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The President and Fellows of Harvard College Ottoman Podillja: The Eyalet of Kam''janec', 1672-1699 Author(s):

The President and Fellows of Harvard College

Ottoman Podillja: The Eyalet of Kam''janec', 1672-1699 Author(s): DARIUSZ KOŁODZIEJCZYK Reviewed work(s):

Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1/2 (June 1992), pp. 87-101 Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute

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Ottoman Podillja: The Eyalet ofKam "janee', 1672-1699

DARIUSZ KOLODZIEJCZYK

In October 1672 the Ottoman dragoman Panaioti congratulated the French ambassador in Istanbulon the fortunate conjuction that provided two great

monarchs -

Poland and the Netherlands.1Thanks to Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel, Pan

(Turkish,

Wotodyjowski, the history of the loss of KanVjanec'-PodilVkyi

Kamaniçe; Polish, Kamieniec Podolski) to theOttomanshas become part of

Poland's popular history. Unfortunately, the later period has been com- pletely neglected and the stereotypes about the "barbarian night" survive

even today.And, in Cossack question is

basic to the understanding of seventeenth-century Otto-

man history,2very littlehas been done fromtheTurkishside to clear up this

chapter of Ahmed Köprülü's3 foreignpolicy. To begin with, we should considerthe economic, demographic, and pol- itical factorsthat might have had some bearing on the Ottomandecision to attackthePolish-LithuanianCommonwealth:

Mehmed IV and Louis XIV - withtheir respective successes in

spite of Halil Inalcïk's assertionsthattheBlack Sea and

Economy: Contrary to common views, Podillja was not a rich province, at least not during the second halfof the seventeenth century. All theriversin

Podillja flowedin the "wrong" direction -

fifteenth century the economy of thePolish-LithuanianCommonwealthhad been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe.

towardthe Black Sea. Since the

Michael Postan has estimatedthattheland transport costs betweentheMid- lands and London may have been higher than the water transport costs

between Warsaw and London.4 This cheap transport was possible only because of the great Polish riversthatflowednorth.The Italian projects for

exporting Ukrainian productsthrough the Black Sea had already failed in

1 A. Galland, Journal

.pendant son séjour à Constantinople(1672-1673), ed. Ch. Schefer,

vol. 1 (Paris,1881),p. 225.

2 See H. Inalcïk, "The Heyday andDeclineoftheOttoman Empire," in The Cambridge His-

toryofIslam, vol. 1A (Cambridge,1970),p. 350.

3

Köpriilü, was succeededinthe post of grand vizier by his son, FazflAhmed (1661 - 1676), and

then by his

4

toryofEurope, vol. 2, Tradeand Industry in theMiddle Ages, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,1987), p. 196.

M. Postan, "TheTradeofMedieval Europe: The North," inThe Cambridge EconomicHis-

The householdof Köprülü had remainedin power since 1656. Its founder, Mehmed

protégé and son-in-law,KaraMustafa (1676- 1683).

88

DARIUSZ KOLODZmJCZYK

the sixteenth century.Traditionally,only the Ottomans were accused of blocking these attempts. Sixty years ago, however, Janusz Pajewski discovered a report froma Polish Senate meeting at which it had been decided not to open the Dniester tradebecause of the fear thatthis would show the Turkish galleys the way to Poland; it was more prudent to leave the Ukrainianborderland undeveloped thanto tempt the Ottomans.5These fearsare betterunderstoodifwe rememberthatthePolish-LithuanianCom- monwealth, witha population threetimes smaller, had a state budget about thirty timessmallerthanthatof theOttoman Empire.6

Demography: The same reasons that led to the underdevelopment of Ukraine under Poland-Lithuaniacould have enabled its development as a

base withintheOttomanBlack Sea system for provisioningConstantinople. For theOttomansto achieve thislevel of development in the area, however, intensivecolonization and settlementwere necessary. From the end of the

sixteenth century, the demographicpressures withinthe Ottoman Empire itselfdeclined sharply. It was unlikely thatthe Ottomans,having failed to

colonize the Hungarianplain and the shores of the Black Sea in Bucak and Yedisan, would succeed in colonizing even moreremote Podillja.

