Vietnam and the United States: Convergence but not Congruence of Strategic Interests in the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper to The 4th Engaging With Vietnam Interdisciplinary Dialogue Conference - Australian Night co-sponsored by the Australian Consulate General, Monash University, and the East-West Center The Hawaii Imin International Conference Center Honolulu, November 8-9, 2012

Vietnam and the United States: Convergence but not Congruence of Strategic Interests in the South China Sea
Carlyle A. Thayer*
Introduction
On the occasion of the 15th anniversary (1995-2010) of the normalization of diplomatic relations Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in Hanoi that America considers Vietnam not only important on its own merits, but as part of a strategy aimed at enhancing American engagement in the Asia Pacific, and in particular Southeast Asia. According to Secretary Clinton, all the fundamentals were in place for the U.S. to take its relations with Vietnam to the next level of engagement, cooperation, friendship, and partnership.1 Seventeen years ago bilateral relations were weighed down by unsettled issues arising from the Vietnam War: full accounting for U.S. Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, Vietnamese refugees, and Vietnams demand that the U.S. address the wounds of war and stop its support for anti-communist exiles seeking to overthrow the Hanoi government. Some aspects of these legacy issues still persist today but are no longer the centerpiece of the bilateral relationship. The U.S. accepts that Vietnam is doing its best in providing a full accounting for MIAs. Nevertheless, the POW/MIA issue still remains one of the U.S. governments highest priorities with Vietnam. In reciprocation for Vietnamese humanitarian assistance in addressing the MIA issue, the U.S. has made cooperation in health the cornerstone of its assistance program and directs three-quarters of its funding to addressing HIV/AIDS and pandemic influenza. Vietnam has pressed for reciprocity in addressing legacy issues and in recent years has asked the United States for assistance in dealing with Agent Orange hot spots. Congress has appropriated funds to assist with dioxin removal and to provide health care facilities in Danang where Agent Orange was once stored. In 2010, Secretary Clinton promised in Hanoi

Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. Email: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
1

For an assessment see: Carlyle A. Thayer, US-Vietnam Relations: A Scorecard, Asia Pacific Bulletin (EastWest Center, Washington, D.C.), No. 67, September 14, 2010. 1-2.

3 to increase our cooperation and make even greater progress together to deal with the legacy of Agent Orange. Economics took center stage in 2000 with the signing of a Bilateral Trade Agreement. In 2007, Vietnam and the United States reached a Trade and Investment Agreement. Two-way trade jumped 48 fold from $450 million in 1995 to $21.8 billion in 2011. In 2011, Vietnam had a U.S. $13.1 billion trade surplus with the U.S. Obama Administration officials support Vietnams full participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership to expand free trade. American companies have invested more than $10 billion in Vietnam, placing the U.S. among the top ten investors. Economic relations also include a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement (2003, amended in 2008) and a Bilateral Maritime Agreement (2007). Over 200 memoranda of understanding have been signed between universities in both countries. Political relations have steadily improved since 2000 when Bill Clinton became the first American president to visit Hanoi. In 2006 and 2007, the U.S. and Vietnamese presidents exchanged reciprocal visits. A major turning point occurred in June 2008 when Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Washington. In a joint statement, the United States declared its respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam and its opposition to the use of force to overthrow the Hanoi government, thus addressing one of the Vietnamese concerns noted above. Prime Minister Dung returned to Washington in April 2010 to attend President Barrack Obamas Nuclear Security Summit. In April the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation in nuclear power including access to reliable sources of nuclear fuel. This agreement reportedly will open the door for American companies such as Bechtel and General Electric to sell nuclear reactors to Vietnam. While there is definitely new momentum in the relationship, there are constraints and potential difficulties in the path ahead. The first concern is what Secretary Clinton described as profound differences over human rights and political freedom. Human rights remain the main point of contention in bilateral relations. U.S. officials repeatedly have made clear that arms sales to Vietnam are not possible until the human rights situation improves. The second constraint arises from conservative elements in Vietnam who still view the United States with suspicion. They not only characterize religious freedom, human rights

