I.

First Amendment Protections

A. Levels of Protection i. Absolutism - NYT v. US 1971 - Black Concurrence ii. Ad Hoc Balancing - Denver v. FCC 1. Criticisms - balancing acts tend to undervalue speech, seem too simple/oversimplified iii. Strict Scrutiny - court makes govt justify compelling govt interest and narrowly tailored to that interest. 1. Content-based regulation - regulates by reference to the context of expression 2. Prior Restraints - most restrictive form of restraint deserves heightened scrutiny 3. Smith v. Daily Mail (US, 1979) pg. 102 If a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful info about a matter of public significance, state officials may NOT constitutionally punish the publication of the info absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order. iv. Intermediate Scrutiny 1. Content neutral statutes - regulates without reference to the content of expression (e.g. no loudspeakers in streets overnight) a.Turner v. FCC (US 1994) pg. 97 -Must-carry rules are content neutral because the rules on their face impose burdens and confer benefits w/o reference to the content of the speech, and b.c they dont reflect Congresss manifest purpose to regulate speech b/c of the message it conveys -Content neutral = intermediate scrutiny.

II. Non-Print Distribution

A. Broadcast i. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (SCOTUS 1969) 1. FCC requires fairness doctrine giving equal time to an idea/person that is directly challenged by another party on the radio a. Two Prong Standard: (1) cover controversial topics; (2) cover them fairly. 2. Test applied is not an established test, more of balancing of state interest in the rule. Unarticulated form of lower level of review 3. The restriction is allowed as it does not actually restrict speech, but requires equal time to both sides of an issue.

4. Court reasoned that the state had a valid interest in forcing radio stations to give equal air time to differing views because it would help to produce an informed/educated public. 5. Also, radio frequencies are already regulated by the govt, there simply arent enough channels for everyone to be heard unless there is some sort of response doctrine. ii. Miami Herald Publishing Co. Tornillo (SCOTUS 1974) 1. Florida right of reply statute that gives political candidates the right to demand that newspapers publish a reply by the candidate for free if the newspaper attacks the candidates personal character or official record. MIA Herald refuses, Tornillo sues. 2. State argues that the statute should be upheld in the interest of fairness. 3. Court determines that the statute interferes too much with editorial control to be inoffensive to the 1st Amendment. The statute is content based which requires strict scrutiny. Also, the candidate could just have his response published in a different newspaper because there is no limit to the number of newspapers like the limits on radio channels. 4. This is also no bueno because it could have a chilling effect on political speech. iii. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (SCOTUS 1978) 1. George Carlins Filthy Words was being broadcast on the radio at 2pm. Father complains to FCC. FCC sanctions the channel because the routine is patently offensive and can therefore be restricted under statutes. 2. Court finds that restricting material that is considered offensive to hours that are not likely hours when children will hear the offensive content is OK because there isnt a less restrictive method to protect children from the offensive content. 3. This does not infringe on 1st Am. rights no right to broadcast this kind of language in the afternoon special impact of broadcast media on children. 4. Broadcast gets the most limited 1st A. protection because it is a limited medium. 5. Obscenity lies outside of 1st A. protection as well. BUT offensiveness is not a reason to ban, it is a reason to protect, especially if it is political content. iv. FCC 2001 Policy Statement 1. In determining whether broadcast material is indecent: a. Material must describe or depict sexual or excretory organs or activities, and

b. It must be patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium. to determine patently offensive: the full context in which the material appeared is critically important. i. The explicitness or graphic nature of description or depiction ii. Whether the material dwells on or repeats at length iii. Whether the material appears to pander, used to titillate, or appears to have been presented for its shock value.

