Commission of the European Communities

physical sciences

EXVEMA Explosion Venting Manual

Report EUR 10571 EN

Blow-up from microfiche original

Commission of the European Communities

physical sciences

EXVEMA Explosion Venting Manual

N. LABATH*)
INGAR Santa Fe Argentine Republic

S. MAZZOCCHI**)
TEMA S.p.A. Milano Italy

*) INGAR Instituto de Desarrollo y Diseo Santa Fe, Republica Argentina. Work developed at the Joint Research Centre, Ispra Establishment, Italy, with a scholarship granted by CONICET (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnolgicas de la Republica Argentina). *) TEMA S.p.A., Reliability and Safety Division, ENTE NAZIONALE IDROCARBURI, San Donato Milanese, Milano, Italy.

Directorate-General Science, Research and Development Joint Research Centre Ispra Establishment - Italy

P R wr\ AL
N.C./ti

>JS Ef

1987

CL!EUR 1 0571

Published by the COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Directorate-General Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation Btiment Jean Monnet LUXEMBOURG

LEGAL NOTICE Neither the Commission of the European Communities nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information

ECSCEECEAEC Brussels - Luxembourg, 1987

III-

CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I: Fundamentalsof Combustion and Venting CHAPTER II: General Guides to Applying the Available Methods CHAPTER III: Methods and Recommendations for Deflagration Venting of Gas and Dust Mixtures CHAPTER IV: Design Criteria and Recommended Practices for Deflagration Venting CHAPTER V: Recommended Practices to Prevent Explosions CHAPTER VI: Bibliographical Review and Abstracts 77 85 87 25 1 5 15

APPENDIX 1: Definitions BIBLIOGRAPHY

101 105

IV-

ABSTRACT

This is a Manual intended to help the design engineer in the selection of the most appropriate methods to protect a vessel, duct or building from overpressures caused by deflagrations. Theoretical methods are outlined and many practical methods are given to define the design parameters and the number of venting devices. Some recommended practices for a good detailed design of venting devices are given, as well as some recommended practices to prevent deflagrations. A bibliographical review is included, with some comments for every reference, which are intended as a guide to find the reference(s) that may help the design engineer to get better understanding and information about his particular case or problem. A computer program containing most methods included in Chapter III is available, but it is not included in this report.

INTRODUCTION Many dusts, gases or mists processed in the chemical industry can produce flammable clouds when they come into contact with air. The presence of any kind of ignition source (naked flames, welding sparks, etc.) may produce a hazardous situation, the consequences of which should be avoided or minimized. Different prevention and protection methods are available, according to the specific characteristics of the combustible substance being handled, the process equipment in use, and the compatibility of the protective system with the efficient operation of the plant. Among the prevention measures available, all the devices fall into three categories. These are the elimination of fuel, air or source of ignition. Since the fuel is part of the process being evaluated, it cannot be eliminated; its concentration can be limited to less than the lowest explosive value, at best, but it is not a reliable measure and may give a false sense of safety. Air can be eliminated in many closed systems by inerting. New systems can be designed to accommodate this technique and some already installed equipment can often be adapted to use it. As to sources of ignition, their elimination is never completely assured. However, systems can be designed to reduce to a tolerable level the probability of ignition from open flames, hot surfaces, electrical equipment, static discharge, frictional heat, mechanical sparks and spontaneous heating. In this sense, several Standards and Guides are available. Once the ignition has occurred, three types of protection measures can be used to limit the damage. These are: explosion suppression systems, equipment designed to contain the explosive force, and adequate venting of explosion pressure to a safe location.

Explosion suppression systems either quench or extinguish fires by means of high-molecular weight gases or powders. Basically, the principle is to sense an explosion as it is beginning to develop, and trigger the extremely rapid addition of an inert substance or an extinguishing agent. Inert materials act to quench an explosion by ab-

sorbing enough of the heat generated to reduce the prevailing temperature below the ignition point. This method is recommended especially for gases or dusts with a high maximum rate of pressure rise, for which large venting areas would be necessary. Regarding the measure of designing equipment to contain the explosive force, it could be said that, although this is possible in almost any case, it is not practical, especially for reasons of cost. Usually it is limited to those pieces of equipment where proper explosion vents or explosion suppression are impractical. Explosion venting is designed to prevent the container or apparatus in which a gas or dust explosion occurs from being destroyed by the pressure arising from the explosion. Explosion venting does not prevent or suppress the explosion, but through suitable pressure relief devices the explosion pressure is reduced to a level which the container can withstand. Comparing the explosion venting technique with the other possible protective and preventive measures, the following advantages can be mentioned: a) increased capital expenditures are required only once, and no additional operating expenses are incurred, as in continuous inerting with N2 or CO2; b) the maintenance of bursting discs and explosion doors is less expensive than the maintenance of inerting systems or explosion suppression arrangements; c) the pressure resistance or shock pressure resistance of containers and apparatus does not have to correspond to the full explosion pressure. It is sufficient if the container is strong enough to resist the reduced explosion pressure, a very much lower value. On the other hand, this method presents some disadvantages, especially related to the disposal of the vented material either when the equip-

ment is in closed rooms or outdoors, because of the possible dangers to operating personnel. Explosion venting is, however, the most commonly used of the techniques available for dealing with the problem of dust and/or gas explosions (for further information about all these methods of prevention and protection see references /8,9,19/ and chapter VI). This manual is intended to provide useful information, methods and criteria for the design and utilization of devices and systems to vent the gases resulting from the deflagration of dusts, gases or mists in equipment, rooms, buildings, or other enclosures, so as to minimize structural or mechanical damage. Most emphasis will be given to the process equipment of chemical plants, that is to say, crushers, grinders, pulverizers, sieves, screens, bolters, dust collectors and arrestors, conveyors, screw feed conveyors, bucket elevators, driers, oven and furnaces, spray driers, blenders, mixers, ducts, pipes, bins, silos, spreaders, coating machines and packaging equipment. Different methods will be presented and outlined, describing their main features such as limits of application, conditions where they should be applied, parameters to determine experimentally or to obtain from specific bibliography, etc. General and specific criteria for using the several parts of the manual will be given. In those cases where no good method is available, some indications and references will be provided in order to let the user apply the specific information to his problem. Some recommendations will be given about the proper design of the venting devices, their location, their adequate numbers, the design features of the discharge tubes, distances from other equipment, allowable venting device weights, etc. operation. Some recommended practices will be presented to prevent explosions at the design stage and during plant

Finally, the results of a review of the available literature on the subject will be outlined. Abstracts of all the papers reviewed will be given, as well as a classification of the subjects discussed and treated in these papers. This is done in order to help the user to find those papers in which his study case is more specifically or completely analysed.

Some of these methods are implemented in the computer code EXVEMA, which has been programmed as a friendly user code, letting the user calculate the venting area required by the different methods applicable and in different design conditions in order to give him adequate information and allow him to design options to compare and so to choose the method which is most appropriate to his case.

CHAPTER I -

FUNDAMENTALS OF COMBUSTION AND VENTING

The following conditions are necessary for a combustion process to occur: a) fuel present in the correct proportions in the atmosphere; b) air or other oxidant; c) a source of ignition. Once started, the combustion process may become a deflagration or a detonation, depending on the value of the flame speed. A deflagration is a burning process which takes place at a flame speed below the velocity of sound in the unburned medium. When the flame speed is higher than the velocity of sound, the burning process is a detonation. As a consequence of this combustion process there will be a pressure increase in the system. If this system is not structurally capable of withstanding the maximum pressure developed, an explosion will occur. General description of a deflagration The following description should not be taken as the only possible type of deflagration process, because this process depends on the experimental conditions, the type of venting devices, their positions, opening pressures, venting areas, etc. This description is intended to provide a framework to show the different aspects and factors which have a considerable influence in the deflagration process. Later, more specific details about the effects of these important variables will be given, as well as many references. First of all, a clear distinction must be made between the deflagration process in systems with uncovered vents and systems with covered vents, because their characteristics are rather different. The deflagration process is better followed through th analysis and discussion of pressure-time diagrams which are generally obtained in most of the experimental work already done.

Initially uncovered vents The observed pressure-time histories are characterized by the existence of several pressure peaks, and in most cases two peaks are dominant. For special conditions, strong pressure oscillations of the acoustic frequency of the model are also present. We will describe first the case where the explosion is ignited at the rear wall at maximum distance from the vent /31/. Experimental data show in general that the first peak occurs when the flame reaches the vent opening (and not when it touches the confinement walls). Then the vented gas changes from relatively cold and dense unburned gas to hot combustion gases of low density. The available pressure drop over the opening is now able to vent a substantially larger gas volume per unit time. The volumetric flow through the vent increases rapidly while the production rate of combustion gases in the module does not change significantly, and hence the rate of pressure change drops. The increased volumetric flow rate will result in a sudden increase in the flow velocities of the combustion gases. This will generate and amplify flow-induced turbulence within the confinement and hence leads to a positive feedback in the energy release. The production of combustion gases and rate of pressure change will then increase until most of the remaining gas is burned. steep pressure drop naturally follows when the combustion has ceased.

At least two flame acceleration mechanisms appear to be important in these processes. In the phase up to the first peak, where the flame surface is smooth and free from largescale turbulence, the pressure will increase as a t x . For closed confinements without flow fields generated by venting, the pressure rise is observed to be cubic, 3 . However, when the explosion is fully vented, may increase up to 5. This indicates that even the weak flow fields set up in the early pha ses of the venting increase the rate of energy release. The flame surface is thereby increased, and this is probably the rea son for the increased combustion rate.

Of greater importance is the acceleration of the combustion rate pro duced by the turbulent combustion initiated when the flame reaches the vent opening and which manifests itself in the second pressure peak, in which the pressure rise now is exponential, ^ exp(kt). When the sudden change in vented gas type occurs at the first peak, the flow velocities of the combustion gases will increase. The high velocities of the combustion gases result in a large velocity gradient over the boundary layer between unburned and burned gases, i.e. the flame. The flame will accordingly be unstable, and a turbulence will be formed exactly in the same way as turbulence is formed when a jet flows into a gas at rest. Thus, while the flame during the period up to the first peak has no largescale turbulent structure, the flame structure in the last phase producing the second peak is typical of a strongly turbulent flame. It should be stressed that these combustion acceleration mechanisms can be quite strong. If the second peak is to be modelled as the later part of a spherical combustion inside the confinement, burning speeds 2030 times the laminar would often be necessary.

The existence of such strong flame acceleration mechanisms even in empty confined spaces does not appear to have been recognized in many experimental works of the past. Apparently, multiple peaks in pres sure loads from vented gas explosions have been observed previously, but without receiving much attention, probably because they appear to be less dominant in smallerscale explosions (see references /13, 22,31,35,36,39,41/).

The mechanisms discussed above are most clearly seen when the explo sion is ignited at the rear wall at maximum distance from the vent opening. When the gas is ignited at the centre of the confinement or at the front wall close to the vent, the picture is further complicated by other strong flame instabilities.

Initially covered vents If the vent is closed by a cover that opens at a certain overpressure, there will be an initial peak from the pressure build-up before the vent opens. If the flame at this time still has not reached the vicinity of the opening, the initial peak will be followed by the double peak picture as discussed previously and illustrated in Fig. 1. These may very well be stronger than the first peak which is governed by the opening pressure of the vent. If, on the other hand, the flame is close to the vent when this opens, at least the two first of the three peaks will coincide. Other papers mention the existence of a final peak, accompanied by pressure fluctuations, caused by a standing acoustic wave in the vessel. Some other features of this phenomenon are described in the references /39,40/. For dust deflagrations, things may be somewhat different.

Pressure A; initially covered vents

time

B: uncovered vents

time Fig. 1 Typical pressure-time history for explosion ignited a t rear wall.

Factors affecting an explosion or deflagration Much experimental work has been done in recent years in order to provide useful information about the several factors that influence the main aspects of a deflagration process. The corresponding published papers are classified in Tables II - V, according to several categories in order to help the user find the papers that are most useful for his needs. Of all these papers, those which describe with greater detail the factors and variables which affect the deflagration process are: /4,5,6, 9,13,14,16,23,25,29,30,31,33,35,36,39,40,41,42,43/. In this chapter, important factors will be mentioned and some comments will be given; a more detailed description of their effects can be found in the respective references given for each variable, as well as the experimental evidence from which such conclusions were drawn. Fuel: The fuel may be a gas, mist, dust or a combination of these

(usually called hybrid mixtures). Fuel concentration: Most gaseous fuels have a lower and upper flamma-

ble limit; the concentration must be within these limits for a deflagration to occur. For dusts, the upper limit is not well defined. The dependence of the maximum deflagration pressure and rate of pressure rise on the fuel concentration can be seen in several curves given in /4,43,6,9/. For both dusts and gases, it can be said that in general these curves present a maximum, which is not the case for the same concentration. In cases where the particle distribution is not uniform, the flame velocity could change and maximum pressures could be different from that of homogeneous mixtures /4,5/. Some interesting experiments with dusts in partially filled vessels show that explosion parameters correspond to those of the equivalent real volume, i.e. the actually explodable part of the total volume /23/. Similar results are reported for gases in /34/. Some experiments with gas-air mixtures were made where several layers of explosive mixtures were employed.

10

A linear relationship between maximum explosion pressure with layer depth of gas mixture was found for various vent areas /30/. Oxidizer concentration: The oxidizer is normally the oxygen present

in the atmosphere. Oxygen concentrations higher than 21% intensify the reaction rate of combustion and increase the probability for transition into detonation. Less than 21% oxygen decreases the rate of reaction /43/. Particle size of dusts: The particle size of dusts has a considerable

effect on maximum pressure, and the rate of pressure rise increases significantly with decreasing particle size /9/. A decrease in particle size lowers the minimum energy required to ignite dust clouds /25,43/. A sufficient concentration of particles of a given minimum size must be present for a dust deflagration.

