Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
The information in this PDF file is subject to Business Monitor Internationals full copyright and entitlements as defined and protected by international law. The contents of the file are for the sole use of the addressee. All content in this file is owned and operated by Business Monitor International, and the copying or distribution of this file, internally or externally, is strictly prohibited without the prior written permission and consent of Business Monitor International Ltd. If you wish to distribute the file, please email the Subscriptions Department at subs@businessmonitor.com, providing details of your subscription and the number of recipients you wish to forward or distribute this information to.
DISCLAIMER All information contained in this publication has been researched and compiled from sources believed to be accurate and reliable at the time of publishing. However, in view of the natural scope for human and/or mechanical error, either at source or during production, Business Monitor International accepts no liability whatsoever for any loss or damage resulting from errors, inaccuracies or omissions affecting any part of the publication. All information is provided without warranty, and Business Monitor International makes no representation of warranty of any kind as to the accuracy or completeness of any information hereto contained.
November 2012
Vol 2
Business Monitor Internationals monthly regional report on political risk and macroeconomic prospects
INDONESIA
REGIONAL INDICATORS
2010 South East Asia Indicators Nominal GDP, US$bn Population, mn GDP per capita, US$ Real GDP growth, % Inflation, % Goods Exports, US$ Goods Imports, US$ 1,810.6 2,090.9 2,195.7 2,398.7 542.9 7.9 4.1 549.1 4.7 5.4 555.3 4.8 4.1 561.4 5.0 4.3 3,334.7 3,807.7 3,954.2 4,272.8 2011e 2012f 2013f
e/f = BMI estimates/forecast. South East Asia 2 = Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. Weighted by nominal GDP. Source: BMI
Visit www.asia-monitor.com for the following subscriber benefits: Instant access to the latest issue on the day of publication
via pdf download, as well as access to pdfs of back issues.
Dont know your password? Contact Dan Xue at dxue@businessmonitor.com or call +44 (0)20 7248 0468 today. Not a subscriber? Go to www.asia-monitor.com today, register your details and get instant trial access.
Editorial/Subscriptions Office: Senator House, 85 Queen Victoria Street, London EC4V 4AB, UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7248 0468 Fax: +44 (0)20 7248 0467 email: subs@businessmonitor.com www.businessmonitor.com www.asia-monitor.com
ISSN: 1470-7811
MALAYSIA
RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK
...continued from top of front page
account surplus will continue to narrow amid cooling global demand, and that we could see a wave of foreign capital outflows as Malaysian equities and real estate prices fall, we expect the ringgit to remain essentially flat, in line with our average forecast of MYR3.1800/US$ for 2012.
Fundamentals Remain In Place
Malaysia Trade Exports & Imports, US$mn (LHS) & Trade Balance, US$mn (RHS)
6,000 20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 2,000 10,000 8,000 6,000
Jul-07 Mar-09 Jan-05 Jun-05 Jan-10 Jun-10 Apr-06 Oct-08 May-08 Nov-05 Sep-06 Feb-07 Dec-07 Aug-09 Nov-10 Apr-11 Sep-11 Feb-12 Jul-12
1,000 0
Trade Balance
Exports
Imports
valuations in speculative high-end segments of the property market. These inflows have also contributed to the Malaysian ringgit's general outperformance among similar emerging market currencies. However, we believe that asset prices in Malaysia may have peaked and that foreign investors may soon shift their assets elsewhere in search of better returns. The Malaysian government is expected to introduce a wave of new measures aimed at curbing speculation in the property market. We note that previous measures introduced in Malaysia are already beginning to have an impact on property prices. According to the Malaysia House Price Index (MHPI) published by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), property prices fell in Q112, with the index recording a 2.3% decline in quarter-on-quarter (q-o-q) terms. We believe that new measures to cool the property market would act as an even greater drag on prices over the coming quarters.