III. Prior Restraints & Criminal Liability

A. Prior Restraints i. Near v. Minnesota (US 1931) pg. 82 1. Newspaper comes out w/ nasty remarks about public officials 2. MN statute: prevents publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles. a. Injunctions not typically used for defamation 3.Strong presumption against prior restraints, so govt has strong burden. If punished afterwards at least society can make judgements. 4. (dicta) Prohibition can be overcome in exceptional cases: exceptional cases, such as those involving dire threats to natl security (wartime), obscenity, incitement to acts of violence, overthrow of orderly govt/ B. Prior Restraint in National Security ii. NY Times v. US (Pentagon Papers) (US 1971) pg. 93, 137 1. Govt argues natl security to justify prior restraint. The material is historical info, not present military info. Publication would be embarrassing to the US and impede ability to withdraw from Vietnam. 2. Govt failed to meet its heavy burden of proof to overcome the presumption against prior restraints. (embarrassment insufficient state interest) iii.US v. Progressive (District Court, 1979) p.140 1. Rare case that upheld prior restraint in the interest of natl security 2. Publication on the H-Bomb is analogous to troop movements/location in time of war, and falls w/in extremely narrow exception of rule against prior restraints. Distinguishes Pentagon Papers case b/c that was historical info, rather than a future threat to natl security. iv. US v. Morison (4th Cir. 1988) pg. 174 1. Published Top Secret Naval secrets. Compelling government interest to keep such information secret. 2. language was not vague regarding person entitled to receive

v. US v. Rosen (District, 2006) pg. 182 1. AIPAC lobbyists charged under Espionage Act. 2. Prior restraint = Strict Scrutiny 3. Espionage Act prohibiting publication is not unconstitutional. C. Prior Restraints for a Fair Trial i. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (US 1976) pg.142 1. Judge entered restraining order against the media from disseminating facts strongly implicative of defendants guilt. 2.Test: a) the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity and c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened danger. a. Easy to say media coverage could affect trial b. Alternatives: 1)change of trial venue, 2) postponement of trial, 3) deep questioning of prospective jurors, 4) emphatic and clear instructions to jury c. Events happened in small town: restraint likely wouldnt prevent the spread of information. 3. Far from clear that prior restraint on publication would have protected defendants rights. Court struck down prior restraint. 4. Put otherwise: 1) substantial probability of prejudice, 2) substantial probability closure of court would help (did media already publish?), 3) No other reasonable alternative to alleviate harm ii. US v. Noriega (11 Cir. 1990) pg. 147 1. Not supposed to use because in conflict with Nebraska. D. Trade Secrets/ Business information i. Procter and Gamble Co. v. McGraw-Hill (6th Cir. 1996) pg. 150 1. Parties in civil litigation agree to keep business secrets as sealed court records. 2. Business Week obtains copies of documents, and attempts to publish, but is blocked by a TRO 3. Private vanity or commercial self-interest simply does not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint. ii. State ex rel. Sports Magazine News v. Nachtigal (Oregon, 1996) pg. 151 1. Statute that prohibited disclosure of trade secrets struck down as invalid because it focused on the subject matter (content-based), not the harmful effects 2. Put burden on judiciary to determine when people could publish E. Privacy i. People v. Bryant (Colorado, 2004) pg. 153

1. Upheld restraint on transcripts of a pretrial proceeding of a rape case not allowed to be published. Information involved sexual history of victim, and a debate as to whether it is relevant at trial 2. State must show compelling interestt: here it was need to protect privacy of rape victims to overcome barriers in coming forward to report the crime ii. Associated Press v. District Court (US 2004) 1. Colorado rape shield statute. Press sought to have records released immediately. 2. SC allowed the trial court to take a few days to release the transcripts to review what they would be releasing. Trial court eventually released records. F. Criminal Liability (post-publication liability) i. Landmark Communications v. Virginia (US, 1978) pg. 85 1. Virginia statute made it a crime to publish details of a judicial disciplinary hearing. 2. Confidentiality of the hearings is thought to increase the likelihood of filing complaints, and protects judges from frivolous complaints. 3. Court did not find this a compelling enough state interest, public First A interest in these proceedings was too great.

