1|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

CASE LIST: RULE 77:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Fleumer vs. Hix, 54 Phil 610 Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil 500 Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil 867 Leon and Ghezzi vs. Manulife, 90 Phil 459 Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868, 8 June 2006

RULE 78: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil 212 Navas Sioca vs. Garcia, 44 Phil 711 Mercado v. Vda De Jaen, 64 Phil 75 Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil 416 Uy vs. CA, GR No. 167979, 16 March 2006 De Guzman vs. Limcolioc, 68 Phil 673 San Luis vs. San Luis, GR No. 133743,February 2007 8. Angeles vs. Maglaya, GR No. 153798, 2 September 2005 9. Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil 175

RULE 77:
ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE THEREUNDER

which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West Virginia as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure; nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. It is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia. II. SUNTAY vs. SUNTAY

I.

A.W. FLUEMER vs. HIX.

Statement of Facts: The special administrator, A. W. Fleumer, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix filed petition for the probate of the purported last will and testament of Edward Randolf Hix, deceased.Judge Tuason of the Court of First Instance denied the petitionA. W. Fleumer appeals the said decision. It is alleged that since the will was executed in West Virginia by a resident therein, West Virginia law should govern. Statement of Issue: Whether or not the will may be probated in the Philippines. Ruling of the Court: The courts of the Philippines are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of law were not met. There was no showing that the book from

Statement of Facts: On Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and 9 children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. After

2|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China. Statement of Issue: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China may be probated in the Philippines. Ruling of the Court: The will executed in Amoy, China cannot be allowed. Silvino was unable to adduce the necessary proof under the Rules of Court in order to probate the will in the Philippines, specifically: a. The due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; b. The testator had his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; c. The will has been admitted to probate in such country; d. The fact that the municipal court of Amoy is a probate court; e. the procedural law of China regarding probate of wills. III. MICIANO vs. BRIMO Statement of Facts: Miciano, as the administrator of the estate of Joseph Brimo, filed a petition for the partition of the estate in accordance with the will of the deceased. Andre Brimo, brother of the deceased opposed the partition because the will itself was not executed in accordance with the laws of Turkey, in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. The trial court approved the petition for partition, hence this action. Statement of Issue: Whether or not the partition is valid. Ruling of the Court: The Court decided that although Andre Brimo opposed his brothers intention to have Philippine laws apply he was not deemed to have contested the legacy, because the choice of law clause in the will was contrary to law. Our laws apply the lex nationalii of decedent to determine intrinsic validity of a will and this law was purposefully disregarded by decedent. The Court considered this clause as not

imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir even if the testator should otherwise provide. Hence, Andre Brimo can inherit. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects IV. LEON AND GHEZZI vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO Statement of Facts: The case involves the estate of Basil Gordon Butler,formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in New York County and of which James Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate having been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947. The will contained this residuary clause bequeathing the remaining estate to Mercedes de Leon who is to receive an amount sufficient for her current needs. James Madison Ross was appointed as trustee. Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime. De Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance Company's Manila Office. To get hold of the entire amount, de Leon presented the will for probate in CFI, Manila with Ghezzi as administrator. After having qualified, the administratrix filed the motion to demand accounting from Manulife which Judge Amparo has denied. Statement of Issue:Whether or not De Leon can demand accounting from Manulife. Ruling of the Court: Section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

3|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch. V. ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON Statement of Facts: Spouses Audrey and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle. When Audrey died, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard. The will was admitted to probate in Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta as ancillary administrator. Audreys will was also admitted to probate in the Philippines (CFI-Pasig). Later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon with whom he has two children- Kimberly and Kevin. When Richard died, he left a will bequeathing his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was admitted to probate in Maryland, U.S.A. Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed a project of partition of Audreys estate, between Richard and Kyle. These were approved by the trial court. Respondent sought annulment of the project partition made arguing that since Audrey devised her

entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent. The Court of Appeals annulled the questioned orders. Statement of Issue: Whether or not the project of partition filed by the ancillary administrator is valid. Ruling of the Court: Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence, the annulment of project of partition was valid. Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court states: Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was dutybound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.

RULE 78:
LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION, WHEN AND TO WHOM ISSUED

I.

GUERRERO vs. TERAN

Statement of Facts: CFI of Albay appointed Maria Muoz as guardian for minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen Muoz; Maria Muoz gave the required bond Maria Muoz was not a resident of the Philippine Islands at the time of her appointment. She was removed as guardian but still responsible for mismanagement; from the time of her acceptance of appointment up to the time of her removal Doa Maria

4|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

Muoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. Ruling of the Court: There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians. (Civil Code took effect August 30, 1950). Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here. II. NAVAS SIOCA vs. GARCIA

Cebu and Espina being the parish priest in Cebu Central). The will was submitted for probate before the CFI Cebu. It was allowed and duly probated. Fr. Mercado, as the executor named in the will, was confirmed by CFI Cebu and he filed a bond of 5000. The Heirs opposed the order appointing Fr Mercado as executor and prayed for suspension of said order. HEIRS: They alleged that even if Fr. Mercado is named as executor in the will, there is no need to appoint him because the heirs are already of age and the estate has no debts. Mercado is also incapable as executor because he is partial since his parish, San Nicolas was named as one of the legatees in the will. ISSUE: WON the court is bound to appoint Mercado as executor since he is the named executor in the will. RUILING: Yes. Under Section 641 of Act no. 190 (An Act Providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Action and Special Proceedings in the Phil now Section 4, Rule 78), once a will is probated, the court is bound to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person so named as executor of the will provided he accepts the trust and files the required bond. While it may be true that such should not be strictly interpreted, for the court may be deprived of its power to appoint another should the executor so named is incapacitated, it is also true that incapacity must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary. Fr. Mercado was found to be fit as an executor for the estate. He further alleged that the parish of San Nicolas is not the legatee but the poor people of San Nicolas. When Gorordo chose Mercado as executor of his estate after his death, he must have had good and sufficient reasons and as such, his will must be respected. IV. OZAETA vs. PECSON

