Y \ Feecret | NOPORS/ORCO ‘ ee = Oe ert Gill ah Research Study Elites and the Distribution of Power in Iran Secret PR 76 10017 February 1976 copy N2 148Warning Notice fe Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (WNINTEL) NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disctosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS: NOFORN— Not Releasebie to Foreign Nationals NOCONTRACT— Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/ Consultants PROPIN— Caution—Proprietary Informetion tnvolved USIBONLY- —_USIB Departments Only ‘ORCON— Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator REL... — This Information has been Authorized for Release to... sens trom Gort beh ian Shed med ED. THESE exemation cotesorys Astral selenideNOFORN/ORCON SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH February 1976 ELITES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN IRAN by Earnest R. Oney SECRET 3NOFORN/ORCON- SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS NOTE... SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..... THE IRANIAN ELITE . A WORD ON ELITES .... DISCUSSION 1. TRADITIONAL IRANIAN SOCIETY A The Dowrth .o.ccccccteeceees B. The Families .....0-0.00200 ©. Monarchy 2... cesses I. THE MONARCH, HIS FAMILY AND COURT ‘A. The Pabli : B. The Royal Family ... C. The Court Entourage Ill, THE BUREAUCRACY ..........-0555 ‘A. The Uneivil Servants B. ‘The Cabinet IV. PARLIAMENT - A. History and Compositi B. The New Look . a C. Elections—True or False? V. THE SHAH'S ARMY . VI. THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY .. VII. AN EMERGING ELITE? .....0.0000002 VII, THE INDUSTRIAL ELITE ......0.00060065 TOWARD THE FUTURE .. Annex A—Additional Data on the Iranian Royal Family ‘Annex B—Sample of Iranian Electoral Constituencies =... A Comment on Sources ....--60eceesueteersees a a7 51 33 58 ” SECRETNOFORN/ORCON SECRET NOTE This paper is arranged to serve multiple audiences. The Summary and Conclusions is designed for those who, in a limited amount of time, need to grasp the essence of this complex, ancient yet modernizing, society. The main body of the study is aimed at those whose professional responsibilities require more intimate knowledge of the societal structure and the family relationships that provide its motive power. The main body and the annexes together form a reference for those in virtual daily contact with Iranian officialdom. The paper was prepared in the Office of Political Research: It has been read and commented on by persons in other components. Their suggestions were most helpful and are gratefully acknowledged, but there was no attempt to produce a formally coordinated paper; however, the author wishes to express special appreciation to CRS/ NEA/NESA for its cooperation. Research and analysis was completed in December 1975. Comments and reactions are welcome; they may be directed to the author (gray 8252). SECRETNOFORN/ORCON SECRET SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ‘THE IRANIAN 1 ITE Iran's importance need not be stressed. A major oil-producer and one of the most influential states in OPEC, it aspires to a position of power and influence. This paper is not focused on its political and international prospects® but rather attempts to portray and to analyze the peopie who run iran, dominate its politics, contro} its businesses, set its cultural and moral standards and even try to change its ways. Requisites for lite scetus in Iran are the traditional ones of family connection, influence ia patron-client relationships, wealth and education. ia this century education has become more and more Western in thrust, bringing on conflicts with values developed over the centuries by a society which has absorbed, been changed by foreign influences, but never overwhelmed by them. The contemporary Western-cducated Iranian bureaucrat often finds on return to work in. his homeland that he is facing, and perhaps being frustrated by, an institution far older than the Harvard Business School. The analysis below tries to portray the Iranian elite as it now exists and functions, and to convey some understanding of how it will perform in the years ahead. At the top of the elite structure is the Shah, by virtue both of his position as monarch and of his personal power. The centuries-old Iranian tradition of kingship has been stronger than any dynasty or of any individual ruler. Iran without a monarch to rule and protect the nation against outside enemies, would be, for most of its people, a contradiction in terms. Acceptance of the monarch, however, has been coupled with a willingness to accept the elimination of an individual shah who was unable to defend himself or the nation, The incumbent Mohammad Reza Shah, acceded to the throne in 1941. The somewhat insecure son of a tyrannical and domineering father, he has developed remarkably in the years since. For a third of his reign, he