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In the name of Allah

the most
:ompassionate and Merciful
In the Name of GOD, the Beneficient, the Merciful

I s r a e l is the Enemy of Bumanity and Man" - Imam Khomeini

An evident characteristic of the regime which has been in


the past half centu,ry by the name of Israel is its dependence
on aliens and forein support. This is a regime which has been
formed on the initiative of English imperialism, through the
usurption of the land of deprived Muslims and grown in the
care of American imperialism .At the beginning, England in -
order to expand its satanic domination, under the pretext of
"efforts to establish a national Jewish government" along with
the Zionists proceeded to occupy a section of the lands belon-
ging to Muslims. In reality, they established a base in the h-
eart of the Islamic home land from which all satanic forces of
the world could struggle against Islam and attack the Muslims
or weaken the Islamic world through their plots and deception.

Basically, the main motive for the foundation of the raci-


st Zionist regime was confrontation with Islam, for if Muslims
achieve unity, they will undermine world arrogance. This is w-
hy Imam considers The Day of Qods as the day of Islam.

As the univesal domination of England declined, a more po-


werful friend and ally, American imperialism, came to the help
of Israel. The seemingly endless flow of American military and
I economical aid, increasingly encouraged this small entity to
instigate new plots and disasters everyday.

We have heard much about the massacres of the Qods occupy-


ing regime and how the Zionist network dominating it is coord-
inated and aligned with not only the oppressive power but all
corrupt and treacherous regimes.It is for this reason that th-
is regime does not refrain from any level of violence against
the deprived and downtrodden people of Palestine. As we know,
as long as the criminal Shah, the puppet of the Great Satan,
controlled the destinies o f the Iranian nation our oil flowed
to the "burper Israel so that its system of crime and murder
would not stop for a moaent. When the American puppet regime
collapse with the roar of the heroic nation and the help of
G m in tie leadership of =man Khomeini, hmerican imperialism
d i d not s i t idly by. New it d a r e s to capel dependent regimes which a r e

1 apparently a g a i n s t I s r a e l to supply o i l t o this criminal regime.

I n general, America monitors and d i r e c t s t h e l i n e of events i n the


Middle E a s t s o t h a t t h e Z i o n i s t , r a c i s t e l i t e which fond t h e criminal q w -
ernment hierarchy of I s r a e l can c o n t r o l the events of t h e region i n a l l
a s p e c t s and implement any p l o t and conspiracy they choose with t h e a i d of
t h e Great Satan. Hence it b e n e f i t s in this way from t h e numerous e f f o r t s
of o t h e r puppet Arab regimes which u n j u s t l y dominate Islamic c o u n t r i e s and
serve imperialism. The Islamic OÑla is under constant oppression here, an
oppression which stems from t h e deep enemity and h o s t i l i t y of world arrog-
a n c e a q a i n s t I s l a m and t h e Muslims. This OHi- a l l i a n c e encouraged t h e
usurper I s r a e l t o occupy Jerusalem (Qds) the land o f t h e Messengers and
Prophets of GOD, i n June 1967. Now f o r t h e s e y e a r s , t h e dear pods, t h i s
f i r s t c e n t e r of t h e followers of d i v i n e u n i t y and t h e f i r s t s h e l t e r of t h e
I
l o v e r s of t h e v i s i o n of GOD has been captive i n the claws of those who b l -
ock t h e path of Allah. I t ' s holy land has been the ground f o r t h e aggress-
ion and a t t a c k s of t h e enemies of GOD and t h e people and the murderers of
Prophets and d i v i n e men. The dear Qods is now announced by t h e Z i o n i s t re-
gime t o be t h e c a p i t a l of "oppression, aggression and usurpation". The
Qods occupying regime has now made t h e land from which divine prophets and
t h e land of t h e c h i l d r e n of Habil (Abel), i n t o a s h e l t e r f o r t h e descen-
d a n t s of Ghabil (Cain) and has e s t a b l i s h e d t h e domination of t h e followers
o f Namrood (Nimrod) i n t h e land where Abraham grew. A t t h i s time, these
r u l e r s have launched a wildcampaionof Border a g a i n s t t h e t r u e owners of
Qods, t h e oppressed y e t brave p a l e s t i n i a n a and a g a i n s t t h e downtrodden and
martyr giving people of Lebanon and u l t i m a t e l y a g a i n s t a l l Muslin of t h e
world.

What is c l e a r today f o r a l l justice-seeking people of t h e world is th-


a t t h e Qods occupying regime cannot continue its e x i s t e n c e (not to mention
its v a s t aggression a g a i n s t t h e @psli~s) without American support and bac-
king. For t h i s reason, s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t this f e a r f u l cancerous tumor is
only p o s s i b l e through d e c i s i v e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e criminal America and
hence i n t h i s warfront t h e r e is no p l a c e f o r American l a c k i e s . Puppet reg-
imes l i k e t h a t of I r a q , Egypt, Jordan and Arabia, a r e not capable of figh-
t i n g a g a i n s t t h e Z i o n i s t regime because o f t h e i r dependence.

Due t o t h e coiimitment and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y that we have, we gathered


p a r t s from t h e remaining documents from t h e Anerican spy den i n Tehran ,
which d e s c r i b e s t h e a l l i a n c e of American i m p e r i a l i s m and t h e Z i o n i s t r e g i m
i n t h i s connection. It may be t h a t the increased consciousness o f t h e Mus-
lim world and t h e Mustaz'efin concerning these a n i o u s a l l i a n c e w i l l lead
them t o t h e t r u e b a s i s f o r s t r u g g l e which is Islam (not nationalism which
is connected t o racism) and along with t h e g l o r i o u s Islamic Revolution of
I r a n they w i l l undermine t h e p i l l a r s of world arrogance one a f t e r t h e
T h e f i r s t document i s a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e pamphlet concerning t h e espi-
onage and s e c u r i t y system of I s r a e l , and i t has been prepared by t h e s p i e s
cf the Great Satan. I n t h i s document i n r e a l i t y , t h e criminal America has
projected a c l e a r p i c t u r e of t h e crimes and inhuman a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t -
e l l i g e n c e agency of the r a c i s t regime i t supports. A regime which owes its
e x i s t e n c e t o t h e oppressive powers of t h e world, i s n a t u r a l l y compelled t o
e s t a b l i s h a v a s t espionage network i n a small land with a small population.
A s mentioned i n the document,the domain of a c t i v i t y of t h e d e v i l i s h I s r a e l
i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies i s not l i m i t e d t o t h e region and Muslim c o u n t r i e s ,
b u t encompasses t h e whole world. Corrupt and dependent regime' i n any p a r t
of the world enjoy t h e a i d and cooperation of I s r a e l i n t e l l i g e n c e and esp-
ionage agencies. Mossad operations which a r e only a p a r t of t h i s s a t a n i c
system a r e s o v a s t t h a t they cover Russia, U,S;A, United Nations and
Eastern Europe i n matters of p o l i t i c a l , economical and s c i e n t i f i c intel-
ligence gathering.

"M'5ssad has i n t e l l i g e n c e and espionage bases i n most European c a p i t a l s ,


Turky, L a t i n America, Africa and Far East,and engages i n various operations
r a p i n e from dependent o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s with host s e r v i c e s ( l i k e CIA,SA-
VW) f o r i n e l l i g e n c e exchange to t a k i n g p a r t i n s p e c i a l operations d i r e c t e d
against A r a b t e r r o r i s t s " ,

They even go ahead t o spy on t h e i r master, a s they had i n s t a l l e d a


s e c r e t microphone i n the o f f i c e of American Ambassador.

This document a l s o r e f l e c t s the p l o t s and crimes done by Z i o n i s t lack-


j.es i n embassies of t h e zeds occupying regime under t h e cover of "diploma-
t i c activities".

I n a s e c t i o n of t h i s document, it i s w r i t t e n "The c o l l e c t i o n agency


t h e l a r g e s t of t h e e i g h t agencies Mossad has, operates under diplomatic
cover i n f o r i e g n c o u n t r i e s . Now it i s q u i t e evident what r o l e elements who
work a s i-nbassador, Charge d ' A f f a i r e s and o t h e r s i n these c e n t e r s of cons-
p i r a c i e s o r embassies, play i n r e a l i t y .

As we mentioned b e f o r e , c o r r u p t and oppressive regimes and t h e i r suppr-


e s s i v e systems enloy c l o s e cooperation and r e l a t i o n s with Mossad and o t h e r
I s r a e l espionage s e r v i c e s .

The document mentions these instances:

"Mossad i s responsible f o r t r a i n i n g t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s r v i c e s of Turkey


Ghana, and Japan".

" I s r a e l cooperates with South Africa i n t e l l i g e n c e and s e c u r i t y services':


Naturally, t h e SAVAK which suppressed t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s and freedom see-
, b r a who opposed t h e criminal regime of Shah, had an important and long
standing place i n these c o l l a b o r a t i o n s .

"Towards the end of 1958, an o f f i c i a l dependent organization composed


of Mossad, t h e Turkish S e c u r i t y Service and SAVAK was formed and named t h e
THREE HEADED SPEAR".

"Apart from r e g u l a r i n t e l l i g e n c e exchanges, meetings a t t h e l e v e l of


t h e heads of t h e s e s e r v i c e s took place every s i x months".

O f couse, t h e r e s u l t s o f such c l o s e and continous cooperation was somet-


hing beyond t h e mere t r a i n i n g of SAVAK prsonel. Through these r e l a t i o n s ,
Mossad was a b l e t o impose t h e p o l i c i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l Zionism upon t h e
American regime of t h e Shah and f o r c e f u l l y layed grounds f o r t h e suppress-
ion of t h e Muslims whether they a r e I r a n i a n s o r Arabs. This f a c t i s c l e a r l y
projected i n t h e document;

"The main goal i n I s r a e l ' s r e l a t i o n s with I r a n was t o form and increase


Anti-Arab and Pro-Israel p o l i c i e s among I r a n i a n o f f i c i a l s . Following t h e
end of 1950, f o r y e a r s , Mossad has had j o i n t operations with SAVAK. Mossad
has aided SAVAK i n its a c t i v i t i e s and supported t h e Kurds of Iraq".

I t is evident how SAVAK and Mossad c o s p i r e a g a i n s t t h e Muslem Arabs from


one s i d e and b r u t a l l y massacre t h e revolutionary Muslims i n I r a n from t h e
o t h e r . Hence v i a t h i s s a t a n i c thinking Mossad n a t u r a l l y sees t h e existence
of d i f f e r e n t C h r i s t i a n and Muslim groups i n Lebanon a s a s u i t a b l e ground
f o r espionage and i n t e l l i g e n c e a c t i v i t i e s , thus i t proceeds t o form cland-
e s t i n e organizations.

The f i r s t document c o n t a i n s an organizational c h a r t of I s r a e l espionage


systems i n complete d e t a i l and t h i s can well serve a s a guide f o r t h e inc-
reased understanding of M u s l i m warriors a s to t h e n a t u r e of t h i s r u t h l e s s
system. With t h i s increased understanding and with adherence t o Allah and
unity of expression they w i l l i n f l i c t freshworldsupon i t s d e t e r i o r a t i n g
body. For t h e u l t i m a t e destiny of the oppressors i n t h i s world and t h e
o t h e r is none o t h e r than a n n i h i l a t i o n .

I n t h e second document p e r t a i n i n g t o 1965, we s e e how t h e I s r a e l regime


increased and broadened i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n I r a n and developed c l o s e r e l a t i o n s
with t h e Shah's regime e v e n t h r o u g h a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l p r o j e c t s .
This was of course done q u i e t l y and s e c r e t l y . In t h i s area, t h e numerous
e f f o r t s of t h e American ambassador and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Qods occ-
upying regime, mentioned a t t h e end of t h e document a r e noteworthy.

I n t h e t h i r d document, we witness t h e complete and multidimensional


support of t h e Shah f o r I s r a e l . He guarantees t h e continued existence of
I s r a e l through t h e o i l supply and i n f l i c t s excessive blows upon t h e unity
of Muslim world. I t i s n a t u r a l t h a t t h e Shah, t h e number one agent of Ame-
r i c a n imperialism i n t h e region and t h e f a i t h f u l a l l y of the Qods occupyi-
ng regime would consider t h e d e f e a t of I s r a e l t o be impossible, as he con-
s i d e r e d himself invulnerable a s well. They a r e ignorant of t h e f a c t t h a t
j u s t a s t h e Muslin masses overthrew him, through adherence to t h e Almighty
GOD and Islamic e d i c t s , once again all Muslims of t h e region armed with
weapons of f a i t h and adherence to GOD s h a l l punish t h e usurper I s r a e l f o r
t h e crimes it has done, even though today dependent regimes l i k e t h a t of
Saudi ~ r a b i ahave replaced t h e Shah i n supplying I s r a e l ' s and American's
oil.

I n the f i r s t document i t was mentioned how top Z i o n i s t i n t e l l i g e n c e


agents work under diplomatic and embassy covers. The f o u r t h and f i f t h
documents a r e d e t a i l e d evidence of t h i s and how i t manifested i n Iran.

Ben Euqenon who a t one time was a c l o s e a i d e of t h e Prime Minister and


Foreign Minister of t h e Qods occupying regime, acted a s Charge d l A f f a i r e s
i n t h e I s r a e l i espionage mission. This f i g u r e had such a u t h o r i t y over a f f -
a i r s t h a t t h e Great Satan r e f e r t o him f o r information and t h e American
s p i e s e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y informed t h e Z i o n i s t agent i n I r a n of t h e pro-Israel
tendencies of t h e Shah's puppet regime.

The s i x t h document exposes t h e v a s t support of t h e Shah f o r I s r a e l un-


der t h e American umbrella. F e a r f u l from t h e wrath of t h e Muslim masses of
I r a n , I s r a e l i agents while keeping a low p r o f i l e , have clandestinely enga-
ged, l i k e o t h e r so-called embassies of i m n e r i a l i s t governments i n t h e plu-
ndering of t h e wealth of thedowntrodden massesof t h i s land. The closeness
of t h e regime of I s r a e l and t h e Shah who both owe t h e i r p o l i t i c a l economi-
c a l and m i l i t a r y l i f e t o t h e d i r e c t s u p p o r t of America, i s not s u r p r i s i n g
a t a l l . However, what i s s u r p r i s i n g and r a i s e s many questions is the know-
ledge of various Arab embassies of these cooperations and t h e i r s i l e n c e
and agreement.

After t h e overthrowing of t h e Shah's American regime by t h e Islamic


Revolution, t h e severance of a l l r e l a t i o n s with I s r a e l and t h e establishm-
e n t of b r o t h e r l y t i e s with t h e p a l e s t i n i a n people, these regime opposed
and went ahead t o s i d e with I s r a e l i n j o i n t p l o t s f o r undermining t h e
Islamic Revolution.

I n t h e seventh document s p i e s who a r e " f r i e n d s and a l l i e s * of one


another exchange views on I r a n i a n i s s u e t o a t t a i n necessary coordination
f o r t h e plundering and suppression of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . A s mentioned i n
t h e f i r s t document, t h e SAVAK and Mossad formed t h e THREE HEADED SPEAR
organization f o r b e t t e r cooperation. I n t h e e i g h t h document, a Z i o n i s t
-E-
Â¥qui informs h i s American f r i e n d of t h e p r e c i s e events which took place
in one of SAVAK's operation and t h e b r u t a l i t y and savagery ( a s Zionist spy
calls i t ) of SAVAK. This treacherous a l l i a n c e i s again portrayed i n t h e
ninth document and hence it i s not s t r a n g e t h a t t h e usurper I s r a e l feared
the Islamic Revolution s o g r e a t l y , and supports and a i d s i t s former f r i e -
nds i n t h e SAVAK today i n Kurdestan and o t h e r a r e a s where counterrevoluti-
onaries have engaged i n p l o t s a g a i n s t t h e Islamic Republic of Iran. Another
noteworthy p o i n t i n the n i n t h document i s I s r a e l ' s concern over t h e proba-
b l e dissagreement.between I r a n and America i n c e r t a i n a r e a s . This p i o n t
portrays the oomious dependence of I s r a e l on America's universal dominat-
ion.

The t e n t h document i s a C I A r e p o r t p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e background and


reputations of t h e s p i e s i n t h e conspiracy c e n t e r of the Qods occupying
regime who generally had p a r t i c i p a t e d f o r long years i n t h e murder and
massacre of Muslim Arabs. Then t o i n s u r e t h e s a t a n i c domination of Zionism
they continue t h e i r crimes i n I r a n (of course under t h e supervision of t h e
Great S a t a n ) .

The eleventh document l i k e t h e o t h e r s mentioned portrays America * s


monitoring and coordination of t h e Z i o n i s t regime and t h e deposed Shah's
a c t i v i t i e s . American's and t h e I s r a e l i ' s oneness i n confronting t h e revol-
utionary Muslim movements i n P a l e s t i n e and other revolutionary Arab regimes
is c l e a r l y exposed. This matter is f u r t h e r c l a r i f i e d i n more d e t a i l i n t h e
t w e l f t h , t h i r t e e n t h , fourteenth and f i f t e e n t h documents. The s i x t e e n t h do-
cument concerns p r e c i s e iformation from t h e Great S a t a n ' s s p i e s a s a weauon
manufactured by t h e Z i o n i s t regime f o r t h e suppression of t h e Muslims. We
hope t h e exposure of t h i s information s h a l l cause g r e a t damage t o t h e
Z i o n i s t regime.

F i n a l l y , t h e seventeenth and l a s t document is a biography of one of


t h e Z i o n i s t l e a d e r s , t h e criminal Yitzhok Rabin, which has been,prepared
by CIA s p i e s . Rabin i s a man who through t h e massacre of the v i l i a n t Pale-
s t i n i a n people climbed t h e ladder of power t o t h e l e v e l of prime minister-
s h i p of t h e Z i o n i s t regime. Yet h i s r e a c t i o n t o t h e Arab a t t a c k i n 1967
was none o t h e r than f e a r and cowardice.

The evident a s p e c t of a l l documents which we b r i e f l y described i s t h e


oneness and complete coordination between t h e Z i o n i s t regime and t h e crim-
i n a l America i n t h e i r treacherous operations across t h e world and particu-
l a r l y i n this region. I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s usurper regime cannot e x i s t
f o r a moment without the d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t support of t h e Great Satan.
Thus, we s t r e s s upon t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s holy war a g a i n s t t h e Qods occupyers
d d n d s a d e c i s i v e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the Great Satan, and i n t h i s f r o n t
American l a c k i e s , who served Zionism along with t h e Shah's regime and today
replace t h e Shah i n supplying o i l t o I s r a e l can never f u l f i l l t h e i r
h i s t o r i c a l o b l i g a t i o n . ( I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t t h e same regimes
which according t o t h e American spy den documets had no opposition t o t h e
a c t i v i t i e s of I s r a e l i n I r a n , today s i d e with American imperialism i n
charging t h a t I r a n has r e l a t i o n s with pods occupying regime).

Our prayer i s t h a t a l l M u s l i m s unitearound t h e a x i s of t h e l i f e giving


schoolof Islam, Armed with weapons of f a i t h and oneness t h e Muslim w i l l
destroy t h i s base of world arrogance i n the h e a r t of t h e Islamic Ununah.
In t h i s holy s t r u g g l e t h e Muslims should take t h e glorious Islamic
Revolution of I r a n which follows t h e movements of t h e Prophets, as t h e
b e s t example. We a r e confident t h a t t h e a n n i h i l i a t i o n of t h i s base of inf-
i d e l i t y , which has a s h o r t d u r a t i o n according t o d i v i n e g l a w s , s h a l l l a y
ground f o r t h e Government of t h e I m a m of our time (Mahdi A,S,) and give
good t i d i n g s f o r t h e emancipation of t h e Mustaz'efin from t h e claws of t h e
Mustakberin .
MUSLIM STUDENTS FOLLOWING THE LINE OF THE IMAM
secret
noforn-nocontract-orcon

March 1979

Foreign
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Backgm~ndand development of services


2 Objectives and structure
3 Political aspects
I Relationship between the government and the servtces
b. Relationship between the services and Hie populace
4 Profosional standards
a. Intecrit~
b. Efficiency
c. Security
d. Morale and dildpUnaw methods
B MonadÑSecre Intelligence Service * a
1 Functions
2 Organization
3 Administrative practices
I Training
b Funds and salaries
4 Methods of operation
a. Relationship with other services
b. Liaison with forei~nservices
C Shin- BethÑCounteresDioiMg and Internal Security Service
1 Functions 19
2 Or#anization 19
3. Administrative practices 22
4 Methods of oneration 23
D. Military Intelligence 24
1 Functions 24
2. Organization 24
a Air Force Intelligence 30
b. Naval Intelligence 30
3 Administrative practices 33
4 Methods of operation 34
5. Relations with other serviccs 36
E Research and Political Planning Center ¥
F The National Police 36
C. Key officials 39
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N ~ W K ~ , ~ V ~ C U , V ~<)KC
K A< L
) AT
Page
ki Comments on principal sources 40
1 Source materials 40
2 Supplementary overt publications 40

FIGURES
Page
Fig 1 Soviet Agent Israel Beer (photo)
Fig 2. Organization of Israeli Intelligence and Security Services.
1977 (chart)
Fig. 3 Organization of Mossad, 1977 (chart)
Fig. 4 Eliahu Ben S h a d Cohen's transmitter on display in Damascus.
1965 (photo)
Fig. 5 Johann Wolfgang Lotz illustrates the use of a transmitter during
his trial in Cairo. July-August 1965 [photo) t
Fig 6 Organization of Shin Beth, 1977 (chart)
Fig. 7 Organization of Military Intelligence. 1977 (chart)
Fig. 8 Organization of Naval Intelligence, 1974 (chart)
Fir 9 Organization of Israeli National Police, 1977 (chart)
Fig. 10 'sraeli National Police headquarters, Jerusalem, November
1972 (photo)
Fig 11 Israeli Border Guard post under construction at Kefar Rosenwald
(Zant), June 1970 (photo)

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NOFORNJNOCONTRACT/OIICON

GLOSSARY

FOREIGN ENGLISH
Iran HaHagana Defense Organization
Tnu'at H a H m l Freedom Movement
Hlltadmt Haklmlt General Federation of Labor in Israel
she1 Ha'oodim Be'eretz Yisra'el
IDF Tzm H a p a h LeYisra'el (Zahat) Israel Defense Force*
ILP MIfkgel Ha A d h HaYisra'elit I d Lfbof Party
Irrun Irmn Tzm't le'Umt N i h d Military Orummbon
MacMeke~ Hackekm Research Division
Machkket Medinit Political Inteltifence
MAKI Miflegel Komunlltt Israel Commuoift Ptrty
MAPAI Mifleget Po'ale Erets Yitra'el Israel Worken' Pnty
MAPAM M i P e ~ e tPo'alim Me'uhedel United Waken' Pçrt
MI Agaf Modtin (Sherut Modiin) Military Intelllfence
M-d Mossad Letaffirih Mrvow:hadIm Secret Intelligence Service (Literally Cen
tnJ Institute fa Inlelllienoe d Special
Duties)
Plugot Hahatz Snearhead Gmum
Rahw Clandestine Ccdlertlon and Producnoti
flAFI Reshimat Po'ale Yism'el Israel Workers Lut
RAKAH Reshim Komun(Itit Hadasha New Communist Lnt
Shay Sherut Y e d ~ h Infonnatm Service

-
SIAH S m l Yism'el Hadaih New I d Left
Shin Beth Sherut Bitachm Sbdi Countereipionaae and Internal Security

Sherut Modiin She1 Male A r t


(.
Sheml Modiin ce Setachon Kohot
Va'adat Rashd Haahcmlim
Police Branch of Military IntelliKfice
a Yam Naval Intelliaenoe and Secuntv Service
Committee of the Heads of Services
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NOFOItN, NOCONTRACT/ORCON

Intelligence and Security

A. General It has also served as a cover for Shay, which extended


its covert operations into Western Europe and the
Israel's principal intelligence and security authority United States.
b the Va'ndat Boahei Hasherutim (the Committee d
the Heads of Services), generally known as Va'adat. It From 1923 to 1948, Shay's objectives were to
coordinates the operations and activities of its mem- promote the establishment of an independent State of
bers. Mossad Letafkidim Mevouchadim (the Secret Israel; infiltrate Mandatory installations in order to
~ntelligenceService) or Mossad. its common name, has apprise Zionist leadership of British attitudes and
the primary responsibility for foreign operations and is proposed actions; collect political intelligence that
nibordinate to the Prime Minister. Sherut Bitachon could be used in Zionist propaganda; penetrate Arab
~ l a l (Counterespionage
i and ~nternalSecurity), popu- and anti-Zionist factions in Palestine and peripheral
hrly known as Shin Beth. is responsible for security nations; monitor and control all extremist g r o u ~ s ~ l e f t
and is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. Awf and right-among Jewish communities in Palestine
Modiin (Military Intelligence) has the main responsi- and abroad; provide security for the arms smuggling
bility for strategic military intelligence and communi- and illegal immigration programs of the Haganah; and
cations intelligence and is under the command of the finally collect information on Nazi Germany to
Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. The guarantee the security of the Jewish underground and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides support in escape channels throughout Europe before, during and
research and political planning to the Israel intelli- after World War 11.
gence community. The Ministry of Interior assists the
National Police with police investigations and the Shay consisted of the following components: Politi-
maintenance of border security. cal Intelligence (Machlaht Medinit); Counterespio-
nage and Internal Security (Sherut Bitachon Klali);
1. Background and development of services Military Intelligence (Sherut Modiin); Police Branch
of Military Intelligence (Sherut Modiin She1 Mate
In 1948, when the British Mandate ended, the Artzi); and Naval Intelligence and Security (Sherut
Jewish population of Palestine established the State of Modiin ce Betachon Kohot Ha Yam). These services
Israel. Among the agencies'of government to emerge worked independently on behalf of the different
was the intelligence and security unit known as the ministries to which they were individually responsible.
Information Service (Sherut Yedfoth-popularly This intelligence and security community was com-
known as Shay). This organization, which was the petitive and frequently acted on its own, a product of
Intelligence arm of the Zionists' underground resist- the general postwar chaos which required the accom-
ance force, the Haganah, during the years of the plishment of many urgent tasks wherever and
British Mandate, had begun to engage in operations on whenever they might arise. In some of the West
a worldwide scale with the founding of the Jewish European capitals all services were represented and
Agency in 1929 at the Zionist Congress in Zurich, competed for the same agents and sources.
Switzerland. At that time. the Jewish Agency was
composed of both Zionists and non-Zionists, including By April 1951, the Prime Minister and cabinet.
a strong American participation. The Jewish Agency, seriously alarmed by the atmosphere of mutual
which was created to aid and support distressed Jews jealousy and mistrust prevalent among the services at
and to sustain the Palestine Jewish community, has the increasing cost of their uncoordinated efforts in the
been effectively under Zionist control over the years. field, decided to reorganize completely the basic
All information in this s
u m It classified Secret.
Nofom, Nocontact, Orcon.