III. Defamation
A. Defamatory meaning statement gives a negative image. i. Lowers someones respect in significant portion of the community. (i.e. Chapin & Hatfill) ii. White v. Fraternal Order of Police p. 221- The usual test applied to determine the meaning of a defamatory utterance is whether it is reasonably understood by the recipient of the communication to have been intended in the defamatory sense.... When one uses language, one is held to the construction placed on it by those who hear or read, if that construction is a reasonable one. Test: a) Judge: Would a reasonable person understand these statements as having a defamatory meaning (objective)? b) Jury: Did the media intend for the content to be defamatory (subjective)? Media must intend or endorse defamatory meaning; not just reasonable that it could be seen as defamatory. B. Must prove it is false i. Historically, burden of proof was on D, proving truth or near-truth was affirmative defense

ii. When private, public officials or non-public individuals are defamed w/ regard to matters that are of public concern- Hepps decision- SC shifted burden at common law onto plaintiffs C. Opinion i. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal (US 1990) p. 240: No wholesale defamation exemption based on opinion. But Ct. does indicate that there are certain things that simply cannot be the basis for defamation actions. 1. Reaffirms 3 Major Propositions: a. Challenged statements MUST be provably false to be protected; i. "In my opinion, John Jones is a child molester" is defamatory b/c implies there are underlying facts known to speaker. ii. "This is worst play I've ever seen" is not defamatory b/c pure opinion - can't prove true or false. b. Context all important protects speech that could not be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts parody, loose figurative speech or rhetorical hyperbole; c. Court must make independent examination of whole record instead of deferring to jury. ii. State Law: By interpreting state constitutions to be more protective of speech than federal constitution, some cts. give opinion MORE protection than Milkovich requires. State constitutions require more attention to context. 1. What if state constitution uses same language as 1st Am.? High state cts. can use same language as 1st Am. and still give it a broader reading in terms of speech protection. 2. Limitation: Supremacy clause if limitations run smack into guarantees at other end of spectrum. D. If Public Figure, Must Prove Actual Malice i. NY Times v. Sullivan (US 1964) 1. Civil rights demonstration in Montgomery, AL. Sullivan- a city commissioner. Inaccuracies in ad placed in NY Times. Sullivan brings action. NY Times admits to the minor inaccuracies. a. Note: If you publish someone else's libel, you can be liable for it 2. In AL law at that time, to get punitive damages plaintiff had to prove actual malice. a. Malice: Knowledge of the falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth.

3. SC adds malice requirement. Ct. says, if we are talking about criticism of public officials in the context of their jobs, this malice requirement is actually an element of the tort itself. a. Unlike all the other elements of the tort, malice standard is not preponderance of the truth, but probably something higher - more l ike "convincing clarity." (plaintiffs burden) ii. "Sullivan" category of cases - criticism of public official in terms of the way he conducts his duty of office. 1. "Sullivan"/malice-proving disability - rapidly expands. 2. Butts and Walker a. Butts: Prominent football coach. b. Walker: Former army officer no longer in govt. but kind of a political spokesman. c. Both were public figures; both said they were libeled. 3. EXPANDED Sullivan - Public figures now must prove actual malice. iii. Damages? I believe: Private individuals can only recover actual damages if they do not prove actual malice, but both private individuals and public figures can recover punitive damages if they prove actual malice. (dont quote me on that) iv. Sullivan Plaintiffs (public officials, public figures) 1. Need to prove malice w/ convincing clarity. 2. If you are in the Sullivan category, malice is an element of the tort itself. 3. Don't get any damages/judgment w/o proving malice. E. Defining Public Officials and Figures i. Public Official 1. Rosenblatt v. Baer (US 1966) p. 293: Bear supervisor of recreation facility owned by county; held public official a. Test- (1) strong interest in debate on public issues & (2) strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues ii. Public Figure- no clear agreement 1. Time v. Firestone (US 1976) p. 298: Member of one of Americas wealthiest families private figure because did not assume any role of special prominence in affairs of society and had not thrust herself into forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence resolution of issues 2. Wolston v. Readers Digest (US 1979) p. 299: Conviction of crime does not make you a public figure

