LORENZO SHIPPING CORP. v. CHUBB and SONS, et al. G.R. No.

147724; June 8, 2004 FACTS: Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation of Binondo, Manila, loaded 581 bundles of ERW black steel pipes on board the vessel M/V Lorcon IV, owned by petitioner Lorenzo Shipping, for shipment to Davao City. Petitioner issued a clean bill of lading for the account of the consignee, Sumitomo Corporation, which in turn, insured the goods with respondent Chubb and Sons, Inc. The M/V Lorcon IV arrived at the Sasa Wharf in Davao City. Respondent Transmarine Carriers received the subject shipment; discovered seawater in the hatch of M/V Lorcon IV, and found the steel pipes submerged in it. Survey Report showed that the subject shipment was no longer in good condition. After the survey, respondent Gearbulk loaded the shipment on board its vessel M/V San Mateo Victory, for carriage to the United States. It issued Bills of Lading which were all marked ALL UNITS HEAVILY RUSTED. Respondent Chubb and Sons, Inc. filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against respondents Lorenzo Shipping, Gearbulk, and Transmarine alleging that it is not doing business in the Philippines, and that it is suing under an isolated transaction. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent Chubb and Sons, Inc. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition provided under Art. 133 of the Corporation Code applies to respondent Chubb, it being a mere subrogee or assignee of the rights of Sumitomo Corporation, likewise a foreign corporation admittedly doing business in the Philippines without a license? HELD: NO. In the first place, petitioner failed to raise the defense that Sumitomo is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license. It is therefore estopped from litigating the issue on appeal especially because it involves a question of fact which this Court cannot resolve. Secondly, assuming arguendo that Sumitomo cannot sue in the Philippines, it does not follow that respondent, as subrogee, has also no capacity to sue in our jurisdiction. The rights inherited by the insurer, respondent Chubb and Sons, pertain only to the payment it made to the insured Sumitomo as stipulated in the insurance contract between them, and which amount it now seeks to recover from petitioner Lorenzo Shipping which caused the loss sustained by the insured Sumitomo. The capacity to sue of respondent Chubb and Sons could not perchance belong to the group of rights, remedies or securities pertaining to the payment respondent insurer made for the loss which was sustained by the insured Sumitomo and covered by the contract of insurance. Capacity to sue is a right personal to its holder. It is conferred by law and not by the parties. Respondent Chubb and Sons has satisfactorily proven its capacity to sue, after having shown that it is not doing business in the Philippines, but is suing only under an isolated transaction, i.e., under the one (1) marine insurance policy issued in favor of the consignee Sumitomo covering the damaged steel pipes. The law on corporations is clear in depriving foreign corporations which are doing business in the Philippines without a license from bringing or maintaining actions before, or intervening in Philippine courts. The law does not prohibit foreign corporations from performing single acts of business. A foreign corporation needs no license to sue before Philippine courts on an isolated transaction.

PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORP. v. CA G.R. No. 81026; April 3, 1990 FACTS: Canlubang Automotive Resources Corp. obtained from Pan Malayan an insurance policy for its Mitsubishi Colt Lancer. While the policy was still in effect, the insured car was hit by a pick-up owned by Erlinda Fabie but driven by another person. The car suffered damages in the amount of P42,000. Pan Malayan defrayed the cost of repair of the insured car. It then demanded reimbursement from Fabie and her driver of said amount, but to no avail. Pan Malayan filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Makati against Fabie and the driver, averring that the damages caused to the insured car was settled under the own damage coverage of the insurance policy. Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Pan Malayan had no cause of action since the own damage clause of the policy precluded subrogation under Art. 2207 of the NCC. Indemnification under said article is on the assumption that there was no wrongdoer or no third party at fault. RTC dismissed Pan Malayans complaint holding that payment by Pan Malayan under the own damage clause was an admission by the insurer that the damage was caused by the assured and/or its representatives. CA affirmed, albeit on a different ground, holding that Section III-I of the policy, which was the basis for the settlement of the claim against insurance, did not cover damage arising from collision or overturning due to the negligence of third parties as one of the insurable risks. Both tribunals concluded that Pan Malayan could not now invoke Art 2207 and claim reimbursement. ISSUE: Whether or not Pan Malayan was subrogated to the rights of Canlubang against the driver and his employer? HELD: YES. Article 2207 of the NCC is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation. If the insured property is destroyed or damages through the fault or negligence of a party other than the assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to the right of the assured to recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay. Payment by the insurer to the assured operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all the remedies which the latter may have against the 3rd party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The right of subrogation is not dependent upon any privity of contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim by the insurer. There are exceptions to this rule: (1) if the assured by his own act releases the wrongdoer or 3rd party liable for the loss or damage, from liability; (2) where the insurer pays the assured the value of the lost goods without notifying the carrier who has in good faith settled the assureds claim for loss; and (3) where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which is not a risk covered by the policy (voluntary payment). None of the exceptions are availing in the present case. Thus, SC held that Pan Malayan, as subrogee, has no legal obstacle from filing the complaint for damages against the 3rd parties responsible for the damage to the car.

FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP. v. CA G.R. No. 100970; September 2, 1992 FACTS: Deceased, Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation under Finman General Teachers Protection Plan master molicy and individual policy with his parents, Julia and Carlos Surposa, and brothers Christopher, Charles, Chester and Clifton, all surnamed, Surposa, as beneficiaries. While said insurance policy was in full force and effect, Carlie Surposa died as a result of a stab wound inflicted by one of the 3 unidentified men as he and his cousin, Winston Surposa, were waiting for a ride on their way home along Rizal-Locsin Streets, Bacolod City after attending the celebration of the Maskarra Annual Festival. Private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner insurance company which denied said claim contending that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. Private respondent filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission which subsequently rendered a decision in their favor. The appellate court affirmed said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of death of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act of the assailant in killing the former, which, by the very nature of a personal accident insurance policy, cannot be indemnified? HELD: NO. The terms accident and accidental as used in insurance contracts have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. In the case at bar, it cannot be pretended that Carlie Surposa died in the course of an assault or murder as a result of his voluntary act considering the very nature of these crimes.While the act may not exempt the unknown perpetrator from criminal liability, the fact remains that the happening was a pure accident on the part of the victim. The insured died from an event that took place without his foresight or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to expose his life to danger considering that he was just going home after attending a festival.

ENRIQUEZ v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE CO. G.R. No. L-15895; November 29, 1920 FACTS: On September 24, 1917, Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its office in Manila for a life annuity. He paid the sum of P6,000 to the manager of the company's Manila office and was given a receipt. The application was immediately forwarded to the head office of the company at Montreal, Canada. The head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila. On December 4, 1917, the policy was issued at Montreal. On December 18, 1917, Atty. Aurelio A. Torres wrote to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. The following day the local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued. This letter was received by Mr. Torres on the morning of December 21, 1917. Mr. Herrer died on December 20, 1917. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a perfected contract of life annuity? HELD: NO. The law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph of article 1262 of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The pertinent fact is, that according to the provisional receipt, three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was a contract: (1) There had to be a medical examination of the applicant; (2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of the company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant. The further admitted facts are that the head office in Montreal did accept the application, did cable the Manila office to that effect, did actually issue the policy and did, through its agent in Manila, actually write the letter of notification and place it in the usual channels for transmission to the addressee. We hold that the contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because it has not been proved satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant.

ANG KA YU v. PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO. G.R. No. 27881; September 28, 1961 FACTS: Ang Ka Yu and Kee Boc are joint owners of a business establishment, known as Ang Ka Yu Dyeing and Bleaching Factory, in Malabon Rizal. A deed of sale was allegedly made in favor of Francisco Monroy covering the building of said business establishment. Ang Ka Yu and Kee Boc obtained a fire insurance policy covering the property from Phoenix Assurance Co. Franciso Monroy likewise insured the same property with British Traders Insurance Co., Commonwealth Insurance Co., and Great American insurance Co. The insured property was consumed by fire, so Ang Ka Yu sought to claim the proceeds of the policy. Phoenix Assurance Co. denied liability on the ground that petitioner was not the owner but a mere possessor and as such, had no insurable interest over the property. ISSUE: Whether or not a mere possessor has insurable interest over the property? HELD: YES. A person having a mere right or possession of property may insure it to its full value and in his own name, even when he is not responsible for its safekeeping. The reason is that even if a person is NOT interested in the safety and preservation of material in his possession because they belong to third parties, said person still has insurable interest, because he stands either to benefit from their continued existence or to be prejudiced by their destruction. Petitioners insurable interest is not limited to their liability to the owners of insured materials. They are interested in the safety and preservation of said materials. Destruction of the textiles would mean a pecuniary loss to petitioners because they were deprived of the compensation they will receive or are entitled to for dyeing the same.