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structure of Israel's intelligence and security commu- the Prime Minister must know about all the activities
nity The dynamic foice behind the plan was the late of the national intelligence and security service! .
Reuven Shiloah, who reorganized the services accord- be given objective intelligence evaluations balanced
ing to functions and responsibilities and established a and based on different viewpoints from more than one '
mechanism to coordinate their activities. Shiloah was source. To accomplish these aims the committee
chairman of this authority, the Committee of the recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Aff*
Heads of Services (Va'adat Rashei Hasherutim, called Research Division be strengthened so that it would be
Va'adat). He integrated the Naval Intelligence and capable of presenting independent political e&-
Security Service and the embryonic air intelligence tions, both on Middle East issues and other political
unit into Military Intelligence (Aeaf Modiin) The subjects. By upgrading the Research Division, the
Political Intelligence Service was made independent of committee believed that a certain balance would be
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reorganized as the created for security and political evaluations, which
Secret Intelligence Service (Mossad Letafkidim were handled almost solely by the Military Intelli-
Meyouchadim or Mossad). The Ministry of Foreign gence Production Department. The committee also
Affairs retained Research Division (Machleket Hack- observed that the existence of Mossad, which controls
eker). Shin Beth remained intact except for internal secret foreign information gathering assets, facilitated
changes. The Special Tasks Division in the Investiga- to some extent the possible formulation of another
tion Department of the police became a part of the independent evaluation unit. The committee also
new apparatus. Shiloah's reorganization of the intelli- regarded as a matter of vital importance the
gence and security structure produced an efficient and appointment of a special adviser, subordinate only to
well-coordinated community. the Prime Minister. He would be a person of hi&
caliber who would aid the Prime Minister in keeping
The Israeli intelligence and security services re-
in touch with and monitoring the activities of the
tained this structure relatively unchanged throughout
intelligence and security services. The committee's
the Arab-Israel War in October-November 1956. the
principal recommendations were not implemented at
Six-Day War in June 1967 and the Yam Kippur War
the time except for the establishment of the adviser
i t October 1973 During the early and mid-19605,
position and the shift of responsibility for Shin Beth
however, the Israeli Government had considered
from the Minister of Defense to the Prime Minister.
changes in the structure and duties of the components
There was a brief interlude from September 1965 to
of the intelligence and security community. Despite
July 1966 when Isser Harel. the former Chairman of
Shiloah's earlier reorganization, much of what hap-
the Va'adat and Director of Mossad, served as a special
pened in the Israeli services at this time depended on
adviser to Prime Minister Eshkol on intelligence and
the personal relationships between Ben Gurion and the
security matters. Harel resigned as a result of internal
directors and chiefs. In early 1963, just before his
policy disputes within the community and he was not
retirement, Ben Gurion appointed a committee to
replaced at the time.
review the situation. He was concerned that the
intelligence and security establishment which, by
virtue of his serving both as Prime Minister and Following the alleged "intelligence failure" in the
Yom Kipour War, the Israeli Government established
Minister of Defense, usually functioned satisfactorily,
the Agranat Commission in November 1973 to
might deteriorate when he left office. He also was
reported to be dissatisfied with the lack of clarity in investigate matters relating to the hostilities and the
performance of the intelligence and security services-
the community's chain of command and functions and
The commission in its Partial Report in April 1974
ordered the committee to define the subordination
proposed reactivating and strengthening the ~ o s tof
and tasks of these bodies.
special adviser to the Prime Minister on intelligence
In July 1963 the committee submitted its report to a and security matters. The commission also itecom-
new Prime Minister. the late Lev1 Eshkol The mended changes in the intelligence and security forces
committee stated that. while the functions of Prime through the establishment of a research and evaluation
Minister and Minister of Defense did not necessarily unit in Mossad and the elevation of the Research
have to be concentrated in the hands of one person, Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The object

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,,I this modification was to avoid relying exi lusivcly on throughout the world; and (6) collection of political,
Military Intelligence for major estimates and assess- and economic intelligence in other areas of interest to
ments. The commission also emphasized the need for them. such as Africa. The Israeli services also make
W e r operational coordination in the field of collec- special efforts to counter Arab propaganda and tc
tion between the services but it opposed the coordina- neutralize anti-Zionist activity. Within recent years
tion of their finished intelligence judgments. A full or the Israelis have devoted much operational activity to
final commission report, if there ever was one, was combating Arab terrorism, which has grown over the
never made public. years from isolated cross-border raids by Palestinian
Fedayeen to daring and deadly attacks, often interna-
From 1974 to 1976 the recommendations of the
tional in scope, on Israeli personnel and property. The
partial Report of the Agranat Commission were
Israelis also have undertaken widescale covert politi-
implemented. The Prime Minister appointed Reserve
cal, economic and paramilitary action programs-par-
General Rehavam Zeevi as his intelligence adviser, a
titularly in Africa.
d t i o n that was purely a d v b r y and carried no
w t i v e authority. Zeevi assumed this new job in Authorization for foreign intelligence and internal
Addition to serving as the Prime Minister's adviser on security organizations, while not defined by specific
n t e r t e r r o r i s m . Zeevi was also to be the Prime charter, is in Israeli legislation. Paragraph 29 of the
Minister's liaison with the Director of Military Basic Law states: "The Government is authorized to
Intelligence and was also to keep the Prime Minister carry out on behalf of the State, in'accordance with
alerted to differences of views among the intelligence any law any act whose implementation is not lawfully
and security services. In October 1976. however. Zeevi entrusted to any other authority." This implies that the
rÑigne from this post and was replaced by Brigadier government is entrusted with the management of
(Ret.) Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former Director of intelligence and state security affairs since no other
Military Intelligence. The Research and Political authority is empowered to act in this sphere by any
Planning Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs other law. Attempts have been made over the years by
,ame into operation in January 1975. Changes in the officials within the government and the community to
Military Intelligence structure were being carried out. have an act passed defining the status of foreign
A new research and evaluation unit for assessing intelligence and security organizations and their
Information was established within Mossad. New operations. but nothing has come of these efforts
appointees had taken over in most of the intelligence Internal security, on the other hand, is more clearly
a n d security components. In June 1977 the tsraeli defined in law. The Defense (Emergency) Regulations
Government established a Ministerial Committee on of 1945 (established during the British Mandate), the
Security Affairs. Military Law of 21 June 1955 and the Penal Revision
(State Security) Law of 31 July 1957, the Israeli
2. Objectives and structure equivalent of the British Official Secrets Act. all are
The principal targets of the Israeli intelligence and concerned with internal security. The Emergency
mcurity services are: (1) the Arab states-their Regulations of 1945 gave the military administration
capabilities and intentions toward Israel, their rela- the power to arrest and deport troublesome elements
tions with the USSR and other powers, their official and to designate certain locations as "closed areas,"
itutallations and representatives throughout the world, thus requiring local inhabitants to possess travel
their leaders, internal and inter-Arab politics, morale, permits to transit such places. While the regulations
military preparedness and other order of battle; (2) originally applied to both Jews and Arabs in Palestine,
*~lleclionof information on secret US policy or they are now used largely to monitor the Arab
Ircisions, if any, concerning Israel; (3) collection of community in Israel. Administration of the regulations
**icntific intelligence in the US and other developed was transferred from the military to the police in
wntries; (4) determination of government policy 1966. Internal security organs reportedly increased
, w a r d Israel in the USSR and East European nations their agent activity to meet this responsibility.
and the problem of Jewish emigration from these Israeli laws require severe punishment ranging from
arras; (5) close monitoring of anti-Zionist activity the death penalty or life imprisonment for treason or
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assistance to the "enemy," to terms of incarceration Shin Beth does not have the cower of arrest. this
from three to 15 years for espionage, contact with function being performed by the Special Tasks
foreign agents, aiding and abetting a crime against Division of the Investigations Department of the
state security and unauthorized disclosure of informa- Police, which works in close collaboration with S h n
tkm by a public servant. There is no statute of Beth in Israel. Within the Administered Territories.
limitations regarding the unauthorized disclosure of which are controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces,
classified information. Shin Beth applies to the military to undertake arrests
and searches. A soecial comoonent under the InsDector
The central body in Israel's intelligence and security General of Police is the Border Guard, whose mission
community is the VaSa&t, which has as its primary is that of guarding the cease-fire lines against Arab
function the coordination of all intelligence and infiltration and of detecting and running down
security activities at home and abroad. The Va'adat Fedayeen terrorists. In recent years Border Guard
consists of the Director of Mossad. the Director of units have been used increasingly to control and'
Military Intelligence, the Director of Shin Beth. the suppress riots and demonstrations in the West Bank
Inspector General of Police, the Director General of area.
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. the Director of the Military Intelligence, in addition to its responsibility
Research and Political Planning Center of the Ministry for strategic and tactical intelligence, prepares the
for Foreign Affairs, and the political, military. national intelligence estimates p d evaluates all
intelligence and antiterrorist advisers of the Prime information dealing with the Arabs. It also is
Minister. The Head of the Special Tasks Division in responsible for developing and protecting communica-
the Investigations Department of the Police also tion codes and ciphers for all the services and the
occasionally attends the meetings with. or in place of, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and for communications
the Inspector General of Police. Meetings must be held intelligence.
biweekly but may be held more frequently At these
meetings each director usually provides a briefing on The Research and Political Planning Center, whi
the key activities of his service during the preceding was formerly the Research Division of the Ministry f
two weeks. The Director of Mossad chairs Va'adat and Foreign Affairs. analyzes raw intelligence fro
in this capacity is directly responsible to the Prime various sources for officials on the policymaking lev
Minister. The members of Va'adat are quasi-equal in Other Israeli Government organizations that p r o
status and the term memune referring to the Director vide support to the intelligence and security corn
of Mossad as chairman is designed to denote a concept nity are the Ministries of Finance (Customs
of preeminence among equals. In actuality, however, Excise, Investment and Securities) and Tourism,
the Director of Military Intelligence now overshadows national airline. El Al, and the national shipping li
the Director of Mossad in power and importance. This Zim. Unofficial Zionist organizations based in Is
development resulted from the continuing Israeli and Jewish communities throughout the world al
reliance on military preparedness for national survival. give aid to Israel operations when needed.
There are between 1.500 and 2.000 personnel '
Mossad is charged with the collection of foreign Mossad, of whom about 500 are officers. Shin Beth h
intelligence and the conduct of covert action programs about 1,000 members of whom some 550 hold off1
outside Israel. rank In Military ~ntelligencethere are about
personnel, of whom 450 are officers,
Shin Beth is responsible for counterintelligence and enlisted personnel and civilian clerks.
internal security. It functions as the governmental officials in the Research and Political
authority on personnel security matters. It is also of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs ra
responsible for the personal safety of the Prime and 100. The police number about
Minister and other high ranking Israeli officials. Shin Border Guards around 6,000.
Beth is in charge of physical security for ports, airports
and key military/industrial installations in Israel and Since the financing of the intelligence and securi
for Israeli missions and El Al operations outside Israel. services is a closely held secret, it is very difficult

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accurate information on the total amounts Agency but loses neither seniority nor retirement
~ p e n d e dfor these purposes. The funds are conceded status whik serving in that capacity.
in the defense budget, and known to the Rime
Minister, the Minister of Defense, one or two of their 3. Political aspects
tap assistants. the Minister of Finance, the State
Camptroller and his Defense Services Insvectorate. a. RELATIOHMIPBETWEEN THE GOVE~NMENT AND
Tile Comptroller deals directly with the directors of THE SERVICESÑT~ intelligence and security coinmu-
tkt ¥erviceswho request funds at the beginning of the nitv enjoys a strong txaition in the ¥ovemmentand
f b u l year in April. The estimates of ex- by the their affairs are well integrated into more general
directors, who have established remitations for honesty overations. Members d the federation which worked
and integrity, are usually acceptable as a starting point for the atabishment of the state were companions d
fa budget negotiations. The Ministry of Finance. longstanding and joint veterans of nich enterprises as
however, does require a 10-year projection of expend- illegal immbation and -rumins. Many of the
d financial needs (an impossible task which is not current leaders came up through the ranks of the
taken seriously). The Comptroller holds a series of military in a series of wan with the A r a b and entered
d i n g s with the various service directors and their politics through affiliation with one of the major
d f s , reviewing their programs in detail These political parties. All d them had some experience in
ÑÑio continue throughout May and result in a clandestine nutten and have been venonally con-
eueful redefinition of the entire intelligence and vinced by stem lessons of the value d food
Mcurity effort and its cost. By October, the detennina- intelligence and security.
tion d s~ecificbudget needs is completed, based on
The intelligence and security services receive
the procram analysis completed in May. This is then
excellent support from the Ministry for Foreign
nubmitted for h i i r approval and the planning and
Affairs. Many senior diplomats are former i n t e l h
budceling cycle is, upon budget a~vroval.completed
officers and therefore conversant with i n t e l l i i
mt in time to begin anin. problems and operations. With their experienced
Much d the administrative support for the services observations and manifold talents, they serve as
h handled by the Ministry for Defense. Various types valuable auxiliaries to their covert colleaxues. w t w e
d cover are provided for and funded by the Israeli diplomatic cover is diligently sustained by the
Defense Forces (IDF). There is close professional
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, almost
cooperation between the civilian intelligence and every Israeli diplomat abroad has good foreign
Mcurity services and military intelligence. These language and area knowledge or some specialization
which enables him to pursue a much broader social
Ñfvices like all government offices, are subject to
-tion by the State Comptrollers office. An life. with its resultant contacts, than is the case in mist
Acistant Director-General is in charge of inspecling foreign services. In many instances, embassy officers.
including chiefs of diplomatic missions, were former
k defense and security services, the Ministry for citizens of the countries to which they are accredited.
Foreign Affairs, and the police. The annual inspection
covers bookkeeping, financial management and han- Information developed by Israeli diplomats ma&
dhng of administration. The Comptroller is required available to the intelligence and security community
for immediate use of operational intelligence or
to fee that the services are operating economically.
dfkiently and with irreproachable morality. inclusion in archives. As a final boon to cowrt '
intelligence personnel, the vigor and variety of a
normal Israeli diplomat's life outside his installation
Israeli governmental offices and departments are usually renders detection of intelligence officers by the
continuously borrowing money, personnel, equipment host country extremely difficult. The same kind of
and material from one another and salaries are paid by
effective support regarding operations is given by the
the office to which the individual is assigned. An
Ministry of Defense and the Jewish Agency.
Intelligence officer or a Ministry for Foreign Affairs
official stationed in New York and assigned to the The Israeli intelligence and security services play an
Jewish Agency is paid salary and allowances by the important role throughout the government and private
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sector Many leaders in both the civil srrvice and 1967 The Dart played by Military Intelligence, shin
industry have at some time in their careers been Beth and the police in contributing to the victory and
directly or indirectly involved with the intelligence controlling the newly-occupied Arab areas taken by
community. Service assignments are not regarded as Israel was followed by a plethora of praise in all
the end of a career, as persons with intelligence and media The so-called "intelligence failure" in the yon
security backgrounds frequently are selected for other Kippur War in 1973, however, weakened popular
jobs in the government. Thus the services are trust in the services. The subsequent work of the
supplemented by persons who know and continue to Agranat Commission, undertaken to evaluate the
relate their missions to intelligence and security community and its shortcomings and to improve
responsibilities, in senior posts in both the public and cooperation among its members, contributed to ,
private sectors. Officially, the services are nonpolitical partial renewal of public confidence The c o n t i n u i ~
and members of the community are not encouraged to battle by the services against terrorism has also kepi
enroll in any party or engage in political activity. The Israelis loyal to the community. The Entebbe raid in
Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of Knesset is July 1976. which resulted in the rescue of hijacked
normally the government's point of discussion for the Israeli hostages, was one action in recent years which
review and resolution of sensitive policies and fired the public imagination and served as an example
activities. The Director of Mossad and the Director of of a well-coordinated and well-executed Israeli opera.
Shin Beth are often present at sessions which are of tion This raid and its success buoyed UP the moral of
concern to them. the Israelis as nothing else has in'recent years a d
certainly showed the intelligence and security commu.
b. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SEBVICES AND THE nity in a good light.
POPULACE-The current state of relations between the
services and the populace is good as a result of the 4. Professional standards
present position of the services as protectors of the
Israeli state and people in the forefront of the struggle a. INTEGRITY-Thedirectors and senior staff mem.
against Arab terrorists and military forces. Most bers of the intelligence and security community
Israelis are acutely aware of this situation and conform to the highest professional standards of
therefore support the services and their operations. integrity and honesty and impose these standards or
The historical development of Israel and the long the lower echelons. There is relatively little differena
continuing struggle against the Arabs have contributed between the basic salary of a new employee and tht
to this harmonious atmosphere. staff member who enjoys a top position. ThÃ
insignificant disparity has resulted in the granting ol
At times in the past as a result of political rivalries compensatory amenities and privileges such as expens*
and disagreements on the kind of order that was to accounts, purchasing of foreign goods that enter the
prevail in Israel, there have been occasional verbal and country through devious tax-free channels, and "pro
journalistic attacks against the services as instruments tektsia," a magic word in Israel, which means that one
of a police state. In several instances, service can get items, housing or privileges at low cost througl
representatives had to appear in closed court sessions influential governmental connections. This is comrnoi
to defend the intelligence and security community practice throughout the government establishment
against accusations of kidnapping, brutality and however. Because the intelligence and security ser
illegality. Although debates in the Knesset occasionally vices, especially Shin Beth, maintain a very tight cove
have reflected probably illegal practices or procedures within their own community, information on person
by the services, the intelligence and security cohmu- nel, budgets and accounts is closely held by a few to1
nity is completely loyal and if the government people in the government and not subjected ti
reauested the execution of a certain task, legal and widespread bureaucratic perusal and control. Thi
illegal, it would be accomplished. higher echelons scrutinize the expenditure of funds b!
the lower ranks, and if financial dishonesty i
Confidence in the intelligence and security commu- discovered, the guilty individual receives very seven
nity also received a boost after the Six-Day War in treatment.
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b. EFFICIENCY-Israel's intelligence and securit) danger that the armed services will not be objective in
services are among the best in the world Their expert observing and reporting foreign developments and i n ,
personnel and sophisticated techniques have made making national intelligence estimates-a major prob-
them highly effective, and they have demonstrated lem in the Yam Kippur War-and their vested interest
outstanding ability to organize, screen and evaluate in military operations will influence intelligence
Information obtained from recruited agents. Jewish assessments. The Agranat Commission has recognized
communities, and other sources throughout the world. this problem and recommended changes
Israel's intelligence capabilities give it a significant
c SECURITY-The physical security of the civilian
advantage over the Arab states-an advantage which
and military intelligence and security headquarters in
was a n important factor in the 1967 war.
Tel Aviv is reported to be excellent Two
Those members of the intelligence and security services-Mossad and Military Intelligence-were
community who were identified with the Information formerly located within a general army compound in
Service and other components of the Haganah, before the heart of the city The buildings were protected by
and during World War 11. developed a high standard high wire fences and military guards. Military
of efficiency and level of competence, The organiza- Intelligence remains in this location but Mossad now
tions succeeded in recruiting a core of capable and occupies a wing of a multistory commercial office
highly-educated individuals from Europe and the building across the street from the compound. Shin.
Middle East whose equal has been difficult to find, let Beth, which was formerly located in a rundown
d o n e attract, since the founding of the state. The corps building in Jaffa, occupied new quarters just north of
of the "old guard," for example, is fluent in four or Tel Aviv in June 1970. This new building, which was
five languages, an accomplishment which alone raises designed for their use. is fenced in and contains a
their general average of efficiency. The younger technical laboratory as well as regular offices. Guards
nenvration has been given intensive training, including control the entrance and badges bearing a photograph
\tiidv abroad, to assist them in gaining these qualifica- of the employee are worn within the compound
tions It is not uncommon for students to engage in
clandestine onerations while pursuing their course There is an elaborate protected government "guest
of studies. house" for the training and accommodation of visiting
foreign intelligence officers, foreign dignitaries and
Israeli signal intelligence successes against the Arabs sensitive agents
in the past were of such high order that the Israelis had
less need than at present for good agent operations There are a little over 1.000 persons working as staff
wainst the enemy. Part of this success was due to poor officers for Mossad and Shin Beth, all of whom have
Arab communications security. The Israelis now face been given a long, thorough security check. If there is
m e problems since Arab communications security is the slightest doubt raised against an individual, the
gradually improving. The Yom Kippur War intelli- application is rejected Personnel with leftist back-
gence failure is an example of inadeauacies in their grounds generally are not trusted by leading members
communications intelligence cacability at that time In of the intelligence and security services. This attitude
recent years, as well. there also have been indications did not always apply to former members of European
that Israeli intelligence on the Arabs, other than Communist parties, some of whom were eminently
communications intelligence, has been somewhat qualified for clandestine service. e s w i a l l y if they had
Inadequate in quality and their agent operations renounced their Communist ideology and affiliated
lacking in success. with the Israeli Labor Party This exemption, how-
ever, has not applied since the exposure of several
One of the principal weaknesses of Israeli's intelli- high-level espionage cases in governmental and
wnce and security system appears to be that the political circles in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The
production of most finished intelligence and the cases of Aharon Cohen, a MAPAM party expert on the
nrcparation of national estimates is done hv Military Middle East, and Israel Beer (Figure 1). a Defense
iiitelligence rather than by an independent service. Ministry contract employee and IDF Reserve lienten-
Inherent in such a n organizational arrangement is the ant colonel, who spied for the USSR. and Dr Kurt

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laiidrstinely with Israeli officers within the country
Certain unlisted official and personal t e l e ~ h n n
numbers are known only to relatively few ~ e o p kT h i
tyoe of ~rofessional demeanor at home provide
excellent daily training for intelligence and securitl
personnel before receiving foreign assignments.
Classified information may not be discussed ove
the telephone Despite their relatively high standard
of security, however. Israeli officials rewrtedly art
occasionally careless i n observing this restriction The'
also have "an old boy network'. much like the British
Ismelis i n the "network" are willing t o discus
classified siibiects whether or not there is a need ti
know The Israelis also have problems dealing will
vcrscas Jewry whose support they need but w h w
w u r i t y is questionable because of the possibility o
divided loyalty.
Installations and storage containers must conform ti
rienrous security standards. Classification t e n i To1
Secret. Secret. Confidential and Restricted (cornpara
ble to For Official Use Only) are wed. Top Secret an
Secret documents are transmitted b y courier only i t
double envelopes and two receipts are r e q u i r e d ~ o n
for the oackage and one for the contents. Thesi
documents are logged i n and out by date, documen
Figure 1. Soviet Agent Isrod B e i
number, title or subject, and the office a c c ~ w
responsibility for them At least three d i
Sittr, a (icntile professor of physics at Haifa Technion,
inventories are held each year. A registry produces
t h e worked for the Czech Service, caused Shin Both
computer printout four times a year listing all T q
to reconsider its own security procedures while
Secret material for which each unit is responsible
stimulating considerable doubt about the reliability of
Electrical communication is handled entirely b
recanted Marxists The services have devised internal
teleprinter and other communication security device
security systems to expose ideological weaklings by
A record is made of documents t o be destroyed am
more thorough periodic security checks. The Israelis
security officers must witness the destruction of a
believe such individuals constitute a possible long-term
T o p Secret and Secret material.
security threat Israeli citizens are subjected to
stringent registration requirements and must carry A l l personnel requiring a clearance must complete
identification papers Within the intelligence and personal history statement and undergo a routin
security community great pains are taken not to reveal investigation. For higher clearances the investigatior
the identities of personnel even to the average Israeli could include the applicant's entire family and a f u
employed i n the government at large Compartmenta- field investigation New immigrants from the USS1
tion is strictly maintained between services with only and East Euroman countries are normally denie
designated individuals, usually members of the "hard- access t o classified information for a minimum of f a
core," crossing lines Intelligence and security person- or five years. This ruling is not always possible t
nel widely use and frequently change pseudonyms enforce because of "protektsia" Within the ID
The national practice of Hebraicizing European or security risks are reported to Shin Beth and are closel
Yiddish birth names also makes the identification of supervised b y the unit security officer, who is require
some Israelis difficult. Visiting foreign officials and t o make periodic reports on the individual's activitie
agents never use the same car twice when meeting T o stimulate and evaluate the security consciousness c

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I IDF cadre. Field Security personnel nrtulate 30 percent annual bonus, for their personnel to
n g the troops and attempt to elicit military compensate for the risks and the anonymity
dormation involved (Figure 2).
i MORALEAND DISCIPLINARY METHODS-M~SS~~
itxi Shin Beth are comoonents of the Israeli civil
B. Mossad-Secret Intelligence Servic6
rrvice structure and applicants must pass a civil I. Functions
wivice examination. Those in their twenties with a
Mossad is responsible for foreign intelligence collec-
mivcrsity degree are preferred, although other indivi-
tion. political action and counterteirorism. In carrying
diials who have especially desirable aualifications are
out its mitsion to collect positive intelligence, the
a ~ r ~ t e Thed . intelligence and security services, in
principal function of Monad is to conduct acent
,l~,ret competition with the Ministry for Foreign
Allmrs and the rapidly expanding business commun- operations against the Arab nations and their official
representatives and installations throughout the world,
i t y . are at a disadvantage. Most young Israelis do not
particularly in Western Europe and the United Slates,
i i k r the anonymity of the secret service and prefer the
where the national interests of the Arabs in the Near
nore remunerative pay scales of the business world.
East conflict with Israeli interest. Mossad collects
Intelligence and security personnel who do not or information on the d i i i o n , morlle, armunenb,
1 mnnt subscribe to the circumscribed life limited by equipment and state of leadenhip d every Arab Army
wurity restrictions and operational considerations are that could be called into action in the case d another
11hc-r dropped or, if their actions should jeopardize round of fllhting; and dl the information that
l i r service or the state, are severely punished. To boost illuminates Arab internal polite and rehtkcxhin
I n - morale of staff intelligence officers, the services in among the principal Arab leaden and the diplomatic
1w early 1960s sought and secured from the Knesset a activity of all countries in the Arab world. Monad

aMrfSMH

R
I
d Political - A
lion-~C."m
SfÑci
Diviuon
Choifinon.Vo'odnf
I
Monad
Stunlit.
I
Stunlit.

-
LEGEND,
--
MIBlaijilntaBfÃ
I

CHAINOF COMMAND
- COOOOtNATlON
 ¥ I W 1 1-79 CIA
Figure 2. Orgonizotion of Israeli Intelligmce and Security Seryict~, 1977 .
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monitors Arab mmmercial activity. particularly in the


field of arnu purchases in the West. and attempts to
of military, economic and
countenct ~ n recniiting
b
political experts. In this cue the principal desire is to 2. Organization I
recruit t h e e persons as intelligence ¥8entsor failing Mossad has eight departments: (1) Operationa
dn.d t h a to dissuade them from aiding the Arabs or Planning and Coordination; (2) Collection; (3)Politica
to discover their precise functions. Mossad also is Action and Liaison; (4) Manpower, Finance, Logistics
with inciting disturbances calculated to create and Security; ( 5 ) Training; (6) Research; (7) Technical
mututl distrust among the Arabs and to draw Western Operations; and (8) Technology (Figure 3)
sympathy away from the Arab cause, and monitoring
and counteracting Arab propaganda and detecting and The operational Planning and Coordination De-
countering Arab terrorism. In the area of counterter- partment is concerned with the management of
rorism, at times the Israelis have carried the fight to Mossad resources and responsible for interdirectorate
Arab terrorists by taking executive action against operational and administrative coordination within the
them, especially in parts of the Near East and Western organization and interservice liaison within the Israeli
Europe. In particular, the fact that Lebanon has a intelligence and security community This department
mixed Christian, Druze and Moslem population has also deals with requirements and the development of
made that country attractive for intelligence projects. overall collection plans.
T h e Israelis have covert assets and run operations in
The Collection Department 'is responsible
their northern neighbor. In the past they have
foreign covert operations and the processing
mounted paramilitary and executive action operations
production of reporting from clandestine sources.
against Palestinian terrorist leaders, personnel and
component is the largest unit in Mossad.
installations in Lebanon. They have also provided
department has offices abroad under Israeli diplo-
support to Christian rightists in the Lebanese civil war.
matic and nonofficial cover and is active mainly i
In addition to running operations against the Arabs. Europe, where it concentrates on Arah targets throug
Mossad collects political, economic and scientific third-country operations.
intelligence in both the Eastern and Western worlds The Political Action and Liaison Directorate is i
for the protection of the State of Israel, Zionism and charge of political action and relations with frie
Jews generally. Their collection efforts are especially foreign services. This component also maint
concentrated in the Soviet Union and the United contact with those nations and political gr
States, as well as at the United Nations, where policy whom Israel does not have normal diplomati
decisions could have repercussions on Israel and (that is, African countries, Lebanon and/or
Zionist goals. Christian rightist factions and Indonesia).
Intelligence objectives in the USSR and East Europe
consist of determining governmental policy toward
Israel and the problem of Jewish emigration; recruit-
ing persons strategically located in Soviet and East
There is also a Psychological Warfare or Specia
Operations Division, probably in the Political Actio
and Liaison Directorate, which runs highly sensitive?
4
covert action operations against Arah terrorists and ex-'
European bureaucracies who. motivated either by Nazis, and sabotage, paramilitary and psychological!
conviction or corruption, are willing to assist Zionist warfare projects, such as character assassination and
action in those countries; and ascertaining the degree black propaganda
and quality of assistance made available to Near
Eastern groups, whether in Israel or the Arah nations, In the absence of the Director of Mossad, the
by Soviet and East European Governments Director of the Operational Planning and Coordina-
tion Department now becomes acting Director,
Objectives in Western countries are equally impor- whereas in past years the Director of the Collection
tant to the Israeli intelligence service. Mossad collects Department acted for the Director of Mossad With
intelligence regarding Western, Vatican, and UN the drive for greater and improved coordination
policies toward the Near East; promotes arms deals for within the intelligence and security community, the

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Geogrophii & Training Staff S Ã § c u r rStaff

IÑIà IÑIÃ
Station*

Figure 3. Organization of Mossad. 1977

Director of the Operational Planning and Coordina- reports on the Arabs are forwarded by Mossad to the
o n Department has apparently taken precedence Research Department of the DM1 while counterespio-
v r r the Director of the Collection Department. nage reports are sent through Mossad to Shin Beth,
where they are given special processing by counterin-
In headquarters, the department directors direct the telligence investigative departments.
>aimusarea, functional, administrative, and financial
imtrollers. The area departments under the control of Mossad controls Israeli foreign intelligence activities
I In- Collection and Special Political Action and Liaison except for operations launched from Israel against
n a r t m e n t s are: ( 1 ) Central America. (2) South military objectives in peripheral areas of surrounding
41ncr1ca.(3) Eastern Europe including the USSR. (4) Arab countries, which are under the jurisdiction of
Muca, ( 5 ) Asia and Oceania, (6) the Mediterranean DMI, Mossad operations abroad fall into two princi~~al
I Near East areas, (7) Europe, and (8) North categories: those in the Near East, as a first line of
\riwica. Under each controller there are branches or defense, and those elsewhere. The Israelis have
ilr-iks which are responsible for one or more countries designated Egypt as the main target area for
establishing intelligence networks. In 1970 the Israelis
'ositive intelligence and counterintelligence reports estimated that about 50 percent of their operational
i f sent back to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv, effort was directed against Egypt. The next priority is
h a t e d by the Research Department, and dissemi- Syria Much of this activity against the Arabs in the
. I < - d to various government offices. Intelligence Near East is based on deep cover operations by Israeli
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illegals or the recruitment of Arabs in third countries


followed by their dispatch or normal rotation back
Some to an Arab area. Two good examples of Israeli
leep cover illegal operations are the Cohen and Lotz
oses.
Eliahu Ben Shaul Cohen was an Egyptian-born Jew
who was involved in Israeli sabotage operations against
American and British installations in Egypt in 1952.
Cohen succeeded in escaping detection, when most
members of the ring were arrested by the Egyptians,
and went to Israel. Eventually, Mossad recruited
Cohen for an illegal operation designed to develop
intelligence networks and acquire political and mili-
tary information in Syria He received intensive
training, adopted the identity of the late Kamil Amin
Thabet, a Syrian-born merchant, and emigrated to
Argentina, where he became an active member of the
Arab emigre community. Cohen eventually went to
Syria, where he was assisted by two Arabs who had
previously been recruited by the Israelis. From 1961
until 1965 Cohen was active as an illegal in Damascus,
where he succeeded in making numerous contacts
Figure 4. Eliahu Ben Shaul Cohen's trdnsmittu on display
in Damascus, 1965

in time made the acquaintance of a number of


I
prominent and well-placed Egyptians. He made m
with political and military personalities in the Syrian
number of trips from Egypt to Western Europe for
establishment. He made occasional trips to Europe and
debriefings. Finally, in 1964 Lotz began to mail
Israel for extensive debriefings. Eventually, in January
threatening letters to selected German experts in
1965, the Syrians did detect and locate Cohen while he
Egypt. In February 1965. he was arrested by t
was in the act of transmitting information to Tel Aviv
Egyptians, who tried and imprisoned him.
One cause of his downfall was that he was using hand
he was released and returned to Israel in
morse radio equipment and had been on the air for an
Israelis have stated that the operation cost
hour when .he was caught (Figure 4). A Syrian court
$250.000. They have also admitted that er
tried a h e n and found him guilty of espionage. He
in handling his communications and
was publicly hanged in Damascus in May 1965.
executive action operations may have
Johann Wolfgang Lotz (also known as Zeev Gur downfall. During his captivity Lotz was also forced to
Arieh), was an officer in Military Intelligence. In 1959 reveal the whole operation (Figure 5).
during a Va'adat meeting, Mossad announced its need
Mossad stations outside of the Arab areas in the
for a man to be a new illegal resident agent in Cairo
Near East are generally under diplomatic cover within
under cover as a former Nazi officer. Lotz accepted
the embassies and consulates of Israel. There ar
the assignment, which was directed primarily against
stations in the United States, most of the Europea
special weapons activity by German scientists in
capitals, Turkey, Iran and strategic centers in Lati
Egypt. He received intensive training in Israel,
including equestrian instruction, and in early 1960 he America. Africa and the Far East. Opera
from formal liaison exchanges with hos
went to Germany and surfaced as an East German
through unilateral projects to special execut'
refugee and former African Corps officer. Although
directed against Arab terrorists. There are a
Lotz had a wife in Israel, he eventually married a
stations, which run mostly unilateral over
German woman to develop his legend. In 1961 he
handle local liaison on such matters as Arab terrorist
went to Cairo, where he opened a riding academy
Through his activities Lotz made a variety of contacts The Collection Directorate and the Political Acti
in the German community in the Egyptian capital and and Liaison Directorate are separate components