3. Hutchinson v. Proxmire (US 1979) p. 303: U.S. Senator criticized government grants to certain scientists, including plaintiff. Court held plaintiff was private- did not assume role of public importance- cannot make someone a public figure by virtue of defamation 4. General Purpose: Well-known celebrity; person whose name is a household word; public recognizes him and follows his words and deeds 5. Limited Purpose: Name not normally household word but in a limited area you insert yourself into the public iii. Private Plaintiffs but Matter of Public Concern 1. Gertz v. Robert Welch (US 1974) p. 209: Limits Sullivan a. Attorney retained to represent family of kid killed by Chicago policeman. b. Ct. recognizes that Gertz, as a private person, is different from Sullivan c. Gertz plaintiff: Non-Sullivan plaintiff but a matter of public concern d. Ct. says, in this category, malice is not an element of the tort e. State cannot write a defamation statute that presumes fault. F. Proving Actual Malice i. Duty to Investigate 1. St. Amant v. Thompson (US 1968) p. 248: Generally no duty to investigate. Defendant repeated false charged against plaintiff w/o checking charges or investigating source's reputation. Ct. held reckless disregard hadn't been shown. For actual malice there must be sufficient evidence to permit conclusion that defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. 2. Harte-Hanks v. Connaughton (US 1989) p. 250: Defendant relied heavily on a source whose credibility had been seriously impugned by other witnesses and whose version of episode was essentially unconfirmed Ct. found actual malice. a. Failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice BUT purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category. 3. Tavoulareas v. Piro p. 257- published statements that Mobil president had set up son as partner; okay to seek to nail someone as long as you did the research; did here, no actual malice G. Internet & Communications Decency Acts i. Republication Rule: Repetition of defamatory material originating by someone else is a new "publication" and the repeater is a "publisher" liable as if he or she

originated the defamatory statement (otherwise media could defame at will merely by finding someone to attribute the original statement to). ii. Publishers and Distributors 1. Zeran v. AOL (4th Cir. 1997) p. 286: Plaintiff sues AOL for libel for unreasonably delaying the removal of defamatory messages posted by unidentified 3rd party. a. 230 of Communications Decency Act of 1996: Creates FEDERAL IMMUNITY to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for info originating w/ 3rd party user. 2. Blumenthal v. Drudge (US 1998) p. 290: Statute may even apply when ISP is actively involved in obtaining defamatory material AOL employed Matt Drudge, case dismissed. a. Sims argues AOL shouldn't be protected under 230 if it employs the person who creates the material. Theory for liability: Respondeat superior.

IV. Newsgathering Challenges

A. Newsgathering i. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. (CA 1998) p. 256 1. Zone of privacy beyond the home. Reporters go in rescue helicopter after accident, film extraction from car and helicopter ride. Rescue workers are set up by media w/microphone. 2. Court holds this could be intrusion upon privacy. a. Note: This is not revelation of true but embarrassing info b/c matter of public concern defense eliminates that theory. 3. Action for intrusion has 2 elements: a. Intrusion into private place, conversation or matter, b. In a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. 4. Ct. says 1st element satisfied. Did she have a reas. expectation of privacy in helicopter? Yes. Entitled to degree of privacy in convos? Yes conveying private medical info. 2nd element - offensiveness - looking not only at what's revealed but also at method by which intrusion is being done. Ct. says could be highly offensive to a reas. person. Don't hold definitively that it is, but say jury could find it was. ii. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (4th Cir. 1999) p. 472 1. Higher level of public concern, mishandling of meat; not an intrusion-where neither defamation or false light depiction (no malice - Food Lion is a public figure), or truth of embarrassing statements. 2. Misrepresentation/breach of FD to employers to get job as low level employee to do expose.

a. They can say, but for these torts, we never would have hired these people, and therefore the publication damages should be factored in in terms of what we're owed. At trial level, enormous damages - local jury punishing the media for relatively minor newsgathering torts (punished for breach of duty of loyalty but not for publication). 3. Plaintiffs failed to link the articles misrepresentations to a harm (loss of profits, etc.), other than reliance on the undercover reporters employment, so very small actual damages awarded. iii. Pearson v. Dodd (D.C. 1969) p. 500 1. Aides to Senator Dodd secretly removed documents from his files, made copies and delivered to columnists who published them. Dodd sued for invasion of privacy and conversion. 2. Ct. concludes that no liability attached to Ds (reporters) even though they received documents "knowing" they "had been removed" w/o authorization. Reporters weren't the ones who stole so didn't commit the trespass. a. If reporter asks or hires a person to intrude, reporter is then responsible b/c person is an agent for reporter. b. If reporter knows intrusion occurred but didn't direct it, no liability. 3. Where claim is that private info concerning P has been published, question of whether the info is genuinely private or is of public interest should not turn on the manner in which it has been obtained; judge notes it is against human nature to avoid juicy information iv. Bartnicki v. Vopper (SCOTUS 2001) p. 501 1. Bartnicki is union chief negotiator - calling Kane president of local union over phone, someone intercepted and recorded the call; federal law forbids interception by person not party to conversation and punishes intentional disclosurestatute invalid b/c deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the privacy interests at stake. 2. General matterstate action to punish publication of truthful info seldom can satisfy constitutional standards. 3. Holding: Media cannot be punished for publishing info that others may have obtained illegally, so long as the press played no role in the illegal conduct and the info reported involved a matter of public concern. 4. Court Emphasizes 3 Factors: a. Respondents played no part in illegal interception; b. Access to info on the tapes was obtained lawfully even though info itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone else;