Statement of Facts: A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable the court may appoint another person. CFI Samar appointed Jose Garcia, administrator of the estate of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque. Navas Sioca is the surviving spouse of the deceased and maintains that the court erred in not appointing him administrator instead of Jose Garcia. Lower Court based its ruling on the fact that it appeared from the records that the appellant had adverse interest in the estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. Ruling of the Court: A probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. III. MERCADO VS VDA DE JAEN

FACTS: Gorordo is a retired bishop of Cebu. When he died he left a will naming his heirs and executor. The respondent De Jean is the sister of Gorodo who is named as universal heirs including his nieces, Telesfora and Cesorea Gorordo . The petitioner Fr Mercado was named in the will as the executor and in his absence, Fr. Espina (Mercado being the parish priest in San Nicolas,

Statement of Facts: Carlos Palanca died, leaving a will named former SC associate justice Ozaeta, as executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify. Gen. Roxas predeceased Palanca; Ozaeta filed petition for probate of Palancas will, prayed that he be appointed administrator. Heirs of Palanca opposed; Court appointed Phil Trust Co. as administrator. Judge had some personal issues regarding Ozaeta

5|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

Ruling of the Court: The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the rights to dispose. And as the rights granted by him will take effect from the time of his death (Article 777, CC), the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of this court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application. It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar fitness for such position or his want of ability to manage the estate cannot be addressed to the discretion of the county judge. V. UY vs CA

WILSON UY: The trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator. (bec. The letter of admin was already given to him, appointment of Johnny cannot be bec. there is res judicata) ISSUE: WON the appointment of co-admin rules out the order of preference in Rule 78, Sec 6. RULING: No. There is no question that petitioner was appointed as regular administrator of the estate of the deceased Jose K. C. Uy on June 9, 1998. However, private respondent in his motion to intervene sought to be appointed as administrator as he is not only the brother of the decedent but also a creditor who knows the extent of the latters properties. Thus, the trial court, while retaining petitioner as administrator, appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate. In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration. Thus, petitioners argument that the trial court cannot re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties. SUPPLEMENT: . Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are as follows: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of

FACTS: Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner). An intestate proceeding was instituted and Hofilea was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased. Uy opposed the appointment so the probate court revoked Hofilenas institution as administrator and the letter of admin. was given to Wilson Uy. Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate. Johnny Uy was appointed as co-administrator. Wilson Uy now asked the court to order Johnny to bring into the estate properties belongin to the deceased in which Johnny complied. Wilson again moved for Johnnys removal but was denied by the probate court and CA. CA: The appointment of private respondent was justified; that the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not rule out the appointment of co-administrator.

6|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Ruling of the Court: Preference of widow as administrator is not absolute. The principal consideration is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator. If there is another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor becomes untenable. Proceso acquired properties during 1st marriage; none acquired during 2nd marriage; Children of 1st marriage has more interest. VII. SAN LUIS vs SAN LUIS

The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances.In Sioca v. Garcia,this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit: It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a persons suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate. x x x.(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Facts: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708. Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration. Held: The issue of Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code. With respect to such issue, records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of

VI.

DE GUZMAN vs. LIMCOLIOC

Statement of Facts: Proceso de Guzman died without leaving a will. Proceso married Agatona and had four(4) children. When Agatona died, he married Angela Limcolioc with no kids. CFI Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman, child, as judicial administratrix; Limcolioc opposed.

7|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. In the instant case, Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she

proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code. VIII. ANGELES vs. MAGLAYA

Statement of Facts: Maglaya filed a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of his father opposed by Belen Angeles, fathers wife Francisco died intestate leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building Petitioner opposed the petition; she wants to be the administratrix of Franciscos estate. Maglaya: Angeles is not the daughter of Francisco because the birth certificate was not signed by him; and Angeles is not the only child of Francisco, they adopted Concesa Maglaya (daughter) has not even presented a witness to testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife no legal presumption of legitimacy which should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova.

8|RULE 77 & RULE 78: SPEC PRO

net

Statement of Issue: Whether or not the surviving spouse is preferred as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband. Ruling of the Court: Petition of Angeles (wife) is granted On the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. Issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Maglaya is not an interested party; she did not prove her legitimacy nor acceptance of her father. IX. JOHANNES vs. HARVEY

Statement of Facts: Johannes, a married woman, died intestate in Singapore, Straits Settlements. Her husband was named the administrator of her property by the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements. Husband resides in Singapore while brother in Manila. Her brother was appointed by the CFI Manila as ancillary administrator of her properties in Manila. Ruling of the Court: CFI did not act in excess of jurisdiction in naming the brother of the deceased as the ancillary administrator of the estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. A grant of administration does not have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the United States. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domiciliary representative, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other person.