Initial

temperature

and pressure

of mixtures:

A change in initial ab-

solute pressure of the fuel-oxidant mixture produces a proportionate change in maximum pressure resulting from deflagration. A change in initial absolute temperature produces an inverse change in maximum pressure resulting from deflagration. Increase of temperature in most cases results in an increase in the maximum rate of pressure rise /43/. Some other considerations are given in /29/.

Volume and shape of enclosures

Generally, the maximum pressure is

unaffected by the size and shape of the vessel; however, the rate of pressure rise is markedly affected /9,43/. When considerable turbulence is present, even the maximum pressure is altered significantly.

Presence

of admixed moisture

or inert

dilutants:

Moisture or inert

materials in sufficient quantity will quench a dust deflagration partly through absorption of heat and radiant energy and partly by hindering diffusion of oxygen and gases into and from the burning fuel. Moisture in dust particles raises the ignition temperature of the dust because of the heat absorbed during heating and vaporization of the moisture.

11

The moisture in the air surrounding a dust particle has no significant effect on the course of a deflagration once ignition has occurred. In order for moisture to prevent ignition of a dust by common sources, the dust would have to be so damp that a cloud could not be formed /43/. For most flammable gases, the addition of water vapour to the gas-air mixtures affects combustion properties much as does the addition of an inert diluent like nitrogen. Hybrid mixtures: The presence of gas may have a considerable influence

on the burning characteristics of a combustible dust, depending on the type and concentration of flammable gas. There are concentrations of dusts which, by themselves, will not burn, even with a large or intense ignition source, but in the presence of small quantities of flammable gases can burn even at concentrations below the flammable limit of either material. A curve for PVC dusts in the presence of propane can be seen in /25/, which shows that the dust lower explosion limit decreases more than linearly with increasing propane concentration. The presence of a small amount of flammable gas generally reduces the minimum ignition energy required to ignite the dust mixture /25,43/. Some experimental results showing these conclusions can be seen in /25/. The addition of gas to the air generally increases the explosion effects of dusts. But this influence is less pronounced on the explosion behaviour of highly reactive dusts than on dusts with lower reactivity /25/. Finally, a hazard classification of hybrid mixtures is proposed in /25/.

Fundamental burning

veloaity

and flame speed:

The destructive forces

of a deflagration increase with the pressure and velocity developed. The flame speed may be many times higher but never lower than the fundamental burning velocity. The flame speed is fastest and the highest pressures are obtained when the fuel concentration is optimum and uniformly distributed throughout the whole vessel or confinement. The primary difference between a dust and a gas is that the burning time may be slightly longer for the dust. Sometimes dusts produce more disastrous explosions than do gases /9/. This is due, in part, to

12

the slower flame speed and, therefore, longer duration which results in greater total impulse during the burning process /43/. An important factor in flame speed and acceleration is the presence either of an initial turbulence or of several obstacles in the flow direction. This flame acceleration could produce a great increase in the maximum pressure developed, by at least one order of magnitude, and even beyond the values predicted by code formulae. This phenomenon can be observed not only in gases /l3,22,31/ but also in dusts /41/. A more detailed discussion of this subject will be given in the next chapter.

Ignition

source:

In order to ignite a gas or a dust a minimum amount

of energy must be available. Some values of these minimum ignition energies are given in /43/. Many experiments are reported in /25/, where a summary of their results can be found, as a statistical distribution of tested dusts into ranges of lowest minimum ignition energy. According to /43/, the rate of pressure rise and the maximum explosion pressure increase as the strength of the ignition source increases. However, according to /25/, neither ignition source nor ignition energy have an influence on the explosion characteristics of combustible dusts. Reference /25/ also gives an important analytical expression which enables us to calculate the concentration of lowest minimum ignition energy from the data obtained when measuring the explosion indices. Location of the ignition source at the geometrical centre of a confined fuel-oxidant mixture results in the development of the highest pressure and rate of pressure rise /6,43/. Some other experimental results and curves about the influences of the degree of turbulence on minimum ignition energy are given in /25/. Turbulence : This is one of the most important factors to be considered.

Much experimental work has been carried out in recent years in order to quantify its influence, given that in certain cases the maximum explosion pressure can reach values which are ten or more times greater than those predicted by previously accepted methods (NFPA 68 and

13

VDI 3673 codes). Among the most interesting works in this subject, the following can be mentioned: /9,13,22,31,35,36,39,40,41,42/. Generally, it can be said that initial turbulence considerably increases the maximum pressure, while the rate of pressure rise is markedly increased /6,9,43/. A more detailed description of this subject will be given in the next chapter. Venting variables: Venting is a measure which limits the development

of destructive pressures in an enclosure incapable of withstanding the full force of a deflagration. Some factors related to venting devices deserve special consideration. - Vent size. The maximum pressure in vented vessels decreases as the

vent area increases. Especially in small enclosures, one large vent will relieve the pressure of a deflagration as effectively as several small vents whose area equals the area of the large vent. For large enclosures, the distribution of vents relative to the location of the initiation of a deflagration is important /43/. - Type of_vents. Open vents are more effective in relieving pressure

build-up. Vents covered with a diaphragm, swinging door, bursting disc or other device require inertia to be overcome and they are therefore less effective than the open ones (covered vents are usually necessary to prevent loss of the plant contents during normal operation). - Operating pressure of bursting disc or vent_device. Several experi-

ments with air-pentane mixtures, for different bursting pressures and vent sizes, showed the presence of a minimum in some curves representing maximum explosion pressure against bursting disc operating pressure. This relationship becomes linear /6/ only for greater vent areas. This behaviour observed for stationary gas mixtures could not be confirmed in turbulent gas mixtures, where in most cases a linear correlation was obtained /6/. In any case, maximum explosion pressures obtained with turbulent gas mixtures are much higher than those for the stationary mixtures /6/. Some nomographs showed in /9/ indi-

14

cate the importance of operating pressures of bursting discs in the maximum explosion pressure obtained. Duct vents. When vessels are located in a room, it is impossible

to release the explosion pressure directly. The vent must be connected by a more or less long duct to the open air. Beyond that the exhaust openings of such ducts normally have to be protected against the infiltration of rain or snow by an additional membrane or by a shield. Some bends may be necessary to guide the vented products in the desired direction. Experiments carried out with different lengths of ducts showed that there is an increase of maximum explosion pressure with this length until a stationary value is obtained. When using rather long ducts (10 metres), maximum explosion pressure values three times greater than in the case of venting without ducts can be obtained. Some curves in /43/ for coal dusts show an even greater increase. Certain parts of the duct have a pressure similar to that of the vessel and sometimes higher /14,16/. Some other conclusions about the presence of dust in the ducts, the effect of bends (rather negligible), protecting membranes, etc. can be seen in /14,16/. Inertia of vent panels. The inertia of the vent panel and its break-

out pressure interact to produce maximum pressure in the container. Full venting is achieved when the panel moves sufficiently so that the open area around the panel is equal to the vent area without the panel. Vent panels can release by moving in translation or, if hinged, in rotation. The inertia and acceleration of the vent panel must be considered to determine whether it moves far enough to reach full venting before the allowable pressure in the container is reached. If it does not, it will restrict the opening for too long and the allowable pressure will be exceeded. The results of many experiments about the effect of vents of different inertia and the treatment of this variable in mathematical models can be seen in /20,21,30,37,38/.

15

CHAPTER II -

GENERAL GUIDES TO APPLYING THE AVAILABLE METHODS

Several methods are available to design explosion venting devices. These methods can be classified in different ways. One of the most appropriate is according to the most important applications, as follows: the media (dusts, gases, hybrid mixtures) and the enclosure (buildings/ vessels/ducts). Most methods may be applied only to one of these nine possible cases. In certain cases, more than one method is available; the design engineer should use his knowledge and experience to choose the most appropriate for his problem. In other cases, and especially when highly turbulent conditions are present, no general methods are yet available. A second kind of method classification divides them into empirical models and theoretical computer models. Empirical models are all those equations which are recommended for

application in particular cases and provided that certain parameters meet some constraints. These models were generally obtained from limited or extended experimentation, especially developed in low-volume vessels or enclosures. They are described in detail in Chapter III. Computerized theoretical models make use of several theoretical rela-

tionships which try to interpret and represent the dynamics of the phenomena involved in the combustion and venting process. These models have in general a common group of equations relating the most important variables and some basic assumptions. Most of these theoretical models enable the development of the explosion pressure with time to be calculated, but often the vent area recommendations which follow from the calculation are obtained, just as in the simpler methods, by equating the volume rate of outflow at the explosion pressure to the volume rate of expansion due to combustion. And usually the maximum possible volume rate of expansion is used to calculate the vent area. Therefore, in many cases final vent areas are similar to those obtained with simpler methods.

16

In most calculations a spherical, undisturbed, flame front is considered. The flame propagates away from an ignition source which is usually centrally placed in a spherical vessel. It is usually assumed that the unburnt gas ahead of the flame front is compressed adiabatically as the burnt gas expands and that the time taken for a pressure wave to reach the wall is infinitesimally small, giving a uniform pressure throughout the vessel. Variations of temperature and density of burnt gas between the ignition point and the flame front are very difficult to calculate because of compression effects on unburnt gas, which undergoes different degrees of compression as the combustion proceeds. The whole process is generally considered as adiabatic. Some models neglect flame front thickness but others divide it into two areas: pre-reaction and reaction zones /46/. As the pressures developed in these deflagration processes are not very high, it is considered that all molecular species obey the perfect gas law. All models assume that burnt gases attain equilibrium within a negligible time; the number of substances considered to be present in this equilibrium is variable and most computer algorithms seem to be able to work with few substances. To take into account the outflow of either burnt or unburnt gases through the vent, two expressions are used, depending on the relationship between the internal and external pressure of the vessel, and the critical pressure of the gas or mixture considered. Some models consider the inertia of the venting device when opening. Turbulence effects, generally consisting of distorsion and disturbance of the flame front at and subsequent to the operation of the vent, are often ignored. In certain cases /37/, turbulence is dealt with in a simplified manner. Methods of calculating the progress of a vented explosion proceed from a mass balance. At any time during the explosion: M = M + M + M, o v u D d)

17

where M Q is the initial mass of unburnt gas in the vessel, M v is the mass of gas vented from the vessel, M u is the mass of unburnt gas re maining in the vessel, and M^ is the mass of burnt gas in the vessel. My may be the mass of unburnt gas, burnt gas or a mixture of both. Generally the vented gas is considered to be unburnt gas until the flame has reached the vessel walls and combustion is therefore completed (a spherical vessel was assumed). The rate of increase in the mass of burnt gas at any time during the explosion is: 2 dM, /dt = 4 r. S b u b u where r^ is the radius of the flame front,

(2) '

is the density of unburnt

gas, and S u is the fundamental burning velocity. The volume of unburnt gas consumed (V uc ) in time dt is:

dV uc

=4nr b

S dt u

(3)

and the volume of burnt gas formed (V, ) is: 2

dV. _ = 4 u r bf b

S E dt u

(4)

where E, the expansion factor, is given by:

E = /p. = T./. , K u ^b u u b b b u where M. are average molecular weights, P. pressures, T

(5)

temperatures;

subscript b denotes burnt gas properties and u the unburnt gas proper ties. Usually = .

The rate of outflow of material through the vent is calculated by ap plying various equations depending on the pressure differential across the vent. When the inside pressure (P) is less than the critical pres sure (P ._) given by: crit

18

. -
ent a 2

/(-)
(6)

the flow through the vent is subsonic. P a is the external pressure, and is the ratio of substance specific heat capacities at constant pressure and constant volume (C p /C v ). For subsonic velocities:

dM dt

Yl
, rp I2/Y P f -1^T05

When the inside pressure is greater than

. , the flow through the

vent is at sonic velocity, independent of the external pressure, and is given by:

1+Y

where Cd is

the orifice discharge coefficient and Ay is the venting

cross section area.

The venting of gas can be considered from the very beginning of the com bustion process (open vessels) or after a certain operating pressure is reached (bursting disc pressure or venting pressure). By calculating the amount of material vented as the explosion develops, at the end of each time step, dt, of a numerical calculation, the amounts of burnt and unburnt gas remaining in the vessel are known, and an iterative procedure can be used to find the pressure at which the volumes of these gases equal the volume of the vessel. The unburnt gas is generally as sumed to be compressed adiabatically.

Various methods can be used to calculate the behaviour of the burnt gas as the pressure changes. Bradley and Mitcheson /46/ calculate the ra dial temperature profile in the burnt gas; equilibrium temperatures must be computed from thermodynamic data (Gibbs free energy values, enthalpy and entropy polynomials in temperature, etc.) of all the

19

substances considered to be present, generally including CO, CO, H, H, H O , OH, N, N, NO, O and 0_; from their concentrations the burnt gas constant, R b , could be obtained. A similar procedure is used by Swift /38/.

The fundamental burning velocity is influenced by temperature and pres sure. As these properties change as the combustion process develops, the value of S v cannot be considered constant. Bradley and Mitcheson /46/ used for methaneair explosions the following relationship for the isentropic variation of laminar burning velocities: S u = 10 + 0.000371 T 2 0.0052 T 1 * 5 log cm.sec"1

(9)

with measured in atmospheres. When turbulence is present, formula (9) is no longer valid and com puter theoretical models cannot follow correctly the development of pressure with time as the combustion proceeds. Swift /37,38/ proposes the use of the correlations of AbdelGayed and Bradley as a convenient method to consider the gross effects of turbulence on the fundamental burning velocity. In this method, the ratio of turbulent to laminar burning velocity is obtained in terms of the turbulent Reynolds number and the ratio of the laminar burning velocity to the r.m.s. turbulent velocity. A turbulent Reynolds number is derived from the flow Rey nolds number of the vent gases according to the relationship:
fi

Re x

5.925 + 1 0

(Re) '

1 P4

(10)

The RMS flow velocity, u', was taken to be 5% of the maximum flow ve locity in the vessel during venting. Thus, the instantaneous Re^ and u' values are used to calculate the turbulent burning velocity. Abdel Gayed and Bradley correlations are a series of graphs for different turbulent Reynolds number regimes; for their practical use in computers, these graphs can be transformed into tabular form. By numerical manipulation of these equations the development of the explosion pressure inside a vented vessel can be calculated.