4 and democracy as tools to undermine Vietnams socialist regime, but argue that educational exchanges are part of the plot of peaceful evolution. These conservatives oppose the current trajectory in defense relations because of the potential friction it may cause in relations with China. A third constraint lies in different expectations regarding economic reforms. The U.S. has offered technical assistance in trade and investment matters and would like to encourage good governance. But many obstacles stand in the way. Corruption is rampant and affects all sectors. Vietnamese government decision-making lacks transparency, such as the imposition of price controls two years ago. Vietnam is frustrated by what it considers politically motivated trade barriers such as anti-dumping and anti-subsidy taxes on Vietnamese goods as well as U.S. pressures to equitize state-owned enterprises. Vietnam and the United States reportedly are working towards upgrading their bilateral relations into a formal strategic partnership. This process apparently has stalled over U.S. insistence on a separate chapter dealing with human rights and religious freedom. Vietnam would like to subsume these issues in a chapter dealing with political relations. This paper would like to like to focus more narrowly on one aspect of the bilateral relationship - security and defence cooperation - with a specific focus on whether the South China Sea issue has resulted in a convergence of strategic interests that might override obstacles to the development of a strategic partnership. This paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 examines the evolution of Vietnam-U.S. defence cooperation between 2003 ad 2007. Part 2 examines the similarities and differences in their respective national interests in the South China Sea in the years after 2007. In particular, the paper assesses the China factor in shaping national interests. Part 3 examines the interaction between Vietnam and the United States in multilateral settings with a focus on meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF), the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (2010) and the East Asia Summit (2011). Part 4, the conclusion, argues that the growing strategic convergence between Vietnam and the United States does not signify strategic congruence

Part 1 The evolution of Vietnam-U.S. defence cooperation, 2003-2007

Military-to-military relations between Vietnam and the U.S. developed slowly after 1995 because Vietnam was concerned that defense relations might outstrip economic ties.2 In 2000, William Cohen became the first U.S. Secretary of Defense to visit Hanoi.3 The year 2003 proved pivotal In July 2003, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Central Committees eighth plenum redefined its ideological approach to interstate relations by adopting the concepts doi tac (object of cooperation) and doi tuong (object of struggle). In other words, Vietnam had come to view its relations with China and the United States as containing elements of both cooperation and struggle when either state adopted policies that affected Vietnams nation interests.4 In the case of socialist China, territorial disputes in the South China Sea was an issue that required Vietnam to struggle. In 2003 General Pham Van Tra, Vietnams Minister of National Defence, made a visit to Washington to reciprocate the visit of Secretary Cohen three years earlier. Significantly, during General Tras visit it as agreed that exchanges between defence ministers would take place every three years on an alternating basis. Tensions in the South China Sea have prompted Vietnam to enter into a strategic dialogue with the U.S. a year before agreeing to a strategic dialogue with China. Vietnam upgraded its strategic dialogue with the US to deputy minister level prior to doing so with China. In the past it was always China first. Vietnam is motivated to keep the U.S. engaged in Southeast Asia, and the South China Sea in particular, as a balance to China. Despite these important developments, defence cooperation proceeded gradually over the next several years until 2007.

For background consult: Carlyle A. Thayer, Cooperation on All Fronts: Strengthening U.S.-Vietnam Defense Ties, Vietnam Business Journal 8(4), October 1999, http://www.viam.com/oct99/toc.html and Carlyle A. Thayer, The Prospects for Strategic Dialogue, in Catharin E. Dalpino editor, Dialogue on U.S.-Vietnam Relations: Ten Years After Normalization (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, 2005), 26-30.
3

Carlyle A. Thayer, Why Secretary Cohens Visit Mattered, Vietnam Business Journal, May 2000, internet version. http://www.viam.com/05-2000/cohen.htm.
4

Carlyle A. Thayer, The Tyranny of Geography: Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(3), 2011, 348-369.