Support For The Ringgit
Malaysia Trade & Current Account Balances, % Of GDP
25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 Current Account Balance Trade Balance
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
ECONOMIC RISK
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Narrowing Current Account Surplus Malaysia's current account surplus has narrowed significantly in recent years and this is mainly due to subdued external demand during and after the 2008/09 global financial crisis. We also note that the Malaysian economy is gradually transitioning from its export-heavy growth model towards one with a stronger emphasis on domestic demand. In recent years, the government has implemented various economic policies aimed at encouraging consumption. We note that Malaysia's gross national savings rate at around 35%, is exceptionally high compared to other countries. However, government policies in the past have artificially depressed consumption due to a managed exchange rate regime and the Employees Provident Fund (EFP), which requires employees to save a significant share of their income every month. Policymakers are in the midst of reviewing these policies as part of the government's plan to boost domestic demand over the coming years. Overall, we believe that such efforts to realign the economy towards heavier consumption should result in a smaller current account surpluses going forward. This suggests to us that the Malaysian ringgit will experience a milder appreciatory trend over the coming years, where we see the unit gradually heading towards MYR3.0000/US$. Valuations Poised For Correction Foreign capital inflows into Malaysia in recent years has contributed to a surge in property prices, eventually resulting in unrealistic
-10 -15
Risk To Outlook Our risk to outlook for the Malaysian ringgit remains skewed towards further weakness as valuations of asset prices in Malaysia are unsustainable, in our view. As the property market continues to cool, we caution that this could potentially trigger capital flight, placing significant downside risks to our outlook for the currency. Presently, foreign investors hold a sizeable 27.3% of total local currency bonds issued by the Malaysian government, and we see increasing risks that the ringgit could be vulnerable to capital flight as a result of the country's deteriorating fiscal position. Furthermore, we also note that Malaysia's export-heavy economic model remains heavily tied to the fortunes of the Chinese economy and recent economic data continue to show that China is in the midst of an economic slowdown. Therefore, should exports deteriorate significantly over the coming months, we would expect some intervention by the central bank to weaken the ringgit in an attempt to prop up its export sector.
www.asia-monitor.com
MALAYSIA
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
2008/09 global financial crisis, and we see increasing risks of a further contraction over the coming months.
Not A Good Sign
Malaysia Trade Exports & Imports, % chg y-o-y
45 35 25 15 5 -5 -15 Exports Imports -35
Jul-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Apr-08 Oct-08 Apr-09 Oct-09 Apr-10 Oct-10 Apr-11 Oct-11 Apr-12 Jul-12
-25
Latest figures published by the Department of Statistics showed that industrial production contracted by 1.4% year-onyear (y-o-y) in June after peaking at a growth rate of 3.6% in May. On an annualised month-on-month (m-o-m) basis, we also see conclusive evidence of a steady slowdown in production activity in recent months. We see this as a sign that producers are beginning to draw down their inventories in anticipation of a continued slowdown in export orders over the coming months and we expect this trend to persist throughout 2012. Crucially, this contraction in industrial production has also been accompanied by a decline in exports, which contracted by 1.9% y-o-y in July, a significant deterioration comDATA & FORECASTS
BMI View: Our view that economic activity in China will continue to cool bodes ill for Malaysia's trade surplus, and by extension the countrys current account surplus, which we are forecasting to steadily decline
Mining Manufacturing
We note that this is the deepest monthly contraction in exports registered since the
The latest set of economic data reinforces our view that cooling economic activity in China will weigh heavily on the Malaysian economy, which is in line with our below-consensus real GDP growth forecast of 3.8% this year for the country. Central banks in the region including the Bank of Korea (Bok), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and the People's Bank of China (PBoC) have responded to the slowdown in global growth by easing monetary policy, and we continue to expect Bank Negara Malaysia to do the same by introducing a 25bps rate cut at its next monetary policy meeting in November.
from 11.5% of GDP in 2011 to 7.9% and 7.0% in 2012 and 2013. We also point out that the Malaysian government is widely expected to introduce a generous election budget that may include cash handouts and
2010e 2011e 28.9 278.7 9,659 5.1 1.4 185.4 227.9 -5.0 2.6 5.5 3.17 178.7 227.5 48.9 32.0 11.5 131.8 8.9 69,821.4 25.0 5.4 3.0 3.07 16.3 19.2 2.9 132.6 8.1 -
more welfare subsidies for its citizens. This should result in a substantial increase in imports over the coming quarters, resulting in a narrowing current account surplus for the country.