20

A comprehensive description of the different computer models can be found in /47/. Some of these models are developed in /l,11,20,31,37, 38/ and the method of Fairweather and Vasey /44/. There are not many theoretical models for dust explosions, and comprehensive descriptions of Heinrich, Palmer and Rust models are given in /47/.

Turbulence

As has already been said, several experiments in large vessels gave maximum explosion pressures far greater than those predicted by exis ting models /l3,22,31/, invalidating most of the methods recommended in the NFPA 68 /43/. To improve the knowledge available, new experi ments in large vessels have been carried out and reported in recent years, most of them under conditions where considerable turbulence was present /35,36,39,41,49/. In order to have a complete idea of the experimental details and the main ideas and results described by the various authors, the user is directed to the references given. Some of the main findings made in these works will be summarized in the following lines.

Numerous physical mechanisms can give rise to an increase in the bur ning rate or flame velocity in a vented vessel. Most of these mecha nisms are powerful positive feedback mechanisms which, once triggered, will lead to rapid amplification under the appropriate conditions. The various flameacceleration mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and they may all act simultaneously, to an extent that depends strongly on the initial and boundary conditions of the system.

A strong ignition process due to a large number of ignition sources generates a very high burning rate which persists throughout the com bustion of the reactants in the vessel. turbulent jet type of igni tion reduces the burnout time of the mixture considerably. In large volumes, where the reactants are near the flammability limits and the burning velocity is slow, buoyancy can play a significant role

21

in limiting the maximum overpressure rise inside the vessel. The difference in density between the hot combustion products and the cold unburnt mixture creates an upward acceleration vector which distorts the flame shape and influences the rate of overpressure rise in the vessel /35/. Turbulence can markedly increase the burning velocity of a given mixture. Large-scale turbulence causes the flame area to increase by wrinkling while small-scale turbulence increases local heat and mass transfer rates and hence results in a higher burning velocity. The presence of obstacles can increase the flame velocity considerably. Prior to the arrival of the flame, the flow of the displaced unburnt mixture creates a high velocity gradient field and a wake flow around the step barrier. As the flame reaches the obstacle, it is rapidly stretched as it is convected along the gradient field. The shear layer in the wake flow gives rise to a very high local burning velocity and rapid combustion of the recirculation region in the wake occurs. There is an increase in flame velocity past the obstacle, as well as the creation of pressure waves due to the rapid burn-out of the turbulent pocket of gas in the wake zone. The burning rates and the displacement flow velocity it generates, are intimately coupled in the following manner. A higher burning rate causes the displacement flow velocity in the unburnt mixture ahead of the flame to increase accordingly; this in turn gives rise to a more severe velocity gradient and high intensities in the turbulent shear flows. Thus, a positive feedback mechanism is present and the burning rate may rise to extremely high levels depending on the physical boundary conditions (i.e. vent opening, obstacle configuration and spacings). In open flames, or in closed vessels, it is difficult to achieve a high flow velocity in the unburnt gas ahead of the flame. Thus, this positive feedback mechanism may not be too effective. However, under proper conditions of partial confinement or in vented vessels near the vent opening, the flow velocity can be very high and, in the presence of suitable obstacles, to create a gradient field and an intensity turbulent shear flow, this positive mechanism can be extremely effective leading to very high burning rates and possibly even a transition to detonation.

22

Although turbulence is a powerful flame acceleration mechanism, it becomes ineffective when the mixture deviates from stoichiometric composition or when the confinement is relaxed by venting in a direction normal to the flame travel. Vessels with large L/D ratios can lead to very high overpressures even when vented. Venting becomes ineffective when choke phenomena occur. Under appropriate conditions, a turbulent flame may accelerate to velocities as high as a few hundred metres per second. Turbulent quenching provides the mechanism for limiting the continuous growth to detonation. With strong jet ignition, rates of pressure rise one or two orders of magnitude higher than the normal values for weak spark ignition. Flame instabilities have been proposed as an important acceleratory mechanism in the development of pressure in vented explosions. Two main instabilities are identified: Taylor-Markstein type and Rayleigh type. Both may be present and their interaction is complex; meriting further investigation.

Limitations of the available methods Even though empirical methods are easy to apply, in general they are restricted by several parameter constrains (initial pressure, stationary mixtures, maximum values of certain variables, etc.) in such a way as to make them inapplicable to many cases. From all the experiments carried out in which turbulence effects were found in /22/ it is reported that most available methods are not appropriate for volumes greater than 12 m . Furthermore, /31/ says that these methods are limited to volumes smaller than 1 m3. The main reason for these astonishing results is the fact that most empirical methods were obtained with experimental work on low-volume vessels where turbulence effects were not detected or just neglected. Extrapolation to larger volumes has become unacceptable because different flame acceleration processes seem to take place in these latter cases, making the maximum explosion

23

pressure one or two orders of magnitude higher than in previous experiments. Some researchers propose the use of safety factors to consider the effects of turbulence, multiplying the maximum pressure predicted by the available methods times these safety factors (Rasbash methods /44/). Theoretical computer models are much more flexible and easy to apply, because most parameters are free of constraints. However, they cannot produce better results than empirical methods when turbulence effects are present. Some researchers /35/ emphasize the need to develop these kinds of methods and to introduce there those correlations or equations which seem to be the most appropriate to consider turbulence. This is the idea implemented in /37/, where some correlations to calculate the turbulent burning velocity are proposed. Further interesting work in this direction is reported in /48/. Summarizing, the user is urged to analyse carefully the possibility of the existence of turbulent conditions in the vessels or enclosures where one of the available methods described in Chapter 3 is to be applied. If turbulence may be present, the design engineer should try to reduce its intensity as much as possible (see some recommendations in Chapter 4 ) , and/or to include in the calculations the safety factors proposed by some authors and/or analyse all the qualitative and quantitative information he may obtain for his problem (experimentally or from other sources).

25

CHAPTER III -

METH ODS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEFLAGRATION VENTING OF GAS AND DUST MIXTURES

Before applying any one of the methods included in this chapter, the general guidelines given in Chapter II should be read.

Methods are grouped in two sections; those belonging to Section A are applied to gas explosion venting, and those of Section to dust explosion venting.

The meaning of the variables which appear in the formulae is given at the end of this chapter.

26

SECTION A:

GAS EXPLOSION VENTING

The flow diagram 1 is a guide to the selection among the available vent sizing methods, according to gas properties, equipment to be protected and other parameters. The methods are described in separate sheets; each method has the reference number indicated in the flow diagram 1.

27

/START

< 24 kg/m 1 /-

Y
J FRA- LMAX/LMIN] j FRA=L/D|-

CONSTAN CROSS SECTION

7-

-/ ,

> 0,75

n\/

WEIGHT PER UNIT AHEA IS TOO HIGH THERE IS NO A V A I L A B L E METHOD

<6 /

y V > 3 ms / /

STRAIGHT UNOBSTRUCTED DUCT

-.
SEE N FPA 68-1978(54,88) IG

l/D >

3/

METHOD. JOIN T FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION SEE N FPA 68-1978 (54, 86)

3G

METHOD: JOIN T FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION SEE N FPA 68-1978 (54, 87)

2G

VENT CAN N OT BE SIZED V TOO HIGH

-/si

<

18m/s/-^

STRAIGHT UN OBSTRUCTED DUCT

SEE N FPA 68-1978 (54. 89) I 4G

METHOD: JOIN T FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION SEE N FPA 68-1978 (54,88/89)

) - .

5G

28

/
No

FRA > 5

/ THERE IS NO AVAILABLE METHO D

-/Vi< 10 kg/m 2 /

^E>
-

(1)

V > 3000 m

f-

THERE IS NO AVAILABLE METHO D

PRBAR < 0,1

kg METHOD V D I 3673 SEE NFPA 68-1978 (54)

6G

/
(1)

F A> 3 /-^ R

NO MO RE METHO DS A V A I L A B L E

}-^>

X V > 200 f
I 7G

ETHODS: CUBBAGE SIMMO NDS

I
PVMBAR > 490 XPVMBAR < 70 /

-L

METHOD: CUBBAGE-MARSHALL

J-'
I

8G

METHODS: RASBASH RASBASH ET AL.

9G
10G

METHOD: BRADLEY-MITCHESO N

y-'
I

11G

(1) Remark: This upper limit volumes only hold if there is no turbulence

FLOW DIAGRAM 1

29

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Method described in NFPA 68 EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, Sheet 6886) has been freely adapted by the compiler

REFERENCE METHOD No. IG

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: straight constant section enclosures (ducts) without internal ob structions*) 6< L/D< 30, where D = 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the enclosure flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds of less than 3 m/s

FORMULAE:

- a vent c o e f f i c i e n t = Ajj/Ay i s defined

- t h e maximum o v e r p r e s s u r e P m [/rn^ ] i s c a l c u l a t e d a s P m = (0.482 L/D) P m = x ( 0 . 2 4 1 L/D + 6 . 2 K) P m = x ( 1 2 . 4 1 K)
I S l l l (SUBJEC [GAS)~| [Su S I I K I K C I T 4 A K I r
1

follows:

where K= 1 where 1<<^2 where 2 < <^32

where

|_Su (PROPANE)

J *

The fundamental burning velocity Su for a number of gases are reported as S 0 in Table III.l,

REMARKS: The provision of only one vent device is generally sufficient if P v 4 0.5 P m . The vent device should be placed near to the position of the likely source of ignition or near the centre of the enclosure if such a position cannot be ascertained.

*)See reference method No.3G if the enclosure contains obstructions.

10

The weight of the vent cover should be lower than 10

kg/mr.

- The vent cover should be held in position by magnets or springs. Where a bursting disk is used it should fail at a pressure lower than 0.5 P m . The above equations give the maximum pressure for the most unfavour able relative position of the relief vent and the ignition source. TABLE III.l Typical combustion properties of some hydrocarbon gases and hydrogen in air
%Cas at maximum burning velocity 54 10 6.3 4.5 35 29 25 2.3 9.3 7.4 5.0 3.9 3.3 2.7 Maxim um laminar burning velocity Sc, (m/s) 3.5 0.45 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.52 052 1.58 0.83 0.66 0.57 0.62 0.52

Fuel Hydrogen H2 Methane CE, Ethane C2H3 Propane 0} Butane C4H|0 Pentane CsH|2 Hexane CeHu Heptane C^Hie Acetylene C2H2 Ethylene C2H4 Propylene C3He Butylne C4He Benzene CeHe

Molecular weiaht

A Flammabihty limits % v/vgas Lower Upper 4 5 3 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.2 2.5 3.1 2.4 1.7 1.4 1.3 75 15 12.5 9.5 8.5 7.8 7.5 6.7 80 32 10.3 9.5 7.1 8.0

% Casat stoichio metric ratio 30 9.5 5.6 4.0 3.1 2.6 2.2 1.9 7.7 6.S 44 3.4 2.7 2.3

2 16 30 44 58 72 86 100 26 28 42 56 78

Cyclohexane CeH,12 84

31

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Method described in NFPA 68EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheet 6887) has been freely adapted by the compiler

REFERENCE METHOD No. 2G

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: straight constant section enclosures (ducts) without internal ob structions*' L/D>30, where D = 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the enclosure flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds of less than 3 m/s

FORMULAE : a vent coefficient = Ajj/Ay is defined the maximum overpressure is calculated as follows:

Maximum distance apart3 60D/X 30D/X 20D/X 15D/X

Maximum pressures (KN/m2)a Pm Pm Pm Pm = = = = 0.28 x(0.42 x(0.49 x(0.56 I^/D I^/D + 0.7) Lj/D +1.4) I^/D + 2.1)

Maximum pressure for greatest spacing (KN/m2) 16.8 13.3 11.2 10.5

1 2 4 8
a

The meaning of has been specified in Method No.lG.

REMARKS: An open end of duct may be regarded as an explosion relief of size = 1. A terminal room of 200 times greater volume than the volume of the duct may be regarded as an open end. If the ends of a duct are not open or may be closed some of the

*)See reference method No.3G if the enclosure contains obstructions.

32

time, an explosion relief should be placed as near as possible to these ends. Vent covers weighing not more than 10 kg/m should be used. They should be held in position by magnets or springs. If heavier covers cannot be avoided, the explosion reliefs will need to be closer than indicated in the above table, if pressures are to be kept below 14 KN/m .

33

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Advices in NFPA 68 EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheet 6888) have been freely adapted by the compiler

REFERENCE METHOD No. 3G

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: vessels and ducts containing obstacles L/D > 6, where D = 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the enclosure flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds of less than 3 m/s

FORMULAE: are given:

Formulae are not available, therefore, only general remarks

A single obstacle in a duct may increase the maximum pressure in an explosion. Even for an obstacle blocking only 5% of the cross sectional area of a duct, an increase in pressure by a factor of 2 to 3 may be obtained. The above factor is about 10 for obstacles such as sharp rightangled tees or elbows or orifices blocking about 30% of the cross sectional area of the duct. Based on experiments, the maximum pressures in ducts containing ob stacles of the above type could be reduced to 14 KN/m^ by installing every 6/x diameters an explosion relief device of area equal to the

area of cross section of the duct. It is important that an explosion relief device be placed near the obstacle. For a long straight duct connected to an obstacle (a teepiece or orifice), an explosion relief device should be placed as close as possible to the obstacle and also at 6/x diameters on either side of the obstacle. Thereafter, explosion reliefs should follow according to Methods NO. IG and 2G. *^The meaning of has been specified in Method No.lG.

34

REMARKS: - Any bend sharper than a long sweep smooth bend and any obstruction obscuring more than 5% of the cross section of the duct should be regarded as an obstacle. For obstacles within these limits it is advisable that an explosion relief device be sited near the obstacle - Vent closures weighing not more than 15 kg/m^ should be used. - They should be held in position by magnets or springs.