GEAGONIA v. CA G.R. No. 114427, February 6, 1995 Facts: Armando Geagonia is the owner of Norman's Mart located in the public market of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He obtained from Country Bankers Insurance Corporation a fire insurance policy covering Stock-in-trade consisting principally of dry goods such as RTW's for men and women wear and other usual to assured's business. Geagonia declared in the policy that Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. was the co-insurer for P50,000.00. From 1989 to 1990, Geagonia had in his inventory stocks amounting to P392,130.50. The policy contained a condition that the insured shall notify the Company of any existing insurance(s) or which will be procured afterwards covering the properties insured; failure to do so would preclude the insured from claiming under the policy. On May 27, 1990, fire of accidental origin broke out at the public market of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Geagonia's insured stocks-in-trade were completely destroyed prompting him to file with Country Bankers a claim under the policy. Country Bankers denied the claim because it found that at the time of the loss Geagonia's stocks-in-trade were likewise covered by fire insurance policies issued by the PFIC Cebu branch. Geagonia then filed a complaint against Country Bankers with the Insurance Commission for the recovery of P100,000.00 under fire insurance policy. Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure of other insurance policies violate condition 3 of the policy, so as to deny Geagonia from recovering on the policy? Held: NO. Condition 3 of Country Bankers's Policy is a condition which is intended to prevent an increase in the moral hazard. It is commonly known as the additional or other insurance clause and has been upheld as valid and as a warranty that no other insurance exists. Its violation would thus avoid the policy. However, in order to constitute a violation, the other insurance must be upon the same subject matter, the same interest therein, and the same risk. The fire insurance policies issued by the PFIC name Geagonia as the assured and contain a mortgage clause which reads: Loss, if any, shall be payable to MESSRS. TESING TEXTILES, Cebu City as their interest may appear subject to the terms of the policy. This is clearly a simple loss payable clause, not a standard mortgage clause. The Court concludes that (a) the prohibition in Condition 3 of the subject policy applies only to double insurance, and (b) the nullity of the policy shall only be to the extent exceeding P200,000.00 of the total policies obtained. A double insurance exists where the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect of the same subject and interest. Since the insurable interests of a mortgagor and a mortgagee on the mortgaged property are distinct and separate; the two policies of the PFIC do not cover the same interest as that covered by the policy of Country Bankers, no double insurance exists. The non-disclosure then of the former policies was not fatal to Geagonia's right to recover on Country Bankers' policy.

DEL VAL v. DEL VAL G.R. No. 9374; February 16, 1915 Facts: Petitioners and private respondents, who are brothers and sisters, are the only heirs and next of kin of Gregorio del Val who died intestate. It was found out that the deceased took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to private respondents as sole beneficiary. After Gregorios death, Andres collected the proceeds of the policy. Of the said policy, Andres paid P18,000 to redeem some real property which Gregorio had sold to third persons during his lifetime. Said redemption of the property was made by Andres lawyer in the name of Andres and the petitioners. According to Andres, said redemption in the name of petitioners and himself was without his knowledge and that since the redemption, petitioners have been in possession of the property. Petitioners now contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased and not to Andres personally. Petitioner filed a complaint for partition of property including the insurance proceeds. Andres claims that he is the sole owner of the proceeds and prayed that he be declared the sole owner of the real property, redeemed with the use of the insurance proceeds and its remainder; petitioners to account for the use and occupation of the premises. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a right to the insurance proceeds? Held: NO. The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with the subject. Our civil code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life-insurance contracts of to the destination of life-insurance proceeds that subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce. Thus, contention of petitioners that proceeds should be considered as a donation or gift and should be included in the estate of the deceased is UNTENABLE. Since the repurchase has been made in the names of all the heirs instead of the defendant alone, petitioners claim that the property belongs to the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. SC held that if it is established by evidence that, that was his intention and that the real estate was delivered to the plaintiffs with that understanding, then it is probable that their contention is correct and that they are entitled to share equally with the defendant. HOWEVER, it appears from the evidence that the conveyances were taken in the name of the plaintiffs without the knowledge and consent of Andres, or that it was not his intention to make a gift to them of real estate, when it belongs to him.

PACIFIC TIMBER EXPORT CORP. v. CA G.R. No. L-38513; February 25, 1982 Facts: On March 13, 1963, Pacific Timber Export Corp. secured temporary insurance from the Workmens Insurance Co. for its exportation of logs to Japan. Workmen issued on said date Cover Note 1010 insuring said cargo. The regular marine policies were issued by the company in favor of Pacific on April 2, 1963. After the issuance of the cover note but before the issuance of the two policies, some of the logs intended to be exported were lost due to a typhoon. Pacific filed its claim with the company, but the latter refused, contending that said loss may not be considered as covered under the cover note because such became null and void by virtue of the issuance of the marine policies. Issue: Whether or not the cover note was without consideration; hence, null and void? Held: NO. SC upheld Pacific Timbers contention that said cover note was with consideration. The fact that no separate premium was paid on the cover note before the loss was insured against occurred does not militate against the validity of Pacific Timbers contention, for no such premium could have been paid, since by the nature of the cover note, it did not contain, as all cover notes do not contain, particulars of the shipment that would serve as basis for the computation of the premiums. As a logical consequence, no separate premiums are required to be paid on a cover note. If the note is to be treated as a separate policy instead of integrating it to the regular policies subsequently issued, its purpose would be meaningless for it is in a real sense a contract, not a mere application.