Politics: The third,political, factor should have prevented the Ottomans from attacking the Commonwealthin 1672. The attack seemingly contra- dicted the Ottomans' traditionalnorthern policy of the sixteenth, seven- teenth, and eighteenth centuries.The main concern of this policy was to preserve equilibrium between the main rivals, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. In the sixteenth century a balance was maintained indirectlyby the Crimean Tatars. The Tatars had sufficientreason (slaves and cattle) to raidboth neighboring territories, butitwas saferto do so undertheOttoman umbrella.In the firsthalf of the sixteenth century, most of the Tatar raids were directed against an actually stronger Poland-Lithuania. During the second halfof that century, itwas Ivan theTerriblewho was consideredthe

primaryenemy, and OttomanrelationswithPoland were verygood in that

period. In 1571, the year of the Battle of Lepanto, Poland sold large amounts of tin - a strategic material - to the Ottomans. In 1579, when

5 "Okoto portu na Dniestrze pamiçtamy,gdyámy to bylipodalimiçdzypanyRadyNasze, ze ichwiele bytoktorzy nanzezwalali, ale jak teznie mniejbylo,ktorymsiç zgota nie podobal. Przeto, ze siç tymsposobem Turkom droga do ziem naszychukazuje"; from KingZygmunt

August's

Zborowskiego do Turcji w 1568 roku. Materiafy do historiistosunkow polsko-tureckich za

panowaniaZygmuntaAugusta," Rocznik Orientalistyczny 12

b

wieku -

no.3 (1987): 375-94.

letterto PiotrZborowski, 7

December 1567, in J. Pajewski,"Legacja Piotra

(1936): 21.

I give some rough estimationsin D. Kotodziejczyk,"Imperium Osmanskiew AVI

kilka uwag o potencjaledemograficznym i gospodarczym,"PrzeglqdHistoryczny 78,

THE EYALETOF KAM" JANEC

89

William Harborne succeeded in acquiring

the first English capitulations

with the Ottomans, it was stated that the English merchantswould then

enjoy thesame

privileges as the French,Venetian, and Polish subjects.7 of equilibrium lasted into the seventeenth century. Succes-

This policy

sive Polish-Lithuanian triumphs over Muscovy in 1619 and 1632 were fol-

lowed immediatelyby two Ottomanattacks against theCommonwealth - in

1621 (Sultan Osman's Xotyncampaign) and in 1633 (led by Abaza Pa§a). In 1657 the Tatars were sent, this time to help weaken Poland-Lithuania against the coalition of Sweden, Brandenburg, the Cossack Hetmanate, and

Transylvania.

In 1667, afterthe cataclysms of Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising and the wars against Sweden, Russia, and Transylvania, the Commonwealthwas forced

to cede Smolensk and a

Russia.

Polish historiansconsider thisdate a turningpoint in the relations

between the two states. Between 1667 and 1795, when the Polish noble state was liquidated, the border moved only westward. Given these cir-

cumstances, an Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth could only

strengthen Russia.

great part of Eastern Ukraine, includingKiev, to

*

*

As we have seen, neither economic, nor demographic, nor political reasons can account forthe war of 1672. This war was, in addition, veryunpopular among the Ottoman soldiers. Poland was considered a remote and cold country; it did not offer great spoils and could not even feed the invading army. The road through the Balkans and Moldavia was long and exhaust- ing. Poor systems of communicationexcluded any greater Ottoman terri- torial gain in Eastern Europe. Paul Kennedy's termof "strategical overex- tension"8is applicable not only to the Hungarian and Persian limitationson Ottoman growth, butalso to thePolish-Ukrainianlimitations. It was not accidental that almost all the Turkish-Polishtruces were signed at the end of October. The Turks preferred to be home by ruz-i Kasi'm (5 November), the day when peasants paid the second installmentof the timar and other taxes. This was also the end of the season for trade trafficon the Black Sea. If we consider thatone monthwas necessary for

assembling troops, at least one month was needed to reach the Polish

border, and

at least one monthmore to return home, the time available for

7

Studyof theFirst Anglo-Ottoman Relations (London,1977),p. 50.

8

Conflictfrom 1500to2000 (New York,1987),p.l 1.

S. A. Skilliter, WilliamHarborneand theTradewith Turkey 1578-1582: A Documentary

P. Kennedy, The Rise

and Fall of the GreatPowers: Economic Change and Military

90

DARIUSZ KOtODZIEJCZYK

effective campaigning was very limited. In spite of these conditions, Ahmed Köprülü, one of the greatest Otto- man statesmen, decided to move against Poland. According to his letterto

theCrown deputy chancellor Jçdrzej Olszowski, the primary factor leading

to the war was the relationship with the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their hetmán Petro DoroSenko, to whom the Ottomans had grantedprotection

against the Polish king a

not as a pretext but as a

Why did the Ottomansinvolve themselvesin supporting such an unstable

elementas the Cossacks, whom they themselveshad many reasons to hate

few years earlier.9If we real cause for the war, a

accept this explanation further question arises:

and destroy? From the"classical" point of view, the Cossack raids were considered a just revenge made by a desperate Ukrainian population in reaction to the