35

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Advices in NFPA 68 - EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheets 68-88-89) have been freely adapted by the compiler.

REFERENCE METHOD No. 4G

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: - unobstructed ducts conveying flammable gases at speeds between 3 and 18 m/s - L/D> 6, D< 0.76 m, where D = 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the duct - gas moving at speeds between 3 and 18 m/s

FORMULAE: - a vent coefficient = A n /A v is defined - In order to limit the explosion pressure to 14 KN/m^ the following criteria are suggested:

Li/D*> 0.3 * 0.45 0.45 * 0.76 1 2 1 2 12/x 6/x 9/x 5/x

A)The meaning of has been specified in Method No. IG.

REMARKS: - Vent covers held in position by magnets or springs should be used. - The maximum permitted weight of the covers will be: . not higher than 48 kg/m^ for gas speed of 7.5 m/s . not higher than 24 kg/m^ for gas speed of 7.5 to 18 m/s.

36

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Advices in NFPA 68 EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheets 6889) have been freely adapted by compiler

REFERENCE METHOD No. 5G

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: ducts containing obstacles L/D > 6 D 0.45 m, where D = duct diameter

FORMULAE: are given:

Formulae are not available, therefore only general advices

A vent area equal to the crosssectional area of the duct should be provided on each side of the obstacle at a distance equal to 3/x*' duct diameters, followed by a further vent for each ide, spaced at a distance equal to 6/x diameters. The remainder of the duct should be treated as unobstructed duct (see Method No. IG).

REMARKS: The weight of the 6 covers nearest to the obstacle should not exceed: . 15 kg/m^ for gas speeds below 7.5 m/s 7 kg/m for gas speeds between 7.5 and 18 m/s.

The covers should be held by magnets or springs.

*)The meaning of has been defined in Method No. IG.

37

METHOD:

VDI Richtlinien 3673

REFERENCE METHOD No. 6G SOURCE: VDI Richtlinien, Druckentlastung von Staubexplosionen, VDI 3673 Draft, June 1975, published by Verein Deutscher Ingenieure. RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: - venting gas combustion Fig. III.l) - L/D 5, where D = vessel diameter - initial pressure inside the vessel: 1 atm. FORMULAE: Nomographs given in NFPA 68 - Explosion Venting 1978 allow to calculate the relief venting area F required in order that the overpressure resulting from the combustion explosion inside an enclosure of given volume V filled with a flammable gas mixture, will not exceed a value
p

deflagrations

inside vessels where the burning

characteristics of the gas are represented by its KG value (see

red'

Th

is

area can be selected depending on the value of Pstat'

the

static pressure at which the relief device opens, and the expected violence of the explosion. This expected violence is represented by the value of

WMAX

assigned to the gas-air mixture filling the enclosure. The nomographs are available for the following values of Kg: 75, 55, 550, 140 bar-m/s as (51). The chart of Fig. III-5, together with Table III.2, can be used as a guide in selecting the suitable nomograph case by case. Each nomograph holds for: nomographs G, H, I, J. They are here reproduced as Figs. III-1,2,3,4, each with the interpolation equation given by Schwab

38

- zero initial turbulence - spark ignition source of about 10 Joule The use of the nomographs can be extended to the cases where the initial gas pressure is slightly higher than the atmospheric pressure, following the scheme of Fig. II1-6. REMARKS: - Sometimes a rupture disk will not provide a suitable vent and a device like a hinged panel must be adopted instead. - The venting devices should have a mass/area ratio lower than 10 kg/nj2. Doubling/tripling of the weight per unit area of a vent panel of given area can result in doubling/tripling of the pressure developed during the combustion venting (43). TABLE III-2 : Kg values for gases (bar.m/s) Values determined with electric spark ignition source of about 10 Joule Fuel gas Initially static gas mixture Methane Propane Hydrogen Propyl acetate Mehyl ethyl ketone Toluene Methanol Ethyl acetate Initially highly turbulent gas mixture 460 500 1270

55 75 550 40 56 56 66 67

39

NIM I f

"VENT RE LE ASE PRESSURE, P S T A T pSTAT " 1 B A R G A ; P RE D > 2 B A R G A A 4 iA U "PST A T 0.2 bA ICJ -'REL0.5 A I G ^ R E E 6 3A RGA ESTAT "

mui

0,2 bar

0,8 bar 2,0 bar

VE gT AREA , F (nrM

1000 40 10 1 0,1 1 10 100 Fig.III1: Nomograph G P r o p a n e , s o l v e n t v a p o r : K Q = 7 5 b a r . m / s Weak ignition. Stationary mixture at time of ignition Interpolation equation:
l427 +12.4544 6 . 7 5 Log 1 0 F + 9 . 3 6 3 / P ^ 2 4 = 4 . 7 1 L o g 1 n V - 6 . 9 8 5 8 P ; ^ ^10 RED

IUI I 1 1 1 1 III II VENT P F I FASF PRFSSIIRF' S I M I . .. 0 1 BARGAPRFn>02BARGA. =P STAT 0.2 BAR GA; P R ED > 0.4 BAR GA. c STAT 0.5 BAR GA: Pocn > 0.6 BAR GA VENTING. P D c n . BARGA

0,2 bar 0,4 bar 0,6 bar 0,8 bar 1.0 bar 1,5 bar 2,0 bar

V ENT ARE .A, F (m1

V E>SEL VOLU VIE V (m 5 )

40

10

01 ,

10

100

1000

F i g . I I I - 2 : Nomograph H. Methane, n a t u r a l g a s : K G = 5 5 b a r . m / s . Weak i g n i t i o n . S t a t i o n a r y m i x t u r e a t t i m e of i g n i t i o n . I n t e r p o l a t i o n e q u a t i o n : 6 . 5 L o g 1 0 F + 1 0 . 0 3 / P ' ^ 2 6 = 4.966 L o g ^ V - 6 . 7 9 4 6 P ^ 8 6 3 + 1 2 . 8 3

40

VENT RELEASE PRESSURE

"
BAR fiA AR GA AR GA MAXIMUM PRE SSURE DURING VENTING P R E D , BAR GA 0 2 bar '',0Abar 0,6 bar ; ! 0,8 bar 1,0 bar ' ; 1,5 bar

Ir

* 01 BAR GA. P > 0 2 S T A T C .2 BAR G A P R E D > 0 . 4 P STAT " .5 BAR G A P R E D > 0 . 6

P

\ \

2,0 bar

VESSf : L VENTARE/ V F ( m

VOLUME

(m 1

')

40

10

0,1

10

100

1000

Fig.III3: Nomograph I. Hydrogen: K G = 5 5 0 bar.m/s. Weak ignition. Stationary mixture at time of ignition. Interpolation equation: 6.93 Log F+7

3 9 ^ 6 - 4 6 5 ^ 1 0 - 2 1 2 1 0 8 P ; RED
G A G A G A

5466

+26.21

VENT RE LE ASE PRE SSURE , P S T A T

P P

STAT " 1 STAT " 2 P STAT " 5

BAR GA BAR GA BAR

; P RE D > 2 B A R P RE D > 4 B A R GA P RE D > 6 B A R

" J 0,2 bar ' VENTING P R E D , BARGA 0,4 bar 0,8 bar t* t ,0 bar

\ \

VE MT AREA, F (m 2 ) 1

^VE SSEL VOLUME, V ( T1 J C

...|_
40 10

LU.
10 1000

0,1

10

F i g . I I I - 4 : Nomograph J . Coke oven g a s : = 1 4 0 b a r . m / s . Weak i g n i t i o n . m i x t u r e a t t i m e of i g n i t i o n . I n t e r p o l a t i o n e q u a t i o n : 6.863 L o g 1 n F + 8 . 7 7 / P ^ 5 5 = 4 . 6 6 '10 L o g ^ V - 2 . 8 1 7 P ^ 5 3 8 + 8.817

Stationary

41

/ ~7

IS THE FLAMMABLE GAS LISTED IN TABLE III2

/ /

READ FROM TABLE 920, REF () TH FUNDAMENTAL E BURNING VELOCITY S0 OF TH GAS E

(GAS f AIR) MIXTURE INITIALLY STATIC / /

/ IGNI" ITION SOURCE OF ~J LOW E N ERGY 10 JOULE

FIND THE CORRE SPONDING VALUE OF kg FROM THE FOLLOWING TABLE : So

(m/j)

KG (bar m/i) 55 75 140 550

<0.36
USE FOR K G THE MAXIMUM VALUE

USE FOR K G THE FOUND VALUE

0,37 0,46 0,47 1,0

(*) Perry, R.H., et at.. Chemical E ngineers Handbook, 5th edition, Mc GrawHill (1973). (The fundamental burning velocity appears there reported as "flame speed" and it is given in ft/s)

Fig. Ill 5 SE LE CTION CHART FOR K,

42

THE USE OF K G NOMOGRAPH IN CASE OF INITIAL ELEVATED PRESSURE (UP TO ABOUT 4 ATM. ABS)

SPECIFY THE INITIAL ABSOLUTE PRESSURE p 0

SPECIFY THE RELEASE ABSOLUTE PRESSURE PSTAT

CALCULATE STAT = <PSTAT/Po> - 1

SELECT THE K G NOMOGRAPH

ASSUME: K - 1,5 IF K G < 7 5 K = 1,4 IF K G = 7 5 " M 5 0 K - 1,2 IF K G > 1 b O

IF KNOWN ARE

VENT AREA, VOLUME

P R E D . VOLUME

READ FROM THE K Q NOMOGRAPH: PRED

CALCULATE
K

PRED = ( I + PRED) I--1-)

Po

-I

CALCULATE PRED= 1 +
p

RED

READ FROM THE K Q NOMOGRAPH: VENT AREA

PRED = t ^ ) K

RED

Fig. Ill - 6

43

METHOD:

CUBBAGE SIMMONDS formula

REFERENCE METHOD No. 7G

SOURCE: Cubbage P.A. Simmonds W.A., An Investigation of Explosion Re liefs for Industrial Drying Ovens, Trans. Inst. Gas Eng., 105, 470 (1955) and 107 (1957); R.J. Harris, The Investigation and Control of Gas Explosions in Buildings and Heating Plants, British Gas, 1983.

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: HlAX'HlIN = 1 to 5 W <, 24 kg/m2 V < 200 m 3 FORMULAE: A vent coefficient is defined in the following way: . A s /A v if the relief device is to be installed in the face of the vessel which has the largest crosssectional area; . V^/S/Ay if the relief device is to be installed in either of the other faces. A turbulent burning velocity is defined as S T = 3.So, where is a turbulence factor depending upon the type of enclosure (1< < 10). Values suggested by Rasbash et al. (40) for cases where there is no turbulence prior to ignition, are: = 1 if there are no internal obstacles; 6=1.5 for enclosures of room or laboratory size where turbulence is generated by furniture or obstacles on one level; = 5 for explosion propagating through large openings into other sections of an enclosure or where the obstacles are distributed throughout the entire vessel volume. If singificant turbulence may be present prior to ignition, an appro priate value of might be as high as 8 or 10.

44

The maximum overpressure 2 (KN/m2) is related to the value of through the following formula: P 2 = 5.8 ST-K The first peak of overpressure Pj (KN/m2) can be related to the value of W through the following formula: Px = ST(0.43 KW + 2.8)/V1/3

REMARKS: - The above formulae are strictly applicable only with the use of lightweight panels retained by gravity or by the minimum of friction. - The work carried out by Cubbage and Simmonds forms the basis of the recommendations on explosion relief which are incorporated in the Health and Safety at Work Booklet No. 46.

45

METHOD:

C UBBAGEMARSHALL

REFERENCE METHOD No. 8G

SOURCE:

Cubbage P.A., Marshall M.R., Pressures Generated by Explo sions of GasAir Mixtures in Vented Enclosures. Inst. Gas Engineers Communication No. 926 (1973); R.J. Harris, The Investigation and Control of Gas Explosions in Buildings and Heating Plants, British Gas, 1983.

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: SlAX MIN

P v < 49 KN/m2

= 1*4
2.4 <. W <, 24 kg/m2 V < 200 m 3 FORMULAE: A vent coefficient is defined in the following way: . = Ag/Ay if the relief device is to be installed in the face of the vessel which has the largest crosssectional area; . V ^ / A y if the relief device is to be installed in either of the other faces. A turbulent burning velocity is defined as S T = 3.So, where is a turbulence factor depending upon the type of enclosure (1 < 3< 10) . Values suggested by Rasbash et al. (40) for cases where there is no turbulence prior to ignition are: 3 1 if there are no internal obstacles; 3= 1.5 for enclosures of room or laboratory size where turbulence is generated by furniture or obstacles on one level; 3 = 5 for explosion propagating through large openings into other sections of an enclosure or where the obstacles are distri buted throughout the entire vessel volume. If significant turbulence may be present prior to ignition, an appro priate value of 3 might be as high as 8 or 10.

46

The maximum overpressure

(KN/m^) is related to the value of

through the following formula:

Pm = 0.1 [P + 23(s5cw/V 1/3 )]

'

REMARKS: The above formula is strictly applicable only with the use of light weight panels retained by gravity or by the minimum of friction.

47

METHOD:

RASBASH Formula

REFERENCE METHOD No. 9G

SOURCE:

Rasbash, D.J., The relief of gas and vapour explosions in domestic structures, Fire Research Note No.759 (1969); R.J. Harris, The investigation and control of gas explosions in buildings and heating plants, British Gas, 1983.

