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TELEGRAMS NO. TEHRAN 1 0 7 5 2 ,TEHRAN 10.3 4 2 ,!10Sr3W
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2 2 1 56 ,TEHRAN 0 9 5 0 3 ,TEHRAN 9891 6 ,USICA 5 0 2 5 3 AN0

TEHRAN 58831 WERE THE LAST C O P I E S OF T H E I R O R I -
G I N A L TEXTS AND,THUS,VERY DULL I N COLORPTHEREF-
ORE THEIR PRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN BOOKS
WERE NOT FAYDRABLY P O S S I B L E . F O R T H I S REASON,THJ
ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS
1
WERE R&-TYPED.
 CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

SUBJECT: Alternative Views from the Provinces

SUMMARY
Nine letters, written in both Farsi and Erfglish, re-
c~ivedduring the past two months from as many
Iranian friends --former students, colleagues
(high school teachers), and close friends -- living
in Shiraz and Khorasan portray post-Pahlavi Iran
in a somewhat different light than American Em-
bassy and American press reporting. Shiraz and
certain remote areas of Khorasan appear calm and
peaceful, generally free of violent incidents.
Inhabitants of these two areas have welcomed the
demise of the Pahlavis and the establishment of an
Islamic Republic, and yet criticize freely and fear-
lessly their new leaders, including Khomeini. Al-
though high school students throughout Iran, even
those in the remotest towns, were greatly politi-
cized, schools were running normally by Now Ruz.
Although a sense of betrayal and hyprocrisy of
Carter's human rights policy led most to lividly
condemn the USG, affection and respect remained for
individual Americans. While the Correspondents
recognized the great problems confronting post-
Pahlavi Iran, few desire to flee. On the contrary,
most of these nine correspondents, inspired by the
undreamed of quick success of the Revolution in
toppling the Shah, seek to participate actively in
the transformation of their society. In short, these
predominantly young, lower-to-middle class "provincials"
remain optimistic six months after the Shah's departure.
The diversity In correspondents is great: in education, from
eleventh graders in high school to two masters degree holders;
in age, from sixteen to about fifty-five; in experience, from
an isolated villager who has only traveled to Mashhad once
or twice in his life to an urbane Shirazi who has traveled
widely in Europe (but not the US); in social class, from
tribal lower class to urban upper middle class.
In only two respects can the correspondence of such a varied
group be generalized. First, all now approve wholeheartedly
of the overthrow of the Shah. Several students participated

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -

actively in street demonstrations during the Revolution,

while others (Shirazi teachers) waited on the sidelines
ti1 the outcome was certain. Several are vociferous in
their criticism of the dyarchy; i.e., Khomeini and the
PGOI, replacing the Shah -- but none feel the present
leaders begin to compare in venality, tyranny, and cor-
ruption with those of the ancien regime.
Second, with the exception of one unsigned letter vehe-
mently critical of ~hotbzadeh'smanagement of NIRT and
Yazdi's stewardship of MFA, all wrote openly and fearlessly,
oblivious to any supposed new reign of censorship. The
tone in the letters was strikingly different from ones re-
ceived from the same corespondents under the Shah: Then,
never a direct criticism of HIM was,penned and only the
most convoluted indirect ones. Now, Khomeini, Bazargan,
Ministers and government policies are unabashedly and
directly criticized.
The degree of politicization of the youth is remarkable,
encompassing not only the previously politically aware
students of Tribal High School (THS) in Shiraz, but also
those of a small isolated town near the Afghan border who
prior to the Revolution concerned themselves with little
more than football, family chores and ardesh One
Khorasani student writes simply, " W h e n b i t youth of
Iran were being killed, I was only thinking about volley-
ball. Funny, isn't it? During the Revolution many things
changed, and so did I. I'm not the same Ali anymore."
Students at Tribal H.S. write of the confrontations be-
tween Islamic and leftist student groups for control of
the curriculum and administration. One week English, "the
language of the imperialists", was voted out of the THS
curriculum, only to be reinstated the following week. By
Now Ruz, however, passing year-end exams vied with political
consciousness-raising sessions for students' attentions.
Even at Shiraz University (the old Pahlavi U), a consider-
able number of students had opted to attend classes, al-
though they could participate in "political activities*
and not attend classes one semester without losing their
"registered" student status.
Nearly all strongly condemned the USG's human rights policy,
perceived to be applied hypocritically in Iran. One student
drew the analogy between US support of the Shah and Somoza;
several drew parallels to American intervention in Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -

While bitterly attacking the USG (frequently citing Carter

by name) for its last ditch support of the Shah and sale
of 'murderous" weapons to HIM, most correspondents were
careful to distinguish between USG policies and individual
Americans. Respect and fondness for individual Americans
remained as that for the USG plummeted to new depths.
Although ethnic battles among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turko-
mans were mentioned,' no disturbances i~Shiraz or Khorasan
were cited. Incidentally, several correspondents (them-
selves of Qashqai or Sunni Persian origin, and possibly
harboring autonomy sentiments) criticized the severity of
the PGOI's actions to squelch ethnic demands.
Former Shirazi colleagues, admitting the slow pace followed
by PGOI's implementing its socio-economic policies, gen-
erally praised the nationalization of undeveloped lots
within the city and plans for construction of housing for
the poor on them. They pleaded for time for the well-
intentioned Bezargan government.
Khorasani friends noted little material difference in their
small town but a profound change in inhabitants' "minds".
Several correspondents, while criticizing NIRT's ~atpntly
pro-Khomeini and pro-"republic of the akhunds~f~&m"e'n)ted
on the remarkable freedom of the press. One former Shirazi
colleague noted he was spending much of his time reading
all the books, from Shari~tito Marx, now easily available,
that he could not legally obtain during the past twenty-six
years.
Finally, among the nine correspondents, only two expressed
any. desire to leave Iran. One, a retiring teacher, would
like to visit his son studying in Texas for a few months.
The other, a student from a well-educated upper-middle class
Shirazi family, wishes to study economics in England upon
completion of high school next year. All the others, both
teachers and students who, before, had frequently confided
their desire to go abroad for further education, now intended
, t o remain in Iran and participate in the reconstruction of
their society. Far from wallowing in dire predictions of
national doom and catastrophe, they remained cautiously optimistic
about Iran's future as well as their own.
NEA/IRN:BHanson
July 31, 1979

CONFIDENTIAL

3
 IRAN: Communication Environment Problems, Prospects, Ideas

PREMISE:

U.S.-Iran relations are very problematical.

While we have been urged by the Tehran Government t o give evidence

of our intentions to normalize relations, the Qom faction, specifically
Khomeini, the press, and others continue t o rail against us as the nefarious,
imperialistic hand behind Iran's problems.

Iran's domestic policies - executions, attacks on the Kurds, expulsion

of foreign correspondents, newspaper closures --
have exacerbated
an already negative sense of the "new Iran" here in the U.S., and cause
us serious difficulties in projecting any "warming" of relations. We
should avoid any gestures which might be construed, either here or
there, as supportive of these policies.

At the same time, our interests in Iran remain considerable, not the least
of which is oil. Since an Islamic Government in some form or other
(with religious leadership continuing t o play a pivotal role) i s likely
for the foreseeable future, we must, in a measured way, convey our
benign intentions and assure Iran that we both wish them well and intend
not to involve ourselves in their domestic affairs.

ASSETS:

Large numbers of U.S. and western educated Iranians among whom we

can expect a reservoir of essential good will and from whom we can
expect Western oriented decision-making.

U.S. expertise in fields of concern t o Iran: business, technology,

agriculture, education, defense.

U.S. position as a necessary counter t o a perceived worse danger --the

U.S.S.R.

An official government (as opposed t o the Qom faction) which has given
indications of being pragmatic, non-extremist, and interested in normalized
U.S.-Iran relations.

Large numbers of Iranian students who are or wish to be in the U.S.

LIABILITIES:

Our minimal ability t o influence kanian events.

Ayatollah Khomeini who, in addition t o fathering Iran's extremist policies

and pronouncements, seems heatedly anti-U.S.

Our minimal ability t o communicate with the religious leadership and

lower clam majority of Iranians.

The "secret hand" theory which is deep in the Iranian grain and blames
the U.S. (among others) for ban's many problems.

The widely held determination t o "root out foreign influence."

An officially sanctioned press which has been vitrlolically anti-U.S.

Heatedly anti-Zionist sentiment and the identification of U.S. policies

a s supportive of Zionism against Islamic and Arab interests.

Identification of the U.S. with the Shah's government and all of its excesses.

OBJECTIVES:

Suggest that the U.S. will not involve itself in Iran's internal affairs, that
we wish them well and that our interests are coterminous in our mutual
desire f o r a peaceful, stable and independent Iran.

Promote a dialogue with Iran's new leadership.

Rebuild a meaningful and mutually beneficial long term relationship.

DANGERS:

To the extent that we move away from our current very low profile approach,
we risk further assaults (verbal certainly and perhaps other). This IS
particularly true a t a time when Iran is facing massive internal problems
and frustrations, all of which feed the "secret hand" theory of foreign
meddling.
Without prudence, any "warming' of o w relations may appear to be an
endorsement of those of Iran's current policies which are in violation of
ow human rights positions.

Assuming an evolution of the present government to other forms and atyler

in the future, too close an identification with a government inaeaaingly
known for its excesses could leave w v&_51:able to the =me L i d of charges
we faced with the fall of the Shah's government.

RECOMMENDATION:

Despite problems, and the potential for problemr, the significance of o w

interests in Iran recommends that we explore opportunities to build a dia-
th an's new 1&ership. At the same time, thew efforts should,
z " l " h e w term, be both measured and low key, emphasizing our long
term relationship with Iran rather than s h a t term tactical gains.

USICA: WHAT ARE WE DOING? WHAT MIGHT WE DO?

CURRENT OPERATIONS:

- Support to the Binational Centers (Iran America Societies) in Tehran

and Isfahan.
- Support to English language teaching through the BNCs in Tehran and
Isfahan.
- USICA library in Tehran.
- Student counseling through AMIDEAST, a t the BNC and at the USICA
library.
- VOA Persian language broadcasting.
- Press work.
- (Limited) magazine distribution to institutions.
- Giant assistance to the American Institute of Iranian Studies.
- Fulbright program (grants to Iranians continue, Americans in Iran currently
in abeyance)

WHAT MIGHT WE DO?

- Expanded VOA Persian broadcasting (will be increased one how)

- American participant visits.
- Resumption of Iran America Society English teaching in Shiraz.
- Film programs at the BNC.
- A project to bring Iranian religious figures to the U.S. for the Hejira
anniversary ce1ebra:ions. A specid seminar? Travel around the U.S.
in connection with the celebrations?
- A Branch PA0 in Isfahan next year?
OTHER IDEAS?

Suggest convening a special meeting to consider idea8 for restoring a dia-

logue with Iranians. This should include the private sector, Iranologiats,
Ramsey Clark? Religious or theological figures? USICA and M R can
co-sponmr. '
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BT
48831

NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/3
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/1

RUQMAR RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT

RUFMPS RUSNAAA
DE RUQmR #8831/01 219 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
R 0710042 AUG 79 CHRGE: STATE 8/7/79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3105 DRFTD: ADM:TESKUD:GO
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0218 CLEAR: P0L:VLTOMSETH
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0210 DISTR: POL2 CHG ADM
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0222 ICA ECON
RPQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0193 RF
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0254
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0248
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0260
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0220
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0309
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0188
RtJEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0230
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0118
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0267
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08831
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/7/85 ( SKUD, TIMOTRY E.) OR-?
TAGS: PINS, ECON, PORS, MILI, SCUL,ELAB, IR
SUBJECT: ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ
1. ( C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY SPENT ABOUT TWO WEEKS
IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. HE FOUND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
RELATIVELY GERAT BUT UNEMPLOYMENT HIGH. REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEES IN BOTH CITIES REMAIN ACTIVE. THE TRIBES
OF FARS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE U.S.
IS STILL WIDELY BLAMED FOR IRAN'S TROUBLES. TNCLUDING
THE REVOLUTION ITSELF. SKUD FOUND GROWING UPPER AND
MIDDLE CLASS DISSATISFACTION BUT THE LOWFR CLASS REMAINS
GENERALLY LOYAL TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.
THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN SITUATION OF THE MILITARY.
END SUMMARY.

3. EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY PAID VISITS TWO CONSULATES IN

SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. THE FIRST IMPRESSION OF SHIRAZ WAS
THAT THE CITY HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE BAZAAR WAS
ACTIVE, MOST RESTAURANTS AND THEATRES HAVE REOPENEB
AND THE STREETS ARE BUSY UNTIL LATE AT NIGHT. HOWEVER,
MOSS FACTORIES AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REMAIN INACTIVE
OR WORK HALF-DAYS ( WHICH ARE CONSUMED BY TEA-DRINKING
AND CONVERSATION). LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED COULD BE
SEEN ON STREET COWERS OR AT PUBLIC OFFICES BRINGING
THEIR PLIGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,
THE LABOR OFFICE, OR THE KOMITEH. ANOTHER SIGN OF THE
REVOLUTION IS TVE PROLIFERATION OF KIOSKS AND SIDEWALK
VENDFRB , WHO FORMERLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MOVE ON.
 --
4. THE CITY WAS RESPLENDENT FOR THE CELEBRATION
ORDERED BY KHOMEINI OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE HIDDEN IMAM.
CITY STREETS AND SHOPS WERE LAVISHLY DECORATED. A
LARGE BALLOON INSCRIBED WITH THE NAME OF THE PROPHET
DIOATED OVER A DOWNTOWN MOSQUE. FESTIVITIES WERE MARKED
BY DEMONSTR4TORS SHOUTIN9 " DEATH TO THE COMMUNISTS AND
SPEECHES BY NIRT HEAD QOTB-ZADEH (WHO DID NOT CONVI CING-
LY DENY PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS). THERE WAS SCATTERED
SHOOTING AT NIGHT AND A BUILDING ON AN ARMY COMPOUND
WAS SET AFIRE.

5. WHILE EMBOFF WAS IN SHIRAZ CONSULATE WAS VISITED BY

TEMBERS OF LOCAL COMMITTEE-WHO WHISHED TO LIBERATE/PROTECT
THE CONSULATE VEHICLES. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED WITH A
PHONE CALL TO THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL. CONSULATE
EMPLOYEE WITH NATIONAL POLICE CONNECTIONS RECONGNIZED
ONE KOMITEII RUNNER, ENGINEER ABDULLAHI, AS A FORMER
HA~~GER-ON AT SAVAK AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE.
HE HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO HITCH HIS WAGON TO ANOTHER
STAR.

6. IN SHIRAZ (AS IN ISFAHAN) THE CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL HAS

BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE COMMITTEE. THE SHIRAZ CHRISTIAN
HOSPITAL WAS MORE OF A PRIVATE INSTITUTION THAN A
MISSION, AND RUN BY A LOCAL CHRISTIAN. OTHFR PRIVATE
HOSPITALS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN OVER.

7. ALTHOUGH SHIRAZ HAS ONLY ONF KOMITER, IT IS

CONTROLLED BY SEVERAL AYATOLLAHS WHO VIE FOR POWER WITHIN
THE STRIJCTURE. A LOCAL RFSTAURANT OWNFR EXPLAINED THAT
ONE WAY A MULLAH COULD STRFNGTHFN HTS POWER BASE WAS BY
RFCRUTTING GREATER NUMBERS OF PASDARANS INTO HIS CAMP.
THF OllALITY OF THE RECRIITT IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE
ADDITTON OF ONE MORE BODY TO TOTE A GllN. CONSEQUENTLY,
ANY YOUTH WHO TTHES OF CLASSES OR lrlORKTNO IN DAD'$ SHOP
OR 1,OOKTNG FOR WnRK CAN AFCOMF A PROTECTOR OF GOD AND
CnllNTRY. THE WITIjI~TN(:01' CTVTI, AIITAORTTY BY THESE
('ALLOW YOIITHS PRESFNTS A MAJOR ORSTACLE TO THE EXTENSION
OF CENTRAI, OOVFRNMFNT AIITHORITY AND NORMALIZATION.
ClIRRFNTLY THE LEADTNn MIILLAH IN FHIRA7 IS AYATOLLAH
RAlU3ANT-FtlIRA7T WHO TS RAID TO RE PERSONALLY DEPUTED
PY KIIOMEINT .

R. THF THTRER TN PhPS PROVINCE HAVF REMAINED FAIRLY

Q11TET. THE LARQFST AND MOST POlv'FRFIlL TRIBE, THE
RT
# 8831

CONFIDENTIAI, TEHRAN 8831/1

la
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/2

QASHQAIS, IS LED BY NASSER KHAN AND KHOSROW KHAN, BOTH

RECENTLY RETURNED FROM FOREION EXILE. THEY ARE SAID
TO BE STICKING WITH THE NEW ORDER AS LONG AS IT APPEARS
TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO, BUT HAVE NO DEEP
SEATED COMMITMENT TO KHOMEINI ET AL. THE LURS ARE SAID
TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISAPPOINTED, UNHAPPY WITH UNEMPLOY-
MENT,RISING PRICES AND THE HARASSMENT OF SOME OF THEIR
LEADERS. ONE MEMBER OF A LEADINQ LUR FAMILY TOLD EMBOFF
THAT ALL THEY NEED IS FOR THE U.S. TO GIVE THEM GUNS
AND THE GO AHEAD.

9. THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE

IRANIAN DRAMA REMAINS. NEARLY ALL IRANIANS WHO ARE
DISSATISFIED WITH CURRENT CONDITIONS BELIEVE IT
KHOHEINI IS BACKED BY AMERICA. THIS BELIEF IS FOUND
ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND HELD BY DOCTORS,
RUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND SO ON.
10. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT REGIME IS STRONGEST
BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES. ISSUES
INCLUDE UNEMPLOYMENT, RISING PRICES, FEAR OF THE
COMMITTEES, AND THE BAN ON ALCOHOL AND MOST ENTERTAINMENT.
AMONG THE BAZAARIS AND LOWER CLASSES, HOWEVER, KHOMEINI
STILL COMMANDS UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT. THIS SUPPORT IS
PERHAPS BEST CHARACTERIZED AS RELIGIOUS DEVOTION AND IS
NOT CONCERNED WITH ISSUES OTHER THAN ISLAM AND FREEDOM--
TIE, W N I N O S OF WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO IWTERPRETATION.
00 ONN, NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY IS ISLAMIC, TO
ANOTHER, OPENING A FOOD STAND IN A PUBLIC PARK IS FREEDOM.
THE SUPPORT FOR THE AYATOLLAH COMES CHIEFLY PROM THE
MAINLY ILLITERATE, AT BEST POORLY EDUCATED, BULK-OF, THE
IRANIAN OPULACE WHO REMAIN POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED
AND LARGELY IGNORANT OF MANY ISSUES AFFECTING THEIR LIVES.
ONE BAZAAR1 WAS ADAMANT THAT THE UNEMPLOYED FILLING THE
STREETS OF SHIRAZ WERE OUT-OF-WORK SAVAK AGENTS.

11- EMBOFF LUNCHED WITH ARMORED CENTER OFFICER

LT. KAMAL KHAKSAR ( PROTECT) AND HIS FAMILY AT W E I R HOME
IN THE MARRIED OFFICERS QUARTERS. THE LIEUTENANT WAS IN
UNIFORM WHEN HE CALLED FOR EMBOFF AT CONSULATE. THIS
WAS IN MARKED CONVMST TO HIS BEHAVIOR TWO MONTHS AGO.
AT THAT TIME WHEN EMBOFF RAN INTO HIM ON THE STREET
HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS AND ARRANGED TO MEET AT A
RESTAURANT, WHERE HE APPEARED IN MUFTI.

12. KHAKSAR REPORTED THAT ROUTINE CHIEFTAIN TANK

MAINTENANCE IS NOW BEING PERFORMED. HE SAID THAT AS
LONG AS HE AND OTHER OFFICERS WOULD START TO DO THE
WORK THE ENLISTED MEN WOULD THEN JOIN IN, BUT A MERE
ORDER TO DO THE WORK WOULD NOT SUFFICE. HE CLAIHED THAT
A ROUTINE ENGINE OVERHAUL THEY HAD DONE HAD TAKEN ONLY
FIVE DAYS, WHEREAS BEFORE, EVEN WITH BRITISH ADVISORS,
IT HAD TAKEN TWENTY. HOWEVER, KHAKSAR SAID THAT HE A N D
OTHER OFFICERS FELT THAT THE RETURN OF A LIMITED
BRITISH TEAM WAS NEEDED. RUSSIAN ADVISORS HAD REMAINED IN
SHIRAZ UNTIL ABOUT MID-MAY . THEY HAD SCHEDULED TO RETVRN
IN EARLY JUNE BUT WERE ABOUT TWO WEEKS OVERDUE WHEN
SKUD WAS IN SHIRAZ. IN GENERAL. KHAKSAR WAS MOST
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY. HE CITED LACK
OF DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE RANKS AND THE LOW HORALE OF THE
OFFICER CORPS.
13. NO F-14's WERE SEEN IN THE AIR AT SHIRAZ OR ISFAHAN,
ALTHOUGH EMBOFF DID SEE A TEENAGE BOY ON ISFAHAN'S MAIN
STREET READING A BLUE PAPERBACK BOOK WITH "QRUMMAN F-14"
IN WHITE LETTERS ON THE COVER. ( IT COULD HAVE BEEN
ANYTHING FROM TECHNICAL TO PROMOTIONAL MATERIAL. BUT IT
DOES RAISE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE.) SOME
OF THE ARMY AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN ISPAHAN WERE SEEN
AIRBORNE BUT MOST WERE IDLE.

14. POLICE OFFICERS IN SHIRAZ ARE STILL REGULARLY PAID

ALTHOUGH FEW ARE ACTUALLY ON DUTY . TRAFFIC POLICE ARE
THE ONES MOST COMMONLY SEEN. SOME PATROLMEN ARE WORKING.
BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE 0FFICER.EXPLAINED THAT THERE
ARE TWO REASONS TO BE A POLICEMAN: (1) TO COLLECT ONE'S
PAY, AND, (2) TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT
BT
IY 8831
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/2
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/3
IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN THE PEOPLE DO NOT WANT PRO-
TECTION FROM THE POLICE, SO THE POLICE JUST COLLECT THEIR
PAY.

15. ALONG THE SHIRAZ-ISFAHAN-TEHRAN ROAD LITTLE SEEMED

CHANGED BY THE REVOLUTION. A FEW STATUES HAD TOPPLED.
BUT THE TOWN OF SHAHREZA WAS STILL CALLED SHAHREZA.

16. IN ISFAHAN TOURISTS WERE WELCOME AT THE SHOPS AND

ATTRACTIONS AMNQ MEIDAN-E-KHOMEINI ( FORMERLY MEIDAN-E-
SHAII, BUT THE ETMOSPHERE REMAINS MORE HIGHLY CHARGED
FHAN THAT OF SHIRAZ. HOSTILITY TOWARD FOREIGNERS WAS
EVIDENT. PASDARANS WERE MORE COMMON, AND ?'HE LOCAL
COMMITTEES SHOWED MORE OF AN INTEREST IN THE CONSULATE.

17. ISFAHAN IS CONTROLLED BY FOUR REGIONAL COMMITTEES

AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE CONSULATE IS LOCATED IN
THE PRECINCT CONTROLLED BY AYATOLLAH KHADEMI BUT NEAR
TO THE DOMAIN OF AYATOLLAH TAHERI, WHO ALSO WEARS THE
FOREIGN PROBLEMS HAT. TO AVOID PROBLEMS DURING A
TRANSFER OF FURNITURE TO TEHRAN, BOTH GROUPS WERE
CONTACTED AND SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROPERTY SECTION OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED AND A TWO-HOUR JOB BEGUN
IN THE EARLY MORNING LASTED UNTIL MIDNIGHT. THE
COMMITTEE INSISTED ON READING ALL OF THE TRASH DISPOSED
OF BY THE CONSULATE (SENSITIVE MATERIAL HAD LONG SINCE
BEEN DESTROYED), AND GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO OLP
CALENDARS-- PERHAPS LONGING FOR THE GOOD OLD DAY.

18. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE

IN ISFAHAN. A REQUEST FOR HIS AID RESULTED IN THE
COMMITTEE BEING BERATED FOR BOTHERING THE GOVERNOR
GENERAL WITH A PROBLEM THAT WAS CLEARLY A COMMITTEE
PROBLEM.

19. AN TSFAHAN BAZAARI, AND A DEVOTED FOLLOWER OF THE

AYATOLLAH TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE THOUGHT AMERICA AND IRAN
SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS AND THAT SOME AMERICAN
ENGINEERS SHOULD RETURN. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT
AMERICANS WERE UNLIKELY TO RETURN AFTER THE WAY THEY
WERE THROWN OUT. HE REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE
PAID FOUR TIMES WHAT IRANIANS WERE PAID. EMBOFF
SUQGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD FOUR TIMES THE EXPERIENCE.
BAZAARI SAID MAYBE, THEN SAID IRAN HAS A PROBLEM, NOBODY
WORKS VERYHARD.

20. ON THE ISSUE OP GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. EMBOFF

POINTED TO THE ATTACKS UPON AMERICA IN SPEECHES AND IN
THE PRESS. THE BAZAARI REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE U.S.
COMPLAINED ABOUT THE EXECUTION OF ELGHANIAN WHO WAS
CLEARLY AN ISRAELI AGENT. HE SAID ELGHANIAN MADE MONEY
IN IRAN AND THEN SENT IT TO ISRAEL WHICH WAS STEALING
3ROM THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. AN ANTI-SEMITIC TIRADE
FOLLOWED,JEWS DO NOT DO ANY WORK, THEY ARE MONEY LENDERS
WHO CHARGE USURIOUS RATES, AND ONLY HELP THEIR OWN
PEOPLE. HE CONTRASTED THIS WITH ISLAM WHERE MONEY IS
GIVEN TO THE NEEDY FREE OF CHARGE, AND NO ONE HAS MORE
THAN ONE HOME. LAINGEN
BT
#8831
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/3

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P 0921182 AUG 79 CHG
FM USICA WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L USICA 50253

USICA CHROW

FOR GRAVES PROM NEA

EO 12065 GDS 8/8/85

SUBJECT: PROGRAM .POSSIBILITIES

REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3109
CLASSIFIED BY R. T. CURRAN,DIRECTOR, NEA
1. INTERESTED IN YOUR REPORT CONVEYED TEHRAN REPTEL.
2. REZA'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF IAS, ENGLISH TEACHING, AND
USICA LIBRARY OPERATIONS ENCOURAGING.
3 . CONCUR WITH EXPLORATION OF LOCAL SPEAKER POSSIBILITIES FOR
IAS (PRESUME THIS ALSO INCLUDES BOARD MEMBERS ) . HOWEVER,
WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANYTHING WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY USG OR IAS
WITH THE RELIGIOUS FZGHT OR ANY OTHER GROUPING.
4. ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR INTENTION TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES
FOR LOW-KEY VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT. WE TEND TO
BELIEVE, AS BETWEEN AN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS OR PHILISOPHY
FIGURE, PHILOSOPHY LESS LIKELY TO BE MISINTERPRETED. AGAIN,
WE ENDORSE VERY CAREFUL EXPLORATION (AMONG OTHERS, IT WOULD BE
USEFUL TO HAVE VIEWS OF MININFO MINATCHI) ACCOMPANIED BY A
CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HOW SUCH A VISITOR MIGHT BE USED, WITH
WHOM, IN WHAT CONTEXT, AND WHERE.

5. IF YOU ASCERTAIN TO YOUR AND MISSION'S FULL SATISFACTION

THAT AN AMPART VISIT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, PRODUCTIVE AND
DESIRABLE, WE WILL LEND FULL SUPPORT THIS END IN SEEKING OUT
APPROPRIATE NAMES FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

6. DO NOT WISH BY FOREGOING TO APPEAR NEGATIVE. HOWEVER. AS

YOU FULLY AWARE AND APPRECIATE, THESE ARE SENSITIVE. DIFFICULT
TIMES FOR U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE ANY PROGRAM
DECISIONS, HOWEVER LOW-KEY, MUST CAREFULLY WEIGH LONG TERM
ADVANTAGE AGAINST SHORT TERM TACTICAL GAINS (OR LOSSES).
RFINHARDT
BT
I0256
 i 3 F i ' K : FC,O:;:ALEL::S
CLTbT! : : OK?
.~.k:
-., ? - , i:a&-3 ca: PO;
I I.: P:ROh'
E.O. 12Ce5: G D S 8/g/a5 (LAIN3EK. L. P.: 03-M
ANALYTICALhEPOBTIh'3 SXBEYSE
I .
fl. (C - EhTIRI: TEXT)

ACCOST :
--
T3B &ISINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN
BLrSINLSSMCh'
SZPTEYBER:
-
GUIDANCE FOR U . S .

--
BEVISYOF TZE P03R PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION
-
ATTITUCLS OF IRAU'S OIL FIELC WCRGBS

I
KTCBEE:
-
-
OIL -0LICY DEVELOPMENTS
1RAE;IAB AID TO TEE LDC'S -POLICY bNr FFOj?: -:Tf
KOVEEXER :
1-- M ~ N L G X K GIRAN'S I I N I X C I I L SJaPLVS
1-- BLECTRIC 30ZER PROSPECTS I K IPCN
/ILECZKBEP :
- A6 ECONOYJC ASSESSYENT
3. -h'z WILL UPDATE THIS SCEEI>ULI. APPSOXIMP.:TLY EVZ;,Y
YQHTXS UNLESS WB DEFABTUEVT PP.IFER3 4 h A L T Z B K ~ T I ~ F
ABRLICmEN:. LhINCENlY
IllT
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8916

DE RUQMHR #a916 221..

ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
R 0908202 AUG 79 CHRGE: PROG 8/9/79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHG: L. UNGEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3151 DRFTD: EC0N:ADSENS
BT CLEAR: NONE
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08916 DISTR: ECON-3 CHG POL
RF CHRON
E.O. 12065: GDS 8/9/85 (LAINGEN, L. B . ) OR-M
TAGS: EGEN, IR
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC AYALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE

2. THE FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TEHRAN'S PROPOSED ECONOMIC

COMMERCIAL ANALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE THROUGH DECEMBER
1979.
AUGUST :
-- THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN-GUIDANCE FOR U,S.
- BUSINESSMEN
SEPTEMBER:
-- REVIEW OF THE POOR PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION
-- ATTITUDES OF IRAN'S OIL FIELD WORKERS
OCTOBER :
-- OIL-OLICY DEVELOPMENTS
-- IRANIAN AID TO THE LDC'S- POLICY AND PROSPECTS
NOVEMBER :
-- MANAGING IRAN'S FINANCIAL SURPLUS
-- BLECTRIC POWER PROSPECTS IN IRAN
DECEMBER :
-- AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
3. WE WILL UPDATE THIS SCHEDULE APPROXIMATELY EVERY SIX
FONTHS UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PREFERS AN ALTERNATIVE
ARRANGEMENT. LAINGENll
BT
18916
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8916

LE KTOHHC #693B/01 225 **
ZAY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
R 15134562 AT? 79 CAR3E: SUAUE 8/12/73
TV AWEMEASST TFBRAN APPRV: CHARCE:LBLAIL
d 0 SECSUAUE hASUBC 31E2 DRPUD: P0L:VLUOMSEUB:
FT CLEAR: 1 . R O N :BSCliELI
i b N P I C E N U I A L SECUION 0 1 OF UYBRAN 0 3 9 3 0 2.CONS .RYOREJ
DISTR: POL3 CBG ICA
ECON DAO CONS
9 . 0 . 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS 3/12/95 (TOMSET?. VICTOR L . ) OW-P
TAGS:
. .. PEPR. IR
-.
EUFCT: N E C O T I A T I ~ V S
1. (C - EYTIRE TEXT).
2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NFCOTIATTOYS IY YFICS THE
SMBASSY BAS BEEN INVOLVED BERE, RANGING PROM COMPOTND
SPCURITY TO VISA OPERATIOVS TO STP TO TPS SHERRY CASE.
FIGRLIGHI SEVERAL SPECIAL FEAUTRES OF CONDTCUING
PUSINFSS IN THE PERSIAN FNVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES
UBE DIFFICTLUIES # S HAVE ENCOTNUESED ARE A PARUIAL
QFFLECTION ON TAB EFFECTS OF T l F IRANIAN RTVOLUTION.
BTU r E BELIEVE USY TNDERLYIN? CTLUTRAL AND PSYC90LOGICAL
QLALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR TQE NATURI OF TPESE DIPFICUL-
UIES ARE ANC d I L L RSMAIN RSLAUIVELY CONSUANU. UHSREPORE.
YE SUGGEST THAT TEE FOLLOWING AEALTSIS BE USED TO E R I F F
BOUH T S J PERSONNTL AND PRIVAUX SECUOR REPRESENUAUIVES
WBO ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS YITH AND IN THIS
COTNURY. END I NURODTCUION .
3. PERHAPS THE SINCL3 DOMINANU ASPECU OF UE3 PERSIAN
PSPCBE I S AN OVERRIDING EGOISI*. I T S ANTECEDENTS L I B
IN THE LONG IRANIAN 91STOHY OF INSUASILIUY ANr INSECTRIUY
WFICH PUT A PREKICM ON SELF-PRESERV4TION. THE PRACTICAL
EPFECT OF I T I S AN ALMOST TOTAL P m S I 4 N PQEOCCUPAUION
W I T H SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR ~ N D E R S T A N D I N GPOINTS
OF VIFW OTHER TAAN ONE'S OWY. TRUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IU
I S INCOMPEEHENSIBLE TO AN IRAhIAN TEAT U.S. IMMIGRATION
LAY MAT P R O A I E I T ISSUING u I n A TOURIST VISA WREN FE HAS
JETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA.
SIMILARLY, THT IBANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES NO INCONSISTENCY
IN CLAIMING FORCE HAJEURE TO 4VOID PENALTIES POB LATE
PPYMEYT OF INTEREST DUE ON OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILP TAE
GOVERHHENU OF VRICH IU I S A PARU I S DENYING THE VAILIDITY
OP TBE V E R Y GROUYDS UPOY V A I C Y THE CLAIM IS FADE WFEN
CONFRONUED BY SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM POREIGN FIRMS FORCED
'I0 CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION.
4. UHE BEVERSE OF UXIS PARUICTLAR PSYCBOLOOICAL COIN.
AND HAVING THE SAPE AISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM.
I S A PERVASIVE TNSASE ABOTU UTE NAUTRE OF UHE WORLD IN
WGICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE AAS BgEN TAAT
NOUaING I S PERMANENU AND IU I S COMMONLY PERCEIVED UBAU
HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCE AN ENVIRONMENT EACR
IhDIVITTAL MTSU BE CONSUANULY ALERU FOR OPPORUTNIUIES
10 PROTECT BIMSELF 4GAINST THE MALEVOLEIT FORCES TEAT
YOTLD OUHERUISE BE R I S TNDQING. RB I S OBVIOTSLT
J S S T I F I E D IN USING ALMOST ANT MEhNS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT
CON?IDENUIET. UEHB

24
 CONPIESHUIAL USABAN 8980/1

SOC9 OPPORTUNITIES. T F I q APPROACP UVDERLIFS TPE SO-

CALLED .BAZAAR M E ~ U A L X T Y "SO COMMON AMON3 PERSI I N S , A
f i f N b S E l ' TPAT OFT'Y IGYORFS LONCFR, TrRM NTFR S S 1
EAVOR OP IMREDIAUELY OSUIINABLE ADJANTAGES hH% EOUN~EY-
ANCBS PRlCTLCES TPAT ARB 9TGARCED AS 1INFTBICAL PY OTRFR
NORMS. AN EXAMPLE I S UEE SFEYIYCLY SHORUSIOEUED 4ND
BARESSING TACTICS FVPLOYED PY THE PGOI IN I T S Y F X T I A -
TIONS WITH GTE.
5 . COTPLED CIUK UHESE PSYCIOL0:ICAL LIYIUSUIONS I S A
GFLFBAL INCOflPPEHENSION OF CASUALITT. ISLAM, WITH I T S
EMPYASIS ON UHI OMYIPOUBNC? OF GOE, APPTARS UO ACCOTNU
A1 LEAST I N MAJOR PART FO3 T Q I S F9YN3PYYON. SOMBWPAT
STRPRISINJLY, EV3N U90SE IBAYIANS EDTCAUEr I N U9E
YPSTERN STYLE IND PPRpdPS YITF LONG FXP:RIENCF 3UTSIDP
IRAN IUSELF F3EQTXNULY BAY9 DIVTICTLUY =FASPIN', UYE
IhTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVFNTS. YITNBSS A YEZCI RESISTING
UHE IDEA UHAU IRANIAN BEPAVIOQ 9AS COYSJCTENCES ON LIBE
FiRCEPTION OF IRAN I N TEE S.S. OR TBhT T 4 I S PFRCFPTION
I S SOME30U RELAUEC ?O AMFRICAN POLICIES RSSARDIN;
IRAN. T B I S SAME QUALITY ALSO EELPS EXPLAIN PEaSIAN
AVERSION UO ACCEPUINO RESPONS~AILIDY FOR OYS'S OVY
A C I I O N S . THE DEUS EX MACHINA I S ALW4YS RT V O X .
6 - THE PERSILN PROCLIVITY TOR ASSUVING THAT TO SAY
SOMBTFINS I S TO DO IT PURTSY? COMPLICATES HATTSRS.
AGAIN. YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISF WTEN INFORMED TF4T TPE
ISREGULPR SLCUPITY FORCES ASSIGNEE TO TH9 EMBASSY REflAIY
I h PLACE. BUT Tl?EnCENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD ME TREY
WOULD GO PY MONDAY, HS SAYS. A4 YFA O P F I C i A L RFPORTS
LtAU UBE SHERSY CASP I S "90 PERCEZT SOLVED. BUT YASN
A CONSULAR OFFICFR INVFSTI5ATFS EX PISCOVERS TPPT NOTRINC
EAS CSANGED. UHBRE I S NO RECOCYIUION UYAT INSTRUCTIOhS
NUST E! FOLLOVVD C P . TPAT COMYITRFYTS MVST 9 3 JCCOMPANIEP
b y ACUION ANC RTSTLUS.
6. FINALLY, USERF ARY UBE PERSIAN CONCSP'JS O* IN?LTENCE
hHD OPIIGATION. PVERYONE PAYS !J?FISAYCF T 3 TPP FORn?9
ANC UBE SAUUEB I S TSTALLY RONOREP IN USE EbEACS.
F E B S I A N S A R CONSUNED
~ W I T R DEVfLOPING P A ~ T IFAZI--TAT
INFLTINCE UBAU Y I L L SELF 3SU U?INSS CONE--iBIfE PAYORS
APE ONLY GRLDGINGLY BFSTOIEO AND TPEN J C S T TO T F F
brj
ReQF0

CONFIDENUIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL TEERAN 89@/2
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 0@9P0
DISTR: POL3 CEO 1CA
BCON DAO CONS
AWXN NAAG R l
LXUENU UHAU A UANGIBLE Q T I D PRO QTO I S IMMEDIAUELT
PRTCEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST
YEAR OR EVEN LbSU WEEK; WHAT CAN BZ OFFERED TODAY?
7. THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR TBOSE YBO WOULD NEGOT-
IAUE r I U 9 PERSIANS IN ALL UHIS:
- --FIRST, ONE SBOVLD NEWER ASSUME THAT F I S S I D E OF
UBE I S S T E WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LEU ALONE UHAU I U WILL
B i CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION MITE
SLLF PRECLUDES T H I S . A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNI-
TION OF B I S POSIUION TPON H I S PERSIAN OPPOSIUE NTMBER.
-10 PERCEIVE
--SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY
THE ADVANTAGES OF A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
PSED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT P I S OPPOSITE
NTMSER I S ESSENUIAtLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WIUR
B I K BE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE TBE BENEFITS TO RIMSELF
TEAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OSTAINABLE. HE WILL B E PREPARED
UO GO UO GREAU LENBUSS UO ACHIEVE URIS G 3 h L . INCLTDING
PUNNING TEE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WUOFVFP RE I S DEALING
YIUB UAAU FTUTRE BTSINSSS WOTLD BE TNUSINKABLE, AU
LLAST TO THE LATTER.
- --UHIRG. INU3RLOCKfNB EELAUIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECUS
02 ilk I S S L E MUST BE PAINSTATINGLY, FORECEFULLT AND
REFEA?TSTLY DEVFLOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY
LOPIPREHEEDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS.
- --FOUSTP, ONE SHOULD I N S I S T ON PERF3RMANCE AS TRF
S I N E OTA NON AU EACB S U A X OF NECUOUIA'JIONS. SUAUBMSNUS
Lb INTENTIOh COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

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A rASTE OF PFPORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE 4T ALL
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IAbLE TSE-MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAPINGS, HE
YUST F F MADE TO KYOk T9AT A OUID PRO QUO 1" IYVOLVFD
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E F COwZD f Y TB.?F'PSSIPLITY. GIYZN T 8 9 F'YRSIEN
hSGOUIAUOP'S CTLUTRAL AYD PSYCH3LO:ICAL LIYIUAUIOYS. 4 3
1 5 GCING TO RESIST TEF VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL
(YRSM Y E YFSTSBN POINT OF V I S Y ) NEGOTIATTYO PROCTSS.
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SUBJ: VIOLFYCE I h TEHBbk
!REF: USINFO: 1501142 AUG 79
I. (C - ENTIRE TEXT. )
2. ----- I- S A REASONABLY ACCURhTS ACCOUVT EY 4 JO:?UbL-
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I Y T YITH CONSICFAABLEEXPERIENCE I N I R ov~ C L P . S ~ E SRE-

TYEBN SECULARIST POLITICAL GROUPS AND YEZai~LLh'I!IS {:I---
ERALLY, ADSERENTS OF THF PARTY OF 3 0 D ) LOYAL T 3 AIAPGL-
LAE YHOHbINI ON AUGUST 1 2 ANC 13. ALLOYbY'S RPPPB'! IS
COLOREL SO#EYAAT BY H I S SYMPATBT FOR T H I S?GULh?ISTS C!ir
HIS OWN BRUSH WIT3 ISLAMIC FANATICISM. BUT T%F ;ROJIN3
POLITICAL ANC SCCIAL DIVISIONS HE CESCRIBZS P9134 UivLZR-
L I E TBESE CLASPES ARE VY91 REAL.
3. HAVING SAII: THAT, AOWZVER, WF ARF VOT I i J e r I u E T : 'I0
CONCLUDE THAT wRAT BAS HAPPENED T E I S L 3 E K S I G k h L S fY2
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DAY, AUGUST 1 4 , "NP T 0 l ) A l . AU*IUST 15, TtiF CITY I S YI9-
IUlLLY CLOSEC UP BECAUSF OF T9E SOMMEY'ORATION 'IF THF
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ACTION TEAN TBZY qAQE TO DITP. LAINSEN
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J O H N A. WESTBERG & ASSOCIATES. INC.
SUITE 960
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WASHINOTON, 0. C . 2 0 0 3 6 I E W ~ A N . lma*
WSI o r r l c c BOX 11-1313
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August 15, 1979

Mr. Henry Precht

Iran ~ e s k
Room 5246 M e r , J L-S&
U.S. KJeDaitment of State

Dear Renry:
I am sending herewith my notes from the AWA Iran

w*
Update program on July 25-26 in New York City, together with
a copy of the attendance list, per our telephone conversation
last night.

John A. Westberg

Enclosures
 AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION'S IWLN UPDATE
Notes
July 25-26, 1979 New York City

1. The first and by far the most significant

speaker was professor James Bill of the University of Texas.
He is perhaps the best known writer on Iranian affairs in
the English language. His discipline is political seience
wlth an emphasis on social and political change. Re began
by describin? 5 6 Iranian rev~lutisn+s the m s t renarkable
in history, noting that the breadth and depth of the opposition
to the Shah's regime was extraordinary. Here follows other
points that he made.
1.1. The main forces behind the revolution
were grinding poverty (which I question) and corruption. Bill
noted there were also other factors, namely oppression, the
letting up of 3ressure 52 the Shah without eoing anything
constructive to deal 1~1ththe disgruntlement with his govezn-
ment, the fact that popular religious leaders decided to
fight the monarchy, and the decision arbitrarily by the
government In early 1978 to cool off the economy.
1.2. The present political system in Iran is
dominated by the Mujtahids, who are older, revered religious
leaders. There are perhaps 200 of these religious leaders
in Iran today. They are not to be confused with the Mullahs,
who are farther down the hierarchial ladder of Shiite Islam.
Bill feels these Mujtahids are the most important people in
Iran today and that we must therefore get to know who they
are, how they think, and what their vision is for the Iran
of the future. There are many indications that the younger
Mujtahids and also other older Mujtahids do not agree with
Khomeini. Bill also feels that we must count on the Mujtahids,
such as Ta1eghar.i. to bridge the nap between the Passes of
the people and the intelligen~ia. However, we cannot expect
the Mujtahids to provide governmental leadership, or political
leadership, since their traditional role in society has been
the protection of the people's rights vis-a-vis the go\-ernment.
They do not think positively enough to be political or
governmental leaders.
1.3. Bill was very critical of the inter-
nat~onalne&ia, referring to their f o b as "fourth-raze"
several times during his talk. He particularly objected to
the way Khoneini has been presented, arguing he is not nearly
as bad as the press has made him out. Query, however, the
pronouncements this week that music is evil.
1.4. There is a preoccupation within the
revolutionary gover-nent today with a perceived danger of
interference by the United States. Paranoid. Bill says this
stems from a number of things, including the fact that
right-wing assassination squads have been knocking off eight
to ten revolutionary people every night since the revolution
took place. If this is true, it certainly would help to
explain this matter.
1.5. There are four main forces threatening
stability in Iran today. The first is the right-wing bands
of assasins, which Bill feels will continue their activities
for another year and a half at least until they are brought
-~r.Aer
ccntrol. Zacxc?:y, z h c e hre =he etnnic separatist
novements, which Bill feels is the most dangerous force.