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local level in regard to overt functions such as physical


security for Israeli official and commercial installa-
tions in the country and the protection of staff
members and visiting Israelis. There is also close
collaboration between the Israelis and Swiss on
scientific and technical matters pertaining to intelli-
gence and security operations. Swiss officials have
made frequent trips to Israel. There is a continual flow
of Israelis to and through Switzerland. These visits,
however, are usually arranged through the Political
Action and'Liaison regional controller at the E m b y
in Paris directly with the Swiss and not through the
officials in the Israeli Embassy in Bern. although the
latter are kept informed.
In Spain, on the other hand, there is no known
official or semiofficial Israeli instalktion. There have
been contacts, however, between Politic*) Action and
Liaison Directorate officials of Monad and (he Smish
service for some time. The oritinal meetins a w -
ently occurred in Paris in the late 19% dnce then
there have been contacts in Madrid and Paris.There is
a possibility that Mossad may also have a clandestine
Collection Department station in Spain. In Jmuuy
1973. Baruch Asher Cokn. a Monad officer, was
assaainated in Madrid by Arabs.
figure 5. Johann Wolfgang loti illustrates (h* uw of a Special operations are mounted on an ad hoc ball*.
ircinimitter during his trial in Cairo, July-August 1965 Headquarters directs the effort from brad and
employs Mossad officers and -b on sueciil
\ h s a d and are carefully compartmented at head- temporary duty. In July 1973. an Israeli madnation
piarters. Collection and Political Action and Liaison squad of 16was involved in the murder of a Moroccan
i i n t a i n separate permanent staffs outside Israel in Arab in Lillehammer, Norway. ~ o k g h authorities
n
Lwer stations. There are thus either two Mossad captured. tried and imprisoned six of (he group, the
1.alions or two compartmented components in each rest escaped. It became clear in the course of the trial
.ition in some countries-one for unilateral clandes- that the squad, which was composed of Israelis, who
I N : collection and one for liaison. For example, at were Mossad o f f i i and Eurooean Jews,who were
in-sent in Paris the Israelis have an Embassy. recruited for the mission, did much of its preparatory
( onsulate-General and Ministry of Defense Mission. work in Paris and entered Norway on a specific
1ruler embassy cover, Mossad has a Collection assignment-the elimination of Arab terrorists. After
I hrectorate regional controller and a Political Action the murder, two of the squad sought refuge with an
r i d Liaison Directorate regional controller in the Israeli Embassy security officer. The Norwegians
t wnch capital, which has more or less over the years declared the officer personna non grata. althoush he
1 vinained the fulcrum of Israeli intelligence activity on apparently was not privy to the operation.
l l w continent of Europe.
3. Administrative practices
In Switzerland the Israelis have an Embassy in Bern
i d a Consulate-General in- Zurich which provide The Israeli Prime Minister appoints the Director of
o v e r for Collection Department officers involved in Mossad. The Prime Minister does not need the
ulateral operations These Israeli diplomatic installa- approval of the cabinet or the Knesset for this
u s also maintain close relations with the Swiss on a appointment.
Chiefs of station and their staffs are Mossad careei sent to universities abroad, whrrc their pursmt of ar
but they function abroad on behalf of all the advanced degree simultaneously serves as cover foi
intelligence and security services. If a member of Shin their extracurricular operational activities. One of lhÃ
Beth or the I D F is considered the most qualified established goals of the intelligence and security
individual in the community to d o a particular foreign services is that each officer be fluent in Arabic 4
job,h e still belongs to his parent organization, but he is nine-month, intensive Arabic language course is giver
assigned to, and subject to the control of, Mossad as annually in the Tel Aviv area to students from eact
long as he remains outside the borders of Israel. This service. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sends twÃ
rule does not apply, however, to military attaches or three officials to each course. Mossad officers wh(
(army, air, navy) who remain subordinate to the are going into Arab operations take the same ArabiÃ
Director of Military Intelligence. language training as Shin Beth officers. As furthe]
training. these Mossad officers work in the Adminis
Mossad does not have a logical career progression
tered Territories for two years to sharpen thei~
program. The organization promotes case officers who
language skills before being posted abroad. During thi;
have been successful in the field to top managerial
period they usually serve in the Sinai and often rur
jobs. T h e results of this arrangement are mixed as
Bedouin agents into Egypt in conjunction wit1
some of the successful operators are often not
Military Intelligence.
necessarily the best managers or administrators.
All Mossad officers are trained in the use of smal
a. TRAINING-The Mossad training cycle encom- arms and required to fire them at iregular intervals
passes a Basic Operations course for recruits and lower
ranking personnel, and Operations course and a Field b. FUNDSAND SALARIESÑT~ Director of M-d I

Operations course. All new officer candidates are a civil service Class 1 officer. H e receives generow
required to take the four-month Basic Operations expense and entertainment allowances. There art
course before actually entering on duty. The entire reported to be several Class 2 and Class 3 officers ir
training cycle takes almost two years and is generally Mossad as well. The monthly take home pay of 2
given to classes of 12. Most of the training takes place ranking Mossad officer, after taxes but including
in the Tel Aviv area. The instructors in these Mossad bonuses and cost-of-living and family allowances, i'
courses are teachers on permanent assignment, intelli- about IL4.000 per month (US$460). They also receivÃ
gence officers on temporary tours of duty, and expense and entertainment allowances and are pro
vided with a car and gasoline allowance as well
headquarters personnel, including the Director of
Mossad and department directors, who give occasional Higher academic degrees place intelligence officers ir
lectures on their specialties. a higher pay bracket, thus a directorate director wit)
an advanced degree makes the same as the Director A
The three services run a joint advanced school in middle-ranking officer with allowances for a largt
Jerusalem that offers specialized courses of two to number of dependents would receive more than hi;
three months' duration on world political affairs, seniors. In general, higher-grade civil service salarie:
Israel's political and economic objectives, new techni- are roughly comparable to those of higher-ranking
cal operational aids, and the latest information on military officers The rather insignificant differentia
foreign intelligence services All officers who are between grades is compensated by fairly impressiw
midway in their careers arc required to attend this p ~ ~ q u i s i t e sespecially
, in the senior ranks. Officer!
advanced school upon their return from a foreizn abroad are eivt-n generous cost-of-living allowance!
assignment A*, many as 40 to 50 stirients arc reported that conform to the allotments rtf tin" rwiliir Foreisr
to have !wen f-r:rollfrf! in a ' i i i i ~ k running of tliis Affairs officers For cover purmsc'i these are p a d bi
course. The faculty is ~unioosedof representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry If, however, an intelli
the three -tervi<-t-sand is directly subordinate to the w n c e officer needs a larger apartment or house foi
Director of Mo-isud The Prime Minister or some other representation, operational puriHws, or family re.
high official has addressed graduating classes quirements, his service quietly pays the difference
Some younger ~ossadofficers,who may be weak in Officers and their families usually travel tourist clas:
certain fields of higher education or languages, are on Israeli carriers whenever possible but the absence 01

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, firm rule permits them to travel on any air or than Israeli in speech, demeanor, and attitude B\
,tramship line at their discretion. Clerical employees forging passports and identity documents of Arab and
travel tourist C ~ ~ S S . western countries and providing sound background
Each station abroad is granted funds for operational legends and cover, Mossad has successfully sent into
and entertainment expenses. Responsible individuals Egypt and other Arab countries Israelis disguised and
,lo not entertain any more than is necessary but when documented as Arabs or citizens of European
h e y do, it is done lavishly. Efforts to extend countries.
mpitality unstintingly are made at headquarters in There are numerous persons in Israel who have a
\rael when favored agents or ranking foreign intelli- thorough area and language knowledge of any area of
, ~ n c eofficers are guests. interest to the intelligence services. These area experts
can render extremely valuable assistance in analyzing
4. Methods of operation intelligence information and formulating country
Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapwrt requirements, thus contributing to the total opera-
i t h highly-placed persons and government offices in tional potential since they enable Israeli intelligence
Â¥ver country of importance to Israel. Within Jewish officers to estimate rapidly the efficiency and
(immunities in .almost every country of the world. reliability of their agents and informants. These
h e r e are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render persons are also useful for their ability to pass
Â¥itronsupport to the Israeli intelligence effort. Such completely for a citizen of the nation in Question. The
m t a & are carefully nurtured and serve as channels Israeli talent for counterfeiting @orforging passports
lor information, deception material, propaganda and and documents ably supports the agent's authenticity,
other purposes. Mossad directs clandestine operations The Israeli intelligence service depends heavih on
throughout Europe. including the USSR and East the various Jewish communities and organizations
l-.oropean countries; North and South America; the abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general
&ear East; Africa; and the Far East. including South information. The aggressively ideological nature of
Fast Asia. Mossad activities are generally conducted Zionism, which emphasizes that all Jews belong to
t hrough Israeli official and semiofficial establishments, Israel and must return to Israel. had had its drawbacks
l w p cover enterprises in the form of firms and in enlisting s u p w r t for intelligence operations, how-
iir~anizations, some especially created for, or adapt- ever. since there is considerable opposition to Zionism
I t to.~ a specific objective, and penetrations effected among Jews throughout the world Aware of this fact.
ithin non-Zionist national and international Jewish Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate
nicanizations discreetly within Jewish communities and are under
The function of intelligence officers under cover of instructions to handle their missions with utmost tact
liplomatic establishments is to arrange information to avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt to
hariges with officials ot local services, manage penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize
iminunieations. serve as accommodation addresses the opposition. Despite such precautions, the Israelis
K I funding channels, and direct agents toward targets frequently experience setbacks and there have been
I ~ t f - r c i tOfficial organizations used for cover are several cases where attempted recruitments of Ameri-
I r 4 Piirchiising Missions and Israeli Government I of the Jewish faith have been rejected and
I url-it. Ei Al and Zini offices Israeli construction reported to US authorities
1 1 s . industrial groups and interriational trade*orgarii-
Israel's program for accelerating its technolwiwl.
1 1 ~ i i i also
s uiuvidt, nonofficial cover Individuals scientific and military development as rapidly as
! ~ k i t i gunder deep or Jlegal cover are r~irmally xmible has been enhanced by exploiting scientific
I i w d with ptw-tratiw obiectives that require a exchange programs Mossad plays a key role in this
inre-. morf v-ibtli-'approach. or with activities in
I
.
. 4 the Israeli Government can never adnn! endeavor. In addition lo the large-scale acquisition of
published scientific papers and technical journals from
"ir>lp-!!y a over the world through overt channels, the Israelis
devote a considerable portion of their covert oper-
ations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence
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This had included attempts to penetrate certain often. they recruit Palestinians over whom they may
classified defense proiects in the United States and have more control because of bank assets frozen in
other Western nations. Israel since the war in 1948. In certain cases these
bank assets have been released for intelligence services
The United Nations is a major target for Mossad
rendered.
penetration because it is a major sponsor of interna-
tional exchanges in all fields and because of its The Israelis are prepared to capitalize on nearly
importance in settling disputes between Israel and the every kind of agent motivation. A substantial effort is
Arab states. Israeli agents operate at the UN under made to appeal to Jewish racial or religious procliv-
diplomatic and journalistic cover. ities, pro-Zionism, dislike of anti-Semitism, anti-Soviet
feelings (if applicable) and humanitarian instincts.
Mossad recruitment, training and control of agents
Blackmail is also used. Other recruiting techniques
varies widely, depending upon the target, area of
include the proffer of money, business opportunities.
operation and the desk in headquarters. While there is
or release from prison. Among the Arabs, money has
a certain amount of standardization in the handling of
been especially effective. Appeals have also been
operations, Israeli intelligence officers appear to have
made successfully to other Arab vulnerabilities such as
considerable freedom in running operations. There is
jealousy, rivalry, fear and political dissension.
no hard rule requiring specific headquarters' approval
prior to the recruitment of an agent except in the case The Israelis have used false-flag recruitment itches
of Communist countries. Name traces are requested of extensively and successfully. In several cases they
headquarter's voluminous files but this is not a approached citizens of Western European nations
consistent routine. Contemplated operations against under the cover of a national NATO intelligence
the USSR and the East European countries, however, organization for operations in Arab target countries.
are approached very cautiously, and entail a great deal
While intelligence officers in the field recognize the
of headquarters planning and control and a special
importance of securit;, they tend to be carela;
branch composed of area experts is responsible for
Although otherwise well trained, Israeli intelligence
authorizing and directing this activity Mossad is
officers occasionally have been lax in their use of the
especially interested in early warning regarding such
telephone abroad. Also, they often have given away a
developments as the dispatch of Soviet military units
considerable amount ofr information by confiding in
from the USSR to the Near East. There also exists agents and contacts with whom they have had only a
within, or affiliated with, Mossad a small unit whose
slight relationship. Nonetheless, they periodically
sole objective is to remind the Soviets through
recall the basic principles of their profession, and for
propaganda and contacts about the Jewish question at
awhile complicate the lives of their agents with a
any point throughout the world. All sorts of people.
welter of security regulations that they themselves
even Cyrus Eaton, have been stimulated to raise the
eventually transgress. Occasionally a rendezvous ar-
subject. Israeli efforts must at times be effective
ranged between an officer and an agent, is countersur-
because the Soviets often attack the Israeli service in
veilled by two or more officers, both to spot possible
their propaganda with detailed revelations of Israeli
surveillance of the meeting and to protect the officer.
plots against allegedly innocent Soviet citizens.
In the recruiting process, the officer generally uses a
The Israelis select their agents almost exclusively fictitious name, executes a secrecy agreement with the
from persons of Jewish origin. However, there are prospective agent, and provides him with a pseudo-
security hazards involved in cases of divided alle- nym or alias. Whenever money or other gratuity is
giance between dedication to the Zionist State of Israel given to an agent, an attempt is made to secure a
and loyalty to a homeland. The recruitment of signed receipt in the agent's handwriting.
Gentiles is comparatively rare.
Although an agent occasionally may be sent to Israel
Many Arabs, especially walk-ips. have directly or for special training, this course of action is neither easy
indirectly helped the services, usually as a result of nor inexpensive to accomplish. Therefore, the intelli-
monetary inducements, but the Israelis do not consider gence officer himself is usually responsible for training
these Arabs good sources of reliable information. More the agent in the fundamentals of tradecraft, security

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measures, and the use of radio and code communica- intelligence officer receives detailed, prepared q u a -
tions If the exigencies of the situation demand special tions from headquarters and is allowed little leeway in
training, the Israelis rent an apartment for this purpose terms of what he submits. In a meeting with an agent.
in places like Paris and New York. Agents who have many of whom are low-level. the intelligence officer
been so trained were taught to mix and use secret ink; debriefs him on the basis of headquarters questions.
conceal documents and letters on the person; deliver The intelligence officer must then forward all the
information to secure hiding places, and to com- agent says, even overt information. The intelligence
municate otherwise with the case officer and/or officer may if he wishes add his own remarks to the
headquarters. report.
The methods of communication vary greatly de- Mossad headquarters does not disseminate agents'
pending on locations and circumstances. Personal reports to all customer agencies. The overwhelming
meetings between the agent and his case officer are bulk of the reports goes to one specific analytical unit.
arranged by secret writing, open mail, or oral message for example, usually reports on Arab affairs are sent to
by couriers. The cities or towns to be used have code Military Intelligence, counterintelligence reports to
names and the meeting places are at specified times Shin Both. However, an exceptional agent report u
with alternative times and places. In case of emeraen- disseminated to Israeli policymakers. The Mossad
cy, the agent can alert the intelligence officer by use of intelligence officer abroad does not show copies of his
a prearranged open code in cables or letters, or if time reports to the Israeli Ambassador! but sends them only
permits, by secret writing or courier. to Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv.
The Israelis place considerable emphasis on personal
relationships with their agents. They have been known The Israeli services have a very keen interest in the
to be exceedingly generous in granting personal use and development of technical equipment As far
concessions and monetary assistance to keep their back as 1947-1948, the Information Service conducted
agents happy. One such individual, a Journalist in Paris technical surveillance operations against Arab and
who recruited French officials and elicited infonna- British delegates to the UN Mossad, with assistance
tion from witting and unwitting informants in the from Shin Beth. has provided technical training to the
French political world, was paid the equivalent of Turkish and Ghanaian security and intelligence
USS1.000 per month. After years of steady employ- services. Exchanges of technical equipment and
ment and a succession of Israeli case officers, his information have also been carried out with the
services were gently but peremptorily terminated. Japanese intelligence and security services. Mossad
Severance pay was calculated at the rate of one receives support in external technical operations from
month's salary for each year of service to assuage any Shin Beth and Military Intelligence. The technical
hard feelings. On the other hand, the Israelis can be capabilities of the Israeli services are adequate for
absolutely ruthless to both the intelligence officer and normal demands. Moreover, the very close coordina-
I he agent if the latter's disaffection or treachery should tion existing between the services and the industrial
hreaten a sensitive operation or endanger the security concerns of the country ensure that technical equip-
of the state. There are several cases of Jews in Europe ment to support continuing audio operations is
w'ho. while or after working for the Israeli service, supplied and developed as needed. The existence of a
trafficked with the Egyptians for substantial sums of limited research program, coupled with high Israeli
money. These Jews were enticed into traveling to competence in technical matters, indicates that the
w a d or abducted, tried in camera, and given stiff Israelis intend to remain abreast of advances in
prison terms of 10 to 14 years. autiosurveillance and countermeasures.
Mossad headquarters controls the acquisition, flow a. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SERVICES-Mosud
and dissemination of reports in a rigid manner, which has good relationships with Shin Beth, Military
m t r a s t s with the considerable freedom allowed in Intelligence, the Research and Political Planning
running operations. An Israeli intelligence officer Center of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the
abroad must accept all information reported by an Special Tasks Division of the police. Successes like the
a ~ e n t and may not change a single word The Entebbe raid are illustrative of well-coordinated

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and execution-a testimonial to Rood rela-


pl~iiiii~ig information on the political intentions d the A,&
tions among the services. countries which could affect the security of Israel, and
the activity and identifications of UAR agents uorkini
The Agranat Commission advocated greater coordi- against Israel. The Israeli service has also given the
nation between the services and revived the post of
Turks counterespionage and technical training
intelligence adviser to monitor interdirectorate dis-
putes The exchanges between Mossad and the other The main purpose of the Israeli relationship fi
services through the coordinating mechanism of the Iran was the development of a pro-Israel andanH.
Va'adat and the use of ad hoc committees, however, Arab policy on the part of Iranian officials M a d hi
continue to ensure cwrdination and cooperation engaged in joint operations with SAVAK over die
belu cen the serbiees. years since the late 1950s. Mossad aided S A V A ~
activities and supported the Kurds in Iraq. The Isnefa
b LIAISONWITH FOREIGN s&v~c~s-Mossad has also regularly transmitted to the Iranians intellig-
liaison relationships w i t h many of intelligence and reports on Egypt's activities in the Arab c o u n l r k
security services throughout the world With a lev' trends and developments in Iraa, and Cornmum
exceptions, the Directorate of Foreign Liaison and activities affecting Iran.
Political Action is responsible for relations with most
foreign organizations. In most instances the point of Israeli liaison in Africa has varied considerably f-
contact is abroad in foreign 6apitals. although some country to country, depending on the exigencies of the
foreign services insist on liaison in Israel. situation. Israeli intelligence activities in Africa havÃ
usually been carried out under the cover of military
At present Mossad, in cwrdination with Shin M h , and police training, arms sales to national military
maintains liaison with foreign intelligence and security forces, and aid and development programs. The ~ r a b
services through membership in the Kilowatt group. nations, in conjunction with the Organization of
an organization which is concerned with Arab African Unity, have brought great pressure to bear a
terrorism and is comprised of West Germany, most African nations to break all formal ties with
Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg. Israel. Despite the break in diplomatic r e h i m
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Fraiice, Canada between Israel and many of the African nations, the
Ireland. Sweden, Norway and Israel. The Israelis also Israelis still maintain good intelligence liaison with
have informal connections regarding terrorism with certain African services. The Israelis also hxw
other European nations, including Spain, Portugal and relations with the Kenyan Service. In Central Afrim
Austria. the Israelis are still active in Zaire. In West Africa the
T h e Israelis-have over the years made eftorts to Israelis trained the Liberian Security Service and
break the Arab ring encircling Israel by involvement police. They also helped establish the Ghanian
with non-Arab Moslem nations in the Near East. A Military Intelligence Service. In southern Africa the
formal trilateral liaison called the Trident organization Israelis have a relationship with the South African
was established by Mossad with Turkey's National intelligence and security services.
Security Service (TNSS) and Iran's National Organiza- The Israelis have been ver, active in Latin A m e r h
tion for Intelligence and Securitv (SAVAK) in late over the years One of the createst intelligence C O U ~
1%8 Since the origindl agreement there has h w n an the capture of Adolph Eichniarin, the former Naa
addition to Mossad's bilateral relationshit> with each Ifudrr. occurred in Argentina Recently, much of their
service The Trident organization involvfs continuing liaison activity in Latin America has centered m
intelligence exchange plus semiannual meetings at the training and antiterrorist operations. The I s d i
chief of service level. Consulate in Rio d e Janeiro, for example, providrt
The general terms of the original agreement with cover for a Mossad regional station responsible l a
the Turks, aside from legitimizing Israeli liaison with Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Officers from
Turkey, stated that Mossad would furnish information this post have gone to Buenos Aires to give training to
nn the activity of Soviet agents in Turkey and those the Argentines; in the course of these contacts t b
working against Turkey throughout the Middle East. Israelis recommended greater involvement in ioinl
In return, the Turks agreed to supply Israel with antiterrorist operations. The Israelis also maintain
luisnIl "ith security services of Mexico, Nicaragua. Shin Both at o n e h engaged i n positive intrlli-
I,,rtta nica, and Panama, the Dominican Republic. gence operations and immigration affairs i n the
yenezuela. Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Caracas is Balkan countries, particularly i n Romania. Biiliuriit,
ll,,. Regional Center for north and western Latin Yugoslavia, and i n Hungary, but no longer does Shin
imerica and Central America. Beth is the government's authority on personnel and
physical security matters, is responsible for the
he ~sraelishave operated for sometime i n East
personal security of the President, the Prime Minister.
They have provided intelligence training to the
and the Minister of Defense.
;,,,,.rnment of the Republic of China and maintain
,il^on with it. The Israelis also have relations with the Shin Beth does not have the Dower o .sl -at. which
~,,l,.,ilese. Thai. Indonesian, and South Korean services, is the right only of the Special Tasks Division of the
..l,,fiall, on terrorist matters. The major Mos-sad Investigations Department of the Israeli Police, a
l,~,4,1~al center i n East Asia is i n Singapore. The Israeli national force with headquarters i n Jerusalem When
,.,~,,,n chief there frequently travels throughout the an arrest is desired. Shin Beth submits a detailed
and conducts business with services i n the report on the case plus a request for an arrest warrant
l,,.,chlmring nations Indonesia as a Moslem nation to the Ministry of Justice. The Legal Department
,l,,,-s not have formal diplomatic ties with Israel The transmits the request to the Special Tasks Division,
\(,ad-Indonesian relationship, therefore, is very which issues the warrant and makes the arrest. When
, ~ m - r ~ The t. Mossad representative i n Singapore is more expeditious handling is,justified. Shin Beth
to the Indonesian service. There are also directly notifies the Special Tasks Division, which is
\losad officers i n Jakarta under commercial cover. empowered to take the suspect into temporary custody
TIif primary reason for the Indonesian liaison is to ending receipt of the warrant. On occasion a Shin
i i J iaid ~~ i n counterterrorist efforts. The Israelis. on the Beth officer will sit i n court with the Drasecution staff
oilirr hand, are not only engaging i n antiterrorist as a special consultant.
,,Iwrations but also have an opport~inityto collect
2. Organization
infnrmation and engage i n political action in another
\Iii\lem power. Shin Beth is organized into eight operational and
functional departments: (1) Arab Affairs; (2) Non-
C.Shin Beth-Counterespionage and Inter- Arab Affairs; (3) Protective Security; (4) Operational
nal Security Service Support; (5) Technology; (6) Interrogation and Legal
Counsel; (7) Coordination and Planning; and (8)
I Functions Administration. Regional departments i n the field are
located i n the Gaza/Sinai area with headquarters in
Shin Beth has the responsibility in Israel for
Ashuelon; the Northern area with headquarters in
numterespionage and internal security and the service
Haifa; and the West Bank area with headquarters i n
1%basically internally oriented. Shin Beth is primarily
Jerusalem. A unit within Shin Beth national headquar-
m l ~ m s i b l e for collecting information on foreign
ters i n Tel Aviv serves as the fourth regional
iiitclli~enceorganizations, both hostile and friendly.
department. These regional departments are broken
Â¥iitheir activities, protecting the security of Israeli
down into subdivisions identical to but smaller than
~ ~ I l i c ~andi i l s installations abroad: and investigating all
those of the parent organization (Figure 6).
l ~ ~ of i i subversion
\ directed by either internal or
i - r i d forces, including sabotage and terrorism in The Arab Affairs Department is responsible f m
1 and abroad Shin Beth evaluates all information counterespiunage. antiterrorist operations, control of
l r l ~ i p e d collates
, it with other material routinely political subversion, research and the maintenanceof a
*n<l rncrtly available from both Israeli and foreign counterintelligence index on Arabs. The components
~ i r i - i - sand
. submits evaluated reports to the appropri- handling these activities are organized into offensive
4 1 eovernment
~ agencies for action. Shin Beth operates and defensive sections. This department operates
1- wmbat two main adversaries. the Arabs and the through field offices controlled by regional officers.
'nwt and Eastern European intelligence and security These officers report to the regional commanders but
" I , 1CÈ. rely on the Arab Affairs Department for guidance and

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,"pport, which includes aid in couiiterespionage, and is engaged in the prevention of leakage of
,ituntersabotage and surveillance as well as research industrial secrets such as patents, processes, statistics,
and records support. The overall headquarters func- etc. It also carries on liaison with security o f f i n
,ton is that of determining doctrine, systematizing throughout the Israeli Government. Although guards
work and supervising. and security officers are paid by the institutions to
which they are assigned, their recruitment, training,
The Non-Arab Department handles counterintelli- and control is a Shin Beth responsibility. The
fence operations dealing with all other countries,
Protective Security Department controls the security
countersubversion (one component dealing with Com-
of internal communications and the secrecy of
munist subversion, the other with non-Communist
information. A small unit within the department, for
N ~ WLeft subversion), foreign liaison and research.
example, handles all matters concerning espionage
vJich unit dealing with these activities has offensive
with the Office of Mail and Telegraph Censorship
.nd defensive sections. The Non-Arab Department
investigatesand counters espionage activity by foreign The Protective Security Denrtment directs Shin
powers, both hostile and friendly, by all known Beth security activities oversets including the Drotec-
methods, including the penetration of their intelli- tion of Israeli personnel, diplomatic and transport
icnce services and diplomatic installations in Israel. o f f i i facilities and e&-t Although Monad hm
operations against foreign missions within Israel were mwndbility for unilateral operations and liaison oa
formerly conducted by Military Intelligence, but with intelligence matten and Military Intelligence controb
the evolution towards greater centralization and the attache system and military l u i Shin Beth
professional specialization since the reorganization of handles ~rotective security and litison with local
1951, this function has been the responsibility of Shin security services a b r d to safezuard Israeli personnel
Beth. and property For instance, there is a regional
Protective Security office in Parit which is concerned
The Non-Arab Affairs Department engages in the
primarily .th El A] and Ztan security.
urnetration of extremist political parties such as MAKI '?>\*~ ?a25
[the Communist Party of Israel); RAKAH (the New The 0pektionaT'~u~ptxt Denrtment is responsible
(hmmunist List), a largely Arab-supported splinter for assisting the operational departments with surveil-
tioup; SIAH (the New Israel Left); and anti-Zionist lance, observation, airport security, censordilo, listen-
and extreme rightist organizations., The Department ing devices, special tasks and counteraudio summi.
ibo investigates counterfeiting, blackmarketing, the This department has tactical comDonents. which aid in
unuggling of money and goods in and out of the counterintelligence operations. VIP protection and
twintry. and violations of the economic control laws. It telephone taps. The Department provide* supoort in
h responsible for tapping telephone lines and inter- running a hichly developed intercept operation from a
repting domestic and diplomatic telephone conversa- switchboard installed in Shin Beth dficn.This nubla
lions. the service to avoid having to make t a u either a c r a
pairs in a local box or even in the t e l b centrals
The Non-Arab Affairs Department is responsible for
under the jurisdiction d the M i n i d Communica-
foreign liaison and handles all correspondence by Shin
tions Telephone Services: and also avoids any uadble
k t h with other foreign intelligence and security
compromise by leftist employees of the Teleohoo
srrvices. The interrogation of immigrants from the
Services.
USSR and Eastern European nations is also undertaken
liv this department. The Technology Department lends support to the
The Protective Security Department is responsible operating departments in electronics, mechanic*,and
lor the protection of Israeli Government buildings and
chemistry. It provides technical support to operations
mbassies. El Al and Zim installations and craft, in the following *rcçsaudio and vinul surveillance.
ilrfense industries and scientific establishments, and communicatiom, photoinohy, furTeDlltkxu entry.
biding personalities. This department is also charged teleohone tan*. mail cemorihio, security devtett, etc.
with the security of all important industrial plants, The Interrogation and Legal C & u d Department
specially those of actual or potential military value, handles all counterintelligence and security interroga-
tions for Shin Beth operating departments not handed security procedures relating to their personnel became
over to the Special Tasks Division of the police. This military security components handle most of t h
department makes selective use of the polygraph. It cases. Shin Beth, however, sets the policies ad
also checks the reliability of Mossad sources, fabrica- standards for military security controls.
tors, and suspect double agents. Personnel in this
component travel to the field as required to give Among the 500 officers in Shin Beth are some 100
polygraph tests and conduct interrogations. The individuals who have been selected, screened,
department also assists in preparing cases for trial and trained to serve as security officers throughout t k
provides other legal assistance to operating depart- governmental structure. These officers are stationed in
the Prime Minister's office, intelligence and security
ments as needed.
components including Mossad, scientific institutes.
The Coordination and Planning Department has Al installations, and foreign service posts.
responsibility for coordination of counterintelligence
and security methodology, training. security recruit- Most career employees, a few of whom are women,
ment and the central registry. This department have broad educational backgrounds and experience.
maintains the Shin Beth card files, with the exception About one-third of Shin Beth officers are assigned
of those on Arabs In addition to ordinary carding abroad early in their careers as security officers where
procedures, there is an entry on every individual in they come under the operational and administrative
the country who has a police record. This enables all control of Mossad. Upon return to,Israel from foreign
government offices to make a quick check on the assignment, Shin Beth officers revert to the internal
police record of present or potential employees security service. Because senior Mossad and Shin Beth
through Shin Beth. All tracing procedures are chan- officers are given identical training in a combined
neled into this department, from name checks through advanced operational school, their modus operands is
neighborhood investigations This registry uses a similar.
military computer. The registry on Arabs is not vet
computerized because of the difficulty with Arabic There is a certain amount of personnel exchange
names. among the services. Shin Beth may accept an army
major or colonel on temporary assignment or recruit a
The Administration Department performs the usual retiring officer on a oermanent basis. All recruits are
functions of personnel management, finance, supply, subject to a thorough background security investlea-
transport, communications, and security. tion culminating in a physical examination, polygraih
A policy body within Shin Beth is called the tests, and psychiatric screening. Security checks o n
Directorate of the Service. It normally meets once a native born Israelis are relatively easy to do. for the
month. Membership consists of department directors young Israeli, whose life is well documented, rart-I>
(including the regional directors), all of whom are of enjoys the luxury of privacy. Police files, sclicm
eaual rank. records, university professors, army records, youtk
movements, political affiliations, voting records, fam-
3. Administrative practices ily history, political persuasions, and friends are
scrutinized. If the applicant is foreign born, detailed
The Director of Shin Beth is appointed by the Prime
immigration records may reveal pertinent information
Minister who may seek advice for the appointment
which can be cross-checked Loyalty to Israel is t e
but needs no approval from either the cabinet or the principal criterion. If the subject was a Zionist from
Knesset. early youth, he belongs to a special category; if h~ ha!
Shin Beth is responsible for the security of all never belonged to the leftist parties, MAPAM, M a 1
civilian intelligence and security personnel. Further- and RAKAH, or to Herut, a rightist part), hi!
more. it also recruits and selects personnel, according employment opportunities are considerably enhar,cd
to specific requirements based on loyalty to the state, It is almost impossible for a Jew to disguise hi*;;'as[
education, capability ahd potential, and subiect to the when he is once in the hands of the
approval of the individual civilian service The there are in Israel many thoroughly
military is somewhat more autonomous in regard to from every country which has or had a Jew
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,,,mmunity, who can ^)e consulted for information on penetrated subversive Arab elements includiw Coin-
pnlrntial recruits. munist cells and Arab nationalist groups. They have
The Director of Shin Beth is a civil service Class 1 also picked up local Arab espionage agents on their
officer. He has an expense and entertainment way back to neighboring countries and doubled them
There is a rather insignificant differential in coordination with Military Intelliience. Shin Beth is
between grades which is compensated by fairly continually active in the fight against terrorism.
Impressive perquisites, including living quarters, trans- Aside from the Arab target. Shin Beth is primarily
portation and travel, especially in the senior ranks. concerned with the subversive elements of the left.
MAKI and RAKAH owe their allegiance to the USSR
4. ~ e t h o d sof operation but being legal ~arties.they have had representatives
Shin Beth operations within Israel can be broken in the Knesset. Shin Beth has thorou& =netrated
ifown into the four following categories: against the cells of the Communist apparatus, following its
loirigners in general, against Arabs, against Commu- activities through informants, surveillance, and techni-
nists. and against Israelis. There appears to be little cal ooerations. Shin Beth agents attend many interm-
difference in the application of techniques, but a tional Communist front meetinas.
,water deal in intensity, much of which is directed Since all foreigners, regardless of nationality or
,gainst the Arabs. religion, including Jews, are considered potential
The activities and opinions of diplomats both within threats to the State of Israel, Shinfieth employs a large
and outside their diplomatic establishments in Israel
number of informants among local Israelis who are in
arr of primary interest to Shin Both. Generally, the contact with foreigners by reason of their employment
Israeli Government tends to regard diplomats as being or activities. In this category are bartenders, hotel
here to ferret information rather than to promote clerks, telephone operators, secretaries, taxi driven,
cordial relations. caterers, maids, prostitutes, chauffeurs, and waiters. It
also includes trade unionists, scientists, and others in
The degree of suspicion and intensity of operations the educational field.
against diplomats is conditioned by the prevailing
tdations between countries and their long-term There is an Israeli law that authorizes the mlice and
diplomatic objectives. Shin Beth operations with the the security services to pick UD and detain for
d i c e and Military Intelligence are well coordinated questioning any Israeli citizen who is in contact with a
The Israeli police work very closely with Shin Beth in foreigners without official permission or obvious
nuarding foreign installations such as embassies and reason such as employment or business. Since diplo-
ronsulates, and in surveilling diplomats, foreign mats are subject to surveillance. Shin Both soon
~nirnalists, and tourists of special interest. Police becomes aware of their contacts with Israeli citizens,
officers maintain a 24-hour watch in front of at1 When a pattern develops, and suspicion is aroused,
embassies, legations, consulates, and ambassadorial attempts are made to develop further information
~rsidences.They record the comings and games of using wire tapping and other technical aids. It is not
lnicign personnel. esoeciallv diplomatic officers who uncommon for representatives of Shin Beth to call on
w w a r after regular office hours or on weekends the Israeli and attempt to enlist his cooperation. If the
Iln-Y also record the license numbers of vehicles in individual refuses, the Penal Revision Law (State
-Inch the officers arrive and denart Diplomatic Security) is cited to him and he is threatened with dire
m-rise plates differ in color from civilian plates and consequences. This usually evokes compliance. The
,~rr> :I numer~calprefix which identifies the country
Israrli security authorities also seek evidence of illicit
~q~ficnted love affairs which can be used as leverage to enlist
cooperation In one instance. Shin Beth tried to
The security of the border arcs" and the cxcupied nerietrate the L'S Consulate General in Jerusalem
o r i t i e s is mainly the responsibility of MilitarV through a clerical e m ~ l o y e who
i ~ was having iin affair
d l i ~ c n c e , the Border Guard and Shin Beth. with a Jerusalem girl They rigged a fake abortion case
I l m u ~ l ithe use of informants, who may be local against t h e employee in an unsuccessful effort to
s Oriental Jews posing as Arabs, Shin Beth has
^ i ~ b or recruit him. Before thisattempt at blackmail, they had
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tried to get the Israeli girl to elicit information from D. Military Intelligence
her boyfriend.
1. Functions
Two other important targets in Israel are the US Military intelligence is charged with the collecti
Embassy in Tel Aviv and the United Nations Truce production and dissemination of military, geograp
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) with headquarters and economic intelligence, especially on the AI
in Jerusalem There have been two or three crude nations, and security in the Defense Forces a
efforts to recruit Marine guards for monetary reward. Administered Territories. This component is
In the cases affecting UNTSO personnel, the oper- element of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and a Q
ations involved intimidation and blackmail. of the Defense Forces General Staff. The Director
Military Intelligence (DMT) is a member of Va'at
In 1954, a hidden microphone planted by the Although Air Force and Navy Intelligence officers
Israelis was' discovered in the Office of the US subordinate to their respective commanders, they
Ambassador in Tel Aviv. In 1956, telephone taps were members of the DMI's staff and attend his st
found connected to two telephones in the residence of meetings.
the US military attache. In 1960, a microphone was
discovered behind the wall plaster in what had been 2. Organization
the office of the Operations Officer in the Jordan-
Military Intelligence headquarters consist of
Israel Mixed Armistice Commission Office.
following departments: (1) production; (2) the Int<
Recently, the Director of the Shin Beth, in gence Corps; (3) Foreign Relations; an<) (4) Fi
testimony before a judicial committee of the Knesset, Security and Military Censorship. The DM1 I
stated that Shin Beth makes entries and taps tele- directs Field Security Units, Territorial Commi
phones in Israel with some frequency. Reportedly, the Combat Intelligence and Air Force and Navy Intt
only concern of the committee members was with the gence through coordination with their respective a
disposition by Shin Beth of acquired information commanders (Figure 7).
which did not bear on national security. It is noted The Production Department is responsible
that these activities have no basis in law and are preparing the national intelligence estimates (verst
conducted on the authority of the Director of Shin of which appear as the Middle East Reufew or Sun
Beth alone. for distribution to friendly liaison services). 1
department also produces daily finished intellige
The Israelis have shown themselves to be most adept
at surveillance and surreptitious entry operations. Men reports and daily bulletins, which contains raw
and women frequently are used together on surveil- partially analyzed information. , Estimates are n
lance teams in order to allay suspicion. If a person prepared by Military Intelligence. Mossad and
under surveillance stops to use a public telephone, the Research and Planning Center of the Ministry
surveillance team reports the situation to the control Foreign Affairs. The Production Department
center which immediately notifies the telephone about 40 percent (approximately 2,800) of
personnel in Military Intelligence. About 600,
tapping unit and an attempt is made to intercept the
call. The conversation or pertinent information is then whom 150 are officers and analysts, are involved
intelligence production. The number of analy
relayed to the team on street. Shin Beth personnel are
however, varies, as specialists are coopted by
experts at entering private quarters where they go
through visitors' luggage and personal papers. Special department for special studies in technical a
portable camera equipment is used for this purpose economic matters. This department is under
and the results are processed in the Shin Beth command of a deputy director of Milit,
Intelligence.
laboratory. Shin Beth technicians have concealed radio
transmitters in phonograph cases, in the false bottoms The Production Department is divided into
of coffee cans,and in the bottoms of portable cooking following units. (1) Geographical (or Regional) I3
stoves which can be used as stoves without removing sion, (2) Functional (or Technical) Division and
the communication equipment. Documentation (or Registry and Records) Divisi