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: HlAX MIN =

P v < 7 KN/m2 = 1 to 5 W 4 24 kg/m2 V < 200 m 3 FORMULAE: A vent coefficient is defined in the following way: _,/, where A T is the area of the smallest side of the SM Iff v SHIN enclosure. A turbulent burning velocity is defined as Sp = 3So, where is a turbulence factor depending upon the type of enclosure (1< 3 < 10). Values suggested by Rasbash et al. (40) for cases where there is no turbulence prior to ignition, are: 3 1 3 = 1.5 if there are no internal obstacles; for enclosures of room or laboratory size where turbulence is generated by furniture or obstacles on one level; 3 " 5 for explosion propagating through large openings into other sections of an enclosure or where the obstacles are distri buted throughout the entire vessel volume. If significant turbulence may be present prior to ignition, an appro priate value of 3 might be as high as 8 or 10. The maximum overpressure P m (KN/m2) is related to the value of through the following formula: P m = 1.5PV + 7.77STK.

48

REMARKS: - The above formula is used to predict the second peak pressure P2 - Vent cladding can be any material held in place by a positive force.

49

METHOD:

RASBASH et al.

REFERENCE METHOD No. 10G

SOURCE:

Rasbash D.J., Drysdale, D.D. and Kemp, ., Design of an ex plosion relief for a building handling liquefied fuel gas, J. Chem. E. Symposium Series No.47 (1976).

RECGMMENDABLE USE FOR: HlAX/LMIN =

3

P v < 7 (KN/m2) = 1 to 5 W 4 24 (kg/m2) V < 200 (m2) FORMULAE: A vent coefficient is defined in the following way: = A__.T/AV, where A_ is the area of the smallest side of the
bMIN
v

>MIN

enclosure. A turbulent burning velocity is defined as S T = .So where is a turbulence factor depending upon the type of enclosure (1 < < 10) . Values suggested for cases where there is no turbulence prior to ig nition are: = 1 = 1.5 if there are no internal obstacles; for enclosures of room or laboratory size where turbulence is generated by furniture or obstacles on one level; = 5 for explosion propagating through large openings into other sections of an enclosure or where the obstacles are distri buted throughout the entire vessel volume. If significant turbulence may be present prior to ignition, an appro priate value of might be as high as 8 or 10. The maximum overpressure P m (KN/m2) is calculated through the follow ing formula: P m = 1.5PV + S T { [0.43 KW + 2.8)/V1/3l + 7.77K}.

50

REMARK: The above equation can be expected to predict the maximum overpressure generated in a given situation, irrespective of whether this relates to the first peak pressure P1 or the second peak pressure P2

51

METHOD:

BRADLEY and MITCHESON

REFERENCE METHOD No. 11G

SOURCE:

Bradley, D. and Mitcheson, ., The venting of gaseous explo sions in spherical vessels, I Theory, Combustion and Flame, 32, 221 (1978); II Theory and Experiment, Combustion and Flame, 32, 237 (1978).

FORMULAE: A nondimensional vent area A() is defined as follows: = Cj Ay/Agij,, where C = discharge coefficient Ay = vent area A S T = total surface area of the vessel A nondimensional burning velocity SQ() is defined as follows*': S = Sr
a

()

^ ) I o l 11

where

uo (Pbo

p u o initial density of unburnt gas = Pbo = initial density of combustion products S0

a

fundamental burning velocity of the combustible gas

=

uo

(Yu p o/ p uo^*^

is tne

sound speed in the unburnt gas

Yu

ratio of specific heats of unburnt gas.

The nondimensional maximum overpressure P m that will not be exceeded due to explosion, is to be specified as: = ?o where P m = overpressure p 0 = initial absolute pressure (atmospheric pressure)

The nondimensional vent activation pressure is to be specified as: Pv Pv = Po where P y = vent activation pressure p 0 = initial absolute pressure (atmospheric pressure)

See Table III3, where values of S 0 for selected gasair mixtures are given.

52

The following criteria for vent sizing are recommended: Case 1; INITIALLY UNCOVERED VENTS (Pv = 0) /S 0 > exp [(0.64 P m )/2] /S 0 > (0.7/P m ) 0 5 for P m > 1 for P m <. 1

The nomograph in Fig. II17 may be used ( P m ) . Case 2: INITIALLY COVERED VENTS Set Pv = Pm

To ensure that the explosion overpressure does not exceed Pv /S 0 > (2.4/P v ) 1 43 , /S 0 i (12.3/P V ) 0 5 for P v > 1 for P v <, 1

The nomograph in Fig. III8 may be used ( P v ) .

REMARK: The above sizing criteria should limit the pressure development to give only a single peak. Consequently, in most situations they will predict larger vent areas in comparison with other empirical equations.

53

10

I I I I lll|

1I

I I I lll|

1 I I I 114-

0.1

0.01
.01

11 m l

' i ' ' "il

A/S

>

Fig. III-7:

Safe recommendations for uncovered vent areas, gaseous explosions / 2 / .

54

10

1 ;

0.1 _

0.01 0.1

I I I I III
1.0
A/S

10

-LU 100

Fig. III-8:

Safe recommendations for covered vent areas, gaseous explosions /2/.

55

TABLE III3:

Properties of selected gasair mixtures at initial condi tions of 1 atmosphere and 298 K. (From Bradley A. and Mitcheson A. (2)).

GAS

MOLE IN AIR 9.48 7.75 9.17 6.53 4.02 4.3 5.0 6.0 2.55 2.7 3.0 3.5 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.07 1.26 1.52 1.0 1.06 1.18 1.39

S m secl o 0.43 1.44 1.54 0.68 0.45 0.46 0.38 0.15 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.29 0.39

uo 'bo 7.52 8.41 8.80 8.06 7.98 8.09 7.97 7.65 8.07 8.18 8.16 7.92 7.82 6.89 6.50 6.64

Pe ATMOSPHERES 8.83 9.78 10.28 9.39 9.31 9.48 9.55 9.30 9.42 9.76 9.77 9.80 9.4 . 8.04 7.78 8.03 8.5x10 3.2x10 3.7x10 1.4x10 9.6x10 9.9x10 9.2x10 3.0x10 9.0x10 9.3x10 8.4x10 6.3x10 7.1x10 4.4x10 5.3x10 1.9x10 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2

CH,
C

2H2

C2H2 C2H4
C

3H8 3H8 3H8 3H8 5 H 12 5 H 12 5 H 12

SH12
C

16 H 34 29.5 1.0 1.6 1.4

2.70 3.45 1.22

40 25

TOWN GAS

Equivalence ratio

Actual Fuel/Air Volume Ratio Stoichiometric Fuel/Air Volume Ratio

Theoretical closed vessel maximum explosion pressure.

56

SECTION B; The

DUST EXPLOSION VENTING is a guide to the selection among the available

flow diagram 2

vent sizing methods, according to the properties of the dust and the equipment to be protected. The methods are described in separate sheets; each sheet is numbered with the reference number of the method in the flow diagram 2.

57

START

I I I

' _

/ v < 1000 m ^

EQUIPMENT VOI UME IS TOO HIGH

'

/ w < 24kq/m2 /

*-L
ruA LMAX/LMII

CONSTANT CROSS SECTION

WEIGHT PrR UN IT AREA IS TOO HIGH THEHt IS NO AVAILABLE MFTHOD

D
-I FHA L/D I -/ L I D C j /

THERE IS NO AVAILABLE METHOD

-c
f

FRA > 5

7
/

-f

O > 0.75 m

/ W < IO kg/m2 USE K ST METHOD VDI 3673 SFF NFCA 68 1978 54. A4

HIGH INITIAL 7 ' TURBULENCE/-

W < IQkg/m'

/
/

V V 30 mS f
/

FAST BURNING DUST

USE K ST ME THOD VDI 3673 WITH THE FOLLOWING LIMITATIONS THE EXPLOSION VCNTING AREA MUST BF THE ENTIRt CROSS SECTIONAL ARE A THE RE LIE FARE A MUST NEVER FALL SHORT OF THOSE GIVE N BY THE NOMOGRAPHS

M AI

"

USE RUST METHOD

-^/ V 3 m/s /

/ ^
8D90-

^ /-

USE HEINRICH METHOD PALMER METHOD

STRAIGHT UNOBSTHUCTEI) DUCI,

7^
USE THE RECOMMENDATION FOR GAS CASE IN NFPA 68 1878(64,88)

L/l) > 30

USL METHODS. JOINT FIRE RFSE AHCH ORGANIZA TION FOR GAS CASE IN NFPA 68 19/8|b4,86|

USE THF RECOMMENDATION FOR GAS CASE IN NFPA 68 1978 154 871

NO MORE METHODS AVAILABLE

.. ' , I ^ ' " " ' A

I TOO MUCH | " J TURBULE NCE ^

STRAIGHT UNOBSTRUCTE D DUCT

P
USE THE RECOMMENDATION FOR GAS CASE IN NFPA 08 19/8 I!J4. 891

USF METHOD JOINT FIHE RE SE ARCH OH(.ANI/A TION FOR (,ASI AS( IN NFPA 6H 19/8 (!>4. 88/891

FLOW DIAGRAM 2

58

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Method described in NFPA 68 EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheet 6886)

REFERENCE METHOD No. ID

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

WARNING : This reference method for sizing dust explosion relief vents is derived from the reference method No. IG previously described in the gas section. As it is not specially conceived for dusts, its use can only be suggested (47) if more suited methods are not available.

USE FOR: straight constant section enclosures (ducts) without internal ob structions*) ; 6 < V D < 30, where D 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of = the enclosure; flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds of less than 3 /.

FORMULAE: - A v e n t c o e f f i c i e n t Aj^/Av - The maximum o v e r p r e s s u r e P Pm = 0 . 4 8 2 L/D Pm = 0 . 2 4 1 L/D + 6 . 2 Pm = 1 2 . 4 1

m i s

defined. :

/m^] i s c a l c u l a t e d a s f o l l o w s where - 1 where 1 < K ^ 2 where 2<^32

*) See reference method No.3D if the enclosure contains obstructions. **)The formulae have been written for the case of propaneair mixture.

59

REMARKS: - The provision of only one vent device is generally sufficient if P v < 0.5 P m . - The vent device should be placed near to the position of the likely source of ignition or near the centre of the enclosure if such a position cannot be ascertained. - The weight of the vent cover should be lower than 10 kg/m^. - The vent cover should be held in position by magnets or springs. Where a bursting disk is used it should fail at a pressure lower than 0.5 P m . - The above equations give the maximum pressure for the most unfavourable relative position of the relief vent and the ignition source.

60

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE ORGANIZATION Method described in NFPA 68 EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheet 6887)

REFERENCE METHOD No. 2D

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

WARNING : This reference method for sizing dust explosion relief vents is derived from the reference method No.2G previously described in the gas section. As it is not specially conceived for dusts, its use can only be suggested (47) if more suited methods are not available.

USE FOR: straight constant section enclosures (ducts) without internal ob structions*' ; L/D > 30, where D = 4A n /PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the enclosure; flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds of less than 3 m / s .

FORMULAE: A vent coefficient * Ajj/Ay is defined. = The maximum overpressure is calculated as follows**': Maximum distance apart Maximum pressures (KN/m2) Pm= Pm= Pm= Pm= 0.28 L x /D (0.42 Lj/D+0.7) (0.49 Li/D+ 1.4) (0.56 Li/D+ 2.1) Maximum pressure for greatest spacing (KN/m^) 16.8 13.3 11.2 10.5

1 2 4 8

60D 30D
2 OD

15D

*'

See reference method No.3D if the enclosure contains obstructions.

**'The formulae have been written for the case of propaneair mixtures.

61

REMARKS: - An open end of duct may be regarded as an explosion relief of size = 1. - A terminal room of 200 times greater volume than the volume of the duct may be regarded as an open end. - If the ends of a duct are not open or may be closed some of the time, an explosion relief should be placed as near as possible to these ends. - Vent covers weighing not more than 10 kg/m2 should be used. They should be held in position by magnets or springs. - If heavier covers cannot be avoided, the explosion reliefs will need to be closer than indicated in the above table, if pressures are to be kept below 14 KN/m2.

62

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Advices in NFPA 68 - EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheet 68-88)

REFERENCE METHOD No. 3D SOURCE: WARNING: These advices on sizing dust explosion relief vents are derived from the advices in reference method No. 3G previously described in the gas section. They are not specially conceived for dusts, but they should be followed when applying methods No. ID and 2D. USE FOR: - vessels and ducts containing obstacles; - L/D > 6, where D = 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the enclosure; - flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds of less than 3 m/s. FORMULAE: Formulae are not available, therefore only general remarks are given: - A single obstacle in a duct may increase the maximum pressure in an explosion. - Even for an obstacle blocking only 5% of the cross sectional area of a duct, an increase in pressure by a factor of 2 to 3 may be obtained. - The above factor is about 10 for obstacles such as sharp right-angled tees or elbows or orifices blocking about 30% of the cross sectional area of the duct. - Based on experiments, the maximum pressures in ducts containing obstacles of the above type could be reduced to 14 KN/m2 by installing every 6 diameters an explosion relief of area equal to the area of cross section of the duct. - It is important that an explosion relief be placed near the obstacle. - For a long straight duct connected to an obstacle (a tee-piece or Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

63

orifice), an explosion relief should be placed as close as possible to the obstacle and also at 6 diameters on either side of the obstacle. Thereafter, explosion reliefs should follow according to methods No. ID and 2D. REMARKS: - Any bend sharper than a long sweep smooth bend and any obstruction obscuring more than 5% of the cross section of the duct should be regarded as an obstacle. For obstacles within these limits it is advisable that an explosion relief should be sited near the obstacle. - Vent closures weighing nor more than 15 kg/m^ should be used. - They should be held in position by magnets or springs.

64

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Advices in NFPA 68 EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheets 6888/89)

REFERENCE METHOD No. 4D

SOURCE:

Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

WARNING : These advices on sizing dust explosion relief vents are derived from the devices in reference No. 4G previously described in the gas section. They are not specially conceived for dusts, but they should be followed if more suited methods are not available.

USE FOR: straight constant section enclosures (ducts) without internal ob strue tions*); L/D > 6, D < 0.76 m, where D = 4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the enclosure; flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds from 3 to 18 m/s.

