Eastern Shipping Lines vs.

POEA 166 SCRA 533 POEA: Cases under the Jurisdiction of POEA Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. (COACO) petitioner,vs. SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THEDEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7 AND CEBUOXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COACVEA) respondents. . GANCAYCO, J.; FACTS:Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and CentralVisayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement(CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988.1) For the first year w each coveredemployee.2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16, 1987-P 200 to each coveredemployee.On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage, insum, Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversaryw a g e i n c r e a s e s n e g o t i a t e d u n d e r a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t a g a i n s t s u c h w a g e increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640.On February 22, 1988, a Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to InspectionAuthority No. 058-88, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. Uponcompletion of the inspection on March 10, 1988, and based on payrolls and other records, hefound that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows:1. Under payment of Basic Wage per R.A. No. 6640 covering the period of two(2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages aboveP100/day prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83,200.00); and2 . U n d e r p a y m e n t o f 1 3 t h m o n t h p a y f o r t h e y e a r 1 9 8 7 , r e p r e s e n t i n g 2 0 8 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivityof R.A. No. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND ANDFORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48,048.00). ISSUE:The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not an Implementing Order of theSecretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated bythe law it seeks to implement. HELD: As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. 6640,w h i c h p r o h i b i t s t h e e m p l o y e r f r o m c r e d i t i n g t h e a n n i v e r s a r y w a g e i n c r e a s e s p r o v i d e d i n collective bargaining agreements, it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic ActNo. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such aprohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislativeauthority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannotbe expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 3 Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existingCBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determi ning compliancewith the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amountthat should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when thelaw took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already a ccrued in favor of the employeeseven before the said law was enacted.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic6640, is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increasesnegot iated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. 6440. This decision is immediately executory.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC FACTS: In the run up to the 1995 Elections, former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (IMR) filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Congressperson of the 1st District of Leyte, which encompasses the city of Tacloban and the towns of the northeastern Leyte, including Tolosa, versus the incumbent Cirilo Roy Montejo In her COC, IMR stated that she had been a resident of Tolosa for several years prior to the election. CMR moved for her disqualification, arguing that IMRs residency fell short of the 1-year residency requirement. IMR sought to amend her COC entry to since birth (which is actually futile since she was born in San Miguel, Manila). The COMELEC refused the amendment, correctly holding that it was filed out of time, and disqualified IMR. IMR trounced CRM and appealed to the Supreme Court, on the contention that she did not lose her residency even when she went to Manila, married then Congressman Marcos, lived in Malacanang and fled to Hawaii, since she was only following the residence of her husband, who under the Civil Code then in force, had sole authority to determine the family residence. ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner has lost her domicile based on the foregoing facts to be a ground for disqualifying her for the congressional election. The Court ruled that: For purposes of election, residency and domicile are synonymous to each other. It is only in Civil Law that we keep the distinction between the two, which is: Residence where one stays at the moment Domicile where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence at one point, with animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus revertendi (intent to retun if absent). In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity (domicilium necessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose her domicile, and her father chose Tolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to Ferdie did not necessarily result in the loss of that domicile in favor of a new one since (1) a woman follows only the actual residence of her husband and not his domicile and (2) as a rule, change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of three elements, (1) actual removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts effecting that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained as evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban and Tolosa, and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district, thereby negating the last two requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when, by her acts she proved her intent to follow her husbands domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for the recovery of her ancestral house in Tolosa, and public announcement to represent the 1st District in Congress after she returned from US exile and almost three years before the 1995 elections, showed her decision to re-establish her domicile there (domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying the minimum residency requirement. Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying her.

CO vs. HRET Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.

Dimaporo v. Mitra FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress. Grounds may be termed to be shortened: 1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof. 2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4. Voluntary renunciation of office ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another government position HELD: N o. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935 Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and he should therefore resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of better service.

BANAT v. COMELEC GR Nos. 179271 & 179295, 21 April 2009 Carpio, J. Facts: COMELEC applied the Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula upon the completion of the canvass and party-list results, thereby proclaiming 15 party-lists to have obtained 21 seats in Congress. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives (all 55 seats have to be proclaimed) provided by the Constitution before the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC denied the said petition, stating that it had already become moot and academic. Issues and Ruling: 1. W/N the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. 2. W/N the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional. NO. In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. The Court finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. The Court strikes down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941.1 The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. 3. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of RA 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: (1)The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than 3 seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in RA 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? 1 Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, that those garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three seats.