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Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique Author(s): Jeffrey C. Isaac Reviewed work(s): Source: Polity, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 4-31 Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3234935 . Accessed: 05/11/2012 04:27
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the Beyond ThreeFaces of Power: A RealistCritique*

of University Indiana,Bloomington Thisarticle the science Robert critiques debateinpolitical among Lukesoverthe Dahl, PeterBachrach/Morton Baratz,and Steven method itsstudy.Theauthor of meaning powerand the proper for their three views powersharea that, aside,these argues differences of common in problem, grounded a misconception thenature social of of that leadsthem to view all causascience, powerin terms empirical of tion.Drawing recent on in philosophy science and arguments the of socialscience, challenges "empiricist" he this and perspective offers instead "realist"theory poweras socially a and structured enduring of capacities action. for C. Science Indiana at Jeffrey Isaac is Associate Professor Political of His book,Powerand Marxist A University, Bloomington. Theory: Realist waspublished Press.He View, by recently Cornell University has also published articles social theory thehistory political on and of in Political thought a number journals,including of Theory, History of Political and and of Thought, theCanadianJournal Political Social Theory. A great dealofinkhasbeenspilled of the debating meaning theconcept ofpower. Anglo-American In science fulcrum thedebate the of political is whatis sometimes called "the threefacesof power"controversy. There an airofscholasticism is this and is surrounding debate, there thus a healthy of skepticism amongmanyabouttheusefulness yetanother intervention. paper,however, not simply This in is another entry the debate.It is a critique thedebate of itself. that The debateabouttheterm on "power" rests themisconception I will thepurpose socialscience to document of is empirical regularities.
of *The authorwishesto thankthe following people fortheirhelp in preparation this David article:TerenceBall, RobertDahl, PeterManicas, Roy Bhaskar,Erik Olin Wright, Mayhew,BurtZweibach, Mike Krasner,Ian Shapiro, and Debra Kent.

C. Jeffrey Isaac

C. Jeffrey Isaac 5 that revolution and in labelthisviewempiricism suggest thebehavioral is science responsible it.Thismisconception ledmany for has to political to as think power a behavioral of of concept, referring theconjunction such "A thebehaviors twoparties, that haspower of over means B" that I in somesenseA does something getB to do something.willargue to it to thatthisviewis doublyconfused. of First, is limited situations "powerover" and failsto see that"powerover," or whatI willcall is domination, parasitic upon a "powerto." Second,it failsto disand of between possession theexercise power. the tinguish I willarguethatnoneof thethree is facesof power ableto recognize I thisbecauseof their to that commitments behaviorism.willpropose of another, accepted philosophy science-realism-enables increasingly I us to think that better aboutpower. be Moreover, willpropose power in conceived structural rather thanbehavioral terms to be clearer or, in from outset, terms thestructures of within which behavior takes the I In conclusion,willsuggest someoftheimplications this of place. argument research, for aboutthestate. as theorizing specifically it regards I. Behavioralism theFaces ofPower and The behavioral in revolution political science had has, unsurprisingly, and long-term effects the practice political on of research. important Theseeffects, havebeenmuchlessinnocent thantherevoluhowever, believed. Robert "monument a to Dahl, inhisfamous tionary vanguard successful wrote:"the behavioral is to protest," approach an attempt our of to the improve understandingpolitics seeking explain empirical by of life and of aspects political by meansof methods, theories, criteria to and proofthatare acceptable according the canons,conventions, of science."'Thisquotation someassumptions modern empirical gives of of selfthing theflavor theintellectual moment-optimistic, naively assuredabout the natureof the scientific outlookwhichwas to be emulated. as Dahl himself, But makes the of clear, success unwittingly, this movement in much thetriumph scienless of protest representedfact tificmethods than an emerging of viewof hegemony an empiricist science.Dahl quotesan earlyprescriptive which presents he as tract, and scientific: simply matter-of-factly a to the of a [Wefavor] decision explore feasibility developingnew to of behavior. Baseduponthestudy approach thestudy political
1. Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monumentto a SuccessfulProtest," American Political Science Review 58 (December 1961): 767.

the 6 Beyond Three FacesofPower of individuals political in this calls forthe situations, approach which throw can on with of light theproblems involved, theobject and testing uniformities of formulating hypotheses concerning .2 behavior...
examination thepoliticalrelationships men . of of
.

by disciplines

Thisviewof scientific as and explanation thedocumentation prediction of empirical uniformities a central was tenet thebehavioral of movement. theory, A David Eastonwrote, "any kindof generalization is or that thattwoor morethings, or activities, events, proposition asserts A covaryunderspecified conditions."3 more recentwork asserts: with of "Scienceis concerned theexplanation prediction) specific (and events means statements of which invariantly from setof are true one by circumstances another."" to and Thisunderstanding science whatI, following Bhaskar of is Roy the RomHarr6, call empiricism. takes empirical will the It world, world to of experienced occurrences, be theobjectof scientific investigation as necessities causesand natural and eschews appealto underlying any the positivist This viewextends unscientific beyond "metaphysics."' to and in claimthattheories verifiable experience refer unprobare on observables. and lematic unmediated hinges Empiricism primarily an thatthere is is which Humean,namely of or theory reality, ontology, is oneofcontingent whose of buta flux events relationship only nothing and This viewis widely by accepted philosophers social conjunction. Thus bedrock critics Humean of who scientists areotherwise empiricism. of themost KarlPopper, philosopher post-positivist important arguably which he calls betweenscientific method, science, distinguishes and "Insteadofaiming nominalism," "essentialism." "methodological he its and at defining true a out at finding what thing nature," is, really how a thing aims at describing nominalism writes, "methodological

2. Ibid., p. 764. 3. David Easton, A Systems Analysisof Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 7; see also his "AlternativeStrategiesin Theoretical Research," in Varietiesof Political Theory,ed. Easton (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall,1966). Social Inquiry(New and HenryTeune, TheLogic of Comparative 4. Adam Przeworski see viewof scientific theory, RobertT. York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970),p. 18. For a similar Holt and JohnE. Turner,eds., The Methodologyof ComparativeResearch (New York: Free Press, 1970). (London: MacMillan, 1970); and Thinking 5. Cf. Rom Harr6,Principlesof Scientific of Roy Bhaskar,A Realist Theory Science,2nd edition(AtlanticHighlands,NJ: Humaniof tiesPress, 1978). For a defense thislabel, and of thepositionwhichitdenotes,see Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1980).

C. Jeffrey Isaac 7 in behaves various and whether there any are circumstances, especially, in itsbehavior."6 regularities LikeHume,Popperassociates attempt provide definitions to real any and analyze causalnecessities medieval with scholasticism unscienand tific Also likeHume,he construes as causality constant metaphysics. conjunction. Popperwrites: meansto deducea stateTo givea causalexplanation an event of ment which one describes using premises thededuction or as of it, with more universal certain the statements, laws,together singular
initialconditions.. . . The initialconditions describe whatis usually

in calledthe"cause" of theevent question.7

is branded metaThus,becauseanytalkof natural necessity derisively and that the be to physics because only meaning canthus given causality is as empirical the becomes regularity, task of scientific explanation formulation generalizations empirof about deductive-nomological-the icalregularities which enable to predict "Whenever then us that B."' A, Thisidealofscientific once within of explanation, dominant philosophy to in has criticism philosophy. justas science, beensubjected much But, ittookpolitical scientists time some before were to they willing adoptthis has its ideal,there alsobeena lagbetween abandonment philosophers by anditsrejection political scientists. consequence this itsconOne of is by influence thedebateaboutpower. on tinuing II. The First Face ofPower Thisunderstandingscientific of explanation shapeda newand rigorous effort formalize concept power.A number articles to the of of were all on is published, variations thesametheme-power a causalrelation between behaviors twoagents, the of understood conas causality being stant conjunction.9
6. Karl R. Popper, The Open Societyand itsEnemies,Vol. I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 32. 7. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery(London: Hutchinson,1959,and New York: Harper& Row, 1968), pp. 59-60. 8. See, in additionto Popper, Carl Hempel's Aspects of Scientific Explanation(New York: Free Press, 1965), especiallypp. 364-67. As Holt and Turnerwrite:"Typically,the involvesa predicted hypothesis betweenat least two variablesand [scientific] relationship takes the generalformof 'If A, thenB.' " Holt and Turner,Methodology,p. 6. 9. See, forexample,Herbert Simon, "Notes on theObservation A. and Measurement of PoliticalPower," Journalof Politics 15 (1953); and JamesG. March, "An Introduction to the Theory and Measurementof Influence," AmericanPolitical Science Review 49 (1955).

