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How might a contextualist reply to a sceptic? What are the prospects for success?
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Nick Fletcher PF302/3
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Nick Fletcher PF302/3
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Nick Fletcher PF302/3
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Nick Fletcher PF302/3
insensitive. In order to reconcile these claims, the sceptic invokes the rule of
sensitivity, arguing that contextually sensitive epistemic standards govern the
conditions of warranted assertability, our attributions of knowledge, but the not
the truth value of those attributions.
These two views have very different origins, one seeking to prove that we
can attribute knowledge to certain beliefs, the other seeking to prove that we
cannot. A contextualist argues that the facts relevant to true or false attribution
of knowledge vary in different contexts, just as the truth value of statements
such as those discussed above also vary from context to context. On the other
hand, the sceptic uses the AI to show that we know nothing, or at least very little.
Both sides postulate a solid case for their views, and neither comes out clearly
victorious. The only real difference between the two views is that a contextualist
is happy to ignore certain arguments when attempting to attribute knowledge
and a sceptic is not. This distinction manifests itself in the contextualist belief
that contextually sensitive epistemic standards govern the truth values of our
attributions of knowledge and the sceptical belief that the context only governs
the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge and our attributions of
knowledge are always false. Both sides can argue the finer details forever; it
seems that the only deciding factor between the two is whether or not the
attributor personally believes that sceptical hypotheses affect the truth value of
everyday attributions of knowledge.
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See DeRose (1995, p32), who in turn borrowed the example from elsewhere
References:
D. Lewis (1996), “Elusive Knowledge”, in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy
74, pp. 549-567.
K. DeRose, (1995), “Solving the Sceptical Problem”, in Philosophical Review 104,
pp.1-52.
S. Cohen, (1998), “Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems:
Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery”, in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy
76, pp. 289-306.
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