FPJ CASE: Tecson, et. al. v.

Commission on Elections On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines for the May 2004 national elections under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Various petitioners sought to disqualify FPJ in his bid for the presidency on the contention that he made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were foreigners; his mother an American and his father, a Spanish national since his father was the son of Lorenzo Pou, who was a Spanish subject. Moreover, they argue that granting Allan F. Poe, his father, was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to his son, since FPJ is an illegitimate child of an alien mother, Bessy Kelley. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessy Kelley and second, even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan Poe married Bessie Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ. The Supreme Court, in this case, held that Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen and must be allowed to continue his bid for the Presidency of the Republic. Justice Vitug, being the ponente in this case, cited five conclusions that can be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents presented by both sides. First, the parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and

Bessy Kelley. Second, FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939. Third, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September 16, 1940. Fourth, the father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou. And fifth, at the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Pou was 84 yrs. old. Petitioners presented documentary evidence that indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes and the father of Allan Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou was not presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on September 11, 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ showed that he was born on May 17, 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza mother, Marta Reyes. Petitioners also introduced an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez on 5 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on August 20, 1939 to Allan Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. The marriage certificate of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. Both contending parties have submitted these documents in evidence during the proceedings before the COMELEC. In line with this fact, Section 3

Rule 130, Rules of Court states When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office. Being public documents, therefore, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents in line with Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, since a certification was issued by the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez can be found and that the certificate of their marriage presented was only an uncertified photocopy, it was not greatly considered by the Court in this case. Citizenship of Grandfather The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years old, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner argued that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,

Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court presumed that the residence of the person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. In fact, it would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that if Lorenzo Pou is assumed to be in the Philippines in 11 April 1891, being a Spanish subject who continued to reside in the Philippines without preserving his allegiance to the Crown of Spain, then he was converted to a Filipino citizen in accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902. Lorenzo Pou now being a Filipino, Allan Poe is also a Filipino upon birth and Fernando Poe Jr. is likewise held to be a natural-born Filipino in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. On Legitimacy or Illegitimacy The opinion of Joaquin Bernas, SJ is most convincing in the issue at hand. He stated that the Court must ask what the lis mota was in each of the cases cited by the petitioners to support their contention that birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child and therefore he would follow the citizenship of his mother, an American. Among the cases cited were Morano v. Vivo (20 SCRA 562), which was about a stepson of a Filipino but the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father, Chiongbian v. de Leon (82 Phil. 771), which was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution, and Serra v. Republic (91 Phil. 914), which was about an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The facts in these cases were not

the same as those in the case at bar. Moreover, in another case, Paa v. Chan (21 SCRA 753), which was about the son of an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, the argument was based from an obiter dictum, which was absolutely unnecessary for the case and cannot be given great weight. Father Bernas further stated that aside from the fact that such pronouncement that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father cannot run for public office would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother. In the case of People v. Cayat, jurisprudence has established a test to determine valid classification. Although distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children rests on real differences, these differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another. In fact, it must be considered that it was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. To disqualify the illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. Thus, it transgresses the equal protection clause. Another amicus curiae, Mr. Justice Mendoza, also reiterated that where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise

parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not prejudice or discriminate him. The Convention on the Rights of the Child was also used as basis in this case since it abolished all discriminations on account of birth or other status. The Convention protects in the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political rights, civil rights, social rights, economic rights and cultural rights. A violation of one right is considered a violation of the other rights. It also embraced the rule that all actions of a State concerning the child should consider the best interests of the child. This was, however, attacked by Justice Carpio in his dissent by stating that FPJ cannot invoke the Convention since he is no longer a child when the convention was ratified in the Philippines in September 1990 and, thus, has no retroactive effect. Moreover, he stated that the Convention has the status of a municipal law and its ratification could not have amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of the Philippines are qualified to be President. He further noted that the Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely the right to acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was apparently under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth FPJ also had the right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiations to his alleged Filipino father in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen. The majority opinion and the dissenting opinions also discussed the concepts derived from the Civil Code in relation to this issue. However, this was not given great weight by the Court since the distinctions

between legitimacy and illegitimacy codified in the Civil Code should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or infringe on the domain of political law.