c. Subject matter of conversation was a matter of public concern. 5. A strangers illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the 1st Am. shield from speech about a particular matter of public concern. 6. Criminally obtained info that the media knows was criminally obtained gets protection B. Reporters Privileges: Should media be required to disclose their sources? i. Sources of Reporter's Privilege: 1. U.S. Const. 1st and 14th Amendments (Branzburg, et. al.) 2. State Constitutions 3. State Shield Laws 4. Federal "Common Law" (Gonzales) ii. Many states have privilege statute but no federal privilege statute. iii. Consider the following: 1. Nature of disclosure sought (confidential or non-confidential, published or unpublished, personal observation or 2nd-hand account); 2. Type of proceeding in which disclosure is sought (grand jury investigation, criminal prosecution, criminal defense, civil litigation, or other); 3. Whether the reporter (or his or her employer) is a party to the proceeding in which disclosure is sought. iv. Is there a privilege? Not sure b/c of Branzburg and EEOC. v. Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) p. 529: Can journalists be held in contempt for failing to respond to a grand jury investigation? Branzburg involved in 2 caseswrote article about persons changing pot to hash & article where he interviewed drug users and observed them smoke pot. Media proposes qualified privilege. 1. Holding (White - Conservative majority): NO 1st Am. privilege to refuse to reveal confidential sources and info to a grand jury. 2. 4 dissenters and Powell concurrence: The media have SOME qualified privilege. a. Still have to make a case-by-case analysis and do a balancing test: Balance freedom of press vs. obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony w/ respect to criminal conduct. 3. Majority holding leaves little room for an expansive notion of privilege as to grand jury proceedings. a. Branzburg and companion cases (EEOC, Judith Miller) were about need for federal grand juries to enforce the law w/ media compliance. All 3 cases limited to grand jury matters. 4. Some circuits interpret Branzburg as giving a qualified privilege.

vi. In Re: Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller (DC 2005) p. 565: Valerie Plame CIA Leak 1. Even if 1st Am. privilege existed, it was not absolute and had been overcome by special prosecutor's showing of need and no federal common law privilege. 2. Miller sent to jail for not revealing sourceBranzburg meant what it said. vii. Overcoming Qualified Privilege 1. "Materiality and relevance" in the usual evidentiary sense is not enough - there MUST be some specific showing of need to outweigh the sacrifice of 1st Am. values the disclosure entails. 2. If Powell plus 4 liberals means privilege still existsread Miller narrowly that its only about grand juries - like in Branzburg there is a recognition of privilege beyond grand jurythis is possible. 3. STRONGEST ARGUMENT: Miller and Branzburg can be limited solely to the facts of grand jury subpoena. 4. Note: In civil cases, the privilege will be extremely hard to overcome. But remember that libel Ps who must prove Sullivan malice have right to enquire into editorial process. C. Access to Courts i. Criminal Proceedings: Generally speaking, criminal trials are open to the media. 1. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (US 1979): 1st courtroom closure case, suppression of pretrial proceedings to prevent disclosure of very incriminating confession. a. Media challenged this on 1st and 6th Am. Grounds. b. Ct. holds that 6th Am. Right protected criminal Ds, not the media. c. Ct. didn't decide whether 1st Am. Guaranteed media access to the pre-trial proceeding, but held that even if it did, the trial judge could properly determine that the right was outweighed in the circumstances of the case by the D's right to a fair trial. d. Still good law, but to what extent has it been eroded by later case law? Judge can only decide to exclude press if there is a compelling, narrowly tailored state interest that cannot be protected by less restrictive means. 2. Richmond Newspapers v. VA (US 1980) p.609: Right to attend criminal trials generally; 4th trial for murder, Ds atty. requests trial be closed to media and public b/c concerns about enormous amount of prejudicial info that has already tainted jury. P challenges closure.