Latest Period Q212 Jun Sep Jun Jun Jun Jul Jul 2012f 29.3 283.4 9,667 3.8 2.9 188.0 245.3 -6.4 1.7 5.2 3.20 196.5 236.9 40.3 22.4 7.9 138.9 8.5 71,526.7 25.2 2013f 29.8 310.0 10,407 4.6 3.8 195.5 260.7 -6.8 2.0 5.8 3.00 212.7 252.0 39.4 21.8 7.0 146.4 8.3 73,231.9 23.6
Population, mn [2] Nominal GDP, US$bn [3] GDP per capita, US$ 3 Real GDP, % change y-o-y [1,3] Industrial production index, % y-o-y, ave [3] Fiscal revenue, MYRbn [3] Fiscal expenditure, MYRbn [3] Budget balance, % of GDP [3] Consumer prices, % y-o-y, ave [3] Lending rate, %, eop [4] Exchange rate MYR/US$, eop [5] Goods imports, US$bn [3] Goods exports, US$bn [3] Balance of trade in goods, US$bn [3] Current account, US$bn [3] Current account, % of GDP [3] Foreign reserves ex gold, US$bn [3] Import cover, months g&s [3] Total external debt stock, US$mn [6] Total external debt stock, % of GDP [6]
28.4 237.8 8,374 7.2 7.4 159.7 202.9 -5.6 1.7 5.0 3.06 157.3 199.0 41.7 27.3 11.5 96.4 7.4 68,116.1 28.6
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. 1 Base Year = 2000. Source: 2 World Bank/UN/BMI; 3 Bank Negara Malaysia, BMI; 4 IMF,BMI; 5 BMI; 6 World Bank, BMI
www.asia-monitor.com
PHILIPPINES
RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
ECONOMIC RISK
Japan US
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
This compares favourably to neighbouring Indonesia, where exports, which fell by 2.3% in H112 from H111, led to a massive swing from a current account surplus to the nation's largest current account deficit on record. Nevertheless, we believe that the Philippines faces an increasingly difficult outlook for external demand, suggesting that export growth over the second half of the year will likely not be able to continue its heady pace. As we wrote in August (see our online service, August 17, 'Export Sector To Lose Its Shine'), the Philippines' main export destinations China, Japan, and the US all face relatively grim growth prospects over the coming quarters. H212 Looks Challenging, But Rebound Possible In 2013 We note that the strong y-o-y performance in Philippine shipments has largely been a result of base effects given the sector's poor
performance in 2011. Although exports of some manufactured goods, specifically transport equipment and machinery, performed well in the first half of the year, exports of electronic goods fell by 3.9% yo-y. Ominously, the outlook for electronics goods does not appear likely to improve in H212. Both the US and Japan book-to-bill ratios, a measure of future semiconductor demand, posted below the 1.0 level that separates expansion from contraction for the third straight month in August. Japanese demand is looking particularly dour, posting its lowest ratio (0.74) since May 2009. With semiconductors making up approximately 30% of all Philippine exports, the atmosphere for H212 shipments is increasingly challenging. Looking to 2013, we do not see scope for a pick-up in export growth. Although risks remain weighted to the downside, we expect regional economic growth to stabilise next year, helping to prop up external demand. Furthermore, after a very poor 2012, there is potential for a rebound in demand for electronic goods. The current account will also continue to receive support from remittances, which have historically proven to be somewhat immune even to extreme global economic downturns. Although growth has moderated from its peak years in the middle of the last decade, remittances from overseas workers (which accounted for a hefty 8.9% of GDP in 2011) continue to expand at a healthy pace. Nevertheless, we have cut our 2013 nominal export growth forecast to 7.8% from 9.7% previously as a result of milder global price pressures and what we now envisage to be only a moderate regional growth rebound. For this reason, we expect the current account surplus to decline marginally to US$6.9bn (2.7% of GDP) in 2013 (versus our previous forecast of US$11.1bn) from our downwardly revised 2012 forecast of US$7.4bn (3.0% of GDP) (US$8.9bn previously).
