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Philosophy Colloquia The UCLA Department of Philosophy sponsors a series of colloquia throughout the year.

These colloquia are open to the public. October 26, 2012 Disagreement in Platos Euthyphro

Its a pleasure to have today speaking to us Katja Vogt, who is coming to us from Columbia University, where she is a Professor from the Philosophy Department and the Chair of the Grad Program in Classical Studies. Her education was in Munich. She has a recent book on ancient epistemology, which is her third and shes published on the Stoics, Plato, skepticism and ethics, and today shell be speaking to us on Disagreement in Platos Euthyphro.

Thanks very much for the invitation and introduction. It is a pleasure to be here. So what I am talking about today is, as it were the beginning of trying to apply my earlier work in ancient epistemology. Two questions in ethics, value theory, theory of motivation and agency, and so this paper is sort of part of a beginning of new project, and Ill be very interested in feedback.

The basic idea of Socratic epistemology if you like, so the kind of epistemology that started Socrates and Plato developing it in various ways and eventually maybe moving away from it but then picked up by the Stoics and the ancient skeptics. One way to sort of sum up the basic intuition is that you shouldnt hold beliefs. And thats a very strange claim [that remains] and certainly not a claim that today anyone would make, but you can sort of see the intuition for those of you who know for example from a familiar sense non-approval which says that you shouldnt assert that P if you or you should only assert that P if you know that P. So its that kind of intuition. The idea is that assertions are the linguistic counterpart of beliefs and we assert things that really very often could be such things as such that our assertions are [related to become] part of our beliefs but that we only should assert things that we actually know of, that we which we assert.

And thats a very, very [human] norm and a lot of what Socrates is about and then Stoic epistemologists and skeptic epistemologists develops that kind of idea, develops the idea of, you know can you even talk [as you can] accept, can you even investigate what kind of mode of speech would you have to develop, is there something like a kind of non-esoteric speech that would get you around them, regular kind of [blunt] . . . those kinds of questions.

And so one way of saying what I want to do today, is to apply that kind of, that type of perspective to value judgment. Now, value judgment, they at least have a surface structure of assertions. And then someone like Socrates is, as it were famous for not making judgments like, what you do is wrong or what you do is impious or/and so on and so forth. So for example, the very beginning of The Euthyphro, Socrates and Euthyphro are in front of the courthouse and Euthyphro says to him, It must be that you are here because someone else is bringing charges against you, because you would never bring charges against anyone. Thats just not something Socrates would do. Because he doesnt take himself to be in the position to judge the confidence that someone did something wrong. So thats sort of his reputation. And now I thought that I should, maybe not everyone reads Plato as much as I do. I should maybe briefly situate before I properly start The Euthyphro.

The Euthyphro is a very well-known dialogue. Its one . . . its presumably one of the early dialogues. Its very short text, just you know, like twenty pages or so. And it is kind of an unusual early dialogue, because its extremely dense with a lot of complicated philosophy, which may be also true of some other early dialogues, but its quite special in this way. And a lot of contemporary ethicists have written about it. Say, like people like [Crispin Wright] and so on have picked up on certain ideas from The Euthyphro. Because it seems to, well a number of arguments that . . . that might be interesting for those who are studying the metaphysics of value, or what values are, or what problems values are or, what values of judgment are, and so on.

And so its a rather . . . its a text that speaks to a lot of people. At the same time, it is pretty standard Socratic dialogue in so far as, it has a what is X question as a guiding question so the . . . that is the kind of pattern that . . . that you see in a number of dialogs that Socrates asks, Well I would like to know what X is X and X stands as for virtue, lets say as, what is justice, what is moderation and so on.

In The Euthyphro this virtue that they want to know about what it is, is piety or the pious and people who are interested in the text are not necessarily interested in it because they are interested in piety, they are more interested in, as it were general questions about the metaphysics of value. However, the dialogue also has its own life in, as it were, the philosophy of religion, which are discussions that are that are somewhat separate from the meta-ethical discussions that I have in mind. Now so the

basic structure of the text is, so they ask what is piety and they come up with a couple of replies and all of them are rejected and it all ends in aphoria, that we dont know what piety is and thats a pretty standard, as it were pattern for early Platonic dialogues or Socratic dialogues, definitional dialogues, whatever. And however even though you would think that thats a pretty standard pattern and that dialogue clearly ends in aphoria, the general take on the dialogue has been somewhat out of tune with this fact, mainly people have read it or tend to read it as if Plato said, as if it were the upshot of the dialogue was that the pious is the [prior] value property that today people would talk of . . . that they would put forth the theory that today one would describe as realism, the Realist Theory of value, that the pious is a property that actions have independent of attitudes, that agents or assessors or whoever might have pious actions.