8 Beyond Three the FacesofPower Thisapproach taken byRobert was Dahl, one ofthemostimporup tantfigures thethree in facesof power debate.Dahl, in a series artiof the of amenable thekindof to cles,argued needfora definition power research envisioned behavioralism. he wrote: Thus empirical by "power in terms modern socialscience refer subsets relations to of social among units suchthat behavior oneormore the of units response units, (the R), in on of units depend somecircumstances thebehavior other (theconis the units, then, an empirical trolling C).'o Power, regularity whereby of Dahl is explicit behavior one agentcausesthebehavior another. of that: aboutthis, noting For theassertion has power 'C overR' wecan substitute asserthe in situations which of is likethelanguage power, usedto interpret will the that to is there a possibility someevent intervene change events." order other of seems obvious. on rests a Newtonian Thatthis notion power of analogy is until at or We areall naturally rest at constant velocity, ourmovement socialagents Poweris thatforce force. altered an external whereby by to of the alter behavior other it, or, agents as Dahl puts getthem do what that Dahl wouldnototherwise Trueto hisempiricism, insists do.12 they of the between behaviors agents, there no necessary are relationships of causal in thenotion thatis strictly that writing "the onlymeaning suchthat thatis, a regular is sequence sequence: power one of regular is or what A when does something, follows, whatprobably follows, an actionbyB.""' mustbe force but Theseremarks maysoundunexceptionable, their of of smacks no his here Dahl is insisting that notion power emphasized. that involves thatits assertion nothing is notempirically metaphysics, faces power of three is of This evident. view power thebasisoftheentire of relation is All debate. ofthecontestants that power an empirical agree as of conceives power involving and any causeand effect, noneofthem call or relationships. connections, whatI willlater structural necessary conThis is notto say thatthereasonforthisis becausesubsequent
10. RobertA. Dahl, "Power," International Encyclopediaof theSocial Sciences,vol. 12 (New York, 1968), p. 407. 11. Ibid., p. 418. 12. RobertA. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," BehavioralScience2, no. 3 (July1957): 203-4. 13. RobertA. Dahl, "Cause and Effectin theStudyof Politics," in Cause and Effect, ed. Daniel Lerner(New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 94.

tion 'C's behaviorcauses R's behavior' . . . thelanguageof cause,

C. Jeffrey Isaac 9 wished endorse Humeanview.It is, rather, to the testants consciously thatthey failed challenge most to because failed to it, likely they simply it-an interesting of thepowerof a viewwhich is example recognize as neither asserted recognized such. nor The controversy about powerdoes not revolve aroundthismajor It revolves, How do we around following the instead, premise. question: in A those which wouldnot B instances which getsB to do that identify otherwise done?As Steven have Lukespoints out,thisquestion hinges on thequestion a counterfactual: would haveotherwise of What B done? Dahl's answer thisis thatB's revealed to indicate this.'4 preferences overB" means A's behavior that causesB Thus,"A haspower regularly to do something which does notwant do. Thishas beencalledthe B to "first ofpower"insofar itinvolves face as manifest instances conflict of andcompliance. hasalso beencalledthe"decisionist" It view insofar as it is limited instances actualdecisionmaking choicein action. to of or It is on thebasisofthis ofthe that interpretation counterfactual Dahl, and hisstudent NelsonPolsby, that insisted anyscientific claims about of conflict. thisinsistence, In powermustfocuson instances manifest theirunderstanding scientific of method orderto in theyemployed radical critics American of who aboutpower delegitimate society wrote without to of sort. referringregular sequences theabove-mentioned Thus in Power Political and chastised what he Polsby, hisCommunity Theory, called"categorialism," claims suchas "A haspower over B" categorical which refuse specify empirical to the the conditions, causal behaviors, under which canbe predicted act(note similarity this B to the of criticism to Popper'sinvidious distinction between nominalism methodological and essentialism). Thus Polsbywrites about the claimthatthere a is dominant class: For thislatter statement meananything a scientific to in we sense, to must,according the formal requirements postulated above, makereference specific to in decisions which outcomes particular are affected members theclassesintowhich divide of we the by and secondly, muststatethe conditions we under population, which can takeitas demonstrated theupper we that classdoesnot havemorepower thanthelower class." of are Ascriptions power, aboutthestimuli then, falsifiable predictions
14. Dahl, "The Concept of Power." 15. NelsonPolsby,Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 5-6.

10 Beyond Three the FacesofPower ofthepowerful theresponses thepowerless. and of Dahl,inhis Similarly now-classic of EliteModel," criticized Wright C. "Critique theRuling Millsbyasserting "I do notseehowanyone suppose hehas that can that established dominance a specific the of in or group a community nation without his on examination a series conof of basing analysis thecareful crete decisions.'"6 It is important seewhat these criticisms for so to accomplished, doing willclarify what article criticizing. theonehand,some this is On exactly the of and are sensible plausible points maderegarding importance very and thepossibility theoretical of criticism. the On evidence empirical the to is other hand,thewhiphandof science deployed question very to of and reference claimsaboutpowerthatdo notconform meaning Itis notDahl's emphasis theempirical, on Dahl's decisionist perspective. view on on buthisreliance empiricism, theHume/Popper of causality his with viewof power. thatis theproblem and scientific explanation,

FaceofPower III. TheSecond

and was challenged PeterBachrach viewof power The Dahl-Polsby by the MortonBaratz, who introduced notionof a "second face of Dahl and is The first that rests criticism on twopoints. Their power.""7 the in write a naively sometimes vein,as though locapositivist Polsby of a and simply question observation. were tionofpower unproblematic involves that that is insist this mistaken, all science and Bachrach Baratz a from theoare which derived of ofjudgements significance themaking is Theirsecondobjection thatDahl's formulation retical perspective. In of of feature power-the a misses crucial suppression conflict. criticizand Baratz Bachrach focuson actual conflict, ing Dahl's decisionist as define "a decision which of the they develop concept a nondecision, or of or thwarting a latent manifest challenge in results suppression that of thedecision-maker.""' to thevaluesor interests interaction, not entails simply is of Thepoint this power argumentthat is formulationalso ambiguous on Yet, butlimitations interaction. their from different Dahl's. On theone that and opento thecharge itis little conceiving a formulation, and hand,Bachrach Baratzsuggest structural
16. RobertA. Dahl, "A Critiqueof theRulingEliteModel," AmericanPoliticalScience Review 58 (1958): 463-4. 17. Cf. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American PoliticalScienceReview56 (1962): 942-52, and "Decisions and Nondecisions:An Analytic Framework," American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 632-42. These essays are Press, 1970). in reprinted the authors' Power and Poverty(New York: OxfordUniversity 18. Bachrachand Baratz, Power and Poverty,pp. 43-44.

