP also brings the EU closer to Lebanon and its conflictual environment. Thus, the ENP follows an inclusionary approach towards Lebanon in terms of increasing its interest and interdependency. At present, it is not clear that the European Neighbourhood Policy will be able to act as an instrument of the EUs desired ambitions for promoting its transformational capacity and strengthening its claim as an international actor in the Arab Mediterranean region. However, what it offers in its documents and what it requires from partner states is an open declaration for the long term intentions of the EU in the region. The ENP is an ambitious new political framework of the EU for relations with neighbouring states, and political, economic and cultural areas that are supported to be developed in partner states. With its bilateral differentiation principle, each countrys priorities are assessed and decided with joint meetings from partner states. In this context, with the examination of the Lebanon action plan, its requirements and recommendations for further alignment with the acquis are displayed. As the backbone of the ENP, this document demonstrated the ENPs agenda and supported this thesis argument that the EU tries to establish its hegemony in Lebanon in the long term while imposing its acquis. In this regard, July 2006 War in Lebanon is also presented as an opportunity to manifest the EUs military eagerness and abilities to complement the declarations of the EU in the ENP and the ESSP documents. Consequently, the basic premise constituting the ENP that closer cooperation with the EU would benefit both sides, reduce potential conflict situations, lead to a more secure and stable Europe and enhance overall security serves the same interest with the EUs strategy to reshape domestic political and economic structures of Lebanon: enhancing the EUs penetration in the region and raising its profil. 89
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