FORMULAE: A vent coefficient = Ajj/Ay is defined. In order to limit the explosion pressure to 14 KN/m^, the following criteria are suggested**): D (m) 0.3 0.45 0.45 0.76 1 2 1 2 Lj/D 12 6 9 5

*) For enclosures with internal obstacles, see reference method No. 5D. **)These criteria have been written for the case of propaneair mixture.

65

REMARKS: - Vent covers held in position by magnets or springs should be used. - The maximum permitted weight of the covers will be: . not higher than 48 kg/m . not higher than 24 kg/m for gas speed of 7.5 m/s; for gas speed of 7.5 to 18 m/s.

66

METHOD:

JOINT FIRE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION Advices in NFPA 68 - EXPLOSION VENTING 1978 (Appendix C, sheets 68-89 have been freely adapted by the compiler)

REFERENCE METHOD No. 5D SOURCE: WARNING: These advices on sizing dust explosion relief vents are derived from the advices in reference method No. 5G previously described in the gas section. They are not specially conceived for dusts, but they should be followed when applying reference method No. 4D. USE FOR: - ducts containing obstacles - L/D > 6 - D 4 0.45 m, where D=4An/PERIMETER is the mean hydraulic diameter of the duct - flammable mixture stationary or moving at speeds from 3 to 18 m/s. FORMULAE: Formulae are not available, therefore only general advices are given; - A vent area equal to the cross-sectional area of the duct should be provided on each side of the obstacle at a distance equal to 3 duct diameters, followed by a further vent for each side, spaced at a distance equal to 6 diameters. - The remainder of the duct should be treated as unobstructed ducts (see reference method No. 4D). REMARKS: - The weight o . 15 kg/m 2 7 kg/m - The covers of the 6 covers nearest to the obstacle should not exceed: for gas speeds below 7.5 m/s for gas speeds between 7.5 to 18 m/s should be held by magnets or springs. Experimental results of RASBASH and ROGOWSKI (38)

67

METHOD:

VDI Richtlinien 3673

REFERENCE METHOD No. 6D SOURCE: VDI Richlinien, Druckentlastung von Staubexplosionen, VDI 3673 Draft, June 1975, published by Verein Deutscher Ingenieure. W. Bartknecht, Explosions, Springer-Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg, N.Y., 1981. RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: - venting dust combustion deflagrations inside vessels where the burning characteristics of the dust are represented by its Kgrp value. - L/D <. 5 (if L/D > 5 the method can still be used, provided that a number of limitations be observed. - Initial pressure inside the vessel = 1 atm. FORMULAE: When the hazard class St or the Kgr value (bar.m/s) of the dust are known, the nomographs D, E, F given in the Explosion Venting Guide NFPA 68 - 1978 allow to calculate the required venting area. They are here reproduced as Figs. 111-9,10 and 11, each one with the interpolator equation given by R.F. Schwab (51). See Remark 1. REMARKS: 1. The above said nomographs and equations are based on a high energy ignition source (chemical detonator E = 10,000 J ) . As explained in ref. (50), this mode of ignition gives the same values for the explosion data (Praax,KST-value) as a condenser discharge with an energy output just above the lowest minimum ignition energy; the latter can be in the range of mJ for readily ignitable ducts. According to ref. (50), spark gap ignition, in spite of the relatively high energy (E = 10 J) will give lower values especially for the Kg^-value. Dust explosion data obtained from tests with spark gap ignition are, therefore, not a suitable basis for the planning and design of protective measures.

68

2.

When dusts are handled in the presence of solvent vapours, hybrid mixtures are created. Such mixtures show an increased explosion violence even with vapour concentration below its explosion limit. This leads to an increase in the required relief venting area. The relief venting area has been always found large enough when it was calculated for the solvent vapour present in the dust. If the Kgqi value of the dust was determined with high energy ignition, then the solvent nomograph related to the same ignition source must be used.

3.

The venting device should have a mass/area ratio of less than 10 kg/m^

69

red.

I
/Ss^v

V\\

COMBUSTION VENT ING FO 1 FL At AH - t DUS1S

0,2 bar 0,4 bar 0,6 bar 1 Obar 2,0 bar

-1,5 bar

1 bar m s I STRONG IGNITION SOURC E 1 < K S T < 200 : St 1 201 < K S T < 3 0 0 : S t 2 301 < : St 3 \

F*,

* \ MAXIMUM PRESSURE DURING VENTING, P R E D , BAR GA.

1 1
I

'XZ. 1

10 1 Vent Area, F (m 1 ) 0,1 1

1 1

L 10 1 L
Vessel Volume, V (m J )

100

Fig.IIl9: Nomograph D. Dusts. Vent release pressure: P s t a t = 0.1 bar (gauge). Interpolation equation: F + K = 3.9975 Log.^V + 5. 729/P 0 * 2 1 1 9 iu 10 RED where the value of to be selected depends on the hazard class S t of the dust, according to the following table: 5.966 Log Hazard class

St-1 St-2 St-3

11.267 10.133 8.998

70

red.

V',
V /

x^ X

COMBUSTION VENTING FOR . . FL AMMABL E DUSTS

v\ \

0,4 bar 0,6 bar 0,8 bar 1,0 bar 1,5 bar 2,0 bar

" K g j [bar-m-s 'J - STRONG IGNITION SOU RCE 1 < K S T < 200 : St 1 201 < K ? T < 300 : St 2 - 301 < K C T St 3

.1.

:" s

,' MAXIMUM PRESSURE D U R I N G " VENTIMI BARRA
KtU

II

1
10 1 Vent Area, F ( m )
:

0,1

10 Vessel Volume, V |rn' )

100

Fig.III10: Nomograph E. Dusts. Vent release pressure: Pstat = 2 bar (gauge). Interpolation equation: 6.102 Log 10 F + = 4.1 Log^V + 6.2919/P^ C where the valua of to be selected depends on the hazard class S t of the dust, according to the following table: Hazard class St1 St2 St3

11.785 10.470 9.160

71

. \ \\
> V

red.

FL AMMABLE DUSTS

0,6 bar 0.8 bar 1.0 bar 1.5 bar 2,0 bar

K g j |bar ms 1 l STRONG IGNITION SOUR C E 1 < K S T < 200 : St 1 201 < K S T < 300 : St 2 301 < K S T St 3

'. M A X I M U M rri tasuri t u u m N U ' VE NTING. P o e n . BAR GA.

..t
1

I
10 1 Vent, Area, F (m 1 ) 0.1 1

10

1. 1

100

Vessel Volume, V (m J )

Fig.III11: Nomograph F. Dusts. Vent release pressure: Pstat = 0.5 bar (gauge), Interpolation equation: 6.025 Log.nF + K = 3.972 Log,V + 7.235/P'3 9 1 6 = 1U 10 RED where the value of K to be selected depends on the hazard class St of the dust, according to the following table: Hazard class K

St-1 St-2 St-3

11.71 10.22 9.066

72

METHOD:

RUST-CHAPPEL

REFERENCE METHOD No. 7D SOURCE: Rust E.A., Explosion venting for low pressure equipment. Chemical Engineering, November 5, p.102 (1979). Chappel W.G., Pressure time diagram for explosion vented space AICHE Loss Prevention Symposium, p.76 (1977). RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: Venting combustion deflagrations of fast burning dusts (e.g. Mg, Al) from vessels having a volume lower than 30 m^. NOTE: This thoeretical method of calculation involves several steps. The method, therefore, is not described here. The original sources should be consulted by the user. A description of the method is also given in ref. (47).

73

METHOD:

EQUATION OF HEINRICH

REFERENCE METHOD No. 8D SOURCE: Heinrich, H. Arbeitsschutz 11: 314 (1974).

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: Venting combustion deflagrations of fast burning dusts (e.g. Mg, Al) from vessels having a volume lower than 1 m^. NOTE: This theoretical method is based on equating the two following terms: - the rate at which the pressure would fall due to loss of material through the vent at the pressure of Pred' - the rate of increase of the pressure expected from combustion at the same point in time if the vent was closed. A description of this method is given in ref. (47).

74

METHOD:

EQUATION OP PALMER

REFERENCE METHOD No. 9D

SOURCE:

Palmer, K.N., Relief venting of dust explosions, 1st Symp. on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process In dustries, The Hague, p.175 (1974).

RECOMMENDABLE USE FOR: Venting combustion deflagrations of fast burning dusts (e.g. Mg, Al) from vessels having a volume lower than 1 m^.

NOTE: This theoretical method is based on equating the two following terms the rate at which the pressure would fall due to loss of material through the vent at the pressure of Pred the rate of increase of the pressure expected from combustion at the same point in time if the vent was closed.

A description of this method is given in ref. (47).

75

NOTATIONS FOR CHAPTER III An Ay Ag K, Kgr L IAx IfllN I! Pm

PRED
p

cross section of duct venting area surface area of the vessel face which has the largest cross sectional area parameter representing the burning characteristics of a gas parameter representing the burning characteristics of a dust duct length or vessel length longest dimension of vessel shortest dimension of vessel maximum distance between consecutive vents maximum overp ressure maximum pressure during venting release absolute pressure venting activation pressure initial absolute p ressure fundamental burning velocity of the gas gas-air mixture velocity vessel volume weight per unit surface area of the vent panel

STAT

Pv Pp S0 V W

77

CHAPTER IV -

DESIGN CRITERIA AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR DEFLAGRATION VENTING

Many criteria and guidelines are given in this chapter for the design of venting devices, vent ducts, layout of process equipment regarding explosion potential, etc. The effects of external events are also considered. These criteria have been taken from several references. When a reference is given, it means that all the preceding statements belong to it. In reference /43/ a description of several kinds of vents and vent closures is given, as well as examples and illustrations. The first guidelines given here are of a general nature. Then, criteria are divided into two parts, one for gas-air deflagration venting and the other for dust-air deflagration venting. This classification is made considering the papers from which they were taken, devoted either to gas or dust deflagration. This does not imply that some criteria are not valid for both cases.

General criteria Vents with no constructional members to impede gas flow and vents with rounded edges to promote gas flow are most efficient. Whenever possible, vented products should be directed to a safe location outside an enclosure to avoid injury to personnel and minimizing damage to property. In congested locations, substantial ducts or divertors should be provided to direct explosive force and combustion products to a safe area. Vents should not be obstructed. Whenever possible, vents should be designed to minimize the accumulation of ice and snow and should be cleared to permit proper operation. Where sashes are used for venting, precaution should be taken. Ice

78

crystals may form between the venting sash and the frame due to high humidity in the area and produce a cementing action on the vent allowing greater pressures to build up before the vent opens; a coating of grease on the adjacent surfaces may prevent the bridging of ice crystals between the members of the vent. Corrosion and paint may also increase friction in opening a vent. Vents, particularly those with discs, diaphragms or other closure devices, should be located where flames, gases, or flying material cannot injure people. In addition, a vent closure such as a swinging door should be designed to prevent a vacuum after heated gases from a deflagration have cooled. Structural damage can be minimized by locating hazardous operations or equipment outside buildings and segregated from other operations. This is particularly true of dust collectors, arresters, bucket elevators and reactors. Multiple physical interconnections between the duct work system of each collector should be avoided. Furthermore, such equipment should be properly vented and a device should be provided at the inlet of the collector which will prevent a deflagration from blowing back through the duct work and into the building or structure. Highly hazardous operating equipment should be separated into individual units by pressure-resistant walls, and each unit so formed should be vented outdoors. Exterior walls may be made of heavy construction materials, if equipped with suitable vents or adequate light-weight panels which blow out easily. Locating hazardous operations or equipment in basements or areas partially below grade should be avoided due to the difficulty of providing adequate venting.

When it is impractical to locate hazardous operations or equipment outdoors, they should be located adjoining outdoor walls, in a single storey building or on the top floor of a multistorey building, or in a lightly constructed penthouse, and vented directly to the outside through ducts of adequate cross-sectional areas.

79

External wind pressure or suction may operate venting devices and these effects should be considered in their design. Wind pressures in severe storms may reach over 30 lb/ft2 (1.44 kPa) and vents designed to open at a higher pressure in the event of a deflagration may not provide for building safety. Therefore, the vent design should take into consideration the local wind conditions and building safety /44/.

Gas-air deflagration criteria The addition of a duct or tube behind a vent or a membrane may increase the reduced pressure in the vessel provided with that vent as high as three times. In the tube the pressures may even rise to a higher level than in the vessel. An increase in tube length above 18 metres will not influence the reduced pressure anymore. Introducing bends in the tube does not give significantly higher pressures in the vessel. All the preceding criteria should be confirmed by much more experimental information /16/. In some cases where explosion venting is applied, one must be aware that unburnt gases may continuously escape from the vent opening. This can result in secondary explosions or fires outside the protected installation. In these cases one must ensure that the vent opening is closed gas-tight again, immediately after the venting process is finished. This is often done by using explosion doors. These doors do not have the same efficiency as vent areas that are only covered by thin diaphragms. Experiments and design criteria for explosion doors are given in /13/, which seem promising. For a chemical processing building which could have a combustion explosion, the following needs should be covered: - Sufficient vent panel area to prevent pressure resulting from the combustion exceeding the strength of the weakest part of the building desired to vent. It is important to note that the roof is often the weakest part of a building relative to pressure within the building.

80

- Sufficiently low mass/area ratio for the vent panel so that high pressure is not required to accelerate the vent panel to the necessarily high velocity for opening. No more than 10 kg/m2 of vent panel area is recommended /27/. - Sufficient restraint of vent panels to prevent the panels, once opened, from flying away from the building to cause damage elsewhere. This relates to the means of attaching the tether to the building, and the strength of the tether itself. It may also be desirable to incorporate some form of shock absorber to prevent sudden force application to the tether. - The building member to which the tether is attached must be strong enough to withstand the force of the tether. - The vent panel must maintain its integrity during the venting sequence, i.e. it must not break into pieces lest theue cause some kind of damage. - The vent panel must withstand "wear and tear" in its normal service as a part of the building. - The vent panel may need to incorporate thermal insulation. Again, the total mass/area ratio of the panel must be kept, within the allowable limits. - The vent panel relieving pressure needs to be as low as possible. However, the strongest anticipated winds (skirt of a tornado) should not cause the panel to blow open. This usually means a panel relieving pressure no greater than about 30-40 lb/ft2 (0.014 - 0.019 bar). - A railing may be necessary inside the building along the vent panels to prevent people or equipment from falling on the panels, knocking them loose, and falling out of the building /27/. Many experiments carried out in a large building /27/ on the several components involved in the design of a vent panel and its associated devices have led to the following design guidelines: - Use only ductile (energy absorbing) materials for vent panels. The use of brittle material is discouraged.