C. Jeffrey Isaac 11 as in It that regard practices. is inthis power implicated institutionalized to refer Schattschneider's of of concept the"mobilization bias," they that: writing Politicalsystems and sub-systems of developa "mobilization and instituvalues,beliefs, rituals, bias," a set of predominant tional operate systematically procedures ("rulesofthegame")that and consistentlythebenefit certain andpersons the at to of groups of Thosewhobenefit placed a preferred are in expense others. positionto defend promote and their vested interests.'9 This formulation, comes dangerously close to postulating however, structural relations determining as the behavior, underlying risking essentialism scorned properly so trained scientific theorists. by Polsby makes point: the Thecentral is Evenifwecanshowthat given a status problem this: benefits somepeopledisproportionatelyI think can for we quo (as falls of any real worldstatusquo), sucha demonstration short thatthebeneficiaries the created status showing quo, act in any act way meaningful to maintain or could,in thefuture, effecit, to in tively deter changes it.20 Once again,themark science theexamination behavior, a of is of but status holdsno interest thetheorist for of given quo, in and of itself, power. In theend,Bachrach Baratzsacrifice interest structure and their in to theinterest science. of that actual Theysay explicitly powerinvolves and that be compliance go so faras to assert "it cannot possessed," only to they hold that "although exercised.2' Conceding behavioralism, of absence conflict be a non-event,decision a which in results premay vention conflict very of is muchan event-andan observable one, to and boot."22 Byadmitting Bachrach Baratz themselves a to this, expose criticism madebyGeoffrey Debnam-thatimplicit their in formulation
19. Ibid. 20. Polsby, Community Power, p. 208, emphasisadded. See also RaymondWolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," AmericanPolitical Science Review 65 For an interesting (1971), fora similarcriticism. whichPolsby/ critiqueof the positivism fall of Wolfinger into,and a defense thepossibility discovering of covertdecisionsof Bachrachand Baratz's sort,see Frederick Frey's"Nondecisionsand theStudyof Local Politics: 21. Bachrachand Baratz, Power & Poverty,p. 19. 22. Ibid., p. 46.

A Comment," American Political Science Review (1971). 65

12 Beyond Three the FacesofPower is an important distinction between as and as power nondecision, power of mobilization bias.Theformer refers behavioral to differregularities, the face insofar itincludes as covert instances supof ingfrom first only as of The is pression well as overtinstances compliance.23 latter an and ultimately non-behavioral unexplicated phenomenon. Polsby's criticism thusdecisive: is "How to study secondfaceof power? this To whatmanifestations social reality of the mobilization bias of might to amenable empirical refer? phenomena thissortin principal Are of Bachrach Baratznever and answer questhis investigation?"24 explicitly basis abouttheinstitutional of but instead their sacrifice tion, insight of "mobilization bias" whichI have labelled to the scholarly power empiricism. IV. The Third Face ofPower Bachrach Steven Lukes,in hisPower:A Radical View, picksup where view"ofpower their "twodimensional andBaratz off.He applauds left He as an advanceoverDahl's "one dimensional" perspective. agrees aboutwhich of thatthestudy powerinvolves questions interpretative and Baratz's thatBachrach but to phenomena study, he also believes As he writes their of "is of critique Dahl's behaviorism too qualified." formulation: individuals of a It gives misleading and, picture thewaysin which in succeed excluding and institutions, above all, groups potential are Decisions choices the issuesfrom political consciously process. betweenalternatives, made by individuals and intentionally and can the whereas bias of thesystem be mobilized, recreated, chosennor the in reinforced waysthatare neither consciously of sustained a series indiis thebias of thesystem notsimply by chosenacts,butalso, moreimportantly, thesocially by vidually of and behavior groups, pracand structured culturally patterned be which indeed manifested individuals' of tices institutions may by
inaction.25

individuals'choices. . intendedresultof particular

. Moreover,

of of is that Lukesthus proposes iftheconcept power totakeaccount the itself limit it and is interactionitself shaped limited, cannot wayinwhich
23. Geoffrey Debnam, "Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and Baratz," AmericanPolitical Science Review 69 (September1975). 24. Polsby, Community Power, p. 190. 25. StevenLukes, Power: A Radical View(London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 22-23.

C. Jeffrey Isaac 13 to instances behavioral of as compliance theone-and two-dimensional exercise power avert of to do. He asks,"Is notthesupreme views conand the flict grievance influencing, and by shaping, determining perceptionsand preferences others?"26 of thoseof Dahl and Lukessubmits hisviewof power, that alongwith Bachrach Baratz, "can be seenas alternative and all and interpretations of of accordapplications one and thesameunderlying concept power, A A B overB when affects ina manner conpower ingto which exercises to It of trary B's interests.""1 is Lukeswhomakestheconcept interest central thedebate, itis important seehowmuch similarities to to his yet with predecessors his his Lukesagrees that outweigh differences. power is a causalconcept behavioral He too denoting regularities. agrees that "A has power overB" meansthatA's behavior causesB to do somethat do. thing B wouldnototherwise As Lukesputsit,"any attribution oftheexercise power . . always . a of counterfactual."28 implies relevant In thecases of thefirst facesof power, counterfactualprotwo the is videdbytheexistence empirical of between revealed conflict the preferences of A and B. Lukes differs fromtheseviewsin insisting that can be of of He preferences themselves theeffect theexercise power. thus insists what woulddo otherwise that B cannot gauged be properly B's by but defines as preferences, rather B's interests. by Lukes,then, power follows: exercises "A B to poweroverB whenA affects contrary B's interest."29 concept power The of can thusrefer relations to between A and B evenin theabsence empirical of conflict. Lukes contends thatthisviewcaptures essence poweras an the of relation between and B andthat soledifference A the between empirical this viewand those articulated hisantagonists that"thoseholding is by thethree different viewsof powerI havesetout offer different interof are as and pretations what tocount interests howthey be adversemay Lukes'sviewis thattheconcept interest, what of or has lyaffected."30 beencalled"objective refers what agent to an would under do interest," idealdemocratic circumstances. It thusfollows ifitcan be plausibly that A that affects in a manner B which B limits from argued doingwhatB

26. StevenLukes, "Power and Authority,"in A Historyof Sociological Anslysis,ed. Tom Bottomoreand RobertNisbet(New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 669. 27. Lukes, Power: A Radical View,p. 27. 28. Ibid., p. 41. 29. Ibid., pp. 22-25. 30. Ibid., p. 27.

FacesofPower 14 Beyond Three the would under do idealconditions, itcanbe properly that exerthen said A cisespower overB.3' has Thisnotion objective of interest beensubjected a great to dealof will someof which be discussed below.Butregardless the of criticism, merit Lukes'sunderstandinginterests, importance theconof the of of in to poweras an ceptforhimis grounded his commitment viewing he of Despite his criticisms his antagonists, is empirical regularity. a shared Insofar this as is that concept. explicit he is merely interpreting and is like of Lukes'sformulation, that Bachrach Baratz, ambigutrue, and dimenthe structured culturally ous regarding "socially patterned" sionof power. Lukesseeksto clarify In a lateressay,"Powerand Structure," this, mustbe synthesized and thatstructural empirical approaches arguing and Social is that of andsuggesting there a "dialectic power structure."32 is an event-like and power, structure limits action, phenomenon, being not he says,is an "agency"concept, a discernible Power, empirically. that "structural" by one, yethe writes it "is heldand exercised agents determinants."" and within or collective) systems structural (individual and between the somewhat relation Thisclarifies power structure-social is exercised. italso But which within thelimits structure power provides discussion of Lukes'searlier the leavesunanswered problem posedby of whatis thenature these In other terms. in words, power structural If is are Howdetermining they? power of determinantspower? structural and if it denotes than a structural an agencyconceptrather one, between is then behavioral regularities, whatprecisely the difference and Baratz?Is it and theviewof Bachrach faceof power Lukes'sthird
has as 31. Ibid., pp. 34-35. This viewof interests, Lukes acknowledges, been developed WilliamE. Connolly,"On 'Interests'in Politics," Politicsand Society,2, no. 4 (Sumby his Habermas, particularly mer 1972). This conceptionowes muchto the workof Jiurgen links and Human Interests(Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Lukes explicitly Knowledge of in to himself the idiom of criticaltheory a laterpaper, "On the Relativity Power," in in the Social Sciences, ed. S. C. Brown (Sussex and New Jersey: PhilosophicalDisputes curiousthatin a morerecent paper and Humanities,1979), p. 267. It is therefore Harvester of conception objectiveinterest, he rejectsHabermas's (and his own earlier)transcendental in optinginsteadfora Weberiansubjectivism manywaysakinto Polsby. See StevenLukes, "Of Gods and Demons: Habermasand PracticalReason," in Habermas: CriticalDebates, ed. John B. Thompson and David Held (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1982). This is an issue on which Lukes shows some confusion.For a critique,see Michael Bloch, Brian Heading, and Phillip Lawrence, "Power in Social Theory: A Non-RelativeView," in Brown,PhilosophicalDisputes, pp. 243-60. 32. See StevenLukes, "Power and Structure,"in Essays in Social Theory,ed. Steven Lukes (London: Macmillan, 1977). of 33. See Lukes, "Power & Authority,"p. 635; "Relativity Power," pp. 263-4.