Tatar raids. The Cossack "revenges," however, were usually directednot against the Tatars but against the rich Turkishtowns and villages on the Black Sea. Whereas the Tatars primarily sacked Ukrainiantowns and vil-

lages thatwere of lesser

Cossacks struckat the core of the Ottoman Empire. Narrativesources and

Victor Ostapchuk's recentresearchon kadi court registers(sicils) fromTre- bizond and Üsküdar give evidence of thedisastrouseffectsof Cossack raids on theBlack Sea towns.10The importance of these raids was also strategic. The Venetian Bailo Giacomo Quirini wrote in 1676 that"da questo mar Nero dipende la difensae la conservationedel mar Bianco," citing instances when theOttomanswere forcedto send galleys against theCossacks on the Black Sea thatcould thennotbe used against theVenetians in theMediter-

ranean.11

economic importance forthe Commonwealth, the

By theend of the sixteenth century, Cossack raiding had become more a

professional thana temporaryactivity. Polish controlin Ukraine was very weak. After Xmel'nyc'kyj's uprising, it seemed obvious thatPoland was no longer able to suppress theCossacks. It was thenthattheOttomansseem to

have made their desperate decision to stop the Cossack attacks, even at the expense of breaking theirtraditional policy and further weakening theCom- monwealthvis-à-vis Russia. While the directdestructionof the Cossacks

9 Quoted inthechronicleofSilahdar (Silahdar tarihi [Istanbul,1928], vol. 1,pp.569-72); a

copy

(hereafterAGAD), Warsaw,AR, dz. II, ks. 22,pp. 819-21.

of the contemporary Polish translationis in the ArchiwumGtówneAkt Dawnych

V. Ostapchuk, "The Effectof theCossackNaval Raids on theMuslimand Non-Muslim

10

Populations oftheOttomanBlack Sea," paper readat theSeminarin UkrainianStudies, Har- vard University, 12March1992.

1x Le Relazioni degli stati Europei letteal senato dagli

decimosettimo, ed.N. BarozziandG. Berchet, series5,

ambasciatoriVenezianinel secolo

Turchia,pt. 2 (Venice,1871),p. 168.

THE£rAL£rOFKAM"JANEC

91

appeared unlikely,offering them Ottoman protection and thus directing theirattacksnorthwarddid seem a possible solution. Many of theCossacks and Ukrainian peasants greeted theOttomanswith

hope following the twentyyears of wars and therecent partition of Ukraine

between Poland and Russia. This response

chroniclesof Haci Ali and Silahdar, as well as in Polish sources.12The typi-

against

the Catholic Polish nobility and the extension of the millet policy toward

Armenianand Jewishmerchantsmeant that only the Polish Catholic com- munity could be considered totallyopposed to the new rulers. And even

from among that group therewere some poturczeñcyP To control the Cossacks, however, an active Ottoman presence - a

stronghold ruled directly fromIstanbul - was necessary. As early as 1670, the Polish envoy warned the king that the Turks wanted to capture

Kam "janee'. That Kam "janee' was a main strategictarget of the war can

be deduced fromthe activity

of the Ottoman army

after it seized the fortressin August 1672: the Ottomans seemed well

satisfiedwiththis conquest.

The immense strategicimportance of Kam "janee' in securing Ottoman rule over Cossack Ukraine and Moldavia is evident fromits geographic location. According to Metin Kunt, a parallel role was played by the new

is mentioned in the Ottoman

cal Ottoman policy of supporting the OrthodoxUkrainian peasants

-

or, rather, inactivity

-

eyalets (provinces) of Yanova (Romanian, Ineu) and Varad (Romanian, Oradea) in relation to Transylvania.14 In times of crisis, and given the unstable allegiance of thethreeDanubian principalities, such bulwarkswere

indispensable. In this context the strategicimportance of seizing Kosice

(Kassau), which in fact ensued a few

Podillja enabled the strengthening of control over the Crimean Khanate. Two major Tatar routesto the Commonwealth, theWotoski (Turkish,Eflak) and theKuczmañski (Turkish,Göcmen yolu), ranacross this province.

In additionto these strategicreasons, two otherclassical explanations for the Ottomanattack against the Commonwealthshould be noted: the use of

continual campaigns in maintainingnecessarydiscipline in the army and the eagerness of Sultan Mehmed IV (who had never taken partpersonally in a

years later, is also evident. Seizing

12 Haci Ali, Fethname-i Kamaniçe,SüleymaniyeKütüpkanesi, Lala Ismail 304, fol. 101a;

Silahdar tarihi, vol. 1, p. 610; compare"Copia

[theTurks] "dichiaratosidi trattaremale la solta nobiltàe bene la

Woliñski, "Materialy do dziejówwojnypolsko-tureckiej1672-1676," Studiai Materiaty do

Historii Wojskowosci10, pt. 1 (1964): 260.

rostica" - in J.

di relationevenutadalla Cortedi Polonia" -

gente

13

14

Polish,poturczeniec: a person whohas"becomea Turk"(i.e.,acceptedIslam).