Part 2 Convergence of National Interests

In January 2007, the fourth plenum of the VCP Central Committee resolved to draw up a plan to develop Vietnams maritime resources by integrating economic development in the coastal areas with hydrocarbon and aquatic resources in Vietnams Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. When China got wind of this it proceeded to apply pressure on U.S. and other foreign oil companies (ExxonMobile, Chevron, BP, ONGC) not to assist Vietnam with the implied threat that their commercial interests in China would suffer. Chinas actions were not only provocative but a blow to Vietnams long-term economic development. In 2007, the Bush Administration amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to permit the U.S. to consider licenses, other approvals, exports or imports of nonlethal defense articles and defense services to Vietnam on a case by case basis. ITAR was issued by the Department of State under the Arms Export Control Act enacted by the U.S. Congress and Executive Order 11958 issued by the President. The U.S., however, continues to prohibit licenses, other approvals, exports or imports of lethal defense articles and services destined for Vietnam. The defense articles are included on the United States Munitions List. The 2007 amendments to ITAR further specified that U.S. restrictions also cover the components of lethal weapons and non-lethal crowd control equipment and night vision devises to be used by any Vietnamese agency with responsibility for ground security. In June 2008, Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made a high-profile trip to the United States where he met with President George W. Bush. Dung also became the first Vietnamese prime minister since 1975 to visit the Pentagon. In a joint statement released after the Bush-Dung meeting, both sides agreed to hold annual high-level talks on security and strategic issues. In October 2008, the U.S. and Vietnam inaugurated their first Political, Security and Defense Dialogue was held in Washington. The dialogue was convened by the U.S. State Department and Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs and focused on regional security and strategic issues. The Political, Security and Defence Dialogue meets annually alternating between Washington and Hanoi. The most recent U.S.-Vietnam Political, Security, and Defense Dialogue, the fifth, was held in Hanoi on June 20, 2012. It was co-chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew

7 Shapio. Also in 2008 the State Department amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to allow the export of non-lethal defence articles to Vietnam. When the Obama Administration came to office in 2009 it had to craft a policy response to Chinese harassment of U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters. A serious confrontation took place in March 2009 when Chinese civilian ships accosted the USNS Impeccable in waters off Hainan. At the same time the Obama Administration had to respond to Chinese pressures on American oil companies engaged in legitimate commercial activities. These twin developments sharpened the growing convergence of strategic interests between Vietnam and the United States. In July 2009, two high-ranking Administration officials gave testimony to the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, outlined a four-point strategy to deal with Chinese harassment of U.S. naval vessels:
In support of our strategic goals, the [Defense] Department has embarked on a multi-pronged strategy that includes; 1) clearly demonstrating, through word and deed, that U.S. forces will remain present and postured as the preeminent military force in the region; 2) deliberate and calibrated assertions of our freedom of navigation rights by U.S. Navy vessels; 3) building stronger security relationships with partners in the region, at both the policy level through strategic dialogues and at the operational level by building partner capacity, especially in the maritime security area, and 4) strengthening the military-diplomatic mechanisms we have with China to improve communications and reduce the risk of miscalculation.5

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel noted in his remarks that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in East Asias waterways (italics added). And more pointedly, after reviewing cases of Chinese intimidation against American oil and gas companies working with Vietnamese partners, Marciel stated, We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies.6 U.S.-Vietnam defence relations stepped up noticeably in 2009 when both sides engaged in several high-profile but largely symbolic interactions and, more significantly, stepped up
5

Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 15 July 2009.
6

Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 15 July 2009.

8 defence consultations. In April, Vietnamese military officials were flown out to the USS John D. Stennis, an aircraft carrier operating in the South China Sea, to observe air operations. In 2009, Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung dramatically announced that the commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay would be open to all navies of the world. The U.S. was the first country to take up the offer; the first repair was conducted on the USNS Safeguard in the port of Saigon in September 2009. The following year the United States and Vietnam signed a contract for the minor maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy Sealift ships. Five ship voyage repairs were subsequently completed including four in the commercial facilities at Cam Ranh Bay: the USNS Richard E. Byrd in February-March 2010 (Van Phong Bay), August 2011 and June 2012; the USNS Walter S. Diehl in October 2011 and the USNS Rappahannock in February 2012. The US ships are logistics ships largely crewed by civilians and not warships. The cost of the repairs is minor, just under a half million US dollars each. In December 2009, Vietnams Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh repaid the May 2006 visit of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Enroute to Washington, Thanh touched down in Honolulu to meet with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. During his stop over Thanh was photographed peering through the periscope of the USS Florida, a nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN). In his discussions with Secretary Rumsfeld, General Thanh asked the United States to relax its ban on military equipment and weapon sales to Vietnam. In July 2010, on the fifteenth anniversary of normalization, Vietnams deputy ambassador visited the newest U.S. aircraft carrier USS George W. H. Bush in Norfolk, Virginia, while half a world away Vietnamese local government and military officials flew out to the USS George Washington (CVN 73) in waters off Vietnams central coast. In August 2010, the U.S. and Vietnam conducted their first naval engagement activities when the guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain called in at Da Nangs Tien Sa port.7 In July the following year, three U.S. navy ships - the guided missile destroyers USS ChungHoon and USS Preble and the USNS Safeguard anchored at Tien Sa port and participated in