C. Jeffrey Isaac 15 a class thosewhich involve the simply focuson a different of events, of objective interest rather thansimply If compliance? transgression his of and does is Lukes'sview different, bifurcation power structure not us Lukesseems unable articulate to the go farin showing how.In short, nature socialpower of herightly structural is notes, so important. which, In theend,Lukesleanstoward viewof powerdiffering from a little in terms behavof thatof hispredecessors. them, views Like he power ioralregularities rather their than structural determinants. likethem And he conflates possession powerwithits exercise, of the that insisting rather a structural Lukesexplicitly one. is an agency than power concept rejectsthe locution"power to," and insteadacceptsan exclusive on is in emphasis "powerover."Forhim, power exhausted interaction, in theregularity which can getB to do something, having A with thus overB. His formulation leavesno roomforconsideration the of power to act which possessed A and B, and which are are enduring powers by to He inattention thelocution to brought bearin interaction. justifies that the of "powerto" byarguing itis "out oflinewith central meaning as traditionally and withthe concerns understood thathave power of students power.""3 it is precisely tradiBut this alwayspreoccupied tionalidiomthatI wishto question. adequateformulation the An of of must that one exercises over concept power recognize thepower agent in another is to the agent interactionparasitic uponthepowers actwhich agents possess. The purpose theabove discussion beento demonstrate of has some rootsimilarities the of facesof power conamong contestants thethree and troversy, to pointout thatthedebateaboutpowerhas beenconductedwithin rathernarrowparameters. within these Nonetheless, someserious are And parameters, problems leftunresolved. whilethe irresolution conflict notalways signal something of is a of in awry, this caseitmay indicate needtobroaden parameters debate, in the the of and factto free discussion the from behavioralist its legacy. Themajorunresolved of concerns problem the of difficultythedebate thelimits within which interaction or I the occurs, what havecalled structural nature power. of Thisproblem proven has inarticulable within the confines thedebate, virtue theshared of in of established the premise, by behavioral that causationof one revolution, poweris the empirical actor'sbehavior thatof another actor.Bachrach Baratz, well and as by as Lukes,have failed develop structural to the dimension power of to which rightly Thisis nota problem Dahl,whonever for they raises point.
34. Lukes, Power: A Radical View,p. 31.

16 Beyond Three the FacesofPower this HowDahl's viewis themost issue,and in this respect consistent."3 is at to its ever, consistencypurchased a price-itsinability conceptualize in thewaypower implicated theconstitution theconditions interis of of action.Dahl's critics that insist, rightly, A can have powerover B B in in in it the of without being casethat resists anyway, fact virtue B's it the havebeenableto However, doesnotseemthat critics quiescence. it a To formulate clearalternative conception. takean example, seems has to reasonable claimthatthe SovietCommunist Partyapparatus and eventhough clearly it doesnot workers peasants overSoviet power of in of overthem situations actualconflict revealed preferences, prevail and this us from butDahl's view would claiming (I do notmean, prevent that logicofhisartithe do notbelieve, Dahl woulddeny that this, only with is thisexample, it cles aboutpowerwoulddenyit). Yet, to stick of and classinterests theworkers abouttheobjective to argue necessary not. Thereis of course in orderto say this?I shouldthink peasants but commonsensical one another appearsstartlingly possibility, which of whichviolatesthe basic premise the threefacesdebate-thatthe of of CPSU has powerovertheSovietmassesby virtue thestructure is monopolized a single in which Soviet by party. power political society in it in essentialist Popper'ssense, that is Thisclaimis, however, clearly for rather thanin thesearch of in thenature Sovietsociety interested Such theoretical uniformities. behavioral therefore, interests, require the facescontroversy; require thangoing more they rejectbeyond three foundation. is which thecontroversy's ingtheempiricism and V. Realism SocialScience which at therootof thedebate is the As I haveemphasized, empiricism of aboutthenature doctrine an about poweris primarily ontological Few social theorists and the aim of scientific explanation. causality have Kuhn like conventionalists Thomas what woulddeny contemporary access the is us-that science irreducibly interpretative,scientist's taught frameand to theworldbeingmediated theconceptual theoretical by behavioralism, works hisor herscience.36 of political However, through
35. JamesMarch, "The Power of Power," in Varieties Political Theory,ed. David of of PrenticeHall, 1966), pp. 67-68. As he writes:"The measurement Easton (New Jersey: to in thatconform some variantof theforcemodel [i.e., poweris usefulprimarily systems the recentresearchcorrectly, class of socialbehavioralcompliance]. ... If I interpret thanI preusefulconceptis muchsmaller in choicesituations whichpoweris a significantly viouslybelieved." 36. On "conventionalism,"see Russell Keat and JohnUrry,Social Theoryas Science (London: Routledge& Kegal Paul, 1975). See also Harold I. Brown,Perception,Theory,

C. Jeffrey Isaac 17 have scientists accepted without this the of questioning ontology empirRealist of science involves critique this a of icism. ontology. philosophy realists the of laws Contemporary reject understandingnatural as conand as of sequences tingent empirical regularities of causality regular events."Theydefend concept natural the of that necessity, scientific and of whichare not laws explainthe properties dispositions things reducible their to The of effects. physical properties copper empirical electrical are, exam(malleability, fusibility, ductility, conductivity), for not contingent effects antecedent causedby events; theyare the ple, which be accounted by can ofcopper a metal, as for enduring properties itsatomic In as structure. this is view, causality understood theactualizationoftheproperties realnatural with of entities causalpowers."3 Scientists theories which the of like develop explain phenomena experience, thefact copper that conducts does and electricity string not,byan appeal to thestructures which them. generate In therealist such view,theworldis notconstituted thatit can be events under laws "whenexplained subsuming by covering oftheform Harr6 of ever then Rather, is composed a complex what B." of calls it A, or whichoperatein an "powerful particulars," causal mechanisms, but manner. RoyBhaskar As in writes unpredictable notundetermined hisinfluential RealistTheory Science: A of it science is concerned with of there essentially whatkinds things areandwith what tend do; itis only to concerned they derivatively with what to It predicting is actually going happen. is onlyrarely, and normally under conditions which artificially are and produced that can controlled, scientists do thelatter. And,when do, they its lies in thatit castson theenduring significance precisely thelight natures and waysof acting independently of and existing transactive factually things.39 Thisunderstandingscience of doesnoteschew but empirical evidence, construes evidence themeansbywhich this as scientists underexplain causes.In therealist is in lying view,thisunderstandingimplicit what
and Commitment: New Philosophyof Science(Chicago: University Chicago Press, The of 1977). Indispensableis Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge(London: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1970). 37. See Harr6,Principles;Bhaskar,Realist Theory;and Keat and Urry, Social Theory. 38. See Rom Harre and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New Jersey:Rowman and Littlefield, 1975). 39. Bhaskar,Realist Theory,p. 51.

