People's Broadcasting vs Secretary of DOLE (2009) G.R. 179652 Facts: Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against People?

s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc) for th illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13 month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII,Cebu City. On the basis of the complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection on 23 September 2003. In the Inspection Report Form, the Labor Inspector wrote under the heading ? Findings/Recommendations? ?non-diminution of benefits? and ?Note: Respondent deny employer-employee relationship with the complainant- see Notice of Inspection results.? Petitioner was required to rectify/restitute the violations within five (5) days from receipt. No rectification was effected by petitioner; thus, summary investigations were conducted, with the parties eventually ordered to submit their respective position papers. In his Order dated 27 February 2004, DOLE Regional Director Atty. Rodolfo M. Sabulao (Regional Director) ruled that respondent is an employee of petitioner, and that the former is entitled to his money claims amounting toP203, 726.30. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Order, claiming that theRegional Director gave credence to the documents offered by respondent without examining the originals, but at the same time he missed or failed to consider petitioner?s evidence. Petitioner?s motion for reconsideration was [ denied. On appeal to the DOLE Secretary, petitioner denied once more the existence of employer-employee relationship. In its Order dated 27 January 2005, the Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner did not post a cash or surety bond and instead submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank Deposit. Petitioner maintained that there is no employeremployee relationship had ever existed between it and respondent because it was the drama directors and producers who paid, supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been considered by the labor arbiter because respondent?s claim exceeded P5,000.00. Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor has the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Held: Secretary of Labor has the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the employeremployee relationship has terminated or such relationship has not arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the existence of an employer-employee

relationship is a matter which is not easily determinable from an ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a mere ocular examination. The intricacies and implications of an employer-employee relationship demand that the level of scrutiny should be far above the cursory and the mechanical. While documents, particularly documents found in the employer?s office are the primary source materials, what may prove decisive are factors related to the history of the employer?s business operations, its current state as well as accepted contemporary practices in the industry. More often than not, the question of employer-employee relationship becomes a battle of evidence, the determination of which should be comprehensive and intensive and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial body that is the NLRC. It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE?s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause ? in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists? in Art. 128 (b). Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two important questions must be resolved: (1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of; and (2) Are there violations of the Labor Code or of any labor law? The existence of an employer-employee relationship is a statutory prerequisite to and a limitation on the power of the Secretary of Labor, one which the legislative branch is entitled to impose. The rationale underlying this limitation is to eliminate the prospect of competing conclusions of the Secretary of Labor and the NLRC, on a matter fraught with questions of fact and law, which is best resolved by the quasi-judicial body, which is the NRLC, rather than an administrative official of the executive branch of the government. If the Secretary of Labor proceeds to exercise his visitorial and enforcement powers absent the first requisite, as the dissent proposes, his office confers jurisdiction on itself which it cannot otherwise acquire. Reading of Art. 128 of the Labor Code reveals that the Secretary of Labor or his authorized representatives was granted visitorial and enforcement powers for the purpose of determining violations of, and enforcing, the Labor Code and any labor law, wage order, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. Necessarily, the actual existence of an employeremployee relationship affects the complexion of the putative findings that the Secretary of Labor may determine, since employees are entitled to a different set of rights under the Labor Code from the employer as opposed to non-employees. Among these differentiated rights are those accorded by the ?labor standards? provisions of the Labor Code, which the Secretary of Labor is mandated to enforce. If there is no employer-employee relationship in the first place, the duty of the employer to adhere to those labor standards with respect to the nonemployees is questionable. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of relationship, as in this case, is needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its power. The Secretary of Labor would not have been precluded from exercising the powers under Article 128 (b) over petitioner if another person with better-grounded claim of employment than that which respondent had.

Respondent, especially if he were an employee, could have very well enjoined other employees to complain with the DOLE, and, at the same time, petitioner could ill- afford to disclaim an employment relationship with all of the people under its aegis. The most important consideration for the allowance of the instant petition is the opportunity for the Court not only to set the demarcation between the NLRC?s jurisdiction and the DOLE?s prerogative but also the procedure when the case involves the fundamental challenge on the DOLE?s prerogative based on lack of employer-employee relationship. As exhaustively discussed here, the DOLE?s prerogative hinges on the existence of employer-employee relationship, the issue is which is at the very heart of this case. And the evidence clearly indicates private respondent has never been petitioner?s employee.