was dominated by others and frustrated by his lack of power to carry out his ‘Theve are aderevsed in. ine all, NIE, M-1.75, “ran” 9 May 1975, SECRETdecisions. For another third he engaged in a successful struggle to establish his dominance. For the last third he has been clearly in charge and is now so strong that his word is law. In Iran's clearly defined social structure, families count for much; that is, those families whose members compete to carry out the Shah’s decisions, and who are themselves powerful. There are some 40 national ‘elite families whose members move from government to political to private pursuits and back again with facility. There are an Waditional 150 or so families of major but not national importance. ‘These numbers are not fixed; families’ fortunes rise and fall according to luck, connections, and the. skill of their representatives. Nearly a quarter of today’s top families were powerful and influential under the dynasty that the present Shah’s father overthrew 50 years ago. The royal court has traditionally been a hotbed of byzantine scheming. In the Shah’s family are an assortment of licentious and financially corrupt relatives, notably his twin sister, Ashraf, a lady possessed of a greedy nature and nymphomaniac tendencies, The Court’s tone has been much improved since the Shah in 1959 married a woman from one of the lesser branches of a national elite family. French-educated Queen Farah takes a personal and constructive interest in the working of the Shah’s programs of social and economic reform. Together with his family, the Shah is also surrounded by a host of officials and hangers-on. He appears to rely on a small group, perhaps a dozen persons, in whom he reposes special confidence and on whom he depends for information and whom he uses as channels to various groups in the society. While these people have official positions, their status with the Shah is for the most part independent of job title and totally dependent on their closeness to him. Of these dozen, three represent national elite families, although this is not their chief assct. Long friendship and faithful service are essential attributes. For example, Minister of Court ‘Alam of a national elite family, has been close to the Shah for 40 years, and General Fardust whose father had been a sergeant, has been a friend for 50 years. Although surrounded, the Shah is alone, to the best of any observer's knowledge. He seeks information. He does not seek advice, and few in Iran would dare to give him‘any. He decides;“others execute. SECRETSECRET ‘The successful execution of the Shah’s programs requires a bureaucracy possessing a variety of skills. Lawyers, engineers, economists and medical doctors predominate; those educated in the political and social science are scarcer. A prerequisite for the opportunity to exercise one’s skills is loyalty to the Shah combined with self-restraint in political ambitiona factor which becomes important at the higher levels where an official might be in a position to develop an independent political base. There seems to be a considerable number of educated, competent individuals who refuse to work for a regime of which they disapprove or, if they are employed, work at les than their full potential ‘The career of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda illustrates the limitations of ambition and power. Hoveyda’s unprecedentedly long tenure in office (11 years) can be attributed to: —the ability w maneuver among the conflicting personal ambitions of other officials who are in at least covert competition for his job; —the ability to avoid any serious errors in interpreting and cafrying out the Shah's wishes and, perhaps more important; —the ability to play second fiddle to the Shah. ‘This last point has been the downfall of previous politicians, for a prime minister strong enough to be elective has usually ended up believing he is more competent than the Shah to make important decisions. Hoveyda has not yet fallen into that trap. ‘The cabinet of today is a classic example of how an important Iranian institution, the dowreh, works, in this case to the advantage of several young politicians, Hassan Ali Mansur, Amir Abbas Hoveyda and their friends, (The dowreh. “‘circle” is an informal associational group often cutting across class lines, formed for social reasons, ¢.g., card playing, for literary or professional discussions or simply for amiability. A well-established davreh provides a forum for the exchange of information and opinions and a means of promoting the political and economic fortunes of its members.) Mansur had already been a cabinet minister, when he gathered in 1959 a youngish group of middle-level bureaucrats interested in the problems of Iranian development. Within two years the group had expanded and became the Progressive Center, at which point the Shah gave his blessing. The establishment SECRET it