The worldconsistsof things, events.. . . On thisconception not of

18 Beyond Three the FacesofPower in scientists classification do, schemata, their actually in their experiof and in theirdevelopment causal concepts.Stephen mentation, writes thescientist: of Toulmin that are with conviction things notjust happening the He begins butrather somefixed that set evenjust-happening-regularly) (not for accounts Nature's or oflawsorpatterns mechanisms following of should his thatitdoes,and that understandingthese thecourse he of hisexpectations. Furthermore, has thebeginnings an guide for are these lawsandmechanisms ... [and]heis looking ideawhat and will which showhimhowto trim shapehisideasfurevidence
ther..
.

for . This is what makes 'phenomena' important him.4o

in and Scienceis thus both essentialist metaphysical Popper's and invidious sense.Butitdoesnottherefore any presume immutaPolsby's that nor abouttheworld, does it presume it can be or teleology bility thatthe It instead, rationally perceived. presumes, unproblematically that of existsindependently humanexperience, it has certain world and the and through development enduring properties, thatscience, can cometo havesomeknowledge theoretical of criticism explanations, of on can of it. No greater testimony be provided behalf thisviewthan to in a 1931letter thepositivist Einstein Albert thatof themature who, wrote: Moritz Schlick, to fails In general yourpresentation to correspond myconceptual too so orientation to speakmuch whole as insofar I find your style

at out: Physicsis theattempt the . positivistic. .. I tellyou straight

and of of construction a model therealworld itslawful conceptual of the I under (unsharp) structure. In short, suffer separation ...
Realityof Experienceand Realityof Being. . . . You willbe aston-

and four- twoBut Einstein. every aboutthe"metaphysicist" ished thismetaphysicist."' is animal de facto legged

with concerned the be would similarly socialscience In therealist view, of construction modelsof the social worldand its lawfulstructure. The primary analysiswould not be behavioral object of theoretical that socialrelationships structure them.42 but regularities, theenduring
40. StephenToulmin,Foresightand Understanding (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 75. 41. Quoted in Gerald Holton, "Mach, Einstein,and the Search forReality,"Daedalus 97 (Spring 1968). 42. See Roy Bhaskar, The Possibilityof Naturalism:A Philosophical Critiqueof the Press, 1979). See also my"Realism and Human Sciences(Sussex: Harvester Contemporary

C. Jeffrey Isaac 19 This approach neednot result a form hyper-determinism in of which reifies socialstructure. the by Indeed, idea of socialstructure developed of of realists basedon a categorical is rejection thebifurcation structure that and human has is Giddens argued there a "dualAnthony agency.43 are He ityof structure.""" proposesthatsocial structures both the medium theeffect human and neither of action. such, As exist they apart from activities the which nor human they concepgovern from agents' tions these of activities. thesametime, At are condithey also a material tionofthese of activities. Giddens theanalogy language illustrate to uses this:there without and wouldbe no language speakers speaking, yet is the of has language at thesametime medium speech. Language structural on drawin order perform to communicaproperties which agents tiveacts. The majorpointof thisapproachis thatpurposive human has are which therelatively relaactivity socialpreconditions, enduring tions that (e.g., husband/wife, capitalist/worker, citizen/representative) constitute complexity anygiven the of Individuals groups and society. within these and them conditions, participate reproducing transforming in thecourse their of As Giddens "In writes: respect of ordinary lives."' the task is to sociology, crucial of nomological theoretical] [i.e., analysis be found theexplanation theproperties structures."46 in of of of VI. The Concept PowerRevisited We arenowina better to the of position appreciate limitations thethree facesof powerdebateand to reformulate concept power.The the of behavioralist foundations thedebate of constrained participants its from as anything thana behavioral more andpreconceiving power regularity vented them from it To seeing as an enduring capacity. do so, ofcourse,

Social Scientific Explanation: A Critiqueof Porpora," Journal for the Theoryof Social Behaviour 13, no. 3 (October 1983). 43. See PeterT. Manicas, "On theConceptof Social Structure," the Journalfor Theory of Social Behaviour 10, no. 2 (1980). 44. See Anthony Giddens,New Rules of SociologicalMethod (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 121; and Bhaskar, Possibilityof Naturalism,pp. 39-43. Giddens has further in Univerdevelopedthisnotionof structure CentralProblemsof Social Theory (Berkeley: sityof CaliforniaPress, 1979), and A Contemporary Critiqueof HistoricalMaterialism of (Berkeley:University CaliforniaPress, 1981). 45. On transformation Bhaskar,Possibilityof Naturalism,pp. 42-45; Giddens has see called the processof the constitution and transformation social structures of "structuration." See his "On theTheoryof Structuration," Studiesin Social and Political Theory, in ed. Giddens (New York: Basic Books, 1977). 46. Giddens,New Rules, p. 160.

20 Bevond Three the FacesofPower risks whatNagelhas called"objectionable presupposing metaphysical in viewof science, But,as I havesuggested, therealist implications." about nature causalmechanisms the of are presuppositions theenduring of Itis only great that discusessence actualscientific at cost the practice. santsof power haveeschewed suchpremises. Pitkin rightly has outthatempiricist theories powerhave of pointed in inattention linguistic abusedlanguage their to and complexities to for ofmeaning."' Jack observation: Witness, example, Nagel's questions can mean anything we Words,as Humpty Dumptyobserved, to to I do definitions? so choosethem mean.Whybother dispute are merelyarbitrary, whereas preciselybecause definitions to agreement are potentially tests. subject hypotheses producing definitions those are which direct efforts themost useful Therefore, to empirical research."' of Thiswas, as we haveseen,theattitude thebehavioralist innovators a should the of the acquire forregarding concept power-that concept and of scientific to notion amenable their mal definition explanation is to The falsification. first thing noteabout this,however, thatthis If in definifailure itsownterms. themostuseful was effort a striking then toward direct efforts tionsare thosewhich research, the empirical as facesof powerdebatecan onlybe adjudgedfruitless, it has three conforms themethods to that in of resulted a dearth research actually is view The empiricist of definition simply by prescribed thedebate.'9 on in but wrong, it is mistaken a waythatshedslight thetheoretical of sterility thedebateoverpower. of used Wordscan onlybe intelligibly in thecontext their previous to themselves one partheorists confined have power usage.Empiricist to ticular locution, "power over," corresponding theirbeliefthata
of and 47. See Hannah Feneichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein Justice(Berkeley:University CaliforniaPress, 1972), pp. 264-86. 48. Jack Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 175. that 49. My pointhereis not thatthedebate has failedto stimulate inquiry.It is simply most of the researchdone on power, even by Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz, does not to Two studieswhichattempt "operationto conform thestandardsof empiricism. strictly alize" the concepts discussed are Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politicsof Air Pollution Press, 1971), and JohnGaventa, Power and (Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkins University of Powerlessness:Quiescenceand Rebellionin an Appalachian Valley(Urbana: University its book does operationalize purthatneither IllinoisPress, 1980). I would argue,however, of abandonment a conportedmethod,and thatthe successof theseworksis due to their cern withmethodology.