U.S. and Vietnamese sailors interacted in shipboard damage control, a search and rescue demonstration and an exchange of culinary arts (cooking recipes).

9 naval exchange activities.8 The third naval exchange activity took place in April 2012 when three U.S. Navy ships, USS Blue Ridge, USS Chafee and USNS Safeguard, berthed at Tien Sa port, Da Nang for five days. The two navies conducted salvage and repair, and disaster training. The terms naval engagement and naval activities signify that are not combat naval exercises and involve only non-combat skills and training. Also in August 2010, in a significant upgrade of their defence relationship, Vietnam and the U.S. held their 1st Defense Dialogue at deputy defence minister level.9 This meeting focused on bilateral issues such as MIA accounting, unexploded wartime ordnance, Agent Orange, and areas for future cooperation such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, international peacekeeping and maritime security. The two sides also exchanged views on Chinas military modernisation. In October 2010, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh, Deputy Minister of National Defence, returned to Washington to discuss U.S. participation at the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting with their eight dialogue partners (ADMM Plus). Secretary of Defense Robert Gates subsequently attended the first ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi (his visit was not part of the agreement on exchange of visits by defence ministers). In 2011 bilateral defence relations continued on their steady course. In April, the President of the National Defense University, Vice Admiral Ann Rondreau, visited Hanoi and offered scholarships for Vietnamese officers to undertake professional military education in the United States. In June, the U.S. and Vietnam held their 4th Political, Security and Defense Dialogue, in Washington. This meeting focused on peacekeeping operations and training, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, non-proliferation and maritime security. In August, the U.S. and Vietnam signed their first formal military agreement, a Statement of Intent on Military Medical Cooperation;10 the Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet visited Hanoi; and the USS George Washington returned to Vietnamese waters; once again Vietnamese officials were flown out to observe operations.
8

These activities included navigation, search and rescue training, damage control, dive and salvage training, and a community relations project involving medical and dental care.
9

Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnams Defensive Diplomacy, The Wall Street Journal, August 20-22, 2010, 11. The U.S. proposes to transfer a medical research unit from Thailand to Vietnam.

10

10 U.S.-Vietnam defence relations were significantly advanced at the 2nd Defence Policy Dialogue held in Washington on 19 September. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Robert Scher and Vice Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh signed the first formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation. The MOU included five priority areas: the establishment of a regular high-level dialogue between defence ministries; maritime security; search and rescue; studying and exchanging experiences on UN peacekeeping;11 and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The MOU in fact codified activities that were already under discussion and was primarily a transparency measure. The most recent high-level defence visit was undertaken by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in June 2012.12 In a surprise development Secretary Panetta made a quick detour to Cam Ranh Bay before arriving in Hanoi. Secretary Panettas call to Cam Ranh Bay was the first visit to this former American base by a U.S. Secretary of Defense since the end of the Vietnam War.13 The purpose of Secretary Panettas detour was to visit the USNS Richard E. Byrd, a dry cargo ship undergoing minor repairs in the commercial section of the bay. Secretary Panetta addressed the crew of the USNS Richard E. Byrd. He took this opportunity to link the U.S strategy of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific with developing a partnership with Vietnam. In particular, Secretary Panetta focused on the possibility of future visits to Cam Ranh by U.S. Navy ships. He said, Access for United States naval ships into this facility is a key component of this relationship, and we see a tremendous potential here for the future. We look forward to working together with the country of Vietnam to achieve our shared objectives and to take this relationship to the next level. After concluding his stop over in Cam Ranh, Secretary Panetta flew to Hanoi for consultations with General Thanh. Media reporting focused on the carefully choreographed exchange of war artifacts, letters recovered from the remains of two fallen soldiers, one

11

Vietnam is poised to make its first contribution to international peacekeeping under United Nations auspices.
12

Carlyle A. Thayer, Hanoi and the Pentagon: A Budding Courtship, U.S. Naval Institute, June 11, 2012. http://news.usni.org/news-analysis/hanoi-and-pentagon-budding-courtship
13

Cam Ranh Bay is judged to be one of the best deep water ports in Asia. It is strategically located facing the Spratly Islands in the middle of the South China Sea.