So the dialogue is taken both in the philosophy of religion and meta-ethical discussions as putting forth the view that the pious is, as it were, a real property, where one needs to sort of [rather] portion the distinction between realism and anti-realism doesnt quite fit the ancient discussion. So I will prefer to speak instead of attitude dependent or attitude independent value, because that is the distinction that A.) takes place in a lot of todays discussions, but it also really fits what Plato is talking about. So I will use this distinction attitude dependent and attitude independent. Now contrary to this sort of general view that what the dialogue says, is that pious is, as it were attitude independent value property.

I have to say this is completely implausible. Its A.) on any kind of ordinary understanding of piety that you might have, rather far-fetched because you might think that surely piety somehow involves humans and gods and some attitudes between them; humans doing things with the view to wanting to do what the gods say one should do, or whether to do gain divine approval and gods as they are looking at these actions and approving them. So on any kind of ordinary understanding of piety, it seems to be something located in what I would call a bidirectional relation between human beings and gods. So, the idea that, you know, of all properties piety should be an attitude independent property is somehow, you know, it should strike one as highly unlikely. And I will say that this is not what Plato suggests.

Commentators have been so fascinated with a particular stretch of text in The Euthyphro which is 10a to 11b, that they havent really, as it were read the rest of it, in a way because its a really short text and I want to argue that the dialogue is an extended argument as it were from the beginning to

the end and that it is a an analysis of value disagreement that in the course of this analysis value disagreement, Plato arrives at a distinction between attitude dependent and attitude independent value and that he suggests that A.) we need to distinguish between those kinds of values and if there is any attitude independent value, it has to be the good, or the just or the noble. That is the kind of triage of terms that he uses as sort of on the same level, good, just, noble, well noble isn't the translation of [krion] which is the Greek but a mix of ethically beautiful, kind, kind would also be another possible translation. Anyway, so I take the upshot of the dialogue to be that, if there was any attitude independent value, it is not the pious but the good, just, noble and that it is actually really difficult to understand these value properties, so that on this reading of the dialogue standards of Socratic dialogue leads you to a really hard question and makes you realize that you dont know the answer to this question. I take it to be an advantage of my reading that, you know, that this is in the sense of what you should expect.

So, I begin by sketching three cases of disagreement, three examples that I take to be the examples that Plato wants us to think about and they are described right at the beginning of the dialogue. The dialogue in a sense is very, as short as a paper it sort of has structure of the papers that you know today about disagreement, they also start with some example then they try to, you know give you some analysis of how to make sense of these examples. And it has that kind of structure.

So the dialogue starts with Plato and Euthyphro meeting in front of the courthouse and asking each other what are you doing and in that conversation three really complicated cases emerge. 1.) whether Socrates corrupts the young, by inventing new gods and not properly honoring the gods of the city. So that is the question that in a sense until today we do not know the answer. So does Socrates corrupt the young? Socrates says that Meletus, that is, his accuser, the person bringing charges against him must take himself to know what is good for human beings, because otherwise he wouldn't be able to assess what is corrupting the human beings. So Socrates thinks that in order to say to someone that corrupts people you have to know what's good and bad for people and that for Socrates seems like a daunting task. So he thinks that if someone brings charges against him that he is corrupting the young that person must know what's good and bad for human beings.

Well Socrates doesnt take himself to have that knowledge but presumably his accuser is confident in that ability. So that is the first example, is Socrates guilty as charged? And Im just, in order to highlight the difficulty of the discussion there is a famous paper by [Mike Stringer] where hes kind of

telling you, Well I gave this paper many times and many audiences and always have people vote at the beginning of the paper whether they think Socrates is guilty as charged at the beginning of the talk, everyone says no. Socrates is one of our heroes. He cannot be guilty, but then as we go to what we know about Socrates, then some of the arguments from The Apology then at the end of the talk he has the audience vote again and at the end of the talk, more than half the people think that Socrates actually is guilty as charged. So he is not agreeing with traditional religion. He is doing it. He is engaging in immoral education that the city does not approve of and so on and so forth. He is a kind of sophist. Anyway. So that case I want to suggest comes down to our how to assess the actions of someone maybe, someone like Socrates actions very difficult question how to access them.