M. Kunt,"17. yiizyilda Osmanli kuzeypolitikasi iizerinebir yomm," in Bogaziçi Universi-

tesi Dergisi, Beseri Bilimler-Humanities4-5 (1976- 1977): 111-16.

92

DARIUSZ KOtODZIEJCZYK

campaign) to become a Muslim ghazi at the expense of a weak neighbor. The Commonwealthwas completelyunprepared forthe war. Great Het-

man Jan Sobieski, head

the pro-HabsburgKing

money to raise an army, buthis opponents claimed overthrowthe king and thattheTurkishthreatwas

being used as a pretext.

It was believed thatthefew Tatar captives thehetmánsentto Warsaw were in fact disguised ArmenianmerchantsfromLviv. The commonly held opin- ion was that"the Turks will arriveto sell soap, raisins, and carpets as they do every year"; the danger of war was merely the "hetmán's imagina-

tion."15

of the "French faction," was in

sharp conflictwith

Michat. The hetmánwarned of war and asked for

thatsuch an army could

A remarkably situated fortress,Kam"janec'-PodilVkyj

was considered

in the sixteenth century to be a main bulwark against "barbarism"and was compared to La Valetta in Malta. The city was surrounded by the deep gorge of the river Smotryö and had vertical granite walls. Between the city

and thecastle a moat was builtwitha bridge over it. A hydrotechnicalsys- tem raised the level of water in the gorge. At the beginning of the seven- teenth century, the Dutch Hornwerkwas added (the Poles called it Nowy Zamek}** and the Turks, tabye-i kebir11). However, the fortressthathad

been impenetrable in the sixteenth century was no longerunconquerable in the epoch of Vauban; the Ottoman army, with its modern artillery and

assisted by French renegade specialists, was able to seize the castle, which was situated higher thanthe city.

from Edirne on 4 June and reached

Kam "janee ' on 18 August.18 After suffering nine days of heavy bombard- mentand theloss of the Hornwerk, thePoles surrendered.On the following

Friday, 2 September, Mehmed IV celebrated the cuma namazï19 in the

formercathedral.He appointed a governor(beylerbeyi) of thenew province and a judge (kadi) and orderedtheestablishmentof three pious foundations

(vakïfs). The viziers Ahmed Köprülü and Musahib Mustafa, the future grand vizierKara Mustafa, and thechief preacher Vani Efendifollowed the sultan's example. Seven churches were converted to mosques and two

The Ottoman

army departed

15 See "Relacya Kamieñca wzietegoprzez

16

1'

Literally, NewCastle.

Greatbastion.

Turkóww roku1672 opisana wierszem polskim

przez Stanisiawa Makowieckiego z

AGAD, Sucha (BranickiFamilyCollection),sygn. 168/199.

WielkiegoLukoszyna, stolnika latyczewskiego," in

18 Formoredetailed chronology andfurther bibliography, see myforthcoming book,Ejalet kamieniecki1672-1699. Turcy na Podolu (to be publishedby Pañstwowe Wydawnictwo Nau-

kowe).

19 Fridayprayers.

THE EYALETOF KAM" JANEC

93

schools and a high school20were founded. According to Polish reports, the

Turks registered all property in Kam "janee'. In this register, which sur- vives in theIstanbul archives, several names of citizensof Kam "janee* can be found:for instance, the bishop Wawrzyniec Lanckoronski appears in the register as "Lançkoronçki papas-i kebir." The Christianswho remained in

the city retainedtheir property. The workshops,shops, and tianswho leftthe city withthePolish soldiers were sold to

military settlers.21 According to reports of Polish spies, only Poles and a number of

Armeniansremained loyal to

been excluded from sharing in city rights, were now allowed to settle in

Kam "janee'. De la Magdeleine, a French captive and interpreter in the Turkish camp, recordeda story thatcharacterizedtheinternalclashes in the city. Since all theCatholic churcheswere convertedinto mosques, thePoles

remaining in Kam "janee' were given an Orthodoxchurch.The following day, a delegation of the UkrainianOrthodox population asked the Turks to keep dogs in thechurchratherthan give itto thePoles.22 Under the terms of the Treaty of Buéaõ (Polish, Buczacz), signed 18 October 1672, the province of Podillja was ceded to the Ottoman Empire. The Commonwealth agreed to pay a yearly tribute. The Cossack Hetmanateof DoroSenko retainedits autonomy underOttoman protection. The Ottomanstriedto maintain good relationswiththe Ukrainian hetmán

and even ceded to him the importantPodilljan city of Mohyliv as a life tenure.This did not prevent relationsfrom souring in the followingyears.