www.asia-monitor.com
PHILIPPINES
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
for a potentially extended period. At the same time, inflation remains well within the central bank's target range of 3.0-5.0%, suggesting little need for tightening within the next year, and risks to our forecast are decidedly to the downside. Still Stoking Credit Growth As we wrote in July, BSP has been keen to spur lending and prolong the credit cycle since beginning its easing campaign in January. Although credit growth accelerated from 12.2% y-o-y in June to 15.2% in July, it remains well below its cycle peak of 24.8% hit in August 2011. Broad money supply growth, too, remains well in check, coming in at a moderate 8.7% in July versus 7.1% in June. These factors indicate to us that the Philippine economy is not approaching
overheating territory, as opposed to regional peer Indonesia. One thing that the central bank will be keeping its eye on, however, is core inflation, which ticked up to 4.3% in August from 4.1% in July and has remained higher than headline inflation for nine straight months. The BSP monitors core inflation, which excludes the volatile categories of food and energy, as a measure of the longer-term trend in overall price levels. However, like headline inflation, as long as core inflation remains below the upper-bound of the central bank's target range of 3.0%-5.0%, we do not expect it to be a serious concern. In the short term, upside risks to our end-year headline forecast may arise from buoyant global food prices. The introduction of the US Federal Reserve's third round of Quantitative Easing (dubbed QE3) further stokes the risk that food prices will continue to rise through Q412 and into Q113. However, our core view remains that commodity prices in general will be held in check by weakening global economic conditions, especially in light of the ongoing hard-landing in the region's largest economy, China. Although food price pressures may manifest themselves in higher inflation towards the end of 2012, these pressures will be transitory in nature and are unlikely to affect the BSP's interest rate outlook.
full-year ceiling of PHP279bn. We therefore retain our forecast for the entire year's deficit to come in at just 2.2%, lower than the government's forecast of 2.6%.
Latest Period Q411 Aug 41180 Jul July May Jul Aug 2012f 96.5 243.7 2,526 5.0 1,468.9 1,699.2 -2.2 3.0 44.00 65.7 50.6 -15.1 7.4 3.0 70.7 10.8 76,348.4 31.3 2013f 98.1 259.8 2,648 4.0 1,630.5 1,859.0 -2.0 4.5 44.00 72.0 54.5 -17.4 6.9 2.7 77.7 10.7 81,692.8 31.4
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: 1 World Bank/UN/BMI; 2 National Statistical Coordination Board, BMI; 3 Bureau of the Treasury, BMI; 4 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BMI; 5 BMI; 6 World Bank, BMI
www.asia-monitor.com
INDONESIA
RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK
...continued from bottom of front page
correction in May (see our online service, 'Bearish Indonesia Trade And Investment Equities'), the Jakarta Trade, Services, and Investment Index (JAKTRAD) shed 15.4% peak-to-trough, while the Jakarta Composite Index (JCI) suffered a 12.1% decline. Since the two indices bottomed out in June, however, they have witnessed a relatively strong bounce and, once again, we see scope for a correction as a result of their rich valuations. Equities Still Expensive Long one of our least favourite bourses in the region, the JCI is now trading at an expensive 18.6x price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, (versus 15.0x for Malaysia's KLCI, 16.7x for the Philippines' PCOMP, and 12.3x for Singapore's Straits Times Index) and 2.8 priceto-book value (P/B). This makes the JCI one of the most expensive indices in the region in terms of historical earnings, a designation that is even less attractive in light of our recent downgrade to Indonesia's 2013 GDP growth forecast. As has been our view for some time, we expect Bank Indonesia's impending monetary policy tightening cycle to raise borrowing costs in Indonesia, a development that would bode poorly for equity prices. Technically, we find that the JAKTRAD has respected its 61.8% Fibonacci retracement level based on its June low, potentially signalling another leg down in the index. The JAKTRAD is also expensive relative to the region, with a P/E ratio of 19.9x and a P/B of 2.2x. At the same time, we believe that macroeconomic fundamentals are also negative for Indonesian equities, particularly the JAKTRAD. Although the Indonesian consumer has held up well so far this year despite prevalent external woes, we expect that this divergence is beginning to unwind as knock-on effects from weakening investment growth begin to bleed through. Amid a dour global economy with increasingly pervasive risks of large-scale crisis, the high 60% foreign ownership of Indonesian equities makes the market exceptionally susceptible to rapid shifts in investor sentiment. Downside Seen In CDS, Debt Markets Despite the fact that the Indonesian sovereign 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread is hovering near five-month lows, we find that Indonesia's fiscal position is becoming progressively less attractive. As we wrote recently (see 'Infrastructure Boost Overshadowed By Ballooning Subsidies, September 10), the government 's inability