-
Thirdly, there is the alienation of the secular, modern-educated
intelligencia, who, Eill says, is absolutely essential to
the long-tern future of Iran. Finally, there are the left-
wing, marxist groups, the most prominent of which is known as
the Fedayeen Khalq.
1.6. There are three groups which hold the
key to the retam of skability to Iran: The military, the
professional middle Class and the progressive religious leaders,
the Mujtahids mentiones above. In this latter group Bill
feels Taleghani is the most important. He said he did not
think Shariat nadari is a significant force i2 this.
1.7. Bill noted that every U.S. President since
Jack Kennedy has supported the Shah. Nixcn and Kissinger went,
in Bill's opinion, way beyond the bonds Of acceptability
in the deal they made with the Shah. Other reasons why
Iranian attitude towards the United States today is negative
are the supportive statements by Carter right up to the end,
including the famous telephone call from Carter to the Shah
on bloody Friday-(September 8 1978) which was made from
Camp David and, of course, received wide publicity both within
Iran and without. Bill feels there will continue to be dif-
ficulties between Iran and the United States at the political
level for the next year or so, but that ttey will pass.
He says Iranians like Americans and the idea of-America very
much and there is a large reservoir of good will despite
the universal animosity of Iranians towards our government.
(There is a thought here that if Ted Kennedy should become
our next President, relations with Iran would greatly improve
overnight. Query whether I could interest Ted in making a
trip to Iran at the eppropriate time?)
1.8. Eill is milaly criticai of our govern-
ment's present posture toward Iran, which is that of a very,
very low profile. Bill feels our government should be doing
something positive, perhaps offering aid of some kind.
(I disagree with this at the present time because of the
paranoia referred to above by Bill himself on the part of the
Iranian government leaders today regarding interference
by the U.S.) Bill stated other embassies in Teheran are
building up rapidly. He specifically mentioned Korea and
Japan.
1.9. There was only a passing reference to
corruption in Iran today. Bill noted that the social patterns
remain the same and that only a political revolution is in
process so far. Iie seemed to feel that the customary laying
on of gifts is an acceptable thing. (I should query him on
?
.
:
w he squares this with his identi5ying corruption as one
of the forces which caused the revolution.)
1
1.10. There was also only brief reference
to the labor problem. Bill said it was rather encouraging
that the oil workers had stayed on. He also said, however
that the students were running the universities, the workers
were running the factories, and the privates were running
the army. Ee felt all of this would burn itself out fairly
quickly.
1.11. Brief reference was made to the need
for expatriates in Iran. Bill stated the Koreans were no longer
welcome in Iran or the Gulf area for a variety of reasons,
including a reported propensity to the colmnission of robbery,
burglaries, etc.
 2. There were over 50 well-known American companies
represented at the conference. Among these were a number of
investor companies who have had expatriates back in Teheran
recently. The reports of these representatives were very
favorable. The companies include du Pont, Carrier, Foremost-
McKesson-Robbins, General Electric Technical Services (Repair-
shop) and Harza.
3. Bud Menaker is General Counsel for Martin
Marietta Aerospace. He worked in Iran for a couple of years
for the PM3 represe-t:ns tile Irar~iangoverrment in tele-
communications procurement. In his talk he attempted to be
more critical of the present situation in Iran and less
optimistic about the future. He noted the danger of the
clergy fouling the government up for many more months to
come, and the oft-reported oppression of the new regime,
specifically mentioning the banning of movies and music and
the cutti-g into press freedom.
C. Dan Burt, an American lawyer with offices in
Saudi Arabia, flatly disagreed with the view that the
situation in Iran was going to improve. He based his position
on opinion in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area to the effect
that Khomeini will not remain in power much longer but will
be replaced by a left-wing government. Burt said the Saudis
are terribly concerned about what is going on in Iran, by
which he presumably meant the instability caused by the
revolution.

John A. Westberg
AMA ATTENDANCE LIST July 25-26, 1979

George T. Lee, Jr.

Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld
2800 Republic National Bank Bldg.
Dallas, Texas 75201
Robert G. Bihum
VP & General Manager
ARES, Inc.
Box 459
Port Clinton, Ohio 43452
Lee Adams, V.P.
Ralph S. Newman, Jr., Executive VP & CEO
American Rice, Inc.
Box 2587
Houston, Texas 77001
Thomas Carney
Ashland Oil, Inc.
Box 391
Ashland, Kentucky 41101
William Beard, Managing Director
Carrier International
P.O. Box 4806
Syracuse, New York 13221
Raymond Ewing, Mgr.-Treasury
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
1000 Prospect Hill Rd.
Windsor, Connecticut 06095
W.O. Faith, VP
Continental Mechanical of Middle East Ltd
P.O. Box 633
Addison, Texas 75001
~d Kazem, Dir., Finance & Administration
CBS Records Intl
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York 10019
J. Parker Lapp, Intl. Banking Assoc.
Continental Bank-Chicago
Africa/Middle East
231 S. LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60693
J.E. Ryan, Sales Manager
Celanese Corporation
1211 Avenue of'the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Carl Borden, Director
Paul Newhart, Manager
E.I. du Pont
1007 Market Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19898
C.A. Keen, VP & Treasurer
Fedders Corp.
Woodbridge Avenue
'Edison, New Jersey 08817
Alfred Marden
Mgr., Intl. Bus. Dev. Prog.
General Electric Co.
Bldg. 2-707
1 River Road
Schenectady, New York 12345
Paul Lehning
Mgr., Middle East Gas Turbine Service
General Electric Technical Services Co.
Bldg. 513 W
1 River Road
Schenectady, New York 12345
Gulf Oil Corp.
Room 1915, Gulf Bldg.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230
Richard Macken, Sr. Analyst, Mid-East Affairs
Michael J. Figel
General Electric Co.
570 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Linda C. Baroody, Esq.
International Hotels Corp.
Pan Am Building
New York, New York 10017
IBM Europe
8 Cite Retiro
75008 Paris, France
T.F. Cadigan, Manager
Aloysius F. Ring, Jr., Group Contr.
Norman St. Landau, International Counsel
Johnson & Johnson Intl.
501 George Street
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08930
Charles E. Duffy, VP.-Intl.
Mellon Bank
Mellon Square
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230
Niel K. Friedman, Administration Dept.
Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc.
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Phillips Petroleum Company
508 Frank Phillips Building
Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74004
B.L. Bates, Strategic Planner
W.W. Dunn, V.P. -
K.E. Rogers, Esq.
Latin America-Asia

Donald D. Montgomery, V.P. & 1ntl.Const.

Procon International
Algonquin L Mt. Prospect Roads
Des Plaines, Illinois 60016
John Wilson, Director, Middle East & Africa
Ben Cole, Director-Financial Analysis
Rockwell International
600 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
Walter Cardwell, Esq.
Derek S.L. Bostock, Esq.
John Milem, V.P.-Finance
Sedco, Inc.
1901 N Akard
Dallas, Texas 75201
John J. Doherty, Controller
Sylvania Tech. Sys.
Box 9003
Sunnyvale, California 94086
Philip A. Gaita, Dir. Contracts
Cliff Wright, Project Mgr.
Singer Co., Link Division
Kirkwood Industrial Park
Bingharnton, New York 13902
Ray J. Hope, Sr. V.P.
Tidewater, Inc.
1440 Canal Street, Suite 2100
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
Robert Angus, Prog. Mgr., Iran Programs
Westinghouse Electric Corp.
1111 schilling Road, MS 7600
Hunt Valley, Maryland 21030
NNNNVV ESA95 6BRA456
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E.0. 1 2 0 6 5 8 GDS, 8 / 1 7 / 7 9 (UEMENT, CARL) CHRON

TAGS* APER, PEPR, I R

SUBJECT 8 POLITICAL REPORTING: NEEDED RESOURCES
1. <S - EWIIRE TEXT)
2. A S PART OF HIGH-LEVEL PROGRAM REVIEW OF PERSONNEL AND
RESOURCE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL REPORTING FROM
S n E C T E D CRITICAL WUNTRIES, WE HAVE BEEN ASKED T 0 MAKE
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING IRAN. FOLLOWING I S A FIRST
DRAFf WRITTEN ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED FORMAT AND WITH
DEMANDED BREVITY. WE ARE AWAITING SRF COMMENT HERE ON
THE 'GAPS I N COVERAGE- PART, BUT SINCE OUR SUBMISSIONI S
DIE COB AUGUS 21 THERE MAY NOT BE TIME TO VET THAT
WITH YOU. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS,
PARTICLLARLY ON THE 'RECOMMENDED ACTIONS' PART, AND
WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY CARE T 0 MAKE.
3. QUOTE. IRAN.
-- MAJOR PROBLEMS/DEVELOPMENTSr REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION
WITH CONTINUED INSTABILITY AND COMPETING POWER CENTERS.
GOVERIWENIAL PROCESS IN TRANSITIONAL SIAOE. POLITICAL
PROCESS MARKED WITH SERIOUS COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AND LEFT AND RIGHT, WITHIN
ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. SECURITY SITUATION UNSTABLE.
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ANXIOUS. MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS,
ESPECIALLY UNEMROYMENT AND R I S I N G INFLATION, WITH
SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. NEW LABOR MILITANCY.
MILITARY AND POLICE STILL LARGELY DISORGANIZED AND
DISCREDITED. OIL PRODUCTION STEADY AT 4M B/D SINCE
APRIL BUT VLLNERABLE TO DISRUPTIONS. A B I L I T Y TO DEFEND
BORDERS AND GULF AREA QUESIIONABLE. FEARS OF COUNTER-
REVOLUTIONARY AND/OR OUTSIDE PLOTTING. CONCERN ABOUT
MARXIST/COMMUNISI ACTIVIT Y AND CAPABILITY FOR
DESTABILIZING ACTION. .z n
--
OF:
G A P S I N COVERAGEr LACK O F INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING
WHO THE KEY MOVERS ARE AND HOW THE CURRENTLY
FRAGMENTED POWER SYSTEM OPERATES; R E L A T I O N S H I P S BETWEEN
R E L I G I O U S LEADERS, T H E I R FOLLOWERS AND SECULAR L E A D E R S
AND GROUPS; COMPOSITION AND STRENGTHS O F VARIED GROUPS
MAKING U P L E F T I S T FORCES$ L E A D E R S H I P AND ORGANIZATION
O F GUERILLA GROUPS, T R I B E S , AND ETHNIC M I N O R I T I E S ( K l R D S ,
ARABS, ETC.); STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION O F REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS AN0 PARA-MILITARY GROUPS; L E A D E R S H I P AND
ORGANIZATION O F 'KOMITEHS" I N GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS,
M I L I T A R Y , AND 1M)USTRY; L E A D E R S H I P AND STRENGTH O F NEW
MIL ITANT WORKER GROUPS. E S P E C I A L L Y I N O I L SECTOR:
MILITARY COMMAND S T R VRE, ~ OPERATIONAL PREPAREDUESS,
AND WILL T O FIGHTS P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S O F CONTINUED
MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUCH AS LOW PRODUCTIVITY.
SHORTAGES OF MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL, T E C H N I C I A N S , SPARE
PARTS, RAW MATERIALS, F I N A N C I N G , AND MARKETS; BAZAAR
POL IT ICS.
--commf~cw-
RECOMMENDED A C T I O N S ¶ F I L L VACANT ECONOMIC AND
OFFICER POSITIONSIMMEDIATELY. REVIEW NEED
FOR R E E S T A B L I S H I N G P O L / f l I L P O S I T I O N . ENSURE POL S E C T I O N
HAS A PERMANENTLY-ASSIGNED SECRETARY. CONSIDER E S T A B L I S H -
INQ ROTATIONAL J U N I O R OFFICER POSITION I N POL SECTION.
REOPEN T H E THREE CONSULATES A S SOON AS C O N D I T I O N S PERMIT.
A S S I G N O F F I C E R S T O THEM W I T H P O L I T I C A L R E P O R T I N G E X P E R I -
ENCE. F I L L SENIOR FOREIGN S E R V I C E NATIONAL P O L I T I C A L
ADVISOR P O S I T I O N QUICKLY. CONSIDER ADDING ONE FSN P O S I -
T I O N I N POL S E C T I O N T O A S S I S T W I T H MEDIA COVERAGE. MAKE
AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR I N D I V I D U A L LANGUAGE I N Y P ' J C T ION AT
POST T O HELP P O L I T I C A L AND ECONOMIC O F F I C E k f MAINTAIN
AND IMPROVE T H E I R LANGUAGE C A P A B I L I T Y . ASSURE FUNDS FOR
TRAVEL IN-COUNTRY AND START TRAVEL A S QUICKLY AS CONDI-
T I O N S PERMIT. I N C R E A S E P U B L I C A T I O N S PROCUREMENT PROGRAM.
T O MAXIMVM EXTENT P O S S I B L E , E S T A B L I S H AND MAINTAIN CONTACT
WITH ALL MAJOR P O L I T I C A L GROUPS, INCLUDING O P P O S I T I O N ,
AND KNOWLEDGEABLE INDEPENDENT P O L I T I C A L OBSERVERS. CHRISTOPHER
91
115972
 CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12065: GDS 8 / 2 0 / 8 5 (LASNGEN, L. BRUCE) OR-M

TAGS! I R PINT

-
SUBJECT:

1. (C -
IRAN:

ENTIRE TEXT).
P O L I C Y OVERVIEW

2. SUMMARY O F I N T R O D U C T I O N : T H E R E FOLLOWS A N O V E R V I E W

O F T H E CURRENT S I T U A T I O N I N I R A N W I T H I N W H I C H WE P U R S U E

OUR I N T E R E S T S , F O L L O W E D B Y SOME G E N E R A L COMMENTS ON T H E

CONDUCT O F U.S. P O L I C Y OVER T H E N E A R - T E R M (12-18 MONTHS)

FUTURE. (COMPLETE B A L A N C E OF T H I S PARA LATER). END

SUMMARY.

2. C L A R I T Y I S N O HALLMARK OF TODAY'S IRAN. OUR V I S I B I L I T Y

(AND T H A T OF MOST OTHER OBSERVERS) I S STILL LIMITED. THE

I R A N I A N REVOLUTION, U N P R E P A R E D FOR I T S Q U I C K SUCCESS,

REMAINS I L L - A R T I C U L A T E D AND E V E N MORE P O O R L Y I M P L E M E N T E D .

F L O U N D E R I N G WOULD B E T O 0 STRONG A WORD* B U T I R A N I S

M l F A R FROM F I N D I N G I T S B E A R I N G S P O L I T I C A L L Y , A N D I T WOULD

E Q U A L L Y A T S E A E C O N O M I C A L L Y WERE I T N O T FOR O I L R E V E N U E S

U N D I M I N I S H E D FROM P R E - R E V O L U T I O N FIGURES.

4. ONE T H I N G I S CLEAR. I S L A M REMAINS PREDOMINANT.

K H O M E I N I AND H I S ENTROURAGE A T QUM C A L L A L L T H E SHOTS.

THERE I S MUCH T A L K O F U N I T Y I N T H E S P I R I T O F I S L A M , DESCRIBED

AS E S S E N T I L A L T O THWART T H E C O U N T E R - R E V O L U T I O N A R I E S AND
 CONFIDENTIAL ,. 2

AND ARE S I A D TO B E B E H I N D THE REVOLUTION'S

D I F F I C U L T I E S I N K U R D I S T A N AND K H U Z I S T A N AND I N D E E D

RESPONSIBLE FOR T H E R E G I M E S P R O B L E M S I N WHATEVER F I E L D .

KHOREINI RENIANS THE SINGLEI D O R I N A N T M O T I V A T I N G FORCE,

UNCHALLENGED P O L I T I C A L L Y FROM ANY QUARTER, THOUGH N O

LONGER A S S A C R O S A N C T A S S I X MONTHS AGO; A CASE I N P O I N T ,

PROBABLY* I S AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI DISTANCING HIMSELF

I N MESHED D U R I N G T H E E L E C T I O N S T O T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L

R E V I E W C O U N C I L J U S T COMPLETED.

5. THE NATURE O F THOSE ELECTIONS, RESULTING PREDICTABLY

I N A C O U N C I L W I T H A S O L I D M A J O R I T Y OF PRO-KHOMEINI CLERICS,

S Y M P O L I Z E D T H E E S S E N T I A L R I G I D I T Y O F T H E I S L A M I C FORCES

A T QUM. FOR T H E R E G I M E S O P P O N E N T S * I T I S INDEED A JOYLESS

REVOLUTION. T H E RESULT, AS WE H A V E R E P O R T E D S E P A R A T E L Y ,

HAS B E E N A GROWING F R U S T R A T I O N ON T H E P A R T O F T H E MORE

SECULAR* INTELLECTUAL, M O D E R N I S T FORCES I N T H E A L L I A N C E

T H A T T O P P L E D T H E SHAH, W I T H GROWING I N S T A B I L I T Y I N T H E

SHORT TERM AND>%%$ P O L A R I Z A T I O N I N T H E L O N G 7121.

r\
I R A N I S N O T T H U S P O L A R l Z E D YET, B U T T H E V I O L E N C E ON T H E

S T R E E T S O F T E H R A N T H I S P A S T WEEK B E T W E E N T H E S E C U L A R

AND T H E I S L A M I C P O L I T I C A L GROUPS I S S U G G E S T I V E O F D I F F I C U L T Y

TO COME I F T H E R E I S NOT A L A R G E R C A P A C I T Y FOR C O M P R O M I S E

ON THE P A R T O F T H E NOW-DOMINANT I S L A M I C FORCES.

6. THOSE FORCES R E M A I N S U F F I C I E N T L Y I N COMMAND, HOWEVER,

TO ENSURE T H E C A R R Y I N G THROUGH O F A C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O C E S S

T H A T I S S C H E D U L E D TO P U T A N E L E C T E D GOVERNMENT I N P L A C E
 CONFIDENTIAL 3

BY L A T E FALL. N E I T H E R A D I S T A N T B A K T I A R I N P A R I S NOR THE

S T I L L DENORALIZED M I I L I T A R Y I S ANY OBSTACLE TO THAT.

THE NEXT GOVERNMENT I S L I K E L Y TO B E DRAWN E S S E N T I A L L Y FROM

THE PRESENT W T OF CHARACTERS I N THE P G O l AND T H E REVOLUTIONA

COUNCILI WITH A S U F F I C I E N T N A J O R I T Y I N AN ELECTED PARLIAMENT

TO G I V E
57-
WE REASONABLE LONGEVITY FOR THE F I R S T 12-18 MONTHS

AT LEAST. BUT THERE I S L I T T L E REASON TO T H I N K THAT SUCH A

NAJORITY W I L L HAVE MUCH S U B S T A N T I V E COHESION BEYOND WHAT

I S L A M CAN PROVIDE. NOR I S THERE MUCH L I K E L I H O O D THAT I T

OR I T S LEADERS W I L L B E S U F F I C I E N T L Y F L E X I B L E TO STEM WHAT

COULD B E A GROWING A L I E N A T I O N AMONG THE M I D D L E CLASS, THE

TECHNOCRATS* AND THE SECULAR FORCES GENERALLY WHO ARE NEEDED

TO RUN AN ALREADY S U B S T A N T I A L L Y MODERNIZED IRAN.

7. KHOMEINI H I M S E L F REMAINS A MAJOR-DETERMINANT OF THE

P O L I T I C A L FUTURE. WERE HE TO STEP BACK, AFTER THE

I N S T A L L A T I O N OF A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND G I V E

BREATHING SPACE TO MORE MODERATE CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH AS

TALEGHANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI, I T I S POSSIBLE THAT AN I S L A M I C

.
P O L I T I C A L BLOC COULD SHOW

PRESENT A L I E N T A T I O N OF THE

THERE I S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT, WITNESS THE E D I C T S FROM PUN

PRODUCING HARS.HLY RESTRICTIVE CONTROLS ON THE P R E S S AND

ENCOURAGING I S L A M I C EXTREMISTS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO

DENOUNCE SO-CALLED U.S.-INSPIRED, LEFT-LEANING

INTELLECTUALS OUT TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION.

8. S I M I L A R R I G I D I T Y I S STARKLEY APPARENT I N QUM'S REACTION

TO ISSUES OF P R O V I N C I A L AUTONOMY. BRUTE FORCE, INCLUDING

LIBERALU S E OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS, APPEARS TO B E THE R E G I M E ' S

ONLY UAY OF RESPONDING. THAT P O L I C Y MAY HAVE UORKED FOR

THE MOMENT I N K H U Z I S T A N . I T I S NOW B E I N G RUTHLESSLY

APPLIED I H KURDISTAN - AN AREA UHERE FORCE OF THE K I N D NOW

B E I N 6 A P P L I E D WOULD APPEAR ALMOST C E R T A I N TO A L I E N A T E

P O L I T I C A L FORCES AVOWEDLY OPEN TO COMPROMISE ON THE B A S I S

OF AUTONOMY.

9. ECONOMICALLY, THERE I S UIDESPREAD D I S I L L U S I O N M E N T

THAT THE R E V O L U T I O N HAS NOT PRODUCED RESULTS - I N D E F D THAT

I T HAS MADE THIHGS WORSE FOR MANY, I N C L U D I N G THE VERY

LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED. BUT T H I S HAS HARDLY DAMPENED

THE ENTHUSIASM FOR K H O M E I N I AMONG THOSE SEEMINGLY HARDEST

H I T b HE CAN S T I L L F I L L THE STREETS W I T H SUPPORTERS FROH

SOUTH TEHRAN. SO LONG AS O I L REVENUES CONTINUE AT T H E I R

PRESENTLY H I G H L E V E L S THE REVDLUTION I S NOT CHALLENGED

ECONOMICALLY. B U T THERE COULD BE GROUINS P O L I T I C A L FALLOUT

I F P A R A L Y S I S CONTINUES I N THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, WITH

I T S HEAVY EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL, AND I F THE S T I L L GENERALLY

STALEMATED I N D U S T R I A L SECTOR DOES NOT PICK-U$j AN AREA WHERE

THE F L I G H T OF N A N A G E R I A L PERSONNEL AND ~NT&'PERNIAL SKILLS

HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES SERIOUS AND WHERE A T T I T U D E S TOWARD-

THE RETURN OF FOREIGN P R I V A T E ENTERPRISE I S S T I L L U N C E R T A I N

AT BEST.

10. A REGIME W I T H T H I S RANGE OF PROBLEMS AT HOME MIGHT B E

ADVISED TO PLAY DOWN I T S INVOLVEMENT ABROAD. BUT THE

I R A N I A N R E V O L U T I O N I N V O L V E S THREE MAJOR TENETS I N I T S

IJ
FOREIGN OUTLOOK AND THESE REMAIN POWERFULLY DETERHING ON
r-
 CONFIDENTIBL

A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES; THESE TENETS I N C L U D E THE

A P P L I C A B I L I T Y OF THE I R A N I A N REVOLUTION W I T H I N THE

U N I V E R S A L I T Y OF ISLAM; THE REJECTION OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE,

BE I T GODLESS COMMUNISM OR WESTERN C A P I T A L I S M ; AHD THE

PARTICULAR MENACE OF INTERNATIONAL Z I O N I S M TO THE INTERESTS

OF ISLAM. THE RESULT I S AN A C T I V I S T FOREIGN POLICY, ABRASIVE

TO MANY OF OUR INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY V I S - A - V I S ISRAEL,

BUT - BECAUSE OF AN I N N A T E S U S P I C I O N OF THE SOVIETS

POSSIBLY EVEN GREATER THAN THAT OF THE SHAH'S RE61ME - CAPABLE

OF A REASONABLE F I D E L I T Y TO CENUINE NON-ALIGNRENfr

11. I N T H I S SETTING, WE SEE OUR I N T E R E S T S I N I R A N AS

ESSENTIALLY THREEFOLD, FIRST, THE PRESERVATION OF I R A N ' S

I N T E G R I T Y AND INDEPENDENCE; SECOND, THE HEALTH OF I T S

O I L INDUSTRY, WITH A CAPACITY FOR CONTINUED NORMAL MARKETING

I N THE WEST; THIRD, AN I R A N I A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y THAT L I M I T S

THE DEGREE TO WHICH I T I D E N T I F I E S I R A N U I T H THE MORE RADICAL

OF THE NON-ALIGNED ELEMENTS. I N LARGE PART, THESE ARE

INTERESTS THAT WE SHARE WITH MUCH OF THE P O L I T I C A L SPECTRUM

OF I R A N EXCEPT THE FAR LEFT.

12. OUR CURRENT POLICY STANCE TOWARD I R A N I S ONE OF

LOU PROFILE, 'STRICT NON-INVOLVEMENT, OPEN TO OPPORTU~~ITIES

TO ENHANCE OUR R E L A T I O N S H I P WHERE P O S S I B L E BUT LEAVING

I T LARGELY UP TO THE PGOI AS TO THE PACE BY WHICH WE MOVE

TO B U I L D A NEW RELATIONSHIP. WE B E L I E V E T H I S POLICY

HAS BEEN THE RIGHT ONE TO DATE, BUT UE ALSO B E L I E V E A

SOMEWHAT MORE FORWARD POLICY COMMANDS I T S E L F AS I R A N

 CONFIDENTIAL 6

MOVES I N T O I T S P O S T - R E V O L U T I O N A R Y PHASE. WE N E E D NOT,

AND S H O U L D NOT, EMBRACE T H E CURRENT REGIME; KHOMEINI

I S NO F R I E N D OF T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S . B U T OTHERS I W T H E

I S L A M I C CAMP A R E MORE O P E N T O US, OVER T I M E .

13. OUR W A T I O N S W I T H T H E P G O I A N D T H E F I R S T C O N S T I T U T I O N A L

R E G I M E W I L L R E F L E C T OUR R E S P E C T I V E S-
.t;;;; TOWARD EACH

OTHER. AN U N D E R L Y I N G P R O B L E M FOR US I N I R A N H A S B E E N T H E

F A C T T H A T MUCH O F T H E NEW L E A D E R S H I P D O E S N O T Y E T P R E C E I V E

T H A T WE H A V E A C C E P T E D T H E C H A N G E I N I R A N O R X X M E X Y I K I X X I

( T H O U G H SOME OF T H I S I S T A C T I C A L - A R E F L E C T I O N OF T H E N E E D

TO K E E P R E V O L U T I O N A R Y C R E D E N T I A L S I N T A C T . ) E V E N MORE

F U N D A M E N T A L T H A N T H A T H A S B E E N T H E D E T E R M I N A T I O N OF T H E NEW

L E A D E R S H I P T O D E M O N S T R A T E I T S T O T A L I N D E P E N D E N C E FROM

F O R E I G N ( R E A D U.S.) INFLUENCE. WE W I L L N E E D T O B E

UNDERSTANDING OF THPS. A N Y E M B A R A C E F R O M US RISKS BEING

SUSPECT. B U T THERE I S , NONETHELESS, ROOM FOR U S T O

D E M O N S T R A T E A G R E A T E R D E G R E E O F A C C E P T A N C E AND U N D E R S T A N D I N G ,

P A R T I C U L A R L Y AS T H E R E V O L U T I O N MOVES FROM T H E I M M E D I A T E

KHOMEINI-DOMINATED C L E R I C I S M T O S O M E T H I N G H O P E F U L L Y MORE

RE.FLECTIVE
It.
OF S O C I O L O G I C A L AND P O L I T I C A L R E A L I T I E S OF I R A N .
11

14. I N T H E I M M E D I A T E FUTURE, c-bC

N O T H I N G M A T T E R S MORE I N T H A T

R E S P E C T T H A N T H E T I M I N G AND P E R S O N OF A NEW AMBASSADOR.

T I M E AND CIRCUMSTANCES H A V E COMBINED TO G I V E T H I S I S S U E

AN U N U S U A L I M P O R T A N C E , ONE FOR W H I C H T H E P G O I D E C L I N E S ANY

R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y B a T I N W H I C H T H E Y S E E US T O D A T E W I T H H O L D I N G

OUR V O T E OF C O N F I D E N C E I N T H E P R E S E N T L E A D E R S H I P AND-
 CONFIDENTIAL

I N THE REVOLUTION I T S E L F .

15. O F ONLY S L I G H T L Y L E S S I M P O R T A N C E I S T H E AREA OF P U B L I C

DIPLOMACY. T H E P G O I H A S WELCOMED OUR P R I V A T E E X P R E S S I O N S

O F GOOD W I L L A N D O F W I L L I N G N E S S T O C O O P E R A T E I N A M U T U A L

P R O C E S S O F B U I L D I N G A NEW R E L A T I O N S H I P . B U T THEY SEE I N THE

V I R T U A L A B S E N C E ON OUR P A R T OF ANY P U B L I C S T A T E M E N T S T O T H E

SAME E F F E C T A R E F L E C T I O N OF L E S S T H A N F U L L ENDORSEMENT.

T H A T MAY N O T B E A L L B A D L O N G E V I T Y FOR T H E R E V O L U T I O N I S

S T I L L F A R FROM C E R T A I N B U T SOME P O S I T I V E E X P R E S S L O N O N

OUR P A R T O f U N D E R S T A N D I N G FOR T H E D I F F I C U L T T R A N S I T I O N T H A T

I R A N I S G O I N G THROUGH COULD STRENGTHEN T H E HAND OF THE

M O D E R A T E S WHO WANT GOOD T I E S W I T H US. AND W H I L E T H E I

I S P R I M A R I L Y O N T H E P G O I T O A C T I N WAYS T H A T

E N H A N C E I T S I M A G E I N T H E CONGRESS A N D AMONG T H E A M E R I C A N

PUBLIC, AN O C C A S I O N A L P O S I T I V E AND P U B L I C S T A T E M E N T B Y

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S P O K E S M E N A B O U T OUR I N T E R E S T A N D H O P E S I N

T H E NEW I R A N C A N H E L P R E D U C E SOME O F T H E C H I P ON T H E

SHOULDER, DAMN YOU F O R OUR GAS L I N E S , A T T I T U D E S TOWARD

I R A N I N T H E U.S. P U B L I C T H A T DO N O T H E L P U S I N P U R S U I N G

W --RANGE INTERESTS I N IRAN.

16. I N M I L I T A R Y SUPPLY, WE ARE NOW I N P O S I T I O N I N TH-E

A F T E R M A T H O F T H E DOD S U P P L E M E N T A L , T O A C T I N WAYS T H A T

R E F U T E P G O I S U S P I C I O N S T H A T WE H A V E H E L D B A C K ON S w S p a
D E L I V E R I E S FOR P O L I T I C A L R E A S O N S . MORE I M P O R T A N T L Y WE C A N

USE, MORE A C T I V E L Y T H A N WE H A V E TO DATE, WHAT W I L L B E A

N E C E S S A R I L Y REDUCED B U T S T I L L S U B S T A N T I A L M I L I T A R Y SUPPLY
 CONFIDENTIAL

D E P E N D E N C E O N U S F O R OUR OWN I N T E R E S T S , INCLUDING

REBUILDING A L I A I S O N WITH A M I L I T A R Y ESTABLISHMENT THAT

REMAINS STRONGLY WESTERN AND E S S E N T I A L L Y MODERATE I N I T S

P O L I T I C A L OUTLOOK.

THOSE N O N - L E F T I S T S E C U L A R FORCES I N T H E P O L I T I C A L F I E L D WHO

A R E OUR N A T U R A L A L L I E S A R E A L S O T H O S E WHO R E C O G N I Z E I R A N ' S

C O N T I N U I N G N E E D S FOR W E S T E R N C O N T A C T S I N B U S I N E S S A N D

TECHNOLOGY. WE S H O U L D C O N T I N U E T O C O U N S E L A N E R I C R N B U S I N E S S

W I T H UNRESOLVED I N V E S T M E N T I S S U E S I N I R A N TO S T I C K W I T H

I T - WITH PATIENCE, PERSISTENCE, AND A GOOD D E A L OF

S Y P M P A T H E T I C U N D E R S T A N D I N G FOR A && NATIONALISTIC

ATMOSPHERE T H A T D I C T A T E S A M I N I M U M OF F O R E I G N M A N A G E R I A L

AND T E C H N I C A L L E V E L P R E S E N C E .

18. I N FOREIGN POLICY, WE S H A R E W I T H T H E P G O I A

FUNDAMENTAL S T R A T E G I C INTEREST I N IRAN'S I N T E G R I T Y AND

INDEPENDENCE. I T I S A POLICY A S S E T T H E S O V I E T S CANNOT

CLAIM, W I T H T H I S OR V I R T U A L L Y ANY C O N C E I V A B L E SUCCESSOR

REGIME. T H I S I S NOT AFGHANISTAN. UNDERLYING T H I S FACT

I S B O T H T H E F U N D A M E N T A L A V E R S I O N T B C O M M U N I S M AMONG T H E

I S L A M I C FORCES AND T H E H I S T O R I C DISTRVP OF T H E S O V I E T

U N I O N AMONG M O S T I R A N I A N S . T H E S E ARE P O W E R F U L R E A S O N S

WHY WE CAN A F F O R P T O L E T T H E NEW I R A N I A N L E A D E R S H I P

B A S I C A L L Y S E T T H E I R OWN P A C E I N B U I L D I N G A R E L A T I O N S H I P

W I T H U S * W H I L E E X P L O I T I N G O P P O R T U N I T I E S TO G A I N P O L I C Y
 CONFIDENTIAL 9

GROUND U H E N S Y M P A T H E T I C U N D E R S T A N D I N G ON OUR P A R T I S C A L L E D

FOR. THAT W I L L INCLUDE TOLERATING T H E I R NON-ALIGNMENT

AND I N D E E D C O M P L I M E N T I N G T H E M FOR I T U H E N I T I N V O L V E S ,

AS WE B E L I E V E I T U I C L I A R E F U S A L T O GO A L O N G W I T H T H E

CUBANS ON T H E I R V E R S I O N O F N O N - A L I G N M E N T . WE S H O U L D B E

ALERT TO SUCH O P P O R T U N I T I E S T H I S FALL, ESPECIALLY I F

ANY OF T H E P G O I L E A D E R S H I P A T T E N D T H E UNGA.

19. F I N A L L Y THERE REMAINS, HOWEVER, T H E F A C T OF A

S U B S T A N T I A L C O M M U N I C A T I O N S GAP BETWEEN U S AND T H E ' I S L A M I C

FORCES I N I R A N . THAT GAP I S GREATEST I N A L E A D E R L I K E

KHOMLINI, WHERE I T I N V O L V E S B O T H R I G I D R E L I G I O U S ORTHODOXY

AND AN E N G R A I N E D D I S T A S T E AND S U S P I C I O N OF T H E U.S. I T

I S L E S S AMONG MORE M O D E R A T E F I G U R E S S U C H A S A Y A T O L L A H S

T A L E G H A N I AND S H A R I A T - M A D A R I . BUT I T I S A SERIOUS OBSTACLE

TO U N D E R S T A N D I N G W I T H V I R T U A L L Y A L L OF T H E CLERICAL

LEADERSHIP, A GROUP D E S T I N E D TO P L A Y A M A J O R R O L E I N I R A N

OVER T H E N E X T FEW Y E A R S . I T I S I M P O R T A N T T H A T WE S E E K

I M A G i N A T I V E WAYS TO B E G I N T O BRIDGE THIS GAP, INCLUDING

.EXCHANGE V I S I T S BY ACKNOWLEDGED EXPERTS I N T H E F I E L D S OF

R E L I G I O N AND P H I L O S O P H Y AND LONGER T F R M E X C H A N G E PROGRAMS

INVOLVING STUDENTS I N THESE FIELDS.& k

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 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9503

DE RUQMHR # 9503 239 "

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271147 2; AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3468
BT
c O N F I D E N T I A LTEHRAN
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/27/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH
DEFTD: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH:EM
CLEAR: C0NS:RMOREFIELD
09503 DISTR: CHARGE CONS RF POL2

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/27/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-M

TAGS: CVIS, PEPR, SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: NIV APPLICATIONS IN "POST-CRISIS" IRAN

REF: STATE 35557

2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IRAN CAN NO LONGER BE

CHARACTERIZED AS BEING IN "CRISIS, AND, ACCORDINGLY.
RECOMMENDS THAT REFTEL BE RESCINDED. END SUMMARY.

3. THE IMMEDIATE TRAUMA OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS

PASSED. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS FAR DIFFERENT IN
CERTAIN RESPECTS THAN UNDER THE PAHLAVI REGIME, IN THE
SIX MONTHS SINCE FEBRUARY IRAN HAS SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE,
THE MAIN FEATURES OF WHICH WILL PROBABLY PERTAIN FOR THE
INDEFINITE FUTURE. THESE INCLUDE POLITICAL DOMINANCE BY
THE ISLAMIC CLERGY, A HIGH LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS-C'JM-
NATIONALIST RHETORIC NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT THAN THAT
FOUND IN MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND AN ECONOMY SHAPED
MORE BY POLITICAL PEHCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THAN
RATIONAL CRITEHIA FOR SOUND MANAGEMENT.

4. THERE ARE MANY IN IRAN WHO FIND THESE CONDITIONS

PERSONALLY UPSETTING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE
SUSPICIOUS OF THE EMPHASIS ON PERSIAN SHIA ISLAM. MODERNIST
AND SECULAR ELEMENTS RESENT THEIR OWN DIMINISHED ROLE IN
90TH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SPHERES. AND MANY OTHERS
LAMENT THE GENERAL INEFFICIENCY AND ARBITRARINESS OF THE
CURRENT SYSTEM.
5. MUCH OF THE CRITICISM IS VALID. HOWEVER, THE CONDI-
TIONS WHICH IT IS BASED CANNOT BE TERMED A "CRISIS".
RATHER, THEY ARE WHAT HAS COME TO PASS FOR NORMALITY I N
THIS COUNTRY. ACCORDINGLY, WE FIND IT NO LONGER
APPROPRIATE TO SPEAK OF A " POST-CRISIS" IRAN IN DEALING WITH
NON-IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS. THAT MANY IRANIANS WOULD
PREFER TO HAVE THPIR COUNTRY BE SOMETHING OTHER THAN WHAT
IT ACTUALLY IS. DOES NOT, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE GROUNDS
FOR CONTINUED BENDING OF OUR IMMIGRATION LAW. IN SHORT,
THE SITUATION HERE IS ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR TO A NUMBER OF
OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHERE LOCAL CONDITIONS PROVIDE
STRONG INCENTIVES FOR MANY IRANIANS TO EMIGRATE. WE SHOULD
DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION EXACTLY AS WE DO IN THOSE
COUNTRIES WHERE " PUSH" FACTORS ARE ALSO STRONG.