The defeatof 1672 prompted a temporarygeneral reconciliationof fac- tionswithinPoland. The diet rejected theBuéaõ treaty and votednew taxes. The army was increased to over fiftythousand, and Sobieski was able to

defeattheserasker HiiseyinPa§a at Xotyn(Polish, Chocim; Turkish,Hotin) in November 1673 - a victory that brought himthePolish crown after King Michal's death. Sobieski was one of the few Polish statesmento realize both the impor- tance of a Baltic policy and the threatfromHohenzollern Prussia, a former

Polish tributary that had gained independence in 1657. It is, therefore, ironic thatthis man spent almost his entire reign in war against the Otto- mans.

houses of Chris- thenew Muslim

the former sovereign.Jews, who by thenhad

20 Inan Ottoman register we find §eyh'ül-kurra, a

sor; see Istanbul,BaçbakanlïkAr§ivi(hereafterBA), Maliyeden Miidevver (hereafterMM)

4559, p. 4
21

"

C de la Magdeleine, Le Miroirottomanavecunsuccinctrécitde toutce qui c est passé de considerable pendant la guerre des Turcsen Pologne,jusqu'en 1676 (Basle, 1677),p. 10.

title applicable toa lowermedresè profes-

BA, MM 709 passim.

94

DARIUSZ KOLODZIEJCZYK

Afterthree years of

successive campaigns withno results, the armistice

at Zuravno was signed in October 1676. It is not surprising that among the

intermediarieswere the Moldavian hospodar Duca and the Crimean khan. Duca wantedto throwoffthe burdenof provisioning Kam "janee', and the khan was furiousthatthe Ottomanshad succeeded in protecting theirnew subjects against the Tatars more efficiently thanthe Poles had done. Both Duca and the khan, as well as the serasker §eytan Ibrahim Pa§a, led the

to believe thattheirambassador in Istanbulwould obtainmuch better

Poles

peace conditionsforthemthanhad been provided in theBuõaò treaty. Sobieski hoped that, after signing the new treaty, the Commonwealth

would attack Prussia-Brandenburg, as part of

XIV. Contrary to expectations, however, the mission of the palatine Jan

Gniñskiin Istanbul proved to be very difficult.The new treaty was in facta

confirmationof Bucaõ, withthe exemption of the tributeknown as pi§ke§. Only two small fortressesin Right-Bank Ukraine - Bila Cerkva (Polish, Biala Cerkiew) and Pavoloò - were left in Polish hands. When Gniñski returnedto Poland in 1678, it was too late to attack Prussia. In the same

year the treaty at Nijmegen was signed, and Louis XIV was no longer interestedin an alliance withPoland. The crude mannersof the new grand vizier Kara Mustafa towardEuro- pean envoys are well knownand his treatmentof Gniñskiwas long remem-

bered in Poland.23The peace treaty was accepted by the Diet, butthe sense of threatand feeling of humiliationwere noterased. The possibility of Otto-

man occupation may appear to us today to have been unlikely, but the seventeenth-century Poles felt surrounded.The new Ottoman border was only one hundredkilometersfrom Lviv, and less thantwo hundredkilome- tersfromCracow. There was anotherfactorin Polish internal policy which, combined withCatholic propaganda, forcedthe king to join the Habsburgs in 1683: nobles fromthe lost territories preserved their provincial diets and theirseats in the Diet; with theirfamous right of veto, these men could

paralyze every legislative or fiscal decision. Every diet held in the second halfof the seventeenth centurybegan witha reassurancethatthe so-called exulanteswould regain their provinces.

In the nineteenth century, afterthe partitions, some Polish historians began to treatthe victory of Vienna as a great mistake. Some of them assertedthatitwould have been betterto help theTurksseize Vienna rather thandefendit. The recentworks of Zbigniew Wójcik, the foremost expert

a secret alliance with Louis

23 Gniriski's report fromthemissionwas readto theDiet in 1679. It has been published,

together witha

Gninskiegowojewodycheiminskiego do Turcyi w latach1677-1678 (Warsaw,1907).

diary and collectionof letters, in F. Putaski, Zródia do poselstwa Jana

THE EYALETOF KAM" JANEC

95

on Sobieski's times, prove thatall externaland internalfactorsled the Pol- ish king to Vienna in 1683. He simply had no otherchoice.24

Following the impressivevictory of the German Empire and the Com- monwealthin 1683, the Poles were stillunable to regain Kam "janee* until the Karlowitz treaty seventeen years later. The reasons usually given to explain this delay are the shortage of Polish infantry and artillery and the frictionbetween the king and the new hetmán, Stanislaw Jabtonowski.At least two otherfactorsmustbe added. The firstwas the very effectiveOtto- man system of provisioning and the second the heroism of the besieged.