11 Vietnamese and one American. Vietnam used this occasion to announce that it had removed restrictions on MIA search and recovery efforts from three sensitive areas. Secretary Panetta and his counterpart, General Phung Quang Thanh, reviewed progress on the 20011 U.S.-Vietnam MOU on defense cooperation and discussed other strategic issues. At a joint press conference held after their meeting, Secretary Panetta noted in prepared remarks that the new U.S. defense strategy entailed developing the capabilities of our Asian partners, such as Vietnam and to try to take this relationship to a new level. He noted that agreement had been reached to expand some very important cooperation in the five key areas outlined in the 2010 MOU. Secretary Panetta proposed establishing an Office of Defense Cooperation to meet these objectives. Panetta also revealed that he discussed how the United States and the ADMM Plus group could improve the maritime rights of all nations. In his prepared remarks, Minister of National Defence General Phung Quang Thanh confirmed that the bilateral talks focused on the implementation of the 2010 MOU. He flagged future cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and search and rescue. General Thanh noted a long-standing Vietnamese concern to elicit further support from the U.S. to address legacies from the Vietnam War. This was a reference to the Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance disposal issues. General Thanh once again requested the U.S. to lift its ITAR restrictions on military equipment and arms sales to Vietnam.14 During the question and answer period queries were raised about U.S. access to Cam Ranh Bay and U.S. arms sales to Vietnam. It was clear from the replies given that these were sensitive issues. For example, General Thanh ended his prepared remarks by noting that Vietnam would promote bilateral cooperation with the U.S. without doing harm to any third parties. This was a thinly veiled reference to China. During the Q&A session, when asked if Asian nations had to make a choice between China and the United States, General Thanh replied that Vietnam would like to expand defense cooperation with all countries And Vietnam would like to have fine relations with
14

In January 2012, Senators John McCain and Joe Liberman revealed that during their visit to Vietnam they were presented with a wish list of military equipment that Vietnam would like to procure. The Senators made it clear that there would be no progress until Vietnam improved its human rights situation.

12 neighboring countries, with regional countries and with the major powers of the world, and especially the United States and China. With respect to Cam Ranh Bay, General Thanh emphasized that Vietnam would welcome U.S. logistics ships (Military Sealift Command) in Vietnams commercial ports. This was a polite way of saying that visits to Cam Ranh Bay by U.S. Navy warships was not an immediate prospect. General Thanh made it clear that Vietnam wanted the U.S. to lift ITAR restrictions in order to fully normalize relations between the two countries. General Thanh indicated that Vietnams first priority would be to obtain spare parts to repair and overhaul U.S. weapons and equipment left during the war. Next, depending on Vietnams financial situation and the needs of the Vietnam Peoples Army, Vietnam would purchase certain kinds of weapons for the potential modernization of our military. General Thanh was most likely referring to coastal radar, air defense missiles and maritime patrol aircraft. Secretary Panetta did not address the question of arms sales at the press conference. After meeting General Thanh, Secretary Panetta was received by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. PM Dung canvassed the positive development in bilateral relations and expressed Vietnams hope to strengthen cooperation in the field of economics, trade, investment, science and technology and education. But PM Dung stressed that both sides needed to make a greater effort to build mutual confidence in order to take bilateral relations to a new height. He laid down two markers for future cooperation: continued U.S. assistance in overcoming the consequences of war and a complete removal of all restrictions on weapons sales to Vietnam. Secretary Panetta also met with Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh. They agreed to broaden cooperation on safety and security of navigation in the South China Sea and sustainable development of the Lower Mekong River. Part 3 Cooperation in Multilateral Forums Vietnam has consistently discussed, lobbied - if not coordinated - the United States to raise South China Sea issues in multilateral regional forums. In 2010, when Vietnam served as ASEAN Chair, it actively lobbied the United States to be more proactive on maritime security