EJR Crafts Corp., vs CA (2006) Facts: In 1997, private respondents filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, regular holiday pay, overtime pay, non-payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against petitioner before the Regional Office, NCR of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Acting on the complaint, Regional Director issued an inspection authority to Senior Labor Enforcement Officer. On August 1997, an inspection was conducted on the premises of petitioner?s offices wherein the following violations of labor standards law were discovered, to wit: non-presentation of employment records (payrolls and daily time records); underpayment of wages, regular holiday pay, and overtime pay; and non-payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. On the same day, the Notice of Inspection Result was received by and explained to the manager of petitioner corporation Mr. Jae Kwan Lee, with the corresponding directive that necessary restitution be effected within five days from said receipt. As no restitution was made, the Regional Office thereafter conducted summary investigations. However, despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear for two consecutive scheduled hearings. Petitioner failed to question the findings of the Labor Inspector received by and explained to the corporation?s manager. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Order arguing that the Regional Director has no jurisdiction over the case as private respondents were allegedly no longer connected with petitioner corporation at the time of the filing of the complaint and when the inspection was conducted, and that private respondents? claims are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. Issue: WON the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the claims of the private respondents. Held: Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case. The Court favors the respondents in the money claims against the petitioner company. It is admitted that for the Regional Director to exercise the power to order compliance, or the socalled "enforcement power" under Article 128(b) of P.D. No. 442 as amended, it is necessary that the employer-employee relationship still exists.

In support of its contention that it is the Labor Arbiter and not the Regional Director who has jurisdiction over the claims of herein private respondents, petitioner contends that at the time the complaint was filed, the private respondents were no longer its employees. Considering thus that there still exists an employer- employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents and that the case involves violations of labor standard provisions of the Labor Code, we agree with the Undersecretary of Labor and the appellate court that the Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case in conformity with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code which states: Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. ?(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employeremployee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

EJR Crafts Corp., vs Court of Appeals (2006) G.R. 154101 Facts: Sometime in 1997, private respondents filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, regular holiday pay, overtime pay, nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against petitioner before the Regional Office, NCR of the DOLE. Acting on the complaint, an inspection was conducted on the premises of petitioner?s offices on August 22, 1997 wherein violations of labor standards law were discovered. Petitioner argued that the Regional Director has no jurisdiction over the case as private respondents were allegedly no longer connected with petitioner corporation at the time of the filing of the complaint and when the inspection was conducted, and that private respondents? claims are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. Issue: WON public respondent Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case. Held: The Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case. As found by both Undersecretary of Labor and the Court of Appeals, the said quitclaim and release forms are unreliable and do not correspond to other documents on record which would prove that private respondents were working for the petitioner up to August 1997. Considering thus that there still exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondents and that the case involves violations of labor standard provisions of the Labor Code, this Court rules with the Undersecretary of Labor and the appellate court that the Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case in conformity with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code which states that: ?Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles

129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employeremployee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.