6. TREATMENT OF VARIOUS IRANIAN MINORITIES IN POST-

REVOLUTIONARY IRAN DESERVES SPECIAL COMMENT. DESPITE
NUMEROUS REPORTS OF HARASSMENTS DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUAL MEMBER
0 , THR EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO DOCUMENT
INSTANCE OF OFFICIAL PERSECUTION DIRECTED EITHER
AT INDIVIDUALS OR AT CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE. SENIOR GOVERN-
MENT OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP HAVE
REPEATEDLY ASSURED ALL MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS THAT THEIR
RIGHTS WILL BE RESPECTED IN THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.
PREJUDICE AND BIGOTRY MOST CERTAINLY DO SXIST. BUT THERE
IS NO QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRAN UNDER THE SHAH
AND IRAN UNDER KHOMEINI IN THIS REGARD. ALMOST
INVARIABLY WHEN INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS
ARE QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT THEIR MOTIVATIONS FOR
WANTING TO LEAVE IRAN, INCHOATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE
RATHER THAN SPECIFIC ACTS OF PERSECUTION IN THE PAST ARE
GIVEN.
7. IN RIGHT OF THE ABOVE, WE RECOMMEND THAT REFTEL BE
RESCINDED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT ALL IRANIAN NIV APPLICANTS
HENCEFORWARD BE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE BINDING TIED AS
STIPULATED IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.
TOMSETH
BT
#9503
NNNN
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9 6 5 3 / 1
EUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT
BUFNPS RUSNAM
DE RUQMHR #9653/B1 242** CLASS : CONFIDENTIAL
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 3 0 1 1 5 1 2 AUG 7 9 CHRGE: STATE 8/31/79
FM AMEMBASSI TEHRAN APPRV : CHARGE:VLTOMSETB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3 5 5 0 DRFTD: POL: JL1HBERT:GO
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASST ABU DHABI 0249 CLEAR: TL:EASWIFT
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSI ANTARA 0 2 3 9 DISTR: POL2 CEG DAO
RUEEACAJSINT BAGHDAD 0 2 5 4 MAAG ICA RF
RUQMOD/AMEYBASSI DCEA 0 2 2 0 CHRN
RUSBQD/AMEflBASSY ISLAMABAD 0 2 8 7
RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY J I r D A 0 2 8 2
RU~'BLK/AMEUBASS~ KABUL 0 2 9 1
RUOMKW/AMEMBASSI KUWAIT 0 2 5 2
RUQMA~/AMEMBASSIMANAMA 0 2 1 8
BUEEMO/AME'lBASSI MOSCOU P 2 7 2
~UQM~T~A~EMBA nusclr
S S T 8146
RUFNPS/AMEHBASST PARIS 0 3 0 7
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 81 OP TEHRAN 0 9 6 5 3
E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS e/3a/e5 (LINBERT, JOHN) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, P I N S , POOV, IR
SUBJECT: MOVES TOWARD GOVERNMENT UNIFICATION
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS INDICATE TEAT IRAN'S
DUAL SISTEM OF OFlrICIAL AND UNORICIAL GOVERNMENT I S
EVOLVING TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED STSTEM DOMINATZD BY THE
UNOPPICIAL, OR REVOLUTIONARY, SECTOR. THE OFFICIAL,
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMPNT OF IRAN (PGOI) HEADED BY P B I n r
MINISTER BAZARGAN I S BEING INCREASINGLY OVERSHADOWED BY
THE CLERICAL ESTABLISHNENT WHICH I S S M D I N G ITS AUTHORITY
INTO N N AREAS AND WHICH I S INC &SINGLY GIVING DIRECT
ORDERS TO GOVERNMENT MINISTRI&OMINALLY UNDER PGOI
CONTROL. THIS SITUATION MAY BE RECOGNITION OF KHOMEINI'S
PRP-EMINENCE AND OP ?ACT THAT ONLY HE AND HIS ALLIES CAN
COMMAND RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE OF BOTH SIDES OF THE DUAL
AUTHORITY SYSTEM. COUNCIL OF EXPERTS DELIBERATION MAY
SANCTIPT CLERICAL PBEDOMINANCE AND OFFICIALLY PUT PC01
LEADERS NOT CLOSELY IDENTITILD WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OUT
O r PUBLIC LIFE. END SUMMARY.
3. SOME ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN P B I S TEXT OF
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S AUGUST 2 8 STATEMENT ON THE ARMEC
WRCES. KURDESTAN, PRESS FREEDOM, AND OTHER MATTERS ( F B I S
2 8 2 0 1 4 2 LONDON). DURING THE PAST WEEKS THE IMAM AND HIS
ALLIES IN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN TAKING INCREAS-
11617 DIiUCT CONTROL OVER AREAS NOWINALLY UNDER THE
CONTROL OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. I T APPEARS THAT
THE SYSTEM OF DUAL AUTHOBITY DIVIDED BITWEEN QOM AND
TEHR HAS NOT WORKED WELL EVEN AS A TEMPORARY ARBANGE-
QOM I S NOW MAKING DECISIONS ON ALMOST ALL MATTERS
OF I ORTANCE, INCLUDING PUBLIC SECURITI, THE PRESS.
corm CE, A N D THE MILITART.
MENTQ
CONPI DENTIAL TEHRAN 9653/1
55
 CONIIDENTIAL TEBRAN 9653/1

4 . LEOHEIN1 HAS OPENLY ASSERTED E I S AUTHORITY OVER THF

PAST FPY WEEES. FOR PIAMPLE, THE "INTEGRATION" OF TBE
EXVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE CABINETPUT FIVE MINISTZRS
ON TEE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS
IIGURES INTO UNDER-SECRETARY POSITIONS IN THE MINISTRIES.
APPARENTLY THE PRESENCE OF MINISTERS ON THE COUNCIL HAS
NOT AIIECTPD THE WORKINGS 0 1 THAT BODY, BUT THE NEW
uNIIZ%SECFSTARIES ARE WIELDING CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER
MINISTBY OPERATIONS. AYATOLLAE KEAMENE'I TEE NEW
UNDEBSPCRPTARY OF TEE MINISTBY 0 1 DEFENSE. I S BELIEVED TO
BE CLOSELY INVOLVED IN DELIBERATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF
TEE 1-14 AIRCRAFT. ( C I . TEHRAN 9467).
6. KEOMEINI'S ASSUMING TEE POST OP SUPREME COMMANDER
THE ARHED PORCES. H I S ORDERS TO MdYE AGAINST THE KURC
IRSIIWENTS AND HIS CALLS FOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE HAV
-PIRECTLT A ~ S E R T E D QOM'S POWER OVER THE IRANIAN YILITA
,APMED FORCES COMANDERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO COMMAND
~ O B B D I S N CWHBN
~ ~ THEIR ORDERS ARE BACKED BY IHOMEINI'S
"3311~193 THAN BY THE DUBIOUS AUTHORITY OP THE PSOI--
IAUWOPITY WEICH CAN BP EASILY RfVSRSSD. TEE NEW
~COWANDER01 TEE AIR FORCE MAJ GEN BA3HSR1,BACYED BY
CHOMEINI 'S AUTHORITY BAS B ~ X NWORKING TO RE-INSTILL
'$DISCIPLINP AND ORDER IN E I S COMMAND. BY CONTRAST, Prl
BAZABGAN'S AUGUST 27 MESSAGE TO THX ARMY EXPHESSING
pBBATITUDE FOR ITS VALOR IN SAQQEZ, RECEIVED LITTLE
:LTTENTION.
\I
8. TES CLOSURE 0 1 A NUMBER 01 PUBLICATIONS WHICH HAVE
BEEN -SING THE POLICIES 0 1 THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
WAS UNDBETAKEN AT TEE INITIATIVE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
COURT AUTEOBITIB (CF. TEHRAN 9 4 4 6 ) . THE POOI,
SPECIIICALLY THE MINISTRY O I NATIONAL GUIDANCE. HAD
LITTLE ROLE IN TEE EVENTS EXCEPT CATCH UP WITH MEASURE>
LLBUDT TAKPN BY THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR.
7 . TEE CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF
BT
19653
NNNN
CONFIDERTIAL TEHRAN 9653/1
 CONPIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9653/2
RUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT
RUTNPS RUSNAAA
D E RUQMHR #9653/02 242 **
ZNY ccccc ZZH CLASS: CONF J E N T I A L
B 3 0 1 1 5 1 Z AUG 79 CBRGE: S T A T E 9/38/79
Fn-iiitii~issi-~m~~~ APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSET
T O P m H C / S E C S T A T E WASHDC 3551 DRFTD: P0L:JLIMBERT:GO
IN^ a u a n n l / A n s n a A s s r ABU DHABI CLEAR: TL:EASYIFT
RUQMW /AMENBASST ANKARA 8248-- DISTR: P O L 2 CHG DAO
R U E H A D h J S I N T BAGHDAD 0255 ." MAAG M A A ~ - ~ C A
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 8221 CERON R F
R u ~ Q D / A M E M B A S S Y ISLAMABAD 0 2 9 8
RUOMEA/AMEMBASSY J I D D A 0283
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0 2 9 2
*RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY XUWAIT 0 2 5 3
? RUDTC/AMEHBASSY LONCON 0359
" RUQMAH/APlEPlBASSY MANAMA 0219
4 RUEBW/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0273
, R U Q ~ ~ T / A M ~ B AMUSCAT ~~Y 0147
.- --
5
RUPNPS/AMEMBASSY P A R I S 0 3 0 8
RVSNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I H I N G E N G E
nt
Z C 0 N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 02 O F TEHRAN 09653
:WEAPONS I S NOW CLEARLY I N T H E HANDS O F T H E REVOLUTIONARY
LUTHORITIES. TEHRAN REVOLUTIONART PROSECTOR AYATOLLAH
;AHMAD AZARI-QOMI TOLD BAMDAD NEWSPAPER O N AUGUST 27
.THAT ANYONE FOUND POSSESSING ILLEGAL ARMS WOULD BE
:CONSIDERED CORRUPT O N EARTH A N D SHOT. A C C O R L I N G TO
AZARI-QOMI, NO GRACE P E R I O D WOULD BE ALLOWED AND TXZ
ORDER VOULC COME I N T O E F F E C T IMMEDIATELY. FOLLOWING
H I S STATEMENT, T H E REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTORS I N MASEEIID ,
I S F A E A N . N A J I V A B A D , PERDOWS, BANDAR ABBAS. AND OTHER
P R O V I N C I A L TOWNS I S S U E D S I M I L A R ORDERS WITH T E E C O N C I T I O N
THAT THOSE CARRYING WEAPONS, E X C E P T FOR T H E P O L I C E , T E E
M I L I T A R Y , T H E GENDARMERIE, AND T E E REVOLUTIONARY GUARES
( P A S D A R A N I . WOULD HAVS ONE WEEX'S T I M E T O TURN TEEM I N .
ORDERS ~ ~ BEEN i ISSUED
i TO- TEE PASDARAN TO S E A ~ C HVEHICLFS
LND HOUSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS.
8. T H E R E V O L U T I O N I R Y COURT'S CAMPAIGN A G A I N S T WEAPONS
ROLLOWS THE S E I Z U R E O F T H E TEHRAN HEADQUARTERS O F T I E
MOJAHIDIN-E-KHALQ BY T E E PASDABAN. COMMENTINS ON THAT
S E J Z W E . A Z A R I - Q O M I QUOTEC THE IMAN AS S A Y I N G THAT " N O
ONE HAD THE R I G H T T O M I S A P P R O P R I h T E GOYERNMEhT P R O P Z P P I .
T H E M O J A H I D I N THEMSELVES I S S U E D d STATEMENT THAT TIIEY
WOULD A C C E P T T E E ORDERS O F THR IMAM ANC T H E GOVERNMENT.
D E S P I T E RUMORS O F DISCOVERY ON AN ARMS CACHE AT M O J h H I D I N
HEADQUARTERS. AZARI-QOMI NOTED THAT ONLY S E V E N 6-3
R I P L X S WERE FOUND AT T H E B U I L D I N S .
9 THE MEMBERSHIP O F THE ASSEMBLY OF E X P E B T S M E E T I N J TO
DRAW U P A NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N FOR IXAK HAS A E I S T I N C T L Y
R E L I G I O U S C A S T . T H E S O C I A I . I D E A L S O F MOST 07 T E E
MEMBERS ARE S I M I L A R T O , I F NOT I L E N T I C A L WITH T?OS O r
NI. WHATEVER P B I L O S O P R I C A L D I F F E R E N C E S :HE YZfl3EnS
V E , MOST ARE L I K E L Y TO AGREE THAT THE MUSLIM C L F F G "
HAVE A PRECOMINANT ROLE I N THE NEW S T A T E . FYI:
BATES O F T H E ASSEMBLY HAVE NOVFC O F F T B T F R O d T
CONFICENTIAL
57
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 9 6 5 3 / 2
PACE AND HAVE TAKEN ON TEE ASPECTS OF A SIDESHOW TO TEE
EVENTS BEING SHAPED BY KHOMEINI ANC THE REVOLUTIONARY
COURTS. THE MOST RECENT REPORT ABOUT THE ASSEMBLY WAS
TAHUDI OR KALIMI.
A DEBATE ABOUT VHETHER JEWS SHOULD BE REFERRRED TO AS
END F Y I .
18. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SUGCESTEC THAT ALL OF THESE
EVENTS ARE A N OPEN SEIZUBE.OF POVER BY THE UNOFFICIAL.
REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITICS AT THE EXPENSE OF TEE P 0 0 1 .
ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, TEE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY AND
THE PASDARAN INTO KURDESTAN WAS MOTIVATED NOT BY EVENTS
IN KURDESTAN BUT BY KHoMEINI'S DESIRE TO TIGHTEN HIS
CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION.
HOWEVER, THERE I S NO NECESSITY TO SEE A PLOT IN
THESE EVENTS. WHAT MAY BE EAPPENING I S THAT THOSE
~ v E OALREADYHOLD REAL POWER ARE BEING FORCED TO USE I T
S T 0 IMPOSE ORDER LND STbBILITY ON THE NATION. LEAVIN3 AN
,IMPOTENT PGOI TO TRY AN6 DEAL WITH ARMED BANDS, ECONOMIC
:CONFUSION. UNRULY TRIBESMEN, AND OTHERS SEEN AS COVNTER-
RREVOLUTIONARIES BAS NOT WORKED. VHETHER THE REVOLUTIONARY

NNNN
d CONPICENTIAL TEHRAN 9653/2
 c,&.kr~~:.k.' '4""+" W r n r n f l ? S *.*"
C 0 N P I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 13 TEHRAN 09653
HOWEVER. STABILITY I S AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR
CONTROLLING IRAN AND I T TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMICS, RELIGION, OR
FOREIGN POLICY. SUCH A PROCEDURE HAS DEEP ROOTS IN
IRANIAN HISTORY, WHICH CONTAINS NUMPROUS EXAMPLES OF
RULERS TAKING EXTREME STEPS TO ENSURE TEE SECURITY AND
STABILITY OF THIS HETEROGENEOUS NATION.
12. I T I S LIKELY THAT KHOMEINI'S OPENLY EXERCISING DIRECT
RULE OVER IRANIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS COMBINED WITH THE
LIKELT OUTCOME OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OP
EXPERTS WILL RESULT IN A CENTRALIZED STATE I N WHICH
$TEE INFLUENCE OF KHOMEINI AND HIS ALLIES (BOTH CLERICbL
2AND SECULAR) WILL PREDOMINATE. I N SUCH A STATE, THE
3 ROLE OF OPPONENTS OF CLERICAL DOMINATION. OF WHATEVER
!POLITICAL AND SOCIAL S T R I P E , I S LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE
,LIMITEC THAN I T I S TODAY WKEN AT LEAST SOME SECULARISTS
:ARE ALLOWED TO SERVE AS FIGUREHEADS IN THE PGOI. WHILE
:SUCH A PROSPECT MAY NOT FLEASE MANY WHO ORISINALLY
:SUPPORTED THE REVOLUTION. THE INSTITUTION OF SUCH A
'GOVERNMENT MAT BE ONLY THE FORMAL RECOGNITION OF AN
:.I B!l
LLREADY EXISTING SITUATION. TOPTSETH
$ W6is
;UNNK
4 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 0965313
September 2. 1979
Regional Security Officer
memorandum
American Embassy. Tehran Iran
Monthly Status Report f o r August 1979

Chief. A/SY/FO
Department of State

I. Threat Assessment
A. The potential f o r violence in Iran remains hioh. There are
increasina sipns of disenchantnent with tlie results of the rev-
olution a t many levels of society. Hinh unemployment is a prob-
lem and ideological. sociological, and ethnological differences
abound. Although i t c w l d be argued t h a t many of these problem
are not new t o Iran, the lack of any effective central authority
t o deal with them i s a cause f o r concern.
The PGOI, headed by P r i m Minister Bazaroan, has y e t t o so-
l i d i f y i t s administrative control over the country and is con-
tinually upstacred by the shadow government headed by the Ayatollah
Ruhollah ~homeini,often making i t d i f f i c u l t . i f not impossible.
to deal with the problems t h a t have .manifested themselves a s a
result of the revolution. Cabinet members of the PGOI have re-
peatedly offered t h e i r resjgnations in protest of interference by
the revolutionary council and c m i t t e e s . and the resulting in-
a b i l i t y t o do t h e i r job.
Traditional security and law enforcement organizations ( i .e..
National Police and Gendarmerie) do not e x i s t as viable units.
The military, which traditionally has not had an internal security
role. i s inactive. These forces a r e extremely reluctant t o take
part in any activity which miaht involve the use of force against
other Iranjans. Trials and executions (over 400 t o date) a r e con-
tinuing against police, gendarmerie and military personnel who
were involved in security functions prior t o the revolution, a
factor which weakens morale i n these organizations and makes their
personnel reluctant t o g e t involved i n law enforcement and i n t e r -
nal security functions. A good example of these fears i s a con-
versation that recently took place between an Emboff and a hlgh-
ranking Iranian police o f f i c i a l (subsequently related t o RSO).
The pollce o f f i c i a l stated t h a t he had standinn orders t o quell
any major disturbance i n Tehran, usina force i f necessary. The

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CONFIDENTIAL
 Page 2

police o f f i c i a l comnented t h a t i f he were foolish enough t o

carry out these orders, his men would not obey. and, secondly.
he was not about t o give these orders because of the possibil-
i t y of future reprisals. Until such time as there i s a strong
central povernment. possessing clear cut authority and the
public support. i t i s unltkely t h a t these forces will take an
active role in the internal security of the country.
k'ith the National Police, Gendarrerie. and the military in-
active, the security vacuum has been f i l l e d by an irregular
revolutionary guard organized i n t o Revolutionary Komi tehs
(comnittees]. Anyone encounterino them i s subject t o a r r e s t
and detention f o r l i t t l e i f any. reason. The numher of road-
blocks appears t o have decreased in recent days, but they can
reappear a t any time. Although not as a matter of course, sum-
macy justice, both capital and corporal. has been exercised by
those groups. The revolutionary guards are a law unto them-
selves and operate from the Mao Tse-tuna dictum that "poker stems
from the barrel of a gun."
mother group, the Pasdaran, appear t o be f i l l i n q the void
left by the military's inaction. The Pasdaran are also known as
revolutionary guards but are separate'from those serving in the
Khomitehs. Significant i s the f a c t t h a t they too are enpaoed in
internal security functions; a role that the military tradition-
a l l y has not played. Their leader i s an Iranian named RAFSANJANI,
a HojjatolesSan (one step down from an Ayatollah). A t Dresent
there are approximately 10-12.000 Pasdaran who have been screened
and selected f r m young, untrained Iranian Revolutionary volun-
teers. They are only a m d with l i g h t weapons and have been
receiving t h e f r training i n ground force installations in Tehran--
primarily Lavizan (the larger ground force base in Tehran). The
guard i s brbken i n t o three main Froups: a major c i t i e s group;
c i t i e s up t o 5000 people group. and a VIP protection grouo. The
Pasdaran are a separate para-military unit which has thus f a r
been active in internal security functions as well as sustaining
the revolution. They have been particularly active in Turkoman
Sahra area and Khoramshar. I t i s believed t h a t RAFSANJANI reports
directly t o the revolutionary council with an unknown degree of
coordination with the Defense and Interior Ministries. To what
degree the Komitehs and the Pasdaran will be willing t o cooperate
i s unknown. They are independent of each other, but do represent
the only viable security forces in Iran a t t h i s time.

CONFIDENTIAL

61
 Page 3

Demonstrations
A1 though improving somewhat, U.S.-Iranian diplomatic re-
lations remain i n a s t a t e of flux. Anti-Americanism has sub-
sided over the p a s t few weeks (from i t s previous high i n l a t e
May), but i s s t i l l j u s t beneath the surface. Hardly a day goes
by without a newspaper a r t i c l e or public denouncement by a
religious figure o r member of the PGOI, linking the USG/ICA t o
a current problem in Iran. The U.S. continues t o be a very con-
venient scapegoat f o r the everyday problems confronting the
Iranian leadership. There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t any decisions
or actions taken by the USG that are perceived t o be disadvan-
tageous or offensive t o the Iranians would r e s u l t in demonstra-
tions, possibly of a violent nature. In t h i s reaard, anti-Shah
feelings remain extremely stronq. Any decision t o allow him or
h i s family t o v i s i t the U.S. wobld almost certainly r e s u l t i n
an imnediate and violent reaction. The a b i l i t y and/or desire
of the PC01 t o contain such actions i s questionable.
Terrori sm
Terrorism. i n the form of assassinations, harassment. and
kidnappings, i s a l s o a very real threat. Due t o the l a c k o f
central authority. there i s l i t t l e t h a t can be done t o contain
any group or groups wishing t o further t h e i r own interests
through the use of violence. Two of the more prominent inde-
genous pre-revolution t e r r o r i s t groups, the Mujeheddin and the
Fedayeen, have achieved a degree of legitimacy and are now ac-
t i v e politically. Neither group has claimed responsibility
f o r any t e r r o r i s t acts since the overthrow of the Shah.
Forghan (a grwp opposed t o the r o l e of the clergy i n the govern-
ment), on the other hand, has been q u i t e active since the revolu-
tion. I t has claimed responsibility f o i the assassination of
several religious figures. We have no. infomation indicating
t h a t any of these groups have tarpeted U.S. personnel I n Iran.
but we must appear t o be a t t r a c t i v e targets. Aw of these
groups might be tempted t o carry out an operation e i t h e r i n re-
action to'developments perceived t o be antl-Iranian or i n order
t o induce a c r i s i s in already shaky PGOI/USG relations. Pales-
tanian r e j e c t i o n i s t groups, which have pledged t o seek revenge
f o r the USG's part i n the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, must
also be considered. This threat may be tempered somewhat by
the f a c t t h a t the PLO is seekina t o develop the PGOI as an
a l l y and may not wish t o endanger the relationship by placfng
the PGOI in the awkward position of havina t o deal with a
t e r r o r i s t action against the USG i n Iran.

CONFIDENTIAL
52
 Page 4

B. Specific Acts Directed Against the U.S. Enbass2

On August 17 a t approximately 2255 hours the M a s s y Compound
was the object o f a grenade attack. Two separate exp~oSlons, one
.at the n m Consulate Building and one a t the b u i l d i n g housing the
s a t e l l i t e dune d i r e c t l y behind the Chancery, wen registCred.
There were no injuries, hweyer, property damage. including labor
costs, t o t a l l e d appro xi mat el^ RMH) dollars. According t o the
Farsi language paper "Kayhan (August 18) three groups have
claimed c r e d i t f o r the explosions. These are:
- The Iranian Muslim Revolutionary Resistance Movement
- The 17th o f Sharlvar (September 8) Group
- The Tel Zatar Group
here has been no c o n f i m a t i o n t h a t a w o f these groups was
responsible. See Theran 9175 and 9153 f o r detailed Information
o f t h i s incident.
I n the early morning h w r s o f August 12 a group o f about 35-
50 armed irregulars (Pasdaran) arrived a t the Embassy f o r the.
purpose o f removing Mashallah Kashanl and h i s forces froln the
compound. While t h i s act was not directed a t the U.S. Ettbassy.
the method used (e.9. v i r t u a l armed takeover of the compound) d i d
have the potential f o r violence Involvlng American personnel.
Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and the s i t u a t i o n sorted it-
s e l f out a f t e r approximately f i v e t o s i x hours nesotiatlons w i t h
the irregular force. See Tehran 8973 f o r &dditi&al details.

11. Operations .
A. V i s i t o r Consulation/Briefin~s
N) Co. "0'. J e f f Ronald v l s l ted post from A U ~ U S7~t o August 16 -
i n order t o conduct an inspection o f the MSG Detachmnt.
S/A Foucht o f the Naval Intelligence Service v i s i t e d post f r o n
August 14 t o August 17 i n order t o Investigate allegations
against the f o m r NCOIC 6ySgt Main.
Seabee Mike Houseman arrived on August 26 i n order t o p e r f o m
technical security work on new Consulate building.
B. Support A c t i v i t i e s
RSfJ centlnucd t o work closely with 6SO. FBO project super-
visor and Consul General i n order to incorporate securlty re-
q v l - m t s . i n t o construction o f nen Consulate building.
 CORF IOtWT!hL
Page 5

.C. Siqnificant A c t i v i t i e s
- The period of August 1 through August 12 required that
almost a11 o f the Security Officers time and resources
be devoted to dealing w i t h Hrshallrh Kashani and h l s
foKeJ.
- On August 12 Kashani was ousted frm the Embassy compound
b y a force of a m i d irregulars.
- On August 15 S/A Dan XcCarthy arrived f o r a three-week
TDY.
- On August 17 the Embassy compound was the object o f a
combiaed RPG and hand grenade attack. Approximately
8000 dollars I n property darnap was incurred. There
w e n no personal injuries.
- On August 18 ARSO Harland departed post on visitation.
- Annex J. Internal Destruction Plan, was rewritten and
w i l l soon be forwarded t o the Departmeht.
- Detailed security briefings were conducted f o r a l l new
TOY and PCS arrivals.
- Considerable tin was devoted t o w o r k i y w i t h the National
Police i n an e f f o r t t o obtsln a reaular uniformed security
force f o r Edassy protection. ~ h u far, i only the body-
guard d e t a i l canposed o f plainclothes National Police have
r e p o r t d f o r duty on 8 continuing basis. Manning Of
perimeter security parts has been sporadic.
111. Plans f o c Cmino Month
- TW secretary. Lillan. Johnson.. w i l l a r r i v e frm Kinshasa i n
order t o assist RSO's w i t h re-establishment o f records and wnage-
merit systclnr destroyed as a r e s u l t o f February 14, 1979 attack.
- TSO Chuck Soper w i l l a r r i v e i n order t o continue work on
physical Security inprovements;
- Continue t o negotiate f o r a regular security force f o r the
Embassy.
-duringIt Ithes expected t h a t the new Consulate building w i l l open
month o f September.
- RSS w i l l v i s i t post sometime during the month o f September
- ARSO Harland w i l l return from v i s i t a t i o n on September 3.
- S/A FkCartb w i l l depart f ~U.rS. on Septenber 3.
 LIMITED OTTICIAL USE
DE RUQMHR #9739 247
ZNT - ... -ZZH
- . CCCCC --
** CLASS: L I l I W D O?PICIAL 'J
0 0407072 SEP 79 CEBOL: ICA 9/4/79
M AMEMBASSY TEHRAN i5m : i c i t r i o i J ~ R A V B S
-- - -IMMEDIATE
TO RllEEIA/USICA WASEDC
-. . ...-- - -- - DRFTD: 1CA:PAOtJGRAVIS :L'
TE WASECC 3600 CLIIP: ROME
m s n r IOA-2 CURCE POL
ECON CRU
LIMITED OF?ICIAL USE TEHRAN 09733

E.O. 12065: N/A

2SUBJ: A MAJOR PUBLIC APTAIRS CONCERN
?,
3 WITH A' VIEV TO IDENTIfYING "CO~MUNICATIONTENSIONS I "

"AVE, IN TALKING WITH IRANIANS, SOUGHT VATS TO ASK'

pDISCREETLT: WHAT ABOUT AMERICA AND AMERICANS MOST BUGS
*IRANIANS? THE ANSWERS VART CONSIDERABLY, BUT ONE
THREAD RUNS THROVGE MOST OP TAE ANSWERS TO MY QUESTION:
ei 1. TO0 MANY AMERICANS HAVE BEEN T B V I S I B L E TOO LONG
IN TOO MANY ASPECTS OF L I F E IN IRAN.
z
g2.' I RECALL WHEN I VISITOD TEHRAN IN 1973, BEING
P STRUCK BY T E PSRCEPTION
~ THAT s o n S or
WHAT I WAS
:SEEING IN TEBRAN WAS REMINISCENT 0 1 WHAT I HAD SEEN IN
*SAIGON IN 1967: AMERICAN TECENICIANS AND OPERATIOPS
WERE HAVING A VISIBLE IMPACT ON THE LOCAL SCLNE.
3. I SUBMIT THAT, WHEREVER THE AMXRICAN PRESENCE I S
SO PERVASIVE THAT I T IMPACTS WIDELY ON TEE INDIGENOUS
POPULATION, THERE I S LIKELY TO BE A SERIOUS "COP~WUNICATION
TENSION" BUILDING. A PROBLEM FOR ICA IN THE FIELD
AND PERHAPS ?OR OUR RESEARCH O??ICERS IN WASA1N:TON.
BUT nosr OF ALL A PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSICERATION WHICH
THE AGENCY MIGHT USETULLT CALL TO TEE ATTBNTION Of
POLICY MAZERS -AT NSC, DOD AND STATE.
4. ONE MIGHT, BT Why OF ILLUSTRATING THE DANGSR. CITE
PRE-CASTRO CUBA, GREECG UNDER TH6 JUNTA OR THE RUSSIAN
EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT AND A?GANISTAN. AN EVEN MORE
ILLUMINATING EXAYPLE C3ULD. HOWEVER, BE CONJURED UP ?OR
AMERICANS BY EVOKING AN ENTIEtLY EYPOTHETICAL CASE:
50,000 JAPANESE TECHNICIANS LIVING AND WORKING AROUND
JACKSON MISSISSIPPI OR A SIf4ILAR NUMBER OF GERM4NS
VHEELINE AND DEALING IN DULUTH. MINNESOTA. HOV WOULD
AMERICANS COME TO VIEW THESE VISITORS AND TELIB COUNTRIES?
5. GENERAL AMIB RAAIMI 'S STATEMENTS ABOUT BRINGING
BACK FOREIGN ADVISORS AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE EPPECTS
OF SUCH ADVISORS ON THE IRANIAN MILITARl IN THE PAST
REVEAL THE KIND OF FRUSTRATIONS AND RESENTMENTS AMERICANS

LT
IN L GE NUMBERS EWOENDELED HERE.
OUR EAGERNESS TO PROMOTE OUR SHORT-TERM POLIST,
SECU TT, OR BUSINESS INTERESTS, WE HAVE SOMETIMES
PROCUCED LONG-TERM HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION. AMERICAN
55 TEHRAN 9739
 LIMITED O??ICIAL USE TEERAN 9759
PLURALISM AND rat w m o m ; r r c E N T ~ P R I S E01UYRIAC AMERIC
INTXLEST GRO8?I DOES, 0 1 COURSE, RAKE I T DIFFICULT TO
CONTEOL TEE W ( m l 01 AUEIICAMS OPERATINO IN ANY
E W I I I O N ~ANY~PEII
~~ IN r E r UOILD nrn~AMP~ICANS SEE
O F F O ~ T B N I T ~ .NOIIRIELESS, IT snns CLEAR TEAT r a E
EONO-VLII OUHIkl AMERICAN INTIRPST REQUIRIS ?BAT
S T r r m f o u s r m l ~ sBE nor TO IIDUCE, FOP E u n P L E , WE
T I S I B ~ I WERICANPRESENCE (AND xurrcr or T a r c u L r u n r )
EM SUCH COUNTRIES AS SAUDI ARABIA, !lTXICO, AND XGTPT.
ORAIBS
1T
19739

TEHRAN 9739
 EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OFAMERICA

CONFIDENTIAL

September 4, 1979

NOTE FOR POL - Mr.

FROM: ECON - A. D. Sans

The implications as I read them of your recent

cable on the political structure here correctly seem to
be right on the mark. I think you should have gone fur-
ther to say what the implications are of the demise of
-the "dual government" construct for US interests. Vic
suggested that I give you my thoughts in case they might
be useful for a follow-up cable at some point. Here
goes:

fsent, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly became *

It seems to me that if there ever was a dual govern-
source of power. )(I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on
the Kurds, attacks on the left public contempt for the
critical ihtelligentsia. and aiparently temporagy
restrictions on the press in recent,weeks,,rather than as
a panicky reaction to events beyond his control, as a
systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly
that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not
using the weapons of the revolution against sometime
allies of conveniece who would seize the movement for
their own ends.
I think there is a question of timirrg here, too.
Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional
assembly completing the constitution he wants for the
Isalmic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the
revolution will in effect be declared a success and the
new permanent goverment will be launched. It seems to
me Khomeini couldn't givetit a better Ehristening present
(pun intended) than an opposition that has been disarmed
and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement
for order made transparently clear. Besides, at this
point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the
streets on a few hours notice: his revolutionary guards
will throw themselves joyously on any qroup, defenseless
or not. In six months or a year, the inevitable disen-
chantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS 9/4/85
 CONFIDENTIAL

will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his

new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom--
from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease
critics it can no longer so easily kick into line.
What of the implications for US interests? Well, if
Khomeini is able to cotltain the disenchantments, you
have improved prospects for internal stability and for
unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to
me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get
people b$ck to work to ensure a decent--and even rising
by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even
austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean
either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus,
our interest in continued access to Iran's oil sh uld be
safeguarded by the new government's ability to ma$tain
order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our
interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US
should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding
to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly
beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into
jobs throuoh either consumer imports or, much more likely,
labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively
labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for
increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a
confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home
and much skepticism of things Western is going to give
us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need
him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and
so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly
on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force
we will have to reckon with.

cc: CHG:VTomseth

CONFIDENTI-
 /- I-

SEC&(E"/SEE;SITIVE

THROUGH : F - Mr. Newsom

FROM :
SUBJECT: P o l i c y Towards I r h n ,

- Assessment:
The Khomeini/Bazarqan revolutio-:??;. l c 3 3 c r s t i :
f e e l s i n c r e a s i n g l y b e l e a g u c r e d by t:!e f;.:r2s ar.e o t 2 c r
e t h n i c s , t h e L e f t , C e n t e r s c c u l u r i s r r ; , f o r e i g n pz;i.^:rs ,,', , .
[.
t' '-

( I s r a e l , USSR, I r a q , U.S. " i n p e r i . a l i s t - 5 " ) and " p r o -

Shah f o r c e s (ex-Savak and n i i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ) . > \:.+ -..:I\
.
.
Khomeini's uncor.i;roir,isino r e a c t i o n i s 13 l z s n o 3 t
v i o l e n t l y : t h e Bazargan moderates s h a r e some of t h a t * 4'
h a r s h approach b u t a l s o s e e k compronrises, b e t t e r
r e l a t i o n s a b r o a d , and a r e working t o r e - s t a r t t h e
economy. Although t h e r e i s i n c r e a s i n g diser6chantne:;t
---with Khomfini even w i t h i n t h e c l e r g y ( A y a t o l l a h s
S h a r i a t m a d a r i and T e l e g h ~ r i ) ,he c o n t i n u e s t o co~.?anc?
a s t r o n y n a j o r i t y of t h e lower c l a s s e s , and few
p o l i t i c i a n s a r e w i l l i n g t o c o n f r o n t him d i r e c t l y .
The d u a l l e a d e r s h i p p l a c e s i t s hopes i n t h e con-
s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s l e a d i n y t o a new government t o
g i v e I r a n a u n i f i e d , s t r o n g , c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . Each
s i d e ( i . e . , I s l a m i c and l i b e r a l n a t i o n a l i s t ) hopes t o
dominate. The c o n s t i t u t i o n i s now b e i n g reviewed by
e x p @ r t s (mainly c l e r i c s ) . A referendum w i l l r a t i f y
t h e d r a f t and e l e ~ c i o n sf o r a p a r l i a m e n t and p r e s i d e n t
s h o u l d come t h i s y e a r . Bazargan i s a f a i r b e t f o r
p r e s i d e n t . C l e r i c a l i n f l u e n , c e s w i l l be s t r o n g f o r a t
l e a s t t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s and c l e r + c s w i l l c e r t a i n l y
be numerous i n t h e new parlia,;-.es:,. but we doubt t h e hard-
l i n e mullahs w i l l d e c i s i v e and l a s t i n g
v i c t o r y o v e r t h e s e c u l a r e l e m e n t s . The c l e r i c s c a n n o t
t h e m s e l v e s r u n a complex c o u n t r y and w i l l be f o r c e d t o
s e e k h e l p from W e s t e r n i z e d o f f i c i a l s and t o compromise
I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s t o meet p o p u l a r needs. The main
modernizing t h r u s t o f I r a n ' s d e v e l o r r e n t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y
o v e r t i m e weaken Khomeini and t h e c l e r i c s . I f KhoneFni
d i e s , c l e r i c a l i n f l u e n c e w i l l be weakened somewhat b u t
not eliminated. There w i l l be l e s s u n i t y i n t h e i r
r a n k s and a l l i a n c e s w i l l be formed w i t h t h e s e c u l z r i s t s .
As t h e I s l a m i c i s t s l o s e t h e i r h o l d , t h e q u e s t i o n w i l l be
whether t h e L e f t o r t h e C e n t e r i n h e r i t s power.
' I n t h e s h o r t r u n we b e l i e v e the.governmsnt, can
d r i a g e i t s 'problems 'with t h e ~ u r d s ,a l t h o u g h c o n t i n u i n g
s p o r s ' d i c ~ v i o l d ~ i ? h%'ll
e ' b e a l e g a c y of t h e h a r s h c a i t o d s
employed by t h c r e v o l u t i o n a r y g u a r d s . Iran's ability
t o c a p t h e Kurdish r e v o l t t n d a v o i d prcblems w i t h t h r
* e t h n i c Arabs depends i n l a r g e p a r t on t h i a t t i t u d e o f
I r a q . S u p e r f i c i a l l y good r e l a t i o n s e x i s t a t t h e m m e n t ,
f o r I r a q i s v u l n e r a b l e w i t h i t s S h i a m a j o r i t y . For t h e
same r e a s o n , however, I r a q w'ill n o t want t o s e e a stroncj,
s e c u r e S h i a government i n I r a n and may be m o t i v a t e d t o
h e l p s t i r up t r o u b l e s . I n f a c t , I r a q nay now be q u i e t l y
h e l p i n g t h e Kurds. The S o v i e t s may s h a r e t h i s a t t i t u d e
b u t w i l l proceed c a u t i o u s l y , f e a r f u l o f c h a o s on t h e i r
b o r d e r s and t h e i m p l i c a t i s n s f o r s p r e a d i n g i n s t a b i l i t y
i n the reyion.
U.S. Policy:
I n t h e s e c o n f u s e d and u n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s o u r
p o s t u r e h a s been t o l i e low, r e s p o n d i n g t o o p p o r t u n i t i e s
t o s t r e n g t h e n o u r c r e d e n t i a l s w i t h t h e GPO1 b u t n o t
p u s h i n g o u r s e l v e s f o r w a r d . We began a more a c t i v e r o l e
l a s t s p r i n g , b u t wzre s e t back by I r a n i a n r e a c t i o n t o
t h e S e n a t e R e s o l u t i o n i n May.
Our o b j e c t i v e s i n I r a n - - a c c e s s to o i l , d e n i a l o f
S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , promotion o f a f r i e i . d l y , n o n - a l i o n e d ,
~?d,er.qt$.+ ! ~ y $ r ; ! y ? ~ ~ , $ z :.haye.
~ Q . ~..tp,:.bc
. :p"u,yeued,. d - x i n j .... b.
Mriths'when the I r a r i i h n s w i l l n o t h+ve s o r t e d a c t x i t h
p r e c i s i o n t h e i r p o l i c y o r i e a t a t i o n and when t h e c l e r i c a l
t e n d e n c i e s towards a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s l r %illbe o n l y weakly
r e s i s t e d - - i n t h e n e a r tern--by s e c u l a r i s t s . We w i l l want
t o p o s i t i o n o u r s e l v e s s o t h a t we can m a i n t a i n a w ~ r k l n q
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h whatever group h o l d s d e c i s i v e power
w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g t i e s .to o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l
elements, including t h e opposition. We w i l l want t h e
I r a n i a n s t o u n d e r s t a n d o u r f i r m n e s s on o u r p r i n c i p l e s - -
e.?., human r i g h t s - - a n d t o b u i l d r e s p e c t f o r t h o s e
p r i n c i p l e s . We.will a l s o want e q u a l and f a i r t r e a t m e n t
f o r e r i v a f e U.S. i n t e r b s t s : i n . I r a n . :O u t : . a t t i t w 2 € . t o ~ a r d s
f r a n .should b e .cha,racter.ized by p y rnpa'khe ti.c.. undeys tand.inq
v f ' t h e crif'pibul t i e s ,"p a t i e h c e .in r = s o l v i n g them, b u t a l s o
r e g u l a r , f i r i n and c l e a r r e m i n d e r s o f o u r i n t e r e s t i n an
I r a n L h a t i s f r i e n d l y t o - . t h e West-and - s t a b l e , r e s ~ f r c t f u l
o f i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and progres.sive.in meeting t h e
needs o f i t s c i t i z e n s .
'we geed t o ' keep a c l e a r perspective on t h e . ~ u r 3 i i t
and e t h n i q Arab. p r o b 1 . n ~ . These : a r e o l d p r o b l e m s , .an3
th&; w i 1 l " p e i i ' i s t f o r a l 6 i i ~t l m e t o come. To e n c x r a g e
t h e i r a m b i t i o n s f o r autonomy cotild have d e s t a b i l i z i n g
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r tlje e n t i r e r g q l o n
Xn t h e s h o r t . t e r m ( i . e . , u n t i l a new grJernr?:-t i s
formed) we want t o c l e a r away a s many of t h e problems
o f t h e p a s t a s poss'ible and.avoid new i.ssues o f co7ten-
t i o n . During t h e s e months we a r e l a y i n g t h e b a c i s f o r
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e new government t h a t we hope w i l l have
more e f f e c t i v e powers. During t h i s p e r i o d and beyond
we w i l l want t o a l l a y t h e s u s p i c i o n s o f t h e r e l i g r ' o u s
l e a d e r s and, where p o s s i b l e , c u l t i v a t e t h e i r . f r i e , i d s h i p .
Our h a n d l i n g o f A r a b - I s r a e l i s s u e s w i l l have a d i r e c t
impact on I r a n i a n a t t i t u d e s . The I r a n i a n s a r e becoming
i n c r e a s i n g l y s u s p i c i o u s of r a d i c a l P a l e s t i n i a n i n f l u e n c e
e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e o i l f i e l d s , b u t ' t h e r e i s s t i l l among
t h e c l e r i c s and men l i k e Yazdi a s t r o n g a t t a c h m e n t t o
t h e PLO and t h e .."Palestiriian c.aus,+. "
Over t h e l o n g e r term we w i l l want t o work f o r a n
I r a n i n which t h e moderate, s e c u l a r n a t i 0 ~ 1 3 l i s t sa r e
predominant i n managing t h e c o u n t r y . But b e f o r e we
c a n e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n , we must develDp a
p o s i t i o n o f t r u s t and r e s p e c t .

bel.i,eye.w9. sh~uldibegtn'nov to raavir out

range of b i l a t e r a l problems. and o f f e r thcrtal:cr.4ing
auggastions: (We w l l l be developznq a t a S e p t e n b c r 7
i n t e r a g e y c y m e e t i n g d e t a i l e d a p p r o a c h e s on t h e l s s u e s
marked by an asterisk.)

-
SECRET
 3Ef I.::

-4-

-- Bazargan and. ~ u s s c i a t e sh o s e we w i l l do s o
promptly, naming a p e r s o n s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e i r
I

revolution.
.. .e...%herq.is.;nc+ inc?ic:jt,ion- the..PGQZ:qIanw 'i3ObII . t o
:."ye ~ :iaalainat.on a?~..pur..:M .$Fei.r;..
a n . A m p ~ s q ? Q .in. ..
.ai)pb'iri€&&ts 'df i n .&iisahif h&e n e v e r %.e&l i n k e d .
We e 5 p e c t t h e I r a n i a n s .::aj. w a i t u n t i l a new! government
i s e l e c t e d b c f c r s . sondir.? us an envoy.

-~---e c o . ~ n o n dtbn:
at ~ t t e cr o n s u l t a t i o n s w r t h key
C o n g r e s s n e n , nonln t e a ? L->$ssa3ol' t o ts i n p l a c e i n
O c t o b e r . P o s s l b l y i n - o r m t h e I r a n i a n s Q: o u r p i a n s
i n advance t h r o u g h a p r + v a t e r n t e r m c d l a r y .

'2. Should we .qend.,c mcssage o r emlosary p

ameiril?
-- He have had p o d l r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e man who
r e m a l n s . t h e $ t r ~ n g e s t ' ~ o i l t l c leacTermin
al Iran'. His
h o s t i l i t y towards u s i s u n l i k e l y t o a b a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,
a l t h o u g h t h e r e have been fewer venomous s t a t e m e n t s
-- a g a i n s t u s r e c e n t l y . C l e a r l y , a f l r s t meeting c o u l d be
a bruising a f f a i r .
-- A meeting w i t m i n i will signal our definite
on a n d ' c o u l d e a s e somewhat
a c c e p t a n c e of t h e r e \
h i s suspicions of us. .auld a l s o e n a b l e u s t o approach
him mare r e a d i l y on .
t h e f i r s t caJl.
.;
i s s u e s once we have made

.-- Oh ' t h e o t n e r , . w&ld r i s k . appeari'ng' tO

c a v e i n t o a man who !: . -t-: .is and who i s stror.?',;,
d e p r e c a t e d h e r e and by i.;..ztcrcized I r z n i a n s . T:?:J;, we
would want t o be c a r e f u l r o t t o a p p e a r t o esibra-e
Khomeini and t h e c l e r i c s a t t h e ei:?e?s? of .c.i: 12z1s1ar
f'kiends. We s h o u l d a v o i d d i r e c t ? i n k a g e w i t h s-y
s p e c i f i c Iran,ran g r o u p s .
-- ~ % a ' s ~ r b o l i s ior f, a c , a l l , o n !:Lc&ern~ v::ll not
a t t a c h t o v i s i t s t o t h e o t h e r r e l 1 7 l o u s leaeer;, 3 2 ~
t h e y w i l l n o t s e e u s u n t i l we have s e e n him. We b a d l y
nehd c o n t a c t s w i t h T a l e g h a n i , S h a r i a t m a d a r i , and o t h e r ' .
moderate c l e r i c s . We want t o r e a s s u i e them o f o u r
a c c e p t a n c e of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a s t h e i r i n f l u e n c e may
r i s e i n t h e months ahead.
 Recomendatlon: Have Bruce La.ngen p a s s t h e v c r d r
t h a t - h e l a l i k e ti - c e t l o r r l n l a f t e r t.ls r e t u r z -3 .,
Tehran when he c o u l d Jcl1 :cr ? mes:..ge from : i a s h l n : t ~ - .
Laingen c o u l d t h e n p r o s e &c with meerlngs w l t h o t h e r
r e l l g l o u s l e a d e r s . A l t e r r a t r v e l y , make a c a l l o n
.---
,L *"'
ci'
-
'",;
Khomelnl p p r l o r l t y f o r a rew k m l d ~ ~ a d o r .

;3. Row d o , we ' s t r i m q t h a r i be niilitdry rk'lationkhip?