Every year, in spite of a Polish blockade, convoys of hundredsof cartsand oxen, protectedby Turkish soldiers, were sent from Silistra, Nikopil', and

Bender25to Kam "janee'.

Tatars and Moldavians. In a 1686 letterto the grand vizier, the governor of

Kam "janee', Hüseyin Bo§nak, reported thateven duringRamadan, every night after ifiar, the soldiers continued fortificationwork by torchlight.26 Anothersource reports that people often starved, the corpses of horses lay on the streets, and in the winterTurkishsoldiers burned wooden roofs to

warmthemselves.27

In the later period, this task fell mainly to the

There is, however, another problem to raise. AftertheSwedish wars, the

Polish infantry and artillery were not as ineffectiveas has often been assumed. In spite of this, Sobieski never attempted an assault on

Kam "janee'. According to his plans, the Polish army should Moldavia and thenforcethe starvinggarrison of Kam "janee' to

From a strategicpoint of view, it seems obvious that attempting to secure Polish rule in Moldavia, withthe Ottomansstillin controlof the fortressat the rear, was hazardous at best. But it was notthe strategy which prevailed. Sobieski's idée fixewas to secure thethroneforhis son Jakub.In theCom-

monwealth, wherethe nobility considereda hereditarymonarchy the begin- ning of absolution dominium, the fulfillmentof such a plan would prove

difficult. According to the king's plans, Moldavia would become a small hereditaryprincipality of the Sobieski family. No noble would commit fundsforsuch a plan; but, as long as Kam "janee' was not reconquered, the

king could be sure thattheDiet would vote taxes

firstseize

surrender.

fortheTurkishwar. This

24 ForthePolishinternalandexternal policies ofthat time, see especially Z. Wójcik, Rzecz- pospolita wobec Turcji i Rosji 1674-1679 (Wroclaw, 1976), and idem, Jan Sobieski 1629-1696 (Warsaw,1983).

25

26 Defter-imasarifat-i ta' mirât, in the Wojewodzkie ArchiwumPañstwowe (Cracow),

Oddzialna

czasówJana Sobieskiego.

Diariuszi relacje z lat 1691-1696, ed.J.Woliñski (Wroclaw,1958),p. 367.

Present-dayBendery.

Wawelu,Archiwum Podhoreckie,tekiA.

Potockiego,pudto14, teka4.

11

Letterfrom Lviv, 27 January1695, inK. Sarnecki,Pamietnikiz

96

DARIUSZ KOLODZIEJCZYK

is not to say thatSobieski did not want to recapture Kam'. 'janee'; he was, however,certainly muchmoreconcernedwith capturing Moldavia.

In sum, fornineteenof the twenty-sevenyears of theirrule in Podillja,

theblockaded fortress, and the beylerbeyi of

theOttomanswere confinedto

Podillja was in fact no more than the commander of the garrison in

Kam "janee'. Only between the Treaty of

HiisayinPa§a at Xotyn in 1673 and betweenthe Treaty of Zuravno in 1676 and the establishmentof the alliance in Vienna in 1683 can we speak of a

normallyfunctioningeyalet.

Buõaõ in 1672 and the defeatof

*

*

What firststrikesone upon looking at the list of Kam "janee' beylerbeyis (see the charton pp. 100-101) is thatthe profession of Ottomanamir was

not very safe - at least not during the great war. Most of the amirs died at the hands of others. Usually transferred from and to the neighboring Euro-

pean provinces, sooner or later they were also moved to the other parts of thisthree-continental empire. Because the average appointment of a beyler-

beyi at Kam "janee' was less then two years, it was probably considered neitheran advance nor a demotion.However, during the last ten years we

can see the depreciation of this post. For Ahmed, the ninth beylerbeyi, Kam "janee' was probably his first importantpost. He mustalso have been inexperienced,provoking theriotin whichhe was killed by thesoldiers (on theotherhand, it probably did nottake much to provoke a riotin a starving

garrison). Kahraman Pa§a, the man appointed to succeed Ahmed, does not fitthe scheme at all. He remained ten years in the post, and then, after

Kam "janee' was returnedto Poland, he was appointed as

of Anatolian Nigde. The chronicles of Defterdarand Ra§id call him a memberof theKam "janee' garrison; a Polish report even statesthathe was elected from among the riotersand laterconfirmed by the Porte. Silahdar

defineshimas a relativeof

relationsbetween Istanbul and Bahçesarayï in the 1690s and the Crimean

participation in provisioning Kam "janee'.28 The average numberof soldiers in Kam "janee' exceeded six thousand;

of these, threethousandwere Yeniçeriyan-iDergah-i Ali29 (the fullname of

only a sancakbeyi

the khan, whichis also probable,given

the good

28 Compare:

949, fol.