Second example, Euthyphro is there in order to bring charges against his father. His father found out that one of his workers killed someone. The worker was drunk when he killed him, the other person. Euthyphros father didnt know how to punish the killer and he locked him up. However he forgot to give him any food or drink, so while he was sending for advice the prisoner died. Now Euthyphro is bringing charges against his father for murder. Again you can easily see it is really hard to assess the actions correctly. Was it murder? Was it manslaughter? Was it negligence? Was it whatever? What is it that his father actually did? Its also difficult to assess the deed of the prisoner. He was drunk when he killed the other person. Does that act count his murder or does that count to something else? And so on. So again these are cases where we dont quite know what the person did or is hard to say what the person did, lets say.

Third example, Euthyphro, himself is bringing charges against his father, which is considered deeply wrong from the traditional Greek point of view, because you do not bring charges against family members. Euthyphro says that whether you are related to someone or not should not play any role in whether you bring charges against them if they have committed a serious crime. And Socrates says to him, well you already know that no one is going to agree with you. So thats our third example for disagreement, the fact that Euthyphro brings charges against his father, which is a highly contested thing to do.

Now I want to run through some of the features of these cases and then continue with the next step in the dialogue. So one feature of these cases is that the disagreement is about assessing particular actions or sets of actions. And that is the point that will matter greatly and I will talk about that in a moment.

Second common feature and those features are on your handout is that the agents seek resolution by turning to the court. So in order to figure out how to evaluate a given action they turned to the court. Next feature I call Diachronic Disagreement in all of these cases, differences . . . the coexistence between older and newer ways of seeing things, is the source of disagreement. So say you know, traditionally one did not think it right to bring charges against family members but now the legal order somehow takes priority over family relationships and now the modern idea is that, that doesnt matter whether hes your father. Or different example, Socrates brings new ways of teaching to the city. Socrates like the Sophists, introduces novel ways of teaching and those clash with traditional Athenian custom. Or another example Euthyphros father, when he sends for advice, he sends for a so-called exegete, those are people who somehow interpret ancestral Athenial religious law. So he is sending for advice from, as it were, a kind of prophet type person. For then actions were assessed by a human court. So one aspect of disagreement is that part of the clash comes from the co-existence of old and newer ways of thinking.

Next feature on my handout is, kind of attitudes. So whether someone thinks that it is difficult to evaluate those kinds of questions, or whether someone thinks or whether someone is pretty confident that they get it right. Euthyphro is very confident that he gets it right. Socrates is at the other end of the spectrum. He is not bringing charges against anyone. He doesnt take himself to be in a position to judge whats right and wrong.

Next feature, the fact that [epistemic] confidence differs. [These] people react differently to what they see as wrong or different from what they do. Some blame others in quite confident ways and bring charges and others wont do that. Last feature, investigation of action, it is sometimes mentioned, as it were, an objection against Socratically inspired ancient skepticism, that if you, as it were, just keep an open mind, and want to investigate what is right and wrong you will not do anything and that doesnt work either. So it is sometimes said someone who adapts Socratic investigation will die from [antepraxea] or action.

And life is not just so that you can study or investigate forever. Youll have to do one thing or the other. And the case of Euthyphros father, as it were, brings in that aspect. He must [own his own] actions punishing or not punishing administering some kind of punishment to his worker by trying to get expert advice and he might think that thats a Socratically fine thing to do, but to realize but I don't

know what is right, let me ask the expert. However that doesnt quite work either because then in the meantime, he dies. Life is such that even though you dont know the answer, you have to do something a lot of the time. And Socrates, if you consider him some kind of model agent here, he does not stand for [commendation] of investigation and image, so he keeps an open mind but, he says I dont know whats good for human beings or whats good for the young, but he still, you know, hangs out with them all the time, and talks philosophy with all of them all the time. He is and can be confident that talking philosophy is going to be good for them. So the proposal, as it were, is that keeping an open mind can and should go together but nevertheless doing, as it were, what seems more likely to be right.