13 issues affecting the South China Sea. This lobbying was part of a deliberate strategy to internationalize Vietnams South China Sea dispute with China. In particular, Vietnam succeeded in having the South China Sea raised at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in July where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made her dramatic intervention. At a press conference after the ARF meeting Secretary Clinton declared:
The United States, like every other nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asias maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. We share these interests with not only ASEAN members and ASEAN Regional Forum participants but with other maritime nations and the broader international community. The United States supports a collaborative, diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the various territorial disputes without coercion. We oppose the use or threat of force by any claimant. While the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claim and the company [sic] and rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features. The U.S. supports the 2002 ASEAN-China declaration on conduct of parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration. Because it is in the interest of all claimants and the broader international community for unimpeded commerce to proceed under lawful conditions. Respect for the interests of the international community and responsible efforts to address these unresolved claims and help create the conditions for resolution of the disputes and a lowering of regional tensions.15

Vietnam also used its role as ASEAN Chair to shape the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) in October 2010. The ADMM Plus was attended by eighteen defence ministers, ten from the ASEAN states and their eight dialogue partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russian Federation and the United States.16 Prior to the ADMM Plus meeting, ASEAN Defence Ministers reached consensus that issues related to the South China Sea would not be part of the formal agenda and that no reference to the South China Sea would be included in the final joint declaration.17 But no restrictions or pre-conditions were put on the eight non-ASEAN
15

Hillary Rodman Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks at Press Availability, National Convention Center, Hanoi, July 23, 2010.
16

The Defence Minister from Russia did not attend; Russia was represented by the Deputy Chief of Staff (Valery Gerasiov). The US delegation was the largest with thirty-five officials out of fifty delegates in attendance. China withheld the titles and areas of responsibility of its delegation but analysts who poured over their names were quick to spot that all were important experts involved in South China Sea affairs.
17

Kazuto Tsukamoto, Yusuke Murayama and Kenji Minemura, At key meet, Beijing tones down stance on South China Sea, The Asahi Shibun, October 14, 2010.

14 ministers. As noted above, Deputy Minister for National Defence, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinah, consulted with the U.S. Secretary of Defense prior to the meeting. Seven participants, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, raised concerns about territorial disputes in the South China Sea at the first ADDM Plus meeting.18 Predictably the final Joint Statement omitted any reference to the South China Sea. But Vietnam used its role as Chair to issue a final statement that declared:
The meeting noted that the member states are interested in maritime security cooperation and agreed that the collective efforts are required to address the challenges of piracy, human trafficking and disasters at sea. Some delegates touched upon traditional security challenges, such as disputes in the East Sea [sic]. The meeting welcomed efforts by concerned parties to address the issue by peaceful means in conformity with the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) of 2002 [sic] and recognized principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).19

Vietnam also discussed South China Sea issues prior to the 2011 East Asia Summit in Bali, Indonesia where the United States was admitted as a member for the first time. Fifteen of eighteen participants raised their concerns about maritime security in the South China Sea. China opposed discussion of this issue, Cambodia and Myanmar abstained from discussion. In July 2012, while on a visit to Hanoi, Secretary Hillary Clinton made these prepared remarks:
Third, on maritime security. In Bali, our leaders discussed the importance of achieving a collaborative solution on the South China Sea. The United States has no territorial claims there and we do not take sides in disputes about territorial or maritime boundaries. But we do have an interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea. And we believe the nations of the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats, and without use of force. Ill have more to say about this later today at the ASEAN Regional Forum. But I want to underscore one point. Whenever possible, territorial issues should be resolved between the claimants. But broader questions about conduct in disputed areas and about acceptable methods of resolving disputes should be addressed in multilateral settings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Issues such as freedom of navigation and lawful exploitation of maritime resources often
18

Kazuto Tsukamoto, Yusuke Murayama and Kenji Minemura, At key meet, Beijing tones down stance on South China Sea, The Asahi Shibun, October 14, 2010 and Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh quoted in Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Defence meeting in Hanoi calms South China Sea Disputes, October 12, 2010. Some reports claims eight ministers spoke on the South China Sea.
19

Full text of ASEAN official statement: First ADMM+ Chairmans Statement, Vietnam News Agency website, Hanoi, in English, October 13, 2010.