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The Geographical Division evaluates information and communit~, and for operatiod wpport fuwtio
compiles target studies on the Arab countries. It is The Corm is subordinate to the DUI and is under
divided into three area desks: the Western, consisting command of the Chief Intelligem Offier. Thk
of Egypt, Sudan and Libya; the h t e r n , consistine of consists of a large headquarters staff which
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; and the Southern, consisting subordinate operational field elements. ~ l t h
of Jordan and the Arabian Peninsula Every effort is no authority over area command w t s . the
made in this division to create the narrowest t m of levy requirements on these field elements.
specialist-a man who can devote himself to his supervises the use of technical devices in o
material for over a period of years. For example, in All requirements levied on the C o r n m u t
the middle 1960s the Jordanian Desk Chief had held validated by the Deputy Dirwtor of MiIita
his job for 15 years and probably knew more about the Intelligenm.
Jordanian military than most Jordanian Army officers.
The Functional Division is broken down into
substantive units which deal with such subjects as Near gence, agent operations, overt
fistern economics, inter-Arab relations, Palestinian distance observation u n i k (2) Ge
affairs and international activities in the Near East. which is in charge of the militar5-
The division produces intellkence on technical and the Technical Development lnstitu
economic matters, including weapons and electronics and c a r t w r a ~ h(3)
~ ; Training; (4) Organization,
and production, and area developments. The unit and Personnel; and (5) Research knd Developmen
draws heavily on the knowledge of the IDF technical The Signals Branch of the Collection Divisi
services. There is close moperation between the which includes communications and electronic i
gqraphical and functional divisions in producing gence and landline operations. collects comm
accurate and timely intelligence, The existence of a tions intelligence for the entire intelligen
desk concerned with international activities in the security community. The actual collection operat]
Near b s t , including Soviet affairs, indicates that the performed by the IDF Signal Corps. The Israel
functional division deals with the policies of other Force also participates and maintains liaison
nations rn they affect the area. other service components on electronic warfare.
The Documentation Division actually employs over Israelis have been very s~~ccessful
in their COM
half of the personnel in the Production Department and ELINT operations against the Arabs.
All reports are sent first to this component, which Six:Daz- -W?r . in...l967 the Israelis su
keeps a permanent record copy and numbers, cards,
indexes and cross-references documents as necessary. rous volume of Arab traffic quickly an
It then forwards copies to appropriate offices. The including a high-level conversation betw
Documentation Division reportedly has now in>talled President Gamal AM-Nawr of the UA
computers to aid in the diwmination and research Hussein of Jordan. Over the years the
support prows. The registry component of this unit mounted cross-border operations and t
services the entire Military Intelligence establishment.
This Division is the repository for all Military Israelis have also on occasion boobytrapped
Intelligence reports and publications and is responsible landlines
for the dissemination of finished intelligence and a h The Agents Branch is in charge of all a
supervises the intelli~enrcoperatior~scenter, which operations run by Mil~taryIntelligence The Branc
operates 24 hours a day. This center is the terminal for not wrmitted to run agent operations abroad but it
all direct access field comn~unication> and presumably sole jurisdiction over agent operations across
is designed to provide rapid review and dissemination borders of Israel into neighbring states. The A
of information in a crisis situation. Branch has executive authority over Shin
The Intelligence Corps is responsible for overt and owrations which are run against the intell1
covert collection operations, including all signal sernce of a neighboring Arab State. Egypt and
intelligence activities for the Israeli intelli~ence are the p i m e operational targets. The Interroga

SEC
( the Agents Branch controls POW intrrrugation
< , I I of The Training Division is responsible for the
which are especially trained and prepared to intelligence doctrine taught in the Military Intelli-,
t8tnpanyany major IDF military owration beyond gence School and in troop units. It has evident13
3 1 % ~wasefire lines. ~ h e s et e a m are keystones in absorbed the training resmnsibilities of Field Security
kI,l~l.~ry Intelligence tactical operations. Interrogators and Combat Intelligence units. The Military Intelli-
a variety of deception techniques in questioning gence School curriculum includes combat intellisencc,
,.ttwmers. Although prisoners are usuall~treated well, strategic intelligence and "spxial studies.'' The x h w l
,o$ierrcxatorsmay give the initial impression that other may provide some training for personnel of other
,,ttvmrrs have been mistreated or even executed for Israeli intelligence and security services.
t.,lttrv to cooperate ~rabic-speakingIDF interroga- The Organization, Logistics and Personnel Division
, t , wnlrtimes pow as ~ r a b officers and circulate is responsible for administrative tasks. The head of this
. 8 ~ ~ ~ prisoners
tng to elicit information. These tech- d~vision functions as the DMI's designee on all
, ~ t . s produce a large quantity of information
~ ~ 3 , 1 usually logistical and personnel matters. The division conslsts
I < , ~ Icaptured enemy personnel of three componenk Logistics, Personnel and
1lw Open Sources Vivision collects and c o l l i ~ t ~all~ s Finance.
.-AI~TKII from overt sources. T h ~ scomponent. huw- The Research and Development Division is prmar-
. ~ tr , does not evaluate the information ily concerned with computer owrations and program-
ming in support of Military Intepgencc production,
I 11rLong Distance Observation Units are primarily
operations and requirements.
-twrrned with visual sightins of Arab activity along
,Is,. burders and armistice lines. These units also The Foreign Relations Department is responsible for
, ~ ~ >support
~ l eto agent cross-border owrations and liaison between the I D F and foreign military organiza-
I. u h to signal intelligence units based on observations tions and for Israeli Defense Attache affairs. This
department is reportedly divided into two companies
I rat^ movements across the borders.
the Foreign Intelligence Liaison Division and the
I IN, General Head~uartersDivis~onruns the hhh- Attaches' Division. The Foreign Intelligence Liaison
intelligence School and the Technical Develop- V~vision conducts liaison with reprentatives of
,,$, Institute and is in charge of communications and foreign intelligence services which have agreements
~ ~ ~ < ~ r aDM1 p h yhas
. the largest technical capability w ~ t h Military Intelligence. This division also has
1 .any of the Israeli intelligence services, It has a control over visits hy officers and training of troops
' 4 g l ~ l ycompetent RD&E component which produces from foreign countries in Israel. Foreign Intelligence
. wtim~entneeded for militarv intelligence owrations Liaison is also the official point of contact for all
1,. 8 it is the largest, and at one time the only, foreign defense attaches in Israel. Activities mch as
. ~ m v ~ w t ~ rshopi n g in the Israeli intell~gence cam- visits to installations, exchanges of routine information,
, , , t ~ ~ ~itt takes
y, on some projects from other serwcrs br~efingsessions, etc. must first be cleared with Field
Security and submitted to the DM1 for a policy
I Iw Commun~cationsBranch handles all matters
dec~sion,if necessary. Attaches accredited or otherwise
j8solv~ngwireless communication for agent oper-
working in Israel on intelligence matters can expect to
Officials in this branch train agent operators,
rect.ive select information concerning other Near East
1 , G N up signal plans, and maintain radio contact with
a ~ u foreigrt
l nations within perimeters set by the VMI;
., 181, in place From time to trme this hrawh also
8
t111n an attache seeking information on specific
, , , ~ ~ d t ,wpport
x for Mossad and S h ~ nl k t h
rjwsti ,IS of Israeli capabilities and materids would
W W I V ~ the data through this division. It is considered
a "~in1~111m'' of IIJF " w ~ w r ~ t t e ntwlicy
" for lorcim
u ~ ! l i t ~ r ~, ~ ~ X X I J I XI L ! : I,> ~ n l l w tthis t y w u f
I o t l w h a ! 111 the v&t, M : h : >
~ I ~ I W I I ~ ~ I IinO Iany
f l ~ l l 4 l % ? m lust ~ ,m\:$i,! n m h ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ .,I.~
.
l ~ ~ l ~
It- ' r,,, ,%I , , I , , I , , < , ! ,:,i.,:. (1 l<,<4I,,.r -,<.,: ", i , - <
,,,(, ,r:,, I , t i . ? \0,1.:< l k ~7 1 b... , .;%,.;,!:>
5, 8.. .;.
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the wake of the Arablsraeli War in 1967, when the security clearances of all personnel a%
Israelis captured vast quantities of Sov~et material Military Intelligence. This Department cond
from the Arabs. It is believed that Foreign Intelligence liaison with Shin Beth, which is reswnsibh
Liaison may be divided into at lead two components: reserve personnel on inactive status and
General Intelligence and Technical Intelligence responsibility in counterintelligence and secu
Within or attached to the Foreign Intelligence In the middle 1960s the Security Departmen
Liaison Division is a Secret Liaison unit which handles a Personnel Security Division to assign
all operations outside the normal charter of activities superviw and wordinate clearances and
previously dexribed. This unit may be involved either surveillance. A ~unterintelligenceDivisio~
directly or indirectly in bilateral intelligence <>per- responsibility of ensuring security regarding
ations conducted by Military Intelligence w ~ t hother cations, documents and installations. An
services. Thus when a special relationship between a and Training Division was responsible
foreign military establishment and the IDF is ar- security indoctrination. A computerized
ranged, this unit sup~liesthe officers and controls the checking office was set up in the early 1960s
activities. This unit was involved in the excellent distribution and disposal of all Top k r e t c
liaison relationship which at one time existed with originating within the IDF. The Field
France. Further, if Mosad decides that an Israeli Department coordinates and monitors the a1
military officer is in the best position to carry out a Field Security units attached to the IDF
spsific foreign operation, this unit will handle the commands to maintain order. Q c h territc
matter. Operations controlled from this office in all mander is responsible for wurity in his are.
cases are coordinated with Mossad. Field Security units to preserve law and orde
divided into Northern, Csntral and South
The Foreign Relations Department directs the mands plus the Jerusalem, Tel Aviv a
activities of Israeli Ministry of Defense Missions and districts. Both Tel Aviv District and tht
Defense Attaches abroad through the Attaches' Divi- Command, also located there, are separate
sion Ministry of Defense Missions and Israeli Defense General Headquarters which is located in
Attaches are located in Wash~ngton,New York Ctty, The Gaza Strip, although not contiguous to tl
London. Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Ankara, Command, has k e n placed under that
Tehran, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Tokyo. Brasilia and because pacification and antiterrorist operat)
Caracas. Several of these attaches are a h accredited past few years have succeeded in bringin
to adjacent countries. The true role of most defense stability to the area. Sinai is under the
missions and attache pmts is to sell Israeli defense Command, which has two Field Security un
industry produch and purchase defense equipment for mid-1960s the Northern Command has tt
the IDF. There are few m t s which are actually Security units
attache offices in the traditional sense, the principal
ones being in Washington, London, and Paris. lsraeh Field Security officers serve in the
defense attaches abroad advise their respective ambas- commands where they direct the activiti,
sadors, report on host country military matters, keep various Field Security unlts and serve as
abreast of all research and development in the host contact for the Gmmands Security Depart1
country and in grneral, rrpresent the IDF ahroad the terntorial cnmmmders. Field Security
Attaches also do operational support work for Mosad. rrsuonsible for implementing and supervisin
Israeli md~tary missions have been sent to some directives, including instructions, guidance a]
countries for training and support p u r m s , but those tions In the Adminutered Territories, Fiek
missions have not been officially accredited to the Urnts cwuerate w ~ t hShin Beth and the Bar<
country concerned. to p r e w v e security, combat terrorism
The Field Security and Military Censorship Depart- counterintelligence owrations. At brigade le
ment is responsible for counterintelligence within the three area commands, Field Security ha!
IDF, and conducts r ~ h w ~ c aand l personnd security intelligence majors serving as Pcurtty offi
its\- , ,+..,.. I~I<&Ih c u n t y is also resuonsihle for known as such) under the command of the C
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\ w t ~ u n (G-3) Security dficers at battal~on and private conversation and reported gleefully to his
, cmpany level are "coopted" from the infantry but colleagues in the room what he heard. The monitor
.,,r known as security officers only to unit command- was fired on the spot. Monitoring activity concentrates
c . f 5 on the battalion level. At the company level, largely on international telephone calk from foreign
~ . c u r i t ypersonnel are sergeants. media personnel in Israel to their home offices abroad.
The Military Censorship Office within the Field The Public Relations Office of Military censors hi^
bcurity and Military Censor<hip Department is has responsibility for all I D F Dres releases and all
rtwonsible for all censorship. In addition this c o m p official contacts with the public. The Office handles
~ n t by , law, has extremely wide powers In deal~ng relations with the press and the public in cocrdir~ation
,,1t11 the Israeli press and other mass n ~ e d ~ aIn with the Cmsorship Office. The Office alm hosts
~btactice,the 1DF has found it advisable to operate on foreign defense attaches in Israel in conjunction with
.a wntleman's agreement basis and depend largely on the Foreign Intelligence Lia~son Division. As in the
t h good intentions of editors and the like to refrain case of the Gtnsorsh~pOffice, Diretors of Military
tram publishing stories about Israeli military secrets Intelligence uould picfer to see the Public Relations
11115 office operates on behalf of the e n t m IDF Office directly undrr the con~mandof the C h ~ e fof
lhrectors of Military Intelligence in the Dast have Staff
gJerred to Military Cenmrsh~pas part of the %allast" The intell~genceprocess within Military Intelligenm
I I G I ~ they would prefer to see in the Chief of Stafrs operates largely by means of three +eguIarly scheduled
c ~ w office
n T ~ Chief
P of the Censorsh~pOffice is a meetings of the key intelligence officers. First, there is
t~wmberof the "Committee of Three" which acts as a a meeting twice a week or every three days at which
h a r d of Appeal and final arbiter i r ~ all matters the Director of the Production Department holds a
#t,l,itingto censorship. The two other m e m b r s are a briefing for the DM1 and other top officers. Depend-
twresentative of the press and a representative of the ing on the nature of the intelligence discussed, other
p \ ~ I ~ lati c large The last named must b~ agreed upon product~onofficers may also be present. On the basis
18, lmth other parties. In effect all information IS of this meeting, the DM1 issues instruct~onsfor action
l~rokendown into three categories ( I ) items that are or levies requirements for information to the assem-
~ ~ m n i t t ewithout
d question, (2) items that are not bled staff officers One half day after each of these
~wrmittedunder any circumstances, and (3)items that biweekly meetings, the directors of Production and the
#11u5tbe cleared before publication. Blank spaces ale Intelligence Corps meet to work out detailed planning
lhwnd only infrequently in the press owing to a and tactics on what each should do to follow u p the
(wulation which forbids this practice; for example, an DMI's broad directives Immediately after this, the
vr~tire page must be reset if a single item must be Director of the Intelligence Corps gathers together his
w ~tl~draw from
n publication. All I D F publications and own division chiefs and gives them gu~delinesfor
tuvss releases must be coordinated with and approved carrying out their ~ m ~ n d i a trescmnsibilit~es
e The
1 , ) the Censorship Office. All information media, haison officer awgned to Mossad sits in on this
l<trc~gn and domestic, must submit any item having a meeting.
w \ s r ~ t yor significant polit~cal implication to the
The DM1 is always given finished intelligence
1 vt~wrshipOffice prior to its relezdse hlost presb
Individual items are sunimarized in not more than
~ ~ ~ w r n z a t havei ~ ~ nas teletype link w ~ t hthe IDF to
half a page and broken down into three wragraphs.
r \ w d ~ t ethis process, othws must handcariy tlwr
( 1 ) the facts, (2) comments; and (3) evaluation These
~tt.rt~s to the office In the rn1d-l9fXk, t h ~ soff~cewas
are put together & a "reading board'' for selected top
,.t,atled largely by female soldiers
Israeli Government officials with apprspriate mar-
I It? Censorship O f f ~ c eis in charge of mointuring gindl comments from the DMI. There are In add~tion
-~txoingcommunications from Israel to ensure that no daily, weekly, and monthly intelligence summaries
~wl~~rrnation of military value is transmitted If the which are designed to provide a cont~nuinginsight
~~m>mtor hears a discussion involving matters of into the development of events or trends of interest to
111111tary importance, he will cut off the conversation the government These s ~ .\arles,
m togetner wtth spot
1 i n m e occasion a monitor reportedly listened in on a reports on separate ~terns,IL much nf the Dhll's

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responsibilities as the Prime Minister's staff officer for coordinate reporting responsibility Officers from both
intelligence. The Production Department may also services are also permanently assigned to the Cmllec-
generate special research or "think" pieces. Special tion Department to coordinate requirements whicw,
reports are also written in response to requirements are of particular mncern to them.
levied by Israeli agencies 0 t h than military a. AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE-Israeli Air Force
intelligence. Intelligence is a relatively small but efficient organiza-
One of the DMl's most important functions is to tion. Its main functions are to conduct intelligence'
present the annual intelligence estimate during the operations necessary to support air activities and to
latter part of December. While a precis is drawn up coordinate with the DM1 regarding its collection
beforehand, the presentation is oral and is attended by efforts. Air Force intelligence is concerned almost
senior government officials headed by the h m e exclusively with Arab air order of battle and t k
Minister. The DM1 uses the weekly summaries to a collection of Arab aerial target data. This information
great extent in preparing his material. At the end of is largely collected by aerial reconnaissance and
his formal remarks, the DM1 opens the floor to SICINT, with supplementarv information provided by
questions. The minutes of the meeting are then put agent rewrts and prisoner interrogations in hot war
into finished form and circulated to key government situations The I D F relies heavily on photoreconnais-
officers on a need-teknow basis. same for order of battle information. The Air Force
has two photointerpretation facilities, but probably
T h e DMI's major aid in doing his job is a progress does not have more than 20 imaeery interpreters. In
report drawn up every three m o n t h by each of his
1!370, all Air Force Intelligence facilities were
department directors. H e a h reads raw intelligence permanent, although the Israelis planned to acquire
reports from time to time for the purpose of getting several mobile facilities. While Air Force Intelligence
the actual flavor of information presented to him in
does not produce estimates, it does prepare intelli-
the special item reports or to evaluate the usefulness or gence studies on air order of battle, threats and
nature of agent operations. capabilities. The Air Force administers its own
Although the DM1 has an elaborate computer attaches abroad.
capability to assist in collating information, there is a Air Force ~ r c e e d u r e sfor handling imagery intelli-
need for more effective automatic data-prceessing
gence are highly centralized yet flexible. Israeli
equipment for the storage and retrieval of
vhotoreconnai~nce capabilities, however, are limit-
information.
ed. Photographic coverage is not possible below 7.W
The DM1 assigns intelligence officers to the three feet, and camera systems are not capable of revealing,
Area Commands, where they are attached to the for example, whether SAM (surface to air missile) sites
various intelligence staffs down to brigade level. are occupied. Additionally, Air Force photolabratory
Territorial commanders direct the collection of intelli- quality control is almost nonexistent. Air Force
gence in their geographical areas and for some Intelligence, demite its high standards, did not have
distance a c r m the border. The Northern Command is enough imagery interpreters at the time of t k Yam,
responsible for operations against Lebanon and Syria Kippur War and the overall skill level of those few was
while the Central Command controls operations rather low.
against Jordan, Egvvt and perham -Saudi Arabia
b. NAVAL~ N T E L L ~ G E N C E - N Intelligence
~V~~ is a
Information is collected through border obwrvation,
small, centralized service of a~proximately110 people
reconnaissance patrols acd c r o s - b r d e r operations
operating in support of Navy units. Most of the
Air Force and Navy Intelligence are small, highly personnel are located in the Navy headquarters
specialized units concentrating on items of immediate building in Tel Aviv. The service deals mostly with
concern to only the Air Force and Navy commands naval order of battle, foreign capabihes and seaborne'
T h e Directors of Air Force and Navy Intelligence threats Naval Intelligence operates as a semiautonc+
attend the staff meetings of the DM1 Officers from maus unit of Military Intelligence and is not obliged t o
each of these services are detailed to attend the regular pro\,ide personnel at the national intelligence level.
meetina of the Research Department in order to Naval Intelligence mrsonnd are not sutmrdinate to the

SECRET
1)MI except to give consultatwe assistance in naval Shaykh and a commando unit b a
d in southern Sinai.
"~atters In the table of organization, the Director of There is also a P r o t m l Department, which deals with
pJava1 lntekgence falk under the Officer Command- foreign naval attaches in Israel, and a small organim-'
lng the Navy for operational and reporti- matters tion and administration department (Figure 8).
.nd supporh the top navy commands. The service is
, a t t e n d after the Military Intelligence structure but The Collection Department, with about 17 person-
,, geared to the reauirements and scow of navy nel, is one of the smaller components in the Naval
1,mctionsand missions The organiation has a deputy Intelligence structure. It has few integral operational
'i~rrctor and Collection, Targeting, Production (Re- resources and support for most of its collection efforts
!.,.arch) and Security Departments It assigns officers to must come from or be coordinated through the DMI.
the naval bases at Haifa, Ashdod, Elat, Sham el Exceptions to this arrangement are Collection Depart-

DIRECTOR
NAVAL
INTELLIGENCE
I

Organmtmn Secunly P m d ~ c ~ ~ m Targetmg Protod Collect~on


and
~dm,,,,sl,at,on Department Department Department Deprlment Department

- Command
- - Coordmatm
Figure 8. Orgonizotion of Novol Intelligence, 1974

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ment control of Israeli naval attache activities abroad, Security Department personnel are navy officers and
small boat m s t a l owratnons, COMINT, ELINT and enlisted men who have been speciall~trained by the
aerial reconnaissance in cooperation with Air Force Field Securitv Department of Military Intelligence
Intelhgence, and a merchant marine program The Thev perform basic countersubversion and counter.
post-World War I1 Israeli endeavor in clandestine d o t a g e tasks at headquarters and at subordinate
arms procurement and 11Iegal immigration developed bases. Thev d o not, however, carry out base security or
important commercial and shipping contacts, some of wrsonnel investigations, which are done by Military
which may still be handled by or at least m r d i n a t e d Intelligence Field Security units.
with Naval Intelligence. The Organization and Administration Department
The Targeting Department, with about 20 person- with about six personnel assigned, provides secretarial
nel, is divided into two divisions: Svria/Lebanon and support for the Director of Naval Intelligence. T h w
Egypt/North Africa. These divisions are responsible personnel handle routine administrative duties.
for: (1) preparing coastal studies for naval gunfire Naval Intelligence, although small, is a well-trained
missions; (2) preparing beach studies for amphibious and evidently highly efficient service. Recruiting of
assaults; (3)preparing s p x i a l target studies to support
personnel into Naval Intelligence is done by means of
mmmando operations; and (4) preparing and main-
a very efficient, informal system which identif~es
taining target folder on Lebanese, Syrian and E g y p
individuals and matches them to the needs of the
tian ports. The Department has a w e s to all wurm of
Director of Naval Intelligence., (This system IS
information available to the DML In addition to
apparently in force throughout Israeli military intelh-
levying requirements for collection on the Military
gence organizations.) Naval Intellisence officer per-
Intelligence Cu.!ection Department, the Director of sonnel are recruited through several different chan-
Naval Intelligence is on regular d~stribution for
nels Most younger junior officers enter directly from
information obtained by the DM1 related to naval
the universities while others transfer within the Naw
affairs.
from naval operations units to the intelligence servic~
The Production Department, with a staff of about A third source is enlisted wrsonnel who have
40, is the largest mmponent of Naval Intelligence. displayed the necessary qualities and have indicatd
This unit is divided into two divisions: (1) Arab Navies; a n interest in following a career in naval intelligence.
and (2) the Soviet Navy. The Production Department Once identified, such people are sent to a university at
handles research, analysis, production and dissemma- Navy expense. Upon mmpletion of their training they
tion of information on all mobile forces assoaated w t h are commissioned and pursue careers in Naval
Arab Navies and the Saviet Navy in the Med~terra- Intelligence. Israeli Navy enlisted personnel, both
nean. This component is the primary user of all source male and female, are mostly volunteers who have bem
material which flows into Naval headquarters, espe- screened by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Thp
cially SIGINT information. The work of this depart- Naval Intelligence women serve 20 months, while the
ment is mainly in support of units operating out of the men serve 36 months.
four naval bases and the commando unit in southern There are no special naval intelligence schools in
Sinai. Production is limited largely to studies on Israel, and naval intelligence officers and key enlisted
enemy order of battle and special weapons. Those personnel are trained at the Military Intelligence
studies and others, including target folders, identifica- School In general women receive only on-the-job
tion manuals and enemy tactics outlines, are diwmi- training; however, if a woman shows an interest in a
nated to operational commanders and crews through naval intelligence career, she will be enrolled in the
the base intelligence officers. The base intelligence enlisted course of the Military Intelligence School.
officer disseminates such information by briefing Naval Intelligence enlisted men attend an abbreviated
crews or updating a ship's intelligence libraw through course, enrollment in an expanded course depending
additions, updates and changes. on motivation and intended utilization. There appears
The Security Department, which has a staff of to be very little problem with the retention of naval
a b u t 12, performs a limited counterintelligence intelligence personnel. The primary constraint on the
function within Navy headquarters at all naval bases. Director of Naval Intelligence is the total number