Bay Haven v. Abuan Facts: This is a petition for certiorari on the decision of the CA, who denied their petition to annul the resolution of theDOLE .Upon complaint of Florentino Abuan, one of herein respondents, the DOLE, in the exercise of its visitorial,inspection and enforcement powers, through its Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), issued anOrder commanding petitioners to pay respondents a total of P638,187.15 corresponding to the latter's claims forunderpayment as petitioners' workers. The Regional Director based his Order on the results of the inspectionconducted on April 23, 1997 by one of its inspectors who found that petitioner New Bay Haven Restaurant,committed the following violations under the labor standards law which are Underpayment of minimum wage,Underpayment of thirteenth month pay, Underpayment of regular holiday pay, Underpayment of special holidaypay, Non-payment of night shift differential pay and Non-registration of the firm under Rule of Occupational Safetyand Health Standards. The petitioners filed with the DOLE-NCR Regional Office a Motion for Reconsideration,alleging that the office had no jurisdiction over the case and that the order was issued in denial of petitioners' rightto due process, and the jurisdiction rest on the NLRC. they added that their right to due process was also deniedbecause the order was issued without them being furnished copies of the complaint and the inspection report andwithout being notified of the hearings held in the case. The DOLE-NCR Assistant Regional Director, acting for theRegional Director, issued an Order granting petitioners' motion for reconsideration as he found merit inpetitioners' allegation of absence of due process in the issuance of the first order. The order, however, stated thatthe DOLE had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Labor Code. The next hearing was set wherein thepetitioners showed payroll sheets and waivers of quitclaims which were signed by the respondents. However, thelatter denied of the amount stated in the payroll as they contend they receive lesser that what is stated there andalso they were forced to sign the quitclaims. The DOLE issues an order holding the petitioners liable to therespondents. The case was elevated to the CA. The CA ruled in dismissing the petition, ruling that the DOLE hadjurisdiction over the labor standards case and that petitioners did not present enough evidence to refute theclaims made by respondents. Issues:

1) whether the DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives have jurisdiction to impose the monetaryliability against petitioners; and 2) whether the DOLE-NCR, as upheld by the DOLE Secretary and the CA committed an error in awarding the claimsof respondents. Ruling: 1. The DOLE Secretary and her authorized representatives such as the DOLE-NCR Regional Director, havejurisdiction to enforce compliance with labor standards laws under the broad visitorial and enforcementpowers. The Court has held that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary, exercisedthrough his representatives, encompass compliance with all labor standards laws and other laborlegislation, regardless of the amount of the claims filed by workers. 2. The mere disagreement by the employer with the findings of the labor officer, or the simple act of presenting controverting evidence, does not automatically divest the DOLE Secretary or any of hisauthorized representatives such as the regional directors, of jurisdiction to exercise their visitorial andenforcement powers under the Labor Code. Thus, the key requirement for the Regional Director and theDOLE Secretary to be divested of jurisdiction is that the evidentiary matters are not verifiable in thecourse of inspection. Where the evidence presented was verifiable in the normal course of inspection,even if presented belatedly by the employer, the Regional Director, and later the DOLE Secretary, may stillexamine them; and these officers are not divested of jurisdiction to decide the case In the present case, petitioners' pieces of evidence of the alleged contract of lease, payroll sheets, andquitclaims were all verifiable in the normal course of inspection and, granting that they were notexamined by the labor inspector, they have nevertheless been thoroughly examined by the RegionalDirector and the DOLE Secretary. For these reasons, the exclusion clause of Art. 128(b) does not apply.

St. Joseph College vs. SJC Workers, GR 155609, Jan 17, 2005 Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit Catholic educational institution while respondent is a legitimate labor organization which is currently the official bargaining representative of all employees of petitioner except the faculty and consultants of the Graduate School, managerial employees and those who occupy confidential positions. Respondent has an existing CBA with petitioner for the period from June 1, 1999 to May 31, 2004. For the SY 2000-2001, petitioner increased its tuition fees for all its departments. Based on petitioners computation, the incremental proceeds from the tuition fees increase for SY 2000-2001 is P1,560,942.74, 85% of which is equivalent to P1,326,801.33. Consequently, respondent averred that 85% of P4,906,307.58, which is P4,170,360.59 should have been released to its members as provided for in their CBA effective June 1, 2000. ISSUE:

How should the 70%-30% tuition fee increase be allocated? RULING: The law allows an increase in school tuition fees on the condition that 70 percent of the increase shall go to the payment of personnel benefits. Plainly unsupported by the law or jurisprudence is petitioners contention that the payment of such benefits should be based not only on the rate of tuition fee increases, but also on other factors like the decrease in the number of enrollees; the number of those exempt from paying the fees, like scholars; the number of dropouts who, as such, do not pay the whole fees; and the bad debts incurred by the school. The financial dilemma of petitioner may deserve sympathy and support, but its remedy lies not in the judiciary but in the lawmaking body. The law plainly states that 70 percent of the tuition fee increase shall be allotted for the teaching and the nonteaching personnel; and that the payment of other costs of operation, together with the improvement of the schools infrastructure, shall be taken only from the remaining 30 percent. The law does not speak, directly or indirectly, of the contention of petitioner that in the event that its total tuition income is lesser than that in the previous year, then the whole amount of the increase in tuition fee, and not merely up to 30 percent as provided by law, may be used for the improvement and modernization of infrastructure and for the payment of other costs of operation.