81

- Relieving fasteners should be selected through testing which simulates strain rates in an explosion. Of the fasteners examined in tests, the blind rivet is recommended as the most reliable fastener tested. - The structural design of explosion vented process buildings should consider the effects of pressure development on the integrity of the building superstructure and roof (if the roof is not a part of the total vented surface). Most roof systems will tend slightly to amplify pressures with duration greater than about 0.35 times their fundamental natural period assuming elastic behaviour. Only ductile systems should be employed in the design and construction of explosion vented process buildings. Considering the effect of turbulence, flame instabilities and other mechanisms of flame acceleration over the maximum explosion pressure in process deflagrations, the following guidelines are recommended /35/ to minimize the burning rate in a given situation: - Attention should be devoted to keep possible ignition sources as weak as possible and also the number of ignition sources should be minimized. - The flow velocity in the system or ventilation circulating flows should be kept low to minimize turbulence. - A careful choice of vent location geometry, as well as a more gradual vent opening should help in minimizing the strength of expansion waves that may trigger and lead to a rapid growth of interfacial instabilities. - Minimizing the amount of process equipment and piping inside the enclosure and a careful design of their locations and spacings will be effective in suppressing the generation of turbulence. - Where possible, acoustic absorbing lininqs on vessel walls should help to damp and check the growth rate of the pressure oscillations. - Avoid the possibility of confined explosions and minimize partial confinement for the flame propagation inside the vessel.

82

- Choose the geometrical design of the vessel,(i.e. length / diameter ratio, etc.) for a given volume to minimize the'flame trajectory, hence to limit the acceleration to high flame speeds /35/. The control of gas detonations in pipes is an important problem in safety engineering. Under certain conditions, a deflagration may accelerate and become a detonation. The deflagration-to-detonation transition is a complex phenomenon and depends not only on the properties of the burnt and unburnt gases but also upon the conditions at the boundary of the combustible mixture. A significant parameter in these cases is the run-up distance in pipes, i.e. the distance needed for a deflagration to become a detonation. Some experiments are reported in /26,32,42/. Even though there is not enough information to give precise recommendations, some qualitative guidelines were obtained: - The strength of the ignition source is of almost no importance /42/. - The run-up distance is considerably reduced with increasing size of the volume preceding the pipe. This is important because, in many cases, the inside of various installations such as some chemical plants, has interconnecting pipes /42/. - From experiments with propana and ethylene, it can be stated that a mixture with a lower laminar burning velocity or a larger maximum experimental safe gap (MESG) yields a longer run-up distance /42/. - Many passive detonation arrested devices have been judged by experimental testing to be practical and reliable /26/.

Dust-air deflagration

criteria

Vent detailed design will be determined by their powder processing function. Any special design features required to include an explosion vent must not interfere with the primary function of the equipment. Extensive modifications are undesirable for reasons of capital and maintenance costs.

83

Although the vent installation should be a "fail-to-safe" system it must not be susceptible to spurious operation with its consequential loss of production. The vent closure must be sufficiently robust to contain the powder during normal plant operation and should not be opened or ruptured by the normal pressure surges in the system. With certain exceptions, the degree of turbulence in a system will be limited to that required to ensure free movement of the powder and efficient operation of the equipment (i.e. air flow to feed the grinding unit). Opening of the vent by an explosion should not create sufficient additional turbulence to increase the rate of pressure rise within the enclosure significantly /5/. The reduced explosion pressure in a vented vessel is raised if ducts are placed behind the vent and it increases with increasing dust length. After a few metres it reaches a maximum. For practical purposes it should be assumed that this state is reached at a duct length of about 6 m. In this case the reduced explosion overpressure APrecj is 2-3 times as high as without a duct. All parts of the duct must have the same strength as the vessel, especially when dust deposits on the inside of the ducts must be expected. Weather protecting membranes of a low brusting pressure or properly constructed shields at the end of the ducts can be used without severely increasing the reduced explosion pressure. This is also the case with bends in long ducts /14/.

Separation of units to minimize the effects of an explosion by keeping such items as dust filters small and locally mounted instead of using large central collection units is recommended /19/. For certain process equipment, under normal operating conditions, only part of the total volume can contain explodable dust concentrations. Sizing the vent areas on the base of these partial volumes (or degrees of filling) results in smaller areas than those formerly required which were based on the total volume of the equipment /23/.

85

CHAPTER V -

RECOMMENDED PRACTICES TO PREVENT EXPLOSIONS

Preventive measures for both new facilities and ongoing operations fall into a number of categories /19/: Minimize dust accumulations - Specify sloping surfaces whenever possible. - Keep filters small and ducts short. - Empty filter hoppers regularly. - Maintain high duct velocities. Do not pennit the dust to settle out. - Use bona fide dust hoods (not enclosures that simply hide the problem) . Control explosive conditions - Keep humidity high in dusty areas. - Avoid overdrying whenever possible. - Do not generate fines (whenever possible). - Locate filters in safety areas. Filters should be placed so that they can be easily explosion-vented. They should not, for example, be located on the lower floors of a multi-storey building. Practice good house keeping - Keep overhead surfaces clean. Large ducts and flat surfaces of struc turai steel offer places where dusts can accumulate. - Use compressed air only for cleaning out small accumulations from relatively inaccessible areas. - Use control vacuums and plain old brooms and brushes whenever possible to clean up dust. - Inspect ducts regularly for build-up. Do not let a dirty duct become a delivery site for a damaging dust explosion.

86

Eliminate ignition sources - Avoid open flames and smouldering particles. - Watch out for hot surfaces such as motors, drive and lights. - Keep close control over welding and cutting. - Be alert to friction and impact sources such as bearings and hammermilIs. - Protect against electric sparks. Minimize static electricity sources by grounding metal vessels and avoiding the use of static generators such as plastic hose and nylon. Watch out for operating changes - Investigate the effects of formula or process changes. For example a change that calls for the dust filters to handle finer particles could be quite hazardous. - Do not let well-intentioned improvement programmes trap you. Note; These brief guidelines should be completed with those given in many special codes and standards about explosion prevention systems.

87

CHAPTER VI

BIBLIOGRAPHIC AL REVIEW AND ABSTRAC TS

Abstracts of Papers Reviewed

1)2) It proposes one simple method and one for the computer / l / . It compares experimental data and the available formulae and pro poses the most conservative equations / 2 / . Some doubts remain about the effect of turbulence and pressure waves on the maximum pressure obtained.

3)

Useful for gas and dust explosion in buildings. Very simple m e thod. Adopted by NFPA 68. Doubts about the effect of flame velo city. This law is very conservative papers later). (as can be seen from other

4)

Dust explosions in cyclones. Very specific experiments with 4 types of dusts. Several results. Different important variables. Minimal design criteria are given.

5)

It compares several methods: CubbageSimmonds, empirical rules from NFPA 68 and Donat. It applies the factor method to dust explosions in vessels and proposes a method. It gives general design criteria for venting and it lists several measures for avoiding the possibility of explosions or to lessen their proba bility.

6)

It analyses the influence of several factors on the maximum ex plosion pressure: turbulence, bursting disk pressure, venting area, etc. Only for gases. It gives certain curves for the factor.

7)

It gives a probabilistic view

of explosion risks. It considers

two stages: initiation and propagation. It proposes criteria to lessen both probabilities. Interesting final discussion. It gives an application for dusts in boilers.

88

8)

It gives general criteria about explosion prevention (NFPA stan dards) and protection. When to use any one of them. Some formu lae, not very general, and empirical tables are given. Possible application of a formula for design of venting dusts in tubes (or ducts). The whole paper refers to dusts.

9)

Advantages and drawbacks of venting vs other protective measures. Experimental data about the effect of several variables, Cubic law, ranges of application, scope, etc. Useful for gases and dusts. Influence of venting duct length on maximum explosion pressure obtained. Criteria and pressure values for design.

10)

It explains the application of nomographs from 9) for silos (L/D > 5 ) , fluid bed driers, granulaters, filters, dust collec tors, etc. Different experimental data and criteria about effect of several variables, relief position, vent ducts, flame front interferences by obstacles, etc. General and specific design criteria. Useful for gases and dusts. Interesting final discus sion,

11)

It develops a computer program to obtain pressure/time diagrams in deflagration. It applies the spherical model of flame expan sion. Experimental methods to determine the factor. According to the author, in the final discussion in /IO/, this method agrees very well with the main ideae of /10/. It gives some re ferences about design problems in buildings already constructed.

12)

It describes the good results obtained with the use of an aerated liquid column with flexirings, to reduce the maximum pressure developed by an explosion. Applied only for gases.

13)

Theoretical development and computational calculation of pressure/ time diagrams for explosions in vessels with free venting and diaphragma. Experiments and comparisons. Nomograph and simple for mula recommended. It analyses the effect of geometry, tubrulence and venting type. Only for gases.

89

14)

Partial experiments to analyse: the pressures developed outside the vents (simple curve proposed), flame lengths, affected areas, effects of venting duct length (curve proposed) and presence of dust on the internal pressure of the vessel, and protective devices on vent ducts. Only for dusts.

15)

It analyses internal pressure and shock waves produced by certain explosives and gives some ideas for gas and dust explosions. Certain curves are given. It proposes the use of the method which was applied for explosives.

IG)

Different experiments to analyse the effect of vent ducts on explosion pressure. It includes: presence of bends in the ducts, presence (or not) of the flame at the exit of the duct, pressure increase in the vessel (there is a maximum), pressure in the ducts (may be greater than in the vessel). Only for gases. Very interesting. Useful criteria for design.

17)

Experiments for the mixture ethylene-0-N. Pressures obtained for different values of ethylene concentration. Very specific.

18)

It is a review until 1977. It discusses several methods: Cubbage Simmonds and Cubbage-Marshall, Rasbash, Burgoyne-Wilson, Drogasavics, Decker, Runes, Munday, Yao and Nettleton. It recommends Yao's paper, and certain corrections of the original formulae /13/ are given. Only for gas explosions.

19)

Very general article. It mentions NFPA, Donat-Barktnecht method, general recommendations to minimize and prevent dust explosions.

20)

It develops equations and Chapell's model /ll/ to obtain a computer program that produces pressure/time diagrams. It includes the effect of vent panel inertia on opening (several formulae for different panel configurations). Comparisons with DonatBarktnecht. Example.

90

21)

New equations for non-extreme cases (non central ignition, non high turbulence at the vent opening, etc.). It includes the effect of venting panel inertia. It gives a formula for gases in long vessels; for very long vessels it applies NFPA 68. References about data sources.

22)

It proposes formulae useful only up to 12 m . For larger volumes, the Donat-Barktnecht formulae are not valid, according to his experiments, because of considerable flame acceleration. Influence of several obstacles on the maximum pressure obtained. In other experiments, flame instabilities and pressure oscillations were detected and attributed to acoustical phenomena.

23)

Design criteria for dust explosions when the vessel is not full of dust. It follows the cubic law, but as if it were a smaller vessel (see graphs). It then analyses the efficiency of explosion doors and excess venting area needed. Only experiments with propane.

24)

Experiments with dust explosions in a 20 It sphere are described. Comparisons are made with results obtained in 1 m* vessels. Intended to reduce experimental costs,

25)

Description of several aspects related to minimum ignition energy and its measurement for 57 dusts. Many of them are similar to those for gases. A relation between minimum ignition energy (MIE) and induction time is found. Data and curves are given, about the effect of gas presence in the MIE of dust analysed (hybrid mixtures) .

26)

It describes experiments to measure the transition point from deflagration to detonation and the "run-up" time. Several flame arrestors are tested and recommendations are given about their use in gas explosion prevention.

91

27)

Several aspects for the practical design of different parts and components related with gas explosion venting devices are ana lysed (panel material, weight, fasteners, structure resistance, vibrations, etc.). It includes combustion elements: flame, pres sures obtained, applicability of Runes' equation (several C va lues measures are made: in general they are far smaller than the NFPA values), panel inertia, (dP/dt) max , etc. Some design guides are given, very similar to those given at the beginning of the paper. Experiments continue.

28)

Two mathematical models for gas explosion venting are presented: burnt gas vented and unburnt gas vented. Using data from 6) it obtains a correlation of turbulence factor with and the open ing pressure of the bursting disc. The model cannot be applied to many other cases because of the lack of a statistical base.

29)

General review, with some graphs and known formulae. Gas and dust.

30)

Description of experiments and results to measure the relationship between external and internal pressures, for different types and areas of venting devices. Cases of explosive mixtures at different layers of the vessels are analysed. Only for gases (references to cases of heavy gases).

31)

The DonatBarktnecht model is not validated by data obtained for vessels between 1 m and 35 m (see /22/). Experiments continue.

Some factors of interest are analysed. It describes the steps of the explosion very well and proposes two possible models of flame accelera tion.

32)

Description of experiments and results on dust explosion and suppression by chemical agents in mechanical conveyors. These protective measures seem to be effective. General criteria are given. No model proposed.

92

33)

Description of all the variables to be considered for explosion venting, and finding of all the nondimensional terms. A sys tematic experiment is proposed.

34)

Experimental data to detect the real effect of a partial volume causing an explosion. Emphasis is given to the consideration of the impulse in structural analysis. Some data about propane ex periments are given, but general conclusions cannot be found.