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l"fficer and e n d e d ) of slots assigned The centralized sory military service which follows at the completion
,,.stem combined with primary area of intelligence of secondary education. Those who accept are assigned

2.
lends itself very well to the N a1 Intelligence
wrsonnel structure. T h e close knit int ~gencesupport
,"stem also works well considering the lack of integral
to Military Intelligence when they join the I D F
Promising young army personnel are then sent to the
Military Intelligence School, following which they
,-&ction assets. may be commissioned and assigned as assistants to
intelligence officers in the field When they attain the
intelligence. prior to and during the Yom Kippur rank of captain, having x ~ e as d intelligence officers,
$f,ar, was received in the Operations Center at Naval
some are assigned to an area command headquarters
l,,.adquarters During the war, the Director of Naval
or to the Directorate of Military Intelligence to expand
~ ~ t e l i i g e n cworked
e very closely with the Officer their exmrience and qualify them for more rewonsi-
(bmmanding the Navy in the Center durmg ongoing
bility and eventual prom6tion to higher rank Thus.
,,perations. Information from SIGINT and other
many of the officers now serving with Military
~ ~ u r c ewas s received in the Center as raw data. Intelligence entered as young men and moved UP
(brrelation of all information was then done on the
through the ranks.
, ~ byt the Chief of Naval Intelligence and passed on
1" the Officer Commanding the Navy. The informa- Most Military Intelligence personnel are regulars,
tlon was diswminated in the form of orders or reports not reservists because the I D F requires career
to opwational comnanders and units. Processing and intelligence officers All personnel, including con-
,{~spminationof naval intelligence was accom~lished scripts, join Military Intelligence'voluntaril~. Female
,n a highly professional manner with no major enlisted members, who often serve as translatom
,I,-ficiencies or Arab naval surprises in the Yom usually serve only 20 months whereas male enlisted
ktppur War. Naval Intellmence also revealed a personnel serve 36 months.
l , t ~ ~ l t -flexibility
~n when the service shifted quickly Military Intelligence training is professional and
10 a hot war s i t u a t i o ~ and~ handied support for extensive. Officers and analysts are well-trained and
active mval operations including shore bombardment competent in their fields The Military Intelligence
t~&ions. One major area where Naval Intelligence School is located north of Tel Aviv on the road to M e
has problems is the limited number uf personnel. In Dov airport. This school triins b t h officers and
case of contin~~ous operations, similar to the Yom nonmmmissioned officers. Approximately 150 instruc-
K~ppurWar, q u a h y na\,xl i ~ ~ l ~ l l i work ~ ~ ~ nwould
ce tors and 90 support personnel train between 2.mand
l,rol~ably degenerate after a month ,uf steady 3 , W students annually. The school's usual course runs
operations from September through February. This arrangement
has been made to take advantage of new groups of
3. Admin~strati\ep r 8 , <, of the D~rectorateof high school graduates This center is a relatively new
V111taq I n t e I h ~ r n 8< facility whieh was established in the late 19tXh. It was
There are approxi* a officers plus a larger formerly Dart of the I D F infantry School.
number of NCCJs, ,u ,vrsonneI and civilian The commander of the Military Intelligence School
clerical wr.sonnel 111 , I),\',, l'he service has priority is responsible to the DM1 for intelligence instruction
In the selection of . ~ I C Y { military mrsnnnel for and to the Intelligence Corm for training in general.
~ntelliaencea s s i ~ n r w t ~ '\I, ,tdry Intelligence prefers Course content is the responsibility of the DM]. The
I U bring individuals i n , , antt,Il~gence work while they training staff supervises training aids and instruction
are voung and movc timn ~wwardsas they acquire methods. A Combat Intelligence Branch provides
rwerience and can a s w n v greater responsibility. instruction for operational personnel and a General
Recruiters seek promi51ng young m d e who are S u b k t s Branch trains specialists. The General Subjects
~ t u d ~ i nforeign
g language or other subjects of interest Branch, for example, teaches c o u w in field security,
to the sewice in secundary school. Prior to graduation, censorship, military drafting. photo interpretation,
Mil~tarvIntelligence officers contact selected voung research for order of battle analysis, collection, and
ntudents-males and females-and offer them wsi- aerial observation Other s m i a l courses are taught as
lmns as interpreters during the two years of c o m ~ u l - needed Field Security counterintelligence personnel,
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-
Air Force and Navy students also take courses at the the type of sources desired. Once a spotter
Military Intelligence School and Military Intelligence reported a potential source, he st- aside and lmvo
instmctors are responsible to the DM1 for intelligence the rest to Military Intelligence officers. Militaq
training at the xhools of other IDE branches. They are Intelligence contacts the potential soure, him
charged by the DM1 for quality of intelligence and, if a~propriate,attemDts to r e m i t him as .,,
teaching. These instmctors usually have wartime agent. This is d e ~ ~ r i b easd the "direct method" d
assignments with tactical units. Military Intelligence recruitiw agents for Military Intelligence. T b "indi.
mrsonnel staff intelligence positions down through rect method" refers to recruiting sources by or through
brigade level; line officers with intelligence training at agents outside Israel. b t h Field Security and th
the Infantry School staff the lower echelons. police investigate the backgroun& of potential agenb
for Military intelligence.
Field Security personnel are selected on the basis of
strict criteria regarding permnal security and loyalty The motives of the spotters and l m l support p e ~ &
to Zionism and the Israeli State. They are trained by are either monetary or a desire for services in the forrn
Shin Beth. of aid in reuniting families or re~resentationon behalf
of the spotter in some problem with the Israel~
In general, Military Intelligence, although it has a Government. The basic agent motivation is generally
good training program and tries to offer career economic gain in the form of salaries, loans (which are
inducements, has diff~culty in retaming cumpetent seldom repaid), and gifts. Another mmmon incentive
wmonnql because of low wages and slim opportunities is a wish to move to Israel and rejoin relatives who
for advancement. reside there. In some m the agent may be a
4. Methods of owration Palestinian refugee, who believes that he still has a
claim to ~ r o p e r t yin Israel and wants either r m m -
Military Intelligence is respomibk for cross-border pense or a guarantee of the eventual return of his
operations into the neighboring Arab states. Its property. Other agents are members of Arab minor~ty
operations rely heavily on the exploitation of: Arabs groups or opponents of Arab regimes
within Israeli and the Administered Territories; Arab
Military Intelligence officers do have problems m
students, who though residents of Israel, attend
handling Arab agents, who tend to exaggerate and
universities in the Arab nations; Arab travelers and
often fail to report accurate details. Therefore. thr
visitors; Arabs in Israeli prisons; and Arab military
Military Intelligence officers encourage their Arab
deserters, defectors, Bedouins and smugglers.
agents to provide photmaphs, maps, and o t h ~ r
Military Intelligence collection reauirements mver mrroborating documents. Military Intelligence offimn
political and economic subjects as well as military also cross-check reports often by using other agents bn
information and uses the information acquired both the same region. Despite Israeli warnings dunnu
for policymaking purposes and as basic intelligence. training, Arab agents tend to tell other members 01
Military Intelligence is also active in co~~ecting their family about their m i a t i o n with Military
information from sources outside Israeli terrorist and Intelligence. Occasionally an Arab agent may recruit
subversive organizations and activities. Although a11 the members of his immediate family as subagents
SIGINT s o u r m acquire some information on these and try toget his case officer to pay them salaries. Thr
subjects, Military Intelligence officers believe that only Israelis refer to these family subagents as "nonfu~~<
agent sources can really obtain the data needed on tionalist." These subagents sometimes compromiw 4
various terrorist grou~s'policies and plans, methods of whole operation as a result of boasting about the11
operation, equipment, training and relations with activities. occasion all^ the Military Intelligence cax
other groum. Primary Israeli interest in terrorism is to officer will order these unwanted "nonfunctionals'
obtain early warning of impending operations. across the border into Israel for security briefings hut
Military Intelligence has not solved this problem
In each regional area of Israel, local citizens, in some
completely.
c a w Arabs, who are Israeli agents, act as spotters for
Military Intelligence. Most of these stmtters have long Military Intelligence trains its agents in tradecraft
worked for Military Intelligence, which alerts them to :oIlection methods, security and reporting p r d u r ~ s

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SECRET

Mllitarv Intelligence runs Its agents in networks or as operations Military Intelligenm emvloys a SIGINT
~~ndetons; the latter are referred to as "lone wolves." system that is modern, sophisticated and effective,
V w security reasons, Military Intelligence prefers that The DM1 is responsible for providing technica
an agent with good a w e s remain a 'lone wolf." Agent support to other directorates, but the technical servicu
mtworks consist of a primary source and subsources. of the various military intelligence directorates are
Mllltary Intelligence d m s not refer to soums as such, inferior to the technical groups of Shin Beth. The
instead calling both primary and subsource "agents." DMI's technical equipment, such as that used in audio
Mllitary Intelligence officers try to meet and train surveillance or that employed in work agent support is
each agent personally on the Israeli side of the border. generally high although it is less good in some special
Networks usually include a radio operator and in some fields such as miniaturization. In the use and ap~lication
m e s , a courier. of ,infrared devices, however, the DM1 capability is
usuallv g d . Military Intelligence wrsonnel are capable
When possible, Military Intelligence case officers of making ad hoc modifications of existing equipment
twder direct meetings with all agents inside Israel in and are up to date on technical advance concerning
wder to receive their reports personally, to check remote control and activation of transmitters, and in the
~rquirements and to formulate future plans. One field of low-light photography. Military Intelligena
aspect of the relationship between Militarv Intelli- relies heavily on aerial reconnaiance and SIGINT for
mence officers and agents is unique when wmmred to timely order of battle information. Aerial rmnneis.
~ h techniques
r employed by other sewices In many sance is apparentb a primary insthnent for h a t i n g
awrations Military Intelligence headquarters analysts fedayeen groups, although such organizatiow are well
acmmpany case officers to personal agent meetings, in penetrated by field agents.
d e r to clarify certain details of the agent's reports
and give him guidance on certain points or ~rnblems. Military Intelligence is capable of providing timely
l ' h w meetings are usually held in safehouses with and detailed information on Israers primary neighbor-
lmth the case officer and the analyst present but if an ing enemies through agent operations that are well
aamt is p r e d for time, the c a x officer and analyst planned and highly imaginative,
may meet him during darkness at a prearranged spot The main P u r m of Military Intelligence Field
dong the border. Security units is to control the local Arab population in
the Administered Terrorities and to minimize their
Military Intelligenw also communicates with its participation in terrorism. In this endeavor, Field
aurnts by S/W Iettervposted in third countries, by Security of the Administered Territories works closely
awnt radio and by deaddrops. Military Intelligence with Shin Beth and the Border Guard. Residents are
awrations have been marked by flexihilitv, economy required to carry ID cards, curfews have been
tn ihe use of assets and by responsiveness to require- imposed, suspected resistors have been detained, and
nwnts; the system worked well prior to the Yom the houses in the area of persons presumed to know of
K I I I P I I ~ War in October 1973. Agents reported early terrorist activities have k e n demolished, even though
*mrnlng information which, in retrospect, contained the inhabitants were not directly involved. In the early
wlmble indications of a coming Arab attack. Direct 1970s it was estimated that the Israelis had some Q~JO
t~*mmunicationwith agents, however, virtually ceased residents of the Administered Territories under
during hostilities and what little agent reporting there administrative detention. Personnel of Field Security
L.* during the war was of limited value to Israeli units have carried out sweeps in searches for terrorists
M111tary headquarters and field commanders. The and arms caches through areas in the West h n k
v~ncipal problem faced by Military Intelligence in the where terrorism has occurred. On some omasions
wquisition and reporting of intelligence by agents is the Israeli operations have taken place at night, apparently
k c k of modern equipment. Although many of the
intended at least in part to intimidate the populace,
*arnts have radios (mainly receivers) and cameras, and
ale familiar with secret .writing, the sophistication level In December 1969 the Defense Minister a n n o u d
44 lrchniques and equipment is low. This adversely that 516 buildings had been demolished in the
&-cts the quality, security and timeliness of collection occupied territories since the 1967 war-265 in the
SECRET

West Bank, 227 in G a u and 24 in Jerusalem. While Foreign Affairs, prepares analysis based on raw
these Israeli policies and actions have intimidated intelligence for government policymakers. Its office 15
many Arabs who might otherwise have engaged in located in a separate fenced compound within the
resistance activities or in terrorism. in many cases they Ministry of Foreign Affairs complex in Jerusalem A
have been counterproductive in that they have guard at the compound gate prevents unauthorized
aroused deep and widespread resentment among the entrance into the Center, and photo ID cards arc
residents of the Occupied Territories. In areas where required for admittance.
buildings have been destroyed, an atmosphere of The Center presently employs fewer than 100
personal anger and resentment has been added to the people, both analysts and support staff, who were
natural bitterness of a defeated people, particularly recruited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
among the younger Arabs. Israeli universities. The Center has six divisions: North
Africa; the Fertile Crescent; the Arabian Peninsula.
5. Relations with other services other Geographic Regions; Economic; and Strategic
There appears at the present time to be a very Some 70 percent of the Center's personnel are
harmonious relationship between Military Intelligence employed in the three Arab units. The Center
and the other Israeli intellience and security services. prepares its analyses on the basis of raw intelligence
Most Israeli intelligence and security personnel. data available to the Israeli intelligence communit~
especially on the policy and coordination level, realize The Center produces short papers on current intelli
that their very national existence defends on an gence and longer analytical membranda, as required
effective and smoothly functioning intelligence and The Center's products are disseminated to all minis-
security community. In addition, officers at the tries of the government.
department chief and even more so at the division The Foreign Minister uses the Center as his personal
chief level all have known each other personally for a braintrust to give him an independent means nt
long period of time. These relationships have been judging the products of Military Intelligence and
forged during troubled times seldom experienced by Mossad. Although its analyses are sent to Israel's top
any other nation and now provide a framework for decisionmakers. the Center's role in the Israeli
cooperative teamwork and coordination among the intelligence and security community probably is still a
services. modest one. The Center reportedly has few problems
arising from competition within the community,
Liaison between Israeli Military Intelligence and
probably because of a lack of status in comparison
foreign organizations have varied over the years from
with the established and larger intelligence and
good to poor, depending on the exigencies of the
security organizations.
situation and the demands of policy. In recent years
the Israelis have provided military and security aid
and training to various African nations, including
F. The National Police
Ethiopia, Uganda and Zaire. They have also engaged The Israeli Police Force is a national organization
in military and security training and equipment headed by an Inspector General responsible to the
exchanges with Latin American and Asian services. Minister of the Interior. The national headquarters
moved in mid-I969 from Tel Aviv-Yafo to Jerusalem
The Israelis have maintained good relations with
The force is comprised of the following departments
Turkey and Iran in military and security matters.
(1) Administration, which is responsible for transport,
While the Israelis do not have full diplomatic relations
supplies, communications, property and finances; (21
with Iran; they have an overt official mission whose
Investigations, which is concerned with criminal and
members have diplomatic titles, including that of
fraud investigations and special tasks in support of the
military attache.
intelligence and security community; and (3) Oper-
ations, which is in charge of training, patrols and
E. Research and Political Planning Center traffic. There are also personnel, research, planning
The Research and Political Planning Center, for- and development offices. The Prison Services and the
merly the Research Division in the Ministry for Civil Guard are also part of the Police (Figure 91

42 SECRET
SECRET
SECRET

The force is divided territorially into districts, for this component. The Border Guard, which num
subdistricts. zones, police stations, and posts. The three about 6,000, is integrated into the Army in time
~ o l i c edistricts are: Northern, including Haifa, Tel war.
Aviv; and Southern, including Jerusalem. Attached to
the Haifa subdistrict is t mull coast or marine The effective strength of the d i c e f
police force, which is b-ed in the port of if^ and including the Border Guard) reached about

Oriental Jews has been particularly encouraged


A special component of the national police force is
the Border Guard, whose missions are to guard the The police force is capable of maintaining pub
ceasefire lines against Arab infiltration and detecting order and safety under normal circumstances. It h
and running down terrorists. It works closely with the however, been troubled by a manpower shorta
Army and patrols t h e Administered Territories and caused by resignations resulting from low p
the border areas. The Border Guard also trains settlers overwork and the attraction of higher paying :
in defense measures against infiltrators, and schedules elsewhere. Despite the persistent shortage of manw
guard duty in border villages. Military conscripts who er, police discipline is generally satisfactory and, in t
elect to fulfill their term of service by joining the case of the Border Guard, excellent. The pub
Border Guard are the principal sources of new recruits attitude toward the police has improved since t

Figure 10. Israeli National Police headquarters, Jerusalem, frontal-sideview, November 1972
SECRET

Figure 11. Isroeli Border Gwrd post under construction ot Kefar Roienwold (Zarit), June
1970

ççrdays of statehood, despite scandals involving ough. H e is also known to be headstrong, abrasive and
nnuggling and the acceptance of bribes. The police arrogant.
l w e has worked hard to overcome the traditional
frwish fear of police authority stemming from the Hoffi, Yitzhnk
hntoric oppression of Jews The Israeli Police Force in
Major General (Ret.) Yitzak Hoffi became Director
dlri-t acts as a very important auxiliary to Shin Beth
of Mossad on 1 September 1974. H e was born in Tel
*n the preservation of internal security throughout the
nitintry. The police support Shin Beth in investiga-
INHIS, by providing cover and making arrests.

C. Key officials
Achi-Tuv, Avraham
Achi-Tuv became Director of Shin Beth in the
winner of 1974. He is a career security officer. His
wutation was established ;Â¥' chief of Shin Beth's Arab
411-iirs Department, where he was responsible for
~ n d u c t i n goperations in the Administered Territories
*tut within the Arab community in Israel He served
t i f i r f l y as Deputy Director of Shin Both prior to his
+inx*intnent as Director. Achi-Tuv is of German
I*< kuruund. He is married and has a daughter. He
**nwd a law degree at the University of Tel Aviv in
rarly 1970s while serving in Shin Beth. He is
~ i r r n e l ybright, hard-working. ambitious and thor-

UCRET
Aviv on 25 January 1927 He joined the Haganah in Southern Command before returning in 1971
1944 and commanded a company in the Arablsraeli instructor with the Command and Staff Cello
War in 1948. He continued to serve in the Israeli 1972 he became commander of the Intelligence 5
Defense Forces in a variety of command, staff and but left in 1973 to become intelligence officer wil
training posts, including the command of the Para- Armored Division, Southern Command. On 19
troop Brigadr Hoffi w u Acting Chief of Staff for a 1974 Sagi was appointed Deputy Director, MI
brief period in April1974, but retired from the IDF at Intelligence, Production and Estimates. On 2 Feh
that time, apparently became he was not appointed 1979 he assumed the Directorship of Military 1
Chief of Staff Hoffi attended the US Army Command gence, Sagi is soft-spoken, direct and has a no-nor
and General Staff College in the mid-1960s He has outlook He considers himself an Arab expert
also visited the US on many occasions. In 1968 he married and has three daughters. He speaks Ei
inspected police units and participated in army
exercises in Uganda. He traveled as a tourist to H. Comments on p r i n c i p a l sources
Hawaii, Japan, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tehran in
1970 and went to Singapore on undisclosed business. 1. Source materials
He inspected Israeli advisory efforts in Ethiopia in Most of the information in this publication has
1972 and also went to other part5 of Africa Although derived from a variety of sources including
not an intelligence officer by background or training, assets of the Central Intelligence Agency, public,
Hoffi apparently demonstrated his flair for intelli- of the Israeli Government and reports prepared t
fence analysis as Commander of the Northern United States Department of Defense Researcl
Command in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War basically completed in December 1976.
in October 1973 by sensing the impending Syrian
attack and reauesting the Defense Minister to 2. Supplementary overt publications
reinforce the Golan Heights with an armored brigade.
Hoffi reportedly has expanded Mossad's role in the a. Aldouby, Zwy and Ballinger, Jerrold.
collection of intelligence on Arab capabilities and the Shattered Silence; the Eli Cohen Affair. New
interpretation of such information. Coward. McCann and Geoghegan, 1971.
Hoffi is reserved and auiet but can be warm and b. Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jeru
genial among friends. He is married and has two New York: Viking Press, 1963.
daughters. He sneaks English. Neither as flashy nor as
c. Bar-Zohar, Michel. The Avengers. Ls
imaginative as some of his predecessors in Mossad, he
Arthur Barker, 1968.
is reported to be meticulous and somewhat dour.
d. Bar-Zohar, Michel. Spies in the Pn
Sagi, Yehoshua Land; Ism Hare1 and the Israeli Secret h
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1972.
General Yehoshua Sad, born 27 September 1933.
Jerusalem, Palestine (Israel), entered the Israeli De- e. Ben-Hanan, Eli, Our Man in Damascus
fense Force (IDF) in 1951 and was commissioned in York: Crown Publishers, 1969.
1953. From 1953 to 1964 he served in the Southern
Command, fulfilling field duties During the Sinai
f. Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Secret War.
York: Sabra Books, 1970.
Campaign he served as intelligence officer of the
Armored Corm and as commander of a reconnais- g. Ben-Porat, Y. (Dan, Uri). Spy from
sance unit. Following the 1956 war, he served as an New York: Tower Publications, 1969.
intelligence officer with the 7th Brigade and later as
h. El-Ad, Avri and Creech 111, James. Dec,
an assistant intelligence officer. Southern Command.
Honor. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1976.
In 1965 he graduated from the IDF Command and
Staff College. Following his graduation lie served as i. Eytan, Steve. Repeated Triumphs Scoi
commander of an Intelligence Officer Training Israel Spu Sustem. Washington: Joint Pub115
Course, and u an intelligence officer with the Research Service, 1970.

SE
SECRET

I Hare1 Isser The House on Gar~/x/di^trfct, o Rabin, Jacob. Elie Cohen, L'espion de D a m .
th, Capture of Adolf Etchmann London A Deutsch, Paris: Flamrnarion. 1967.
1 ~ 7 1
p. Shlaim, Avi Failures in National Intelligence
k Israel C m r n m e n t Year Book 5735-6 (1975- Estimates: The Case of the t o m Kippur War.
IvW Jerusalem. 1975 Princeton: World Politics, April 1976.
a. Tadmar, Joshua. The Sileni Warriors. Edited
I Lotz, Johann Wolfgang The Champagne Spv
and translated by Raphael Rothstein. Toronto: Mac-
Srà York Manor Books, 1973
Millan, 1969.
ni Pearlman, Moshe The Capture of Adolf r. Tinnin. David B. and Christensen, Dag. The
t I. hmann London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961 Hit Team. Boston: Little Brown, 1976.
n Pickalkiewicz, Janusz Israel's Longer Arm. s Who's Who in Israel. 1976. Tel Aviv: Bronf-
trnkfurt (Main) Coverts, 1975 man and Cohen. 1976
P u t i o l p a t 8 1 Mr. h T l d T o u r g ~ ~ nScooad
, Secretary, I Ã § n e lMiclon
-8 Or-, Polltloal Officer

Mr. Tour- o-atd tht the I à § n e lopçiçtioh r e in Iiç


an a h * U i t l n * . B* that ¥hl hi8 m m -8 ¥¥
to a m rehtioiu with Iran, it rmmllwd the delioatm potition of tho
1-m in - & z i ~ bath Israeli a d m 4 A n b oouutrio8,
¥a t h w f o x * did act imç 0 0 ~ h O t 8to0 ¥uah

DlÈtrt.bu-tion
Mre-mlJÑiia
JAB
TO
BIO
css
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
v,,.,.,,.*.r. L>C ?'-;:,

- -
SECRET

1 WICIAL-INFORMAL February 13, 1969


'lie Honorable
f.rniinH. Meyer
American Ambassador
''chran
) c a r Mr. Ambassador:

In our sessions with the oil companies and the British,


. l i e n we were comparing notes on the Shah's January 31
~ c t i n gwith Consortium representatives, we learned
i f a definite statement by the Shah about the Israeli
ilpeline. He said that Iran had a financial interest
In the line and planned to continue using it regardless
i f any Arab complaints. He added that he was confident
that the Arabs would not be able to defeat Israel and
Israel looked to Iran as a friend.
A l l the best.
Sincerely,

, -
- -

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

SECRET
0.7
MA.
6SA

us1 I
ow.,.

"." "
-M
MI EOlTIOti
Grv o,,
w ,a

LD s r ~ r c s
*
GO\ FANMENI
COMFiDmmu.

Memorandum
10 ' The char; DATE: Uoveabor 10, 1970

FROM POL - Donald bk. ~o+çaili

SLBJEci Your Meeting with Mr. Ben-Tobanan of the I i r M l i Mission,


November 12 a t 11:00 a.m.

Mr. Ben-Tohanan, "Counselor" of the I s r a e l i Mission i n Tehran, i s


calling on you a t h i s request on November 12 a t 11:00 a.m.
Mr. Ben-Tohanan has been i n Tehran only about three mooth*, and our
biographic files contain no i n f o n u t i o n on him.

Using Iranian support of t h e original Afro-Asian resolution i n the


UHGA debate as a s t a r t i n g point, you Bight find it uaeful t o sound
out Tohanan on the current s t a t u s of Iranian-Israeli relations with a
view t o finding out whether t h e I s r a e l i s have detected--as we have--
a s l i g h t change i n t h e I r a p i a n . a t t i t u d a toward I s r a e l . We are attach-
Tii for your i n f i t i o n a copy of our A-148 of M a y 12, 1970.
It would be interesting t o get h i s u s e s ~ e n of t the reasons/significance
behind renewal of Inn-UAB relations--and t o sound bin out on Iraq.
We have heard v i a the press t h a t several high-ranking I r à § a i officers--
presumably supporters of Gewral Hardan Takriti who was exiled--were
recently executed. Radio Baghdad has not, t o our knowledge, mentioned
t h i s yet. A l l signs indicate t h a t a pcnmr stm&e has been going on
inside I r a q f o r scae time. Do t h e I s r a e l i s have any infomation on what
i s going on there?

We have heard t h a t the census of the Kurdish areas has been postpcnd
and t h a t other differences are arising between Barzani and the Oorerrelit
i n Baghdad. Do the I s r a e l i s have any infontation on d e v e l m n t s i n
?-
Finally, do t h e Israelis have any infontation on the I r a q i forces i n Jord

Attachment:
A448
POL: CT)teCaÇkill:ps

Group 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not autcoaticiUy declassified.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum
1 : POL - Mr. Toussaint MTB: Nov. 12, 1970
Â
: L. Douglas Heck . .

r : V i s i t of Mr.,Ben:Yohanan of t h e I s r a e l i Mission

Mr. Ben-Yohanan t e l l s me t h a t he has been i n Tehran f o r about two and


a h a l f months. He came h e r e from e i g h t years i n I s r a e l , and h e s a i d
he was pleased t o have a change from assignments within I s r a e l . He
spent f i v e years i n I s r a e l a t t a c h e d t o t h e Prime Minister's o f f i c e a s
a P o l i t i c a l A s s i s t a n t and t h e l a s t two years i n t h e same c a p a c i t y with
Foreign M i n i s t e r Eban. He s a i d t h e l a t t e r job took him on numerous
missions with t h e Foreign Minister and he had l i t t l e time a t home.
Before t h i s assignment he served with t h e I s r a e l i Mission i n Helsinki.
He c o n s i d e r s himself a c a r e e r f o r e i g n s e r v i c e o f f i c e r .
Ben-Yohanan was n o t very forthcoming on t h e s t a t e of Iran-UAR r e l a t i o n s .
He s a i d t h a t economic r e l a t i o n s were improving with I s r a e l landing a n
increasing number o f c o n t r a c t s f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n , e t c . , i n I r a n .
P o l i t i c a l l y h e s a i d t h a t r e l a t i o n s had not changed much one way o r t h e
o t h e r i n t h e l a s t f i v e o r s i x years.
On t h e q u e s t i o n o f I r a q i f o r c e s i n Jordan he had no information Sug-

r s t i n g t h a t King Hussein was being s u c c e s s f u l i n o u s t i n g them. I n


a c t , t h e f a i l u r e of t h e I r a q i f o r c e s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e r e c e n t
c o n f l i c t between Jordan and t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s might make it more d i f -
f i c u l t f o r King Hussein t o arrange f o r tidrremoval from Jordan.
Ben-Yohanan s a i d t h e r e were approximately 3,000 Jews l e f t i n I r a q .
He doubted t h e r e was much hope of t h e i r e a r l y d e p a r t u r e from t h a t
country. Things were i n c r e a s i n g l y u n s t a b l e i n I r a q and t h e r e were
rumors of new executions, b u t he had no d e f i n i t e information.

BUJ U.S.Sdqs Bonds R<Sffiirly on thi Payroll Savings Plsa


It-
&'

PARTICIFftirrS:
MEMORANDUM OF COMVIBSASIOU
October 14, 1972
Mr. Amnon BEN TOHANAN, I s r s e l i Minister i n Tehran
I
Andrew I. Killgore, P o l i t i c a l Counselor

PLACE: I s r a e l i Mission, Telwsn


m: October 12, 1972

COPIES : IIIR/DRR/+
ma/IAI
m/m Ai.iEa-bassy ?EL AVIV

Unusual Status of I s r a e l i Mission i n

M r . Ben Yohanan stated t h a t t h e I s r a e l i Mission la. Tehran is i n e'very substan-


t i v e respect treated by the Government of I r a n l i k e any other Bubasay.
Ambassador Meir EZRI has ready access t o tlie Shah and other high o f f i c i a l s of
It-.e Iranian Government. When t h e Ambassa3or i s away, Mr. Ben Yohanan i s a l s o
able t o see those Iranian o f f i c i a l s , including the Shah, t h a t be needs to see
t o carry on business between I s r a e l and I r a % It i s only on the ceremonial
side t h a t t h e 1sraeli.Mission i s treated d i f f e r e n t l y fra other regular
Embassies i n Tehran. No I s r a e l i f l a g is f:.wn a t the Mission and no sign on
the front of t h e building i d e n t i f i e s it as the I s r a e l i Mission. Ambassador
Ezri does not attend ceremonies which protocol requires other Ambassadors to
attend. However, Ban Yohanan saw an edvasi%ige i n not having t o play a
ceremonial r o l e which often took up too muc.i of t a e time o f t h e other
Ambassadorsa

The Rnbassies of t h e Arab countries i n Tehran vera fully aware, Ben Yohanan
said, t h a t t h e I s r a e l i Embassy was actually l i k e a l l other Qlbassies here
except f o r the ceremonial aspects. They fui-i-y accepted t h i s unusual s t a t e of
a f f a i r s aud made no remonstrations about it with the Iranian Government. Thus,
t h e I s r a e l i Minister continued, t h e s i t u a t i m was t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s were
wl1l:mg t o forego the ceremonial t r a p p i n g of diplopacy a s long as t h e r e a l
substance was present while the Arabs could t o l e r a t e t h e substance of close
Iran-Israel r e l a t i o n s as long as t h i s was nut apparent frail surface indication
Ben Yohanan realized t h a t the strongly I s l u d c orientation of many Iranians,
inclining then t o sympathize with .ifcei.~fel.'.ow Mu.sllms i n the Arab-Israel
dispute, made it useful f o r I r a n t o mask :.ti t r u e policies by publicly
pretending not t o recognize I s r e e l .