URBANES VS. SEC OF LABORFACTS: Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of CatalinaSecurity Agency, entered into an agreement 1 to provide security services to respondent SocialSecurity System (SSS).petitioner, by letter of May 16, 1994, requested the SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage Order No. NCR-03 which was issued by the Regional TripartiteWages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act 6727 otherwise known as theWage Rationalization ActOn June 24, 1994, petitioner pulled out his agencys services from the premises of the SSS andanother security agency, Jaguar, took over.On June 29, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking theimplementation of Wage Order No. NCR-03.In its position paper , 7 the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground thatpetitioner is not the real party in interest and has no legal capacity to file the same. In any event,it argued that if it had any obligation, it was to the security guards.The SSS moved to reconsider the September 16, 1994 Order of the Regional Director, prayingthat the computation be revised.By Order of December 9, 1994, the Regional Director modified his September 16, 1994 Order by reducing the amount payable by the SSS to petitioner.The Secretary of Labor, by Order of June 22, 1995, set aside the order of the Regional Director and remanded the records of the case "for recomputation of the wage differentials using P5,281.00 as the basis of the wage adjustment." And the Secretary held petitioners securityagency "JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY liable for wage differentials, the amount of which shouldbe paid DIRECTLY to the security guards concerned."Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the DOLE Secretarys Order of June

22, 1995 havingbeen denied by Order of October 10, 1995, the present petition was filed, petitioner contendingthat the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretionPetitioner thus contends that as the appeal of SSS was filed with the wrong forum, it shouldhave been dismissed.The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Article 128, not Article 129, is applicable to the case.Article 128 provides: ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the said case. HELD We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of thepresent case. It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employeremployeerelationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved byreference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it isthe Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not seekingany relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages onaccount of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. Theaction is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to thelabor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to therespondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco vs NLRC (2008) G.R. 151309 Facts: Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), providing for a compressed workweek schedule to be implemented in the company effective May 20, 1996. The MOA was entered into pursuant to Department of Labor and Employment Department Order (D.O.) No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek. As provided in the MOA, 8:00a.m. to 6:12p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular working hours, and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during those hours. The MOA specifically stated that the employee waives the right to overtime pay for work rendered after 5p.m. until 6:12p.m. from Monday to Friday considering that the compressed workweek schedule is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek schedule which also consists of 46 hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12p.m., such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay. Tryco informed the Bureau of Working Conditions of the Department of Labor and Employment of the implementation of a compressed workweek in the company. In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but failed to arrive at a new agreement. Issue: WON the MOA providing for compressed workweek is unenforceable as it is contrary to law. Held: The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioner. Where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Notably, the MOA complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE, under D.O. No. 21, to protect the interest of the employees in the implementation of a compressed workweek scheme: 1. The employees voluntarily agree to work more than eight (8) hours a day the total in a

week of which shall not exceed their normal weekly hours of work prior to adoption of the compressed workweek arrangement. 2. There will not be any diminution whatsoever in the weekly or monthly take-home pay and fringe benefits of the employees. 3. If an employee is permitted or required to work in excess of his normal weekly hours of work prior to the adoption of the compressed workweek scheme, all such excess hours shall be considered overtime work and shall be compensated in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code or applicable CBA. 4. Appropriate waivers with respect to overtime premium pay for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours a day may be devised by the parties to the agreement. 5. The effectivity and implementation of the new working time arrangement shall be by agreement of the parties. Considering that the MOA clearly states that the employee waives the payment of overtime pay in exchange of a five-day workweek, there is no room for interpretation and its terms should be implemented as they are written.

Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) vs. Benigno Vivar [205 SCRA 203 (1992)] Facts: On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations Commission a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid employees for holiday pay. Both Filipro and the Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator. Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. However,the respondent arbitrator refused to take cognizance of the case reasoning that he had no more jurisdiction to continue as arbitrator because he had resigned from service effective May 1, 1986. Issue: Whether or not sales personnel are excluded in the payment of holiday pay. SC Ruling: The Court ruled that field personnel are not entitled to such pay. Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."

The controversy centers on the interpretation of the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after having reported to the office and come back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. if they are Makati-based. The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales personnel's working hours which can be determined with reasonable certainty. The Court does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m., really spend the hours in between in actual field work. The Court concurs with the arbitrator when it disposed that the requirement for the salesmen and other similarly situated employees to report for work at the office at 8:00 a.m. and return at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. is not within the realm of work in the field as defined in the Code but an exercise of purely management prerogative of providing administrative control over such personnel. This does not in any manner provide a reasonable level of determination on the actual field work of the employees which can be reasonably ascertained. Actual field work begins after 8:00 a.m. when the sales personnel follow their field itinerary, and ends immediately before 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. when they report back to their office. The period between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises their hours of work in the field, the extent or scope and result of which are subject to their individual capacity and industry and which 'cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.' This is the reason why effective supervision over field work of salesmen and medical representatives, truck drivers and merchandisers is practically a physical impossibility. Consequently, they are excluded from the ten holidays with pay. Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides: "Rule IV Holidays with Pay. SECTION 1. Coverage. This rule shall apply to all employees except: (e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer The Court finds that the rule did not add another element to the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer. The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are given incentive bonus every quarter based on their performance is proof that their actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty. The Court thinks otherwise. The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns and (6) proper truck maintenance.

The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given incentive bonuses precisely because of the difficulty in measuring their actual hours of field work. These employees are evaluated by the result of their work and not by the actual hours of field work which are hardly susceptible to determination. In San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Democratic Labor Organization, the Court had occasion to discuss the nature of the job of a salesman. It states that : "The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent, works individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as much or as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime he ordinarily receives commissions as extra compensation. He works away from his employer's place of business, is not subject to the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he works per day."

INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION FFW V. INTERPHILLABORATORIES372 SCRA 658KAPUNAN, J. FACTS 1.Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargainingagent of the rank-and file employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a companyengaged in the business of manufacturing and packaging pharmaceutical products. 2.They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from August 1, 1990 toJuly 31, 1993. 3.Prior to the expiration of the CBA, Allesandro Salazar, the vice-president of the HRDepartment and Nestor Ocampo, the union president and Hernando Clemente, aunion director had a meeting. The representatives of the union were asking to makethe new CBA effective for 2 yeas. 4.Salazar informed them that it was still premature to discuss the new CBA. 5.The following day, all the rank-and-file employees refused to follow their regular two-shift work schedule 6:00am to 6:00pm and from 6:00pm to 6:00am. 6.At 2:00 pm and 2:00 am respectively, the employees stopped working withoutsealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on. 7.Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only returnto their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to theeffectivity and duration of the new CBA. 8.In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign duringthe time they were working thus substantially delaying the production of thecompany. 9.Respondent company filed with the NLRC to declare illegal the petitioner unionsovertime boycott and work slowdown which amounted to illegal strike. 10.The respondent company filed with the NCMB an urgent request for mediation.However the parties failed to arrive at an agreement. 11.Petitioner union then filed with NCMB a notice of strike citing unfair labor practiceallegedly committed by respondent company.