C. Jeffrey Isaac 21 What is regularities. propersocial scienceis a scienceof behavioral is crucial that.they all failed provide realdefinition power,50 have to a of instead operational an definition theform, haspower of "A substituting not but describe potentialities actualevents." "Power" derives from Latinpotere, "to the meaning be able." It is usedtodenote property, a orcapacity effect to generally ability, things.52 Theattribution properties capacities a common of or is feature everyof that daylife, e.g.,"thatcaris fast."Thisdoesnotmean ordinary ascriptions constitute scientific valid butitdoesindicate conthe explanations, of senseoftheterm with arguments the gruence theordinary developed here. to of outlined above,powers According therealist philosophy science are a central of science. Harr6writes: As matter natural "To subject or a to is aboutwhat ascribe power a thing material to saysomething it is to referred above,to say thatconductivitya powerof copperis to an enduring to claimthatcopper capacity conduct electricity possesses in in thatis intrinsic itsnature, thiscase itsatomic I structure.wantto thatsocial science similarly with ascription be concerned the of argue to social agents, and withthe explanatory reference these of powers to intrinsic natures. theintrinsic of natures socialagents powers agents' By I meannottheir characteristics individuals, their as but social unique in identities participants enduring, as structured socially relationships. of Theories power, should conceived interpretative be as then, models, to of consideraby developed socialscientists subject therigors critical which action. speakin To tion,aboutthesocialstructures shapehuman thiswayof thesocialstructures account power no different that for is from of that for speaking theatomicstructure accounts conductivity. Bothsorts claimareequally of are to fallible, equally subject theoretical and empirical criticism are equally and with concerned underlying, and causalmechanisms. non-observable,
will or can do ... in virtue its intrinsic To of nature.""3 use an example over B meansthat.. . ." Power, a potential to word,becomesredefined

50. See Peter T. Manicas and ArthurN. Kruger,Logic: The Essentials (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), pp. 34-38, on real definitions. 51. I am here buildingupon an important essay by TerenceBall, "Power, Causation, and Explanation," Polity8, no. 2 (Winter1975). See also his "Models of Power: Past and Present," Journalof the Historyof the Behavioral Sciences (July1975); and his "Two Concepts of Coercion," Theoryand Society 15, no. 1 (January1978). 52. See "Power," OxfordEnglishDictionary (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1933),p. 1213; see also Pitkin,Wittgenstein Justice,pp. 274-79. & 53. Rom Harr6, "Powers," British Journalof thePhilosophyof Science21 (1970): 85.

22 Beyond Three the FacesofPower and VII. Power, Structure, Agency Social powershouldbe understood by relationally, whichI meanin of terms theunderlying relations structure behavioral social which interinthebehaviors action and notinterms thecontingent of of regularities discreteagents who may have no necessary to one relationship and for is The teacher student, example, not between another.54 relation in a contingent two to relation between parties happen engage interwho is action.It is an historically the of relation, nature which preenduring that and of teachers havestudents viceversa.It is thenature these cisely As it to nature socialidentities be inrelation oneanother. such, is their to as to possess be certain which cannot conceived simply powers, powers thepowerto design the The teacher contingent regularities. possesses The and and classroom direct activities, give grade assignments. syllabus, to to do theschoolwork, to and student thepower attend class, possesses to the Thesepowers actare partofthe evaluate teacher's performance. are notregularities, of nature therelationship. strictly speaking, They of and activities. possession The butareroutinely performed purposeful is to in theperformance socialactivities necessary these of these powers is exercise these of but Thus, activities, thesuccessful powers contingent. and in notsucceed directing classroom's the theteacher activities, may nullified. is notthereby Buttheteacher's theclassmaybe unruly. power is the failure direct classroom a difto consistent teacher's Anyparticular wewould orher wellnullify his and ferent However, power. story, itmay to unsuited theroleofteacher is he/she a badteacher, then likely that say with the associated the unableto exercise socialpowers and personally in to of teachers general the role. More generally, persistent inability teacherthatthe classrooms their direct may successfully wellindicate their are and students exercising powers is relation incrisis, that student subordination. their to contest to social poweras thecapacities actpossessedby I willthusdefine in relations which participate. in socialagents virtue the they of enduring as a between broadsenseof power thecapability Giddens distinguishes to and of an actorto intervene, a narrower sense,as "the capability on of outcomes the where realization these outcomes secure depends the is as of agency others.""WhatI havedefined socialpower thelatter. used is situations, the many power properly to describe Thus,while term in which resides his.45 as forinstance neighbor's ability persuasive my
discussiondraws heavilyfromChapter3 of myPower and Marxist 54. The following Press, 1987). Theory:A Realist View(Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity 55. Giddens, CentralProblems,p. 93.

C. Jeffrey Isaac

23

Magnum, the termsocial power is intendedto call attention the way to thecapacityto act is distributed generalized and enduring social relaby is tionships it thecase thatmypersuasive (is neighbor also a policeman?). In thissense,social powerinvolveswhatGiddenscalls relations interof dependence. The teacher's power entails the student's presence and act requiresthatthe student in a certainway. This relational understandingof power clarifies the distinction between"power to" and "power over," or whatI would call relations of domination and subordination, distinction a in facesof ignored thethree thatsocial relationsdistribute power debate. I have suggested powerto act in certainways to those who participate them. Insofaras thisis in true, it is these relations,ratherthan the behaviorswhichtheyshape, whichare the materialcauses of interaction. return the teacher/ To to studentexample: the teacher's behavior does not cause the student's behaviorin thissense,and thestudent's behavioris notsimply response a to the teacher'sstimulus.Rather,the teacher/student relationship providestheteacherwiththepowerto givehomework whichis assignments, or exercisedin interaction successfully unsuccessfully withthe student. The relationship thematerialcause of interaction, specific is the waysin whichtheteacherand the student, who is equally a purposiveagent,act as the efficient cause. This sortof structural determination poweris precisely of whatBachrach and Baratz, and Lukes, gesturedat but failedto articulate.They were interested the reason why the studentis subordinateand saw in that is rightly thissubordination not properly conceivedas simply cona tingent regularity. They suspectedthattherewas some necessary institutional cause of this subordination but, because theylacked a capacityconcept of power, theycould not clarify this. I want to suggestthat a theoretical of explanation thesubordination students of mustanalyzethe structure educationand theway poweris distributed thisstructure. of by Whateverregularities existin behaviormustbe explainedwithreference to the structural relationsof power. To propose this is not to detach the concept of power fromhuman agency.As I definedit, social powerrefers thecapacitiesto act which to are possessed by agentsin virtueof theirsocial relations.But what are theserelationsbut idioms of humanconduct?To say thatteachersand students in a certainstructural are is relationship onlyto say thatthere are people called teachersand studentswho do characteristically the whichtherelationship things involves.If social poweris neverexercised, it can hardlybe said to exist. But its exerciseis always shaped and constrainedby certainenduring relations.I am going to school thisafternoon to givea lecture Dahl, and in doingso, however on unintentionally,

24 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power I am exercising the power of a teacher. The sorts of structurally distributed exercisedin the powers which I have discussedare constantly courseof ordinary life,at home,at work,at school, at thetax collector's Bosses by nature office,and the exerciseof themis always contingent. but have the powerto supervise the may production, tomorrow workers strike.Teachers by naturehave the power to conductclass lessons,but tomorrow students the may boycottclass and conducttheirown teachof in. It is a necessaryfeatureof the existing structure educationthat of But are and students subordinate. theexercise these teachers dominant is the way thisrelationship workedout in concretepractice,is powers, determined the way particularindividualsand groups by contingent, choose to deal withtheircircumstances. connectedto The contingency the exerciseof power is, ultimately, of and the fact that of history, anotherimportant reality-the openness Insofaras not are social structures onlyrelatively enduring, immutable. in it the exerciseof poweris alwayscontingent, is constantly negotiated of life.Thus not onlytheexercise power,but the thecourse of everyday can of veryexistence relationsof power themselves, become objects of contentionand struggle. In such strugglessubordinate groups will obviouslybe at a disadvantage.But theyneversimplyrespond to the of behaviorof the powerful.The reproduction the relationship always the involvestheiragency,whichcan be mobilizedas well to transform less a model of stimulus itself.Power relations approximate relationship and and morea modelof endemicreciprocity, and response, negotiation, withboth dominantand subordinategroups mobilizingtheir struggle, of A powersand resources. theory powermustanalyzestructural specific are workedout concretely sociallysituated and theway they relations by is humanbeings.To thinkof thelatterapart fromtheformer mistaken. to mistaken ignorethe way people make theirown hisBut it is equally tory,even if theydo not do so underconditionsof theirown choosing.