ECONOMIC RISK
to reform its burdensome subsidy structure in the face of elevated oil prices is taking its toll on Indonesia's fiscal position, and we are expecting the fiscal deficit to climb to 3.0% of GDP in 2012 versus just 2.1% in 2011. Combined with the nation's increasingly tenuous external dynamics as a result of a record current account deficit and the growing risk of hot money outflows, we believe there is value in the 5-year CDS protection. While we do not yet see scope for a massive blowout similar to 2008, when the 5-year CDS spread rocketed by 989 basis points (bps) over the course of just two months, we caution that risks of such an event are rising. For the same reasons, we also see downside risk for Indonesian local government debt. Following the Global Financial Crisis, Indonesian debt entered a three-year bull market, with yields on 10-year government notes making an extended march downwards. However, earlier in 2012 we began to see signs of an exhaustion in this trend, and yields have recently been trending sideways. As with the CDS, we believe that macroeconomic fundamentals, including Bank Indonesia's impending rate hike, signal increased downside for Indonesian government debt. Additionally, with approximately 28% of the local currency debt market owned by foreigners, we note that Indonesian bonds remain at risk of a rapid sell-off in the event of an external crisis such as an uncontained default in the eurozone. Rupiah's Struggles Continue In view of Indonesia's rapidly deteriorating terms of trade that led to a current account deficit of US$9.8bn in H112 (versus a surplus of US$2.8bn in H111), the rupiah has been one of the worst-performing currencies in the region so far in 2012. That being said, we see additional downside risk for the unit. Firstly, external demand from Indonesia's key trading partners is highly unlikely to be revived any time soon, with China's ongoing hard landing in particular causing a headache for Indonesian coal exporters. Secondly, given the high foreign ownership of Indonesian assets, risks of acute outflows continue to rise as the global economy weakens. Lastly, although Bank Indonesia has been known to aggressively defend the currency with open market operations in the past, the central bank has indicated a much more dovish approach to rupiah weakness in light of the nation's trade woes. As a result, we have downgraded our end-2012 rupiah forecast to IDR9,600/US$ from IDR9,200/US$ previously, and caution that risks are weighted to the downside.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
www.asia-monitor.com
INDONESIA
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
in the market. The move was a clear indication that BI is done with its easy monetary policy campaign that saw the benchmark interest rate fall from 6.75% to 5.75% from end-2011 to the beginning of 2012, and that it is heeding the growing possibility that the economy is overheating. BI Reaping What Its Sown As we have been writing about for some time, BI's aggressive easing (beginning in October 2011) at a time when the economy was growing at a robust 6.5% has led to some signs of overheating, most evident in the record current account deficit that Indonesia chalked up in H112. As a result, we continue to believe that BI will be forced to hike its benchmark interest rate sometime within the next two quarters. As opposed to the traditional six-month lag from such monetary policy decisions, we believe that
the effect will be shortened in Indonesia given its broader tweaks that began in June. Tightening monetary policy has already begun to be reflected in borrowing costs, with the benchmark 3-month Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate (JIBOR) ticking up from a low of 4.2% in March to 4.9% in September. As we wrote in June, Indonesian banks boast some of the highest Net Interest Margins (NIMs) in the region, indicative of the high credit risk and low competition within the sector. This phenomenon leads to high borrowing costs, especially for consumers. Despite BI having made some progress in driving lending rates lower, as the cost of capital comes back up and NIMs stay elevated, borrowers will find that financing rates are once again on the rise. That said, we remain comfortable with our forecast for lending growth to end 2012 at 24.0%. With BI intent on prolonging the top of the credit cycle while at the same time managing liquidity within the economy by tweaking its monetary policy, we do not yet see ample scope for a major drop-off in credit growth before the year's end. At the same time, we have downgraded our 2013 credit growth forecast to 18.0% from 21.0%, and we note that risks to this forecast are to the downside depending on whether or not BI sees fit to more aggressively tighten monetary policy.