The Shah is a B r i l l i a n t Leader


I

1
I n the context of Iran's rapid emergerice as a leading country i n t h i s part of
t h e world, the I s r a e l i Minister referred -Lo the c a r e n t t r i p t o t h e Soviet
Union of the Shah. Looking a t t h e Shah's dmesti.: and international moves
over the past 10 years, Ben Yohanan faund t.he Ira,iian Sovereign to be a man of
mrtraordinary shrewdness a s a leader. When I asked t h e Minister i f he
perhaps thought t h e Shah's ambitions f o r I r a n overreached t h e country's
m n l i s t i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s , he responded t h a t he did not think so. When the
&ah said I r a n would bring i t s e l f up i n every respect to Great Britain
within a decade or two, who could say t h a t he Wac wrong. O f course, the Shah
w o u l d have t o expend funds very heavily on education i n order t o have a
population with t h e educational and technical levels t o run t h e kind of
m l e t y he envisaged. However, i n view of Iran's rapidly increasing incane
frcnn petroleum and other sources, there vat no objective reason why t h i s could
n o t be accomplished.

Biographical Note
Boa Yobanan is probably i n h i s l a t e f o r t i e t . He speaks perfect English and
my8 he if a career I s r a e l i d i p l a a t . He larked several years i n the office
of t h e l a t e I s r a e l i Prime Minister Levi Eatkol. After t h a t he worked more
than two years f o r Foreign Minister Abba Eban 10 whom he I s devoted.. The
Mioidter expected t h a t i f General Moshe Dayan ant5 Finance Minister Plahas
h p h i r become deadlocked f o r the Prime Minlstej-ship, a l t e r 1.m. ?.dr stepped
down. Foreign Minister B a n stood a chance of becoming Rime Minister of
Israel. It wae apparent t h a t he hoped everts uould work out t h i s way.

Bon Yohanan has been i n Tehran two years and expects t o stay a t l e a s t one
Â¥er year, perhaps two. He struck ne aa extremely i n t e l l i g e n t and v e i l
informed on Iranian a f f a i r s .

fOL:AIKillgore: cak
Tel Aviv, Israel
* ,"
April 30, 1976
Official-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Hawthorne Q. Mills, Esquire
Counselor for Political Affairs
American Embassy
Tehran
Dear Hawk:
I am writing with regard to an Israeli who has been friendly
and helpful to us here at the Embassy and who will be corn-ing
to Tehran to reside for an indefinite period.
Ovadia Danon has been the Special Assistant for Occupied
Territories Affairs to the National Commissioner of Police
since 1968. In that position, he haç been a rc~ularcontact
of the Political Section and has been very helpful to us in
providing information regarding Israeli policies and
activities on the West Bank. He is an Egyptian Jew by
birth. ,--
He will be coming to Tehran in the near future on assign-
ment with the Jewish Agency. He has told us that Israeli
leaders are somewhat concerned about the Jewish community
in Iran; he described that community to us as being wealthy
but becoming increasingly Persian. The community has been
generally supportive of Israel but not as helpful as would
be desired. Danon's job will be essentially one which is
concerned with cultural affairs and Jewish traditions, as
he described it to us, but we believe his primary purpose
is to do what he can to strengthen the ties between the
Jewish community there and Israel. For your information
we also believe he may be somewhat involved with Israeli
intelligence activities.
This week's edition of Nwnwcek magazine has an article on
the Passover march through the occupied West Bank by the
Gush Emunim group of fanatics; you will find in it an
interesting quotation by Danon.
With best regards.
Sincerely.

John E. Crii~up
Political Counselor
~(.~prL&
I Bubject:
Participants:
Iranian Politics
Yoram S h a n i , F i r s t S e c r e t a r y , I s r a e l i Mission,
Tehran
John D. Stempel, AmEmbassy Tehran

1 Time & P l a c e : S h a n i r e s i d e n c e , March 6 , 1977

Distribution: AMB/DCM USIS NEA/I RN


POL BIO INR/RNA
1 OR INR/OIL/B

The S h a n i s had i n v i t e d my w i f e and me t o d i n n e r t o t a l k


nbout our forthcoming t r i p t o I s r a e l . I n t h e c o u r s e of
the evening t h e f o l l o w i n g i n t e r e s t i n g t i d b i t s emerged:

1. According t o S h a n i ' s s o u r c e s , a b o u t t h r e e o r f o u r
months ago SAVAK surrounded t h e wrong house i n a t e r r o r i s t
r a i d . He c o u l d n o t p l a c e t h e t i m e e x a c t l y , b u t it was
a p p a r e n t l y j u s t p r i o r t o o r d u r i n g t h e November-December
1 9 7 6 roundups. SAVAK s h o t t h e house up r a t h e r b a d l y ,
k i l l i n g a l l o c c u p a n t s , whereupon t h e t e r r o r i s t s emerged
from a b u i l d i n g c l o s e by ( p r o b a b l y n e x t d o o r ) and engaged
In a f u l l s c a l e s h o o t o u t w i t h t h e S e c u r i t y S e r v i c e s which
r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e a t h s of a l l t h e t e r r o r i s t s and two o r
three security officers. Shani s a i d t h i s i s r e a l l y t h e
o n l y major m i s t a k e i n i d e n t i t y he knowsof which r e s u l t e d
i n " s e v e r a l " unnecessary c i v i l i a n d e a t h s .

2. F a r i b o r z Atapour, a prominent I r a n i a n j o u r n a l i s t , i s
the I s r a e l i Mission's f a v o r i t e v i l l a i n . About 18 months
ago Shani g a t h e r e d a number of A t a p o u r ' s a n t i - I s r a e l i
w r i t i n g s and complained t o t h e Foreign M i n i s t r y . They
promised t o r e s t r a i n Atapour b u t d i d n o t d o s o u n t i l
Shani had r e p e a t e d h i s demarche e v e r y two weeks f o r t h e
next t h r e e months. I n t h e p r o c e s s , Shani l e a r n e d t h a t
Atapour had t a k e n c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of money from t h e
S y r i a n Government and indeed was regarded by h i s c o l l e a g u e s
a s being v e r y much a "man on t h e t a k e . " Shani s a i d of a l l
t h e j o u r n a l i s t s he h a s t a l k e d w i t h over lunch o r cock-
t a i l s , o n l y Atapour h a s been u n u s u a l l y r u d e and o f f e n s i v e .
CONFIDENTIAL 2

3. S h a n i s a i d h e had t r a g e l e d a g r e a t d e a l i n I r a n
d u r i n g h i s two p l u s y e a r s h e r e b u t had a l w a y s r e g i s t e r e d
a s a n A u s t r a l i a n a t h o t e l s t o a v o i d e ~ ~ b a r r a s s m e nt to t h e
GOI. This l c d t o a discussion of basic Israeli-Iranian
c o n t a c t s . Sliani sc'id t h e s e were v e r y open and f r e e a t
most l e v e l s . I n r i i ~ l yt o o f f h a n d q u e s t i o n a b o u t h i s
t i e s w i t h t h e l o c a l J e w i s h community, he s a i d t h e r e w e r e
n o s p e c i a l e f f o r t s made. I n o u r d i s c u s s i o n of I r a n ,
however, i t "as o b v i o u s t h a t h i s c o n t a c t s i n t h e P e r s i a n
J e w i s h community a r e e x c e l l e n t .
S h a n i h i m s e l f i s 38 y e a r s o l d and h a s been i n t h e I s r a e l i
F o r e i g n in is try between 1 2 and 14 y e a r s . Hc h a s s e r v e d
i n J e r u s a l e m and s p e n t a f o u r - y e a r t o u r i n Sydney. H i s
P e r s i a n i s f a i r t o good and h e d e s c r i b e s h i m s e l f a s t h e
I M i s s i o n ' s p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r . He s a y s h e d o e s most o f
t h e c o n t a c t work w i t h t h e 8 t h P o l i t i c a l D i v i s i o n a t t h e
Foreign Ministry.
H i s w i f e , Rays, i s a n a t t r a c t i v e 30-year-old a r t h i s t o r i a n
who i s working toward a PhD i n I s l a m i c A r t a t t h e Hebrew
1% U n i v e r s i t y . They met i n J e r u s a l e m some f o u r y e a r s a g o
s h o r t l y b e f o r e coming t o I r a n . Both s p e a k e x c e l l e n t b u t
accentuated English. They h a v e no c h i l d r e n .

CONFIDENTIAL
1 (CMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: John D. Stempel, Political Officer, US Embassy
Yoram Shani, Israeli First Secretary
SUBJECT : Terrorists in Iran and Miscellaneous
DISTRIBUTION: ChargeIADCM, POL, POLIM, ECON, OR, USIS
NEAIIRN, INRIRNA, INR/OIL/B
,a
DATE & PLACE: May 18, 1977, Xanadu Restaurant, Tehran
I briefed Shani on Secretary Vance's visit and indicated the
trip had gone well. Shani said he had heard there was concern
over the Secretary's comment which suggested the US and Iran
did not agree on everything. I offered to provide him a
transcript of the press conference to illustrate that this
concern was unnecessary.
leged Terrorist Activity at Jewish Immigration Agency - -
ani said newspaper reports of an attempt by two terrorists
to shoot their way intothe Jewish ~gencywere only semi-
correct. There were two men involved and both were killed.
They had no connection with known terrorists movements, though
one had served a prison sentence, allegedly for crimes against
the state. Shani said it was not even clear that the pair were
oing to attack the Jewish migration gency. Police stopped
fhem on the street; the pair open fired and in the ensuing gun
battle one terrorist took refuge in the Jewish agency where
he was killed. The Iranians believe the pair were fanatical
right-wing Moslims who may have been casing the Jewish Agency
tor future action.
Second Terrorist Battle? --
Shani said friends of his reported
there had been a terrorist shootout May 16 somewhere in Tehran
when police cornered a group in two safe houses. The battle
lasted two hours and security forces reportedly lost seven
e n when some of the terrorists were killed, but noted his
friend said that all involved were eventually shot.
w Local Version of Rockwell Killings - Shani said a close
riend of his, who said he had talked to a peripheral member of
terrorist group which shot three -Rockwell employees in August
1976. told him the following story which is being spread by
the terrorist group:
The terrorist group was really after just one of the men -- a
CIA Major (sic) who had landed in Iran about 14 hours before
the killing, ostensibly with a complete scheme for tapping
Tehran's telephone lines. The two other people killed were
#hot because they drew revolvers, but the princiual target of
the operation was "the CIA Major". (Comment: All of the
employees killed had lived in Iran for sometime though one had
just returned the night before from leave -- none were carrying
weapons. The flaws in this story suggest an obvious propaeandam
attempt.)
Israeli Elections-- In response to my query, Shani said the
situation in Israel was wholly confused. Begin's victory took
everyone here in the Israeli mission by surprise and people
were just beginning to sort out the implications of Israel's
first real change of government since independence.
Nasser Assar-- Shani said someone close to Assar said Assar
was very bitter at his being placed on leave after his recent
press conference which reportedly annoyed the Shah. According
to Assar's friend, Assar, ForMin Khalatbary, and the Shah
discussed the press conference beforehand and Assar was given
the royal OK to discuss all the topics that he mentioned.
Apparently, Assar will be named Iranian Ambassador to Paris
to salve his irritation.
S E C R E T

SRF Memo 1177


21 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Political Section


FROM SRF , .

SUBJECT Background Information on Israeli Trade


Mission, Tehran

Following are SRF Headquarter's traces on members of


the Israeli Trade Mission:
1. Uriel L U B R A N I, born 7 October 1926, has been
unofficial ambassador to Iran since June 1973. Received BA
(Honors) from University of London. Served in Haganah
(Resistance) and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 1944-48.
Kntered Foreign Ministry (MFA) in 1950 and first served in
Middle East Division, then as private secretary to Foreign
Minister Sharett 1951-53. Assigned London 1953-56. 1957-
61 Assistant Advisor, then Advisor, on Arabic affairs to
Prime Minister (PM) Ben-Gurion. (During this period, his
unsympathetic attitude toward Arabs drew criticism from
Israeli Press at least twice.) When Ben-Gurion resigned
in 1963, was appointed Ambassador to Burma, but never assumed
his post. Stayed on as Political Secretary and Director
of PM Eshkol's private office. 1965 resigned post because
of loyalties to Ben-Gurion. 1965-68 Ambassador to Uganda,
Rwanda, and Burundi, during which time implemented Israel's
Aid Program which placed advisors in Uganda Army, Air Force,
and police; these contacts made him one of best-informed
men in Uganda, and U.S. Embassy found him to be valuable
and cooperative friend. 1968-71 Ambassador to Ethiopia.
1971-73 was on Koor Industries management board as Director
of Joint Enterprises and Projects Abroad; this board determines
basic policy for Koor Industries LTD, Israel's largest
Industrial corporation. Married to Sara nee L E V I; four
children. Said to be a capable civil servant, but a rather
tolorless person.
2. Arieh (or Aryeh) L E V I N, formerly named Lova
Lewin, born circa 1927 in Iran, is suspected Intel officer.
Apparently is former IDF officer (Lt. Col) on loan to MFA.
1963-65 First Secretary, Addis Ababa. 1966-unknown date
Charge D'affaires, Kigai-i, Rwanda. Senior Foreign Liaison
Officer since 1965. (One Arieh Lewin, probably identical,
was Chief Military Censor, IDF Intel Directorate 1968-69.)

S E C R E T
S E C R E T

Counselor, Paris, 1969-70. Described as specialist on Iran,


where he grew up. Educated in U.S. protestant mission schools.
Speaks fluent Russian (Russian Jewish background), French,
English, native Hebrew, and Arabic. Has reportedly traveled
and lived in U.S. (no dates given). Very openly pro-U.S.
while in Rwanda, was object of some Soviet interest.
3. Yoram S H A N I, born circa 1939, has been First
Secretary, Tehran, since 1973. In MFA since circa 1965.
Served in Jerusalem (dates unknown), and as Vice Consul,
Sydney, Australia for four years (circa 1969).
4. Eliezer Y 0 T V A - T (or YOTVATH) served at Israeli
Consulate New York City 1960-61 where was in charge of archives
and diplomatic couriers. Second Secretary (Admin), Rome
1968-72. In 1970 one Colonel Yotvat, Milatt in Tokyo, was
reportedly traveling to Taiwan to discuss Israeli munitions
purchases.
5. Abraham Lunz, aka Rami Luncz (or Luntz), born
February 1931 in Tiberias, Israel, has been Milatt Tehran
since 1975. Prior to this assignment, was Director of Naval
Intelligence, IDF-Navy (since 1971). Described as highly
intelligent and capable line officer, apparently has had no
formal intel training. Experienced in commo and electronics,
has served as Commander of Submarine Chaser (1964) and as
Deputy Commander, Haifa Naval Base (1971). Received officer
training at French Naval School, Brest, France (lqSO-53),
and attended Royal Navy Navigation and Direction School,
Southwick, England (1962). Speaks good French and English,
possibly some Arabic. Wife Ada, born 1932 in Haifa, was
formerly nurse in IDF (prior to 1963). His brother-in-law,
Captain Emmanuel K L E M P E R E R, was Deputy Commissioner
of Shipping in 1969. Lunz and his Deputy, Moshe Moussa
Levi (below), were both known personally and professionally
to Defense Attache's Office Tel Aviv in 1975 as outstanding
intel officers.
6. (Lt Col) Moshe Moussa L E V I was Foreign Liaison
Officer at IDF Hqs prior to Tehran assignment in 1974. In
August 1966 one Major fnu L E V Y (possibly identifiable)
was reportedly assisting Iranian instructor at newly-established
intelligence school; apparently helped arrange training
schedules and organize instructional material. This man, in
Iran on loan, was then commander of the "Direct Secret
Collection Agency" on Israel/Jordan border. Lt Col Levi, a
multi-lingual specialist (speaks Arabic, French, English,
Hebrew, and is studying Persian) was reportedly disillusioned
when he first assumed his current post, because of lack of
work. However, he soon created tasks for himself, including

60
S E C R E T
S E C R E T

-3-

developing info on Iranian order of battle and cultivating


Iranian officers. Wife is Ambassador's secretary and is a1
multi-lingual. Both have been described as personable and
well-versed in developing contacts among foreign military
~ i r c l e s , including U.S. military personnel.

SlRJECT 1C l E E ;! CE I'"." :!i'3Ã S:;,:C;LE


OF E 0. I ' d , i.;i';iiai "'~1.'., '. ,.;3 I T
IÈ I E d .IS S:. , à ˆ :.: ; ,1 L 23

if^%~!fe'-i- 10 PfcTGnfuidfe
(luserl dais sr a :'I)

S E C R E T
S E C R E T

Tehran, February 19, 1978

Dear Mr. Minister:


Unclosed is a brief account of the outcome of
Foreign Minister Dayan's recent visit to Washington,
which I would appreciate your bringing to His
Imperial Majesty the Shahanshnh Pryamehr's attention
at your earliest convenience. I shall be leavipq
Tehran for Washington the morning of February 20 to
attend the U.S.-Iranian Joint Commission Meeting.
If you or His Imperial Majesty have any questions
regarding the enclosed, or any comments you wish
conveyed to Washington, my Deputy, Jack Miklos, who
will be in charge in my absence, is au courant and
of course available. We are most appreciative to
His Majesty for the continuing exchange on this
matter and look forward to hearing the results of
His Majesty's meeting with the important visitor
expected later this week.
With high esteem and warmest personal.reqards.
Sincerely,

William Ii. Sullivan


Ambassador

His Excellency
Amir Abbas Hoveyda
Minister of the Imperial Court
Tehran

S E C R E T
S E C R E T

yan's brief visit to Washington produced no new


velopments of any moment. He continues to believe
forts should be pursued to get a declaration of
inciples agreed with Sadat but was not interested in
scussing specific language of declaration while here.
Wo did ask our help in qettinq formal meetings of
political Committee resumed, on grounds that there was
undesirable asymmetry in continued meetings of Becurity
Committee in Cairo while Political Committee was sus-
. We undertook to raise this with Egyptians but
ted we did not think he would be responsive until
b declaration of principles had been agreed to. Dayan
also, predictably, expressed Israeli concern over air-
craft sales to Saudi Arabia (very little was said about
proposed sale to Egypt).
Israelis have expressed unhappiness with our recent'
references to "withdrawal on all fronts" under UN Res.
242. Secretary pressed Dayan as to Israeli acceptance
that 242 does require withdrawal on all fronts, assuming
6qreement can be reached on border adjustments, security
arrangements and political linkage at West Bank to Jordan.
Dayan avoided direct answer, saying only that Israelis.
have "their own plan" (i.e., the "Begin Plan") for the
West Bank. From our recent exchanges with Israelis, it
11 apparent that Begin is not yet prepared to accept thÃ
principle of withdrawal from West Bank, understandable
In view of his long-held ideological commitments, but of
crucial importance if there is to be a successful
mlution to problem and any prospect of a peace settle-
nnt. We believe this will be the most difficult
decision for Israelis to face in coming weeks. We are
certain that His Majesty will recognize the significance
of this particular point.

(ABOVE TEXT FROM STATE 044031 OF 18 FEB 1978)

S E C R E T
NNNNVF
LWVV ESA158BRA08S
PP RUWHR
DE RUEHC # 8 2 0 4 / 0 1 1 3 0 0 7 4 5
ZNY SSSSS Z Z H
P 1 0 0 2 3 7 Z MAY 7 9
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RU01ZN/USMISSION S I N A I P R I O R I T Y 9 0 6 1
INFO RUOMBI/ANERBASSY ABU D H A B I P R I O R I T Y 3 9 0 2 /
RUFHRS/ANEMBASSY ALGIERS P R I O R I T Y 0 7 2 3
RUWGU/AMERBASSY ANKARA P R I O R I T Y 9 1 0 0
RUOHAT/AHEMBASSY ATHENS P R I O R I T Y 2 2 1 2
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD P R I O R I T Y 0 9 7 0
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY B R A S I L I A P R I O R I T Y 7 7 14
RUESBA/AMERBASSY BUENOS A I R E S P R I O R I T Y 4 5 0 0
RUEHEWAMEMBASSY CAIRO P R I O R I T Y 9 2 4 5
RUESRWAMENBASSY CARACAS P R I O R I T Y 6 0 8 8
RUQHOD/AHEMBASSY DOHA P R I O R I T Y 9 3 9 3
RUEHJH/ANCONSUL JERUSALEM P R I O R I T Y 0 9 1 0
RUaHKW/ANEMBASSY KUWAIT P R I O R I T Y 7 0 5 4 I
R U M C / W B A S S Y LONDON P R I O R I T Y 2260
RUFHND/AMEMBASSY MADRID P R I O R I T Y 8 174
RUWAM/ANENBASSY MANAMA P R I O R I T Y 4 5 0 0
RUEHME/AMENBASSY MEXICO P R I O R I T Y 1 2 7 3
RUflDI/AHEHBASSY MOGADISCIO P R I O R I T Y 4 6 6 0
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW P R I O R I T Y 0 7 2 2
RUflHT/AHEHBASSY MUSCAT PRIOR I T Y 7 8 2 1
RUflQG/AMEHBASSY N I C O S I A P R I O R I T Y 64 63
RUFHOK/AHEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT P R I O R I T Y 7 5 9 7
RUFNPWAMEHBASSY PAR I S P R I O R I T Y 2 3 5 6
RUDKBT/ANEMBASSY RABAT P R I O R I T Y 1586
RUQHHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN P R I O R I T Y 2 2 5 9 -
RUEHTV/AHEHBASSY T E L A V I V P R I O R I T Y 3 1 3 9
RUflT VAHEHBASSY T R I P O L I P R I O R I T Y 8662
RUDKKR/AMEHBASSY T U N I S P R I O R I T Y 3 0 6 4
RUQHNWANEHBASSY SANA P R I O R I T Y 3 6 7 6
RUEHDT/USHISSION USUN NEW YORK P R I O R I T Y 0 3 5 4
RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC P R I O R I T Y 2 1 0 6
BI
S E C R E T SECTION 0 1 OF 04 STATE 1 1 8 2 0 4 / 0 1
C.0. 12065 QDS 5/9/85 (GRIFFIN, P H I L I P J.)
TAGS8 EG, IS, PINR
SUBJECT8 INTSW 807 - HAY 9, 1979
LONDON FOR GLASPIE
P A R I S FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR C H I E F S OF M I S S I O N
1. (0 THE AUTONOMY PROPOSAL BEGIN SUBMITTED TO THE
M I N I S T E R I A L COMMITTEE L A S T WEEK THAT DEALS W I T H ISRAEL'S
STAND ON THE NATURE OF AUTONOMY I S APPARENTLY BASED ON
BE# I N ' S O R I G I N A L AUTONOMY PLAN OF DECEMBER 1977. ACCORDING
TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, THE CURRENT PROPOSAL TAKES I N T O ACCOUNT
THE CAMP D A V I D FORMULATIONS. HAARETZ COMMENTATOR
BENZIHAN S A I D BKOIU'S PLAN CONCLUDES W I T H TWO UNILATERAL
OCOARAT IOU#.
(A) THE F I R S T STATES THAT "ISRAEL WILL NEITHER TOLERATE
Â¥O PERMIT A P A L E S T I N I A N STATE EVER BEING ESTABLISHED I N
THE T E R R I T O R I E S OF JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA....
(B) THE SECOND S T A T E S THAT AT THE END OF THE F I V E YEARS
OF AUTONOMY. "ISRAEL WILL DEMAND THE REALIZATION OF I T S
UNQUESTIONABLE R I G H T S OF SOVEREIGNTY* OVER THOSE
TERRITORIES. ACCORDING T O BENZIMAN. A " D I V I D I N G L I N E "
SEPARATES T H E S E TWO DECLARATIONS FROM THE 30 CLAUSES I N
THE PROPOSAL. SUGGESTING T O H I ; THAT THEY ARE NOT PART
OF THE R A N BUT THAT THEY REPRESENT I S R A E L ' S POSITION.
2. (U) P R E S S REPORTS I N D I C A T E THAT SEVERAL OF THE
CLAUSES I N B E G I N ' S R A N HAVE AROUSED COiTSOVERSY I N THE
M I N I S T E R I A L COMMITTEE. HAWKS ALLEGEDLYARE CONCERNED
THAT TWO A R T I C L E S ARE AMBIGUOUS8 (1) UNCULTIVATED
PUBLIC LAND WILL BE UNDER I S R A E L I CONTROL"; (2) THERE
WILL BE NO EXPROPRIATION O F PRIVATE LAND ( A S DEFINED
BY THE GOVERNMENT) BUT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC NEEDS
SUCH A S THE LAYING O F RAILROADS, ROAD PAVING, AS WELL AS
TOR PLRELY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.' SOME M I N I S T E R S
REPORTEDLY CONTEND THAT T H E S E ARTICLES SHOULD BE MODIFIED
TO WARANTEE UNRESTRICTED I S R A E L I SETTLEMENT I N THE
TERRITORIES. I

1. (U) HAWKS ARE ALSO DESCRIBED A S WORRIED THAT THE


FLAN GRANTS TOO MUCH AUTHORITY TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COUNCIL.
--
HAARIV COMMENTATOR H A R I F
WELL-INFORMED OBSERVER
--
A GENERALLY
REPORTS THAT. AT THE NAY 8
MEETING O F THE M I N I S T E R I A L COMMITTEE, SEVERAL M I N I S T E R S
WERE EXPECTED T O ARGUE THAT THE PROPOSALS SHOULD STATE
THAT THE SOURCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL'S AUTHORITY
DERIVES FROM ISRAEL. ( B E G I N ' S DRAFT REPORTEDLY STATES
OILY THAT THE H U I T A R Y GOVERNMENT WILL 'WITHDRAW.")
4. (0 ALTHOUGH THE P R E C I S E CONTENT OF B E G I N ' S PROPOSALS
IS NOT YET KNOWN, THE P R E S S ACCOUNTS SEEM
AUTHORITATIVE. B E G I N ' S RESOUNDING PROCLAMATIONS THAT
ISRAEL WILL NEVER ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE AND WILL
I N S I S T THAT I S R A E L I SOVEREIGNTY BE IMPOSED I N "JUDEA,
SAMARIA. AND GAZA" AFTER THE F I V E YEARS OF AUTONOMY ARE
0-EARLY DESIGNED T O REASSURE HAWKS WITHIN HERUT AND THE
NATIONAL R E L I G I O U S PARTY (NRP).
5. (S) BEGIN'S PROBLEM AS HE MOVES INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS
ARE BOTH P O L I T I C A L AND PSYCHOLOGICAL. ON THE P O L I T I C A L
FRONT. HE WILL HAVE T O WALK A NARROW L I N E BETWEEN T h Z
DEMANDS OF INTERNAL P O L I T I C S AND THOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
THEMSELVES. B E G I N ' S D I F F I C U L T I E S WILL INCREASE AS THE
NEGOTIATIONS BECOME MORE CONCRETE. H I S EFFORTS T O BALANCE
NNNNVV ESA159BRA009
P P RUQNHR
DE R U E H C #8204/02 1300747
Z N Y SSSSS Z Z H
P 100237Z MAY 79
FM S E C S T A T E WASHDC
T O R U Q N Z N / U S M I S S I O N S I N A I P R I O R I T Y 9062
I N F O RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU D H A B I P R I O R I T Y 3903
RUFHRS/AMENBASSY A L G I E R S P R I O R I T Y 0724
RUWGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA P R I O R I T Y 9 1 0 1
RUflMAT/AMEMBASSY A T H E N S P R I O R I T Y 22 13
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD P R I O R I T Y 0971
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY B R A S I L I A P R I O R I T Y 77 15
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS A I R E S P R I O R I T Y 4501
RUEHEG/AHEMBASSY C A I R O P R I O R I T Y 9246
R U E S h S / A N E M B A S S Y CARACAS P R I O R I T Y 6089
RUQNOD/ANEMBASSY DOHA P R I O R I T Y 9394
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL J E R U S A L E M P R I O R I T Y 09 11
RUWKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT P R I O R I T Y 7055
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON P R I O R I T Y 2261
RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID P R I O R I T Y 8 175
RUadAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA P R I O R I T Y 45 0 1
RUEHRE/AMEMBASSY M E X I C O P R I O R I T Y 1274
RUWDI/AMENBASSY MOGADISCIO P R I O R I T Y 4661
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW P R I O R I T Y 0723
RUQMMT/ANEMBASSY MUSCAT P R I O R I T Y 7822
RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY N I C O S I A P R I O R I T Y 6466
RUFHOK/MIEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT P R I O R I T Y 7598
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY P A R I S P R I O R I T Y 2357
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT P R I O R I T Y 1587
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY T E H R A N P R I O R I T Y 2260
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY T E L A V I V P R I O R I T Y 3140
R U M 1 V A M E M B A S S Y T R I P O L I P R I O R I T Y 8663
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY T U N I S P R I O R I T Y 3065
RUOMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA P R I O R I T Y 3677
R U E H D T / U S M I S S I O N USUN NEW YORK P R I O R I T Y 0355
R U E A I R S / T R E A S U R Y DEPARTMENT WASHDC P R I O R I T Y 2107
HI
S E C R E T S E C T I O N 02 O F 04 S T A T E 118204/02

T H E S E C O N S I D E R A T I O N S I N E V I T A B L Y W I L L PRODUCE B A C K I N G AND
F I L L I N G . E S P E C I A L L Y WHEN C R U C I A L D E C I S I O N S ARE AT HAND.
B E G I N ' S T A S K W I L L B E C O M P L I C A T E D BY T H E S E N S I T I V I T I E S
O F H I S NRP C O A L I T I O N PARTNER ON WEST BANK I S S U E S . AND
T H E NRP HAWKS, FOR T H E I R P A R T , W I L L B E D I F F I C U L T T O L U L L
W I T H R I N G I N G D E C L A R A T I O N S I N T H E F A C E O F ANY C O N C E S S I O N S
B E G I N MIGHT B E P R E P A R E D T O MAKE T O K E E P T H E N E G O T I A T I O N S
ALIVE. B E G I N W I L L B E MINDFUL O F T H E I N S E C U R I T Y O F H I S
PARL IAMENTARY P O S I T I O N I F T H E N R P BECOMES D I S A F F E C T E D .
6. (S) B E G I N ' S D I F F I C U L T I E S W I T H T H E N R P W I L L B E
EXACERBATED B Y GUSH EMUNIM A C T I O N S . WHILE NRP DOVES
D I S L I K E T H E GUSH, T H E N R P ' S DOMINANT YOUTH F A C T I O N
E N J O Y S C L O S E T I E S W I T H T H E GUSH. T H E GUSH HAS
DEMONSTRATED AN A B I L I T Y T O P U L L T H E N R P A F T E R I T AND
W I L L EXERT HEAVY P R E S S U R E ON T H E S E T T L E M E N T I S S U E T H A T
COULD GREATLY EMBARRASS B E G I N , FOR EXAMPLE, B Y E X P A N D I N G
T H E E X I S T I N G S E T T L E M E N T E F F O R T I N HEBRON. B E G I N WOULD
HAVE D I F F I C U L T Y U S I N G F O R C E T O BLOCK LARGE-SCALE
GUSH S E T T L E M E N T ATTEMPTS.
1. (S) PSYCHOLOGICALLY, BEGIN SEEMS T O HAVE A DEEP-
SEATED NEED T O CONVINCE HIMSELF THAT HE IS NOT BETRAYING
HIS PRINCIPLES. ACCUSATIONS TO T H I S EFFECT BY FORMER
COMRADES-IN-ARMS AND CLOSE ASSOCIATES AROUSE F E E L I N G S
OF GUILT AND ANXIETY AND A NEED T O DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
CHARGES ARE FALSE.
8. (U) ON MAY 8 AP REPORTED THAT THE I S R A E L I CABINET
HAD VOTED T O S E T U P TWO NEW SETTLEMENTS I N THE WEST BANK.
A CABINET COMMUNIQUE S A I D DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YADIN
OPPOSED THE MOVE. I S R A E L I RADIO REPORTED A NUMBER OF
MINISTERS JOINED YADIN AND OTHERS ABSTAINED BUT THE
ACTUAL VOTE TALLY WAS NOT ANNOUNCED.
9. (U) JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED THAT THE ALIGNMENT
M O T I O N I N THE KNESSET WOULD SUBMIT A NO CONFIDENCE
MOTION .ECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RELEASE O F PALESTINIAN
QUERRILLAS I N EXCHANGE FOR AN I S R A E L I SOLDIER TWO MONTHS
AGO. THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF
C R I T I C I S M S I N C E AN I S R A E L I PAPER PUBLISHED THE NAMES OF
THE P A L E S T I N I A N S WHO WERE RELEASED AND THE NAMES WERE
LINKED WITH S P E C I F I C TERRORIST I N C I D E N T S SUCH A S HIJACKING*
10. (0 EGYPT-ISLAMIC CONFERENCE: THE EGYPTIAN
FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS RELEASED A STATEMENT ABOUT THE
D E C I S I O N OF THE PREPARATORY COMHITTEE FOR THE I S L A M I C
FOREIGN M I N I S T E R S CONFERENCE TO RECOMMEND THAT THE
CONFERENCE SUSPEND EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP I N THE ORGANIZATION.
EGYPT'S MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (HENA) SAYS THAT THE
FOREIGN M I N I S T R Y "HAS EXPOSED THE MANEUVERS CARRIED OUT
BY THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT T O PREVENT EGYPT FROM P A R T I C I -
PATING I N THE CONFERENCE. MENA REPORTS THAT THE STATE-
KENT CONDEMNED MOROCCO'S ATTITUDE AND WARNED THAT
EVERYONE WHO HAS PARTICIPATED I N T H I S "RASH ACTION" MUST
BEAR THE CONSEQUENCES. ACCORDING T O REUTER, THE
STATEMENT ALSO CLAIMED THAT EGYPT HAS RECEIVED O F F I C I A L
WORD FROM MOROCCO THAT THE PLANE CARRYING THE EGYPTIAN
DELEGAT ION WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED T O LAND. OVER THE
WEEKEND EGYPT,AN O F F I C I A L S HAD RECEIVED A MOROCCAN ENVOY.
WHO THE EGYPTIANS BELIEVED WAS TRYING T O COORDINATE
STRATEGY TO PREVENT EGYPT'S SUSPENSION. THE EGYPTIANS
ON THAT B A S I S AGREED TO POSTPONE SENDING THEIR DELEGATION
TO FEZ I N THE B E L I E F THAT T H I S WOULD AID THE MOROCCAN
STRATEGY. THE EGYPTIANS EVIDENTLY NOW B E L I E V E THEY WERE
DOUBLE CROSSED BECAUSE THE MOROCCANS WISHED T O ENSURE
A NON-DIVISIVE CONFERENCE.