--..The..J.rgnL:ng .a're.s!;s~ici~~ of.s ouq h?::Slinc c f
' t% ~F'Ms.t t a s t f u n d , naed s p a r e s al;d $ e c h ? i c a l . s"ppn! -, .
from u s , bu't f e a r f o r p . o l i t i c a 1 , r e a s o n s t o ask f o r t h e.. .
.latter; . " ' '

.'
. .... -,:we w a n t . t o be r a s . p o h s i v e . o ~ . m i l i t a r yi s s u e s i n .
o'i-der td' s t r e n g i h e h ~ o i a r 5 1 ; . : ' s a u t . i . ~ r , i t yznZ t o rr.s .:re
,we have f r i e n d s i n t h e m i l i t a r y who might be key t o t h e
f u t u r e , p o l i t i $ a l o r i e n t a t i o ~of the c o u n t r y .
. . .

a. Increase dur e x c h a n g e s o? info'rmatlri

o n t h e t r u s t fund t o b u i l d I r a n i a n c o n f i d e n c e .
I/

b. Examine t h e r e l e a s e o f s e n s i t i v e r t e m s on a 66
c a s e b - c a s e b a s i s an4 '3e p r e p a r e d t o . r e l e a s e i o w T e v e l
cl&a~tems wher s e r v e s o u r purposes.
c. Be p r e p a r e d e t Irdnian requests for spares
and s u p p o r t somewhat
v i o u s l y s e t . Permit
tries ( e . g . , I t a l y c .
? t h e $5 m i l l i o n l e v e l p r e -
,ed a n d . f r i e n d l y t h l r d coun-
2 - h e l i c o p t e r s ) . t o he:?
'Ic-1

p e t m i l j t a r y npe?s -::nians ~ a ? $0 t dlve;?&fy

' s&F;drt:

'4. Bow d o we head o f f d i s p u t e r botwo?n 'i :. -*?

private companies?
-- I r a n h a s begun i n a 1 i c i t e l . w s y t o pay Sills e-d
... r ~ y . . . p p e r ~ c ~ ~ ! & a..,,.~pAy,on~.qqgqt:~s.5.O
c.c:8 . m i l l - i o n .arb..:i.s
: ,

f i n r s h l n g , t h e I s f a h a n r e f i n e r y : A!.!,: g o t S;G : -:..:.I . :?.

r e s t a r t J e e p o p e r a t i o n s . Many d i - g u t e s persi;: a:.: :r2
attachment of I r a n i a n a s s e t s i s a c o n t i n u i n ? t h r s e t .
GTE and American B e l l a r e n e g o t i a t i n g d i s p u t e s w;th o x
active assistance..
SECRET
 a . Encourage t h e p r i v a t e Iran-American Chamber o f
Commerce t o a s s i s t u s i n working t o r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s .
P e r h a p s a b u s i n e s s m i s s i o n t o Tehran c o u l d b e o r g a n i z e d .
b ~~~~~~e o u r . l n f o r m a t i 0 ~e f f o r t s -to make'kure"
U..S husixle6.s k a o n s o f OW readineg&..to ysaks* the^
w r t h t h e I r a n x a n s a n a o u r s u c c e s s sto;les t o date.

b. r + t can we do t e . r e a c t i \ i a t b t h e 'hcknmn
intelligence s i t e s ?
-- The Iranians have n o t for6!closed t h e p o s s i b i l r t y
o f r e 0 p e n i n g : t h e s i ' t r e s ' i n the Y n d e f i n i t e ~ ' f i t u r e :but'
, it
w r l l be a hard p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . I r a n i a n management
and c o n t r o l and p o s s i b l y S o v i e t a c q u i e s c e n c e c o u l d * t e
preconditi0.n~ .
-- We a r e working w l t h c o n t r a c t o r s t o r e s t a r t t h e
IBF,K intelligence m o n i t o r i n g . p r o j q c t on a regqcqd s c a l e
w i t h ' t h * i&a. t h i ' t ' t h & ~ a k k s m a hf u n b t i b i might' d l t i m d t e l y
b e lncluded i n t h a t operation.
Recommendation: C o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w t h e IBEX
. a p p r o a c h and make d i s c r e e t . soundings. w i t h t h e PGOI
( e . g . , S e c r e t a r y - Y a z d i a t UNGA) b u t make no r e q u e s t s
~ n t i al n e w l y - e l e c t e d government is i n p l a c e

-- There ~ s - & oi'~ d i c h t f o n ' t 6 a f : t h 6 PGOI b i l l .di$-

c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t u s when 1980 c o n t r a c t s a r e s i g n e d i n
December--but d e c i s i o n s c o u l d b e a f f e c t e d by n e g a t i v e
p o l l t i c a l developments. W e a r e now g e t t i n g a l m s t a s
much c r u d e a s l a s t y e a r (750,000 now v s . 900,000 l a s t
y e a r ) a l t h o u g h t o t a l I r a n i a n e x p o r t s a r e down o n e - t h i r d
p w a e n w 2 t . ??-,~r
ilnurz r w ~ b f ~ * &t
f ~ ~ ~
w i t h e y I r a n l a n s u r r n g t h e f a l l on e n e r g y . Dick Cooper
could v i s i t a t an e a r l y s t a g e .
SECRET
 SECRET

-7-

7. lbould wi rosou vim o p e t a t i o n s 'urd parm~tt h e

w-pt.-rchool dependents a s recommenced

-- We lave t o l d t h e I r a n i a n s adequate s e c u r i t y f o r
the compo\md.is a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r v i s a s .
n d a t i n;:.. A. iwm +.irQpua$e;p~.~sec.tio~at,
thd =is . a s k r e d ; we should move ahead on n%rrral' 'f
o o n ~ u l a r p p c r A t i o n sand r e t u r n of dependents on a
8m ~ ~ r i i d ~ i 4

--.*I&. kn+ l i t f l e about I r a n i a n .grou@ .and few

( i n u p s ~ e e m ' t ohave any r e a l coheslon o r s t r e n g t h . we
n*.d to knov m r e
-- A CIA b r i e f i n g o f f i c e r gave a well-receivea
i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g t o Baiargan, Y a z d ~ ,and Entez?!r
on 4ugurt 21. :.The I r a n i a n s were .=t interefited i a
.try;. q a i r s t i n i a n s ;.A? gh&, .ind ' S o b i e t dange$s ' t o t n e
P001. They asked f g r a r e p e a t b r i e f i n g i n two montbs
Recgmwndationr ~ o n t i n u eto develop an i n t e l l i g e n c e
ucchdnge'with t h e fradkans: When .fecnkble, .reek tt
i n c l u d e . l r a n i m n i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n an examinatio~.of
t!Wbi2m*t&bh%.

9 lhould WO @henweour 8pproach.aa i y U n r ~ g h t s

-- u t h o u g t l executions- a n d h a t a h tteatm&nk-'iif 'lturds.

w n t i n u e a t a d e p l o r a b l e l e v e l , s i n c e t h e J u l y amnesty
sol. p o l i t i a a l o f f e n d e r s have been r e l e a s e d from p r i s o n
and t h s r e a r e some s l i g h t s i g n s t h e J u s t i c e Ministry i s
rm&sserting i t s a u t h o r i t y .

20-
-- jw3n3JlM+a%w&+ob+;
C r i t i c a l n e w p a p e r s have been closed and.several
Mshua,. r$.iaed..aS1 ppf
t h e s e i s s u e s r e p e a t e d l y wlth t h e FGOI.
R a c o ~ m n d a t i o n : Continue t o work on human r i g h t s o/-<
p r o b l e m a s they a r i s e and involve prominent o u t s i d e r s '
and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s t o u s e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e a s w e l l .
 .lo. Sow Can we improve Iranian public percepttoas
'%f'thB.LI:s. and U.S. attitudeb towards Iran?
-- Anti-Americanism continues a strong, inhibiting
force in our relationship.
---. 'l'he lrahiane .arebitterly resentful of the 'ger-
ae~v.e@..~s~i~~~i~ti~~~:e$.::e~.:f~e~&:'~s8.p:s&ai ng;. a::. '
"Zionist-imp,erlalrst.consp~racy.

~ . ~ " + : c ~ s a + i r : . ;~. sFy ~ g~ ~ ~ g ~ e ~ , + .??:

~ 3 ;. ~ ( . : di ~ . ~ ~ a ;
-concrete actions on bQth sldes--sxqns that they are
improving on hunan rights and, that w e accept the
, pevoluticn.

:'Recommendation':..
a. ICA develop a plan of more assertive actlons
to cnhancb . U .S.-1Fani.m t.ies, ?+I,. , distinguished
American visitors wllo can meet with reliqjous and
secular leaders, use of VOA to send political mrssaqos,
. ,i~creasad.English 1angu.aae.&eachjng an& magazine dis-....
tribution. ' ' . ..
Q
b. Occasional public statements by senior U.S.
a£ficials on the i~portanceof Iran and p t good U.8.-
, Iranian relations.. &-b -y&
&J\$

same lines.
d. Quiet work with the Iranians to relax the ban 6
on foreign newsmen.
I<.
e.' At an early date holii'a meeting of private and
academic U.S. and Iranian experts on Iran to discuss
ways to bridge the communications gap. (C.

Drafted:. :lEA/IRN:HPrecht:bdf
ext. 20313:9/5/79 .-
Clearance: NEA/IRN': ~ ~ ~ a i n (draft)
~eA'
NEA: PDConstable r p
S/P:PKreisburg ;I!
hIP ooiiibi
t RUQlRR l O e 5 l 249
NT CCCCC ZZH
** CLASS 1 C M I P B W U L
Sip 79 C l l W t STATX 9/8/99
N1 AUtMBASSY TIBPAN wnv: C I I M I : l L f O l l O I t I
'TO S N S T A T t WASHDC 3658 mmr CHAMZ:nmama:
CLEm: NOYt

h.0. l Z l 6 5 r GDS 9/6/85 (TOUSRH, V.L. 1'

TAG9 r PINS, I R
SUBJtCTr EUIGRt PLOTTtRS
1. (C-ENTIRE TtXT.)
2. TEE RtSURTACINB 01 SHAPUR BAKHTIAR I N PARIS AND
PERSISTENT Runons ABOUT VABIOUS IRANIAN EUIQRIW B ~ I N Q
dCTIVtLY INVOLVID IN PLOTS TO OVERTHROW T H t ISLAMIC
R~OIM OT AYATOLLAH montIs1 POSES A T ~ P T A T I O N2 0 SEE
IN t H 1 S t POLITICAL P I I L E S THP SOLUTION TO A SITUATION IN

Ie
RAN T H t U.S. FINDS DISTASTtFUL. U T t R ALL, AMERICANS
AN IDtNTITY WITH BAKHTIAP W I N H t SPEAKS (TLUPNTLY IN
WtSTtEN LANGUAGt) 01 INDIVIDUAL WLtDOU AND t I B t R T Y
H n a s m t ~ r DISGUSTID
a AND I N C O ~ P R L H ~ ~ D I NVHEN
G
YATOLLAH IHALQIALI (IMftEDIATlLT A R L P DISPATCHINO ANOTBfa
AQOLE OT KURDS TO T B I R TATS) PROUDLY DSSCPIBtS HIMSliLT
S TE8 IPANIAN ADOLT EICEHANY. MOUOVEE. TEE ARGUWLUT
!BAT IRAN CANNOT FUNCTION AS A ~ ~ O D P N UTIOU nmom
!HE TtCHNICAL SKILLS ~ O N O P O t I Z ~BY D T E t IRANIAN tDVCATtD
ELITE STRIKES THESE SAME AMtRICANS AS tHlRtNTLY LOGICAL.
LINCI MANY ntnarns or THIS nrrr H A r t n m INTO ~ X I L E
UTHIB THAN PUT UP W IA GOVERNMENT ~ INCREASI~~OLY rnnrrAnn
BY NARBOV-~IIDED ISLAMIC FANATICS IT IS A SIMPLI STLO-
GISTIC STEP TO ?HZ CONCLUSION TEA# THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
I S BOUND TO PAIL THROUGH A SHORTAOL 01 THE TECHNICAL
SKILLS NtCESSART TO OPERATL THE NATIONAL BURLAUCRACT AND
ECONOMY.
3. IT YOOLD. I N OUR VIEV, BE A GUVE p a n o n TO susscaIsr
TO THE PPOPOSITION PUT FORWARD BY VMIOUS EMIGRZS THEM-
StLVICS ?EAT THEY HOLE THE KtY TO SETTING THINGS RIGHT IN
IRAN. OUTSIDE THPIB OWN RILATIVELY MINISCULt CLASS. THEY
HAVE VIRTUALLY NO SUPPORT HERE. TURTHER, THEY HAVE NO

FOBRCIVE HEANS OF OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT OREER READILY

T THEIR DISPOSAL. THE ZMLRCENCE 0 1 NOSTALGIA WITHIN THE
RMED FORCES FOR THE "GOOD OLD DAYS," VITH A CONCOMITANT
ESTORATION OF THE MILITART'S COERCIVE CAPABILITT, COULD
ALTER THE SITUATION, BUT AS OF THIS MOUENT NEITHER OP THESE
PRECONDITIONS EXISTS. TINALLT, THERE I S NO REASON TO
B E L I t V t THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
0 CO-OPT SUPFICIENT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WITH THE
VERNMENT OFFICES ON AT LEAST A SCALE WHICA TBE ISLAMIC
EFPIMENTLY,
BUT CATCHING-UP WITH WEST GERMANY WAS THE
SHAH'S DREAM, NOT KHOMEINI'S.
77
4. FOR TlfE MOMENT, KHOHIIUI'S I S M I C ?OlCLS RtRkIN
FInnLT I U ?LACE urm NO I n r s o T I t r O P P O ~ I T I O N xu SIUET.
DISA~~CTION-111s ~ r01 T n r o R r s r r n L B
BLIN ~ R O V I ~ WBUT
1 U T U l l T I E RANKS O? TBB DISO&~NTLID DO NO2 SLLn LISSLT
TO BE CAPABLE 01 TUUSIATINB TELIR I)ISlAZlSPAliOTION INTO
T I E K I N D 0 1 ACTION THAT UODLb CBALIdIIOX TW RUM8 IN ANT
SERIOUS MAINER. THAT IS I I X C I A L L ' I TlUL 01 MIORBS
WHO EAIE LITTLE SUPPORT VBEBt I T l U L C I COWS
ITSELF. TEE ISLI~YICmrmxwvs c o H r m a zauxztrr W.
- IS XRU
COME TO GRIPS YITK TKB i s b b s n er rwkn n u u ~ r t nrur
YET LEAD TO ITS ULTIRATI PAILUIL, ar IF IT serr wr
ARE REASONABIT COW?ZDLN? TEAT Y l A t W J S RUMCllS f ? WILL 31:
POME BROVN RATEER TIIANNURTURIID W 1 PARIS OR NtV TOEX.
:o+nsETn
 DEPARTMENT O F STATE

The Honorable
L. Bruce Laingen
Charge d'hffaires, a.i.
American Embassy
Tehran
Dear Bruce:

personally.
The main nourishment I took from George was
(1) a deep sense of inadeqacy in governing among the
leadership, a desire for U.S. help, but an inability
to ask for or even accept it; and (2) concern over the
strength of clerical influence, optimism (like us) on
that count for the long term but fear that the Majlis
elections might produce only mullahs -- meaning that
the long ternt might be that mufh.longer away. The
interesting idea is that
of these worries and- is a
m.
-nk
=, can contribute to bxadarua
v o ~
is thinkina what in the inner
circle will be welcome.
Finally, here is a paper I did and for which
DN added the sentence at the top of the second page.
Sincerely,
 We-understand Secretary Brown may ask what you plan to
say to Yazdi when you sec him in Ncw York. (It is not yet
confirmed that Yazdi will attend the UNGA). We suggest the
following points:
-- Since the Revolution wc have sought to fashion a
new relationship cith Iran's lenders, responding positivcly
to requests where possible. Wc hope thc actions wc have
taken have been helpful -- c.~., offer of spare parts, sale
of heating oil and keroscnc, supportlvc public statcmcnts

..
and assistance in settling commercial disputes.
-- We are prcpared to go further if Iran wishcs:
-- We wish to givc Yazdi thc iinmc of a ncw
Ambassador;
-- We reaffirm our rcndincss to Itnvc our Charge
or the new Ambassador mrct with Ayatollah Khomeini.
-- We are prepared to consider any ncw programs of
cooperation -- e.g., in intelligence exchnngc,
agricultural developmcnt, narcotics control,
employment generation, oil field management --
that Iran might suggest.
-- We remain interested in the intelligence site? for
SALT verification and the bencfits that would have for world
SECRBT/NODIS *.
peate. At n suitable time wc will br lircparcd to dis-s
cuss this issuu with the Iranian? and t o allow Iranians
to man the sites.
-- Wu hope thnt Iran will scc t11c.i~moves as sincere
gestures of good will. Wc hope that Iran's lenders, in-
cluding Ayatollah Khomeini, would join 11s in attempting
to combat the mistrust bctwecn our two cour~trics. A gooJ
step in that direction would be to remove the restrictions
on thc foreign and domestic press atid gct back to the
deals behind the revolution.

Clearance: ~ ~ ~ l p ~ ~ d h s t a b l c
-
P b~~kiirso~

SECRET/NODIS

81
 LIMITED O f f I C I A L USE TEHRAN 18888
DE R U Q W R #8988 258 ** CLASS: LIIITLD OIlICIkL
2NY CCCCC ZZH
0 1611132 S L P 79 CHRGE: U S I C A 9/16/79
Ftl AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPII: US1CA:PAO:JGRAl
TO U S I C A VASBDC IMMEDIATE DRlTD: US1CA:PAO:JGRAVES
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ICA-2 CRARGE PO'
l C 0 N CRU

USICA
?OR CURRAN FROM P A 0 S P E C D I S
t.0. 12865: N/A
SUBJ: CPAO WORK GOALS
REF: U S I C A 52725
I PBOPOSE THE ?OLLOWING GOALS ?OR MY OER "CONTRACT-:
1. (NO. 1 I N R L P T E L ) A S S E S S AND ADJUST POST ORGANIZATION,
RESOURCES, AND S T A m ~ nnrr TEEM APPROPRIATE TO POST-
REVOLUTIONART IRAN. S T A F F HAS ALRSADT BEEN GR8ATLY
RIDOCED, AND I PLAN TO DEVELOP A NEW S T A F P T I Q PATTERN
AND N t V J O B D E S C R I P T I O N S BY JANUABT. A S NEW
OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPS TO PROMOTE 0.S. I N T I R ~ S T S . W I L L
A L J U S T RESOURCE ALLOCATIOU AND S T U ? ASSIGNMENTS.
2. (NO. 2 11 R E ? T E L ) D I V R O P I N S T I M T I O I A L A N A L I S I S
UHICII IICLUDB ISLAMIC R~VOLUTIONARY STRUCTOR~S - -
LXBBRAL AND EADICAL-LXlT R l l O L U T I O N A ~ Y -S -T--~ -U- -C- -T-~,~ S .
AID rai NN ooinnnm~-IrIND UU~N TW PROPOS~
1W CONSTITUTION IS I N ?ACT ADOPTED AND SPIWS A NEW
W V P N M Z N T . R E B U I L D PHYSICAL DBS O P L I A T I O U WHICH WAS
D s s r r o n D DURING R n o L o T r o r (ALL n c o ~ nrr ~ s conrrscrTrn).
B U I L D UP A P R A C T I C A L DRS U S I N G T I T L E S R A T R I B THAN
~NDIIIWTAL NARIS, AND a r o r N usrno THIS LIST 02
PARTIC~PANTS- M R P U B L I C A T I O N D I S T R I B U T I O N AND S I I I L C T I O N
01A u t I r n c E s 1011 PROGRAMS. I N CONJUWCTIOI WITH IAS,
BEGIN ESTABLISHING " ~ L C I P I I N T " C A T ~ G O I Y WHICR n A r
CONTAIN S P E C I f I C NAMES RATHER THAN J U S T T I T L E S . I WOULD
ALSO HOPI! TEAT WE C W L D Bt?ORE T H I YEAR IS 001
I D l N T I R A NUMBER O? PROGRAM 1 N S T I T U T I O N S . B U T T H I S W I L L
0 1 COUllSE DEPEWD 01 T E E P O L I T I C A L C L I M A T E (NO IRAMIAN
.
ORGANIZATION WOULD DARE WORK POBLICALT u r T a US AT
PRISENT)
3. ( 1 0 9 I N RE?TEL) n O n o T E usr, BY L I a n A a r ' s NATURAL
AUDIENCE AND O T l l t l l I N C I I I D U A L S IMPORTANT T O T E E M I S S I O N ,
01 OUR LIBRARY'S RE?ERENCE S E R V I C E AND C O L L E C T I O N S -
I W I L L ALSO ENCOURAGE THE LIBRARY T O COOP1CRATS WITH T E E
I A S I N D E I E L O P I N G VATS T O B U I L t U P T E E P Q C h T I O N TEAT
THE CULTURAL CENTER I S O F GlCWUINE S E R V I C I T O T E E
C O M W N I T T * I E . . I M P R O I O RELLVANT B I I m E N C E M A T E l l A L S ~
C O O N S ~ LSTUDENTS, AND STRENGTBLNa o L D I N a s I N RLLIGION
AND PHILOSOPHY.

LIWITSD OIYICIAL usr TMUN lornee

82
 L I M I T E D O T T I C I A L USE T E R A N llli98
r. (NO. l a I N R t T R L ) AS T E t S X C U I I T T AND P O L I T I C A L
SITUATION P ~ U I T S , rssmr THAT r ~ POST r KSTABZISHKS
m r c T r r t P n s o w r z conrcr WITH DRS I a y r m f r o n s .
5. I N C O O P P A T I O M Y I T B THE CONSUL Q S N l n A L , r 0 R t WITH
2111 PWS TO B r m s t rm D A W U ~ R W ~r oLLTA T I t r VISA
PROBLlMi COONSXI THE MlSStOW WITH RlGARD TO THB PUBLIC
AYYAIIS IHPLICATIOYS O P PROIOS2D CONSULAl P O L I C I E S
AND PROClDURt8.
6. XMCOUIAGE I T P E C T I V S I A S O ~ l l A T I O N SAND m L B l I G H T
C O W I S S I O N S IW TllH)AM AI(O r N TEt R O V I N C W AS Tllt
S E c u R I n AND POLITICAL SITUATIOW PIRMITS. AS THINGS
STAND NOV, H10LISH-LAWUUAUt T U C l I I N 0 I S MWCH I N DttlAND.
BUT MANY O T B t B PIOURAM I l l I T I A T I V l S ARk I U L B P OUT.
7. P R O I I t f ANAITTICAL aROlTflSQ ON UtBZA, COtTOltAL,
AND A C A D W I C D r T l L O l l l t R T S .
8. PARTICIPATE rm&rnr~~ I n nrssxow ronmrtr~~ow
OP
POLICI IMO~WNBATIOWS, WBXINOTO nut P~LIC ca~rxw
ATPAIBS IN?LI CATIOHS U t DOLT COWSIDtRXD ID.
 oo -RWEHIA
DE EUQMHR #0087/01, 2591588
ZNT CCCCC ZZE
0 16lleBZ SEP 79 ZDK CITE RUEHIA SVC 000@ 2611843
FM AMEUBASSY TEHRAN
TO USICA VASHDC IHMEDfATE
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEHRAN 18087
E.O. 12065: ODs 9/16/05 tGRAVBS, JOHN E.)
SUBJECT; ABBBETIATED HIGHLIGHTS REPORT
FOR NEA
1. PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATIOW -- KEOMEINI AND MULLAHS,
STILL ENTHUSIASTICALL1 SUPPORTBD BY THX MASSES REMAIN
ONLY EIPECTIIIG POWER IN iRAN. THEY, HOWEVER, ~ A V E
NOT DlVISED MEANS OF GOVERNING EFFICIENTLY. NOR HAVE
THEY YFf MANAGED TO REAtIZE ANYTHING LIKE THP ANACERO-
% NISTIC PAN-ISLAMIC WORLD THEY DBEAM OF RESUSCITATING
a mon A N IDEALIZED PAST. KHWEINI CAN CERTAINLY VETO
e NOVSS BY OTHER FACTIONS I N IRAN. BUT BE PROBABLY
V A N N O T MAKE HIS PAN-ISLAMIC DREAM A REALITY. NOR CAN
a1BE QUELL RIGGIONAL, ETENIC, OR POLITICALLY INSPIRED
UPRISINGS WITHODT THE HELP OF E , ARMY OR LEFTIST
PARA-MILITARY RLVOLUTIONART GROUPS. HE CANNOT REVIVE
1 ?HE MODERN SECTOR OF TEE ECONOMY AND THUS REDUCE
UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT TEE EELP OP WESTBRN-TRAINED
TECHNICIANS AND MANAGERS. HE CANNOT EVEN GET THE
:SCHOOLS BACK IN OPERATION OR 0NSNAE.PL TRAFFIC IN
TEHRAN OR SKIRAZ. ON THE OTHER HAND I T SELMS CLEAQ
TEAT KHOMEINI HAS NO REAL INTENTION b F GIVING THE PGOI
THE UNSTINTING SUPPORT I T WOULD NEED TO BEGIN COPING
WITH THE C O U N F ~ ~ Y ' S PROBLEMS. ~ E R BI S , TEERBPORE,
LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE PRESENT DRIFT WILL T.URN INTO
ANYTHING MORE DYNAMIC OMTIL TEE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS
LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT --
FINISHES I T S WORT AND A N E W CONSTITUTION SPAWNS A
A PROCESS WHICH I S
GOING TO TAKE AT BEST MONTHS AND MAY BRING FORTH A N
IMPRACTICALl ULTRA-ISLAMIC STRUCTURE NOW TEAT THE
UNTINELY DEATR OF AYATOLLIB TALEGEANI HAS STILLET:
THE VOICE OF THE MOST SENSIRLE RELI3IOUS LEADER I N TEE
COUNCIL
2. IMPLICATIONS FOR USICA - I F IN FACT IRAN I S FATED
TO DRIFT FOR MONTHS YET UNDER A PROVISIONAL dOVERNMENT
WHICH I S HAMSTRUNG BY VARIOUS UNCOOltDINATED REVOLUTIONARY
KOUITLHS AND SUPPOBTBD ONLY FITFULLY BY YHOMEINI AND
OTHER POWERPUL CLERGY, USICA SROULD IN MY JUDGMENT:
A. AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH COULD BRING THE UNFAVORABLE
ATTENTION OF ANY FACTION TO FOCUS ON US.
B. PUT OUR OUW REVOLUTION-WRECKED HOUSE IN ORDER
WITH A VIEW TO HAVING READY TEE ORGANIZATION, STAFF,
AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO TALE EFFECTIVE ACVANTAGE OF
UNITIES TO PROMOTE' U.S. IVTERESTS WHYN TREY PRESENT
s EvL J f l ; ; :

VZCZC 177
C. USE THE UtCZLLENT CONTACTS WHICH 1 0 ROSIN HAS
DEVFLOPED TO BELP THE MISSION COPE vITH PRMsING AND
POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITVATIONS SUCH AS OUR VISA-
ISSUING OPERATION.
D. IMPROVE OUR NOW-CONTROI~SIAL MUC APPRECIATED
LIBRARY AND ENGLISH TLACHING SEBI~CES $0 THE COWIINITT.
t. SEEK OPPORTUNITIIS TO DEHOWSTBITL AMERICAN
STIIPATHETIC INTEREST IN ISLAM AND THE VEGL-BfING OP THf
IRANIAN PEOPLE.
I. UNOBTRUSIVSLY ENCOURAGX AND SUPPORT SUCB INSTITU-
TIONS AS THE IAS, FIILBRIGHT COHMISSION, AHIDBAST,
AND AMERICAN INSTITUTE O r IRANIAN STODIES.
3. COMMUNICATION PROCISS -- I N ADDITION TO O W
ONGOING ENGLISH-TIkCHING &ND LIBEABY ACTIVITIES, THE
EXCELLENT VORX 09 10 R O S ~HAS RESULTED IN AN
C?IECTIVE, ONGOINQ COMMUNICATION PROCESS VIA TEE PRESS.
ONLIKELY AS IT MAY ssm I N R ~ V ~ L U T I O N A R TIRAN, ROSEN'S
WARM OUTGOING IIANNBR, FLUENCY IN PABSI, AND INSIGHTS
INTO THE PERSIAN MENTALITY EAV1 ACTUALLY GIVEN THE
POST EAST, CONTINUING OPPOBTUNXTY TO BOTH PLACE
SPECIFIC RELEASES AND ENTER INTO PROGRESSIVELT WORE
REWARDING DIALOG WITB nEHBERS OP THB WORKING PRESS.
NOT ONLY DO THEY NOW CALL ON US REGULARLY ACCEPT OUR
I N V I T A T I O N S , AND LISTEN STMPATHETICALLTWHEN WE TALK
O? OUR CONCERNS, THEY OPTEN OF LATE TA3E PAINS TO
CONTACT US WHEN TBET ARE WORKING ON STORIES OP IMHFIDIAT
CONCERN TO US. VE COULD, rOR EXAMPLE, RAVE HAD
SEVERELY DAMAGING REPORTS OW O W NEWLT REOPENED
COhSULAR SERVICE. BUT PRESS REPORTS DID NOT DWELL ON
THE EUGE CROWDS AH'OCCASIONAL DISORDER, TEE VIEWS
OF DISGRUNTLED VISA SEEKERS, AND THP CONmSXOW AND
OCCASIONAL INJUSTICES WHICH TBE SHAKE-DOWN PROCESS I S
GRADUALLY ELIMINATING BUT WHICH NONETEELESS COULD HAVE
BEEN USED TO MAXE US WOK VERY BAD INDEED. WE GOT,
INSTEAD, IN hLL TBE MAJOR DAILIES STMPATHETIC, COMPRE-
EENSIVE, SERVICE-ORIENTED REPORTING DESIGNED TO FELP
IRANIANS UNDERSTAND AND EFFICIENTLY USB OUR CONSULAR
BT
a0007

NNNN
VZCZC 177
 TEHRAN 1 0 1 8 7

4. PROBUHS -- OUR MOST TIHE-CONSUHING, ?RUSTBATING

ACTIVIR 1 0 1 THE PIOHEN? I S VISA PUSHINQ. I T SEEMS
TEAT AU OUR CONTACTS, WTB SELF-STYLED AND amuxNB,
EAVE RELATIVBS AND ?BIPNDS WHO ARE DESPERATnY EAGIR
TO ENTEll THE U.S. TEE PElSrAN HPYTALITT I S SUCH
TEAT ANTONE nro SEES TEE P o s s x a r L x r y or omxwrre
SPrcrAL PRIVILEGE ?OR nxnstm Q EIS rmrn AND ~ I E N D S
BAS N O QUALM ABOUT ATTXWTING TO USE ANT RELATIONSHIP
BE I T EVER SO TXNUOUS OR ?AR?ETCEED. USICA OFFICERS
ARE T H ~ I I O R SOBLIPED TO SPEND SOtlETHING LIKE TWO
EOURS EIWY vorrxno DAY BITFCR D R A C E ~ L L T~ P N D I N G0 r r
REOUESTS ?OR XELP OR WRESTLING VITE OUR VISA-ISSUING
COLLEAGUIS I N AN A T ~ TOT BENDER S ~ V I C XTO GENUINELY
USLmL EVEN ESSENTIAL CONTACTS IN TEE MINISTRIIS
or I O R ~ I G N AITAIRS OX Q~IDANCE.A C A D ~ I C S . nmaxrs or
TEE IAS, OR mrnmns or rn~ WORKINO PRESS. THE COST
Or DOING IIUSINESS IN IRAN TODAY! 01AVES
BT

NNNN
C O W F I D E N T I A L
 ESB029BRAOl4
'.UEI?I;'V 001885
DD PUQMHR POL
DE RUEHMO #2156/01 2601621
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INFO RUFkRG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7066
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1036
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8221
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RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7866
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1077
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0602
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1557
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7308
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1801
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2218
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1143
RUEHADAISINT BAGHDAD 0382
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1461
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0233
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2867
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCO1.l22156
E.O. 12065: 9/14/99 RDS-1 (TOON, MALC0LM)OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IR, UR

SUBJECT, (U) SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REF': (A) TEHRAN 9646 (B) MOSCOW 21766 (C) STATE 237685
(D) TEHRAN 8828
1.C- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. RECENT SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT JN SOVIET
POLICY TOWARD IRAN APPEARS TO BE PREMATURE. THE SOVIETS
ARE RAPIgLY BACKPEDALLING IN AN EFFORT TO DISASSOCIATE
OFFICIAL POLICY FROM CRITICAL PRESS COMMENTARY ON IRAN,
ESPECIALLY THE BOVIN ARTICLE IN NEDELYA. THE MFA IRAN
DESK OFFICE FLATLY DENIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGFS
IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. THE KOSYGIN MESSAGES TO
BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI WERE PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO
DAMPEN SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ABANDONED
ITS POLICY OF VAINTA-INING FRlENDLY OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH
POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN HAVE NO
DOUBT JNCREASED SOVIET CONCERN AND IRRITATION WITH THE
SITUATION THERE, BUT WE SEE THIS AS A SHIFT IN THE ALWAYS
AMBIVALENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION, XATHFR THAN A SHIFT IN 'BASIC POLICY. THE SOVIET
UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT IRANIAN POLITICAL
ARRANGEMENT AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL WALK TO SEE WHAT
FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. FND SUMMARY.
%7
3. AS NOTED IN REF A, RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIEs
ON IRAN HAVE PROVIDED AMPLE GROUNDS FOR WONDERING IF A
REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET P\'LICY TOWARD IRAN MIGHT BE UNDER-
WAY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF BOVIN'S NEDELYA ARTICLE
(REF B), WHICH BLASTED THE ISLAMIC REVOULTION AND
PASNTED KHOMEINI( THROUGH QUOTATIONS FROM HIS OWN STATE-
MENTS) AS A DANGEROUS RELIGIOUS FANATIC. GOROVOY's
CONVERSATION WITH DEPTOFF (REF C) ALSO TENDS TO SUPPORT
THE IDEA OF A NEW SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, HOWEVER BELIE A

SHIFT IN OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN. PRAVDA ON
SEPTEMBER 11 PUBLISHED SEPARATE TELEGRAMS SENT BY KOSYGIN,
WHILE OVERFLYING IRANIAN TERRITORY EN ROUTE TO ETHIOPIA, -
TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI. BOTH TELEGRAMS EMPHASIZE THE
SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP GOOD-NELGHBORLY
RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND--IN THE TEXEGRAM TO KHOMEINI--
ON BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS.
5. MFA COUNSELOR AND CHIEF OF THE IRAN SECTION STANISLAV
KONSTANTINOVICH KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 12 THAT
THERE HAD BEEN,ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY
TOWARD IRAN. HE SAID THE BASIC STATEMENTS OF SOVIET
POLICY CONTINUE TO BE BREZHNEV'S SPEECHES OF NOVEMBER 19,
1978. AND MARCH 2. 1979, AND ELABORATED THAT SOVIET
RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE BASED ON GOOD-REIDGHBORLINES,MUT-
UAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH
3THER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. KOVRIGIN ALSO TERMED
"AUTHORITATIVE" THE TASS DENIAL (PRINTED IN SEPTEMBER 5
PRAVDA) OF CHARGES OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN
BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND NEWSPAPERS.

6. ASKED ABOUT RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN IN THE SOVIET

PRESS, KOVRIGIN DENIED ?AT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CRITICISM,
SAYING THE SOVIET PRESS WAS MERELY REPORTING THE NEWS
THERE AS WESTERN MEDIA DO. AS FOR THE BOVIN ARTICLE,
KOVRIGIN INSISTED THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS OWN
PERSONAL VIEWS AND THAT NEDELYA, UNLIKE PRAVDA, IS NOT
AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLICATION.

7. BOVIN HIMSELF TOLD AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST (PROTEcT)

IN AN OFF-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW SEPTEMBER 12 THAT HIS
WRITINGS REFLECT HIS OWN OPINIONS AN^ NOT NECESSARILY
'THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE DENIED THAT HIS NEDELYA
ARTICLE ON IRAN MEANT A REILSSESMENT OF SOVIET POLICY,
BT
12156 88
NNNNW ESB030BRA023
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHMO #2156/02 2601629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 1716002 SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1078
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0603
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1558
RUFHNA/USMISSTON USNATO 7309
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1802
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2219
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1144
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0383
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1462
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0234
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2868
BT

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 22256

SAYING HE DOESN'T EVEN KNOW WHAT SOVIET POLICY IS. BOVIN
DESCRIBED NEDELYA AS A "POPULAR" SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT (TO
IZVESTIYA) WHICH IS NOT AT ALL AUTHORITATIVE.

8. IZVESTIYA SEPTEMBER 13 CAFRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY ITS

TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT WHICH IIPLICITLY CONTRADICTED
MANY OF THE POINTS Ill THE BOVIN ARTICLE. ENTITLED "IRAN:
PROCESSES OF RENEWAL," THE IZVESTIYA ARTICLE
-- OFFERED EXCUSES FOR IRAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS, SAYING THEY WERE NATURAL FOR THE INITIAL
?ERIOD OF ANY REVOLUTION AND ALSO THE RESULT
OF ABANDONMENT BY FORMER WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNERS;

-- SAID THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST DIRECTION OF THE IRANIAN

SUPPOI?T WORLDWIDE;
-- CALLED THE SEVERING OF IRANIAN MILITARY AND INTEL-
LIGENCE TIES WITH THE US A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR
GENERAL DETENTE AND PEACE;

-- SAID THE SOVIET UNION TOOK A POSITION IN SUPPORT

OF THE IRANIAN NEVOLUTION AND IS READY TO COOPERATE
ACTIVELY WITH THE NEW IRAN; AND, IN CONCLUSION
-- SAID THE SOVIET PEOPLE VIEW WITH UNDERSTANDING
THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING IRAN AND SINCERELY
WISH THE FRIENDLY IRANIAN PEOPLE A SOLUTION TO THEIR
PROBELEMS.
9. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE OBVIOUSLY BACKTRACING
QUICKLY FROM THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY THE BOVIN ARTICLE
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS REASSESSING ITS IRAN POLICY.
WE DO NOT TAKE AT FACE VALUE, HOWEVER, STATEMENTS THAT
BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS "PERSONAL OPINIONS." IT IS
TRUE THE NEDELYA IS LESS AUTHORITATII~THAN PRAVDA AND
THAT BOVIN IS A MAVERICK, BUT HE IS ALSO REGARDED AS WELL-
CONNECTED WITH SOVIET LEADERS. HIS ARTICLE PROBABLY
ACCURATELY REFLECTS SOVIET IRRITATION OVER SOME RECENT
EVENTS IN IRAN: THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE KURDS, THE
SUPPRESSION OF LEFTLSTS, INCLUDDING THE TUDEH, IRANIAN
SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN, DEFAULT
ON GAS DELIVERY CONTRACTS, AN? ABOVE ALL, ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND
PRESS.

10. WE ARE NOT READY TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS AMOUNTS TO A

CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY, HOWEVER. AS NOTED IN REF D,
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION HAS
ALWAYS BEEN AMBIVALENT. WE SEE THE RECENT MIXED SIGNALS
BEING EMITTED BY THE SOVIETS AS CONFIRMATION THAT THIS
AMBIVALANCE STILL EXISTS, ALTHOUGH THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS
OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE MAY WEIGH SLIGHTLY MORE HEAVILY
NOW THAN EARLIER. THE BOVIN ARTICLE AND OTHER RECENT
CRITICISM OF IRAN PROBABLY SHOULD BE SEEN AS A WARNING THAT
BT
U 2156
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHMO #2156/03 2601635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1540
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RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1038
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8223
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0867
R~FNPS/AMEMBASSYPARIS 7868
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1079
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0604
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1559
RUFHNAAISMISSION USNATO 7310
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY M A N 1803
RUEHEG/AMEM~~ASSYCAIRO 2220
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1145
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0384
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1463
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0235
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2869
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 22156
THE SOVIETS CAN HIT BACK, IF IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERS
AND NEWSPAPERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNIOU. SUCH
CRITICISM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN A TRIAL BALLOON TO TEST
REACTIONS TO A POT!ENTIAL SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY; IF SO,
THE SOVIETS WERE ~PPARENTLYSURPRISED BY THE STRONG
REACTION IT GENERATED IN WESTERN AND IRANIAN MEDIA
AND ARE NOW TRYING TO DOWNPLAY ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

li. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT

POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL
MOST LIKELY WAIT TO SEE WHAT FOPLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING
A SERIOUS REASSESMENT -OF SOVIET POLICY. NFA DESK
OFFICER KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF THAT IRAN'S FUTURE DEPENDS
ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ON WHO WILL OCCUPY THE NEW
ORGANS OF POLITICAL POWER. HE ADDED HIS "PERSONAL OPIN-
ION: THAT ALL OF IRAN'S CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE
TO THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE PGOT. HE BELIEVED THAT
THE CLERGY WOULD STTLL CONSTITUTE THE MOST POWERFUL GROUP
IN THE COUNTRY AFTER THE NEW CONSIITUTION TOOK EFFEZT,
BUT EXPRESSED MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PENDING POLTICAL
STRUCTURE. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES
WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF A KHOMEINI OR
A TALEGHANI, KOVRIGIN SAID THERE WERE NONE IN VIEW. HE
CONCLUDED THIS DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT TRAN'S
POLITICAL FUTURE IS FOR THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE
AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION STRICTLY ADHERES TO ITS POLICY
OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

12. IN SUM, WE RELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS STICKING TO

ITS POLICY OF PURSUING GOOD STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH
IRAN FOR THE PRESENT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NO DOUBT PREFER
A STRONGER SECULAR GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN; BUT THEY
RECOGNIZE THAT KHOMEINT IS THE MOST POWERFUL IRANIAN
POLITICAL FIGIJREBY FAR, AND THEY PROBABLY SEE LI~TLE
POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ALTERING THAT REALITY. THEY ALSO
KNOW THAT-KHOMEINI IS 79 YEARS OLD AND CANNOT LAST FOR
EVER. AT LEAST AS LONG AS KHOMEINI DOMINATES IRANIAN
POLITICAL LIFE, WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE
TO MAKE KNONN ITS DISPLEASURE WITH IRANIAN POLICIES AND
STATEMENTS irARMFUL TO SOVIET INTERESTS AND WILL WATCH
FOR CPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE ITS INFLUENCE IN IRAN.
HOWEVER,WE FEEL THAT MOSCOW WILL STOP SHORT OF TAKING
DIRECT ACTIONS TO INFLUENNCE EVENTS THERE. TOON
BT
12156
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00 Q U E E C 3 U E X J C S R'2EYJCS RUPMRA B U S 3 L V
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C O N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 0 1 O F 02 T E H R A N 10181

2.0. 1 2 8 6 5 . : G D S ( L I M B E S T , JO11N) OR-P

TAX: ,
1 2 , P I k T PGOV
SUEJFCT: C O U N C I L O F E X P E R T S 4 P P R O V E S GOVERNMENT
OF I H i O L O G I A N S
1. (C - XNTIhP TEXT).
2. T3.E C C J N C I L 0 1 E X P E R T S F O R E X A M I N I N G T H E NEW I R b N I 4 N
C O N S T I T U T I O N A P P R O V E D A R T I C L 3 V O F T H E NEW C O N S T I T U T I C N
O h S E P T P Y B 3 P 2 1 BY A V O T E D F 5 E - 8 W I T f l F O U R A B S T E N T I O N S .
T d I S AZTICLE, ESTABLISBES TEE VILIYIT-E-PAQIH. 09
GOVERNWENT O F T H E O L O G I A N S . T A X A R T I C L E S T I P U L A T E S THAT
I N T E E b B S E Y C F , O F T H E IMAM 0 1 T 9 E AGX ( T O WHOM A L L
S Z C U L A 3 POVER R I G H T L Y E P L O N G S ) , T H E MAN4SEMENT O T P U B L I C
A F F A I R S AND T B E L B A D E R S B I P O F T B E COMMUNITY I N T R E
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC O F IFAN I S VESTED I N A JUST, VIRTJOUS
VNO:.fLBDGEABLE, C O U R A G F O U S , AND SAGACIOTJS S P E C I A L I S T I N '
ISIAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (FAQIH).
3. T B I S LEADE?. MUST BE A C C E P T E D AND R E C O G N I Z E D BY 4
MAJORITY O F TBE PUBLIC. I F S U C R A P E Q S O N CANNOT B E
EOUhD, C O U N C I L O F S I C H L Y Q r J L L I P I E D R E L I S I O U S LAW
S C ~ O L A E S W I L L PSSUME T E I S FONCTION. T R E LA1# $ I L L S P E C I F Y
TEE ZIORMATIOd P N C CrlSAA'IIZATION O F T H I S COTINCIL.
4. V I L l Y h T - E - T A O I B I S I N F A C T T H E T I T L E O F ONE O F
hYATOLLAP X R O M E I Y I ' S h O R R S O F P O L I T I C A L P H I L O S O P H P . NO
C E S T A I N O F T S E E X A C T MRANING O F T F E TERM OR O F
YG-TERM P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S . POWEVER I T S
O N DOES REPRESENT A S I G N I F I C A N T A L T E X A T I ~ NOF
I G I N A L DRAFT C O N S T I T U T I O N , WHICH E N V I S A G E D A
S E C U L A R PRESIDSNCY A N D A R E V I T A L I Z E D C O V N C I L OP RXLIGIOVS
V X P T R T S TO A N S U P S T Y A F A L L L A d S Y T R F I N C O N F O U Y A N C F d I T P
VZCZC 150
ISLAM. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL
1906 CONSTITUTION BUT HAD NEVXR BCEN IMPLEHENTCD.
5. IN THL ShORT TERM, THE ADOPTION OF THIS ARTICLE
APPEARS TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO T A U
CHARGE OPENLT OF ALL SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY.
AS LONG AS (QOMEINI IS ALIVE, THERE WILL BE FEW RIVAL
CLNDIDATES PO3 TYF OPFICE'S OF FAQIH.
6. TYL APPROVED ARTICLE MACES NO MENTION OF THE OFFICE
OF PRESIDENCY. h09 HAVE ANY OF THE ARTICLES APPROVED
SO FAR DEFINED TEE PRESIDENCY OR DEFINED TBZ RELATION-
SEIP SETbEEh TRE P2ESIDEdCY AND TEE TEEOCRATIC LEADER.
IT APPEARS, BO'EIZVER, THAT TEE INTENTION OF THIS ARTICLE
IS TO FORYALIZE A MERSIYG OF STATE AND RELIGION AND TO
FN3UR9 THLT THE kEY CBITF OF STATE, WHATEVER HIS PORMAL
TITLE. WILL BE DRAWN F30M AMONG THE LEADEBS OP TEE SEIA
CLERGY. COUNCIL PRESIDENT MONTAZERI SAID ARTICLS WAS
FORMAL ACCNOWLEDGEMENT THAT IN ISLAM RELIGION AND
POLITICS ARE INSEPASABLE. PEQSIAN-LANGUAGE PAPER BAMDAD
SF SEPTEMBEZ 15 REFERRED TO T31S OPINION WRITING
FOP. SOME, NOT WELL-VERSED IN ISLAMIC SU~ISPRUDEWEE, TRP
QCESTIOX IS VHETBFR TH3 GOVEQYYTNT OF TEE THEOLOGIAN
IS THF SAME AS TEE PFESIDENCY. IF IT IS NOT THEN WILL
~ O THE
T EXISTENCE OF TWO AUTBORITIES CREATE EONFLICT
AN& CONTRADICTIONS?"
7. SINCE THE FNTIRE CONCEPT OF VILAYAT-E-FAOIB IS
CLOSELY ASSOCIATED VITB LSOM3'INI. PUBLIC COMMENT HAS
BLEN CAUTIOUS. COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ABU At-BASAN BANI
SADX IS QOUTED Z Y BAYDAC AS AS<IN% R6ETORICALLY VFIFTHXR
IT kILL EE POSSIPLE TO FIhlD A SCHOLAR OF QFLIGIOES LAW
kEO MEETS ALL OF THE CONDITIOYS DEFINED IN THF ARTICLE.
A V O T R ~ RREPRESENTATIVE,POOLDCAM-HA~AGHF'I. EXPLAINED
BIS VOTE AGdINST THE ABTICLP ?Y SAYING TEAT TFIS TFIEO-
CFACY'S FUNCTIONING 'AS DEPENDENT O N THE D ~ E S E N C TOF
AYATOLLAH 3FOMEINI EV? WO3LD PROBABLY NOT WORK IN 41s
ATISZNCX.
E. ACC293IhG TO \ REPORTEF WRITING IN TBE SEPT 11
LKGLISH-IPhCUPGP TFERAN TINFS, ONE OF ATATOLLAH
TALEGQANI'S LAjT 4CTS IN THE: I ~ S E Y B L T ~ 9 TVOTE
O
B'I
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A C 0 N F I D E N T I A L S E C T I O N 02 TEHRAN 101
AGAINST T R I S A R T I C L E . T H I S REPORT HAS R E C E I V B D V I D E
ACCEPTANCF, IN TEHRAN. I F THERE I S TO B E ANY S I G N I P I C A N T
O P P O S I T I O N 10 T H E A R T I C L B , TEEN TALIGBANI'S O P I N I O N
COULD BECOYE T H E FOCUS O F TAAT O P P O S I T I O N . EOWEVSR,
APPROVAL 00 T T I S A R T I C L B I S AN I N D I C A T I O N T E A T THE
PROPONENTS O F C L E R I C A L GOVERNMENT ARE NOk I N THE
ASCENCAhT I N THE COUNCIL 09 EXPERTS. AT T H S SAMS T I M E ,
VILAYAT-E-PAQIH, L I L E THE I S 1 , A P I C R E P U B L I C , I S S T I L L AN
UNYOYN QUANTITY FOR MOST I R A N I A N S . I F A RETEREIDUM WERE
B 3 L D ON THE S U E J E C T TODAY. T R I S P O L I T I C A L CONCEPT
WOULD UNDOURPEDLY R E C E I V E OVERWHELMIYG APPPOVAL AND TBE
D Z T A I L S O F T H I S ARRANGFMENT WOULD 3E L E F T FOR T H E
LEARNED THEOLOGIANS T O V 0 9 7 OUT. LAINCEN
RI
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Ei0 N I D P N T I A L STATE 246467