410-12; Sobieski's lettertoJ.Dowmont, dated11

królewskiej," AGAD, AKW, Dz. tur., k. 78, t.483, no.808,p. 32.

29

tral janissaries, 283 artillerymen(topçu),

D.B§M 343; BA, MM 3113). To

MehmedEfendi, Zübdet' ül-Vekayiat, SüleymaniyeKütüphanesi,Hamidiye

180a- 180b; Tarih-i Ra§id Efendi, vol. 1, fol. 151b; Silahdar tarihi, vol. 2, pp.

March1689, in "Kopiariuszkorespondencji

Janissariesofthesultan'scourt.Forinstance, in 1678the garrison consistedof 2,782 cen-

261 armorers (cebeci), and2,055 local soldiers (BA,

thisshouldbe added over 500 r/mar-holders (compare

THE EYALETOF KAM" JANEC

97

thecentral janissaries, to distinguish themfromthelocal troops). Withmore

than two hundred guns, Kam' 'janec' was among the largest and most

important of the Ottomanfortresses -

dia in Crete. The other garrisons in Podillja - in Bar, Medzybiz, Jazlovec', and Cortkiv - barely exceeded one hundredsoldierseach.

Baghdad, Buda, Belgrade, and Can-

The eyalet of Kam "janee', like other seventeenth-century Ottoman pro-

vinces (Crete, Varad,

sical sixteenth-century Ottoman province. In all the new, late seventeenth-

centuryeyalets mentioned above, theOttomanstriedto introducetheclassi-

cal landholding(timar) system - a system thathad already been abandoned in the central provinces. These effortsshould perhaps be considered within

the contextof Köprülü's policy of strengthening the stateunder the motto of returning itto the golden age of Sultan Suleyman. The main task facing the Ottoman bureaucracy in the newly conquered

territory was to register all

register(defter -i mufassal)

is notextant.It is mentionedin Polish reports and in thelaterTurkish regis-

ter.The war interrupted thisfirst survey.

In 1680, only after the new treaty(at Zuravno) was confirmed, the former defterdar (treasurer), Ahmed Pa§a, was appointed as the new Kam "janee' beylerbeyi and given the task of setting the new boundaries withthe Polish commissioners.Both detailed Polish and Turkish reports on

thisactionexist.30

for Podillja was preparedprobably in 1672 but

Yanova, and

Uyvar) was much smallerthanthe clas-

taxpayers and sources of income. The firstsuch

After setting the borders, the new mufassal register was prepared (between the autumn of 1680 and the spring of 1681). The eyalet was divided into foursancaks (sub-provinces) and nineteen nahiyes (districts).

The central sancak of Kam "janee'

important rivers - the Dniester, Smotryc, and Zbruc. The threeothersan-

caks of Bar, Jazlovec', and Medzybiz were much smaller. The sole kadi residedin Kam "janee'.

comprised the valleys of the most

Defter-iruznamçe,1682,Poznan,Wojewódzkie Archiwum Paristwowe, sygn.2).

30

(pp. 159-68),

and is also registered in Defter-imufassal(see below) on pp. 378-83; Polish

reports can be foundin AGAD, AKW, Dz. tur., k. 77, t. 479, no. 803 (detailedrelation), and

Biblioteka Czartoryskich, TekaNaruszewicza 178, pp. 187-96 (copy oftheofficial protocol of

delimitation). See also [J.Lelewel],Materiaiy do dziejówpolskich(Poznan,1847),pp. 165-67 (the textofanother copy, burnedin 1944); andthememoirsofFlorian DrobyszTuszyriski, a

nobleman-soldier assigned toescortPolish commissioners, inDwa pamietniki z XVIIwieku ed. A. Przyboá(Wroclaw,1954),p. 66.

,

TheTurkish copy is intheBiblioteka Czartoryskich(Cracow), ms 609, no. 21, fols.81-85

.