Okay. Now as I said, Im moving to the next section of the handout, the dialogue has like other Socratic dialogues, one guiding question, which has this what is X? form. And in Euthyphros case, the question is what is the pious? However the way this question is being introduced has a rather peculiar feature. And that feature is that this notion pious is introduced via two words, not one word. That is kind of strange, from Platonic point of view, because if you know any . . . probably most of you know The Republic, so there the question is, what is justice? And justice is being referred to throughout the text by one word. And that, as it were, signals on the level of language that we take ourselves to be investigating one property. So we want to know what justice is. And on the level of language that is signaled by referring to that one thing, that we want to understand why one word.

Now in Euthyphro, the question was the pious is introduced via two words and these words have an interesting difference between them. They are on your handouts to eusebes and to hosion. Namely the former in ordinary Greek, refers more to the action of reverence that human beings have towards the Gods. Whereas the latter, to hosion refers more . . . and so, as it were, they both sort of mean pious but so, this is about nuances through usage. To hosion refers more to what the gods declare to be sacred or what the gods ordain. So these two terms have different opposite directionality. One is more human attitude to the gods. The other is more mind attitude through types of actions or whatever. And I take it to be really quite interesting that the question is introduced in this way. Because for a Greek reader, that it would always [flag] the point that I want to make, is that pious is evidently about attitudes that both relata in this set up of humans and God have to each other.

Okay. So the first answer that Euthyphro gives to the question, what is the pious is the pious is what I am doing now, namely bringing charges against my father. And Socrates response to this, in a way

that seems to rid us of the Socratic dialogues, as the familiar response. He says, I didnt ask you for an example. I wanted to know what the pious is. So in a quasi-literal gloss of the Greek, I want to know the what it is of the pious.

This kind of move in Socratic dialogue has been intensely discussed and famously Peter Geach argued as it were in picking up on some ideas of Wittgenstein, that Socrates move or Platos move is, as it were, deeply misguided. He argued that in our ordinary life, we are very well able to give examples of X even if we don't know what X is. So that in our case it would be very valuable to give examples of piety even though we dont know what piety is. And thats precisely what Socrates rejects as Socrates says, I didnt ask you to give me an example and you actually cannot give me an example of X, when you dont know what X is, because in order to give an example, you need as it were, the model or the what is it of X. You need to know what X is in order to then identify instances of X.

And that might seem highly implausible to a lot of people. Now, I want to, as it were, defend the intuition in Plato and Socrates. Platos and Aristotles favorite example for this kind of thing, is for Theaetetus. That, you know if you wanted to determine whether Theaetetus is the smart liar and trickster and thief or, a practically wise person, you would need to understand what practical wisdom is. Theaetetus is sort of the paradigmatically the smart guy. He always knows how to get out of things. He always finds a way. And both Plato and Aristotle use him as an example for, you know, in order to assess whether someone is practically wise, that is to say that Theaetetus is practically wise, then you need an account of wisdom. And thats awfully hard. Now, same thing here can be applied to our example cases. In order to say, assess whether Socrates is corrupting the young with his mode of education, you would need to know what is good for the young. And that really is very hard. So why should we confidently think that we can assess actions as pious, impious, corrupting, not corrupting, and so on and so forth.

Now The Euthyphro makes, as it were, a furthermore, mainly to emphasize, that its not just as it were, contra Geach. That these particular judgments, this is just, this is pious, this is corrupting the young, and so on; they are difficult. They are, as it were precisely the kinds of things that people disagree about. They are precisely the kind of things that we see pervasive disagreement and that people get into fights and yet people dont quite know how to figure out the answer. So if we take seriously that there are a lot of cases where people disagree precisely at about these particular

assessments then, as it were, it seems to be not on the right track. Whereas, Socrates and Plato seem to have a point, namely that the assessment of particular cases is really difficult, and in order to be able to say that the act is pious or is correcting the young or whatever you would need to know a lot.