PAGS I PCOV. IR
Sm):ECTr CLBRICAL ILFLUENCE
1. (C - LNPIRS TEXT)
2. ?OR PURPOSSS OF ANALYSIS SERE. JP WOULD APPRECIATE
lrOBTAIB PNBASST VIEWS AND INPORHATION ON PERCEIVED 329W-
ING INTLUfNCS 0 1 CLERGY.
A. I? POSIrION OP CLERGY IS BECOHIN3 STRONGER, WFAT
SPECIFIC POLICY EFFECTS \tAY 1P EXPECT? THAT IS. WBAT
D ~ F Y S R ~ N CIN~ SPcor POLICIES (WEETBBR ENUNCIATED 02 DE
?ACTO) DO Y EXPECT IN FOBSION AFPAIRS, ECONO'IIC/
COMMSRCIAL %ISIOkS. OR MILITARY PROGRAHS?
B. WHICH RECENT PC01 DECISIONS DOPS TEE PMBASSY ATTRIBUTS
TO PRESENTLY ENLARGED I~PLUEF(CEOF Tag CLERGY? IS THEBE
EVIDENCE THAT NEW CLERICAL INFLOENCF IS BEING PXPRESSED
BIVOLOTIONARY COI'NCIL AND YOIITEFS --
T9ROPGH NIW PORnS OR INSTITTPIONS aAFHER ThAN PERCCrGE
AS GAS BZEh TSF
CASE SINCI YCBRDARY? FOR EXhHPlE, ??F EYBASSY APPPARS
TO BELIEVE ?PAT TEE BESITATION ON PESALE 3F F-14's CAN
B1- ATTRIQOTRD TO CLERICAL INILUENCL. IS TSERE FIRM
PVIDENCE ?OR T41S VIEW? IS IT LOT POSSIBLE TPAT THEitZ
IS SPRONC DIPPJ?RSNCE OF 3PIEION BEl'#EEN IAF. YFA FACTIOYS
IT0 CLERGY JOINING TEE SIDE POR BZl'ENTI3N OD P3SSIBLP
nRCINC ANT IVPLKHENTING ACTION BE DELAYLD? ARS NOT
TOPlITEES-WABRE CLERICAL INFLUENCE 64s EESN EXPRXSSED
IN THE PAST--NOW YEAYER IN TRF MILITAaY TdAN LAST SPRING?
DOES EMBASSY EAVE EVIDENCE TFAT CLERSY IS BEFIND RECEVT
DECISIONS TO RESTART PAJOS POREIGN CONTRACTS AND YA<E
LARGE PAYMENTS TO US FIR'lS?
C. THE ZMBASSY'S FINF CABLES ON EDUCA'IIOY PRCELEXS
ST TFAF CLERICEL ILTLUENCI VIZFT BE SF09T 01
IVE IN TEAT SECP3rl. YOUR OZSCRIPSI3N SrrG>ISl'S TzLT
TFE CIXRICS MAY BX COMBATTED BOTE ON TBE P 3 0 1 LEVEL ANG
AT T E 3 LEVEL 3 F IMPLEVENTATION WEERE MANY IRANIANS WILL
s I n P L y 40 AS THEY PLEASE. HOW STRONGIS THE TBNDEYCY
TO GIVE L I P SEBVICE TO CLXRICAL DIRECTIONS, BUT
PRAGYLTICALLY TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOl PAST PRACTICES. E.G..
TBF PBACTICE OF PLAYING YFSIC ON BADIO/TV AFTE3 THE
KKOMEINI "BAN*?
D. #E ARE T50ROUG9LY. CONFUSFD BY.TEE PRESS DESCBIPTIOH
OF C ~ N S T I T U ~ I O N ARPVISI3NS.
L TEE NEW ARTICLB F I V E , FOR
EXAPPLE. DOES NOT MATCE WITH ARTICLE P I V r IN THE DRAFT
CONSTITUTION. I S THE DOCUMENT BEING COMPLETLLP RE-
WRITTEN? I T I S ESPECIALLY UNCLSAR BOW THE RELI3IOUS
LEADER AHll COLJNCIL DKSCRIBED I N TEE NEW ARTICLE FIVE
RELATE TO THE DRAFT DOCUqENT'S CO1NCIL OF GUARDIANS,
THE PRESIDENT AYD THE MAJLIS.

MCRKY POLITICLL ENVIRONMENT I N TODAY'S IRAN AND COMHEND

EMBASSY FOR EXCELLENCE OF I T S POLITICAL REPOSTING BNDER
ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES. I T IS IMPORTANT TPAT WE TRY T O
DEPICT TaXNDS UITH AS #UCE S P E C I F I C CETAIL AS POSSIBLE.
WE APE ALSO DEEPLY INTERESTED I N THE INSIGHTS AND
JUDGMENTS OF ASTUTE IRANIAN OPSERVERS WHO ARE CLOSE F 3
TEE ACTION; YEEP RINGING THE DOORBELLS. VANCE
BT
#64B7
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{ C - 0 N F I D F N T I A L SECTION 01 O? 03 TEHRAN 18281

f E.O. 12065,
8 TAGS: PINT,
GDS 4/19/85 (LIMBERT, J 0 8 N ) OR-P
PGOV, IR
: SUBJECT: KBOMEINI MODERATES HIS ATTACKS ON INTELLECTUALS
REPS: (A) TEHRAN QSe8, ( B ) TEARAN 10191
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUWAEY: AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SPEECHES POLLOVING
THE DEATH OX TALECHANI CONTAINED A
CHANCE I N EMPHASIS. HE SOPTENfD HIS
ATTACKS ON THE IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS WHOM HE PREVIOUSLY
ANATHEMATIZPD I S CHARBZADEH (INFATUATED WITB THE VEST).
INSTEAD HIS SPEECHES CONTAINED CALLS ?OR UNITY--
UNITI WITHIN THE CLERGY, UWITT VITEIR THE UNIVERSITIES.
AND UNITY BETWEEN CLERST AND INTELLECTUALS. ALTHOUGH VE
CANNOT BE CFRTAIN O? KHOMEINI'S MOTIVES. HE HAS BBPN
TRYING TO ENSURE THAT A LARGE PART OF FORMER TALBGHANI
SUPPORTERS INCLUDING THE MODERATE CLERCT AND THE
SECULAR I N ~ E L L E C T U A L S ,ARE NOT IRREPARABLY ALIENATED
FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN I?
THE SHIFT IN KHOMEINI'S POBLIC STATEHENTS HAS ANY
PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON THE REVOLUTIONART AUTHORITIES OR
ON THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS.
3. I N REFTEL A EMBASSY DISCUSSED SOME O? THE IMPLICATIONS
OP TALECHANI'S DEATH FOR THE IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADER-
SHIP. ONE PROBLEn CREATED BT HIS DEATH I S TEkT ONE OF
TALEGHAKI'S MAJOR CONSTITUENCIES, THE UNIYEBSITT-BASED
ECTUALSc HAS 3EEN L P T WITHOUT AN OBVIOUS LEADER
OTECTOR. TALECHANI'S DEPARTURE HLS LEFT THIS
WITBOUT A LEADER OF SUFFICIENT STATURE VHO CAN
VZCZC 265
sn
WORY TO PRESERVE UNITY BETWRlN MORE EXTREFIE CLERICAL
SUPPORTERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MODERATE
ANC SECULAR ELEMENTS VEO HAVE ?ZLT THEMSELVES UNDER
INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THF ADVOCATES OF A PURELY
ISLAMIC STATE. ALTEOUGH I T I S STILL TOO SOON TO # A l l
A DEFINITS JUDGEMENT I T APPEARS TBAT ATATOLLAE KHOtileINI
I S WKING AN EPIORT #'o ATTRACT THE MORE MODERATE
CONSTITUENCT OF TALEGEANI AND TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUINQ
LOTALTY TO THE REVOLUTION.
4. AS EMBASSY NOTED RE?TEL A, THE LOYALTY O? TALEGEANI'S
FOLLOVING VAS INTENSELY PERSONAL AND BASED ON AN
INSTINCTIVE TRUST AND RESPECT. I T VAS ALSO BASED ON
A UNIQCE SST OF HUMAN ?ACTORS VHICH ARE NOT DUPLICATED
IN ANT OTHER LRADER NOV ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE.
AYATOLLAH EOSSEIN ALI MONTAZERI, APPOINTED rnrn Jon'ra
OF TEHRdK I N PLACE OF TELEGHANI. HAS NOT ATTRACTED TEE
SANE LOYALTY. MONTAZEBI'S PERFORMANCE AT H I S FIRST
FRIDAT PRAYSRS ON SEPTEMBER 15 AT BEHESHT-E-ZAHRA WAS
UNIMPRZSSIVF. HE I S UYDISTINGUISHED IN
APPEARANCE, AND AN INNFFECTIVR SPEAKER. ALTEOUGE MANY
BTTENCED FRIDAT PRAYERS OUT 0 1 RESPECT FOR THE MEHORY
OF TALECHANI. MONTAZERI MAT FIND I T DIFFICULT TO ATTRACT
TALFGHANI'S MASSIVE CONGREGATION AT TEBRAN UNIVERSITY
WHEN FRIDAY PRAYERS BESUMl THERE ON SEPTEHBER 21.
5. SIGNS HAVE ALREADT APPEARED QN THE GATES 0 1 TEERAN
UNIVERSITY PROCLAIMING I T TO BE TALEGBANI UNIVERSITY ,
A N D MONTAZERI nrr NOT BE ABLE TO MATCH THE PMIPORMANCE
OF E I S PREDECESSOR. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OBVIOUS
REPLACWEIT FOB TALECHANI AS LEADER OF THE EDUCATED,
IT APPEARS TEAT KROMEINI HIMSELL IS MAKING CONCILIATORY
MOVES TOWARD THIS GROUP.
6. THE EDUCATED HAD PREVIOUSLY BElN A TARGET IOR
SBOMEINI'S SCORN AND RIDICULE. JUST A FEY DAYS BEFORE
TALEGBANI'S DEATH, RHOMEINI TOLD A GATHERING AT m I Z I E H
SCHOOL IN OOM TBAT THOSE EASTERNERS VHO HAD MADE THE
VEST THEIQ ~A'ABA WERE TEE FOLLOVERS OF TAGHUT (THE
DEVIL) SPOKEN Q F IN THE QORAN. KBOMEINI SAID THAT BLIND
IMITATION OP THJ VEST HAS BROUGET THE FREEDOM FOR OUR
T_O_UNGPEOPLE TO WATCH PBRNOGRAPET ON TELEVISION, TO

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1MORE OPIUM, AND TO WASTE T H E I R L I V E S I N BROTHELS LND

BARS. A m R B F L I T T L I N G T H E IMPORTANCE O F T H E COUNTRY'S
ECONOMIC I NWASTRUCT*URE, i ( H O ~ E I N 1 WITH GREAT EMOTION
:TOLD H I S L I S T E N E R S , ISLAM I S S E R I O U S . ISLAM I S NOT
IBIVOLOUS. ISLAM DOES NOT MEAN YOUNG BOYS AND G I R L S
TAKING O f x T H E I R CLOTHES AND G E T T I N G I N T O T H S WATER
TOGSTEER. KHOMEINI S A I D THAT ISLAM ALLOWS ONLY TWO
S P O R T S , SHOOTING AND HORS7, R A C I N G , BOTH O P WFICIl iIAC
OVERTONES O F M I L I T A R Y T R A I N I N G . THE LATTER, HE S A I D ,
I S S O IMPORTANT T E A T ISLAM E V l N ALLOWS E E T T I N G ON
T H E RESULTS.
7. KHOMEINI ALSO CONDEMNED T H E U S E O F WESTERN NAMES
FOB SHOPS, ROADS, AND P A R K S - A N ~ ASTED FOR THE BOYCOTT
0 1 PRODUCTS AND SHOPS WHICH BEAR WESTERN NAMES S I M P L Y
FOR T H E S A K E O F P U B L I C I T Y AND S A L E S . ONLY I N T H I S WAT
BE SAID, WOULD IRAN BE ABLE T O OVBRCOMG ITS F A S C I N A T I O ~
FOR T B P WEST AND TO BECOMP SOWETHING OTHER THAN A P A S S I V E
ABSORBER O F EVERYTHING T H E WEST C I S H E S OUT.
8. K H O H E I N I , I N T H I S ANDIOTHER S P E E C H E S , FAD E S P E C I A L L Y
HARSH WORDS FOR IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS. I N AN E A R L I E R
S P E E C H H E HAD S A I D , WE DO NOT WANT INTELLECTUALS" AND
THEN RETRACTED S L I G H T L Y B T SAYING THAT SOME PEW MIGRT
B E WORTHWHILE. I N H I S S E P T 8 S P E E C H I N QOM HE ACCUSED
T H E INTELLECTUALS O F B E I N G I N F E C T E D WITH THE SAME
I U l A T U A T I O N WITH T H E V E S T (GHARBZADEGI) WHICH HAS

:;*y
CORRUPTED THE E N T I R E I R A N I A N S O C I E T Y EXCEPT FOR THE
MOSQUES AND THE CLERGY. (FYI: I R O N I C A L L Y THE VERY T E 9 K
A D t G I WAS COINED ET T T E LATE J A L A L AL ARMAC, O+JE
INTFLLECTUALS WHO XHOMEINI HARSHLY ATTACLS.1 THF
DUTY F THE I N T E L L E C T U A L S , S A I D XHOMEINI, WAS NOT TO
VZCZC 266
190
 VZCZC 266
ADVOCATE THE FALSE FRLIMlM OF THE VEST, BUT TO EXPOSE
ITS EVILS AND ITS E S S ~ N T I A LVORTHLESSNESS.

MODRRATE HIS ANTI-TI

.
NOW ?OR UNITY ESPECIALLY UNITY BETWEEN THE CLERGY
AND THE INTEL~ECTUALS
10. SPEATING IN QOM ON SEPTEMBER 13* IEOMEINI URGSD THE
INTELLECTUALS TO BECOME PART O? THE SEA OF RELIGIOUS
POWZR SO TEAT TEE COMBINED STRENGTH O? THESE GROUPS
coaiD BETTGR SERVE THE C O U N ~ Y . "YOU ARE ALL 01THE
SAME NATION, LIVE IN ONE COUNTRY AND ONE HWg. SO JOIN
FORCES AND PROTECT TOW HOUSE. ALTHOUGH STILL
CRITICIZING THE INT~LLICTUALS'INFATUATIOY urra THE WEST,
i HE SPARED THW THE HARSH* BLANXET CONDmNATION$ RE HAD
$ MADE ONLY FIVE DAYS BEZORE.

11.IHOMEINI ALSO APPEALED TO T I E RELIGIOUS LEADERS

g NOT TO dBUSE TRE POWER IN THEIR RANDS AND VARIED TEEM
AGAINST OPPOSING TBB rJNIVERSITY-EDUCATED YOUNG PEOPLE,
WHO CONSTITUTE THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP 0 1 THE NATION.
- THE OVER-RIDING CONCERN BOTH FOR THE UNIVIRSITY AND FOR
f THE CLmGY 8 2 SAID SHOULD TIE UNITY. $E ENTREATED BOT9
; THE CLERGY 'AND THE UNIIERSITIES NOT t o SPLIT
n INTO ?UEDING ?ACTIONS AND TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERNAL
' UNITY O? PURPOSE.
12. TEE IMAM TOOK A SIMILAR CONCILIATORY LINE I W A

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. SUCB A STEP WOUL~'SFRI0USLY YE4<EN

TRE GOVERNflENT. ADVOCATING PATIENCE, YHOMBINI SAID TBAT
SUCH DRASTIC MEASURSS WERE ILL-ADVISEC AND TBAT SUCH
REFORM SHOULD FOLLOW APP!?OlAL 09 THE NEW CONSTITUTION
AND ?ORMATION O? THE NEV LEGrSLATITB ASS?M9LY.
13. COMMENTI &LT?IOURE *POMEIN1 HAS NOT ILF,TRIAT?LD FROM
ANT OF HIS mNDAMENTAL IDFAS ON THE HARt!RlL ElFECT OF
FOREIGN INFLOENCSS ON IRANIiN SOCIfTY. 4R APPBASS TO BE
CONCERNED TEAT BE NOT ALIRNATR THE LATE 4YbTOLLAH
ET
00291

NNNN
VZCZC 266
VZCZC ZE?
RR PUERC RUBIJCS RUEXJCS RUQMEI RUQMGU RUEHAD
ROQMOD W S B f D RUQMRA RUSBL".UQYYV RUDTC RUQMAM
BUEHMO RUQMMT RUFNPS RWSNAAA
DE RUQNsR #&?281/03 2631321
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 2 0 1 2 5 5 2 SEP 79
FM ANSMBASSY TEERAN
TO ?EEHC/SECSTATE VASEDC 3878
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDV WASR DC
BUEYJCS/JCS WASH DC

e u i u ~ ~ / t i Ns Tr BAGHDAD 2 2 9 1
RUQMO~/AMT"BASSY COHA 0 2 6 6
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RUDTC/AhE?BASSY LONDON 0 4 0 6
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BT
c o N 7 I D E Y T I A t S E C ~ O Ye3 OP 03 EBRAN 1 0 2 e 1
TALEGQANI'S SUPPORTERS AMONG MODERATES I N THE CLSRCT
AND TFE VNIVFRSITIES. TBF ABSFNCE OP TALEGHANI HAS
APPARENTLY FOPCEC TFB IMAM TO TONY DOWN SOWE OF B I S MORR
EXTBEeE ATTACKS A>AINST TYf SFCULAS AND WESTERN-ORIPNTED
SECTION? CF THE SOC19TY. WHO* HE HAD ILEGULARLY
ANATHEMATIZED IN H I S EARLIPR SPESCBES.
14. IN VOCIFTING H I S PUBLIC STATTYENTS, T 8 3 IMAM MAT
FAVP BEEN INFLUENCED BY TEE INMINSNT OPENING OF TRE
SCBOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES, WHEQZ THERE ARE RUMORS OF
SLBIOES DIVISIONS YETIFEN THE RZLICIOUS AND T9E SECOLhR
STUCZNT SFOOPS. XHOMPINI WAY REALITY TSAT HT I S TRE
ORLY POSSISLF RBPLACRVEYT FOR TALEGuANI AS A MEDIATOR
BETWEEN DISPUTI%C FACTIONS. TBFRT I S NO OY3 FLSE WITH
FNOUG? STAT'JRP AND P R F S T I W . ALTiiOU24 I T I S STILL TOO
EARLY TO PE CESTATN, I T APPFAeS THAT (HOMPIMI I S ATTEMPT-
I N 2 TO FXTTND TPE !iAYD OF F R I Z L D S S I P TO A YIDER StCTOR OP
IRANItN SOCIFTY VITHOUT CEANGINZ R I S UNDERLYING NESSAGB
TYAT IRAN'S SALVATION L I E S NEITDER IN PAST NOR 'J:EST, BUT
If4 TE3 ST9AIG9T PATH (SIBAT AL-YUSTAQIY) OF ISLAM.
15. I T I S S T I L L UNCLYAR YhAT THOMEINS'S YORE MOD3RATZ
L I N P IN Y I S RECENT SPEECXZS YILL YEAN IN PQACTJCAL
TIRYS OR WFETSER RE 1 5 OPPElING THE MODESATES ANYTEING
MORE THAN WORDS. ON3 ARPA TO WATCH WILL Bt THE COUYCIL
OF E T P W T S , WBICH HAS BESN CONVERTING T E 9 ORIGIYAL
DXAPT CONSTITUTION INTO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAV OF A
THEOC3ArIC STATE ( 4 B F 5 ) . I T R W A I Y S TO13E SEEN WSFTBSR
TSF DPIVF TOR TEEOCQbCT IN TEE COUNCIL, uED BY ATAT0514<S
T I Ah'!' YONYAZ R I . I S AT ALL BL'lNTED - T T I Z S H I F T - ,
E 0: P ~ O Y E I V I ' S PUFLIC STATEMENTS. I T I T I S NOT,
HOMlI4I'S EFFiRTS AT R7CONCILIATIOY WILL BE
VZCZC 267
vr7
VZCZC "267

CIFFICULT, WPECIALLT AS MODERATES MAT SEE TSWSELVES

BEING SYSTFMATICALLY EXCLODED FROH ANY SEARS I N TBE
IXANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS.
1 5 . WE CCTE THAT A ~.AOYEINI SPEECH AUGUST 19 TO
A I R TOBCX OFFICERS I N oon MADE ATTER TBIS CABLX WAS
WRITTEZ bG4IN COYTAIN? AN ATTAC6 ON WESTERNIZED
INTELLFCTUALS. I T I S DIPFICWLT TO SAT YEETHBR THESF
COMMENTS WILL MARK TEE BESINNIN4 OP A NYW SPATE 0 9 AN
WFSTE9W SPEECSES, OR VEETEER TREY ARE AN EXCIPTION TO
TEE TSEND YE PAVE BEEN OBSERVING SINCE TALEGBANI 'S
DEATH. LA I NGXN
ET

NNNN
VZCZC 267
VZCZC ZTI
00 RUEHC BUEKJCS EUEYJCS RUQMBI RUQMCU EUFHAD
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RUEBMO RUQMMT RUFNPS RUSNAAA
DE R U Q n p a * i i 2 8 8 / 0 1 2631420
ZNT CCCCC L Z R
0 2 0 1 4 0 2 2 SEP 79
FM AflKWBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUSHC/SECSTATE WASBDC IMMEDIATE
I N F O R U E I J F S / S E C D E F WASH DC
R U E I J C S / J C S WASH DC
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RWHADNSINT BLGHDbD 0292
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RUSBQD/AMEMBASST ISLAMABAD 0332
RUQMRA/AMEMBASST J I D D A 0330
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RUQMMT/AMFMBASSY MUSCAT 0 1 8 r )
BUFNPS/AME~BASSYPARIS a360
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN 5E
*
C O N F I D E N T I A L S E ~ ~ I O NO FB 03
~ TEYRAN
E.O. 12065: GDS 9/28/05 ( L I I B E R T , J O H N ) OR-P
TAGS: P I N T . PGOV. I R
SUBJECT: V ~ R XOF'COUNCIL OF EXPERTS PROCEEDS SLOWLY
I. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: THE COUNCIL O F EXPERTS FOR THE EXAMINATION
O F TEE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO
COMPLFTE I T S WORT B T SEPTEMBER 23. HAS S O FAR APPROVED
ONLY X I P T E E N A R T I C L E S O F T E E NEW CORSTITUTION. THE
O B I G I N A L D3AFT SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION CONTAINED
151 A R T I C L E S , S O THE COUNCIL W I L L HAVE E I T H E R TO S P E E D
PP I T S P d C E OR EXTEND I T S MANDATE. ACCORDING TO P R E S S
REPORTS ON SEPTEMBER 19, THE COUNCIL'S L I F E HAS BEEN
EXTENDED P O 9 LNOTEER 15 DAYS. HOWEVER T B I S NEW P E R I O D
WAY WELL_ NOT B E S U F ? I C I E N f TO COMPLETE THE COUNCIL'S
WORI. s N C SUMMARY.
3. THE WORd O F THE COUNCIL 0 1 EXPERTS HAS BEEN PROCEEDING
SMOOTHLY, I F SLOWLY. RADIO AND T E L E V I S I O N BROADCASTS O F
TEE SESSIONS HAVE s a o w N THR DBBATES TO BE LIVELY,
ORDERLY, AND VERBOSE. M E R E I S NO P R O V I S I O N FOR L I M I T I N G
THE LENGTH OF S P E E C S E S OR O F R E S T R I C T I N G THE S U B J E C T .
MATTER. AS A RESULT, ALMOST THE E N T I R E F I R S T MEETINGS
WERE TAKEN U P BY GlNERAL S P E E C B B S BY VARIOUS DELBGATES--
SPEECHES WIV L I T T L E RELEVANCE TO THE S P E C I F I C MATTERS
I N THE CONSTITUTION.
4. T F F g I G H LIGHTS O F THE MAIN A R T I C L E S PASSED S O PAR

A) ARTICLE 5, T E E GOVERNMENT O F THE THEOLOOIAN

INCITE:
VZCZC 277
 VZCZC 277

(VILATAT-E-FAQIH). THIS ARTICLE WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL

SIPTEL. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT MEANING OF THIS ARTICLE
I S STILL UNCLEAR, MAJOR IMPLICATION I S TO ENSURE SHIA
RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT CONTROL OVER THE OFPICE OF
CHIEF OF STATE. PASSAGE OF THIS ARTICLE HAS STIRRED OPEN
CRITICISM. RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR EZZATOMB SAEABI HAS
SEFERZLY CRITICIZED ARTICLE 5 , SAYING THE NEW PROVISION
WILL LEAD TO AN AUTHORITY RUNNING PARALLEL WITH THAT OP
THE GOVERNMENT OR IN OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. I T
I S DANGEROUS POB ISLAM, HE SAID,.BECAUSE I F A GOVERNMENT
MADE MISTAKES I T COULD BE REMOVED. BUT I F A RELIGIOUS
LEADER MADE A MISTAXE, P E O P L ~V O U ~ D LOSE FAITH-IN THE
CLERGY ITSELF AND THUS IN ISLAM. ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS
DELEGATE ANC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MtMBER ABOLHASSAN
BANISADR HAS ALSO CRITtCIZED ARTICLE 5 SAYING THAT I F
CLERGYMEN VFRE TO BE.ENTRUSTED WISHS P ~ C I A LPOWERS,
THEN TEE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT PARTIES WAS UEANINGLESS.
HOWEVEE, IN REPLY TO THESE CRITICS, AY~TOLLAH KHOMEINI
% TOLD GROUP OF AIR PORCE OFlICERS TEAT OUR QOVSRNMENT
2 I S ISLAMIC, AND THAT (THEY) UUST SUPPORT ARTICLE 5 SO
THAT THE COUNTRY I S NOT HARMD. THE NATION HAS CAST
ITS VOTE FOR TEE ISLAMIC R E p B L I C i ALL 0 T YOU MUST COUPLY,
OR YOU WILL BE OBLITERATEn.
2E" - (B) ARTICLE12,ESTABLISHINGTWELVERJA'fABISBI'ISM
- AS THE STATE RELIGION O r IRAN ?OR LTBBNITT. THIS
( ARTICLE WAS OPPOSED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUNNI
0 W
ARFAS, NOTABLY MOWLAVI ABDULAZIZ DELEGATE FOR BALUCHPSTAN,
HO SAID THAT THE OPFICIAL RELIGION SHOULD BE ISLAM
NOT ONE SECT. THE ARTICLE ALSO NOTES TEAT THE VARIOUS
--
SUNNI LA# SCHOOLS ARE RWPECTED AND HAY BE PREELY APPLIED
IN AREAS WHERE SUNNIS PRBDOUINATB.
- ( C ) ARTICLE 13 DEFINES TEE RECOGNIZED NON-UUSLIM
MINORITIES: C B R I S T I A ~ S , JEWS AND ZOROASTIANS. THESE
MINORITIES ARE GUARANTEED m r m n OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
ANC EDUCATION, AND dRE ALLOWED TO APPLY THEIR OWN LAWS
OF DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE. TAIS ARTICLE
CREATED A BRIEP S T I R OF INTEREST IN A SMALL ANCIENT SECT
CALLEC THE SABEANS, WE0 CLAIM TO BE FOLLOWERS OF JOHN
TEE BAPTIST. AYATOLLAH MAHARRENI-SBIlAZI ENDED THAT
CONTROVERSY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE SABPANS WERE INCLUDED
UNDER TEE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO JEWS AND CHRISTIANS.
THE BAHA'I SECT. HOWEVER. I S NOT CONSIDERED A TRUE
BT

NNNN
VZCZC 277
 VZCZC 278
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DE RUQMHR #0288/02 2631428
ZNY CCCGC ZZH
0 2014022 SPP 79
Pn AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE VASHDC IMMEDIATE 388e
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDL? VASE DC
RUEKJCS/JCS VASE DC
RUQHBI/AMEt4BASSY ABO DEABI 0297
a u Q n o u / A n s n s A s s r ANKARA 0282
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'
E RUINPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0361
f
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINOEN GE
BT
C 0 N P I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 01 83 TEERAN 10288
ELIGION BY THE n o s L m s AND, THEELMBE, IS NOT PBOTECTED
BY THIS ARTICLE.
-TO BE (D)COMPRISBD
ARTICLE 17, ESTABLISHES I I V E ARHS 01 THE STATE,
OF THE PWPLE, THE LBQISLATORE, TEE
EXECUTIVE, TEE JUDICIARY AND TEE THlaCRATIC LmDSBSBIP.
THE THEOCRATIC LEADSBSHIP I S O I V E l TRP P m R TO S t f TEAT
TEE PRINCIPLES AND ARTICLES O? T H I CONSTITUTION ARt
IMPLEMENTED, IN ADDITION TO BEING TEE LIAISON B n W P t N
THE OTHER FOUR ARMS 01 TEE STATE.
-oa IRA!,( E )
ARTICLE 21. MAKES PfRSIAN TBll OlFXCIAL LANGUAGI
BUT-ALLOVS .FOB~THIC USE OF O T H ~ "LOCAL
. AND
TRIBAL LANGUAGPS ALONGSIDE 0 1 PERSIAN IN PUBLICATIONS,
TEE HBEIA, AND THE TEACHING O? LIl'ERATUBE IN LOCAL
SCHOOLS.
4. THE ASSEMBLT HAS BEGUN TO PACE THE FORMIDABLE TASK
OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE JUDICIARY,
AND TEE CABINET. UNLESS THP PACE O? WORK I S SPEEDED
UP, TBP;RE SEEMS LITTLE PROSPBCT POR TEB COUNCIL
TO FINISH ITS WORK BEK)RE THE END OF 1979. ON 19 SEPT
HOWEVER. KHOMEINI AGAIN URGED TBf ASSEMBLY TO EXPIDITI
P A S S A G ~ . O FTEE CONSTITUTION G I V I N G INDICATION THAT
HE HAY BE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH TBE ASSEMBLY'S SNAIL
LIKE PACE. SHOULD KHOMEINI STEP IN EE COULD UNDOUBTEDLY
SPEED UP THE PSOCESS.
5. THE COUNCIL HAS CHANGED I T S ROLE FROM THAT ORIGINALLY
GED. IT WAS FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD
QUICS REVIEW OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND
E I T WITH MINOR CHANGES. INSTEAD. TEE ~ O U N C I L
VZCZC 278
 VZCZC 27t'

HAS TURNED INTO A GENUINE CONSTITUBNT ASSEMBLY, RE-

WRITING, ADDING AND OMITTING ARTICLES AT WILL.
6. NOT ALL ARE PLEASED WITH WHAT I S EMERGING FROM THE
COUNCIL. THERE APPEARS TO BE A STABLE BLOC OF ABOUT
FIFTY TO FIFTY-FIVE DELEGATFS WHO SUPPORT VOVES TO
INCREASE THB ROLE OF THE CLERGY I N THE NEW GOVERNMENT.
ALTHOUGH THERE I S NO FORMAL FACTION OR PARTY STRUCTURE.
AYATOLLAHS MONTAZERI AND BEHESHTI EAVE GENERALLY BEEN
SPOIESMEN FOR T H I S GROUP. T2ERE I S A SMALL MINORITY
INCLUDING SOME or TEE NON-MUSLIM DELIGATES AND M O Q A D ~ A M
NARAGHL'I, DELEGATE FROM TABRIZ FROr THE MUSLIM PEOPLES
REPUBLICAY PASTY (MRPP) WHO EAVE BEEN UNSUCGESFULLY
R I S I S T I N G TEE MOVES TO YEaGE CLERICAL AND SECULAR
AUTHORITY.
7. ALTiOUGH TEE DRAFT CONSTITUTION SPECIRICALLY MENTIONED
RIGHTS FOR THF NON-PERSIAN ETENIC GROUPS IN IRAN, TAB

- COUNCIL HAS SO FAR MADE NO MENTION OF TZESE GROUPS I N

5 THE ARTICLES APPROVED. TBE OAIGINAC ARTICLF 5, WHICH
: GUARANTEED WUAL F I 3 A T S FOR PERSIANS, YURDS, TURKS,
ARABS ETC., EAS SO FAR BFEN IGNORED BY TEE ASSEWBLY.
~RITERA N D C B I T I C D R . R E Z A BASAHENI TOLD A N HRPP MEETING
TEAT IY H I S OPINIOV I F THE CONSTITUTION I S R A T I F I E T
VITHOUT GIVING AUTONOMY TO THP MIYOPITIES, I T WOULD NOT
: E E IN LINT WITH TFE IBANIAN REVOLUTION.
IRANIBN EXPERIENCT WITH CONSTITDTIONS ANC PARLIAMENT,
COMMENT:
E EAS NOT BEEN A PAPPY ONE. THS 1906 CONSTITUTION WAS ONE
THE

OP THE YOST VENERABLE AND h 3 S T IGNORED COCUMFNTS IN THE

MIDDL6 EAST. AN IBINIAN POT! CF THX PSE-EEZA SHAH ERA
ONCE NEOTI IN FXASPERATIOK, ONF CAN ONLY DEFECATE ON
SLCH A PAELIAMSNT.

e. MITE THIS BACGG03ND I T I S PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE

TFAT TSE PPCCEEDIdZS OF +FE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS "AV3 NOT
EXCITED CSEAT I N T J S E S T , DESPITE THE FACT Ti'IT I T S
I!ZCISIOYS & I L L BE CRUCIAL I N DETERWINING THT SHAPE OF
A NEW GOVERNMZNT. SONE CONSIDIR TRT SNTIBX PROCEDURE
A CRAPADE gHICE WILL COYPLSTE I T S WORr AND THEN BE
IGNORED BY SOME lvJW DICTATOP. OTHTR MIDDLE-CLASS
IRANIANS ARE WOR2IED EY TET DOCVYENT EMERGING. THRY
SEE T B r KEk CONSTITUTION AS CONFIRMING THEIR WORST FEARS
ThAT IPAN I S FACING A PTFIOD OF RXACTIONARY CLSRICAL
BI
#8288

NSNN
VZCZC 27']
 VZCZC m
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DE PUOMSP f@288/83 2631437
Z h Y CCCCC ZZR
0 2 8 1 4 0 2 2 S F P 79
PM AMWBASSY TEEBAN
TO RUEBC/SSCSTATE VhSHDC IMMEDIATE 3889
I N F O R U E K J C S / S E C D E P WASH DC
R U E Y J C S / J C S VASE DC
RUQMBI/AVBVBASSY ABU DHABI 0298
RUQHG@/AMEMBASST ANKARA 0283
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RUCMOD/AMEMBASSY DOEA 0269
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$ RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCW0295
: RUQMMT/AUBk'BASST m S C A T 0186
? RUPNPS/AMEMBASST PAFIS 0362
--
RUSNAAA/LiSCINCEUR V A I E I N G E N G E
1tTO
'- N ?F 1 D E N T I A L SECTION
RULE ? H A T W I L L UNDO MANY 0 1 T E E HARD-WON S O C I A L G A I N S
T H E I R CLASS EAS ACBIRVED I N T R E L A S T F I F T Y YBARS.
LAINGEN
' BT
#0288
NNNN
 Un11.d Sures olAmema
Weshmomn. D C 2&%7
September 26,1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: State/NEA- Mr. H u o h i 8. h u n d e ~

FROM: IcA/NEA - R T. Curryq'.c

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Communication
&tween United States and Iran
-
October 1979 February 1980

Based on discussion# in lap office on September 7, ICA agrees that

some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for
communication between the United States and Iran in the public
diplomacy area Is in order in the next four a five months.

k a &ding practice, we will try to encourage institutiond linkages,

a ccncept of commuuication endwred on September 7. These
linkage. will stress the two-way flow of relations. At t h b time i t
must he recognized that their development depends on a e a t i n g an
atmosphere of t n u t and respect. In initial stages, friendly and
u n d u r t a d h g onwonone penonally developed ties u e essential.
Tbrougb c a d p e r d rapport can be built carefully determined
inntitutional linlugn which, in t w , can nurture further mutual
relationships. Likely fie& for initiating or reestablishing contact
include Iranolqy, the humanitiu, physical sciences, English teaching,
.adphysical dumtion.

Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest farhim with currently

limited, one-way - Iranirpr to the United States - programs, Is the
work of the Fulbright Commission. The United States dould
maintain its f h c i d capport of these operations 8s a well-
established and core institutional link between private and public

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject to General Declaeaification Schedule of Executive Ordu

12065. Automatically Downgraded a t Two Y e u h t e r v a b 8nd
D e c b i f i e d m September 7.6, 1985.
educators ;ld kutituti- in both c w t r k r M m i l u b , fudictnult
p h d activities of the Amwican hutitute for 2r.ni.n Studin .baJd
be fatered.

Within thi. general approach md responding to the recomm.Pd.timu

of tbe Charge' and our Public-Affairs Officer, we will e u m h e tbe
followiug venues for some restrained i n i t i a t i m wbkh may be
considered if k8nian authorities make it c k u t h t w Marest in
enhanced relationships ia reciprocated:

1. Propose visits to Iran by cuefully selected u h o l u

and public figurer. Whenever possible, the &its +ill
be privately uranged. hdividluk A d d h e
aedibility and relev~nceto premnt-day Iran.

2. Enccurage inritations to Iraahn ktUDic s c h h aad,

poaalbly, Iranian religiarr figure* t o the EejCa
annivemary celebrations in the United Stat- Events
during the vlsft should also hcluda limikr
representatives Lom other Islamic wcietkr t o rtrar
the multi-aational nature of the Q~S~WUIC~S.
Sponsorship should be privately uranged with the
Hejira Anniversary Committee pla* a mdor role.

3. Discuu with private entities, such u the Johnua

Foundation m unireraity-based semimars includiug the
Eut-Weat Center, be- groups of kmiau
rcholars to the United States t o ccasklm non-
controver8lu topics. Preferably the mmtbgs .bOUld
be mu1tiaation.l P-bh field. w litmatme.
eeative writing a, more p.~matic.IIy, library
development 8nd lib?y science.

4. Work with a f e w cuefully selected foc~ipashd4nt

advisers m d admissions officers a t ~mircnities
sophisticated in handling S h m i c and k.nLr, StudOnts
a) t o assen during this period of change In Lam
evolving needa and attitudes of kan1.n dudenu so u
b) to look towud p h s f w a posstbk student
conference or other type dialogue in the United
Stater a t some future p r o p i t w ~date.
.
 5. l%phr dLb h & 8 U c d ~ t l bIS&tW
d
take part in a arppat otha d d u t i o n ~
excbnge o p r a t i a u tn h m k thM-unmtries, ouch
u thorn of tbi- University of Nebraska at O m d a in
- Pakintan, pooil$Uthe f w inviting I?- stlrhacr
and academia to take p u t in aub m m b w
jmojects wbkh f a t e intellectual uadsnt.ndin(( .nd
on-gobg contact.

6. Cauider augmentation of current X C W S Eq@bb-

t e a c w ud cultural InrtitutkuU poridcd t h t
rdminttrutin claim8 for ,put draagss m d
~ t r a t i o o r8m gl*.n cop,ix8nes by &MfM
mthorlties.

7. Be r b t t to o p p a t d t i a to invite k.lrknr to take

put in multi-regiond exchange p w a m s ,
particularly thae in m w m&

NOTE

The V O A p d i r m ~pLvv to inomuc bodcast time to Inn in P c n i e

by one bau a day about th twn of tJm new yeu. It will .bd a
thirtyminut* mornjag ibor featuring new8 and new8-dat.d
material lad 8o ulditiwd thirty minut- to tbe front md of the
current --hour evening .bar. Tb extended $bow will
provide prsater opportdty f a M p t h cowet-e rd nrlhlrd
materid C p i d u r t i m nmrr ereat. in baa outside the politlcd
sphere, a series on Iranian klamk studk. and Centera i the United
States, .ed interviews ria Am4c.n scholar# and k d o & t s ud
appropriate public IIgurw representing a wide spectrum of political
and foreign policy viewpoints.

DISTRIBUTION:

-
D The Acting Mractor
ECA - Ms. Alice Ilchman
--
MGT Mr. James k b t t e r
PGM Mr. Huold Scbneidmur
,

-
VOA Mr. Peter Straw
-
State/NEA Mr. Peter Conrtable
\ -
State/NEA Mr. H u u y Recht
 IC '?IS OEPAETFiiE StATPEBNT AL'OOSZ 23. TAlDf REPORTEDLT.
PPPSS TklAT hSS:L?S P1SCUSSIl;G RELATICNS 3ETVEIK
7'10 CJ:'WPFIES #Ire r A # C E . rAZD1 SAID RE WILL ALSO
h k AMEEICAN PLlY TO LANE COYEAT TOOOPS 1 1 T.1:
C P L F T O PEGPfDP S?AEILlT? IN TRL FtSlOU. SUCK A
hhY OF Thr RECICM'S' COlILICTS .
CS, US SAID, WILL NOT IN-ART VAT W L P
COK!:P~T: TEilRAN PRFSS EAS BEPY POLLOfIN3 WITlI IWTLEWT
!CLS ETlTEarKTS PT QSC OPYICIALS PE3ARff10 fOIMfiTIOV
r ~ F . 6 ~ 6 . T6?Bt BAS BEEL A BRLAT DYAI
ETRE TliAT C S i INTENDS T 3 0! IAS I U C I E I ED
EAT ~ 1 1 I I lT~O i C V IN TEE GULF 1851, TFLT WE YA'
TO fSUD IN FOPCtS TO LFZKINISTAW; AH3 TBbT US
G C04SIDX91':: SbMi AC:ION LOAIYST OIL tIELDS
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10500

DE RUQMHR 10500 273".

ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
0 3012552 SEP 79 ZFF-1 CHRGE: STAT 9/30/79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHAROE:LBLAINOEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC =DATE 3992 DRFTD: P0L:EASWSIFT:OO
BT CLEAR: NONE
C O N F ' I D E N T 1 ALTEHRAN10500 OISTR: POL 2 CHG CHRON
RF
NEA/IRN FOR HENRY PRECHT
FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE SEPT 24 BEING REPEATED
FOR YOUR ACTION. ACTION OFFICE CLAIMS NON-RECEIPT.
QUOTE
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10342

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/24/79 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) 0R.P

TAGS: IR, PORG,MASS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH YAZDI: GULF DISTRICT;
US PRESENCE IN PERSIAN GULF
REF: TEHRAN 10i83
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH YAZDI OCTOBER 3, WE
SUGGEST SECRETARY VANCE RAISE QUESTION OF OUR ACCESS
TO COMMISSARY, GULF DISTRICT AND OTHER MILITARY PROPERTIES
SUCH AS MOTOR POOL AND ARMY COMMUNICATION COMMMAND
(ACOM) FACILITY.

3. FOLLOWING DEATH OF AYATOLLA TALEGHANI, THE TALEGHANI

COMMITTEE FORMERLY CONTROLLED COMMISSARY IS TURNING
OVER CONTROL OF COMMISSARY AND OTHER PROPERTIES
(BOTH US AND IRANIAN) EITHER TO OFFICE OF THE PRIME
MINTSTER OR TO ARMY. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHO ACTUALLY
CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT. WE HOPE THAT
COMMISSARY AND THE GULF DISTRICT MAY END UP IN HANDS
OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. IF SO, YAZDI WOULD BE IN
A POSITION TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY AND
GULF DISTRICT. WHILE YAZDI HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIVE TO
OUR APPROACHES IN THE PAST, WE THINK IT NOW MIGHT BE
WORTH ANOTHER TRY.
4. IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT AUGUST 23, YAZDI REPORTEDLY
TOLD PRESS THAT " BESIDES DISCUSSING RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH VANCE, YAZDI SAID HE WILL ALSO
DISCUSS AN AMERICAN PLAN TO LAND COMBAT TROOPS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE REGION, SUCH A
MOVE BY THE US, HE SAID, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY HELP
DEFUSE ANY OF THE REGION'S CONFLICTS.11

5. COMMENT: TEHRAN PRESS HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITH INTEREST

VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS REGARDING FORMATION
OF RAPID REACTION FORCES. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL
OF SPECULATION HERE THAT USG INTENDS TO 04 HAS ICREASED
ITS COMBAT MARINE FORCES IN THE GULF AREA; THAT WE MAY
INTEND TO SEND IN FORCES TO AFGHANISTAN; AND THAT US
MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SOME ACTION AGAINST OIL FIELDS
IN MIDDLE EAST. LATEST VERSION OF THIS IS KAYHAN STORY
AUGUST 24 QUOTING KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UAE
MODARESSI THAT FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND US TROOPS '
ARE STATIONED IN JUFAIR BASE IN BAHRAIN. IT WOULD BE
VERY USEFUL IF SECRETARY COULD DISCUSS WITH YAZDI
DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN
GULF SO HE WILL HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTION
IN THE AREA,CHARGE TOOK OPPORTUNITY DURING CALL
ON MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINISTER MINACHI TODAY
TO DESCRIBE PRESS REPORT OF U.S. TROOPS IN BAHRAIN AS
TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND UNHELPFUL TO ATMOSPHERE AFFECT
ING US RAN RELATIONSHIP. LAINGEN
UNQUOTE.
LAINGEN
BT
#0500
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10500

 D ee PaDily,
It'. F r i L y aft.noon, ) h e 1 1 0 8 l d Sunday, and eP the f i m t dny e l n w tam
day woeknd. 11. (ping t e p1.j t.1.i. with the I t a l i u A ~ b u r s d ui n 8 few * a
. We
t a w 0 . u 6G or 70 %bas-iem here, a p o i mumbar ccmpilred t o Wta. Sbviot e o l 1 . y ~ .
i e n veky memior Soviet d i p l u t , refleoting rtke importance they attach k tbi@plm.
I have not cmllad on hi. yet, i n i M e he wan g..o a &ood doal of the
to make a courtesy c d l on him the ether aad was told...
-... bot I u k d
c a l l again im on* w a d ~ a b
time, the Ambassador i a ill.. sounds lib a diplomatic i l l n e s s to me81
J The place where the action i s these day9 i n N Elb8s.l is the C n m l u sbet*a... thd
v i e r issuing place. ~9f.1-o the Revolution the consular section was l e o a t d im a oop8mta
bui-diag i n another part of toke. EP$n then i t w ~ sbysy, siace the student f l w t o the
a USA ha8 always been heavy. %Utt h a t buildin# was dm& during the m v e l u t i e ~
and eo wo c l o ed down eur c o n a a l d a o t i v i t i d . o f f i c i a l l y except f o r s.lrgev requiracmtsi
Ve told the govoruent here that u n t i l we had s u f f i c i e n t personnel back hero of our m,
u.rtil we had t i n e to rebuild en efPieo f a o i l i t y , and...-bet important... u @ i l tho
gaveras?nt could .ssu,a eur secl(Sity ip the coap.un&, we# wore not going t o mopenf.
That s i k u t i c n cantirued u n t i l a week a gm, who8 we f i n a l l y fiWshed work on 8 d w u d
vrry modern r u d g f i o i e n t visa issuing facility... l i k e a b a d , with r..r e f o f f i e i n
bmhind b u l l e t glass. 1180 we f i u l l y o o n ~ m a dtho gw-t h e n t h a t thy bad
t o "8- 20-25 police t 8 control the o r d s , u d t h a t they f-4 did.
Se wo roopn- a week y, t o rid about 3000 poplo
ti. i n ti.. f o r f a l l c d s s classes u d
- t o t r y t e gain entry into oome soh001 w h i c h they claimad t o ua
them.
4-w

of these students, however, hare such l w grade8 p.d moh limitad m

-
a d c 1 u o r i . g f o r visa.- especially students, B u y of them marrhr m i o w t o got tLem
...J,
we su8pect th8ir.re.l Furpore i s aimply t o g e t t o the US and 8 w a u w a d - b e i r i g u b
tho atxwot8 aatold*

m a w mbro 8f them s i m p 4 8ppIJh# Sor 8 s

;am grr@
o
to
b tht
So our refumal r a t e i a high... UP t o f o r t y poment. We n w ha.). 8 . m o f f i o q
1ncludi.q two wives, irtFrm one of whss you've .rdrr sat, Pevne, who sit k h h d t k e i r
,
b u l l s t proof P a m a d ~ntorviewapplieadte a l l day long. A Marine help. contr.1 t h i y r
irside, ale* bebind thick bullet proof glass, u d a11 s o r t s of e l e c t r i o b r u n e n o p m t .
tno eng.m l a d exit.. A oomputer bank, linked t o f i l e 8 1n P u i e , is zrn%x a d l a b l o ;
to c ~ e c ~ % ~ l i 68temino ~ ~ t # whetlor
t ~ ha's been turred d o n -re before. f
EutAeutoide i s a mesa. The #s police are g e t t i n g b e t t e r a t o r c d c m t r b l , grrduUXyl I
but h moot days It we simply haw t o close d m beasuse no order or l n o o w bo ,
oaintahed. Tke plaoe has become &*st a t o u r i s t a t t r a c t i n in thie city, s i d d
v nclrrs h=ve s e t up shep, u d we suspect t h a t tho A -
Y a police m invelrod i n a l l
- a r t s fa of petty bribery i n a s s u r i q pepplo of ~ l d h u 8 n 8 . prof0u.d s ~ p&oo8 h
the limos. So far, fortunately, t h e n ' s beem no reriou8 riolencc, u d mo &kidbaa
b-en threaten+d i n ply way. But we worry 8 b i t about t h a t , o.p.cially the r i a U
r e a c t i m of a m a 80rt from tho8e who a n tuxmod d m . Honce the bullet m e f r h m m iuU.l - -
a d thm pbiice ~ u t s i a ~ .
Why the mumberm?.. . p o d qW.tir. Partl). tho e o n t i m u t i n 8f a pt-...
- :-.>*la have been the preferred e l a c e f o r highbr education of P*rsim student8 9r.r 8 i ~ o
A]
v d l d W - r 11. part& too of courlb 138 aimply tho dosire t o get out of ~ r o l u t l n l d y
Iran, not the most plenaant place theso day8 f o r tho s e a u l u , wostsnisod Iruiu...
s e r e t h d h r l t of tho Crowds eutside a r e ~ o t u d o n t s ,thoso I r u i u s
~ e +n t 1migra.t vim. glfan the .mall n u b - r of those n w available u d who w a m t t o go the
US em "viait' but who really intbud t o stay.

-
I dem't mean to imply that a11 thi8 i e bad. I t is f a I r u V 8 thW,beouuf
it u . 9 r t s t o 8 torriblo brain h i m . But f o r U 8 it i 8 u d d ~ d 01-t im .rp
b i l a t e r a l relationship with thi8 cbuntry... a kuu l i n k t h a t dh .d*8 m u Lp.rtut
atremuth a t the grass root8 t o UsdarstanUng. Am& yet tho p i e h that a l l this prom-
i s a b i t o f a puadox... we a n not the most poplar people im Iru theso &ye) w
obrioum and toe supportive of a d i l l i k d r y i m e undw the shU. So mr our Mode hem
cautioum about being seen 6.0 cl8eb t o us... u d y e t t k r n is thir pie* of
hua&ed8 p.d sometime8 thm8ud8 of I r a n i u 8 out8ide ~ u rETba88y emh w, .shl obrioum
'dospusto t o get t o the Unit.d Stat081
Tho worther i 8 loroly here n w l we had a d u a t i y of n o u n tko u p i f l e n t a-
wultain r l ~ y c behimd t ~ aui t y l a a t week. u d t h m i r a t x c h of id1 im
i n the city. Tko oky i 8 blue, tho oelebrated Por+iu b l w of t h i s e u a
* rir d m

weather, mad we try to p t out int* tho m&Ms8 on hikoo ud pimica

doing that trmorrw, ef which 1'11 w r i t * in r y noxt lsttrr.l....
116
 hluu, Iru

mlu Emily,
lu AP t i h r it;r i m mi* twt.
nurw tkt tb A & f i i a t r e U u h u d - i m t a uma IAhsam u A ~ b U d nte Irn. 88
tlw tal-a ia rimgw n d 1 1. w i a g it, tk m~ tht id ~ ~ 8 u te. a b .
L w
8. IkoimiU b U mt k .r 8*n l dl fl'N l m m W i t * EM) h m-pli*,
w 8-t tk rmp.rt. ykn I rrU thrm vu ma h i m t a it, te q b w l d g o , .h.

q nt. B*v nba hd ?an*. rw i. s . b m y r ) l r u d I f n w t t a u k . I Ud a& tkor tr

ratan tln p e w whioh I h o p #ha did.
kty 4h m u h b r s a d a r . . ..
I thimk you all h w t h a t 1 haw wry mixad f a a l i . 0 a h t fL* po*ribi;if
b e u u a af the f d l y a a P . r A a t i a iarmlvd.
q.Ur h a 7 4 it wm't h p p n , a t th .un tino u I m i m a t h a t I u a
mf .O
I liJ

P r o r i d a t rut ma t a servo. I m a t k r w r b I'm di8cipli.Y. n 8ubJaot te diroiplfie...

d a t tk m t k I'm a Y. Vk Uvom h i s f u i l y u d min*. t h u t e r r i b l y r-t ~ l ,
aapocimlly taml(lit with -8 r\1..r u a u d . Bvem1mp rrr Lud, awm v i t h th r n n d e f
Batiorrl
tel-bl.,
reo~pti.u
baomma r &
tho- 1J1 w, ly afhr day d perfect Idiu
t holp l l i ' L I 1 e ' ~ ea ~ ym i d a f f tle aaplr.tim. Dyfiw h
buy r -.m
-,
tun i r RI* t. r . n -tkr im g l n i ?
ud t h a t h e l p YL. thi* p l ~ .
M b l e . ant nt .uulL. I d n * t lilu t
I +a.t m i d uJiy ma. I f I L.l it te do .m . (....
b W l y r i t u r t i r ~ " r g m t t am p a l f i m t a .
. i.
.
1

.
Wt X a r u * m utirrl dy.... a-eaptia
.
ia a u ~ i f i o m at p r a v l i y ydn r i t b
a full na mrhod.. K o m u b p i t 8 l i t . J i a lilu t h a t af Jupu.. g.oiau8 e d
calm.. .
d e l i u t e , tb wra ia k m t i h r l K a n u u t i d h a s af mait b i l l w i ~01.- il put01
*rery..e date- te uL. y- o d a k b l * a t wa+r turn. But M a t i d D.j.
f a d fraqueatly, t h e th E m u . . .
are buiy muathalama... the a u c pomplb, the m u m r m a d of ruman t a a h , tb m a n
l i k e the Chiawa m a r l i e r t h i s w k . . .ia U f f . r r t
d d e 1 i c i . u ~ . Our n l a t i a s with Sema kiy p u t i o d b 4 c l a a a , ~got a 8pooi.l r1+
I've had a bod prosa looally thin m*k, t h u k r t e a o m m a n a t i n I had a f w (y.
h o k with the Mimister af Imeriar. I omlled am hi. i m what ur m a l l a c m u r k q c a l l i , '
t k i r buminesr... That ia,I had mat ut n talke d v i t h him k f a n u d I u k t e d t a beorwe
I Lw trid t a c a l l am a l l the Mimirtan. Va had am L.u ta&ethm, a c c m n r u t i a f i
R r a i u with 3ae of ay you& effioera d e n & f a t r u a l e t a . It w e 8 a11 vary f r i n d l y mad
courtewr sad I Yd a* n u r m t a think t h a t a f t e r I t a d l e f t Che ~ ~ m h t wa dr d -11 j m
tho l a d prers end t a l l t h p l that I had e r e ir t a protest tha a e c t t i e n s reccstly a f
three elderly f a a e r s a u t a f a r k i a g "taghrut*, whiob maarm carrupt r e n u t s af the
Shah'm rogiae. I m f a c t I had ~ l t i ~ theme m d axrcutiama as the kimd af actiaa that the
m g ) t&aa ~ that & i n s it u a.p.cia1ly b d i l ~i m. tba DG,ud I thaugbt the Mialrter
ahould ~ B O Vtht. f msid I taek ma panitiom on the ,@lc
'
a r i8macmoa a f tho80 three
n m , or of u y mf the etkar 500 a r 8. atharm w b hare k u a n u u i l y exccutllrd

-
here, but t h a t he ahmuid how t h a t the ~ n n o r ymature af the t r i a l 8 oad the quick
a- d u - c u t i r s did o u a a plblic apiniam i m my cauhtry t a wmdar whether t h i s m & k
was l v a l l g u y d i f f e r e a t frm t h e t i f the Shh. Uerewer I h e w I n l u u r r e l i & i n l f
a t r c y u d capumiom asd I did mat rae evideaca af t h e t vhem 81 y o u cld farmer S e u t a r n
were l i n d up u d ahat rt twa i m tL. -+A&
I abviau*ly tauchad r m e m with thkr. Far thia a r whatever n a s d the Uimimter
went public with thin u d t h i r cauaad the C.rt. 8 ok-rum t a accuse me of "undue
meddling" (1 wemaor what "duo" mdd'ing weuld be!J.ACally t h i s b0si~tsmabout the
axecutimr w e 8 omly ane ~ T a a f long camrt.raatimm which was, I theught, a rutual a f f a r t
through d-elmy. t a L.lr facur om v(ys t a build a b a t t e r r a l a t i a i s h l p . The next diy a
mawspaper clasa t a K r e i a i damnucad w i n the r e s t v i t r i a l i o texas, call-mg me 8 pem,
a v i s o h u p r m f a r the CIA, pre8idl.g aver an Fhbasey f u l l e f expic~8gcwe&, -3.
w i t * hadm bloodied f r a H i n r b i u , V i a t a u u d Cad knwa vhat el*.. I t could mat b r a
ham w m a . It wra r e bmd t h a t I think amst n d e n f e l t np~pathyf a r ma, u d I W.
.IILr ma doubt t h a t my m faelingo about these e x - d t i c n a a r e ahrted widely u c y
I r u L u a . But w e r e # t i l l i m the midue af r great deal af reralutlamuy f e m z h e n
u d m dm meqd t a walk a careful liae... t a d y the oludastime S o r i r t r a d i o OYr: t h a t
braadout8 fraa 8.ku t a I r u lu the f u l l t e i t af the maaty a d i U r i a 1 and prawedad te
duanuca n i m tbir m word.. That'r akw; I daa't d a d mch whet the ;wie t a k v a
l aubJact. I u matiafiad havain& thLt what I raid war right.
117
 DB aupnaa #m97/8i 277 **
ZNT CCCCC Z Z B CLASS : CONFIDENTIAL
P 0 4 1 3 1 1 Z OCT 79 CHRGE: S T A T 18/4/79
Ff4 M I V B A S S T TEHRAN APPBV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
T O $UI;HC/SECSTATE WASHDC P R I O R I T I 40W PRFTD: POL~MJ.L(ETRINKO:O~
I W M RVICIIJCS/SECCEP VASE M: CLEARr P0L:EASVIFT
RUICJCS/JCS WASH DC DISTR: POL^ CHG ICA
RUQMBI /AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 031 1 ECON CONS CHRON
RUQMGU/AMErBASSY ANTARA 0300 RP
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0303 S Y-
RUOMOD/AMEMBASST DOHA 0282
BUSBQD/AMBMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8348
RUQMRA/AMEUBASSY J I C D A 0350
RUSBLK/AMBMBASST KABUL 8352
RWQMKW/AMEMBASST KUWAIT 8314
BIIDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0422
R U Q H ~ ~ / A M ~ B A S SMANAMA
T 0279
~ o r a n o / ~ n r n ~ n noscow
ssr 0311
RUQMMT/AMBMBASSY MUSCAT 0192
aniw~s/mmsllss~ PARIS 0381
:.BC T
.RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
0 N 1 I C E N T I A L S E C T I O N 01 O F TEHRAN 10697
E.O. 12865: G C S 18/4/55 ( S W I F T , E L I Z A B E T H A. ) OR-P
ITAGS: SHUM, I R , P I N S , P I N T
S U B J E C T : WEEKLY P O L I T I C A L ROUNDUP
z
$ I.
i:
~

(C - E N T I R E TEXT).
:2. SUMMARY: A GROWING NUMBER O P DEMONSTRATIONS AND
P R O T E S T S BY T H E UNEMPLOYED HAS SWEPT IRAN I N THE L A S T
:TWO WEEXS, AND THE S E R I O U S NATURE O F THE P R O T E S T S MAT
. B E THB H A J O B REASON FOR A REPORTED BAN ON UNAUTHORIZED
PROTESTS AND GATBERINGS. ACTS O F TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE
ALSO CONTINUE WITH KHUZESTAN AND T E E KURDISH ABEAS
B E I N G THE M A ~ NAREAS O F UNRPST. THE C I T Y O F MASHAC
BAS V I T N B j S E D TWO RECENT A S S A S S I N A T I O N S . BOTH V I C T I Y S
B E I N G CLERGYMEN. I N S I S T A N AND BALUCHISTAN. A S E C U R I T Y
PROBLEM BETWEEN T R I B g S P E O P L f AND GOVERNMENT PORCTS
SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEFUSED B T T R I B A L LEADERS AND T H F
LOCAL GOVERNOR GENERAL. ACROSS THX COUNTRK THERE I S A
GROWINC. EFFORT BT C I T I E S TO BRING UNRULY COMMITTEES
UNDER CONTROL. END SVY'IARY.
3. THE I R A N I A N P O L I T I C A L SCENCE HAS BEEN DOMINATED
DURING T B E P A S T WEEK BY MAJOR C A B I N E T R E S H U F F L I N G ,
T E E CONTINUATION OF THE ASSEMBLY O P EXPERTS WORC ON A
NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N , AND THE APPARENTLY QO?l I N S P I R E D
C R I T I C I S M O F NATIONAL I R A N I A N O I L CO. HEAD RASSAN N A Z I 3
WHICH RESULTED I N H I S TEPASTURE FROM THE NIOC AND
DISAPPEARANCE, RUMORS S A T PERBAPS T 3 P A R I S .
4. ACCORDING TO DEP P P I M H I N TABATABAI, THE GOVERNMENT
U S BANNED A1.L UNAUTHORI ZEC R A L L I E S , CEMONSTRATIONS ,
GATHERINGS AND MARCBES Y I T B A WABNING THAT THOSE WBO
P E R S T I N T B E S E PROTESTS W I L L 9 E DEALT WITH AARSFLY.
IBE 1 5 PROBABLY A RESULT O F T H E 1ROWTN3 C D N P L A I I I I
AND MONSTRATIONS FROM THE RANKS OF T F E UNEMPLOYEr
 C O N l I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10697/1
B E I N G SEEN ACROSS IEAN. ONE O F T H E MOST T E L L I N G
INDICATIONS OF THE s n r a r n OF rat Paoamn WAS THE sIzr
O F A CROWD Y E I C H JAMMED THE AREA NEAR TEERAN'S IRAN A I R
O F F I C E S ON SEPTEMBER 23. PARS NEVS S E R V I C E CLAIMED
THAT "THOUSANDS" O F P E O P L E CAUSEC A MAJOR T R A n I C SNARL,
N E C E S S I T A T I N G TEE U S E O F P O L I C E CARS AND B E L I C O P T E R S TO
D I S P E R S E TEE CROWD. T H E THRONG BAD GATHERED AROUND T H E
IRAN A I R B U I L D I N G T O A P P L Y FOR T E E TWENTY A I R STEWARD
J O B S ADVERTISED AS VACANT BY T H E NATIONAL A I R L I N E S . IN
THE CASPIAN COAST TOWN O F BABOL. T E R E t HUNDRtD R E C W T L T
GRADUATED TEACHERS ENGAGED I N A S I T - I N AT TAZ CITY'S
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT TO DEUAND JOBS AND A S I M I L A R
I N C I D E N T O c c u R R E D I N T H E NEARBY C I ~ Y or S A R I . AT
NOUSHAHR AND LANGRUD, 1200 B I G H SCHOOL GBADUATES DEMON-
STRATED TO ATTRACT ATTENTION T O T H E I R LACK 01 J O B S , AS
D I D 200 XI-STUDENTS AT BABAK (NEAR KERMAN). ONE HUNDRED
F I t T T H I G E SCHOOL GRAGUA?ES AT S I T A R K A L G A T B E R I D I N
FRONT O F T H E EDUCATION O F F I C E . D I S M I S S E D T E E B U I L D I N G S
S T A F F AYD BEGAN A S I T - I N FOR TW SAME R t A S O N S . ON
SZPT HS ~ H U N D R E D S ~ O IUNEMPLOTED YOUTHS OATHERED IN PRONT
O F THE P R I M E M I N I S T W TO DRAY ATTENTION T O T H E P L I G H T
O F J O B L E S S RECENT GRADUATES, A GROUP THEY E S T I M A T E AS
218,008 STRONG. ANOTHER CROWD O F 350 DEMONSTRATEf AT
T H E M I N I S T R Y O F LABOR ON SEPTEMBER 26. T H E DEYONSTBATIONS
A T THE P R I M E M I N I S T R Y CONTINUED DURING THE V E M , GROWING
TO A CROWD ESTIMATED AS 1200, AND RESULTING I N T H t
REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS D I S P E R S I N G T H E CROWD U I T E SHOTS I N
T H E A I R AND THE M L P I S T O F S I X DEMONSTRATORS ON OCTOBER 1.
DEMONSTRATIONS AT T H E P R I M E M I N I S T R Y BECAME TENSE.
WITH K H O W I N I .
REPORTEDLT SOUE O F THE DEMONSTRATORS VERB SHOUTING "DOWN
W I T H VACANCIES MINIMAL I N P R I V A T E
INDUSTRY, WITH THE I R A N I A N U N I V E R S I T Y SYSTEM ABLE TO
ABSORB ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE O F A P P L I C A N T S FOR HIGHZR
EDUCATION. AND V I T H M I L I T A R Y S E R V I C E PROCEDURES S T I L L
B E I N G S O U W H A T CONFUSED. THERZ SEEUS T O B E NO Q U I C S
SOLUTION FOR T H E UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLtM.
5. THE SLOW BUT STEADY ATTXUPT BY C I T I E S ACROSS IRAN
E I T H E R T O D I S S O L V E T H E COMPLICATED COMMITTEE STRUCTURES
OR TO MERGE THEM I N T O P O L I C E OR REVOLUTIONART GUARD

NNNN
 TEHRAN
O I O A N I Z I T I O N S BAS W T WITH VARYING DEGREES 01 S U C C E S S .
WIIllO T E E MONTHS S I N C E THE PLYOLUTIONl THE COMMITTEE
S?ST# BAS COUP I N 101 A GRPAT DEAL O F C R I T I C I S R , WITH
C O M I T T S E BANDS B E I N G POPULAPLY ACCUSED O F CRIMES RANGING
non r a m TO zoarwa TO ILLEGAL ARRESTS. ON SEPT 11.
KHOMEINI O R D E R b REVOLUTIONARI ORGANIZATIONS NOT TO ACT
ON T H E I R OWN I N GOVERNMELT A T I A I B S . SOME EXAMPLES HAVE
APPEARED RECENTLY, E S P E C I A L L Y I N T A B R I Z 01 COMMITTEE
M U B I B S BEING ARRESTED AND T R I E D PO11 ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY
ACTS. I N TEHRAN, ATATOLLAX MOHAMMSD REZA MAHDAVI-KANI,
NAFIONAL DIRECTOR O r IRAN'S U V O L U T I O N A R T COMMITTEES,
HAS ANNOIIIICED THAT ALL O F TEHRAN'S REVOLUTIONABY SUB-
C O M M I T T E D ARE DISSOLVED. AT P R E S E N T , TEHRAN HAS A
REVOLUTIONARI connIrrrr FOR r A c a or ITS 14 D I ~ T R I C T S ,
AND ONE E T I M A T E O F T E E SUB-CORMITTEES HAS BEFN GIVEN
AS 1,280. ACCORDING TO MAKDAVI-KANI, THE YEMBERSHIP
O P T B E 14 D I S T R I C T COMMITTEES W I i L B E S T R I C T L Y CONTROLLEE.
AND ANYONE WITH A QUESTIONABLE RECORD WILL B E P J R G E D .
6. ACTS O F SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM CONTINUED THROUZHOUT
T H E COUNTRY LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARL^ CCTOBER. SEVERAL
. S H O P S WERE DAMAGED WHEN AN EXPLOSION SHOOX THE BAZAAR
!A? KHOBPAMSHMR, ALTEOUGH NO I N J U R I E S HAVE BEEN REPORTED.
. " A 70 METER COMMUNICATIONS TOYER ON THE iHORRAUjHA!IR-A9YIZ
;ROAD WAS BLOWN U P ON SEPTEUBER 31, AND COMMUNICATIONS
- U I N I S T E R HASSAN ESLAMI CLAIMED THE LXPLOSION YAS CAUSED
:BY A T I n r BOPB. THE TOWER PELL ACROSS A N ADJACENT RELAY
L S T A T I O N , DAMAGING THAT B U I L I I N G . AND CAilSING A CUT O F F
; I N COMMUNICATIONS EETWEEN THE MAIN C I T I E S O F THE O I L
f PROVINCE AND THE R E S T 0 1 IRAN. ON SEPTEMBER 38 ANOTKER
:EXPLOSION OCCURRED NEAR THE KEORRAMSHAHR GOVERNOR'S
OIFICE. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. AT LEAST E I G H T
. P E O P L E WFgE K I L L E D AND 1 7 I N J U R E D ON OCTOBER 3 #HEN A
!BOMB EXPLODED ON THE TEERAN-KHORRAMSHAXR T P A I N . T E E R T I S
PSTILL NO I N C I C A T I O N VBO S E T OF? THE BOMB.
" I N TXERAN A F I R E BROKE OUT A T T E E AFGHAN EWBASSP ON
SEPTEMBER 23. AN EMBASSY SPOXESMAN CLAIMED THE BLAZE WAS
CAUSED BY ABSONISTS. DAMAGE WAS APPARENTLY L I M I T E R T C
THE GUARDS CABIN AT THE E H B A S S I . ANOTHER DXPLOSION,
PERHAPS FROM A GRENADE, TOOX PLACE O U T S I D E T E E SAUDI
ARABIAN W B A S S I ON SEPTEHBER 24 DURING THE O F F I C I A L
CELEBRATION BEING HELD TO YART SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL
DAY. TWO ASSASSINATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE I N MASHAD,
BOTH INVOLVING LOCAL CLERGYMEN. HAJ MOSHALLAH HOMAI
WAS GUNNED DOVN LATE I N THE EVENING ON SEPTEMBER 22.
A NEWSPAPER REPORT CLAIMED THAT THE CLERGYMAN HAD SEEN
A SUPPORTER O F THE SHAH. A SECOND CLERSYMtN WAS
ASSASSINATED I N MASHAD ON OCTOBER 1. SETTED ADMAD
AHMADI WAS SHOT TO DEATH ON THE COORSTEP OT H I S OYN
HOUSE,AND RUMORS CIRCULATING I N MASHAD CLAIM THE DEATR
WAS PART O F A PLOT TO L I Q U I D A T E 21 PROMINENT PERSCNALI-
T I D I N THE C I T Y .
7. T E E ETHNIC KURCISH AREAS HAVE ALSO BAD A F A I R SHARE
O F UNREST DURING THE P A S T FEW DAYS. ON OCTOBER 3 EIGH"
BUILDINGS I N NAQADEH. INCLUDING T H E TOWNS WATER S U P P L Y
, T E E GENDARMERIE HEADQUARTERS AND P R I V A T F HOMES
AMAGED I N A GRENADE ATTACK. SPORADIC VIOLENCE
T OTHER KURDISH TOWNS TOO, AND CLASHPS AND I N C I I L V T S
C O N P I D E N T I A L TI
129
HAVE BEEN PEPOBTXD I N SAEDASHT, BANLH. S A Q W Z , IIAEAMD,
AND ~ U U I T E E f a r z r I r n e ) . rr ~ A N A N D A J TXE uousr or A
REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSIIAN VAS WRECKED BY AN ZIPLOSION
ON OCTOBER 1. ON OCTOBER 2 A GROUP OF 24 n E V o L m I o N A n r
'
GUABDSUEN WERE AHBUSHED I N SAPDASH? RESULTIN6 I N I I V E
0 I TEE GUARDS BLING KILLED, EIGHT VOUNDD AND THE BEST
BEING CAPTURED.
8. THE BALUCHISTAN BIIOION BAS ALSO SEEN RECENT ONBEST.
ON SEPT 28 WNCBEDS O t ZAHIDAN IISSIDINTS SUF'POPTBD BY
PSOPLP FROM KHASH AND IRAN S U E R DWONSTBATED A3AINST
THE NEV IRANIAN CONSTITUTION AIITICLES W I C B STATE THAT
THE OFOICIAL RELIGION 0 1 IRAN I S TEE JA'AIAEI SECT 0 1
S H I I T E ISLAM. BALUCHISTAN I S A PRBDOIIINANTLT SUNNI
AREA. U N C O N P I P ~nunons
D OF BESTLESSNESS HAVE BEEN
FREQUENT FROM THE REGION, BUT THEBE HAS BLlN LITTLE
8T

NNNN
C O N I I D E N T I A L
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10697N
COVERAGE I N THE IRANIAN P R E S S . THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
O P S I S T A N AND BALUCHISTAN, DR. H A R I R 1 , P A I D A RECENT
V I S I T T O QOM TO REPORT ON C O N D I T I O N S I N H I S P R O V I N C E .
CLAIMING THAT THE REGION I S UNDER CONTROL. SOtlE
TROUBLE HAD OCCURRBD IN THE LASHAR AREA YAERE TRIBESMEN
ATTACKED TWO GENDARMERIE P O S T S AND DISARMED THE
S E C U R I T Y YORCES THERE. LEGOTIATIONS V I T A T R I B A L LEADERS
RESULTED I N A PARDON ?OR THOSE ACCUSED O F ATTACFING T H E
GENDAEHERIE P O S T S , AND H A R I R I CLAIMS THAT THE T R I B E S
P E O P L E V I L L SURRENDER T H E I R WEAPONS. LAINGEN
R I

NNNN
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEERAN 10697/1
DE RUQMHR 10752/01 280**
ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS:CONFIDENTIAL
0 0713472 OCT 79 CHRGE: STAT 10/7/79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4122 DRFTD: POL: JL1NBERT:GO
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC CLEAR: POL: EASWIFT
RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0315 E C O N ~ ( ICHRON
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0303 RF
RUEHADDSINT BAGHDAD 0308
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0286
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0353
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0354
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0355
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0318
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0428
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA C283
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0315
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0196
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0386
RUSNAAA/USClNCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 10752

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/7/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P

TAGS: PINT, PINR, IR
SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY MASHHAD

REF: TEHRAN 10151

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT) .
2. SUMMARY: POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN
MASHHAD, CAPITAL OF NORTHEASTERN PROVINCE OF KHORASAN.
CITY WAS IN FESTIVE MOOD AND FILLED WITH VISITORS ON
OCCASION OF BIRTHDAY OF EIGHTH IMAM. MASHHAD CONTINUE
T?P TRADITION OF GOING ITS OWN WAY OUTSIDE OF THE MAIN-
rTlEAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI
HAS ESTABLISHED HIS AUTHORITY THOUGH A DELEGATE WHO
WERSHADOWS BOTH THE CIVIL GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE TWO
NFLUENTIAL LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO RAN THE CITY FOR
IrE MONTH BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVE COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL
OVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN JANUARY 1979 AND THE REVbLUTION
P FEBRUARY. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CONDITIONS
T MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO LEADING MASHHAD
ELI'GIOUS FIGTJRE. END SUMMARY.
123
 3. EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN WASHHAD
THE CAPITAL OF KHORASAN PROVINCE AND THE SITE OF THE
SHRINE OF IMAM REZA. EIGHTH IMAM OF THE SHI'A MUSLIMS.
OFFICER HAD NOT VISITED MASHHAD IN EIGHT YEARS AND DURING
HIS VISIT HE CALLED ON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ON
AYATOLLAH HAJ HASAN TABATABA'I-QOMI, ONE OF SENIOR .
RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE PROVINCE. FOLLOWING ARE
IMPRESSIONS GAINED FROM THE VISIT.
- HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

4. MASHHAD HAS TRADITIONALLY FOLLOWED A PATH INDEPENDENT

OF THE MAINSTREAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. THE
REASONS FOR THIS INDEPENDENCE ARE OBSCURE, ALTHOUGH THEY
MAY BE RELATED TOTHE CITY'S GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION TEHRAN
IS 600 MILES WEST AND THE ROADS BEYOND MASHHAD GO NOWHERE,
THEY SAY). HISTORICALLY THE CITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN MORE
CLOSELY LINKED TO CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN THAN TO
THE CENTRAL PERSIAN HEARTLAND. FOR WHATEVER REASONS,
THE CITY'S ROLE IN THE MAJOR POLITICAL UPHEVALS OF THE
PAST DECADES--THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, THE SEPARATIST
MOVEMENTS AFTER WORLD WAR 11, THE MOSSADEGH PERIOD, AND
THE RECENT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION--HAS BEEN PERIPHERAL.
THIS CHARACTER OF THE CITY EXISTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT
MASHHAD IS A CERNTER OF PILGRIMAGE, FOR ALL SHIA MUSLIMS.
IS ONE OF THE FIVE LARGEST CITIES IN IRAN, AND IS THE
CENTER OF ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL
AREAS.
5. MASHHAD HAD REMAINED RELATIVELY FREE OF THE DISTURB-
ANCES WHICH COVERED SO MUCH OF IRAN THROUGHOUT LATE 1978.
THE INHABITANTS' HOPE FOR PEACE WERE SHATTERED IN EARLY
JANUARY,lo79,HOWEVER ,WHEN FOUR DAYS OF FIGHTING LEFT
ABOUT 2,000 PERSONS DEAD. ACCORDING TO LOCAL SOURCES,
AT THAT TIlilF THE ARMY WENT ON A RAMPAGE, ATTACKING A
t'OcPITAL AND SHOOTING INDISCRIMATELY AT ANYONE IN THE
ST17ETS. FOLLOWING THAT FIGHTING, VANY OF THE SOLDIERS
FLFD THEIR BARRACKS, AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITY MELllED
AWAY. THE FARMANDAR (TOWN GOVERNOR) JOINED THE
REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE OSTANDER AND OTHER CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES LFFT THE CITY. FRON EARLY
JANUARY UNTIL THF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION, EFFECTIVF AUTHORITY
WAS IN THE HANDS OF AYATOLLAH HAJ HASAN TABATAAA'I-OOMI
AND AYATOLLAH SAYYID ABWLLAH SHIRAZI, WHO RAN THF AFFAIR?
OF THE CITY PROM THEIR HOMFS AND SCHOOLS. IT WAS AYATOLLAH
SHIRAZI, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO FORBADE THE PFOPLE FROM ATTACK-
ING FOREIGNERS. THE FOREICH COMMUNITY LEFT MASHHAD AROUND
JANUARY 7 AND TRAVFGED OVERLAND TO HEART.

6. DOLLOWING THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN

WFPQUARY 1979, THF TWO AYATOLLAPS OF MASHHAD LOST
M1'CP OF Tt'FIR POLITICAL POWER TO SHEIKH TARASI, AYATOLLAH
m-
u--<:
':Nn ':
 CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10752/2
KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN MASHHAD. TABAST WAS AN
OBSCURE CLERGYMAN BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, BUT ASSISTED BY
KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY AND BY A SMALL GROUP OF RNOIJJTIONARY
GUARDS, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO ASSERT HIS CONTROL OF THE CITY
TO THE POINT THAT HE NOW ORDERS ARRESTS,TRIALS, AND
EXECUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND OTHER RE PRESENTATIVES OF THE
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY
TABASI.
7. A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT, LIBERAL MASHHAD FAMILY
EXPLAINED THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF THE TklO AYATOLLAHS
AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DURING KHOMEINI'S 15-YEAR EXILE FROM IRAN, THE

MASHHAD RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD BEEN FORCED TO M K E
ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES. AZIZI, THE
LAST GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHORASAN UNDER THE MONARCHY, HAD
ESTABLISHED EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE MASHHAD RELIGIOUS
LEADERS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE NEW REGIME HAS NOT MOLESTED
HIM (AZIZI). HOWEVER, THE AYATOLLAHS HAD ALSO DEAL WITH
EX-GOVERNOR GENERAL VALIAN, WHO IS ONE OF THE NEW REGIMJX'S
NUMBER ONE TARGETS. KHOMEINI'S THREATS TO REVEAL THESE
ASSOCIATIONS HAS PREVENTED THE MASHHAD AYAYTOLLAHS FROM
EFFECTIVELY OPPOSING HIS POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
- (B) DURING THE FIRST WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION,
AYATOLLAH TABATABAI-QOMI DID VOICE SOME OPPOSITION TO
THE PROCEDURES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. SPECIFICALLY,
THE AYATOLLAH NOTED THAT UNDER ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
THE ASSERTIONS OF A PLAINTIFF HAD TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE
TESTIMONY OF IMPARTIAL WITNESSES. HOWEVER, THE
REVLUTIONARY COURTS WERE USING THE KAINTIFFS AS WITNESSES
AGAINST THE ACCUSED. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCE,
KHOMEINI SIMPLY IGNORED THESE OBJECTIONS AND "BLACKMAILED"
THE AYATOLLAH'S INTO SILENCE BY THREATENING TO MAKE AN
ISSUE OF THEIR ASSOCIATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PAST
REGIME.

8. THE MASHHAD AYATOLLAHS HAVE REPORTEDLY ALSO BEEN

UNHAPPY AT THE CULT OF PERSONALITY WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT
UP AROUND KHOMEINI. THE RECENT AHNIVERSARY OF HIS TRAVELS
FROM IRAQ TO PARIS(0CT 5) WAS DESCRIBED ON THE STATE
RADIO AND TELEVISION AS THE SECOND GREATEST HEJRAT
(MIGRATION) IN ISLAMIC HISTORY, SECOND ONLY TO THE TRAVEL
OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMAD FROM MECCA TO MEDIFIA. SUCH
LANGUAGE VERGES ON HERESY FOR STRICT MUSLIMS. KHOMEINI
HAS ALSO ASSUMED THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT CLERICAL TITLES
ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. TRADITIONALLY SUCH HONORIFICS
AS AYATOLLAH AND HOJJAT AL-ISLAM WERE NOT BESTOWED BY
ANY INDIVIDUAL BUT 'WERE GRANTED BY CONSENSUS OF THE
SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY WHEN A PERSON HAD REACHED A CERTAIN
DEGREE OF LEARNING AND PIETY. KHOMEINI'S UNILATERALLY
BESTOWING THESE TITLES ON VARIOUS CLERGYMEN IS SEEN AS A
THREAT TO THE COLLEGIAL SYSTEM WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY
PREVAILED AMONG THE SHIA LEADERSHIP.