35)

The DonatBarktnecht model is criticized for large volumes. All the factors that influence flame speed are analysed, based on ex periments. NFPA 68 /43/ no more valid. Interesting discussion at the end. The author is in favour of analytical (computer) methods. Several criteria to minimize the presence of high flame speed are given. Only for gases.

36)

Description and discussion of a series of experiments about the critical points in explosion venting (degree of turbulence, L/D effect,stoichiometry of gases, different fuels, confinement and partial venting), chain transmission of explosion to adjacent buildings, strong jet ignition, etc. Experimental curves are given (made with vessels of V < 1 m ) . Experiments were carried out only with gases, methane and propane.

37)

New model for gases, which can solve nearly all the cases consi dered, especially for large volumes (> 10 m ^ ) . it might be used with dusts, but some experiments should be done first. The ven ting device inertia to open and the effect of the Cn (discharge coefficient) value assumed are considered in the model. Some ad vantages regarding Runes, Donat and NFPA 68 models. Interesting final discussion. The computer model developed must be run seve ral times with different area values. Until now, the presence of vent ducts has not been considered. The presence of obstacles may be considered in the model as it is.

93

38)

More details of the method proposed in /37/ are given. Some theoretical developments and the state of the art are included. New experimental correlations from Abdel-Gayed and Bradley are proposed to calculate the turbulent burning velocity, taking account in such a way of the effect of turbulence on flame acceleration. Some comparative tables are given. The effects of C D selection and vent opening inertia are clearly indicated in the respective curves. Comprehensive bibliography. Useful nomographs are given at the end. Some interesting points in the final discussion.

39)

Experiments with a 5.2 m

vessel are described. Using low vent

opening pressure, three peaks are found in general. Especially for small vessels, the third peak is caused by acoustic waves (internal linings of the vessel can lessen these pressures considerably) . New experiments prove thatBradlev Mitcheson criteria do not cover all the cases, especially for larger volumes. The external effects of blast waves from venting are measured and some graphs and criteria are given. Interesting final discussion. 40) Explosion tests are carried out in a 22 m^ chamber fitted with different explosion relief devices (areas and materials). The nature of high secondary pressure peaks caused by acoustic oscillation is investigated. Comparison with other published data. 41) Dust explosion experiments in a 500 m 3 silo cell are reported. Other important dust features are considered: chemical composition, particle and shape distribution, initial turbulence present, degree of dispersion, etc. Experiments with quiescent clouds show that NDI and NFPA formulae are conservative. When initial turbulence is present, one order of magnitude difference can be found between code predictions and actual maximum pressure obtained. New experiments are needed. Interesting final discussion.

94

42)

Experimental investigations on the run-up distance of gaseous detonation in large pipes. Different parameters influencing runup distance to detonation are discussed according to experimental results: pre-volume, turbulence, change in cross-sections, presence of flame arresters. No general rules or safety factor values are given. Qualitative relationships between run-up distance and laminar burning velocity. Ignition source strength is not so important. Run-up distance decreases with greater prevolume.

45)

Three common methods of estimating vent areas are compared using experimental data, determined in the Hartmann bomb and the 20 litre sphere. The results are condensed into some guidelines about the range of application of any one of the methods analysed (the vent-ratio method, the cube root law and nomograph method, and the Rust approach).

46)

The computer model for explosions in spherical vessels outlined in reference /l/ is here comprehensively described.

47)

In this book, many available methods are described, either empirical or theoretical. It is a review which aims at assessing the worth of these estimation methods by direct comparison of their predictions with the results from experimental measurements reported in the literature. Limitations of empirical and theoretical methods are given. Theoretical methods even for dust explosions are given. Future research work is outlined.

48)

The results of the application of two computer codes to calculate combustion overpressures are given. One of the codes is very sophisticated and the other is a simplified one. The last one gave promising results for the examples seen, but is not suitable in its present form to help in the design of safe vents for all vessel or building geometries and every possible combustible gas mixture.

95

49)

Recent activities on gas explosion research in Japan are reviewed with emphasis on the studies of combustible gas distribution and flame behaviour effects on pressure build-up in enclosures. Years 1981/1984 are included and most works were presented in symposia and scientific meetings devoted to safety engineering in Japan.

96

TABLE

I - Theoretical developments and models

Theoretical aspects and development of equations; /l,2,11,13,20,28,31,35,36,37,38,46,47,48,49/

Qualitative aspects about important variables; /l,2,6,9,10,13,14,15,16,18,25,27,31,33,34,35,36,37,38, 39,40,41,42,46,47,49/

Models proposed; Emgirical or simple models: /2,3,5,6,8,9,10,13,14,16,21,22,25,28,31,47/

Computer models: /1,11,20,31,37,38,44,46,47,48/

97

TABLE

II -

Experimental data and information

Internal pressures developed: /2,4,5,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,15,17,22,23,25,26,27,30,31, 34, 35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,45,47,40/

Vent duct pressures and external pressures developed; /10,14,16,30,31,39,40/

Experimental data on very specific equipment: /4,10,23,32,41/

Chain explosion in several rooms or pieces of equipment: /36/

Explosion suppression systems: /26,32,42/

Experiencies related with turbulence, flame propagation, partial venting, etc.: /35,36,39,40,41,42,49/

Vent device (door) inertia: /20,21,23,27,37,38/

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TABLE III - Design criteria and recommended practices for venting

Based on experiments; /4,9,10,13,14,16,23,27,30,31,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41, 42,47/

General comments and guidelines; /4,8,9,10,11,13,14,16,18,19,20,21,27,30,31,35,36,37, 38,39,40,41,42,47/

Specific criteria; General rules^ details, limit values, etc. /5,8,9,10,14,16,19,23,27,35,36,47/ Construction d e t a i l s , a n g l e s , p o s i t i o n s , d i s t a n c e s , e t c , /10,23,27/

99

TABLE IV -

Other characteristics

General reviews; /15,18,27,29,45,47,49/

Comparison with other methods of prevention; /8,9/

General criteria;

To grevent_explosion mixture formation /5,8,19,26,32/

To lessen pressures to be develoged in an exglosion /12,19,32,35,36,39,42/

To lessen the probabilities of a 2iven_explosion

,7/

101

APPENDIX 1

Definitions:

For the purpose of this Manual, the following terms have

the meanings shown below. Autoigni lion temperature: The ignition temperature of a substance,

whether solid, liquid or gaseous, which is the minimum temperature required to initiate or cause self-sustained combustion independently of the heating or heated element. Blanketing: The technique of maintaining an atmosphere which is inert

or enriched with a fuel above a liquid in a container or vessel. Combustible Burning: (fuel): A gas or mist or dust capable of being burnt.

Is the chemical reaction of a combustible and gaseous oxidant

with the resultant production of a flame. Deflagration: Burning which takes place at a flame speed below the

velocity of sound in the unburnt medium. Detonation: Burning which takes place at a flame speed above the velo-

city of sound in the unburnt medium. Dust (industrial): Any finely divided solid material 420 microns or

smaller in diameter. Uxplosion: A bursting of a building or container as a result of the

development of internal pressure beyond the confinement capability of the building or container. Fire Point: The lowest temperature of liquid in an open container at

which vapours are evolved fast enough to support continuous combustion.

102

Flame speed

or flame

velocity:

Is the speed at which the flame front

progresses through the unburn t mixture. Flammable limits: In the case of most flammable liquids, gases, dusts,

and mists, a minimum concentration of gas, dust or mist in air, oxygen or other oxidant below which propagation f flame does not occur on contact with a source of ignition. Usually there is also a maximum concentration of gas in air, oxygen or other oxidant above which propagation of flame does not occur. These limits are known as "lower and upper flammable limits", respectively. Flammable range: The concentration range lying between the lower and

upper explosive or flammable limits. Flash point: The flash point of a liquid means the minimum temperature

at which it gives off vapour in sufficient concentration to form an ignitible mixture with air near the surface of the liquid within the vessel as specified by an appropriate test procedure and apparatus. Fundamental burning velocity: The velocity of the gas normal to the

flame front with which the unburnt mixture enters a flame and is chemically transformed. Inerting: The process of rendering a combustible mixture non-combus-

tible through the addition of an inert gas. Open vent prea.zurc: The pressure developed by a deflagration in a con-

tainer having an unobstructed vent. Optimum mixture: A mixture in which the combustible material and oxi-

dant are in the proper proportions to give the deflagration with the highest maximum rate of pressure rise. Generally this occurs at approximately the stoichiometric proportion.

103

Oxidant:

Any material or substance which can react with a combustible

substance to produce burning or combustion, or a similar exothermic reaction. Oxygen in air is the most common oxidant. Purge gas: A gas suitable for rendering an atmosphere non-combustible.

It may be inert or combustible. Air can also be used as a purge gas. Purging: The displacement of a gaseous oxidant or gaseous combustible

by another gas to render the mixture non-combustible. The purge gas may or may not be an inert gas. KaLc of pressure viae: The amount of pressure rise during a particular

interval of a deflagration. It is expressed as the ratio of the increase in pressure to the time Interval (dP/dt) required for that increase of pressure to occur, ' ' o average r.iLe of procure rise is the ratio lh of the maximum pressure to the time interval from the initiation of the deflagration until the maximum pressure is reached. Explosion suppression: A technique by which burning in a confined mix-

ture is detected and arrested during the incipient stages, preventing development of pressure which could result in an explosion. Yent ratio: The relationship of the area of the rupture diaphragms

or relieving panels to the volume of the equipment or room subject to internal deflagration. Ventilation: The process of supplying or removing air, by natural or

mechanical means, to or from any space.

105

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.

Bradley D. and A. Mitcheson, "The venting of gaseous explosions in spherical vessels. I - Theory". Combustion and Flame, 32, 221-236 (1978).

2.

Bradley D. and A. Mitcheson, "The venting of gaseous explosions in spherical vessels. II - Theory and experiments". Combustion and Flame, 32, 237-255 (1978).

3. 4. 5. 6.

Runes E., "Explosion venting". Loss Prevention, 6, 63 (1972). Palmer K.N., "Relief venting of dust explosions". Loss Prevention 8, 10-14, 1974. Gibson N. and G.F.P. Harris, "The calculation of dust explosion vents". Loss Prevention 10, 141-146 (1977). Harris G.F.P. and P.G. Briscoe, "The venting of pentane vapourair explosions in a large vessel". Combustion and Flame, 1 1 , 329 __ (1967).

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Rose H.E., "Useful approach to dust explosion hazards". Loss Prevention, 9, 82-90 (1975). Nelson R.W., "Protection of enclosures handling combustible dusts". Loss Prevention, 6, 100-104 (1972). Donat C , "Pressure relief as used in explosion protection". Loss Prevention, 11, 87-92 (1977). Bartknecht W., "Explosion pressure relief". Loss Prevention, 11, 93-104 (1977). Chappell W.G., "Pressure:time diagram for explosion vented space". Loss Prevention, 11, 76-86 (1977). Franke F.R., J.C. Burnett, D.E. Danly and W.B. Howard, "Explosion protection for process systems". Loss Prevention, 9, 97-100 (1975). Yao C , "Explosion venting of low-strength equipment and structures". Loss Prevention, 8, 1-9 (1974). Hattwig M., "Selected aspects of explosion venting". Second Int. Symp. on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industry, Heidelberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 6-9 September 1977, IV (249-256).

106

15.

Baker W.E., E.D. Esparza and J.J. Kulesz, "Venting of chemical explosion and reactions". Ibid, IV (243248).

16.

Wiekema B.J., H.J. Pasman and Th.M. Groothuizen, "The effect of tubes connected with pressure relief vents". Ibid, IV (223231).

17.

Fiumara ., "Explosion pressure as parameter for the safety in the process industries". Ibid, III (173181).

18.

Anthony E.J., "The use of venting formulae in the design and protection of building and industrial plant from damage by gas or vapour explosions". J. of Hazardous Materials, 3 (1977/78) 23 49.

19.

C ocks R.E., "Dust explosions, prevention and control". Chem. Eng., November 5, 94101, 1979.

20.

Rust E.A., "Explosion venting for lowpressure equipment". Chem. Eng., November 5, 102110 (1979).

21.

Singh J., "Sizing vents for gas explosions". Chem. Eng., Septem ber 24, 103109, Ifi79.

22.

Zalosh R.G., "Gas explosion tests in roomsize vented enclosures". Loss Prevention, 13, 98110 (1980).

23.

Hrlimann H., "Results from real scale explosion tests". Third Int. Symp. on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, Basel, Switzerland, 12 (826838), 1980.

24.

Siwek R., "Experimental methods for the determination of explosion characteristics of combustible dusts". Ibid, 12 (839850).

25.

Pellmont G., "Minimum ignition energy of combustible dusts and explosion behaviour of hybrid mixtures". Ibid, 12 (851861).

26.

Flessner M.F. and R.A. Bjrklund, "Control of gas detonations in pipes". Ibid, 12 (863891).

27.

Howard W.B. and A.H. Karabinis, "Tests of explosion venting of buildings". Ibid, 13 (9791039).

28.

C resciteli! S., G. Russo and V. Tufano, "Mathematical modelling of relief venting of gas explosions. Theory and experiments". Ibid, 16 (11871197).

29.

Marshall M.R., "Gaseous and dust explosion venting: determination of explosion relief requirements". Ibid, 16 (12101229).

30.

Palmer K.N. and P.S. Tonkin, "External pressures caused by venting gas explosions in a large chamber". Ibid, 16 (12741294).

107

31.

Solberg D.M., J.A. Pappas and E. Skramstad, "Experimental inves tigations on flame acceleration and pressure rise phenomena in large scale vented gas explosions". Ibid, 16 (12951303).

32.

Gillis J.P. and S.G. Dale, "Explosion venting and suppression in operating mechanical conveyors". Ibid, 16 (13041314).

33.

Baker W.E., J.C. Hokanson and J.J. Kulesz, "A model analysis for vented dust explosions". Ibid, 17 (13391347).

34.

Naidus E.S., "Fullscale explosion study of relief vents suitable for protecting large structures". Loss Prevention, 14, 3543 (1981)

35.

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