15
involve a wide region, and approaching them strictly bilaterally could be a recipe for confusion and even confrontation..."

U.S.-Vietnam consultation on the South China Sea prior to meetings of regional multilateral security forums demonstrates their convergence of strategic outlook regarding maritime security issues.

Part 4 Conclusion
Chinas sovereignty claims to the South China Sea and the assertive manner in which China has pursued these claims have led to a convergence but not congruence of strategic interests between Vietnam and the United States. At the broadest strategic level, both Vietnam and the United States share an interest in a peaceful and conflict-free security environment in the South China Sea so that the key international shipping routes that traverse this semi-enclosed sea remain safe and secure. Both Vietnam and the United States share an interest in a peaceful resolution of sovereignty disputes on the basis of international law and the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea. Both oppose intimidation, coercion, and the threat or use of force by any nation to assert its claims. Both nations therefore share an interest in the effective promotion of maritime security by the regions multilateral security institutions including the early adoption of a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN. Vietnams national interest focuses heavily on protecting its sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction over its Exclusive Economic Zone and the islands and other features that it currently occupies so that it can exploit the natural resources (hydrocarbons and fisheries mainly) in the waters, sea bed and continental shelf. Vietnam may have an interest in awarding contracts to American firms in the expectation that the United States will be moved to protect these interests. The United States does not take a position on competing sovereignty claims but argues such claims should be based on land features in accord with international law. The U.S. has a national interest in seeing that American companies can pursue unimpeded lawful commercial activities. This is an example of where strategic interests converge but are not congruent. The United States, as the pre-eminent maritime power, has a declared national interest in freedom of navigation and over flight in the South China Sea. Freedom of navigation includes the right, under international law, to conduct military activities in the EEZs of

16 littoral states. Vietnam has a similar interest in freedom of navigation and over flight but not on the conduct of military activities. Prior to the adoption of the Law of the Sea of Viet Nam in June 2012, Vietnam required prior notification by military ships transiting its EEZ. The United States conducts a strategic dialogue with Vietnam as part of official Department of Defense engagement policy. The U.S. hopes to institutionalize defense cooperation across a number of areas and to habituate Vietnam into cooperating with the United States on a regular basis. In other words, the U.S. hopes to evolve the relationship from one-off arrangements to regular activities that become a normal part of defense cooperation over time. For example, Vietnam restricts all foreign countries to one naval port visit each year. The U.S. gently prods Vietnam to lift this restriction. Secretary Panettas visit to Vietnam is another illustration of the convergence but congruence of strategic relations. Panettas visit demonstrated the closeness in political relations between Vietnam and the United States but it was also rich in symbolism. For example, Vietnam was able to send out the message that the United States was a legitimate regional player by permitting the U.S. Defense Secretary to visit Cam Ranh Bay. In this instance Vietnam was able to challenge Chinas view that the U.S. is an outside power whose meddling in regional affairs only complicates matters. A net assessment of Secretary Panettas visit must include more than an ounce of caution. Vietnam is likely to develop further defense cooperation with the United States but at its own gradual and cautious pace. Vietnam is unlikely to remove its restrictions on one naval port visit per year or permit U.S. warships to anchor in Cam Ranh Bay. Although Vietnam and the U.S. share a convergence of strategic interests on a number of regional security issues, the constant reference by all of Vietnams leaders to mutual respect and sovereignty are an indication that Vietnam will cooperate with the U.S. up to a point but will not align with it against China. Secretary Panetta may express in public his desire to advance mil-to-mil cooperation and to have U.S. Navy ships return to Cam Ranh Bay but Vietnam will continue to adhere to what I have termed its policy of three nos outlined in its 2009 Defence White Paper. The "three no's" include: no foreign alliances, no foreign bases, and no bilateral relations directed against a third party. Vietnams agreement to repair U.S. Maritime Sealift Command vessels does not violate this policy but it does send a subtle non-provocative message to China that