11. (U) PLO-ISRAEL: ADDRESSING A P A L E S T I N I A N COMMANDO


GRADUATION CEREMONY ON MAY 8, ARAFAT PROMISED T O S T E P UP
GUERRILLA ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND CALLED FOR STRONG
BT
NNNNVV ISA\60BRAB08
P P RuQNM
DE RUEHC <8204/oi 1300748
Z N Y SSSSS Z Z H
P 100237Z MAY 79
FT1 S E C S T A T E WASHDC
T O R U a i Z N / U S C U S S I O N S I N A I P R I O R I T Y 9063
I N F O RUQMBI/ANEMBASSY ABU D H A B I P R I O R I T Y 3904
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY A L G I E R S P R I O R I T Y 0725
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA P R I O R I T Y 9102
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY A T H E N S P R I O R I T Y 2214
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD P R I O R I T Y 0972
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY B R A S I L I A P R I O R I T Y 77 16
RUESBA/AMENBASSY BUENOS A I R E S P R I O R I T Y 4502
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY C A I R O P R I O R I T Y 9247
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS P R I O R I T Y 6090
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA P R I O R I T Y 9395
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM P R I O R I T Y 0912
R U W K W / A h E M B A S S Y KUWAIT P R I O R I T Y 7056
RUDTC/AM@USSY LONDON P R I O R I T Y 2262
RUFHND/AMEMBASSY MADRID P R I O R I T Y 8 176
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA P R I O R I T Y 45 02
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY M E X I C O P R I O R I T Y 1275
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY M O G A D I S C I O P R I O R I T Y 4662
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW P R I O R I T Y 0724
RUQNMT/ANENBASSY MUSCAT P R I O R I T Y 7823
RUQflQG/AMEMBASSY N I C O S I A P R I O R I T Y 6467
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT P R I O R I T Y 7599
RUFNPS/ANEMBASSY P A R I S P R I O R I T Y 2358
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT P R I O R I T Y 1588
RUQNHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN P R I O R I T Y 2261
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY T E L A V I V P R I O R I T Y 3 14 1
RUQMTI/ANEMBASSY T R I P O L I P R I O R I T Y 8664
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY T U N I S P R I O R I T Y 3066
RUQNNS/AMEMBASSY SANA P R I O R I T Y 3678
R U E H D T / U S M I S S I O N USUN NEW YORK P R I O R I T Y 0356
R U E A I R S / T R E A S U R Y DEPARTMENT WASHDC P R I O R I T Y 2108
BT
S E C R E T S E C T I O N 03 O F 04 S T A T E 118204/03
ARAB A C T I O N A G A I N S T T H E US. HE ASKED T H E I S L A M I C
CONFERENCE M E E T I N G T H I S WEEK T O ANSWER T H E US " C O N S P I R A C Y
A G A I N S T PEACE."
12. (U) LEBANON: I S R A E L I P L A N E S S T A G E D TWO R A I D S I N
SOUTHERN LEBANON ON MAY 8 , MARKING T H E T H I R D S T R A I G H T
DAY O F A I R S T R I K E S A G A I N S T WHAT T H E I S R A E L I S D E S C R I B E
A S " T E R R O R I S T CONCENTRATIONS." A P QUOTED L E B A N E S E
GOVERNMENT A U T H O R I T I E S S A Y I N G T H R E E C I V I L I A N S WERE
WOjHDED I N ONE ATTACK.
13. < U 1 ON HAY 8 T H E M I D D L E E A S T R E P O R T E R S A I D
THAT LEBANON "WAS SHAKEN" B Y B E G I N ' S S T A T E M E N T S WHICH
COULD HERALD T H E B E G I N N I N G O F A " B I G BLOW UP.
A S S A F I R QUOTED GOVERNMENT S O U R C E S S A Y I N G T H E B E G I N
O F F E R T O N E G O T I A T E W I T H T H E L E B A N E S E ENCOURAGED HADDAD
T O CONTINUE THREATENING THE VILLAGES I N THE SOUTH I N
P R E P A R A T I O N FOR AN ALL-OUT I S R A E L I M I L I T A R Y S T R I K E .
SEVERAL P A P E R S C A R R I E D P R I M E M I N I S T E R HUSS' STATEMENT
THAT B E G I N ' S O F F E R WAS "BLACKMAIL." A S O F THE STH,
EMBASSY B E I R U T REPORTED. T H E R I G H T I S T P R E S S HAD MADE NO
COMMENT ON B E G I N ' S S P E E C H .
14. (C) YEMEN: T H E F - 5 PROGRAM I N T H E YEMEN A R A B I C
R E P U B L I C (YAR) U S I N G U S P L A N E S AND T A I W A N E S E P I L O T S , ALL
M I D FOR BY T H E S A U D I S I S O F F T O A P R O B L E M - F I L L E D AND
KMBARRASSING S T A R T , ACCORDING T O OUR EMBASSY I N SANA.
t l X O F T H E 16 F - 5 s D E S T I N E D FOR T H E YWAR HAVE A R R I V E D
ALONG W I T H AN 81 MEMBER T A I W A N E S E TEAM O F P I L O T S AND
bUPPORT PERSONNEL. T H E F - 5 s HAVE NOT B E E N O F F T H E GROUND
U N C E T H E I R A R R I V A L A P R I L 30. T H E T A I W A N E S E TEAM HAS
INCOUNTERED NUMEROUS O P E R A T I O N A L PROBLEMS I N C L U D I N G
M I S S I N G EQUIPMENT AND LANGUAGE D I F F I C U L T I E S ( T H R E E
SPEAK E N G L I S H AND NONE S P E A K A R A B I C ) . NECESSARY
COMMUNICATIONS AND F L I G H T CONTROL PROCEDURES HAVE NOT BEEN
INSTITUTED. T H E E M B A S S Y COMMENTS THAT T I M E AND E X P E R I E N C E
M Y CORRECT SOME O F T H E PROBLEMS BUT I N T H E MEANTIME,
WORD ON T H E S I T U A T I O N HAS S P R E A D AND W I L L B E AN
INCREASING P O L I T I C A L EMBARRASSMENT FOR T H E U S AND T H E
SAUDIS. S O V I E T M I G S F L Y I N G FROM T H E YAR C I T Y O F
W D E I D A H HAVE MADE D A I L Y P A S S E S OVER T H E C A P I T A L EVERY
DAY S I N C E T H E F - 5 s A R R I V E D AND HAVE, ON AT L E A S T ONE
OCCASION, BUZZED T H E F - 5 s ' P A R K I N G AREA, A DEMONSTRATION
TOR AT L E A S T SOME Y E M E N I S O F T H E B E N E F I T S O F S O V I E T
VS. U S M I L I T A R Y S U P P L Y PROGRAMS.
19. (U) FRANCE-PEACE TREATY: FRENCH F O R E I G N M I N I S T E R
fflANCOIS-PONCET I N A MAY 3 A D D R E S S T O T H E N A T I O N A L
ASSEMBLY S A I D T H A T , "THE P O S I T I O N O F T H E FRENCH GOVERNMENT
I S N E I T H E R ONE O F H O S T I L I T Y NOR O F O P P O S I T I O N ( T O T H E
COYPI I A N - I S R A E L I T R E A T Y ) . T H E P O S I T I O N R E C O G N I Z E S THAT
(HE AGREEMENT HAS C O S T A GREAT D E A L O F E F F O R T AND THAT
I7 S I G N I F I E S A R E A L D E S I R E . I T CANNOT F A I L T O RECORD,
MOUEVER, WHAT I S M I S S I N G I N T H I S AGREEMENT I N ORDER T O
IRULY O P E N T H E P A T H T O A J U S T AND DURABLE PEACE. AT
IHE HEART O F R E L A T I O N S BETWEEN I S R A E L AND T H E ARAB
COUNTRIES T H E R E I S T H E PROBLEM O F T H E P A L E S T I N I A N P E O P L E
OF WHICH T H E M A J O R I T Y HAS KNOWN E X I L E AND W H I C H
A S P I R E S T O A HOMELAND. T H E R E W I L L NOT B E A C O R R E H E N S I V E
QTTLEMENT, AND T H U S NOT A DURABLE P E A C E , I F T H I S PROBLEM
I S 0 D O E S NOT F I N D A J U S T SOLUTION...." THE FOREIGN
M I N I S T E R NOTED T H A T N E G O T I A T I O N S WERE T O B E G I N ON T H E
P A L E S T I N I A N I S S U E BUT S A I D T H E " O B J E C T I V E I S NARROW AND
-DEFINED."
16. (U) FRANCE-IRAQ: A WESTERN NEWS S E R V I C E QUOTES
fKENCH O F F I C I A L S A S HAVING S A I D ON MAY 8 I N P A R I S THAT
UAB W I L L SOON S I G N A D O L S 1.5 B I L L I O N D E A L T O P U R C H A S E
la0 M I R A G E F-1 FIGHTER-BOMBERS AND OTHER S O P H I S T I C A T E D
ARMS FROM FRANCE I N EXCHANGE F O R O I L . FINAL NEGOTIATIONS
a
a
04
NNNNVV ESA161BRA010
P P RUWHR
DE R U E H C # 8 2 0 4 / 0 4 1 3 0 0 7 5 0
Z N Y SSSSS Z Z H
P 1 0 0 2 3 7 Z MAY 7 9
FM S E C S T A T E WASHDC
T O RUffl-IZN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9 0 6 4 1~ K W ?-
I N F O R U Q N B I / A N E N B A S S Y ABU D H A B I P R I O R I T Y 3905
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY A L G I E R S P R I O R I T Y 0726
RUQMGU/AMENBASSY ANKARA P R I O R I T Y 9 1 0 3
RUQNAT/ANEMBASSY ATHENS P R I O R I T Y 22 15
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD P R I O R I T Y 0973
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY B R A S I L I A P R I O R I T Y 77 17
RUESBA/ANEMBASSY BUENOS A I R E S P R I O R I T Y 4503
RUEHEG/ANEMBASSY C A I R O P R I O R I T Y 9248
RUESRS/AMENBASSY CARACAS P R I O R I T Y 609 1
RU@lOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA P R I O R I T Y 9396
RUEHJM/AflCONSUL J E R U S A L E M P R I O R I T Y 0913
RUaMKW/ANEMBASSY KUWAIT P R I O R I T Y 7057
RUDTC/ANEHBASSY LONDON P R I O R I T Y 2263
RUFHND/ANENBASSY MADRID P R I O R I T Y 8 177
RUWAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA P R I O R I T Y 4503
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY M E X I C O P R I O R I T Y 1276
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY M O G A D I S C I O P R I O R I T Y 4663
RUEHNO/ANENBASSY MOSCOW P R I O R I T Y 0725
RUOMMT/AMBHSSY MUSCAT P R I O R I T Y 7824
RUaMQG/ANEMBASSY N I C O S I A P R I O R I T Y 6468
RUFHOK/AWENBASSY NOUAXCHOTT P R I O h l T Y 7600
RUFNPS/AMENBASSY P A R I S P R I O R I T Y 235 9
RUDKBT/ANEflBASSY RABAT P R I O R I T Y 1589
RU@lHR/ANEHBASSY TEHRAN P R I O R I T Y 2262
RUEHTV/ANENBASSY T E L A V I V P R I O R I T Y 3 142
R U W T I/AMEMBASSY T R I P O L I P R I O R I T Y 8665
RUDKKR/ANEMBASSY T U N I S P R I O R I T Y 3067
RUOMNS/ANEMBASSY SANA P R I O R I T Y 3679
R U E H D T / U S M I S S I O N USUN NEW YORK P R I O R I T Y 0357
R U E A I R S / T R E A S U R Y DEPARTMENT WASHDC P R I O R I T Y 2109
BT
S E C R E T F I N A L S E C T I O N O F 04 S T A T E 118204/04
WERE HELD D U R I N G I R A Q I D E F E N S E M I N I S T E R T A L F A H ' S R E C E N T
V I S I T T O P A R I S , AND T H E HEAD O F T H E F R E N C H D E F E N S E
M I N I S T R Y ' S D I V I S I O N FOR I N T E R N A T I O N A L ARMS S A L E S
R E P O R T E D L Y W I L L G O T O BAGHDAD T O S I G N T H E CONTRACT. VANCE
4

VV ESA 194BRA960
DP R UCK HR Y J u ~ i i 11' 24;
OE RUEHC # 5 9 4 6 / 0 1 2 0 0 0 6 1 1
ZNY ccccc ZZH
1 S 2 1 5 1 Z JUL 7 9
FK SECSTATE WASHDC
TO INTSLV COLLECTIVE P R I O R I T Y
INFO RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC P R I O R I T Y ? 4 7 4
fUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
"T
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION E l O F ¥V S T A T E 1 8 5 9 4 6 / 0 1
E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 GDS 7/18/85 (ROBERTS, SAMUEL)
TAGS: EG, IS, PINR
SUBJECTt INTSUM P55 - JULY 18, 1979
LO-DO- FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDR"SSEES FOR C H I E F S OF M I S S I O N
1. (U) ISRAEL: I S R A E L ' S T W O L A R G E S T KIBBUTZ
FEDERATIONS, BOTH AFFILIATED WITH FACTIONS OF THE LABOR
PARTY, HAVE ANNOUNCED PLANS TO MERGE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
2. (C) A C I A ANALYSIS NOTES THE FOLLOWING: THE MERGER,
WHICH WILL BRING TOGETHER THE KIBBUTZ MEUHAD--AFFILIATED
WITH LABOR'S AHDUT AVODA FACTION--AND THE MAPAI-BASED IHUD
HAKVUTZOT VEHAKIBUTZIM, WILL GIVE THE SMALL BUT WELL-
ORGANIZED KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT A MAJOR VOICE I N LABOR
DECISIONMAKING. FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON, WHO
HAS CLOSE T I E S TO THE-MEUHAD MAY WANT TO USE THE KIBBUTZ
UNION AS A BASE FROM WHICH TO CHALLEMGE LABOR PARTY
C H I E F ^HIMON PERES. MOST KIBBUTZ POLITICAL LEADERS,
HOWEVER, ARE BIDING TH-IR TIME AND CONSOLIDATING THEIR
T I E S WITH OTHER SEGMENTS O F THE PARTY BEFORE COMMITTING
THEMSELVES I N THE INCREASINGLY INTENSE LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE
DEVELOPING BETWEEN ALLON, PERES, AND FORMER PRIME MINISTER
YITZHAK RABIN.
3. (U) THE TWO KIBBUTZ MOVEMENTS HAD OEEN SEPARATE
SINCE 1 9 5 1 , WHEN IHUD S P L I T FROM MEUHAD I N A 0ITTER D I S P U T E
OVER IDEOLOGY. THE D I F F E R E N C E S HAVE BLURRED OVER THE
YEARS, AM) THE R I S E TO POWE OF A NEW GENERATION O F
KIBBUTZ LEADERS NOT INVOLVED I N THE-ORIGINAL D I S P U T E MADE
THE MERGER ACCEPTABLE TO OOTH MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE
KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT CONSTITUTES LESS-THAN 3 PERCENT OF
I ' T A W L ' S POPULATION, I T S FINANCIAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, AND
MANPOWER R E S O t R C E S CAN 3E CRITICALLY IMPORTANT I N NATIONAL
ELECTIONS.
4. ( U ) C FWIMARY TA'iK OF THE NEW FEDERATION WILL BE THE
REBUILD ING OF I A R O R ' q ¥"OC I'iT IDFOI OGY. IHUD SECRETARY
PUSSA HARIF TOLD R F P O R T t R P HF WANTED TO UqE THE FEDERATION
T O BUILD A W I M R E f F N T A - 7 O C I A L I S f l FOR THE KZS." MOST
K,BBUTZ NEMBERS HAVE MADE N O ?FCRrT OF TH-IR B E L I E F THAT
LABOR LOST TH" 1 9 7 7 ELECT ION HFCAllPE THE PARTY PLAYED DOWN
I T c F O C I A L I S T IDEOLOGY AND /iCr.UIRFD THE IMAGE OF A
COLORLESS, CORR UP1 POL I T I CAL MACHI NF. A MORE IDEOLOGICALLY
ORIENTED PARTY, KIBRIITL LEADERr " l I N T A l N , WOULD GO A
LONG WAY TOWARD WINNING; PACK THE WB'-TANTIAL NUMmERS-OF
KIBBUTZ MEMBERS WHO DEFECTED TO THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT
FOR CHANGE OR <HELL1 1 4 THE 1977 E1"CTIONS.
5. (U) KIBBUTZ L E M F R F P L ~ OWANT A N FND TO "HOT THEY
CflLL THE L I K I D ' S MIC;GI'TDED :ETTLEvENT P O L I C I E S . SEVERAL
KIBBUT, LEADERS SPOKE 0"T AT THE RFCENT FEDERATION
CONVENTIONS AGAINST "RIME MINIST-R B E G I N ' S P O L I C Y O F
S E T T I N G UP AND FUNDING SETTLEMENT? IN POPULATED ARAB AREAS
O F THE WEST BANK, W H I L E , ACCORDING TO KIBBUTZ MEMBERS,
DELIBERATELY U;DER FUND ING KIBBUTZ SETTLEMENTS IN THE
GALILEE. WHILE OPPOSING THE P O L I C Y O F SETTLEMENTS-IN
POPULATED AREAS O F THE WEST BANK, THE KIBBUTZ LEADERS
MADE IT-CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD CONTIM DNCBPUSH FOR S E T T L F -
P E N T S ALONG THE JORDAN R I F T AND I N THE G0LftN.- ' A R D L I d E
KIBBUTZ LEADERS, MOSTLY FROM THE I H U D , ENDORSED A
RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ANNEXATION O F THE GOLAN. POLICY
TOWARDS THE GOLAN, WHERE IHLD AND MEuHAD HAVE NUMEROUS
SETTLEMENTS, I S L I K E L Y TO BE A CONTENTIOUS I S S U E I N THE
PROPOSED FEDERATION. MORE D O V I S H MEMBERS WA;T TO AVOID
CALLING FOR ANNEXATION OF THE AREA, WHILE OTHERS ARE
CONCERNED THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT MAY MAKE S I G N I F I C A N T
CONCESSIONS T H - R E AND WANT THE FEDERATION ON RECORD AS
OPPOSING ANY T E R R I T O R I A L PULLBACK.
6. ( C ) THE NEW KIBBUTZ FEDERATION I S L I K E L Y TO PLAY
A MAJOR ROLE I N THE STRUGGLE NOW DEVELOPING FOR LABOR
PARTY LEADERSHIP. BUOYED BY POLLS SHOWING LABOR
POPULARITY ON THE INCREASE, ALLOH AND R A B I N HAVE BEGUN
L I N I N G UP SUPPORT FOR THE OCTOBER PARTY CONVENTION, AT
WHICH THEY APPARENTLY PLAN TO CHALL:NGE SHIMON P E R E S FOR
CONTROL O F THE PARTY. ALLON, WHO I S A MAJOR ARCHITECT
OF THE PLANNED KI 0BUTZ MERGER, MAY BE HOPING THAT H I S
BACKGROU4D A S A KIBBUTZ LEADER CAN BE PARLAYED INTO
SUPPORT FOR H I S CHALLENGE TO PERES. THE YOUNGER
GENERATION O F KIBBUTZ LEADERSÑINCLUDIN H A R I F WHO APPEARS
TO BE DEVELOPING A STRONG FOLLOWING--HAVE MADE I T CLEAR
THAT THEY WANT T O REDUCE THE ROLE O F THE OLD-STYLE
P O L I T I C S ; I N LABOR AND ARE NOT EAGER TO SUPPORT THE
61-YEAR-OLD ALLON* S R A N S . MOST KIBBUTZ MEMBERS
APPARENTLY BACK PERES.
7. (C) THE P O L I T I C A L INFLUENCE OF THE KIBBUTZ UNION
WILL PROBABLY BE ENHANCED BY A GROWING ALLIANCE BETWEEN
I T S L E A D E R S H I P AND A FACTION LED BY CHAIRMAN O F THE WARD
OF D I R E C T O R S O F BANK HAOPOLIM, YAACOV LEVINSON. LEVINSON,
A 47-YEAR-OLD A C T I V I S T WHO SOME OBSERV R S B E L I E V E HAS A
RT
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1 INT SUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Â¥IF RUEATRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2 4 7 5
K K J C S / D O D / I S A WASHDC PRIORITY
11
0 N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 1 8 5 9 4 6 / 0 2
O D CHANCE OF EVENTUALLY BECOMING PRIME MINISTER.
IVELOPED CLOSE T I E S WITH THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT DURING
I ? 1 0 YEARS IN IHUD KIBBUTZ ROSH HANIKRA AND THROUGH H I S
IADERSHIP OF THE MAPAI YOUTH MOVEMENT. HE AND HARIF
" E LONGTIME POLITICAL ALLIES. THE KIBBUTZ-LEVINSON
L L IANCE HAS WIDENED IN RECENT MONTHS TO INCLUDE SOME
HBAN POWERBROKERS L I K E NA'AMAT (PIONEER WOMEN) SECRETARY
&NEPAL NAVA ARAD AND JERUSALEM LABOR PARTY BOSS UZI
# Â ¥ R A M THE COMBINATION O F A KIBBUTZ UNION, URBAN PARTY
'1SSES.-AND LEVINSON'S BACKERS COULD MAKE T H I S DEVELOPING
1 L IANCE THE MOST IMPORTANT POWER 0ASE IN THE LABOR
'ARTY AS IT PREPARES FOR THE 1 9 8 1 KNESSET ELECTIONS.

1 8. (LOU) ISRAEL-COURT-SETTLEMENTSt ISRAELI LAWYER


TL ICIA LANGER. WHO I S REPRESENTING PALESTINIANS I N TWO
ASES IN WHICH ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT SEIZURE OF PRIVATE LAND
< THE WEST BANK I S CLAIMED, TOLD OUR CONSULATE GENERAL
U JERUSALEM THAT THE CASES WERE BEING BROUGHT FORWARD ON
HE B A S I S O F INTERNATIONAL DECLARATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
, HE QUESTION OF PRIVATE 0WMERS;IP AND USE O F LANDS WOULD
1 r - i ~ BE NEGLECTED. HOWEVER, SHE SAID. I N THE CASE OF A
BANNED NEW SETTLEMENT NEAR BETHLEHEM, MS. LANGER SAID
' 1 I S TO BE SETTLED BY AMERICAN JEWS INCORPORATED I N A
IMPANY KNOWN-AS THE "JUDEA AND SAMARIA DEVELOPMENT
1RPORAT ION."
10. (W ISRAEL-SETTLEMENTSt JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED
OM JULY I ? THAT TWO-NAHALS <PARA-RILITARY SETTLEflENIS>
WERE "CIVILIANIZED- LAST YEAR BUT THE CHANGE I N STATUS
WAS NOT PUBLICIZED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM "A HIGHER
AUTHORITY. ODE SETTLEMENT WAS IN GAZA AND THE OTHER
ON THE WEST BANK. T H I S ALLEGATION WAS MADE BY REPRESENTA-
T I V E S OF THE AGRICULTURAL UNION AT A NEWS CONFERENCE I N
TEL AVIV. THEY ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF NOT DOING
ENOUGH FOR THE DEVELOPMENT-OF SETTLEMENTS.
11. (ID BEGIN-SADAT-KNESSET t I D F RADIO REPORTED
J H - Y 17 ON BEGIN'S REMARKS T O A KNESSET COMMITTEE ON H I S
TALKS WITH SADAT. BEGIN SAID THE TWO AGREED THAT ISRAELI
TANKERS WOULD LOAD UP WITH O I L FROM THE ALMA FIELD THE
DAY AFTER THE FIELDS ARE RETURNED TO EGYPT. BEGIN SAID
HE AND SADAT HAD AGREED T O DISAGREE ON SETTLEMENTS. ON
AUTONOMY, HE SAID ISRAEL NEEDS THE COOPERATION O F WEST
BANK AND GAZA RESIDENTS T O ENSURE THEM FULL AUTONOMY
BUT IT WILL NOT FORCE THEM T O TAKE PART I N ELECTIONS.
AT ANY RATE, BEGIN SAID, THERE WILL BE NO PLO STATE I N
"JUDEA AND SAMARIA. BEGIN SAID HE AND SADAT ARE NOT
ATTENDING THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE MEETING I N OCTOBER BUT
ARE SENDING THEIR FOREIGN MIHISTERS.
12. (U) KUWAIT-US ENE-GY PLAN:- KUWAIT'S MINISTER OF
STATE FOR CABINET AFFAIRS JULY 17 SAID H I S GOVERNMENT
WELCOMES PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY PLAN AND HOPES FOR
CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OIL PRODUCING AND
COÈiZUMIN NATIONS ON ENERGY MATTERS. THE MINISTER SAID
KUWAIT ALSO WAS PREPARED T O CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE EFFORTS
T O FIND SUBSTITUTES FOR OIL. VANCE
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ET
F E C R R T SECTION 21 OF a2 STATE 231959/01

E.0. 12065 GDS 6/3/95 (MONTVILLE. JOSEPH V.)


