BABST v. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD G.R. No. L-62992 September 28, 1984 PLANA, J.

FACTS Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Aside from the interrogations a criminal complaint for libel was also filed against some of the petitioners. Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty ISSUE WON the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation is unconstitutional HELD The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters. Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation ____________________________________________________________________________________ NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. UNITED STATES, 403 U.S. 713 Decided June 30, 1971 FACTS United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy ISSUE WON Government can halt the publication of current news which concerns the public. HELD I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without

oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints. In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell The Government maintains that despite the First Amendment's emphatic command, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the Judiciary can make laws enjoining publication of current news and abridging freedom of the press in the name of "national security." To find that the President has "inherent power" to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make "secure." ____________________________________________________________________________________ GROSJEAN v. AMERICAN PRESS CO., 297 U.S. 233 Feb. 10, 1936 FACTS This suit was brought by appellees, nine publishers of newspapers in the state of Louisiana, to enjoin the enforcement against them of the provisions of section 1 of the act of the Legislature of Louisiana known as Act No. 23 which imposes an additional license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business amounting to 2% of the gross receipts of such business. Petitioners assail the validity of the statute, among other things they contend that it violates the Federal Constitution: That it abridges the freedom of the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment ISSUE WON the statute is unconstitutional. HELD The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that 'Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' While this provision is not a restraint upon the powers of the states, the states are precluded from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press by force of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That freedom of speech and of the press are rights of the same fundamental character, safeguarded by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by state legislation Appellant contends that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to corporations; but this is only partly true. A corporation, we have held, is not a 'citizen' within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause But a corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses, which are the clauses involved here. The tax imposed is designated a 'license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business,'-- it is a tax of 2 per cent. on the gross receipts derived from advertisements carried in their newspapers when, and only when, the newspapers of each enjoy a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.

 It is not intended by anything we have said to suggest that the owners of newspapers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government. But this is not an ordinary form of tax, but one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press. The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. ____________________________________________________________________________________ NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 Decided March 9, 1964 MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN FACTS Respondent, an elected official, brought suit in a state court alleging that he had been libeled by an advertisement in corporate petitioner's newspaper The advertisement included statements, some of which were false, about police action allegedly directed against students who participated in a civil rights demonstration and against a leader of the civil rights movement-- Southern Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights Although neither of these statements mentions respondent by name, he contended that the word "police" in the third paragraph referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised the Police Department, so that he was being accused of "ringing" the campus with police Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought on account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. o Respondent served such a demand upon each of the petitioners. None of the individual petitioners responded to the demand, primarily because each took the position that he had not authorized the use of his name on the advertisement and therefore had not published the statements that respondent alleged had libeled him o The Times did not publish a retraction in response to the demand, but wrote respondent a letter stating, among other things, that they were not sure how respondent could think the article referred to him Respondent filed this suit a few days later without answering the letter. The Times did, however, subsequently publish a retraction of the advertisement upon the demand of Governor of Alabamabut not for respondent alleging that the article did not pertain to him SC of Alabama o the Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the trial judge's rulings and instructions in all respects o It held that where the words published tend to injure a person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with an indictable offense, or tend to bring the individual into public contempt, they are libelous per se ISSUE

whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the first and Fourteenth Amendments.
HELD Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a publication is "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person . . . in his reputation" or to "bring [him] into public contempt"-- Once "libel

per se" has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars. Unless he can discharge the burden of proving truth, general damages are presumed, and may be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury. A showing of actual malice is apparently a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages, and the defendant may in any event forestall a punitive award by a retraction meeting the statutory requirements.
A State cannot under the First and Fourteenth Amendments award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves "actual malice" - that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false We reverse the judgment. We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct ___________________________________________________________________________________ Sanidad v. COMELEC October 12,1976 MARTIN, J Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be anewspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the

constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public informationcampaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchiseholder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. ___________________________________________________________________________________ GITLOW v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK June 8, 1925 Mr. Justice SANFORD FACTS

 Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for the statutory crime of criminal anarchy. Allegations against him: o The defendant had advocated, advised and taught the duty, necessity and propriety of overthrowing and overturning organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, by certain writings therein set forth entitled 'The Left Wing Manifesto'; o the second that he had printed, published and knowingly circulated and distributed a certain paper called 'The Revolutionary Age,' containing the writings set forth in the first count advocating, advising and teaching the doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force, violence and unlawful means. The defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party-- a dissenting branch or faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of 'moderate Socialism. The defendant was on the board of managers of the paper and was its business manager. He arranged for the printing of the paper and took to the printer the manuscript of the first issue 16,000 copies were printed and subsequently mailed out The Manifesto-- contemplate the overthrow and destruction of the governments of the United States and of all the States by immediately organizing the people through mass strike and force and violence, if necessary, compelling the government to cease to function, and then through a proletarian dictatorship, taking charge of and appropriating all property and administering it and governing through such dictatorship until such time as the proletariat is permitted to administer and govern it both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held the statute constitutional The contention here is that the statute, by its terms and as applied in this case, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ISSUE whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case, by the State courts, deprived the defendant of his liberty of expression in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment HELD The statute does not penalize the utterance or publication of abstract 'doctrine' or academic discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete action. It is not aimed against mere historical or philosophical essays-- What it prohibits is language advocating, advising or teaching the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. These words imply urging to action The Manifesto advocates and urges in fervent language mass action which shall progressively foment industrial disturbances and through political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action action overthrow and destroy organized parliamentary government It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question. Freedom of speech and press, said Story, supra, does not protect disturbances to the public peace or the attempt to subvert the government. It does not protect publications or teachings

which tend to subvert or imperil the government or to impede or hinder it in the performance of its governmental duties. By enacting the present statute the State has determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion, is clear. We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press; and we must and do sustain its constitutionality. ___________________________________________________________________________________ SCHENCK v. U.S. , 249 U.S. 47 (1919) March 3, 1919 Mr. Justice HOLMES FACTS the defendant wilfully conspired to have printed and circulated to men who had been called and accepted for military service under the Act of May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat., a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such insubordination and obstruction. According to the testimony Schenck said he was general secretary of the Socialist party and had charge of the Socialist headquarters from which the documents were sent. The book showed a resolution of August 13, 1917, that 15,000 leaflets should be printed on the other side of one of them in use, to be mailed to men who had passed exemption boards, and for distribution--Schenck personally attended to the printing Defendants allege o They set up the First Amendment to the Constitution forbidding Congress to make any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, and bringing the case here on that ground have argued some other points also of which we must dispose. ISSUE WON the acts of the defendants are within the purview of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech HELD The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual

obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced ___________________________________________________________________________________ SALONGA V. CRUZ PANO G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention-- Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. After several other bomb explosions-- arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely-- One of them was herein petitioner. Petitioner was thereafter arrested the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner-- It is the contention of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. ISSUE WON petitioner can be held liable under the revised anti subversive act HELD The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This

Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The alleged remark about the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is protected by the guarantee of free speech the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any subversive organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at Daza's birthday party, no proof whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. The alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.

_____________________________________________________________________________ MANUEL V. PANO G.R. No. L-46079 April 17, 1989 CRUZ FACTS This case goes back to April 21, 1976, when a raid was conducted by the agents of the now
defunct Anti-Smuggling Action Center on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo, Manila, pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of Customs of Manila on April 20, 1976. The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly smuggled into the country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong. These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official receipts. While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19,1976, to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible therefore be investigated-- The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged were all exonerated An article on the complaint appeared on Bulletin Today-- On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel was filed against the petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the Court of First Instance of Rizal A reading of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it said was that they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter of April 29, 1976 (which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin Today.

 petitioner, claimed that his letter to the ASAC Chairman was not actionable because it was a privileged communication; that the news report in the Bulletin Today was not based on the letter-complaint; and that in any case it was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and therefore also privileged. ISSUE WON petitioner committed libel HELD the letter and news article were held as the exceptions in article 354 the letter is classified as private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty and is therefore not considered as defamatory imputation The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to the ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men when they raided the Chinese tourists' rooms in the Tokyo Hotel. It was sent by the petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to protect his clients. While his principal purpose was to vindicate his clients' interests against the abuses committed by the ASAC agents, he could also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose the proper disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good faith, the letter was sent privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or publicity. As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen without any known ties to the newspapers, could have by himself caused the publication of such an explosive item. There is no prima facieshowing that, by some kind of influence he had over the periodical, he succeeded in having it published to defame the ASAC agents. At any rate, the news item comes under Item 2 of the abovequoted article as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks. This is also privileged. The vitality of republicanism derives from an alert citizenry that is always ready to participate in the discussion and resolution of public issues. These issues include the conduct of government functionaries who are accountable to the people in the performance of their assigned powers, which after all come from the people themselves. Ever citizen has a right to expect from all public servants utmost fidelity to the trust reposed in them and the maximum of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of their functions. Every citizen has a right to complain and criticize if this hope is betrayed.