upgraded our 2013 fiscal deficit forecast to 2.7% of GDP versus 2.2% previously, while we continue to expect 2012's deficit to hit 3.0% versus just 2.1% in 2011.
Latest Period Q212 July July July July 2012f 244.8 883.3 3,609 6.0 5.0 1,281,778.3 1,525,467.4 -3.0 4.8 9,600.00 188.2 210.6 22.4 -12.7 -1.4 116.7 6.3 229,576.8 26.0 2013f 247.2 982.2 3,973 5.6 5.3 1,452,254.8 1,700,896.2 -2.7 6.0 9,200.00 218.9 241.8 22.9 -15.0 -1.5 130.7 6.0 242,203.5 24.7
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. 1 Base Year = 2000; 2 Data prior to 1998 are from the IMF, subsequently from BI. Source: 3 World Bank/UN/BMI; 4 BMI/IMF; 5 IMF/BMI; 6 Bank Indonesia/IMF/ BMI; 7 BMI
www.asia-monitor.com
SINGAPORE
RISK SUMMARY
POLITICAL RISK ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
ECONOMIC RISK
grew by a solid 4.8% over the same period in 2011, while in the past three months (June, July and August), they fell by 2.3%. Given Singapore's heavy reliance on exports (net exports represent a hefty 24.1% of the economy), the MAS is more likely to be growth supportive now that inflation is less of a concern. Further bolstering the case for easing is the fact that import prices are in deflation (-0.2% y-o-y in Q212) and core inflation remains benign at 2.2%. We therefore believe that the most likely course of action for the central bank will be to slightly decrease the appreciatory slope of the Singapore dollar, leaving the width and centre of the policy band unchanged. In combination with the country's parlous export outlook and the performance of its foreign reserves, which have been declining in y-o-y terms for four straight months (indicating downside pressure on the currency), we continue to forecast for the Singapore dollar to end 2012 at SGD1.2600/US$.
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. 1 Manufacturing data used; 2 Singstat data used from 2002 for all BOP, Deflator values available only from 2002; 3 Includes Gold. Source: 4 World Bank/UN/BMI; 5 Statistics Singapore/IMF/BMI; 6 Statistics Singapore/ BMI; 7 Monetary Authority of Singapore/BMI; 8 BMI/Monetary Authority of Singapore; 9 Monetary Authority of Singapore/ Statistics Singapore
www.asia-monitor.com
Copy Deadline: 28 September 2012 Analysts: Andy Wang, Andrew Wood Editor: Stuart Allsopp Sub-Editor: Savika Voratanitkitkul Subscriptions Manager: Katie Patton Marketing Manager: Julia Consuegra +44 (0)20 7246 5131 Production: Neil Murphy/ Reema Patel Publishers: Richard Londesborough/Jonathan Feroze
Copyright of Asia Monitor: South East Asia Monitor Volume 2 is the property of Business Monitor International and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.