98

DARIUSZ KOtODZŒJCZYK

Considering Heath Lowry's skepticism about theusefulnessof defiers as demographic sources,31 close examinationof the Podilljan muf assai is far from discouraging. Whereas the Polish inventoriesand poll-tax registers fromthe sixteenthand seventeenthcenturiesmentionedfewer than seven

hundred settlementsin Podillja, the defter-imufassal lists over eight

hundred -

Another point to note is thatalmost 70 percent of these settlementswere

even more than on the best maps fromthe nineteenth century.

deserted {kali ez reayet). The population of Podillja was estimatedat 96,000 by the end of the sixteenth century;32 in 1662, after Xmel'nyc'kyj's upris- ing, itwas only 55,OOO;33and, according to the mufassal, in 1680 the popu- lation,excluding the soldiers of the garrison, did not exceed 40,000.34 The

catastrophicdepopulation in the seventeenth-century Commonwealth was particularly extremein Podillja. In additionto the Cossack uprisings, Tatar

raids, Polish pacifications, and the robberies, plagues, and climatic changes usually linked with the seventeenth-centuryglobal crisis, the Ottomans played their part in depopulating that particularprovince. They cannot, however, be held solely responsible, as has been done before. On the con-

trary, theOttomansmade some effortto resettlethe province,especially the Dniester region(Podnistrov"ja; Polish,Podniestrze).

Their efforts,however, did not

bring sufficientresults.In the spring of

1683, just beforethe new war, the beylerbeyi of Kam "janee', who already enjoyed extraincome (arpalïk) fromthe Bulgarian sancak of Nikopol', was given, in addition, a yearlysalary (salariye) fromthe Anatolian sancak of

Bolu, because the peasants in his has domain in Podillja had not yet returned (reaya heniiz yerlerinegelmedi).35 According to the Ottoman provincialbudget drawn up in 1681, thirteen million akçe were spentyearly in Kam "janee', primarily forsoldiers' pay (mevacib). Of this amount, less than 3 percent was collected in Podillja

31 See H. Lowry, "The OttomanTahrirDefterlerias a SourceforSocial andEconomicHis-

tory:

Congress onTurkishSocial andEconomic History,Munich, 4-8 August 1986.

32

ZiemieRuskie,Woiyñ i Podóle, Zrodla dziejowe, 19 (Warsaw,1889),pp. 12,62, 73.

33

author'sestimations.On the

"Vailive dferelo dlja vyvòennja istoriimisti sil

1665 r.),"Naukovo-informacijnyi biuleterìArxivnoho upravlinnja URSR, 1963, no. 2/3, pp.

Pitfallsand Limitations,"unpublishedpaper prepared for the FourthInternational

A.

vol.

Jabtonowski, Polska XVI wieku pod wzgledemgeograficzno-statystycznym,

8,

AGAD, ASK, oddz. I, sygn. 71, Pogiownegeneralne(Poll-taxregister from 1662);

generaldepopulation of Podillja in that period, see M. Krykun,

Ukrajiny(Lustracija PodilVkoho vojevodstva

23-24.

34 BA,Tapu Tahrir, no.805.
35

orderis confirmedinAhkam defteri(BA, MM 2931,p. 29).

BA, Ali

Emiri, IV. Mehmed, no. 1659 (berat issuedforAbdurrahman Pa§a). The same

THE EYALETOF KAM"JANEC

99

itself; therestwas sentfromthecentral treasury.36

In

September 1683, war again broke out in Podillja. In 1684 Polish sol-

diers removed thousandsof peasants fromSouthern Podillja to the neigh-

garrison.

According to a letterfromSobieski to the pope, some of these peasants had become Muslims under Ottoman rule and had been circumcized, though theirwives had remainedmorefaithfulto theold religion.37 In conclusion, let us returnto "the greatpolitics." Polish historians agree

that the statesman Ahmed Köprülü made a great mistake in taking Kam "janee': the conquest pushed the Commonwealthtoward the alliance withthe Habsburgs and intothe long exhausting war thatcaused Ottoman defeaton one hand and thefurther weakening of theCommonwealthon the other.The real winnerswere the Habsburgs and Russia. This analysis is generallyacceptable, though the issues were somewhat more complicated. In 1672, when the decision forthe conquest of Kam "janee' was made, the Commonwealthdid not appear capable of making such great effortsas the

rescue of Vienna or even the Xotynvictory.Furthermore, the Muscovy of Aleksei Mikhailovichdid not yet resemblethe Russian Empire of Peterthe Greatand CatherineII.

boring provinces with the aim of starving the Kam' 'janee'

During the twenty-sevenyears of its existence, the eyalet of Kam "janee'

ensured Moldavian and Crimean loyalty. The Cossacks - the

foritsfoundation -

thismatterstillneeds furtherresearch.The usefulnessof Kam "janee' as a northernbulwarkof the Ottoman Empire was proved after1699 when the Ottomans took