TAGS: EG, IS, PINS
SL'PJECT: INTSOM P f - ABGUST ¥' 1075

LONDON TOR GLASPIE


PASIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPFY
DOF/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTKER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION
(PARAGRAPHS,1-5 SECRET)
1. PROSPECTS TOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT:
APART FROM A CHANCE IN TH-' GOVERNMENT RESULTING FROM TH2
DEATH, INCAPACITATION, OR HPSIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER
TEGIN, TEE3E IS SOME CHANCE TRAT THE GOVERNMENT MIGHT FALL
SUDDfNLY. THIS WCULS OCCUP IF THE GOVERNMENT LOST A VOTE
OF CONFIDEMCS IN THE K*iE??ST, OR IF IT RESIGNED IN ANTI-
CIPATION OF SDCF A DEFFAT. IS THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE. SUCH A COLLAPSE PROBABLY WOULD
Â¥) FOLLOWED BY NEW ELFCTIONS. RATHER THAN BY A REFORMATION
OF TEE COALITION OR THÂ ESTABLISBMtNt OF A LABOX-LED
CABINET.
CABINET.
2. THE1F ARE THREE SETS OF ISSUES THAT COULD WW ABOUT
.
THE GOVERNMENT'S fALL: ?3LIGION. THE E C O N O M , AND
FOREIGN POLICT
3. RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES ARF HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE IN
ISRAEL. NOT ONLY DOES TEE COALITION DEPEND 709 SURVIVAL
ON THE VOTES OF TEE RBLIGIOUS PARTIESÑTR NATIONAL
RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP) AND AGUDAT ISRAEL--THERE ARE
SIGNIFICANT MILITANT SECULARIST COMPONENTS OF THE COALI-
TION TEAT ARE UNFRIENDLY TO THE ORTRODOX. (THE LIBERAL
1 PARTY AND TEE DEMOCSATIC MOVEMSNT, IN PARTICULAR. ART
^ STRONGLT SECULAPIST IN TON?.) IN ADDITION, ULTRA-
OPTPJPOX ELEhENTF. UFICF AR7 INTERESTED SOLELT IN M3VING
IS3AEL TOVASD A %0?S ORTHOEG^ STANCE. EXERT CONSTANT
PRESSURE ON THE 3ELISIOUS PARTIES. AS A RESULT. A
D01INO REACTIOt;. 5ESINNING WITH PCBLIC PRESSURE FROM
THE ULTRA-OPTEODOX NATURE1 'CA?TA AND CULMINATING IN THE
WITHDRAWAL OF TFF RELIGIOUS PARTISE FROM THE COALITION.
COULD QOICELY COME ABOUT.
4. fCONOMIC ISSUE? ALSO COULD PROVlDt; A POLITICAL
FLASP POINT. PUBLIC DISSATIS*ACTION VITF TFE B3GIM
GOVSPMMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICIES IS YIRRORED WITBIh THE
tNESSET AND EVEN WITHIN THF COALITION. THE NUMSI!OGS
OPPONENTS OF IPS PRESSNT GOVTRNMENT COULD ?ST A VOTE ON
AN ECONOMIC ISSUE AS A PRETEXT FOR VOTING AGAINST THE
CABINET. OR THST COULD ABSTAIN OR ABSENT TKEMSSLVES AT A
CRITICAL MOMENT.
5. FINALLY. CONCESSIONS ON SENSITIVE AUTONOMT-RELATED
i ISSUES COULD BE THE STRAW THAT B R E A K S THIS GOVERNMENT'S
BACK. TEE ABSTENTION ON ABSENCE OF SEVERAL LIKUB AND NRP
tNESSET MEYBEES ON A CLOSE VOTE COULD SPELL THE END FOR
THE CABINET.
6. (0) REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S NT TIMES INTEPVIEU:
ISRAELI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TADIN SAID ANT ATTEMPT TO
CEANGF TIN RESOLUTION 242 IN OBDFR TO CIRCUMVENT PLO
OPPOSITION WOULD BE A GRAVE OBSTACLE TO ADVANCING
NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD PVACE. COMPARISON OF T H ~ A L E S T I N I A N -
PROBLEM T O I R F US CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT WAS UNFOHTUNATE.
TADIH SAID.
(A) JUSTICE MINISTER TAMIR SAID THE "OIL ISSUE" PROVPTSD
THE US T O TRT AID ACCELERATE TEF TALKS. HE SAID AN
ISRAELI " N A T I O N A L CONSENSUS WOULD RFSIST ATTEMPTS TO 30
BEYOND ADMINISTXATIVE APTONCMY FOR PALESTINIANS.
(B) A TEDIOr AEARONOT ARTICLE SAID THE US POLICY 0 1
NEGOTIATIONS KITH THE PLO WAS OF GRATE CONC3SN TO
ISRAEL. THE PAPER WONDZSS IF ISRAEL IS R33U?STED TO
RFCOSNIZE h PLO STATE.
( C ) MAARIV SAID THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS "ARE SUPPLYING
AN IDEOLOGICAL Fn^IDATIOXi FOR PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IN THE
AOTONOMT TALKS.
(D) VEST BANT PSESS RBACTION WAS MIXKD WITE ONE MODERATE
PAPIS ENCOURIMHD BT TEE PRISIDSNT'S UOBDS A N D TWO OTHER
PAPERS REJSCTING THE INTERTIEM.
. (C)
nfIll
BUW-AUTONOMY TALK?: ISRAELI INTERIOR MINISTER
HIAVILT CP.ITICIZED WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS T3E US
MLF! IN TEE LAST BOUND OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS IN REPORTIN3
'3 TTf MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTONOMY TALKS. HE
" A R C E D INADMISSABLE U S " I N T ~ ~ E N T I O NI"N THE T A L K S A N D
IKPQESSED ASTONISHMENT AT T3E O N E - S I D E D PROPOSALS
'RE LJS ALL#GEDLT INl'RODUCED. WE ARE NOW ENTERING. A
I N E F I E L D , B U R G SAID. BE fEITERATED HIS UNDERSTANDING
T P / T THE US COULD MAKE PROPOSALS ONLT IF NSGOTIATIONS
IjFACSED A DEADLOCiC. EMBASSY TEL AÈI REPORTS THAT
ISRAELI PRESS IS WOT CHALLINGINS BURG'S VERSION OF THE
TALKS. THE EMBASSY ALSO COMMENTS THAT KITH AUTONOMf
IT
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INTO RUEATRS/ THEASURT DEPARTMENT WASHX P R I O R I T Y 2587
RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC PRIORITY
BT
S E C R I T TINAL SECTION OT 82 STATE 2 d l - > 5 9 / 0 2
T S L F S ( W T I N U DOWN TO SUBSTANCE* I S R A E L I C R I T I C I S M IS
PROBABLY U N d l O I D A B L l UNLESS m US SISS CHOOSES TO BEMAIN
!'OMPI.ETELT PASSIVI.
c. (V} ISRHL-POLL: HA'ARETZ REPORTS TEAT PRIME MINISTER
P S C I - ~ ' S POPULARITY CONTINUES TO B S LOW. I N THE POLL
8 q?L? I N JOLT ONLY 4 3 PERCENT O F THE RESPONDENTS EXPHESSBD
S,!TISFACTION WITH BEGIN AS PRIME MINISTER AS OPPOSED
TO c^ PERCENT A YEAX AGO AND 4 0 . W E R C E N T LAST MONTE.
9. ( L O U ) PLO-INTERNAI P O L I T I C S ; lEUI?R HSPOrlTS TBAT TEB
FOPULA? TROUT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE ( P F L ? )
ONDE1) GEO5GE BASBASH 'dOUT,3 ASAI?.' ASSPV? A SEAT ON TUB PLO'S
15-MAN EXSCDIIVE CO'IMITT?E A M E R AS ABSENCE OF ALMOST F I V E
YEASS. THE 3 E P L A C S M W O f "US LATE SXCOM1 MEPBES
@ZURAIRMUHSIN rfOL'LD bLLEGZDLY PROVIDE TRi; OPPOATUNITT
TO RSST??!JCTORE IBT EXBCOTIVE COMMITTEE. ?EUTZX
FURTFER REPORTS THAT T d 0 SMALL I I S Q I - 3 A C t E D 2XT3EMIST
P A L ~ S I I N I A N FACTIONS THE POPOLAR STRIGSLE FRONT AND THE
P A L F S T I N E L I F E R A T I O N ' F ~ O N T M I G E T A L S O R E C E I V E SEATS ON
TFE COUNCIL. YE N O T F T T ~ A T ' H A ' B A S H ' S SRCUP WAS SUPPOSED
TO R E J O I N THE EXCOMM I N FEBQUARY O? T H I S YEAR DURING T H I
P A L S S T I N E NATIONAI C 0 7 N C I L . I T MB MOT BXCAUSE OF
BICYZRING BSTWEEN THE REJECTIOMIST FACTIONS AN' FATAH
O V E X INCLUDING THE TWO AFOREMENTIONED XYi'REIIST ORGANIZA-
TIONS ON TBF EXCOMM. WE PAVE NO CONFISMATION THAT AST
COMPROMISE HAS BEEN WORKS2 OUT WHICH ÈOUL7 PERMIT TEE
P F L P TO TAKE I T S MCOKM SSAT.
19. ( 0 ) EGYPT-TXIPARTITE TALK?: TEE EGrPTIAV MIDDLE
FAST NEWS AGENCY (MEHA) RSPORTS TBAT I T HAS LEARNED TBAT
EGYPT WILL ADOPT A FINAL DECISION ON TXZ QUESTION OF
PARTICJ,PATING IN ?FE T R I P A R T I T E MEETING CALLED M R BI
TRE 8s CPON THE RETURN OF P l I P E MINISTER {HALIL AND
MINISTER OF STATE BUTRUS GKALI FROM ISRAEL.
11. (C) IRAQ-TRIAL OF PLOTTERS: THE SPECIAL COURT
TRYING THE CONSPIRATORS IN IRAQ HELD ITS SECOND SESSION
tUGUST 2. NO RESULTS YERE ANNOUNCED. USINT BAGHDAD
REPORTS THE CITY HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. TEE IDEA OF
STRIAN INVOLVFMENT IN THE "PLOT" CONTINUES. TWO PROMINENT
1TRIAN BAATRISTS. BOTB ANATHEMA TO THE SYRIAN LEADERSEIP,
tPPEARED AT A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED CEREMONY AUGUST 2. THIS
CONSTITUTES AN IRAQI SLAP AT DAMASCUS, ALTHOUGH THERE IS
40 EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ IS. AS YET. DIRECTLY BLAMING ASSAD
roR THE EVENTS I N IRAQ.
12. (0) ISRASLI COMMANDO S T R I K E JERUSALEM RADIO HAS
tNNOUNCED TRAT IN TEE NIGHT Of AUGUST 2-3 AN ID? ASSAULT
rORCE ATTACTEL? TERRORIST BASES I N SOUTHERN ?ATHALAND.
tRE ISRAELI FORCE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES AND. ACCOROING
TO TFE IDF S P O U S M A N , SEVEN TFRXORISTS MERE KILLED. VANCE
IT
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T O INIEUM COLLECTIVE PRAORITY CHR
INFO hUEfTRS/ TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC P R I O R I T Y 3SS9 ECO
RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC RF
--
BT CUR
S E C R E T SECTION 0 1 OF 02 STATE 2 8 6 1 3 2 / 0 1
EmOm 12- GDS 11/1/85 (MONTVILLE* JOSEPH V*)
TAGS:
SUBJECT!
EG, I S * PINR
IWSW 929
LONDON FOR GLASPIE
- NOVEMBER 1, I 9 7 9

P A R I S FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY


D O W I S A FOR RANSOM
OTHER A D D R E S S E S FOR C H I E F S OF MISSION
WARNING NOTICE; SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVtD
NOT RQEASAbLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
(PARAGRAPHS 1-6 CUNFIDEMIAL)
mI ISRAEL: THE CAbINET RESHUFFLE: THE OCTOBER Z9
CABINET REORGANIZATION, WHICH LEFT BEGIN AS ACTING FOREIGN
MINISTER. SHOULD SLIGHTLY STRENGTHEN THE COALITION'S
BASE I N THE KNESSET WHILE BUYING TIME FOk BEGIN TO FIND
A NEW FOREIGN MINISTER* I T D U S NOT RESLVE THE PKOBLEfiS
TRIGGERED b Y THE ELON MOREH DECISION AD DOES NOT BY
I T S E L F GUARANTEE A LONG L I F E FOR THE CAdINETm I N OUR
JUDGMENT* BEGIN WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RUN THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY IN ADDITION T O DISCHARGING H I S DUTIES AS PRIME
MINISEK.
2- THE TWO KEY- ASPECTS - OF
. - . -.- -
. THE RESHUFFLE
. -- WERE
- -. - THE
. FAILURE
. -

TO MANE R REGULAR FOREIGN MINISTLR AND THE COOPTION OF


HOROUITZ INTO THi; CABINET. BEGIN'S I N A B I L I T Y T O FIND
A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR DAYAN ATTESTS TO THE; INTENSITY
OF IMTRA-COALITION DIFFERENCE^, AS WELL AS T O LEGIN'S
GROWING INABILITY TO EXERCISE STKONG L n A l  £ R S H I P
3. BEGIN KCPORTLDLY APPROACHED BOTH YADIW AND IÈUR ALWT
BECOHING FOREIGN MINISTEKm YAUIN hEPOhTkDLY DEMANDED THAT
IE CONLUCT THE AUTONOMY NLGOTIAT1O?!> I F KS- .-iLCAtE FOREIGN
EIMSIER. Hi FURTHtH I N b I L T L C THAT P i I M b T # OF LA£O
KATZ* A NEflhtR W H I S bEFiuCTAT1C WVEill-NT < D M > * fiL
ALLOWED TO RETAIN H I S PUfiTFOLIO.
4 BEGIN COULD HOT ACCLI'T THESE DENANDL. rH&Y WOULD HAVE
ALLOWED THL DM TO HuLD THREE SUtlSTANTIVL CAi.1Kk.T PORTFOLIOS
DESPITE THE. FACT THiiI I T HAS ONLY bEVfcN KNESSET MLMtERS,
A SITUATION THAI THC NATIOhAL KELIGIOUh PARTY C h P )
WOULD NOT COUNTt-NANCE. THL NRP HAS FPi-UUENTLY COMPLAINED
THAT THE DM I S L'JLIiKEPfiESLWLD 11 THE CALINET* MOftELVkR~
1% AUTONOMY ! E L u l I A T I O N S A>E U i C:iUCI/.- I ? F w t . T A k . X Y U T '
W .  ¥ \ D 7 HI. P t H Y L I L L ^UT rt-'.IkfcUlSn H i 8i.Y ç'à I b
1HLM*
BURG. HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT 70 RCLMQUISH THE
INISTRY, AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF P W m AND
ONAGK FOR- THE f f i P AS A WHOLE AND FOR BURG'S LAKIFNEH
ION I N PARTICU-AR. MOREOVER, BURG UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZES
THAT HE IS CURRENTLY PERFORMING AN IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE
ROLE WHICH NORMALLY WOULD BELONG TO THÂ F O R E I W MINISTER *-
CONDUCT OF THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS*.

IS COttCUMo IS T t f DEPARTURE OF DAYAN, A MAN WHO HAS


ENJOYED GREAT INfLUENCE OVER BSQIN. AND CONSEWENTLY
OVER ISRAELI FORtIGN POLICY*
.
TO TÃ C O O ~ I O NOF HORWITZINTO THECABINIT
IS A SIGNAL
ABOUT TMC FUTURE COURSE OF THE ÇOVCRNMCNT' FOREIGN POLICY*
HOROWSIZ I S AM ADAMANT HAWK. WHO RESIGNED FhOH THE
Â¥OVUNNEN M HOTEST OVER THE CONCESSIONS ENTAILED I N
THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. HERUT AND THE NRP HAVE PUSHED
M I D FOR HORWZTZ* (THE LIBERALS WANTED HORWITZ BECAUSE
HE IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE FIRM LEADERSHIP I N ECONOMIC
AWADtS, AND BECAUSE THERE WAS WIDESPREAD LIBERAL
ANTAaOMZSH TOWARD EHRLICH.) HOfi W I T 2 WILL BE LIKELY
TO T I F F I N THE CABINET'S NEGOTIATING POSITION ACROSS
IHK BOARD* H I S PRESEKCE IN THE CABINET ALSO INSURES
BEGIN THE SUPPORT OF THE THREE-MAN RAFI FACTION THAT
MORWITZ LEADS.-
fc I F THE BEÇI GOVERNMENT SURVIVES I T S CURRENT CABINET
&ISIS, THERE I S A FAIR CHANCE THAT BEGIN MIGHT NAME
KNCSSXT KEMBEII YCHUDA BEN-MEIR DEPUTY FOREIUN MINISTER
WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENT OF THE
MINISTRY* BEIMfIR I S AN AQQRESSIVE, HAWKISH NRP FIGURE.
H I S PRESENCE .AT THE PMEIGN MINISTRY WUD STRENGTHEN
FURTHERTHE HOLD or THE HAWKS OVER THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
THX BEQIN OOVERMIENT*
% (U) NEW I S t A C L I POLL: A PUBLIC OPINION POLL
PUBLISHED a HAARCTZ SHOWS THAT IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD
I
NOW, LABOR OULD RECEIVE 38.5 PERCENT OF THE VOTES;
LIKtffi 1&51 AND THE NEW tfl.TRA-RI6HT TEHIYA PARTY. 3.
OTHER RCS&TS ARE AS FOLLOWS!
<A) 84 PEKCXNT ARE UMWALLY DISSATISFIED WITH THE
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TO INTSUK COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/DOD/ISA WASHDC
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(B) OM-Y 30.8 PERCENT ARE SATISFIED WITH BEQIN'S
PERFORMANCE AS PRIME IIINISTER; AND
(0 50 PERCENT ME PREPARLD TO MAKE "TERRITORIAL
CONCESSIONS" IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE* ALTHOUGH 82 PERCENT
OPPOSE "SHARING" JERUSALEM WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT*
If. (U) NEW SETTLEMENTS* ACCORDING TO RADIO JERUSALEM*
THE DIRECTOR OF THE JEWISH AGENCY'S SETTLEMENT
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCED OCTOBER 3 1 THAT ISRAEL WILL
ESTABLISH THREE NEW SETTLEMENTS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
T H I S YEAR*
11. CU> IRAQ-VIETNAH: RLUTER REPORTS THAT VIETNAM
WILL SEND IRAQ 75 CONEAT PILOTS IN RETURN FOR AN IRAQI
LOAN OF 70 MILLION DOLLARS*
12. (SfNF) YAR PRIVATE ARNYI EMBASSY SANA REPORTS
THAT RECENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN YAR MILITARY AND
PARA-MILITARY FORCES SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENT SALIH MAY
BE FORMING A PRIVATE ARMY TO KEEP HIMSELF I N POWER*
INDICATIONS ARE THAT SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF US EQUIPMENT
DELIVERED I N THE PAST S I X MONTHS HAVE bEEN USED TO ARM
T H I S FORCE* TO INSURE THE LOYALTY OF THE FORCE* SALIH
HAS ASSIGNED MEMBERS OF H I S IMMEDIATE FAMILY TO KEY
POSIT IONS*
13. CC) EGYFT-SUBSIDIES:EMBASSY CAIRO REPORTS THAT
IN AN OCTOBER 29 MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY
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SUBSIDY ISSUE WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED 'to SADAT:
(A) ABOLISHING THE SUBSIDIES OVER A THREE-YEAR
PERIOD8
(B) KEEPING THE ALLOCATION TO SUBSIDIES UNCHANGED
IN THE 1 9 6 0 BUDGET (THUS, EFFECTIVELY DECREASING THCM);
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1 14. (U) FLO-WEST GERMANY: UEST GERMAN SECRET
SERVICE CHIEF MANFRED SCHUELER STATED ON OCTOBER 3 0 ,
ACCORDING TO REUTER, THAT THE WEST GEROAN GOVERNMENT
"COULD NOT RULE OUT FURTHER COOPERATION WITH I S R A E L I
INTELLIGENCE. RLUTER ALSO REPORTED THAT THE AMBASSADORS
OF SYRIA, IRAQ* Ahb KUWAIT CALLED ON THE WEST GERMAN
FOREIGN MINIETRY ON (JCTOBER 312 TO D I S C U S S THE INTERROGA-
TION OF J A I L E D PALESTINIAN GUERRILLAS I N VEST GERMANY BY
ISRAELI AGENTS AND FLO CHARGES THAT THE INTERROGATION WAS
PART OF A R O T T O ASSASSINATE A SENIOR FLO LEADER.
WORDING TO THE CLANDESTINE VOICE OF PALESTINE RADIO
STATION, FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER SALAH KKALAF
(ABU IYAD) HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 30 I N WHICH
HE SAID THAT I N THEIR RESPONSE T O THE ACTIONS OF THE
UEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT, THE PALESTINIANS "WILL NOT RESORT
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1. ( S / N O F O R N ) ON 29 O C T O B E R , T H E I S R A E L D E F E N S E F O R C E ( I D F ) F O R -
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AT L E A S T 6 Y E A R S O F I N T E N S I V E R & D T O F I E L D A M A I N B A T T L E T A N K
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PAGE 2 R U E K J C S 1 4 3 7 S E C R E T
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THE T R O O P E R S , " T H E HERKAA I S A V E R Y GOOD TANK."
3. (S/NOFORN) T H A T T A N K ' S S T R O N G P O I N T S ARE: 1 ) A PROVEN K A I N
GUN; 2) GOOD P R O T E C T I O N FOR T H E CREW; 39 P A L L E T I Z E C A I : K U N I T I O N ;
4) E A S Y A C C E S S T H R O U G H R E A R D O O R S ; 5 ) I N F A N T R Y P E R S O N N E L CAN BE
C A R R I E D ; 6) SMOOTH R I D E ; AND 7) FORWARD P L A C E M E N T O F T H E E N G I N E .
T H E T A N K I S L I M I T E D B Y T H E F A C T T H A T I T I S U N D E R P O W E R E D L Y KOfiHAL
T A N K S T A N D A R D S AND H A S A R E L A T I V E L Y H I G H S I L H O U E T T E . T H E NEW
T A N K S A R E S C H E D U L E D T O bE P R O D U C E D AT A R A T E O F U P T O 1 0 P E R
MONTH, W H I C H W I L L B U I L D T H E T E L A V I V ARMORED I N V E N T O R Y T O A P P R O X I
MATELY 435 M E R K A V A S OVER T H E NEXT 4 T O 5 Y E A R S . T H I S NEW MODEL
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I S R A E L ' S T A N K O F T H E 1980s
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1
1 I
PREPARED BY: HAJ J. H O E R L Z ,
C R E W 3 1 OCT 55)
U S A , JSI-5
Confidential

Biographic Report
Yitzhak RABAT
Prime Minister of Israel

Confidential
BR-74-30
June 1974
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Claiiifrd by 004050
ixtmpt from ,.rrra1 dKlatiificario" .ch*dul.
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CONFIDENTIAL

The New Prime Minister


CONFIDENTIAL

ISRAEL Yitzhak RABIN

Prime Minister

On 22 April 1974 the Israel Labor


Party (ILP) nominated Yitzhak Rabin
(pronounced rahBEEN) to succeed
1 CENTRAL
REFERENCE SERVICE
(iolda Meir as Prime Minister. He
was charged with forming a govern-
ment to replace the one he had joined
a Minister of Labor the previous
month. Unable to come to terms with
a former coalition partner, the
National Religious Party, Rabin
formed a Cabinet consisting of mem-
bers of the Labor Alignment (the I L P
and MAPAM-the United Workers'
Party), the Independent Liberal Party
and the Citizen's Rights Movement
(CRM). The new coalition gives the government 61 of the 120 votes in the
Knesset, which approved the Cabinet on 3 June. Decidedly more "dovish"
than many members of his own ILP, Rabin, by including the leftist C R M
n the coalition, has offended a number of colleagues, including former
Prime Minister Meir.
Because he was Army Chief of Staff during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,
Rabin is a popular public figure, but his political strength comes from his
relations with key members of the ruling elite rather than from any organ-
wational power base. The endorsement of Pinchas Sapir, the powerful
SormerMinister of Finance, was crucial to his election. After returning from
a 5-year lour as Ambassador to the United States in early 1973. Rabin worked
on the 1973 Labor Alignment election campaign. He was first elected to the
Knesset on 31 December 1973 as a member of MAPA1 (Israel Workers' Party).
the ILP's largest faction. Because he had not been involved in the pre-October
government. Rabin could not be accused of sharing any responsibility for its
shortcomings in the conduct of the October I973 war. During the war itself
Kabin headed Israel's voluntary war loan drive.
In selecting Rabin as its head, the I L P Central Committee chose not to be
influenced by charges that he had collapsed in a state of acute anxiety on the
eve of the 1967 war. The allegations, contained in a memorandum released
by his former Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Ezer Weizman, just
This report was prepared by the Central Reference Service and was coor-
dinated within CIA as appropriate. Comments and questions may he directed
t o Leslie Koch. Code 143. ex!. 6756.

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hcl'ore the Ce.itral C'onimntce vote, produced a strong negative reaction-


Rahin's dclcnder'> included leaders of the conservative opposition Likud
(Unity) bloc. Thi-i account ot Rabin's breakdown had been public knowl-
edge for some year>, and Rahin readily admits that he asked Weizman to
take charge for 24 hours hut claims it was only because he was fatigued and
needed rest.
Rabin was also accused o f accepting fees for personal appearances while he
was Ambassador to the United States. In acknowledging this, Rabin stated
that the practice was entirely legal and that he had made speeches to explain
Israeli policy or for fund-raising purposes without charge.

"The Sons ofihe Founding Generation. . ."

Rabin represents a marked break with the past generation of Israeli leaders
and personifies many changes the public has been clamoring for. He is the
first sabra (Israeli-born) Prime Minister, and at 52 he is the youngest. The
election process itself was hailed in Israel as a watershed in ILP politics-for
the first time the party machinery did not predetermine the outcome; Rabin
and his RAFI (Israel Workers' List) opponent, then Information Minister
Shimon Peres. ran on a personal basis without reference to their factional
afiliation within the ILP: and voting was by secret ballot. In accepting the
nomination Rabin said, "The sons of the founding generation have come of
age, and with them, the immigrants who came since national independence. . .
a generation that pursues continuity but has its own uniqueness." The
businesslike ex-general also admitted that he had, characteristically, prepared
two speeches, "just in case."

Outgoing Prime Minister Golda Meir toasts her


successor.Vitzhak Rabin

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Military Hawk"Politica1 Dove

Israel's security is more important to Rabin than an actual peacedocument


because he considers security the key to attaining "unconditional
recognition" from the Arabs. In his view, Israel has been fighting for
recognition as an independent state, not for territory. The new Prime
Minister has been characterized as a "military hawk and a political
dove3'- committed to seeking a negotiated peace but prepared to use force to
protect Israel's security. He believes that negotiations with the Arab states
will take time and thinks that Israel will have to remain in a state of constant
alert for any military exigencies. Pragmatic and less doctrinaire than previous
Israeli leaders, Rabin feels that the government must take a chance for peace
and show flexibility.
Rabin has little regard for the usefulness of international organizations in
peace negotiations. In July 1971 he called the United Nations a "place of
demagogy" and accused it of having played a negative role with regard to
Israel for 15 years.
Before the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973. Rabin was inclined to
believe that Israel could give up most of the occupied territories, retaining
only Sharm al-Shaykh and strategic parts of the Golan Heights and the West
Bank. Since the war he has publicly advocated partitioning the Sina'i and the
Golan Heights into three Lones-one under Israeli sovereignty, one with
Israeli military presence and one demilitarized but under Arab control.
Rabin favors the return of populated Arab areas of the West Bank to
Jordan and the rehabilitation and relocation of refugees, believing that these
actions would eventually lead to the "Palestinianization" of Jordan. At the
same time, he believes that Israeli civilian settlements on the West Bank are
an integral part of Israel. During a March 1974 interview with a British
reporter, Rabin said that Israel could not accept a separate Palestinian state.
Later, during an off-the-record conversation with the same correspondent,
Rabin said he felt that history was moving in the direction of a separate state
and Israel might have to move with it. Rabin would like, to reach a further
settlement with Egypt before beginning any negotiations with Jordan.

The General as Ambassador

Rabin's only diplomatic assignment, that of Ambassador to the United


States, was marked by an unprecedented improvement in Israeli-US relations
and a corresponding deterioration in his personal relations with then Foreign
Minister Abba Eban and the Ministry's hierarchy. In his blunt, unadorned
style, Rabin went after his primary objectives in the United States:
armaments and economic support for Israel and assurances that the United

CONFIDENTIAL
States would remain a deterrent to the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean.
Rabin felt that an Ambassador should help formulate policy, not just
implement instructions. He was critical of the Ministry's ceremonial
trappings. He often bypassed Eban on important matters to deal directly with
the Prime Minister, who credited him with a profound understanding of
American politics and a good grasp of Israeli-US relations.
In June 1972 Rabin referred to US Presidential candidates in terms that
left no doubt that he thought Richard Nixon would be the best President as
far as Israel was concerned. Eban felt that Israel should stay out of US
politics. Rabin also alienated some members of the American Jewish
establishment by refusing to use them as middlemen in dealing with the US
Government. One U S official said that Rabin could "appear to be an S.O.B.
at times," but that he was an effective one. A highly placed US official credits
Rabin with having been "formidable in diplomatic give-and-take, a master of
the facts, brilliant in analysis, articulate in presentation and cogent in
debate."

"Exodus" Hero

Yitzhak Rabin was born on 1 March 1922 in Jerusalem. He wanted to


become a farmer, so he entered Kadoorie College, an agricultural boarding
school. Upon his graduation in 1940 Rabin was awarded a scholarship prize
from the British High Commissioner of Palestine. Later that year Yigal
Alon, a commander of Palmach (shock troops of Haganah, the Jewish
underground), recruited him to join that organization. During World War I1
Rabin fought for the British and saw action in the Vichy French areas of
Syria and Lebanon. In 1946, once more with Palmach, he was imprisoned for
6 months by the British on charges of smuggling refugees into Palestine. His
exploits. during 1946-48, including raids to liberate detainees who had
immigrated illegally, inspired many of the episodes in which Leon Uris later
cast the fictional character Ari Ben-Canaan in his novel Exodus.
During the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Rabin commanded the brigade that
secured the road to Jerusalem. He was also executive staff officer to Alon,
then head of Palmach. At one point during the war in the Negev, Rabin and
the late Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, then an army officer. met,
discussed the military situation and shared a bowl of fruit. After the cease-
fire, Rabin was a delegate to the Arab-Israeli armistice talks in 1949 on the
island of Rhodes. That occasion was supposedly the first time he wore a
necktie.
The youngest colonel in the new Israeli Army, Rabin was put in charge of
the battalion commanders training school; he also acted as head of operations
on the General Staff. After attending the Staff College at Camberley,

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England, during 1952-53, Rabin was appointed head of military training. He


served as commander of the Northern Command from 1956 until 1959, when
he became chief of operations of the General Staff. He spent 2 months at a
modern weapons familiarization course in Texas in 1960 before returning to
Israel to be named Deputy Chief of Staff. In 1964 Rabin was promoted to
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). A brilliant military
tactician, he presided over the modernization of the 1DF and prepared the
basic strategy that was successfully used in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.
A man who seldom shows emo-
tion, Rabin was deeply affected by
his responsibilities in 1967. The
strain from the demands made upon
him in the tense days prior to the
war began to tell on the Chief of
Staff; he slept little and smoked
continuously. On 23 May Rabin
was no longer able to carry out his
duties-whether from the mental
breakdown claimed by Weizman,
the nicotine poisoning reported by
his staff, the extreme fatigue he
himself admits to, or a combination Rabin (r), with Generals Narkis and Day
of all three-and he asked his deputy entering theoldcity inJerusalem,June 1ç6
to take charge. By the evening of the next day, however, Rabin had resumed
command, and the ultimate credit for Israel's victory in the June 1967 war
is given to the military forces built and led by him.

Strong Belief and Extreme Caution

The Prime Minister's personality has been described as a combination of


strong belief and extreme caution. He has a reputation for being introspec-
tive, for seeing a problem in the round and for having a tendency to worry,
but for acting resolutely once he makes a decision. A stickler for detail and
a perfectionist with an encyclopedic memory, Rabin insists that things be
done his way when he is convinced he is right, and he personally sees to it
that they are. At the same time, he refrains from even commenting on
matters with which he is not familiar. In his new post, Rabin. who favors
the telephone to correspondence, usually arrives at his office about 7:00 a.m.
and works straight through until 11:OO p.m.
An introvert, Rabin is uncomfortable in crowds. He is reserved at social
gatherings and does not engage in small talk, although in the company of
close friends he is the center of attention, talkative and sociable. When his
children were born, Rabin reportedly waited outside the hospital all night.

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hein}; too shj to cnicr lie dislikes iormality, and open-necked shirts and
iipplc-e.iting heiiiiiic itie >i\mhols of his tenure as Chief of Staff. Rabin
'ihhors ol'l'color nikci ,nid docs nut drink alcoholic beverages. Formerly a
chain-smoker, he has .itteiiipted 1 0 curtail the habit. He is an accomplished
amateur photographer, and he enjoys action movies but seldom has time
to attend them. In~~nedi.iteIy;liter the 1967 war Rahin was awarded an
hiinorar) doctorate h\ tlchrcw Universit) He has also received four honor-
ary degrees from U S schools. He likes to swim and play tennis Rabin
speaks fluent English except when he i-i nervous.

A Fighting Family

Rabin's parents were born in Russia. His father, Nehemia. spent 15 years
in the United States before volunteering for service with the Jewish Legion in
Palestine during World War I. There he met and married Rosa Cohen, the
daughter of a wealthy timber merchant. Both were active in the Jewish labor
movement and Haganah; Rosa was a commander in the latter organization.
Known as "nurse Rosa," she encouraged Jewish resistance during the Arab
riots of 1920 and smuggled arms to Jewish self-defense units. She was also
one of the founders of a cooperative banking system. Y i t ~ h a kand his sister
were often left to their own devices. almost to the point of neglect, but
Y i t ~ h a knevertheless adored his mother. She died when he was 17. Nehemia
Rabin lived with his daughter Rachel in Kibbutz Manara until his death in
1971.
The Prime Minister's wife, the former Leah Schlossberg, was also active in
Piilmach, which she joined after graduating from high school in 1947. She

\ ilzhak and Leah Rabin at home

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was born in Germany and emigrated to Palestine with her family in 1933. An
active extrovert, Mrs. Rabin claims it has never occurred to her to he afraid
for herself. During her husband's tour as Ambassador to the United States.
she would not curtail Embassy activities for fear of possible incidents
because, she said, to give terrorists the satisfaction of stopping things would
be "too much." A delightfully frank person, Mrs. Rabin has traveled
throughout the United States seeking support for the United Jewish Appeal
and Israeli bonds. She insists on writing her own speeches. Mrs. Rabin, who
likes to play tennis, says the only benefit left from her rigorous Palmach
training is that it helps her breathing on the court. Mrs. Rabin speaks fluent
German, French and English.
The Rabins are a close family. There are two children - a daughter. Dahlia,
in her mid-20's. and a son, Yuval, 19. Dahlia, married to an IDF officer, is
expecting her first child. Yuval had just entered military service prior to
October 1973 and was said to be very disappointed at being given guard duty
instead of a frontline post. Mrs. Rabin's sister, Aviva, is married to Brig.
Gen. (Res.) Avraham Yoffe. Yoffe, who has been director of the Nature
Reserves Authority since 1964, was elected to the Knesset in December 1973
as a member of the Likud bloc.

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96