a. There is a presumption of accessibility by the media to criminal trials. b. Burger: Emphasizes historical rationale, historically public had right to attend trials 1st Am. took that into consideration. c. Concurring Justices: Do not like historical basis, rather functional allowance of access to the media and therefore public has access serves functional element assures that criminal D has a fair and accurate adjudication. d. Liberals and conservatives agree that murder trial has strong presumption of openness. 3.Press Enterprises (1986) p. 619 & 623: Pretrial hearing. Whether or not a nurse accused of having killed a number of people in hospital. Voir dire - primacy of the accuseds right is difficult to separate from right of everyone in community to attend voir dire, which promotes fairness. No right of access to media here some possibility that at least in pretrial hearings in criminal cases these will be closed. a. TEST: 1) compelling, narrowly tailored overriding interest, 2) no alternative, less restrictive means of protecting that interest b. Presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. c. Qualified 1st Am. right of access to criminal proceedings applies to preliminary hearings. iii. Juvenile Proceedings 1. Delinquency proceedings are often closed by statutory mandate or at discretion of the judge. Original theory was that publicity would interfere w/rehabilitation increasing skepticism about treating juveniles differently. 2. Child custody proceedings traditionally not open. 3. Globe Newspaper Co v. Superior Court (US 1982) p.616 : Brennan majority Ct. struck down MA statute that had been interpreted to require that the courtroom be closed during testimony of minor victims of sexual offenses. a. Question IS NOT historical openness of a particular type of trial BUT rather state interests purportedly supporting restriction. b. To deny access it must be shown that denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. c. Court thought absolute closure too broad.

D. Access to Records i. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (US 1978) p. 628: Already given transcripts, broadcasters petitioned for access to tapes used in criminal trials of Watergate aides. 1. The common law right of access to judicial records does not authorize release of the tapes in question from the District Court's custody. a. The common law right to inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute, but the decision whether to permit access is best left to the sound discretion of the trial court b. The presence of an alternative means of public access tips the scales in favor of denying release. (here there was an alternative-transcripts had been released to the public) 2. The release of the tapes is not required by the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. Under the First Amendment, the press has no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public. ii. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart (US 1984) p. 631: Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation sued newspapers for libel; newspapers asked for membership and contributor lists during discovery and P refused to provide. 1. Normally presumption against release of names but they are suing us for defamation and we would like names take position that we have right to exercise religion gets access to stuff he normally wouldnt get access to but says not to disseminate protective order valid. 2. Where a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause, is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of info if gained from other sources, it DOES NOT offend the 1st Amendment. (not a prior restraint) 3. In this case privacy and religious freedom sufficient to justify protective order and to overcome protections afforded free expression concurrence. 4. What the media wants is too restrictive matter of legislative and judicial grace. ii. Generally w/ regard to right to records there is a 1st Am. and CL claim recognized a CL right when its views were not particularly open as these things had to be. 1. High court recognizes that there is a right at CL to have access to the tapes it is a qualified right of allowing access to records for people who want it. Review Session: 1. 60 pts-- 6 Qs, 75 words max (10 pts each), roughly 40 minutes 2. 100 pts-- Essay--Qs A(50), B(30), C(10), D(10)

3. 2.5 hrs Dendrite not on it, and model defamed online not on exam No damages or harm 4. Dont bother with some lengthy rule explanation. Court Closure Analysis: 1. Talk about presumption of openness of trial courts/judicial proceedings 2. Identify overriding govt interests if any 3. Identify effects of closure of trial 4. Specific findings on closure 5. Narrowly tailored solution? 6. Less restrictive alternatives? 7. Level of scrutiny? Prior restraint?