So the first response to what is the pious has been rejected. This is just an example and youre not even able to give an example because you dont know. You havent told me what piety is. Then Euthyphro comes up with the next attempt. And he says, that, well the pious is what the gods love. And that gets modified to what all the gods love. And Euthyphro is committed to, as it were, the traditional picture of Greek religion, where the gods fight. And that Socrates says, You know I dont agree with you. You know that. Lets set that aside and go with your assumption, that the gods fight and they were . . . You know, I mean, all these stories about the Greek gods, how they deceive each other and so on. So lets assume that they disagree as you think that they disagree. Then there will be things that some gods love and other gods dont love. And that it is so that the gods disagree. However, Socrates doesn't, as it were, himself believe that the gods disagree. That is just going along with the present Greek religion, which is what Euthyphro is committed to. And because Socrates isnt, as it were, interested in talking about those kinds of gods that he doesn't believe in any way, he says, Well you know, Im actually interested in that kind of phenomenon and if the gods disagree then they will disagree in precisely the same way that human beings disagree. And that remark launches a very detailed account of value disagreement. So that is what I want to talk about now.

The first premise in this account of value disagreement: what happens when people disagree, is that disagreement is about this [triage] of properties, that were referred to earlier good, noble, just. Thats a very remarkable thing to say at this point of the dialogue. Because the dialogue is about what is piety and you would expect that . . . now, they just talked about how some gods love this and other gods love that. So they should say, well the gods would disagree about what is pious. But Socrates doesnt say that. He says well, if they disagree they will disagree the same way which we disagree they will disagree about what is good and bad, what is just and unjust, what is noble, kind and shameful.

And this move to what I will talk about as first order value properties: good, just, noble and their opposites, is reinforced by Euthyphro comparing himself to Zeus. Euthyphro, in defending why its the right thing for him or why it is pious of him to bring charges against his father, says, and dont you

recall what Zeus did to his father, Zeus father Chronos. So Zeus mutilated his father, Chronos. Thats part of the horrible saga of the generations of Greek gods that Zeus came into power by mutilating his own father and then becoming the supreme Olympian god. So dont you recall that Zeus also acted against his own father Chronos. And Zeus is said to have acted most just and good in acting against his father.

And at that point it becomes clear that if you take the perspective of the divine assessors of the picture it would be nonsensical to describe actions as pious or impious. It wouldnt make sense to say of Zeus that he was pious of him to strike out against his father because theres presumably there is no one above Zeus to evaluate his actions. So the moment you take out of the picture, the kind of framework where you have some kind of superior mind assessor that looks at your action, it becomes nonsensical to describe the actions as pious. And instead the action must be described as just or good, in terms of what are called, first order value properties.

The second premise, value disagreements differ from other disagreements [such as] there is no method for resolution. Sometimes this method is comparable to counting or measuring. Thats a rather strange move. The claim is that, the [alternate] of other domains these other domains are not distinguished from the domain of value in terms that would be familiar to us today. So its a not distinction between [extant] value [patterns]. Its not a distinction between the normative and descriptive or anything of that sort. Its a distinction between domains where we have methods of disagreement resolution and domains where we dont. And methods of disagreement resolution are referred to as methods of measurement. Whatever these methods of measurement would be. So in other domains we have methods of measurement and if you and I disagree, say how many chairs are in the room, then we can count. And that is an established method of disagreement resolution. And we have no analog to that in the domain of value. So we have no method of resolution that is, as it were, established among all of us. And we can turn to that method and figure out whos right.

Next premise, people love what they consider good, and they hate what they consider the opposite. Therefore, value disagreement involves fighting and conflict and hostility and anger. Now, thats again a complicated claim. For Plato, it is the real question whether loving the good should go along with hating the bad? However at this point, it is just stipulated, as it were, that people love that which they consider good; they hate that which they consider bad. And therefore value disagreement is special

amongst other kinds of disagreements. Because it makes people fight. And thats different from say, us disagreeing about the number of chairs in the room.

Value disagreement further involves agreement on conceptual claims, like the wrong should be righted. So the next claim is that even if we disagree, there is actually something that we agree on. And the Greek language in which this is phrased is, you know, very [clear] that it should be a conceptual claim. Its when people have done wrong, which is [a dekein] then, [dekei] which is right, should be done in response. So, the wrong should be made right or something like that. That presumably we agree on, those kinds of perceptual agreements on the background when we disagree on particular cases.

Next premise is the point I already discussed in detail, disagreement is about particulars. And here this point Socrates says it is about a . . . because it is about particular actions, it is about who did what and when.