VIII. PowerandInterest
into the three the Lukes, we may recall, introduced conceptof interest of While a fulltreatment theconceptwould facesof powercontroversy. about theconnection go beyondthescope of thispaper, some comments are betweenpower and interest in order. is For Lukes, the concept of interest necessaryto the discussionof What powerinsofaras it answersto the questionof the counterfactual: A's behavior?I have arguedthatthisway of would B do wereit not for thinkingabout power is mistakenand that ratherthan treatingA's thestructural behavioras thecause of B's behavior,we should focus-on

C. Jeffrey Isaac

25

relations thatbindA and B together, theseas thematerial cause viewing of bothA's and B's conduct.In thissense,Lukes's counterfactual question does not figurein my account, because I reject the Newtonian on B which premise whichit rests.RatherthanA getting to do something B would not otherwise social relationsof power typically involve do, both A and B doing what theyordinarily would do. The structure of not teachers,causes students act like students, to education, just as it causes teachersto act like teachers.Teachers and students, giventheir would not otherwise anything whatteachers social identities, do but and do. a of students nor regularly And neither conflict revealedpreferences, of objectiveinterests, mustbe discoveredin orderto attribute powerto theseroles. As Lukes recognizes, relationof powercan existeven in theabsence a of an empiricalconflictof revealedpreferences. to However, contrary of Lukes, a relationof powercan also existin the absence of a conflict It objectiveinterests. may well be the case thatmypower over mystudentsis in theirbest interest, the relationship not forthatreason but is and subordination. Lukes's own formulation anyless one of domination would seem to deny this, openinghim up to the chargesof vanguardism.'5 However, to say that the use of the concept of power does not in logicallyrequirerecourseto the concept of interest the way Lukes has argues is not to denythat the idea of interest a role to play in the so analysisof power. As poweris determined social structure, too is by interest. We mustbe clearabout what"interest"means,forithas at leastthree thatmustbe distinguished. first The of refers meanings meaning interest to therevealed,or subjective, In preferences actuallyheldby individuals. thissense,as I have suggested, conceptis not epistemically the necessary to claimsabout social power.Different individuals have different preferences. Some mayliketheir social role. Some maynot. Some maynotand yet preferto do nothingabout it. We can talk about the structure of to of power in the classroomwithoutreference the preferences the stueveniftheyprefer remainso. This is notto to dents,who are subordinate are denythatpeoples's preferences causallyimportant, onlyto question Dahl's view of whytheyare. The second meaningis Lukes's idea of "objective interest," what i.e.
56. See Peter Abell, "The Many Faces of Power and Liberty:Revealed Preference, Autonomy, and Teleological Explanation," Sociology 11, no. 1 (January 1977); K. Thomas, "Power and Autonomy: FurtherCommentson the Many Faces of Power," Sociology 12, no. 2 (May 1978); and G. W. Smith,"Must Radicals Be Marxists?Lukes on and Power, Contestability, Alienation," British Journalof Political Science 11 (1978).

26 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power or he so reallyis in theinterest, good, of an agentwhether thinks or not. I have arguedthatwe need not have recourseto thisconceptin orderto locate a relationof power, for the peasant with a gun to her head is is WhileI believethat subordinate evenif collectivization in herinterest. of we can thus talk about power independently the issue of objective or I interests, do not believethattheconceptis unintelligible irrelevant, to We as manyof Lukes's criticshave claimed.57 will return thisissue. These two usages have preoccupied theoristsin the debate about in way. I may also be understood a third power,but theidea of interest will call this "real interests"and defineit as those norms,values, and in purposesimplicit the practiceof social lifeand associated withsocial are interests real because of roles as principles action.5"So understood, in are causallyeffective practicein a sensein whichobjectiveinterthey X to estsare not. To return theteacher/student example:Professor may in her class; she may have an for have a preference extreme discipline a as objectiveinterest, a pedagogue,in teaching seminar;but as a college in teachershe has a real interest teachinga particular body of English the guidelinesof the university work within (grades, exams, schedules, that is shared by college room assignments, etc.). This is the interest her as such. Similarly, students in system Englishteachers theuniversity have an objective to may prefer read RollingStone magazine;theymay in in interest readingShakespeare;but as students theuniversity system the somehowfulfilling course in theyhave a real interest goingto class, and college credit. requirements, getting What I have called real interests obviouslyplay a centralrole in the of constitution social power. They are thepracticalnormswhichjustify the whichcharacterizes and legitimate power relations.The rationality subordinain role of theuniversity students, thisexample,sustainstheir to whilethe proletarian tion. Similarly, may prefer make more money of in and may have an objectiveinterest the transformation capitalism in into socialism,he has, in a capitalistic society,a real interest finding mustbe tailoredto of and keepinga job. The satisfaction hispreferences the to he thisand thusdespitehis objectiveinterests, is unlikely challenge which characterizesthe role of system. Once again, the rationality of workerin a capitalistsocietysustainsthe structure power.59 thus requiresan analysisof the real interests The analysis of power and of the ideologieswhichsustainit. The analysisof ideologyand its
Power, pp. 223-24. 57. See particularly Polsby, Community Classes (London: Verso, 1985). 58. See Erik Olin Wright, 59. For a finerecentdiscussionof this,see JoelRogersand JoshuaCohen, On Democracy(London: Penguin, 1984).

C. Jeffrey Isaac

27

to connection powerplayeda centralrole in whatMills called "classical social theory,"60 and yet ideology has receivedverylittleattention in debates among politicalscientists about power. I would, at the same time, argue that the analysis of power also This of sense, an analysisof objectiveinterests. requires,in a different coursehingeson thequestionof therelationship betweenfactand value, and of description versusevaluation,in social analysis.Many of Lukes's critics, particularly Polsby, ridicule any attemptto move from an of social reality a critique it. However,manycontemporary to of analysis have arguedthatitis bothpossibleand necessary do so.6' to philosophers There are two ways in whichwriters withpowerhave dealt with dealing thisand whileboth are problematic, in thereis merit theirinterest an in intent. analysisof powerwithpractical,emancipatory The first is of strategy thatof Lukes and, moregenerally, Habermas, whichmay be called theneo-Kantian approach. In thisview,theanalyst of power mustjudge empiricalreality againsta postulatedideal conditionof autonomousagency.Habermas's ideal speechsituation, which in individualscould hypothetically engage in "undistortedcommunication" about what to do, is paradigmatic.62 The problem with this to approach is not that it enjoins the theorist make normative judgementsabout the actionsof others.All normative fromPlato to theory, does this.The problemis thatit Dahl's A Prefaceto DemocraticTheory, detaches the analysis of objective interest fromthe analysis of actual As powerrelations. in Kant,thisviewseemsto reston a sharpdichotomy betweenthe real world of causal relations and an ideal worldof autonwiththis omy. How those subject to relationsof power mightidentify ideal conditionand be inclinedto bringit about is leftproblematic.63 The second strategy that most often associated with is Marxists.If thefirst failsto bridgethegap between Luka.csian thereal and strategy the ideal, the second obliterates It does this by positinga teleology it. thosein a subordinate whereby positionare either actuallyor immanent-

60. See C. WrightMills, The Sociological Imagination(London: Oxford University Press, 1956). 61. See particularly Roy Bhaskar,"Scientific Explanationand Human Emancipation," Radical Philosophy(Autumn 1980). 62. See Juirgen Habermas,Knowledge& Human Interests, and his "On Systematically DistortedCommunication,"Inquiry13 (1970). 63. On thisdualismin Habermas, see QuentinSkinner's"Habermas's Reformation," The New YorkReview of Books (October 1, 1982), pp. 35-39; on Lukes's failings this in and the Sociologyof Power," Sociology 15, regard,see Ted Benton,"Objective Interests no. 2 (May 1981).