12.In the interim, the case before NLRC continued. The labor arbiter then found that theovertime boycott and the work slowdown as illegal strike. 13.Petitioner union contended that according to the provisions of their CBA on workinghours clearly state that the normal working hours were from 7:30 am to 4:30pm. Thelabor arbiter should not have admitted other evidence than that stated in the CBA. ISSUE Whether or not the working hours of the petitioner is only from 7:30 am to 4:30 pm. HELD NO. The parties in the CBA stipulated that: the schedule of shift work shall be maintained;however the company may change the prevailing work time at its discretion, should changebe necessary in the operations of the Company. All employees shall observe such rules ashave been laid down by the company for the purpose of effecting control over workinghours.It is evident from the foregoing provisions that the working hours may be changed, at thediscretion of the company, should such change be necessary for its operations and that theemployees shall observe such rules as have been laid down by the company. The companyhad to adopt a continuous 24-hour work daily schedule by reason of the nature of itsbusiness and the demands of its clients. It was established that the employees adhered tothe said work schedule since 1988. The employees are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule since they followed, without any question or complain, the two shift schedulewhile their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto. As the employees assented bypractice to this arrangement, they cannot now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because they were not obliged to work beyond eight hours.

Odango v. NLRC Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! Odango vs NLRC G.R. No. 147420 June 10, 2004 Facts: Petitioners are monthly-paid employees of ANTECO whose workdays are from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday. After a routine inspection, the Regional Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") found ANTECO liable for underpayment of the monthly salaries of its employees. On 10 September 1989, the DOLE directed ANTECO to pay its employees wage differentials amounting to P1,427,412.75. ANTECO failed to pay.

On 29 November 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners granting them wage differentials amounting to P1,017,507.73 and attorneys fees of 10%. Florentino Tongson, whose case the Labor Arbiter dismissed, was the sole exception. The Labor Arbiters Ruling The Labor Arbiter reasoned that ANTECO failed to refute petitioners argument that monthlypaid employees are considered paid for all the days in a month under Section 2, Rule IV of Book 3 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code ("Section 2").5 Petitioners claim that this includes not only the 10 legal holidays, but also their un-worked half of Saturdays and all of Sundays. The Labor Arbiter gave credence to petitioners arguments on the computation of their wages based on the 304 divisor used by ANTECO in converting the leave credits of its employees. The Labor Arbiter agreed with petitioners that ANTECOs use of 304 as divisor is an admission that it is paying its employees for only 304 days a year instead of the 365 days as specified in Section 2. The Labor Arbiter concluded that ANTECO owed its employees the wages for 61 days, the difference between 365 and 304, for every year. The NLRCs Ruling On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling that ANTECO underpaid its employees. The NLRC pointed out that the Labor Arbiters own computation showed that the daily wage rates of ANTECOs employees were above the minimum daily wage of P124.The lowest paid employee of ANTECO was then receiving a monthly wage of P3,788. The NLRC applied the formula in Section 2 [(Daily Wage Rate = (Wage x 12)/365)] to the monthly wage of P3,788 to arrive at a daily wage rate of P124.54, an amount clearly above the minimum wage. The NLRC noted that while the reasoning in the body of the Labor Arbiters decision supported the view that ANTECO did not underpay, the conclusion arrived at was the opposite. Finally, the NLRC ruled that the use of 304 as a divisor in converting leave credits is more favorable to the employees since a lower divisor yields a higher rate of pay. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals held that the petition was insufficient in form and substance since it "does not allege the essential requirements of the extra-ordinary special action of certiorari." The Court of Appeals faulted petitioners for failing to recite "where and in what specific instance public respondent abused its discretion." The appellate court characterized the allegations in the petition as "sweeping" and clearly falling short of the requirement of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Issues: Whether the court is correct in dismissing the case and whether the petitioners are entitled to their money claim?

Held: We agree with the Court of Appeals that nowhere in the petition is there any acceptable demonstration that the NLRC acted either with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Petitioners merely stated generalizations and conclusions of law. Rather than discussing how the NLRC acted capriciously, petitioners resorted to a litany of generalizations. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying their claim for wage differentials. Petitioners base their claim on Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Petitioners argue that under this provision monthly-paid employees are considered paid for all days of the month including un-worked days. Petitioners assert that they should be paid for all the 365days in a year. They argue that since in the computation of leave credits, ANTECO uses a divisor of 304, ANTECO is not paying them 61 days every year. Thus, petitioners claim is without basis.