Final premise in this [sketch up], that is [agreement], when the gods disagree whether an action that are god, noble or just . . . good, noble or just . . . sorry, then the action is either, neither kinds, either kinds or is both. And those actions are not pursued in the text. It is, as it were, stipulated that those are confusing ideas. So if it were the case, that value was conferred by an attitude, should we then think that in a case of disagreement, where you, as it were, confer one property on the act and I confer the other property on the action, does it cancel each other out, does it add up? That, all that is pretty strange and it is not pursued. And instead that kicks off the metaphysical portion of the dialogue.

So they say, okay this is probably where we need an account of the metaphysical now. And this leads to the famous Euthyphro Problem. Ill read out the questions, that is probably something you all heard of, is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? Now the discussion of this question is the reason why commentators standardly think that Socrates or Plato hold that the pious is the real property and an independent property. Because it seems at this point in the text, that that they go for a . . . A.) is the option that the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious. And that seems to suggest that pious is, as it were, a property that actions just have and the gods respond to it. So that is the standard reading.

Now I wont go into as it were all the detail of the argument, which is pretty dense. But heres roughly how it works. The analysis of godlove, which is one of the properties they look at now. So they look at pious, the property pious and the property godlove. The analysis of the property godlove works by comparing it to three other properties: carry, lift and see . . . no, four and move, sorry. Move is a much more general word than carry, so I think we can say that is fine. So the comparisons are godlove is like carry, lift and see. Its a very strange idea.

Now, the first thing to say about those kinds of properties; is that there need to be two relata. So if something gets carried then, you know say, the chair is carried. Then its said, I carried the chair. So the chair gets to have the property, carried, by being carried. And there are two relata.

The second point is what I call dependence. This is the relation between these two relata, is as it were, one directional. I carried the chair. The chair doesnt have any attitude to me, but I, as it were, [actively] do something with the chair, carry or whatever, the chair. If you take the example of seeing, say, I see the chair, I don't [add anything] to the chair. The chair by being seen doesnt have attitude to me, or something like that sort.

So, Plato expresses this then, in terms of sort of, rather, the kind of theoretical term, in terms of, becoming a qualification by being carried or say, by being seen, the chair comes to have the quality: seen. Or, yeah, thats . . . so those three ideas which are discussed all in terms of carrying stuff and seeing things or [leading] someone, lead to the kind of first time conclusion, an interim conclusion. Namely, that there was a difference between two kinds of, two, between two properties. Namely, between carry, between being carried, between carry and that which is being carried. Or say and, and . . . chair, lets say, thats it.

So similarly say, the gods love your action A.) which you perform right now. Godlove is like carry, in the sense that there is a relation between two relata which only goes in one direction. The gods love your action. Your action comes to have the quality of godlove, in the same way that the chair comes to have the qualities seen or carried. But your action doesnt, as it were, have any . . . your action in the same way in which the chair, doesnt have attitude to me by being seen. Your action doesnt, as it were, relate to the gods. So the analysis of godlove, is that it is a property that or quality that something comes to have by standing in relation to a divine assessor who approves of it and thats as it were all. So thats a pretty complicated argument for something that may appear awfully simple.

Now the next step in the argument is that, if suppose your action is a pious action and it is loved by the gods and that action comes to have the property of godlove. Then your action, as it were, what it is, prayer to and independent of standing, being loved by the gods. Therefore pious and godlove must be two properties because your actions comes to be loved on account of what it is. So it is already pious. And it comes to have the property godlove through standing in that relation, being loved by the gods. Therefore, pious and godlove are A.) two properties and B.) two kinds of properties, because one of them is this one directional attitudinal property. Whereas the other, pious must be more complicated, as it must involve your attitude towards the gods.

Now, interpreters tend to think that there must be a flaw in . . . and Im sure now you must also think there must be a flaw in this argument, because it is so strange. There must be a flaw in this argument, because some properties of Plato seem to presuppose that the gods love something for a reason. So in giving us these two options whether the gods love the pious because it is pious or whether the pious is pious because the gods love it. The option doesnt come up that the gods may, as it were, just randomly, you know, or capriciously, as the Greek gods are, love whatever they love. And that is standardly considered the flaw in the argument.

