Developing

Countries and the Emerging World Order

by Acharya , 2000
I - Introduction rd Cold War: two fundamental factors shaped 3 world predicament & role in the world. The first: relative abundance of violent conflicts, outnumbering the developed world. Also: it was made distinctive by its political posture. A quest for enhanced status and economic justice. Whilst working in a bipolar system, the third world worked to alter its inferior position. Hedley Bull: this process = a revolt against the Norths superior economic & military power. Despite immense diversity, the third world came to exhibit a remarkable unity of purpose in its struggle, to destroy the old international order and establish a new one. II Third world insecurity: a decompression effect? Despite the Cold War instability in the third world, some commentators predict that its end may be even more destabilising. Conflicts may emerge/ re-emerge, having been overlaid by superpower rivalry. Jose Cintra: conflicts will very probably arise from decompression and from a loosening of the controls and self-controls. Robert Jervis: the cold war in the net...generally dampened conflict [in the third world]. Superpower retrenchment has led to a shift in the balance of power, creating opportunities to step into the vacuum. Many regimes, without their superpower patrons, have now either collapsed or are facing collapse. The emergence of ethnic conflicts in the Third World, e.g. in the Balkans/ E. Europe is evident in old third world, e.g. Africa. The end of superpower protection creates pressures on former clients to achieve military self-reliance. The withdrawal of superpowers entails merely that the Third World will do more of its own fighting. (Christophe Carle, IHT 89) The end of the cold war also raises prospects for more inter-state fighting. Barry Buzan: If the territorial jigsaw can be extensively reshaped in the First and Second Worlds, it will become harder to resist the pressures to try and find more sensible and congenial arrangements in the ex-Third World. But: concerns could be overstated. The end of the Cold War hasnt been entirely negative. The political settlement of conflicts in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Central America: helped by US-USSR co-op. Also, the collapse of regimes hasnt always led to violence. Latin America: loss of Soviet support for leftists and US support for right-wingers has helped a largely peaceful democratisation (e.g. Nicaragua, El Salvador). rd rd The spread of democracy in the 3 world might also create better prospects for stability. In the 3 world theres always been a strong correlation between authoritarianism & conflict, largely due to insecure regimes consolidating power through war. rd Furthermore: Due to the end of bipolarity, the North is becoming more selective in its engagement in the 3 world. Waltz: with two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happened anywhere was potentially of concern to both of them. The US is now likely to limit its engagement to just the Middle East, East Asia and Central America. rd This means many 3 world problems will be marginalised but also prevents the internationalisation of local wars. rd Regional powers can no longer count on foreign patrons, so even the most powerful 3 world nations may find wars harder. The Iraqis during the first Gulf War is an example of this. Those who argue that the end of the CW may destabilise overlook the fact that the CW itself was hardly tranquil. Furthermore, the seeds of many post-CW conflicts (e.g. Iraq 1) were planted during the Cold War. rd The end of bipolarity doesnt by itself alter the fundamental sources of 3 world insecurity. rd Halliday: since the causes of 3 world upheaval were to a considerable extent independent of Soviet-US rivalry, they will continue irrespective of relations between Washington and Moscow. rd Ayoob, Buzan, Aza & Moon, Sayigh: causes of 3 world conflict = weak state-society cohesion, underdevelopment, bad regimes. Thus in Africa many recent conflicts = linked to ethno-national cleavages within weak state structures, instability & eco. crises. rd Concerns in more developed parts of 3 world = integration, institutionalisation etc. rd The end of the cold war doesnt have a single/ uniform effect on 3 world security. In Africa: sharp decline in arms imports. In East Asia: fears of a major arms race. Regional hegemonism is a distinct possibility. III The North-South divide in the New World Order


Four areas of North-South tension in the emerging world order: 1. Global environmental change. North seen as eco-imperialist, protecting its wasteful lifestyle by exporting the environmental burden to the south. But: the South recognises the potential of the issue to extract concessions. Malaysias PM Mohammed is evidence. 2. Emerging frameworks for peace and security championed by the North. Considerable resentment of US domination of UN decision-making process. Zbignew Brzezinski: first Gulf War = largely an American decision and relied primarily on American military power. Strong current of opinion against armed intervention, and in support of non-interference. Interventionism runs counter to the imperatives of state making (Ayoob). Without bipolarity, states cant use rivalry to guarantee non-intervention. 3. Northern approach to arms control and non-proliferation Elite clubs with their selective application of rules and discriminatory nature. Chubin: the Norths anti-proliferation campaign frankly discriminates between friendly and unfriendly states. K Subrahmanyam: a racist bias...inefficient instruments for pursuing global non-proliferation issues. 4. Wests advocacy of human rights and democracy. Aid conditionality etc. is seen as a threat to sovereignty and economic well-being. Malaysian PM Mohammed saw the human rights campaign as a way to perpetuate the dependency of the South. Singaporean FoM: Concern for human rights has always been balanced against other national interests. IV Insecurity, Inequality & Institutions Cold War: NAM spearheaded Souths conscious, collective challenge to the world order. NAM members highlights the effects of the arms race and showed the link between disarmament and development. But the diversity of the group undermined its unity, as many states were actually aligned (Cuba, India, etc.) NAMs post-Cold War direction remains unclear. Some members (India) want it to push for democratisation. Others (Malaysia) want to counter US-created world order. Tim Shaw: in its second decade, it has been a critical reaction to international inequality. The concept of the NIEO was embraced at the 1973 Algiers summit. North-South dialogue failed due to hostile Western conservatives such as Thatcher and Reagan who viewed the North-South paradigm as an annoying distraction to the goal of world influence, overcoming the East-West paradigm. The promise of regionalism remained largely unfulfilled during the cold war. Superpowers bypassed/ ignored regional peace arrangements and encouraged balance-of-power arrangements which fuelled ideological polarisations. Regionalism also founders on the reefs of distrust, noncooperation and parochial nationalism. Post-CW: regional frameworks have gained appeal in the light of the UNs limitations. The end of the Cold War has also reduced the polarising impact of regional organisations. Dependence of local states on external security guarantees entails frequent great power interventions. 1990s: revival of Southern interest in regional trade liberalisation. Doubts about WTO. But: suspicions of who gains most? The weakness of intra-South arrangements might be offset by emergent North-South ones. But Buzan warns that North-South trading arrangements/ blocs may lead to the exploitation of the periphery by the centre. CONCLUSION rd Realists AND liberalists analysing post-CW IR have concluded that the end of the Cold War means the end of the 3 World. They point toward the non-realisation of NIEO, and the irrelevance of non-alignment. Realists point to decline of Souths bargaining power, but Liberals suggest dampening of polarisation due to interdependence. But the end of the third world might be misleading and simplistic. Its based on a narrow conception of interests and roles. Post-CW era: Southern instability hasnt disappeared. Its become more localised. The persistence of Southern regional instability contrasts with the North. The end of the Third World doesnt mean the end of the N-S divide, just changes in the way the divide is managed. Greater economic differentiation in the South doesnt obscure the convergence of a critical interest among many developing countries in relation to issues. The post-CW South faces simultaneous pressures for rebellion and adaptation within the system. Futility of Souths confrontational approach with the North has induced greater degree of pragmantism. For a genuine new world order to emerge, the concerns/reservations & aspirations of the South must be noted & addressed.