28 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power of One consequenceof system power.64 ly in oppositionto the existing this is that discreteacts of resistance,and more ordinaryformsof are as and conflict, inaccurately interpreted signsof a movenegotiation This menttowardsocial transformation. mistakeleads to themoralizing of theoreticalanalysis, and a failureto recognizethe coherenceand of stability social forms.A second consequenceof thisis an inattention it to real normative questions. Insofaras change is seen as immanent, and how the to out becomesless imperative figure whychangeis justified future should be better organized.65 Somewherebetweenthe idealismof the first and the historistrategy cism of the second lies the terrainwithinwhichthe analysisof power Normative broachthequestionof objectiveinterest. can properly theory, must of what formsof social lifeare just and legitimate, as an analysis and historical of actual social practice possibilialwaysaddressquestions of analysis. ty,yetit can neverbe reducedto a merecorollary descriptive case that the conclusionsof normative And it is only at the limiting as become causallyeffective the objectiveof a real social group. theory

IX. Conclusion
on I have argued thatthe threefaces of power debate falters its shared and that social power is betterconceivedas premiseof behavioralism structural thosepowersdistributed thevariousenduring relationships by location and groupsbased on their and exercised individuals in society by some implicaI in a givenstructure. would liketo concludebysuggesting for tionsof myargument empiricalresearch. of First, the argument this paper is a critiqueof a meta-theoretical debate about the conceptof power, not of the actual researchdone by in theparticipants thedebate. It seemsclear thatthedebate has failedas is a methodological agenda forempiricalresearch.More interesting the possibilitythat the participantsthemselves,in their own empirical employtheirformalconcepts.Books analysesof power,did not strictly such as Dahl's Polyarchy,or his more recentDilemmas of Pluralist
64. See George Lukacs, Historyand Class Consciousness(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1971). The same problemcan be foundin Ralf Dahrendorf'sClass Conflictin Industrial Press, 1959), pp. 175-79; I have criticized Society (Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversity and the Sociology of Power': A Benton on thisin my "On Benton's 'Objective Interests 16, no. 3 (August 1982). Critique," Sociology In 65. On this problem withinclassical Marxism,see Svetozar Stojanovic's excellent Search of Democracy in Socialism: History and Party Consciousness (New York: About Marx and PrometheusBooks, 1981); also Norman Geras, "The Controversy Justice,"New Left Review 150 (March-April1985).

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Democracy, do not conformin any obvious sense to the canons of And even Who Governs?talksabout thepowerof Mayor behavioralism. muchcloserto theviewI have developedin Lee of New Haven in terms thisessay.66 Second, there is a great deal of empiricaland theoreticalanalysis whichalreadypresupposestheviewof powerI have developed.Debates for in contemporary feminist theoryabout patriarchy, example,center of relations genderand how theydistribute around the structural power Marxismas a theoretical betweenmen and women.67 and opportunities terms."Capital," as traditionhas always treatedpower in structural Marx put it, "is a social power."68In their analysesof thelabor process Marxists and changingformsof capital accumulation,contemporary have emphasizedthestructural of dimensions class domination, focusing on particularly the question of ideology. Moreover, the traditional Marxian emphasison class struggle involvesa view of the contingency and negotiationof the exercise of power akin to the one I have suggested.69 I would also suggestthatMills's The Power Elite can be seen as prethe supposinga realistviewof power.Mills insists throughout book that thepowerof theeliteis structurally that are determined, they a group"in positions to make decisions having major consequences" and that "behind such men and behindtheeventsof history, the linking two, are the major institutions modernsociety.These hierarchies stateand of of the means of power."'7 This is not to endorse corporationconstitute Mills's theory to paperoverthekindsof evidentiary or weaknesses which Dahl and othershave pointedout. But it is to suggest thatto dismissit as and as critics meaningless metaphysics, thebehavioralist did, does notdo it justice. There is a difference betweenquestionablescience and nonscience, a differenceignored, all too often self-righteously, by behavioralists. In termsof contemporary debates within politicalscience,the theory
66. See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971); Dilemmas of PluralistDemocracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982); Who Governs?(New Haven, CT: Yale University thatDahl does Press, 1959). For theargument in notemployhis own methodology his actual research, PeterMorriss,"Power in New see Haven: A Reassessment 'Who Governs?' " British of Journalof PoliticalScience2 (1972). 67. See Michele Barret'ssynthetic discussionin Woman's OppressionToday (London: Verso, 1981). 68. Karl Marx and Freidrich Manifesto,"in TheMarx-Engels Engels,"The Communist Reader, ed. RobertC. Tucker,FirstEdition (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 347. 69. See myPower and Marxist Theory,Part II. 70. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford, 1956), pp. 4-5.

30 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power of thestateis thatarea whichis mostilluminated therealist view.The by advent of behavioralism to the declineof the state as an object of led theory(the real state, of course, grew into, among other things,a massive financial supporter of behavioral research). Lasswell and Kaplan, advocatingbehavioralist approaches, insistedon seeing "such in abstractionsas 'state' and 'sovereignty' termsof concrete political influenceand control."" David Easton, in The Political Systemand of connotations otherworks,unleashedan assault on the metaphysical insteadthe conceptof the political the conceptof the state,preferring deducof as system one more amenableto the development empirically It tivetheories.72 is common knowledgethatthe conceptof the stateis a experiencing renaissance.Political economists,democratictheorists, that thereis relationsare all discovering of and theorists international that is some overarching coherenceto the institutions government of In of thepoliticalsystem. thefaceof thisrenaisobscuredbytheconcept in issue of the critique a recent sance, Easton has reiterated behavioralist the Greek Marxist, Nicos Political Theory. The specific target was Poulantzas, but theenemywas reallytheconceptof thestate.As Easton argued, either the state is the empirical behaviors of government essence, a officials,"or it is some kind of undefinedand undefinable 'ghost in the machine,' knowable only throughits variable manifestaThis argumentshould sound familiar.It formsthe basis of tions.""73 Popper's critiqueof Marxismand of Polsby's book on power.Easton is of clear thatthevalidity theconceptof thestaterestson questionsabout the natureof science. But what Easton fails to see is that all scienceis based on reasoning In fromempiricalphenomenato theircausal mechanisms. thisrespect, fromthe conceptof a magnetic the conceptof the stateis no different field-we cannot observesuch a field,and yetthe concepthas definite with real effects. real meaningand denotes a hypothetically structure Theoristsof the statehave begunto recognizethatconceptualissues of thesortraisedin thisarticleare centralto theirown research.Thus Bob Jessop,in The CapitalistState, discussesthe stateas a set of structural officials. As he power to government relationshipswhich distribute thatcannot, qua institutional writes:"The state is a set of institutions exercised exercise ensemble, power." The powersof thestateare, rather,
71. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society(New Haven, CT: Yale Press, 1950), pp. x-xv. University 72. David Easton, The Political System(New York: Knopf, 1953). 9, 73. David Easton, "The PoliticalSystem Beseigedby theState," Political Theory no. 3 (August 1981), p. 316.

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roles. separately,by specificofficials,occupyingspecificinstitutional a of of But, he insists, theory thispowermustbe a theory thestructural the relationswhichdistribute power so exercised."74 No meta-theoretical herecan everdecide analysisof thesortpresented substantive questionsin social theory.The beliefthat such an analysis was one of the greatmistakesand greattragediesof could so function In behavioralism. its empiricist a zeal, it stigmatized greatdeal of valuable substantive workon purely formal The pointof thispaperis grounds. not to repeatthiserrorby once again providing albeitdifferent, litan, mus test with which to judge who deserves the badge of scientific weaknessesin the approval. It is, rather,to expose some fundamental debate about power, in the hope that social researchers can prevailing now proceed to examine social structure uninhibited the stigmaof by In the metaphysics. exposingthe mobilizationof bias underlying three faces of power debate, I hope, in some small way, to empowerthose theorists who have been constrained the power of empiricism. by
74. Bob Jessop,The CapitalistState (New York: New York University Press, 1982), p. 221. For a good summary recentarguments of about the state, see MartinCarnoy's The State and Political Theory(Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).