However, my proposal is that if we include the analysis of disagreement that we saw earlier, and that is directly preceding this argument then we have a premise in place, which was the first premise about disagreement, namely that, gods respond to the good. When they disagree, Socrates said then they disagree about what is good and bad and justice and unjust and noble and shameful. So we already have the premise in place that the gods attitudes are not capricious. They are also not based on what is pious. They are based on what they see as, good, just, noble. So that gives us the distinction between three kinds of properties.

A.) those most basic properties like, good, just, noble, to which the gods respond. B.) the one directional attitudinal property of godlove and 3.) the bidirectional attitudinal property of pious, which involves not just the gods loving the actions, [but includes who is doing it, who is doing the pleasing to the gods.]

So I take the upshot of this argument to be that, if you want to do metaphysics of value, you need to think about some such distinction between different kinds of value properties. And more over, it

seems that in our daily disagreement about values, on the one hand we ultimately want to refer to those most basic properties like good and just. On the other hand, we talk a lot in terms of what is pious and impious and invoke those types of relations. But also compare this [triage] of properties to a [triage] of properties that could come up in the legal domain. You could . . . and that is a plausible thing to do because the whole dialogue has, as it were, has the courthouse as its setting. So in the legal domain you might think the law aims to [adhere] to that which is to be done which is just or right or good. And that as not to be done or to be punished which is unjust or bad or shameful. So the law would ultimately . . . as the gods would ultimately pick up on what is good and just and noble. The law aims to pick up that which is good and just and noble.

So then you can have the one directional attitude dependent property that human beings try to do that which is legal. So an action might be legal, in so far as, it agrees with what the law says. And then you have the bidirectional relational property, which you could call lawful or something like that. Where its not just the case that an action is assessed as legal. But the agent also, as it were, confers it, in the spirit of wanting to adhere to the law and that notion of what is lawful. I think I described legal the wrong way. Legal should be that the law declares something to be right or just. And then lawful would be the bidirectional property where the law says that something is right and an agent performs the action in the spirit of wanting to do what the law says.

Now let me wrap this up. So the proposal I think that merges from the Euthyphro is that, we tend to operate with different kinds of value properties. And some of them can be understood in terms of attitudes and relations between assessors or that which is authoritative and those who try to comply with that authority. So pious or godlove would be so, such attitude dependent properties. But when we talk in these terms, ultimately we hope to [confer] an attitude independent value. Ultimately we assume that, that which the gods became to be or that which the gods approve of, they approve of because they see it as good. Similarly to how we hope, that that the law doesnt just set out something or the other but that which is just. So even though we operate with these attitude dependent kind of values we hope that they ultimately pick out attitude independent value. However the very beginning of the dialogue and the analysis of disagreement says that those attitude independent properties or values are the properties that they disagree about. So or are we pervasively and importantly disagree about. So even though, we can as it were, maybe hope that the law ultimately the picks out that which is good or just. Or the gods pick out that which is good or just. It is not at all the case that it has [a good handle] on these attitude dependent properties. Those are

precisely the properties where, in our ordinary every daily judgments, we disagree about them. We disagree which action is good and bad; which action is just or unjust, and so on, and so on.

So, I take the upshot of the dialogue to be that pious is not an attitude independent property. Godlove is certainly not an attitude independent property. Hopefully and maybe, good and just are attitude independent properties. But those are the properties that we disagree about.

And so those are the properties that we need to study. Now that as it were a starting point for a huge research project. And I take it that, that makes a lot [premises] of where Plato goes from here, in a way that is quite stunning. Piety does not show up after The Euthyphro, The Republic, other major ethical text in Plato or about what is good or what is the just. They are, as it were situated in the sphere of, as it were, purely human ethical terms. And that is not meant I think, or here I agree I guess with the standard reading of these dialogs, that is not meant as a dismissal of religion. So that it is not meant as implying that reading as being reverent to the gods, or whatever, is completely confused or maybe even wrong. That . . . its not meant that way, that there is a lot to be said about god being good and you know, honoring the gods and so on. I think it is meant as if you want to understand the nature of value, that those are the most basic properties and that therefore that is what we need to study and that is the really difficult subject to study, to study in ethics. And only if you understand those basic properties like good and just, then you can move on and say something about these attitudinal properties that aim to [pick out] these basic properties. Thank you.