17 the United States is a legitimate actor in regional maritime security and it presence is welcome. The United States would definitely like to expand defence cooperation with Vietnam to more practical activities and joint exercises. For example, the 2011 MOU that outlined five key areas of cooperation did not signify anything really new but was a reiteration of what was already going on. Vietnam has been hesitant to take the next step. This is why when U.S. warships visit Vietnam every year they conduct activities and not exercises that impart combat skills. These activities are highly restricted and take place in the port of Da Nang. If further defence cooperation is developed it is likely to be in non-controversial areas such as non-traditional security. This would likely involve cooperation to address humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and search and rescue. It is also likely that Vietnam will slowly step up its involvement in professional military education and training programs by sending more officers to the United States. Vietnam is internally divided about how to manage relations with China and the United States. There are a core of party ideologues who still believe the U.S. is promoting the plot of peaceful evolution to overturn Vietnams socialist regime. These ideological concerns surface from time to time in remarks directed at the Peace Corps and American universities wishing to operate in Vietnam. The conservatives maintain that Vietnam can manage its sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea without aligning with the Unites States. The conservatives point to an improvement in relations with China since the visit of party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing in October 2011 when China and Vietnam reached agreement on Guidelines on Fundamental Principles to Resolve Maritime Disputes. Trongs visit followed the dispatch of two special envoys in January and June. However, there is some evidence that Chinas heavy-handed response to Vietnams adoption of its Law of the Sea has provoked a rethink. A background briefing by a senior State Department official (widely believed to by Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell) on the occasion of Secretary of State Hillary Clintons visit to Hanoi in July 2012, noted even the most hardline guys, are saying, look, we want a better relationship with the United States. They want us to ease our policy on certain kinds of defense articles. They want a closer relationship, and they want us to be clear and firm with respect to our position on the South

18 China Sea. It is undeniably the case that our relationship has improved dramatically with Vietnam. Other members of the Vietnam Communist Party are committed to the policy adopted by the eleventh party congress in early 2011 of proactively integrating with the world. This policy is designed to promote Vietnams multifaceted engagement with all the major powers including the United States. Defense cooperation is a major component of proactive integration. In conclusion, the pace of defence cooperation between Vietnam and the United States has stepped up largely due to sovereignty and territorial disputes involving China and the South China Sea. Chinese assertiveness has resulted in a growing convergence in strategic interests between Vietnam and the United States. But the China factor has not led to strategic congruence because of ideological differences with the Vietnam Communist Party. In order to get the U.S. message across on the importance of addressing human rights concerns. Secretary Clinton sought and was given a meeting with the VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong during her visit to Hanoi In July 2012. Later, Secretary Clinton remarked to a meeting with staff and families at the U.S. Embassy, weve reached a level of engagement that would have been unimaginable only a few years ago And our military-to-military ties, as evidenced by Secretary Panettas very successful visit, are also intensifying. We are working toward a strategic partnership agreement that will give us a framework to deepen and broaden this engagement. The future of a U.S.-Vietnam strategic partnership is dependent on a number of factors including a potential leadership transition in the United States, a power shift in China, Chinese actions in the South China Sea, and continued factional skirmishing among factions within the Vietnam Communist Party. As the author has argued elsewhere:
Vietnam seeks to be the pivot in relations with China and the United States. In other words, Vietnam seeks to develop comprehensive ties with each and make each bilateral relationship important in its own right. As pivot, Vietnam wants China and the United States to accept Vietnam as a reliable partner. Vietnam wants to shape its relations so it does not have to ally with one side against the other. 20

20

Carlyle A. Thayer Vietnam looking to play pivotal role with both China and US, Asian Review, The Global Times (Beijing), July 25, 2012, 13. For an in-depth analysis consult Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnams Relations with China and the United States, in Ky Yeu Hoi Thao Quoc Te Vai Tro Cua Viet Nam Trong Khu Vuc Chau A-Thai Binh Duong (Proceedings of International Workshop on The Role of Vietnam in the Asia-Pacific), co-sponsored

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by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung and Khoa Quoc Te Hoc (Faculty of International Studies), Truong Dai Hoc Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi va Nhan Van (Social Sciences and Humanities University), Dai Hoc Quoc Gia Ha Noi (National University of Vietnam Hanoi). Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban The Gioi (The World Publishing House), 2011. 7-66.