9. EMBASSY SOURCE SAID HE HAD VISITED AYATOLLAH QOMI AS

PART OF A DELEGATION . IN PRIVATE, THE AYATOLLAH TOLD
ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS THAT KHOMEINI WAS ABLE TO
" SIT UNDER AN APPLE TREE IN PARIS AND ISSUE EDICTS

W!ILE THOSE LEADERS ON THE SCENE HAD TO TRY AND ALLEVIATE

THE BLOODSHED AND SUFFERING OF THEIR FOLLOWERS. DURING
THE WORST OF THE FIGHTING IN MASHHAD, BODIES OF THE
VICTIMS WERE STORED IN AYATOLLAH QOMI'S HOUSE UNTIL THEY
COULD BE WASHED AND BURIED SECRETLY. QOMI SAID HE HAD
TO C0E:SOLE THE SURVIVORS AND TO DEAL WITH THE AUTHORITIES
TO TRY AND STOP FURTHER KILLING. "WHERE WAS KHOMEINI
DURING ALL THIS"? HE REPORTEDLY ASKED.
BT
10752
NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10752/2

10. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CALL ON CONDITIONS

OF MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO AYATOLLAH TABATABA'I-
QOMI . LAINGEN.
BT
60752
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10752/3

,126
0 0 RUQMHR cti: 2746
DE RUEHCR X I 0 0 1 2850238
ZNY S S S S S ZZH CHARGE'
0 1202102 0'3 79
Rrl SECSIATE WASHDC
TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5685 / CHRON
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEhRAN IMMED IATE 4949
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5864
RUWRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1630
BAGHDAD 2 2 7 0

2. EGYPT IAN EMBASSY OFFICERS ZANT AND HAREDY CALLED ON

NEA/IRN OCTOBER I 0 FOR A B R I E F I N G ON IRAN. I N GENERAL
EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO SHARE GENERAL L I N E S OF OUR ASSESS- Lh
MENT SUMMARIZED BELOW.
3.
CENT.
THE ECONOMY:
OIL PRODUCTION HOLDING 3.5
REVENUES PROBABLY EXCEEDING 1978.
-
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION S T I L L DOWN 5 0 PER
4.0 MILLION B/D WITH
GREATEST D E F I C I E N C Y
20
YEAR.
-
I S L O S S O F EXPERIENCED MANAGERS. UNEMPLOYMENT ESTIMATED
40 PERCENT; INFLAT1011 2 0 PERCENT.
SPOTTY SHORTAGES SOME MERCHANDISE.
GOOD AGRICULTURAL
GENERALLY SLOW
MOVEMENT TOWARDS RECOVERY. ENCOURAGING THAT INCREASING
NUMBEE OF US FIRMS BEING PAID AND SOME AGREEING T O RESUME
WORK (FLUOR ON ISFAHAN REFINERY, AMC TO ASSEMBLE J E E P S ) .
4. KLRDS AND ARABS:' RECENT OUTBREAK OF BOMBINGS A N D
ARMED ATTACKS CONSIDERED SERIOUS. DIFFICULT T O EVALUATE
I M R I C A T I O N S FOR REGIME, HOWEVER, AS THERE HAVE BEEN
MOMENTS O F SERIOUS D I F F I C U L T Y FOR PGOI IN THE PAST.
5. ARMED FORCES: SLOW MOVEMENT TO REGROUP. NEW COMMANDER
OF I A F APPEARS STRONG AND DETERMINED. .OUR CONTACTS WITH
IRANIAN MILITARY GENERALLY BUSINESSLIKE AND P O S I T I V E IN
T ONE.
6. LEFT AND MIDDLE CLASS: LYING LOW. SMALL I N NUMBER,
NO MASS APPEAL, FRAGMENTED, LACK OF STRONG, CHARISMATIC
LEADERS. POTENTIAL AUGMENTATION O F STRENGTH SHOULD
PRESENI REGIME STUMBLE BADLY. TUDEH PARTY SMALL AND
DISCREDITED BY SOVIET LINKAGE. ,,,
7. Q E R Z C A L ASCENDANCY: KHOMEINI--DESPITE MIDDLE CLASS,
L E I T - W I N G AND E T H N I C D E F E C T I O N S - - C O M M A N D S S T R O N G M A J O R I T Y
S U P P O R T O F T H E MASSES. . HE AND OTHER H A R D - L I N E MULLAHS
A P P E A R D E T E R M I N E D T O A S S E R T T H E I R D O M I N A N C E OVER NEW
C O N S I I T U I I O N AND E L E C T I O N S FOR M A J L I S AND P R E S I D E N T .
N E V E R T H E L E S S , T H E R E SOME R E S I S T A N C E W I T H I N T H E P G O I
(BAZARGAN, Y A Z D I ) AND AMONG C L E R I C S ( S H A R I A T M A D A R I ) .
8. FOREIGN RELATIONS: R E G I M E D E E P L Y S U S P I C I O U S O F SHAH-
S U P P O R T E R S THOUGHT T O B E BACKED I N K U R D I S H AND A R A B A R E A S
B Y I S R A E L AND IRAQ. VAGUE F E A R O F A S A U D I - I R A Q A L L I A N C E
BACKED B Y U S A G A I N S T IRAN. SOMEWHAT L E S S F E A R O F S O V I E T
TIREAT. S O V I E T HAND I N I R A N NOT NOW A P P A R E N T . EMBARRASSED
D E S I R E B Y P G O I T O R E A S S U R E G U L F S T A T E S A F T E R C L A I M S AND
T H R E A T S A S S E R T E D B Y V A R I O U S A Y A T O L L A H S A G A I N S T B A H R A I N AND
KWAIT. A B I D I N G FEAR O F U S M I L I T A R Y P R E S E N C E I N T H E G U L F
AND O F U S A S N A N I P L L A T O R O F OMAN1 I N I T I A T I V E FOR S T R A I T O F
HORNOZ. R E S T R A I N T ON A F G H A N I S T A N D E S P I T E C O N C E R N F O R
I N C R E A S E D S O V I E T ROLE. C O O L I N G P R I V A T E A T T I T U D E S TOWARD
R A D I C A L P A L E S T I N I A N S OUT O F C O N C E R N FOR T H E I R I N F L U E N C E
I N T E H R A N AND P O S S I B L E M E D D L I N G W I T H 0 I L . F I E L D A R A B
WORKERS. EQUAL H O S T I L I T Y TOWARDS I S R A E L AND E G Y P T .
C O N T I N U I N G S T R O N G S U P P O R T FOR PLO.
9. U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS: D E S I R E ON OUR P A R T T O F A S H I O N
A E W R E L A T I O N S H I P , C O O P E R A T I N G WHERE W A S I B L E , M O V I N G AT
A P A C E COMFORTABLE FOR I R A N I A N S I N L I G H T O F S T I L L S T R O N G
S U S P I C I O N S AND A N T I - A M E R I C A N F E E L I N G S . LIMITED RESUMPTION
I N SHIPMENT O F PREVIOUSLY-PURCHASED MILLTARY S P A R E P A R T S
AND S A L E O F NEW S P A R E S . ONE-S)(OT S A L E O F K E R O S E N E AND
H E A T I N G FUEL. E X T E N S I V E E F F O R T S T O S E T T L E COMMERCIAL
AND M I L I T A R Y CONTRACT D I S P U T E S . I N T E R E S T I N N A M I N G AN
AMBASSADOR AMONG E X E C U T I V E B R A N C H O F F I C I A L S BUT D I F F I C U L T Y
O F M A K I N G F R I E N D L Y G E S T U R E WHEN A T N O S P H E R E I N I R A N S O
F R E Q U E N T L Y UNFRIENDLY.
10. SCENARIOS:
--I N f LHUOEPNECF LE L W: I T HMODERATE P R A G M A T I S T S M A I N T A I N OR AUGMEVT
O U T C A U S I N G R U P T U R E W I T H C L E R I C S AN0
REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUES.
--(LOOMY: P G O I CONTROL S L I P S F U R T H E R . KURDS, A R A B S AND
b T H E R S S U S T A I N REVOLT I N PROVINCES. ECONOMY U N R A V E L S .
--MIDDLE GROUND: T H E R E A F A I R CHANCE, HOWEVER, T H A T
P R E S E N T P O L I T I C A L C O N D I T I O N S WOULD P E R S I S T W I T H O U T C L E A R
R E S O L U T I O N FOR SOME T I M E T O COME. I F CLERICS ESTABLISHED
F I R M CONTROL, AND T H I S NOT YET A S S U R E D , I T SEEMED MATTER
O F T I N E B E F O R E C O M P L E X I T I E S O F GOVERNMENT WOULD OVERWHELM
THEM. REPLACEMENT P O L I T I C A L F O R C E I M P O S S I B L E T O V I S U A L I Z E
AT T H I S T I M E . VANCE
BT
17101 128
 Policy Initiatives - Talks with PermReps
We do not need to dwell on the importance of Irqn to
the West.

now than -
Suffice it to say that the independence and
stability of Iran %*,-if anything, more important to us
at the time of the Shah. Our job of
protecting Western interests in Iran is, of course, infinitely
more difficult. We are dealing wtih a government that is
inexperienced, deeply suspicious o k our motives, and attempting
simultaneously to accomplish the conflicting objectives of
restoring normal conditions and transforming the society
according to vaguely-defined Islamic revolutionary ideals.
The U.S. has special problems which make our task more
complex than our allies. The unwinding of our military
relationship is a serious point of contention with the Is-
lamic Government. We are also confronted with a wide range
of similar, but more manageable problems with commercial
contracts. Some of these problems have resulted in action
in U.S. court8 to attach Iranian assets in this country. The
Iranians do not understand the extent to which we are bound
by the separation of powers; the laws, requlations and
precedents which often control our action; and the political
limitations thrtt press treatment of their hynan rights record
has created for the USG. Finally, despite our repeated denials,
the Iranians are deeply suspicious that we areplotting against
them in concert with the Israelis, the Shah, the Saudis, even
 the Iraqis and the coannunists.
If, as we conclude, no group or individual outside
Iran, has any real capability at the moment of signifi-
cantly influencing events in Iran (i.e. bringing down the
Government), our best approach would seem to attempt to
-- moderate the policies of the present regime and
help to promote greater pragmatism, reconciliation and
economic recovery.
-- help to preserve' and strengthen elements in
Iran, especially in the military, moderate religious
and secular groups, which could play a useful role in
the future as the political drama unfolds.
-- build confidence of the regame in an effort to
reduce the prospect of harsh measures of reaction which,
in turn, make stability more elusive.
In recent months, the U.S. has taken several limited
steps to begin to fashion a new relationship:
-- release of spare parts in the pipeline and
resumption of Iranian purchase of spares. The Iranians
have been slow to take delivery.
-- sale of kerosene and heating oil.
-- concerted efforts by the State Department to help
resolve commercial disputes.
 SECRET-SENSITIVE
-3-
-- patient efforts to close out the PMS program
in a manner which would protect Iranian as well as
US interests.
We would like to appoint an Ambassador, but the
Iranian campaign in the press (and privately in meetings
LLnot given us a fit opportunity.
with Yazdi) I There
is still considerable reluctance on the part of political
leaders, especially the clerics, to talk to us.
There are five ideaswhich you might discuss with
.':<,<l. c * .
the other three S&Aers:
1. An approach to Khomeini. To our knowledge no
senior Western ambassador or emissary has seen Khomeini
since the February Revolution. We think it might be use-
ful for Western representatives to call on him, not to
embrace the,clerics, but to reassure him that the West
accepts the Islamic revolution, has no intention of inter-
fering in Iran's internal affairs, and is concerned with
'
the continuing instability that derives from weakness of
the Bazargan Government. The object w ~ u l dbe to sugqest
very gently to the Ayatollah that Bazargan needs additional
backing if the communists are not to have an opportunity
for serious meddling in Iran.
We have no suggestion as to which country might
make the first move, but perhaps the French, given their
past assistance to Khomeini, would be in the best position,
SECRET-SENSITIVE
 SECRET/SENSITIVE
-4-

2. Approach to the Iraqis. The Iranians are

convinced that Iraq is actively assisting Kurdish and
Arab rebels in Iran. There may well be some truth to
these assertions. ?t seems very probable that if Iraq
made a serious effort to police its borders, the Iranian
,rebels, especially the Kurds, would find it hard to con-
tinue their insurrection.
As a first step we think the French and Germans
might separately engage the Iraqis in discussions of
Iranian developments. The ultimate purpose of the exchange,
I,
which might require prolonged confidence building, would ;I
beto persuade the Iraqis to reduce the pressure on the
I
Bazargan government.
3. Assistance to Iranian Military. The Iranians
have told us it is their policy to diversify support for
US-origin military equipment. We have replied that we
would have no objection in principle provided the arrange-
ments with Europeans were made within the framework of
our laws, regulations and policies. (We will license
only what we ourselves would provide.) We have also
pointed out the practical problems that may arise. While
there are real impediments to the diversification of
support, we hope the allies will agree,thatall of us
should_do what we can to strengthen the iranian military --
which could be a key group in the future. We would like
to stay in close touch with the allies in advance of these
developments in order to assure that the Iranian military
SECRET/SENSITIVE
ccgceives the necessary support.
. 4. contadts with Dissident Exiles. we do not believe
m t i a r and otheg Iranian dissidents abroad at this-tim
hold any promise for future political influence. W. intend
t o avoid any association with these groups which could imply
political endorsement.
5. Regular consultations. We believe it would be important
to stay in continuing contact with the allies on Iranian
developaents. We suggest that we encourage our Ambasscldors
and Charge in Tehran to consult'on their activities frquently,
although it may be awkward for all four to assemble at once.
We suggest at least quarterly meetings of the PenaReps.

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:sch
'10/13/79 x. 20313
Clearances: IAR/RNA
P - -
MLGreene (draft)
Mr. Newsom (draft)
 ', e.,..r 1r.m
Ootmcer 15, 1979
mu friend.,
1"m a t heme toa-t, which is uu4Ul l a t e l y because mf a hasry rchedule mf
d i p l e u t i c parties:.. ~ @ vgea t tke tmlavisrimm em, l i s t e n i y ( i n p e r s i u ) t m a v i s i t i n #
PLO d m l e p t i o n beim& lauded a t the Cmamtitutimmal Review Cmuacil sesmicm tmday, with b t h
- n PI0 -8 ud t h e Mullaka deamuaein& the US fmr i t s suppmrt f m r . i m p c r i r l i s u ,
Z i o a i m u d Iaramli agr08mima.
s l a g t k a t at learnt-men mf the rhetmrio is j u s t t:.at
h
-
It g e t s weprlag a f t e r a while... you l e a & t m dmldier en,
s a i d fmr tke recmrd aad maid
z z a f y rermlutianuy @
radim1( u d televimiod .. "*em
I s e a l , whioh is stmut indecd the cmuneila s f the 8 t a t e
I.prmteat t m &mvelueat types t h a t t h i s kind mf a t t ~ a k
c m a s t a ~ t l ymn US purpmaes i n I r u eannmt r e a l l y s r r v e the gmvernments'e mwa i n t e r e s t s i n
d e n l m p i y a e m d r e l a t i a s h i p v i t k us tke u w e r i s u s u a l l y smacting t m the e f f e q t k a t
we st r s c m p i z e t h a t tke mvmlution is n e t y e t cmmplete aad t h a t - t h r gmvaauent itmalf
c u a s t o u t r e 1 erne mf the t h i w t h a t u e said mn the r$ib aad tclvision. ~ h i 18 c ~
nmnsemae but what i s mne t m do... yester3ay the r a d i ) c a r r i e d aamthar a tack mn me O
m a CIA y m t up t m a l l smrts ef d a a t a ~ d l yt h i a m
a , a s d-mo3strated by my a l l r p d
p r e t e s t cfrt ever the executimns...... well, I w i l l grumble a b i t when I see the Pmreim
~ U n s t e rtmmerrmv and we s h a l l see what he has t m say. -
Even i f muh government were t m d e c i l e t m my name fmruard a s ~ a b a n a a d ~ r ~ ~ ~ s
tkt the enthusiasm mn the p a r t mf the l a c a l gcvernment v r i s would be a b i t su86ucl.
I n f a c t hm.ever,I caa nmw t e l l ymu t h a t the liklihmmd mf my s t a y i n s om bere m C T i e e r
e x i s t s , a dacisibn we tomP q u i t e indepeqdemt mf.attitude*-here. Far ma i t i m a &nmd thine,
f u i l y wise, aad la p l y event I have LS1 a f a i r l y e x t e n ~ v e . t m u xhere.... when I w i l l be
r e l i e v e d i n s t i l l u a o l e u , but we shmuld bmw shortly. Yepwhile there is much t o dm,
u d much t m wmrry abcut, i f one is inclined t m wmrry. I ' m met, mince mur capacity k
r e a l l y influence t h e evmlutimm mf eventa here is l i a i t e d i n aay event. But I am u
mptimist abmut the lmnger t e n . Minister, r e t u r i a g Utmm seeimg Iec:r*ry
&ee i n New Ymrk, w e f u l l mf c % , i z f f : T us mn maay c s w i r , but .lam w n t ma t m
ray, publicly, t h a t I r a a neededathe US j u s t aa the US aeeded I r a a . Fine. I f t k t ' s the
policy apprmach h e r e we c u l i v e with t h r t , because I t h i J t h a t kind mf awareness w i l l
prmduce r e s u l t s , hmwever slmwly.
I have %tuck elmem t m the compmund l a t e l y , because of the pressure m.f work... and t h a t
n e t auch a b a d f d e becausa usually there i s plenty of diversiom hem. Temnis is alidays
available, u d I play a t - l b a s t every e t h e r day. This Friday we have a t m u r a u e n t here
a g a i n t the I t a l i a a c e u u a i t y , sad we w i l l aak them t o s t a y an f a r dinnek aad the f i l a
" I l t e n a i m n a l Velvet". mlm weeks a:@ we had a r a m mf the "Kmmeini CU* tmurame~t i n
qmftball, van a a u s u a l by the Marimes... they're y o u # anU tough emmugh t e always b e i t the
pp.ts off t'ne r e s t mf us. One might we went, with my b u l l e t prmmf limsusime u d L
pmlice i n a fmllmw-car, t o a b i g PirUthday part a t the homo of an Ambricu g i r l married tm
u Iruiu. Fine time, u a t i l midaibbt when the revmlutiamaries frmm t h e meigkborhmd .
%rnitehn discovered hy c a r and the p l l i c e eutside the g a t e s e f the heuse and deolded t ey
h a ' t l i k e what was gmkag m l . Sm the blacked m u r way and i n s i s t e d we fmllmw them t m
Kamitsh hdqs. we s a i d tuDu nm, they had 1s r i g h t , ctc. After smme minutes they l e t ur
leave but them fmllmwmd us. dernuding mvar the W l k i e - t a l k i e s (they have them t m m , atmlen
frcm mur campmund i n ~ e b r ~ i r yt h) a t we ffmllew then t e t h e i r hdqs. But my d r i v e r , tei!lnd
the wheel mf the'hmmred tamkl'that iyChrysler has becmme, i s n e t t m be t r i f l e d with a t
u y heur amd e s p e c i a l l y net a t midnight. Sm we zmsmed mff end were eventually l e f t air"
Yesterday a Cernan busimessman whm l i v e s tatbbmex i n the b i t y was aasasainated a s he l e f t
.
fmr wmrk, killmd by two yauthm with mileama en a mm~mrc~ole. This has sent mhmck waves

brez
tnrsugh the f a r e . b u s i ~ e s sce.ouaity,aad it w i l l b x m : be even mere l i f f i c u l t t m g e t
b u s i n e s r t t m c me here. ~e (hink i t i s an e x c e p t i . n t e the r u i e rec-mtiy...
the s u r i t y situat,?on has c e r t a i n l y bren imp@@v:ng, a t l e a ~ in t Tehrm. Tlaewhere i n
the couqtry, 1.. The f i g h t i n g i n Kurdestan i s g e t t i ~ gworse and tbere i s t r r u & l e i m
Baluchistin tmm. ~ l ofl which i s bad, but tol-rbble fmr t h i s regime, sm 1 m y a s
things remain uader cmntrml i n the m i l prmvi.ce ef Khuzistan. Wen t h e r e , t h r r e has been
trouble l a t e l y , and t h a t could r e a l l y sprkk t r ~ u b l , .
Yeatarday I c a l l e d an a leading Hullah fmr a long chat... it went well u d I wa8
w8raly received b u t I c u e away with a new appreciatimn mf hew much mf a c m m u a i c a t i r
&ap e x i x t s betweea the West aad the c l e r i c a l leadership mf t h i s place. Suepicims mf m
i 8 deep indeed, a prmduct mf m u r auppmrt fmr the Shah, I s r a e l , amd a perceptiea *f mr
h c i c t y d a s a m a t e r i a l i s t mse r ) e r r a l l y hmatile tn Islan. Hmwever much I t r i e d t m
emphasize t h a t we tam a r e a p.mple with s t r s a g s p i r i t i u a l values and premcoupatimnm I fmund

because. t m c s h a phrase, I s l a a i s here t m atay....

134
 UNCLASSIFIED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

suewcr: The Current Situation in Iran

(Speech given at 33rd Annual Conference of the Middle
East Institute)
PARTICIPANTS: James Bill University of Texas

PLACE: Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

DATE: October 5, 1979

DISTRIBUTION: INR/DDR NEA/I RN Embassy Tehran

NEA/ s/p

Approximately half of Bill's speech was devoted to explaining the

background of the Revolution. (Bill's analysis Can be found in the
Wlnter 1978-79 issue of Foreign Affairs). He then turned to the
current situation with the comment that he expected continued chaos
in Iran for the following reasons:
--a leadership famine;
--no viable political institutions; and
--the tremendous disruptive nature of'the revolution itself.
Bill maintains that there would be even more chaos than there is
presently if Khomeini and the clerics suddenly departed the scene.
They are presently the only ones who have the capacity to hold the
social mosaic together. However, in the long run the ayatollahs do
not have the ability to erect a new political structure. Historically,
the Shi'a clergy have always been outside the government and have ,
acted as a negative force. They are mentally and emotionally un-
prepared for the challenge of rebuilding Iran.

:.::
DS.I?W --
UNCLASSIFIED .--
135
 /

ruling cllque:
--the ethnic tribes;
--"countarrevolutionary" groups.
\
of remants of the old military and security
apparatus. Bill believes they
at least 600 revolutionary guards, komiteh or
religious leaders. ) ;
--the far left, particularly the Fedayeen-a1
Khalq;
--the secular, modern intelligensia. ("Ultimately
Iran cannot be ruled without their support.")
The Future. Bill believes that the conservative funda-
mentalist clergymen will not be able to retain power over
I
long run. Eventually a triple alliance composed of the
military, the progressive religious clergy and the secula
technoc~atsmight emerge to allivate the continued chaos
(which will persist as long as the fundamentalist are in
power.) Amplifying on this senario, Bill suggested:
--Iran must have a central instrument of coercion
and the military is the only institution which
can fulfill that role. Although it has been
decapitated, it will rebuild itself.

I
--There are progressive religious leaders who
are waiting in the wings. He put the following
individuals in that catewry: Zanjani, Shariat-
Medari, Shirazi, Beheshti and Lphuti.
The US Position. In order to improve US/Iranian
Bill suggested we:
--Admit past policy "errors";
/
--Send a "new breed" of representative

technical-and administrative aid. (We

should assure this aid reac
and not just the government
--Avoid contacts with the exiles.

UNCLASSIFIED
136
 CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN (f--<3
(for 2nd Quadripartite Meeting, October 15, 1979)

The Current Situation

Nine months after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty,
the Iranian revolution has still not run its full course.
Power continues to be fragmented, the economy is stagnated,
andmilitaryand security forqes remain shattered. The
loose coalition of forces which overthrew the Shah has
collapsed as its leaders have split over the kind of society
that they envision for the future. Nevertheless, Ayatollah
Khomeini is the pre-eminent figure in Iran and will most
likely remain that for the coming months.
Internal Political Situation: Three major forces are
currently at work in Iran. .
First, Khomeini is consolidating his power and control
over =aspects of Iranian society. This effort is being
waged simultaneously on several fronts. A Council of Experts
is preparing a final draft constitution, which will provide
the legal basis for the Islamic Republic. In this process,
the constitution is being made more strictly Islamjc. The
.constitutional referendum and national elections which will
follow are likely to be dominated by clerical forces.
Religious forces could easily win the election and dominate
the new government.
Religious leaders are increasing their control in
other key areas:
--The ousting of bil chief Hassan Nazih removes
the man who was most outspoken in opposition
to the Clergy.
--The threatened purges in the oil company, the
military and the government bureaucracies are
designed to eliminate the less fervent supporters
of the new order.
--Even the very halting steps aimed at curbing or
eliminating the independent local komitehs are
part of a process which strengthens clerical
control.

CONFIDENTIAL

137
 CONFIDENTIAL

Second, parallel to this increased clerical domination,

factions wlthin the ruling clique are jockeying for power
and position. Khomeini remains the final arbitrator of
any dispute among these factions. His associates include
other ayatollahs who agree with him to various degrees and
secularists such as Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign
Minister Yazdi. These latter men continue to fight a quiet
internal battle against the clerics for Khomeini's good will.
None of these associates is accepted as a possible successor
to Khomeini. That fact, plus Khoneini's age (he is 79),adds
much uncertainty to the regime's future course.
Finally, the new regime is being challenged by several
opposition groups including:
--the ethnic minorit~es (most notably the Kurds
and the Arabs);
--remnants of the old regime, including military
and SAVAK personnel;
--leftist forces who are underground, well-armed
but not an immediate threat; and
--the exiles in Europe and the US who are composed
of former army officers, technocrats, the
intelligentsia, and liberal politicians.
None of these groups has been able to put together an
organization which can effectively challenge the Khomeini
machine. The clerics have run rough-shod over the ethnic
minorities and have outmaneuvered the left. Although many
of the exiles,would like to topple the regime, they appear to
be uncoordinated and disorganized, notwithstanding the efforts
in Paris of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. We
believe Bakhtiar has very little prospect of political
success in Iran.
#foreign Polic : The form and the content of the new
regime's foreign p%licy are still taking shape. Present
foreign policy reflects the confused domestic situation,
but several trends are becoming clear:
2.
--Xenophobic nationalihm: This includes general
ant-tern and specific anti-US policies.
--Islamic messianism: Khomeini wants to export the
revolution to Islamic or Shi'a groups abroad.

CONFIDENTIAL
130
 CONFIDENTIAL
6
- 3 -

So far, however, he has not supplied much material

aid to such groups. Rather, he has been eXpbrting
an idea and the revolutionary techniques and the
organizational theory necessary for the idea's
implementation. Iran8s,anti-Israeland pro-PLO
stances, as well as some pro-Shi'a activities in
the Persian Gulf are the key expressions to date
of this drive. The Iranians have, however, been
quite restrained in Afghanistan.
--Participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM):
Iran has been searching for a new international
framework to substit te for the Shah's close ties
to the West. The N d presents some possibilities,
but in general Iran will remain a lone wolf.
--Recognition of Iran's geopolitical realities:
Inevitable tensions exist between this element
and the Islamic one.- Those tensions have been
particularly evident in the Persian Gulf: the
"realists" of the Foreign Ministry want normal
relations, but the clerics want to export the
revolution. One result has been insecurity in
the region as the Gulf regimes attempt to assess
what Iran will do. Those states are convening a
security conference (without Iran) in November.
Another result has been a more assertive attitude
among the minority Shi'a communities in the Gulf.
The Econom : Iran is faced with strong inflationary
pressures, unem:lqyment of 2-3 million (20 percent of the work
force), and a decline in real GNP of 20 percent. Yet, the
Iranian economy is functioning and even shows some tentative
(if DerhaPs orilv,tem~orarv)sisns of improvement. Banks are
functioning, seGera1-majo; joint ventures are operating. oil
continues to ~rovide$60-570 million per dav in revenues, and
the important-wheat, and rice harvests-appea; satisfactory.
The longer-term outlook, however, remains less encourag-
ing. There is nothi g on the economic horizon to replace oil
l!
as a vehicle for gro th when crude production begins to decline
gradually early in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Bazargan govern-
ment has inherited an economy afflicted with a twin curse: a
legacy of unrealistic prestige programs initiated during the
oil boom, and the near anarchy Wreaked by the revolution itself.

CONFIDENTIAL
139
 CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 - I

There could be a silver lining: the revolution affords I

planners a rare chance to wipe the slate clean, strip away
past excesses, and rationalize the economy. The present
political climate is not, however, conducive to this develop-
ment. Moreover, uncertainty about the future is causing an
exodus of those whose skills and talents are crucial to any
economic recovery in Iran. t

The initial hope that accompanied Khomeini's arrival is

being replaced by disillusionment as expectations remain un-
fulfilled. The removal of National Iranian'Oil chief Aasrsn
Nazih not only casts doubt on the ability of the petroleum
organization to function effectively but also will be seen
by the modern technocrats and professionals as an attack on then.
The Soviet View of Iran
I
Moscow welcomed the creation of the new Iranian regime in
February and set out to encourage the new regime's anti- I
Western policies, to help prevent the repression of pro-Swiet
groups, and to protect the USSR's economic interests. Since
then, the Soviets have been pleased with Iran's continuing ,
anti-Western orientation but perturbed over their inability
to improve economic and political relations with the Ithomeink
1
regime. The Soviet Ambassador has had two unpleasant en-
counters with Khomeini, and Khomeini has indirectly accused
the USSR of involvement in the Kurdish conflict.
Moscow's options in dealing with Iran are limited. A.
long as there is no group that can effectively challenge
Khomeini's rule, the USSR will continue to try for good
relations with Iran's present leaders, even though it wants
a more secular, pro-Soviet government eventually to emerge.
To this end, Moscow has encouraged Iran's "progressive
element*" (the ethnic minorities, the left a;d the recular
moderates) to unite and "build for tomorrow.
Direct Soviet support for the "progressives', however,
will probably remain cautious and circumspect. The Soviets
are well aware that their relations with Tehran will be
damaged if their efforts are detected. They must also know
that support for subversive actions increases regional
suspicion of Soviet intentipns and risks producing a counter-
action by other regional states.

CONFIDENTIAL
140
 The Soviets are perhaps most immediately concerned with
bilateral economic probl-ems. The Chairman of the USSR State
Committee for Economic Relations conferred with Iranian
officials twice last summer in an apparently unsuccessful
effort to persuade Iran to comply with various contractual
colPmitmants to the USSR including natural gas deliveries.
The reduced gas deliveries and Tehran's decision not to
construct the export segment of a second natural gas pipe-
line to the ~ S S Rare particularly aggravating to the Soviets.
Moscow's frustration over the lack of progress in Soviet-
Iranian bilateral relations has been evident in recent Soviet
press commentary. The Soviets have used selective quotations
from remarks by Iranian officials as a basis for increasingly
open criticism of the Iranian leadership, particularly
Bazargan's provisional government. The Soviet press has
generally stopped short of direct critikism of Khomeini, but
kt has conveyed it$ displeasure with some of his policies
and statements.
The Soviet media have openly defended the Iranian Tudeh
Party and the ethnic minorities. However, the media have
also emphasized the necessity for those groups to operate
within a framework of national unity. This cautious line
suggests Moscow does not want to antagonize Khomeini further
Dr unnecessarily increase the Tudeh Party's already exposed
position.

CONFIDENTIAL
la1
VZCZC '224
0 0 EUSNAAA
rY RUOMHR # 0 9 7 ? 2 9 a l i 5 S
ZNY CCCCC
G 1 5 1 P 5 9 Z OCT 79
FY CARYISH/MAA: TfFRAN IRAY
I 0 USCIYCEUR VAIUIN3EY GE I P h E D I P I E
Ern
U'

C 0 V F I D E. h T I A L TEHRAN IRAN 1 P 9 7 3
FOR ECJ4/7-SA
Z'laJECT: SPTCIAL FY-61 PZVIEW OF OVERSIAS PEaSOhY7' a

!-IF: YCUR CCNFIrFYTIAI MSs 1 1 1 Q 0 1 Z CCT 7 ? . S4"F 533ZtCT

1. REF MSG hE3UFSTEI AFMIcS-YAA9 V I F d S . ZCOSCIYATFI k I T F
iMBPSSY AEi? P F F F h S S ATTAChE O F F I C S iDAO'. C V POSSIBLE .
CCNSCLIrATIOY OE TAO AND SFCU?IT" ASSISPAY3Z t ' A V A 2 F W J ~ 2

2. ALTHCUGH I T I S RECCGhIZFC TnhRF Y9Y > F SOY] BFGFIJS

TO CONSOLIPATION OF SYALL OR3AhIZATIOiS k d E Q i SOME
IPPLICATIVE MAk'PCLTR SPACES MIGHT 3 ) SAVEr. ?B:CMMFFr TPE
hFb OrC I h IRAK. FORYED Oh 1 OC" 7 P , hOT 33 C O h S I ? ? r S r a
CANLILPTF K C
H C'lKSOLIDA?ION AT T-:IS TIME. fY6 l O L I C J I ; ' 1
DEASONS AQP OFFEREC O' R COYSICER4TIOh:
A. AS A hESbLT CF T F F 4EB 7 9 3FBOLJTICh I & ' IAEY, TU'
SECURITY ASSISTAYCT DR3SEPN IY IRAN. THi L4.23'31 l'S1
TRCGRAM OF I T S "INT IN L F I S 3 U C F PRICR TC THE RTVCLLTICY,
HAS BEEN UVDFR;OING DRASTIC CHAY;ES. BECPrSF C"TP?SL
CHANGES IN RFSPfil'CTO"Ih'3 A V T THX S I G k I F I , ^ 4 \ I T PCTEh"1
IYPACTS CPOh TPE ENTIRF US: FYS PRO:RAY, I T I S EIFt'ICCZT,
I F HCT IMPCSSIPLFp 5C TOR7AST YAFPF E NEd IRANIAN PiiO-
GRAY YAY IEAC. FPESEkTLY YANY OF THE INDIVIDUfL r ' E S I L 3 4 L

'I
PROGRAMS S T I L EEING CLOSED OUT. SUCH AS PEACE ZEBRA. A3E
LAlGEH TEAU F T I F E PFCGFAY' CF CTHES COUNTFIES.
ALLY, THFRZ H YE BEEN INDICATIONS FROY THE F;OI TriAT TdEF
b I L L WAN? SUPPLY SUPPORT PTCGRAVE REIVITIATZC IY THP
FUTU3E. AS A RESULT OF TIiFIR FOiiCE STRUCTUPE ANl' PRSVIOUS
ATCITICN-

USG FUBNISHED EC.ITIF't'ENT ALRFADY PURCilhSFD, I T J3ULD BE

FEASONABLF AT TfiIS TIME TO ESTIY4TE A PROSRAY TO SDPFOET
THESE US PROVIDEC SYSTEPS WOULD BE EXTENSIVE.
F. CUE TO TZH UYCFRTAINTFS SURROUNLING TAF RFSTRUSTUPIhG
ACTIOhS ON THE PPESZNT IRhYIAN FMS FR03EAr ANT THF S I Z P OF
THE PRCJECTEC PROGRAM. AS STATFr IN ?A AZOV?, A CC'uSCIITAT
ED OROANIZATION, REPUCED IN S I Z E . WOULD PR034ZLY a7 UMAaLE
TO HANCLE TPE NEW SECURITY ASSIST4NCE FUNCTIONS WdI:P PAY
b E LEVIED. THEREFOR!?. TATIYG ACTIOh TO COlSOLICATF ?PIOR
TO A NEJLY DEFINIT-IZED PROGRAP WOULD P F PRHNAIURE.
C. F R E S E ~ T L Y?AO T E H R A N HAS TGLVE ( 1 2 ) I U T S O B I Z F ~P C S I P -
SN P C S I X C N S 9E;AUSr. E A r i CE :HISF
UIPED, AhP NZ FYSCEIJS NO kEDUCTIO\ I h
N I F TIIF r A 3 !blC .'qr t'AbG * " R E 1 3 El
ICIFATT NO REDUCTIOVj IY 2 4 0 STACTS
EALI7E3. THT hEJLV FOiPEC PhD ACIIVPTEI
S I X , B J YILITARY ?FFSCAYPI h P H A C i I Z
i POTrY'iIAS CONSOLI3P1ION M 2 v E r 1'4
i"2CzC @24 lA2
VZCZC Zi4

T n E LOCJL N A T I C F E I P C S I T I O h S PCSSIBLY O h 3 D 9 I V F 9 COt'LL R P

PLIhINATED AND THY ODC FSN CLERT P O S I T O N ELIYILAIE:. ONE
CTHER P O S S I B I E PCSITION V S I S H Y I S F T 9F F L I Y I N B T F r I S Y E
ODC GS-7 ATYIN CO-ORDINAmOR. WIT8 THY W-C C O O i C I V A T 0 9 I h
THE CAO, T 3 I S VICYT BE UNNECESSAFY DYPLICAIION. KOIEVTR,
5TCAUSE OF RPASONS S P E C I F I F r E A Q L I E 9 IN 2 4 % N r 3, AGAIN WE
C4NNOT PREDICT TBE k O R ( L 0 I D IN SECURITY ASSISTAECF. Ah? I T
~cvLrTUEREFORE S T I I L A ~ P E A RIMPSUEEVT rc. RECUCE - . ~ I.T H -O U T
ANY FACTUAL W09iIOAD DATA RE3UIREMENTS.
1. TEE YOST APPARENT PROBLEM YE ANTICIPATF. I S THE REICT-
IOh OF TXX F C O I . ALTHOUCP WF ARE YOVIY3 SLOWLY I N ? R E S A
RFSTRIlCTU9ING EFFOBT. d E APPEAR TO RE UA(Ik: P R 3 C a l S S . WE
HAVE ACCCYPLIS?Er T H I S BECAUSE OF TAE APPAEFYT TRUST CUR
LOGISTIJS PERSChNEL FAVE FSTABLISHED #IT!! T F E I R CO3YTER-
PARTS. T E I S TRUST MIGHT BF S E R I 9 U S L T J E O P A R D I I E E I F TSE
FCOI PERCEIVED CUR OPC PEOPLE 4S BTING PART CF TfiB DAC.
OUR C I S S I O N / P U R P O S S I S D I S S I M I L A R IY TfiAT L4E ODC I S T b S i E P
TO A S S I S T THE HCST COUNTRY IN S d TYPE SUPPORT. WHEHFAS l'AC
EERSCNNEL OBVIOUSLY ART RECOGLIZEO AS COLLECTORS O F OVERT
INTELLIGENCE I.NFORCATI3Y. AS AN EZAPPLE. PRESENTLY OUa
ODC PECPLE CAN MAKE V I S I T S WITH THEIR CCUNTERPARTS AS A
PAR1 O F NOitCtAL OPERATI3NS. WITHCUT ANY PROTCCGL REgUIREMYhT
ON THE OTHER AAkC, DAO I S PRESEhTLY RXSTRICTED TC % O I h 5
THROUGH J O I N T S T b P F PROTOCOL BEFORE MEETIN3 Y I 1 R CEMBERS OF
THE P G O I .
3. IN CONCLUSION, REC3CMENr THAT TIlE NEW O r C 3RGANIZAPION
I h IRAN NOT BE CONSOLIDATED WITA D I O . T E E SAVINSS I h PFR-
SCNNEL ANC FUNrING YCUIC BE MINIMAL. AN1 THE PCTENTIAI i C 9
,LOST GROUND IN SECURITY ASSISTAECE/OPC Y I S S I O N ACCOYFIISH-
MENT WOULC BE UNNECESSARILY INZRl'ASPC.
4. CAARGE CONCURS.
BT
RULYCSA T COYCARGSU S I X
REEPERA T USS JOSEPU STRAUSS
R 1700122 3CT 7 9
FM DIA WASHINSTON DC//JSI-?//
TO DIACURINTEL
AIG 7 0 1 1
A ~ G7933
RUVAAAA/AFLC ~ P A F BOE
RUFLEY.k/NAF SIGONELLA I T / / I N
RUEBDSA/DFSC CAMERON STATION VA//FOSC//BG SFAMON
-T
R -
C O t i F I D F N T I A L 5934
DIADIN 283-3A (AS OF: 1453 EDT 16 OCP 79)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLISENCE NOTICE ( D I N ) (U)
I
IRAN: WOVE TOWARD THEOSRACY. (U)
I
1. ( C ) THE ASSEflBLY OF EXPERTS DO!lIN&PED BY MUSLI5 R E L l C I O b S
LEADERS WHOSE MANDATE I S TO REVIEW TET DRAFT CONSTITUTION BAS
BEEN GRANTED AN EXTEYSIO* O F TIflR BECAUSE I T I S MAZING S U B S T A N T I V ~
CFANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION. MOST OF TEESE CHANGES BAVE BPEN

PAGE 2 HUEZJCS 4381 C 0 N 5 I D E N T I A L

DZSIGNED TO CONCENTRATE ALL POWER IN IRAN IN THE HANDS OF S B I I T E
LEADERS. THE LATEST CONSTITLJTIONAL CLAUSE ESTABLISEES TEE POSITION
OF A SUPREKE R 2 L I G I 3 C S LEADFR, WHICH WILL B t ASSOiIED BY TEE ONE
MOST RESPECTED BY H I S COLLEASUES. I F ONE CANNOT BE CHOSEN, TEE
OFFICB WILL BE HELD BY A COUNCIL OF HOLY YEN. THE SUPREME LEADER
WOULD BE COMMANDEI IN C F I E F OF TEE ARMED FORCES, WOULD HAVE POWER
TO DECLARE JAR IN CO#SULTATION # I T 0 F MILITARY COUNCIL (YHICE
HE APPOINTS), AND WOULD BE AGTAORIZED TO REHOVT THE ELECTED PRESI-
DENT. FOLLOWING THE PASSAGS OF T E I S CLAUSE, THE ASSEMBLY I S NOW
DEBATING THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THF PRESIDENT, YilOSE AUTEORITY,
IN VIEW OF TFE NEW CLAUSE, 6OULD BE PUESTIONABLE. T H I S BODY I S
REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING TBRET OPTIONS. q E COULD BE APPOINTED BY
THE PARAMOUNT RELIGIOUS PERSON, ELFCPED WITE TKE LAFFER'S APPROVAL,
OR CHOSEN FROM A L I S T OF CANDIDATES CRAWN UP BY TEE LEADER.
2. ( C ) I T I S CLEAR IRAN I S EVOLVING TOdARD A THEOCRATIC STATE
IN YEICB THERE WILL BE LITTLE ROOM FOR DISSENTING VIEWS. ALTHOUGH
TAE CONSTITUTION MUST BE PASSED BY A POPULAR REFERENDUM, I T I S
EXPECTED TO BE APPROVPD BY A L A W F MARGIN. IN S P I T E OF 'INCREASINGLY
VOCAL OPPOSITION BY TEE L E F T I S T S AND YODERATE SECULARISTS, TEE
DEEPLY DPVOJP LOkXR CLASSES APPARENTLY R#MAIN STFADFAST IN THEIR
SUPPORT FOR KHONEINI AND WILL VERY LIKELY CONSIDER SUPPORT OF
THE CONSTITUTION THEIR RELIGIOUS DUTY. I T WILL NO LONGE9 BE
NECESSARY mL AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO RUN FOR TEE PRESIDENCY, OR
FOR ANYONE ELSE FOB THAT MATTER. THE LATPST C L b U S t WILL LEOITI-
MIZE THE U N O r l I C f A L POSITION.HELD BY KEOMEINI AND WILL REDUCE
TEE PRESIDENT TO A WERE FIGURXHEAD.
P R E P j S D BY% LCDR D. ADAPIS, USN, J S I - 5
(DECL 16 OCT 85)
BT
 wMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

-
IRAN

S e t ti n s
The f i r s t s i x weeke o f 1979 marked t h e f i n a l phase
?of t h e Iranian r e v o l u t i o n . The Shah l e f t t h e country on
January 16, Ayatollah e o m e i n i returned on February 1,
t h e Government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar collapsed on
February 11, and a new p r o v i s i o n a l GQvernment under Prime
~ i n i s t e 'Ba2argan:was
r installed. For most I r a n i a n s ,
Ayatollah Khomeini remained t h e p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e
as s p i r i t u a l guide and l e a d e r of t h e r e v o l u t i o n . An

Islamic Republic was proclaimed following a n a t i o n a l

refqrendum on March Sfi
I
I n twe t a l l 4 I
e l e c t e d Council
of Experts prrppred a new c o n s t i t u t i o n which was t o be
submitted ta a referendum p r i o r t o t h e e l e c t i o n of a new
government.
Violence againstunarmed crowds by t h e s e c u r i t y
f o r c e s of the previous regime t h a t had begun i n e a r l y
1978, and wbich took thousands of l i v e s , continued i n t o
1979. I n addition, beginning i n l a t e 1978, mobs, widely
btlievell t o have been h i r e d by t h e previous regime,
attackefl supporters o f t h e revolution i n s e v e r a l loca-
tions. Thus, Wan the r e v o l u t i o n succeeded, f e e l i n g s of
 -2-

bitterness and revenge against the leaders and supporters

of the Shah's regime were intense. The traditional-security
forces and judicial system were discredited. In consequence
power was diffused among a variety of groups which were
rarely responsive to the directions of the central govern-
ment. It was a period of great revolutionary fervor,
political uncertainty and confusion. Revolutionary courts
were established on the national and local levels: most
administered justice according to their own standards.
Rough justice -was.'aleio meted out by a variety of revolu-
tionary committees and armed groups -- some of which had
no legal standing whatsoever; their weapons gave them
authority. Throughout this period the formal government
under Prime M-ijster Bazargan was committed to according
full due process, criticized practices of the revolutionary
courts, but was-ble to interfere with those practices.
1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person,
Including Freedom From:

a. Torture.
We are aware of no reports of torture by any government
agency or by the national system of revolutionary courts.
There were two or three reports of harsh t r e a t - c n t S y
revolutionary groups in the provinces. In general, those
persons accused of crimes by the revolutionary courts seem
to have been fairly treated in the circumstances of a
chaotic prison system. Authoritative Government and
clerical leaders have stated on various occasions their
condemnation of torture which is specifically prohibited
in the new draft constitution.
b. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
.p,oh~b'. '-5~-
More tha@<xecutions by firing squads, often carried
out in the midst of night, took the lives of political and *
s,Jdb c ~ , ~ u.h
e d e-b.b**da
h.b.3~
military figures a'idehtif ie0 with the previous Governmentfi
counter-revolutionaries accused of plotting to overthrow
the new Government and persons accused of violating Islamic
ethical norms (prostitutes,homosexuals, drug sellers).
The Government argued that the public rage against such
persons was so intense that if some had not been speedily
/
tried and executed by the revolutionary courts, crowds
would have taken justice into their own hands causing
a far higher death toll. There is no way to prove or
disprove this assertion.
The number of executions of persons from the previous
regime declined/subs=>
1 - ?FIRVCL
'!kolloxing anRamnesty declared
,n July 11 by Ayatollah Khomeini for all pprsons except
or
Oph,*
I'
ddni
those directly involved with murder or orders to kill. ca0k
into the fall months. The working of revolutionary
courts caused widespread fear and resulted i15 the
flight from Iran of thousands of citizens who believed
they could be victims of an unfair system.
c. .Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment.
Arrest and imprisonment by revolutionary groups--with
or without Government sanction--remained an e v e r
present threat 'through 1979; the incidence of such
arrests declined in the second half Of the year. Pro-
longed imprisonment without charge was frequent. Many
prisoners arrested in spring on suspicion of polrtical
crimes were released beginning in July. In October
the Government stated there were political
prisoners held in jails throughout the country. We
believe.. ...
d. Denial of Fair Public Trial.
Although supporters of the new Government have stated
that the revolutionary trials were conducted fairly
and-with due process, we cannot agree. Most of the trials
were carried out in secret in a very short time and with-
out right of appeal. Most accused persons we know of were
not afforded the right of defense counsel or time to pre-
pare evidence in their behalf. The summary nature of the
 -5-

trials by revolutionary courts was strongly criticized

s.ne
byaeaders of the Iranian Government, as well as Iranian
and international human rights groups. The guilt or
innocence of persons condemned by these courts will
never be known.
e. Invasion of the Home.
The search by revolutionary groups for figures from
the previous regime led to frequent invasions of the
privacy of homes. Our impression is that these incidents
were significaritly reduced in the second half of the.year.
as Government police forces began to reassert
over revolutionary groups.
2. Governmental Policies Relating to the Fulfill-
ment of Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, health
d r e and Education.
The new government clearly considers among its
highest priorities the improvement in the standard of
life of the average Iranian citizen, especially the
pscrrr classes. The Government 1s cowlt:~CI to the
revitalization of agriculture, the extension of educa-
tional opportunities and the prcvislon ef improved
housiiio and health care. Bur beraose of the revolutionar:
turmoi1,'only limited steps could be taken during the
 year to implement these policies. One beginning was
/l

the work of the Reconstruction Crusade which sent yo ?g

%
.
Xranians into the countryside and poorer neighborhoods
u;" t
to build schools and other public buildings and perform $'
previously-neglected public services. Slowness in
economic recovery made the reduction in unemployment
levels a key government concern. Some progress was made
in stimulating economic activity during the summer and
fall.
3. ~espectfor Civil and Political Liberties,
' Including :
a. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion, and
Assembly.
It is clear that freedom of speech, the press and
assembly were significantly strengthened with the advent
/
of the new government. That situation continued generally
until August when the Government felt threatened by the
Kurdish challenge to central a ticism
from left and center groups. wspapers
and,rnagazines were closed and 1
8 * foreign

I correspondents were expelled. A new xequirenent for

licenses for demonstrations was established. h press

law promulgated in August established penalties f ~ r

criticism of political and religious leaders and was
harshly criticized by Iranian journalists as excessively
restrictive. The arrest of several prominent critics
was ordered and they remain in hiding.
Nevertheless, throughout 1979 and even including
the post-August period of restrictions and intimidatio~
Iranians enjoyed a greater opportunity to express their
political views than at any time in the past 25 years.
The press has freely reported events, pursued officials
I
/with sharp questioning and criticized Government policies

P
land political eaders. Although opposition leaders and
editors justifiably feel that the freedom they had in
the first half of the year has been abridged, their
ability to speak out is still less restricted than under
the previous government. By December 1, 6 previously
banned papers had been allowed to resume publication.
Religious minorities experienced periods of great
anxiety about their well being during the year. With
the execution of the prominent Jewish leader Habib
Elghanian and harsh attacks on Israel and Zionism,
Iranian Jews felt seriously threatened. Similarly,
when a mob attacked a Baha'i shrine and the Government
confiscate3 property of the Baha'i corr~unity,members
of that faith felt similarly threttened. The new draft
constitution continues the provision in the previous
constitution which recognizes the Jews, Chriatians
Zoroastrians, b u t n o t t h e Baha'is a s r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s .
The Government s t a t e d r e p e a t e d l y t h a t r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s
would n o t be p e r s e c u t e d , t h e i r r i g h t s would be p r o t e c t e d
and t h a t o n l y t h o s e p e r s o n s charged w i t h s p e c i f i c o f f e n s e s
w i l l be a r r e s t e d and t r i e d . There i s no e v i d e n c e o f
p e r s e c u t i o n by t h e Government, b u t t h e a b s e n c e of e f f e c -
tiv-rnment c o n t r o l h a s sometimes allowed v i g i l a n t e
I\
groups t o t a k e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e m i n o r i t i e s , e.g. the
a t t a c k on a B a h p ' i s h r i n e i n S h i r a z .
b. Freedom o f Movement Within t h e C o u n t r y , F o r e i g n
T r a v e l and E m i g r a t i o n .
There a r e no o f f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on movement w i t h i n
the country. I n t h e f i r s t month f o l l o w i n g t h e - r e v o l u t i o n ,
t h e d e p a r t u r e o f a d u l t m a l e s was p r o h i b i t e d . Subsequently,
t h e r i g h t of I r a n i a n s t o l e a v e t h e c o u n t r y h a s g e n e r a l l y
n o t been a b r i d g e d e x c e p t f o r a group of p e r s o n s who a r e
wanted i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l and c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i -
g a t i o n s , and some o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e s . The number of
p e r s o n s b a r r e d from l e a v i n g t h e c o u n t r y from March t o
October i s n o t known b u t i s b e l i e v e d t o t o t a l around

c.
./-_ - -
10,000; t h e 1 s t was reduced I n n ~ r b e rI n October.
----
-_
Freedom t o Participate I n t h e P o l l t l c a l P r o c e s s .
P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r e f e r e n e a and e l e c t l o s s helC I n I r a n
s i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n h a s been f r e e l y p e r m i t t e d . However,
 -9-

a full range of alternatives in the referenda were not

available and there was not time in the elections for
well-developed campaigns or for the organizations of
effective political parties. The voting power has been
a mixture of secret and open balloting. On occasion,
groups identified with pro or anti-Government groups
have intimidated candidates or sought to disrupt the
electoral process. These disruptions were, in part, a
consequence of ineffective government police powers,
in part a result of individual zeal by revolutionary
authorities.
The regime has offered greater autonomy to the
provinces and to the ethnic minorities than they were
permitted under the previous government. The government
proposed autonomy including locally-elected councils

-( elections were held in October) and the use

of local languages with Persian in the schools, media,
and assemblies. These offers have been rejected by
some Kurdish, Arab, an8 Baluchi leadere whose demands
have not been made clear in detail. The demands of
some'leaders may include indepen8ence from Iranian
central government control -- unacceptable to any
authority in Tehran. Negotiations between the government
and dissident ethnic groups continued sporadically most
of the year.
 The Kurdish revolt and disturbances caused by other
ethnic leaders was often met by a sharp, forceful response
by the Iranian army and revolutionary guards. Excesses
of violence have been committed by both the'regime's forces
and rebel groups, as well as by terrorist groups opposed
to the government.
4. Government Attitude and Record Regarding
International and Ron-governmental Inves-
tigation of Alleged Violations of Human
~i~hls:
he Iranian Government has been severely criticized on
human rights grounds by many international and non-
government human rights groups. Representatives of
these groups have been invited to Iran and some have
made visits and inspections. The Government has criticized
these groups and the international press for presenting
a distorted and unfair picture of conditions in Iran.
Although the Government excluded most of the foreign
press, it made an effort to maintain a dialogue with
human rights groups.

Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp
10/18/79 - ext:20313
I
1
AmEmbassy London
INCOMING TELEGRAM
cofi;\o&~@iL3 I

00 RUDTC FND753NAA651
NNNNvv
DE PUFHNA 1 7 2 0 5 2 9 2 1 1 3 5
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
.
- y
.

FW,: L~NA
~
- .
E
0 1 9 1 1 3 5 2 OCT 7 9
r f USMISSION USNATO
TO AMEYBPSSY LONDON IAMEDIATL 3 7 7 8
m
1 "O: 7165

-
C O N.F 1 D E N T I A L <

STAD I S .i
FOR G L A S P I E
E.0.12065: GDS 1 6 1 1 9 / 8 5
TAGS: IF!
SUBJECT: (C) UPDATE ON IRAN
I. (C - ENTIRE TEXT). --
2. PLEASE P A S S TO HENRY PRECUT FR3M HOPPER. .
3. ALL I I E 3 S IN YOUR T A L K I h G POINTS PAPS? WERE USED,
IN ADDITION TO I N R ' S ASSESSAEhT.
4.
FIRST HIGH-LEVEL CDNTACT .
UNIVERSAL AGFEEi'lENT BUT. SOME HESITANCE TO MAKE

5. MODEFATE E X I L E S SEEN A S HOPELESS AT X S T , DANGEROUS

AT WOPST. CONFORT WAS EXPRESSED THRT PEESENT CLERICAL
REGIXE I S SO CLEARLY NOT ASSOCIATED WITH WEST THAT AT
LEAST W E NEED NOT a E SLANED FOR I T S HUMAN RIGHTS F A I L I N G S .
PX)REOVER, I T S PECULIAR NATIONAL AND P E L I G I O U S CHARACTER
I S A TEMPORARY BARRIER T O CONMUHIST ADVANCES. MEAN-
WHILE I T S NON-M~TEPIAL CAST MAKES IRAN UNLIKELY PQOLIFERA-
TIOt! CANDIDATE FOP MEDIUM TERN. FINALLY, I T I S AN INTRO-
VERTED PEVOLUTION.
5. MOST FELT SOVIETS WERE LAYING BACX WAITING FOR EVENTUAL
S C I A L PEVOLUTION. TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULP L O U FOR
SIEPS TO INCREASE R E G I M E S C O N F I D E N C E ~h J E S T , A N D E N A L L Y
mPORTANT SEEK CPLN, GRADUATLD S T E P S TO 3 0 L S T E P NEIGHSORING
MODERATE STATES.
7. F P E N C H A N D G E R M A N M I N I S T E R SHAD F R I E N D L Y MEETINGS W I T H
YAZDI I N NEW YORK. THE FOHKEP I h SCHLDULED BILATERAL, T H E
LATTEP I N UNPLANNED CONTACT AT IECLPTION. 6 0 T H , HOWEVEP,
U V E L I S T S OF BILATEPPL I S S U E S ON WHICH THEY NEED COkCRETE
PESULTS BEFOPE THEY WOULD CONSIDEF HIGH-LEVEL V I S I S S .
3. OTHERS SAWGPEATER PISK OF LEFT-WING F E A C P I O L W I T H I N
SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.
9. Y Y P IDEAS TO LOOK FOP PFACTICAL S T E P S WERE WELCOME
331 FrOVOLE3 FEW Ii'lMiDIATE FESFGhSE5. S S I G TnGuGHT S O T d
TURKEY. WHOSE EMSASSY REPOPTEDLY HAS E:TASLISHED GOOD
C O N T A C T S , AND I N D I A h S . X I G h T U ~ E F U L L YPLAY-MIDCLL?IAN POL5
WERE I T NOT FOR COtlNTEPVAILIhG PZOILENS. SOME THOUGHT
THEY MIGHT ALSO a E USED TO PASS CAJTIONAPY irOFCING TO

10. ASIDE FPOM I g A N ' S POLE k1TH P-0 --

WHICH ALSO CAUSED
LATTEP SOME PROSLEMS -- T i i I " FOREIGN POLICY I S I O T PPD-
9LEi'l NOW-FOR WEST. XEY QLtESr!ON 1 s dkZ?aZF( CLERICAL
PEGIME CObLD ADD R A ~ I O ? ~ AS LT a U C T b F f C i E S J E P N GOVEPNNENT
TO I T S ICEOLOGICPL DASE.
156
 t1. EE-9 A T T E R P T I N G . I h D I V I G U 4 L L Y AND C O L L E C T l V E L Y WAIN-
T A I N PLLATIONS. I N F A C T C O ? I ~ U S I T Y c o h 5 ~ c i E t ~OPEUL tii~o-
T I A 7 I O N S It1 A U G 3 S f . S I L L T E i A L T R A i i C C N T l N U i S A N D USE 3 F
GOVERNPENT G U A R A N T E E S C H E R E S h R S &EN L i S S T H A N F E A R E J .

12. LOCAL CONTACTS B Y Z X B A S S I E S nus Y ~ U PIDEA OF C L O S Z ~

C O N S U L T A T I O t 4 , I N T E P P A N AND E L S E r Y i ? i , W E L C O X E J . ANOW-
LEDGE G A P E X I S T i D F E G A P D I N G P 4 i S E N T P F A C T I C E S . G L I T m A N
m
 LIFII'I'ED OFFICIAL USE

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tehran, Iran

October 25, 1979

MEMORANDUM
TO: The Files
FROM: L. Bruce Laingen - Charge dfAffaires, a.i.
SUBJECT: Comments by the French Ambassador Raoul Delaye

I made a courtesy call on the #rench Ambassador today.

He has been here two years. I would not describe him as
enthusiastic about the present situation in Tehran.
He has seen Khomeini three times; two times were sub-
stantive. He describes him as friendly but not warm
towards France. He seems convinced that Khomeini will
inevitably fail and that the immediate gain will be
by the left.
The Iranian Revolution is unvopular in France. No
clerical revolution could possibly have strength with
the French public.
The presence of Bakhtiar in Paris in itself does not seem
to have caused the French much problems with Khomeini; at
least not yet, said the Ambassador. Yazdi did not refer
to Bakhtiar during his bilateral with the French Foreign
Minister in New York.
The French community'numbers about a thousand in Iran.
That number may grow slightly following an agreement to
resume construction on a conventional power plant in the
Tabriz area, an agreement reached t w o or three days ago.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

 VZCZC -537
RR RUEEIA
DE RUQMHR # I 3 7 6 3 0 1 1 3 5 8
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 2 8 1 3 4 2 2 OCT 79
m AMEHBASST TEHRAN
TO USICA WASHDC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11376
USICA

E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : N/A
SUBJ: USICA IRAN'S PROGRAN NEEDS: TURN ON THE SPIGOT
1. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOfiUTION, THE POST FOUND
I T NECBSSART TO CURTAIL I T S STAFF AND ACTIVITIES AND
THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT AGENCT PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES
BE REDUCED OR SUSPENDED.
E CLIMATF IN IRAN HAS NOW SUFFICIENTLY STABLIZED
MI? RENEWED PROGRAM ACTIVITY. THE BINATIONAL
IN TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS INITIATED A FEATURE
ERIES AND TWO PERSIAN PLATS ARE CURRBNTLT BOOKED
IN TEE IAS THEATRE. TEE IAS I S ALSO EXHIBITING A PERSIAN
ARTIST AND THE ART WORK OF PERSIAN CHILDREN. A PIANO
CONCERT I S SCHEDULTED FOR NOVEMBER AND SOME 3 , 5 0 0 STUDENTS
ARE ENROLLED IN ENGtISH CLASSES. THE LIBRART I S ATTRACTING
ABOUT 158 USERS AND FIELDING 28-36 REQUESTS FOR
INFORMATION A DAT. THE STUDENT COUNSELING SERVICE
HAS DIPFICULTY COPING WITH DEMAND. THE BINATIONAL CENTERS
IN ISPHAHAN AND SHIRAZ ARE ALSO ACTIVE. THE NLBRIGHT
COMMISSION IS'ONCE AGAIN ORGANIZING EXCHANGES ANO THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY COME UP WITH CANDIDATES
FOR AGENCT PROGRAMS.
3. BOTH THE CLIMATE IN IRAN AND POST OBJECTIVES LIMIT
SHARPLY, HOWEVER, THE KIND OF PROGRAMMING WHICH I S
FEASIBLE. IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES PRECLUDE ALL BUT CLASSIC
MUSIC AND NO PILM,PLAY, OR DANCB'WHICHHAS ANT OVERT
SEXUAL ASPECT CAN BE USED. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN
SENSITIVITIES CURRENTLT MAKE PUBLIC PROMOTION OF
SOME U.S. OBJECTIVES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ( I . E . HUMAN
RIGHTS, MIDDLE EAST PEACE BASED O N THE CAMP AVID
AGREEMENTS. AMERICAN SECURITT CONCERNS). ON THE OTHER
HAND THE POST CAN MAKE EXCELLENT USE OF ANTTHING WHICH
S B O V ~U.S. INTEREST IN ISLAM. PERSIAN CULTURE, THE
WELFARE OF FAMILT AND CHILDREN, SPIRITUAL VALUES, THIRD
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL
3 INTEGRITY OF NATIONS.
$.THE POST'S KEY OBJECTIVB NUST OF NECESSITT BE TO
REDUCE IRANIANS SUSPICIAN THAT THE U.S. I S SEEKING TO
3' UNDERMINE TEE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND I S NOT REALLY
? PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IRAN TO RESOLVE ISSUES AND
f PROMOTE MUTUAL INTERESTS. THE POST RPCOGNIZES, OF
1 VZCZC 537
8 r
VZCZC 537
COURSE, THAT T H I S OBJECTIVE I S D I F F I C U L T TO ACRIEVE
AND I S THEREFORE TAKING A LONG-TERM VIEW I N PLANNING I T S
COMMUNICATION PROGRAM. IRANIANS RECALL PAST O.S.
P O L I C I E S AND ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT REASSURING TO THE

OTHER CONTEXTS: A SERVICE ORIENTED LIBRARY WBICH FOCUSES

ON IRANIAN BISTORY AND CULTURE. RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

WORLD ISSUESI FILNS AND VTR'S 'WHICH SHOW A M E R I ~ A N INTEREST

IN MORAL VALUES, SPIRITUAL EXPERIBNCE, FAMILY AND
CHILDREN. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT. HEALTH. AND
SCIENCE A N D TECHNOLOGY SERVING .BASIC HUMAN NEEDS; FEATURE
FILMS VHICH APPEAL TO IRANS STARVED FOR ENTERTAINMENT
AND INDICATE U.S. INTEREST I N HAVING FRIENDLY RXLATIONS
WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN.
5. THE POST THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT AGENCY PROGRAM
SUPPORT SERVICES AGAIN INCLUDE TEHRAN AS AN ADDRESSEE
WEEN ANNOUNCING AVAILABLE MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS.

:;I OST RECOGNIZES THAT MUCH OF WHAT I S BEING OFFERED

STS BY THE AGENCY I S INAPPROPRIATE TO IRAN AT
PRE NT, BUT THE POST IS PREPARED TO COPE WITH A LARGE
AM0 T OF PAPER I N ORDER'TQ FASTEN ON THOSE FFW OFFERINGS
VEICH ARE USEFUL IN IRAN TOCAY. THE POST ALSO RXQUZSTS
,TEAT PDM AND ECA ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN ACQUIRING OR
DEVELOPING PROGRAM OFFERINGS WHICE MEET THE NEEED OUTLINED
IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF T H I S MESSbGE.
6. THE POST RSQUESTS THAT THF 4GENCY SUSPEND, IN THE
CASE OF USICA IRAN. RESTRICTIONS ON AGZNCY PROGRAM
SUPPORT SERVICES WHICR PRECLUDE ALERTING POSTS TO
OFFERINGS WHICE ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THEIR PROJECT
PROPOSALS BECdUSE USICA TEHR4N DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROJEC
PROPOSALS ON RECORD. I F THE CLIMATE IN IRAN REMAINS
REASONABLY STABLE, THE POST WILL, ROWEVER, PARTICIPATX
FULLY IN THE AGENCY'S NEXT PLANNING CYCLE. GRAVES
BT

NNNN
VZCZC 537
 P-7-J
TEHRAN 11405 1 / 2
C E RUQMHR #1405/01 302 **
ZNY C C C C C Z Z H
n 2 9 1 2 2 4 2 O C T 79
FM AMEfiBASSY T E H R A N
T O R U E E C / S E C S T A T E VASHDC 4529 TRFTD: POL:JLIMEERTIEM
I N F O R U E C J C S / S E C D E F WASH DC CLTAR: P0L:VLTOHSETH
RUECJCS/JCS WASH DC D I S T B : C H A R G E P O L - 2 ECON
PIIQMBI /AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0351 R ~ ~ C B R O 6N/ W E B
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANqARA 5345
R U E H A C / U S I N T BAGHCAC 0351
RUQMOD/AME?lBASSY DOAA a320
R U S B O D / A M E ~ B A S S Y ISLAMABAD 0396
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JICDA 0414
RUSBLK/AMEM B A S S Y T A B U L 0393
RUOMKW/AMEMBASSI SUWAIT 0361
F U D T C / A M Z N S A S S T LONCON a 4 7 4
RUCMAM /LMEMBASSY MANAMA 4319
RUFHMO/A~~EMBASSY MOSCOW 0356
RUQMMT/AMEMBASST MUSCAT 0228
R U F N P S / A M E M B A S S Y PARIS 0426
:
I
EUSNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I A I N G E N G E
om
Dl
;C 0 N F I D E # T I A L S E C T I O N 4 1 O F TEHRAN 11405
i TE.O.A G S : 12065:
PINT
C D S 15/29/85 ( T O M S E T H . V.L.)
SA IR
OR-P
t SUBJECT: M ~ L L I ~ NY ASR C H FOR ~ N I T Y~ N DKHOMEINI
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. M I L L I O N S O F I R A N I A N S P A R T I C I P A T E D I N O C T O B E R 26
YARCH I N T E H R A L AND T H E PROVINCES T O SHOW S U P P O R T F O R
T H E L E A D E R S H I P O F AYATOLLAH K H O M E I N I AND F O R U N I T Y O F
IYAY (KHOMEINI) AND OMYAT (NATION). THE MARCH H A C BEEN
C A L L E D BY T H E I S L A M I C P E P S B L I C A N P A R T Y ( I R P ) . L E D BY
K Y A ~ O L L A HB E H E S H T I . I Y TEHRAN I CROWD E S T I M A T E D A T O V E R
O N E N I L L I O N P E O P L E C O N V E R G E D B Y V A P I O U S R O U T E S ON T E A R A N
G N I V E B S I T Y WHERE T H E Y L I S T E N E D T O S P E E C H E S , C H A V T E D
S L O G A N S , AYC H V L D F E I C A Y P R A Y E R S .

3. MARCH AND F E E T I N G S J E R E O R D E R L Y . I N T E E R A N , CROWD

I N C L U C E D MANY WOMEN AND C K I L C R E N AND U N I F O R M E C Y I L I T A R Y
raRSONNEL. T H E R E WAS A G E N E R A L B O L I D A Y MOOD, 4 N D H 4 R A S S E D
Y A R S H A L L S D I C AN E X C E L L E N T J O R O F K E F P I N Z O R D E R AND G O O D
SFIFITS. CROdDS F I L L E D ALL STREETS S[JRROUNDINl TERRhN
' N I V E R S I T Y A S WELL P S U N I V T R S I T Y ;BOUNDS, NBLCH # E R E T O O
O I L C ~ T E CF C R NANY P T R S O V S T O P R P Y .
I. AT F O a E I 3 N M I N I S T E R ' S S U G G E S T I O N . V I S I T I N G D E P T O P B
i ICBT, A C C G M P A N I E C 3~ EYBASSY POLOFF A N D WORRIED-LOOKING
I * F I C I i L F 3 O M MPA P R O T 3 r O L A T T E N D E D P X A Y E R S AND R I L L Y .
C \,ET P A S T GA'E G U A R C S , Q U I C 3 - T I N T I N 3 MFA O F F I C I A L
I ' T n O D U C E D U . S . V I S I T O R S LS 'FROY T H E S E I E G A L E Y B C S S Y
~ J T I C ~ P T F L YNO
."
, 3 N E I N V O L V E D <NEW MUCH A B O U T S E N E G A L . O N & 1

COYFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11405 1 / 2

161
 COLFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11405 1/2

5. CROWD WAS ADDRESSED BY AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, SECRETARY

GENERAL OF THE IRP, A N C BY MOHAMMAC ALI R A J A ' I , ACTING
MINISTER OF EDUCATION. BEBESATI CALLED FOR UNITY FOR
ALL SUPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION AND. REITERATED PHQMEINI'S
EARLIER CALL FCR UNITY BETSEEN THE CLERGY AND THE UNIVER-
S I T I E S . THESE SPEECHES WERE FOLLOWED BY TRE ADDRESS
(IEOTBEH) OF AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, IMAM JOM'EH OF TEHRAN.
YONTAZERI APPEARS TO H h l E CONSIDFRABLE POPULARITY AYONG
THE ORDINARY IRANIAN, dHO APPRECIATESHIS LACK OP AFFECTA-
TION ANC H I S SIMPLICTY OF SPEECH. HIGHLIGHTS C F MONTAZERI'S
ADDRESS INCLUDED:
- A. PEOPLE SHOULC APPSECIATE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND NOT
COMPLAIN AT SHORTAGES 3 F SOAP POIDEB AND MEAT. HE COYPARED
THESE COMPLAINTS TOaTHC PORANIC STORY OF PEE I S R A E L I T E S '
COMPLAINTS AGAINST MOSES 4FTER HE HAD LED THEY TO FREEDOM.
x
2- B. PERSONS IU HIGH P O S I T I O N S . INCLUCING CLERGYMEN,
k SHOULD FOLLOW T&E EXAMPLE OF THE PROPHET, AND NOT SURROUND
"HEMSELVES WITH SERVANTS AND GUARDS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES
g F 6 0 M TEE PEOPLE.
s" C.
ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY BUREAUCRATS SHOULC NOT BE
";AILED. BUT SHOULD BE QUIETLY RETIRED AND REPLACED,,BY
YOUNGER, COMMITTED PEOPLE. MONTAZERI COMPLAINED, AT
]LEAST I N THE OLD EATS FEAR OF THE SAVAK MADE SOYE OFFICIALS
:DO SOMETHING FOR THE PEOPLE EVERY NOW AND THEN. NO!
THE SAVAK I S GONE. ANC THEY NEVER TEINK OF THE PUBLIC

- r. F I V E MINUTE ARABIC SPEECH ACVISED ARABS TO LF4VE

THE EAST AND WEST AND FOLLOW THE STRAIGHT PATH 3 F ISLAYIC
6. AFTER PRAYERS, CHEERLEADER LED ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES
OF REVOLUTIqNARY SLOGAM. THE ONLY ANTI-AVERICAN
VERSE WAS. DEBT3 TO TEE CORRUPT TRIUMJIRATE: CARTER.
SACAT, AN^ BEGIN." CROWD THEN DISPERSEC I N ORCERLY
FASHION.
7. SIMILAR MARCHES AND PRAYERS WERE HELD IN OTHER C I T I E S
B'I
#I405
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11405 1/2
 C O N F I D E N T I A L TLXShN 1 1 4 d ~Z i ?
O F IRAN. I N ESPAHAN, S H E I X H YHALYHALI TOLD THE CROWD
THAT GENERAL HUYSER, ACCOnPANIED BY TUO BUALY SERGEANTS,
HAD FORCED THE SHAH OUT OF T 9 E COUNTqY. F t l I D d l YRA'E >
WHICH HAC BEEN STOPPEC ~d TEAT C I T Y .OR S O W :rms $1 t 3 y '
RESUflED AT YHOflEINI'3 C I R E C T ORDTH UN"ZH THE L F I D E P , H I P
OF AYATOLLAH 4AahBBRI. I R A N I A N RADIO AN1) '?ELEVISION ;bVE
PROMINENT COVERAGE TO T H E MARCH O F S U P P O R T I N MECCA,
CLAIMING THAT I T WAS J O I N L D B Y P A K I S T A N I S , I U V A I T I S .
ANC CHACIANS.

BT
XI405

NNNN
C O N F I D E N T I A L
 C 0 N F I D E N T I A L //NODIS//CHE?'lfEE TEHRAN 1 1 4 4 5 ,
U E HUQMHR # I 4 4 5 3Y3 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZd CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL r
0 3MlL4592 OCT 7 9 CHPCE: STAT 1 0 / 3 0 / 7 9
E M A M E M B A S S YT F H R A N APPRV: CRARGE:LBLAINB@
TO S E C S T A T E W A S H D C I M M E D I A T E 4 5 4 1 CRFTD: CHARGE:LBLAINC~
b 'i' CLTAR: NONE
C 0 N P I D E N T I A L ThHRAN 1 1 4 4 5 TISTR: CHARGE
?
J
NODIS
CCEhOCEh
I
3.0. 1 ? 0 6 5 : RDS-2 1 0 / 3 0 / 9 3 (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M 4
i
,TAGS: PFPH, I H , US
, SUBJAC?: THF SHAH IN U.S.
$

:hhF: STATE 282888 I

3 I.
12.
(c-ENTIRE T ~ X T . )
AT NO TIME HAVE WE GIVEN P C 0 1 ANY SUGGESTI3N THAT
!
"USG SHOULD HONOH OH RAE ACCEDEC TO REQUEST PHYSICALLY
$ T O EXAMINE THE SPAii. dHEN I SAW YbZDI AT ALGERIAN
? N A T I O N A L D A Y R E C E P T I O N OCTOBER 28, I TOLD H I M THEN
5 THAT WE Iihl! NOT AGREED TO FORWARI: T H I S REQUEST TO
SHAH'S ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. HE RESPONDED BY SAYIN:
f H E WOIILD H A V F T H O U G H T , G I V E N THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
$,OF THIS ISSUE, THAT WE COULD S E T ASIDE WHAT I DESCRIBED
:TO Bd THE PEDICAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND ETHICAL STANDARDS
THAT HAD PBECLIICED OUR PRESSING THE COCTORS TO AGREP
TO A PRYSICBL 2XkHINATION BY IRANIAN DOCTORS.
3. hfl7 HAVF NOT f i R N MEDICAL BULLETIN ON SHAH S I N C E THAT
Of OCTOBER 2 5 (STATE 2 7 3 1 2 9 ) . IibS THERE BEER OVE SINCE?
LAINGEN
BT
U1445 -
NNNN
c o N F I D E N T I A L //NODIS//CSEPO*;EF TEHRAN iius
 --------- '.-..*
DE EUQRHB a1523 306 +5
ZNT CCCCC zza CLASS: L I P I----
T E l l OBFTCTIT.
P 0 2 0 6 4 5 2 NOV 79 CERGE: STAT 11/2/73
PN AUEUBWSI TEXBAN APPRV : CH::LBLAI NGEN
TO S R S T A T E YASELC PRIORITY 4590 SRTTD: CH1:LBLAINGEN:TLl
BT CLEAR: NOKE
DISTR: CHARSE' POL CHRON
L I M ~ T B UOPFICIAL US6 TEHXAN 11523
FOR UNEEBSECRETART COOPXR FROM CEAR:
E.O. 12865:N/A
TAGS: 0TXA (COOPER)
SUBJ: V I S I T
1. I WANT TO BEYEV THE S'J3:ESTIGS dE TOUCHED ON WBEk ':E
TALfED I N LATE AU 9UST P3AT YOU CONS1319 STOPPIQZ BY IRAN
3 ON SOMT UPCOlING T R I P IN C < TZPO?3A P i E AREA. ONE S F
Q OUR LIBITATION3 BZRE I S TEAT d E ?>.Vr NOT HAD 4 N f POLICT
LEVEL VISITORS -
INLEEC YE ZAVE 'AC NONE S I N C 3 TKE
"EVOLUTIOI(. TPI1 T I Y E 3 9 5 XOT AI.:AY3 BEEN :OGC, BUT ON
- - - - - - - ----. - I n L
$THE YHOLE I T I S EETTE3 NOr' A N h- i 'JOT:T.?.JPT"nHF
~ ~ A C E ESUPPORT
D I N OUR EFFORTC: T O F N H A N C E OIJR CRECENTIALS
g WITH THE NHV IR1VEAV LT4DERSAIP TEAT A SENIOR VISITOR
COULD BRING TO BEAh.
f
~ Z ~ . T R EPDOI'S OJN POLI,T E I R E C T I O N I N THE ECONOWIC AREA
IS STILL IR A GOOD DEAL O F D I S A X B A T , A N D MAT R E M A I N
:THAT V11 IOR SOPI% TIYE -
THE 307EBHYIVT S T I L L BEING
P R O T I S I O N U AND TEE' COYSTITUTI3NAL DRAFTIN1 PROCESS NOT
YET C O W L 3 3 I . HENCE TYRRF; ARE REAL L I N I T S ON YBAT CAN
BE LEaRUllIY PROY f X E I d l N I i V S I D E . BUT riE CAN B ~ N E F I T
PXOR d TIUELY REAPFIRYATION 3P OUR RIADINISS T 3 YORC
WITH THE P 6 0 I IN A YTITUAL PROCESS OF BUILCING A NEfi
RXLATIONSBIP IN THE INP3RTbNT I'CONOY IC/COYMEifCILL/OIL
A2EAS.
3 . YE EAVE I N MIND A FA1 RLY BRIEF S'POPOV'R, DITRING dHICH
YOU COULC GET SCXE POLICY PCINTS ACROSS IN C I 9 3 C T
CGNVEBSITIONS WITH SENIOP PSOI TPPXS. P O j S I R L f SIJYPLr.
W Z N T I~n A N r N r o a v h L s a n I v A a A T TBE: R T S I D E N C I I OR T IF:
I9AN ERICAN AN SOCIFTY 3N 1. 3UI S T , INVITATIONAL BASIS.
4. I F YOU COCPIh'lJF TO TilIN' WFLi OF T:i: ICEA, nlE 'JG 817
MELCOYE KNO#ING SOHETHIN: OF POSSIRLE TIMI'J: 5 3 THAT .I
COULD TARE SOME SOUNDIN2S MFH7. LAINZEN
BT

LIYITFD 0 : F I C I I L USE rd 115, "

C H (KLF: L B L A I N G E N
ECON: A G R O S S M A N
ECON-3 CHARGE POL, CHRON

E.0.12065:GDS 1 1 / 4 / 8 5 (KENNEDY, M.) OR-E

TAGS: kINV, I R
SUBJECT: OPI&POLITICAL RISK "- I N V E S T M E N T I N S U R A N C E PROGRAM

OPI C

REF: A. S T A T E 281949, B.

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S . E M B A S S Y A P P R E C I A T E S T H E O P P O R T U N ~ T YT O
M A K E I T S V I E W S KNOWN A T T H I S E A R L Y S T A G F . WE C O N S I D E R F R E S H I N V E S T Y I N I

B Y A M E R I C A N C O M P A N I E S T O B E A N I M P O R T A N T F A C T O R I N R E B U I L D I N G OUR R E -

LATIONCHIPS WITH IRAN. T H E TWO P R O P O S A L S D I S C U S S E D I N REF A ARE J U S T TIIE

;
K I N D OF ESTABLISHED,LOW-PROFILE I N D U S T R I E S OF I N D I S P U T A B L E USEFULNESS i
I;?
W H I C H S H O U L D B E I N T H E V A N G U A R D O F S U C H NEW I N V E S T M E N T . WE H O P E T H A T i

i
/

T H E S E C O M P A N I E S W I L L P R O C E E D W H E T H E R OR N O T T H E Y A R E I N S U R E D BY O P I C .

3. WE H A V E W&Xth7 MISGIVINGS, HOWEVER, OVER T H E UTILJTY, B O T H FROM I H E

P O I N T OF V I E W OF [ H E USG AND O F T H E COMPANIES, OF t S P O U S I N G THESE I N V I S T -

/

M E N T S ,9fl&qL?A AT T H I S T I M E W I T H THE P G O I . MOREOVER, BEFORE INCREASING

ODIC INSURANCE L I A B I L I T Y , WE S H O U L D H A V E A B E T T E R F E E L T H A N WE H A V E NOW

FOR P G O I A T T I T U D E 5 T O W A R D S F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T , AND P A R T I C U L A R L Y TOWARDS

COMPENSATION I N CASES OF N A T I O N A L I Z A T I O N .

4. OUR R E C O M M E N D A T I O N , THEREFORE, I S N O T T O RESUME A L I M I T E D PROGRAM

AT T H I S TIME, U N T I L THE SITUATION CLARIFIES. END SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S .

5. PROCEDURAL D I F F I C U L T I E S . R E G A R D I N G R E F A, P A R A 2 1 OUR B E S T I N F O R M A -

T I O N I S T H A T T H E FORMER C E N T E R F O R T H E A T T R A C T I O N O F P R I V A T E I N V E S T P E N T

,
 I S DORMANT, AND DOES N O T E V E N A N S W t R THE (ELLPHONE. WE A R E T R Y I N G

DISLRE~TLY T O FIND OUT M O R E A B O U T ITS P R ~ S E N TS T A T U S .

E . : .c/
6. WEREI"0 F I N D S O M t O N E T O T A L K TO, WE WONDER W H A T V A L U E A N Y A P P R O V A I
1
G I V E N BY THE C E N T E R W O r L D HOLD. T H E PGOII
.
SO F A R A S WE KNOW,

DENOJJNCED T H E I N V E S T M E N T G U A R A N T Y A G R E E M E N T S O F 1 9 5 7 A N D - 1 9 7 9 W H I C H
HAS NOT

C L L A R L Y RESPONDED TO T H E P O L I C Y MANDATES O F T H E tORMER REGIME. WHETHER

THEY R E T A I N ANY S I G N I F I C A N C E W I T H I N THE P O I I C Y AND I N S T I T U T I O N A L UNCER-

T A I N T I E S OF TODAY'S I R A N I S A N O T H E R Q U E S T 1 N. WE A R E R E A S O N A B L Y C O N F I -
k L

DENT T H A T N o C I V I L S E R V A N T w o u L D APPROVE T H E S E PRJi-r(Ts <AND W I T H THEM THE

RESUMPTION OF O P I C PROGRAMS) ON H I S OWN.' E V E N I F A M I N I S T E R WERE T O G I V E

H I S APPROVAL, T H E R E I S NO A S S U R A N C E O F HOW L O N G H E M I G H T S T A Y I N O F F I C E .

I N MORE N O R M A L A N D S T A B L E GOVERNMENTS, A CHANGE I N M I N I S T E R S NEED NOT

E N T A I L A N A L T E R A T I O N O F P O L I C Y OR A F F E C T T H E V A L I D I T Y OF GOVERNMENTAL

CONFIDENCE FOR THE PGOI.

4hl
7. P O L I C Y PROBLEMS. WE WOULD H A V E G R E A T E R C O N F I D E N C E I N T<;E APPROVAL
\T
G R A N T E D B Y A MINISTER W E R E W E CONFIDENT THAT mM~~~arnnr~Sdfcky,
REFLECTED SETTLED P G O I P O L I C Y REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT. AT THE

MOMENT, P O L I C Y I S NOT SETTLED. A NUMBER O F O F F I C I A L S , OF V A R Y I N G DEGREES

OF INFLUENCE, W I L L T E L L YOU T H A T THEY ARE A L L FOR RENEWED F O R E I G N '

INVESTMENT. C E R T A I N M U L L A H S WOULD SAY T H E S A M E . IHE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISH-

MENT, HOWEVER, I S DEEPLY DIVIDED. KHOMEINI'S OUN H O S T I L I T Y TO W E S T E R . !

- ww\\., b,l-:.\%,%,
('------
INFLUENCE-'I'N--IRAN
-
~\~\b:v47t'n
OR W H I C H F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T I S A M O S T V I S I B L Y SYMBOL,

N E E DS N 0 F C A ~ ~ ~ ~ W . X H & . T J ~ ~ A ~ J ~ S - & ~
 PAGE 3

8. I N T H I S AREA, AMBIVALENCE S E E M S TO P R E V A I L . FOR E X A P P L E , ISLAMIC

ECONOMIST BANI-SADR, S A I D TO B E D E S T I N E D T O P L A Y A H I G H L Y I N F L U E N F I A L

R O L E I N T H E NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N A L GOVERNMENT, T O L D US ( R E F ) THAT HE

FAVORED F O R E I G N INVESTMENT, P R O V I D E D T H A T I T WAS FOR T H E B E N E F I T OF I R A N

A N D N O T FOR T H E B E N E F I T OF M U L T I N A T I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N S . BANI-SADR DID

N O T A M P L I F Y H I S S T A T RENT. WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, HE DISALLOW R E M I T T N C l S

OF P R O F I T S TO F O R E I G N I N V E S T O R S .
7 A S S U M I N G T H A T H E BECOMES T H E R E S P O N S I B I F I

MINISTER, WOULD H E I S S U E P R O J E C T APPROVALS, T H t R E B Y RECOGNIZING THAT

THE ~
u, so7 i I W W H~A S W
h V A~L I D AND C O N T I N U I N G I N T E R E S T I N T H E

INVESTMENT, AND R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y FOR I T S P R O T E C T I O N ? I

9. REVOLUTIONARY PARANOIA. HOWEVER V A R I E D * T H E C..L"~~'OF A T T I T U D E S T O t I A R D S I

,

1
P R I V A T E F O R E I G N INVESTMENTI T H E C O N C E P T OF A L E G I T I M A l E I N V E S T O R G O V t K N -
a ~.h-I,<d,,v
MENT I N T E R E S T I N I N V E S T M E N T RUNS COUNTER T O D E E P R E V O L U T I O N A R Y

FEELINGS. ;HE NOTION O F A SINXSTER ALLIANCE A M O N G T H E "COLONIALIST" IISG,

.'@
THE " T R A I T O R " SHAH, A N D T H E I R J O I N T HENCHMFN, U.S. P R I V A T E INVESTORS,

B A N ~ R S I A N D CONTRACTORSI

SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

M I N D S O F T H E S H A H W I T H T H E USGI
C O N T I N U E S TO SURFACE, ESPECIALLY I N CONlRACT

T H E RENEWED I D E N T I F I C A T I O N I N R E V O L U T I O N h R Y

T H E R E S U L T O F R E C E N T M r D I C A L TQAVFL,
1
S H O U L D G I V E F R E S H L I F E TO T H E S E S U S P I C I O N S .

10. I N TIME, HOPEFULLY, T H I S R E V O L U T I O N A R Y P A R A N O I A W I L L F A D E AWAY. I N

THE I N T E R I M , I S I T I N T H E I N T E R E S T O F F U T U R E U.S. FORFIGN INVESTMENT

G E N E R A L L Y A N D OF T H E S E TWO I N V E S T M E N T S I N P A R T I C U L A R ,
J.p.=.w *kt\&\ ~-I?#--~GT IV Kc&?
FOR T H E USG VAQ/dbvy
-
TO @ ? A ! M ~,FOR A L L T H E B E N E F I T S T H A T O P I C I N S U R A N L E WOULD E N T A I L

FOR T H E S E I N V E S T O R S , WE WONDER k l H E T H E R A H A N D S - O F F P O L I C Y A T T H I S .is%r

M I G H T NOT SERVE T H E I R INTERES~~BETTER.

 PAGE 4

11. PROHLtMS OF CORPINSATION. FOR T H E USG I T S E L F , A THRESHOLD Q U E S l I O N

I N DCCIDING WHtTHIR OR N O T T O I N C R E A S E O P I C I N S U R A N C E A G A I N S T UNREASONABLY

SIOW, I V A D C R U A T E OR I N E F F E C T I V E C O M P E N S A T I O N I N T H E E V E N T O F FiJTURE
',.<n,lL C
'JATIONAIIIATION I9,THE Q U A L I T Y OF THE COMPENSATION ACTUALLY B E I N G OFFERED
A
BY THE P G O I . W H I L E THE RECORD I S MIXED, THE EXPERIENCE T H U L F A R k i A

'J1J"IFR OF FORMER CONTRACTORS (AMERICAN B E L L INTERNATIONAL, G T E t ETC.) HAS

R F t N FAR FIIOM H A P P Y . WE U N D E R S T A N D FROM I R A N l A N S O U R C E S T H A T B . F . G O O D R I C

I S S A T I S F I F D WITH I T S SETTLjMENT. I N NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PETROLEUM

i?,,:uj\,
J O I N T VENTURES, THERE I S ~ ~ ~ ~ % & A
E VYI DPE N
~C E (REF ) THAT THE P G O I I S NOT
,\
AVLRSE TO DANGLING THE LURE O F FUTURE CRUDE "ALLO~ATIONS A S A MEANS O F

b H I T T L I N G DtWN COMPENSATION CLAIMS. A T THE VtRY LEAST, WE S H O U L D T A K E A

I ' R R D LOOK AT I H E CONPLNSATION FINALLY AWARDED TO MAJOR U.S. BANKS AND

INSIJRANCE TOISPANIES BEFORE T A K I N G A D E C I S I O N T O INCREASE INSURANCE

l,;&%2sG I N IR A N .

TO'3PINSATION ON T H E P A R T O F T H E P G O I , AN E N D T O P R E S E N T P A R A N O I A , AND AN

INSTITUTIONAI A N D POIICY EVOLUTION TO'THE POINT W H E R E INLESTMENT AGREE-

M r N T S AND APPROVALS A G A I N REFLECT SETTLED POLICY, WE S H O U L D A T T H A T T I M E

GIVE rAVORADlE CONSIDtRATION TO T H E R E S T O R A T I O N O F O P I C PROGRAMS I N I R A N .

13. SPEClIIC RECOMMENDATION$. WE U N D E R S T A N D r H A T U.S. INVETTORS

CAN
y 4qeyw,..d\ % L ~ V - h3h2 3 6 tL,\ " w h a/
R ~ G I rSE R P R O J E C T S W I T H OPIC GTHOUT ACTUALLY dlbr.
ACTIVAGNI;
/I \h v-L C.<fk$
PIICSUMABLY, NO APPROACH T O T H E P G O I WOULD B E R E Q U I R E D Ad- I F

T H I S I S THE CASE, WE S O R E C O M n E N D W I T H R E G A R D T O T H E S E &d INVESTMENTS

FOR T H E I M M E D I A T E FUTURE. LAINGEN##