Indo-Pak Relations (1953-1962)

Introduction:
Relations between India and Pakistan have been strained by a number of historical and political issues. Soon after partition India and Pakistan established diplomatic relations but violent upheaval and territorial disputes overshadowed the relationship. Pakistans existence as a sovereign state has been threatened from the very beginning. A number of her territories, comprising Jaunagarh, Hyderabad and specially Kashmir whose overwhelmingly Muslim population was eager to join Pakistan were forcibly occupied by India. In 1950 and 1951, India deployed her forces on the borders of both East and West Pakistan and her Prime Minister threatened other methods to deal with Pakistan. In the early days of her existence, Pakistans internal conditions were most serious. There were gloomy predictions about the collapse of Pakistan. But Jinnah roused the confidence of the people and declared that Pakistans foreign policy was one of friendliness and good will towards all the nations of the world. So Pakistan turned to the common wealth for help in order to protect her diplomatic isolation. India, however, resented any outside interference. Pakistans attempt to establish friendly relations with Muslim countries of the Middle East was also vigorously challenged by India. During the first phase of Pakistans foreign relations in the years 1947-52, when she tried to maintain non-involvement in the East-West cold war. Pakistan felt isolation and friendliness. This increased her sense of insecurity. She felt the need of the support of some bigger power. The link with Commonwealth and friendly relations with the Muslim countries could not solve the problem of security. This led to the abandonment of the policy of non-alignment, and in 1953 there opened the second phase of Pakistans foreign policy. It is called the period of alignment

because during this period Pakistan signed treaties with US. India and Pakistan as factors in each others foreign policy and relations became more prominent. The quest for security and anxiety to maintain territorial integrity, led Pakistan to peruse a policy of alliance with the West, particularly with the United States. First of all there was military, economic, and cultural alliance with Turkey. The Turco-Pakistan pact was followed in May, 1954 by Pak-US Mutual Security Programme Agreement. On September 7, 1953, she joined SEATO and then the Bagdad pact on September 23, 1955. The thing is that, whenever Pakistan tried to foster brotherly relations with any county India always criticized and created hurdles in her way of progress. So when Indian came to know about the Pak-US agreement on November 17, 1953, she did not like it and reacted harshly. Anti-Pakistan feelings were expressed in all over the India. Indian Prime Minister initiated the campaign against the proposed agreement and there was real possibility that the agreement would not be materialized due to Indias opposition. Nehru told the Pakistani Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Bogra that an expansion of Pakistan war resources with the help of United States of America can only be looked as unfriendly act in India. Obviously, he was anxious to maintain the disparity between the military strengths of the two countries, which he had aggravated by depriving Pakistan of her share of military assets at the time of partition. According to Nehru, any addition to Pakistans military strength as a result of her pact with the United States would disturb the area of peace in Asia, bring the East-West cold war to the subcontinent and upset the balance between India and Pakistan.

It is interesting to note in this context that, for all the dust raised in India over the American arms aid to Pakistan, the first United States military advisory mission to function in the subcontinent was not in Karachi but in New Delhi. In 1962-63 she also sought and got massive military aid from western countries, particularly from the United States that showed her deep hostility towards Pakistan. In 1954-55, relations between India and Pakistan further aggravated due to the SovietIndian friendship and the direct involvement of the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir in the EastWest cold war. The Soviet Indian friendship was the outcome of the new phase in Pakistans foreign policy. Soviet-India entente reached its zenith with the visit of Nehru to the Soviet Union in June 1955 and return visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin in December 1955 and openly declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India. As a result of Russias open support to India on Kashmir, Pakistan sought the help of her allies at the second annual meeting of the council of SEATO held in March 1956. Council affirmed the need for an early settlement of the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiations. In reaction, Indian government sent protest notes to the SEATO governments, claimed, that Kashmir is in law and fact part of India and discussion of its future was outside the scope of SEATO. So after the Indian-Soviet entente following American military aid to Pakistan, Kashmir became an issue in the East-West cold war and the Soviet Union helped the India over Kashmir by her veto power. There are certain further aspects of the divergent policies of the two countries especially in Middle Eastern and South-East Asian Policy. Pakistan since independence had pursued a policy of friendliness towards the Muslim countries of the Middle East, seeking to foster closer relation with them. Pakistans joining the Western sponsored Bagdad pact was not liked by some of the Arab countries, particularly Egypt. She considered the pact as a threat to her hegemony in

the Middle East. Nor did Egypt welcome Pakistans enthusiasm for Muslim solidarity and unity, India also contributed to this lack of mutual understanding between Egypt and Pakistan. It was however, the Suez Crisis of 1956 provided India with the best opportunity to vilify Pakistan in Co-operation with Egypt in the Middle East. Pakistan played a prominent part in Suez Crisis; gave military assistance, held meetings at Tehran, Bagdad and Ankara in favour of Egypt and Criticized Britain intervention in it. She also played a vital role in twenty- power London conference on Suez Canal. She stayed out of the second eighteen- power London conference when she thought there was a possibility that Egyptian sovereignty might be compromised. But nothing could please Nehrus trusted friend president Nasser and he declared under the influence of India: Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India. This was a rude shock to Pakistan. However, in South and South-East Asia India was most actively working to build up an area of influence for herself and Pakistan was resolutely opposed to Indias hegemony in these areas. Even during the Prime Ministers Conference of the Colombo powers in April 1954, Nehru tried to assert his leadership and influence over Pakistan and other countries. But Pakistan made it quite clear that they are not prepared to follow unquestioningly Mr. Nehrus leadership. Nehru also tried to vilify Pakistan in Bandung Conference by condemning collective security systems such as SEATO and the Bagdad pact. He lost no opportunity to lower Pakistan in the estimation of Asian and African countries. Furthermore, the active involvement of the United States, the Soviet Union in the subcontinent and the rise of China as a major power in Asia further deteriorated the tension

between India and Pakistan in the 1960s. When Ayub became President, the Pak-USA agreement of Co-operation for Security and Defense was signed at Ankara in March 1959. This treaty is more significant than the earlier one of the May 1954 because it contains clear guarantees for the defense of Pakistan. This new bilateral agreement aggravated the tensions and differences between India and Pakistan. Nehru declared that it would come in the way of a solution of IndoPak disputes. Soon he got the assurance from the American ambassador in Delhi that the bilateral agreement contained no new or additional commitments. But Ayub Khan made sincere efforts to put an end to the corrosive quarrels between the two countries. In October 1959, he expressed that if the basic differences between the two countries were settled honorably, Pakistan would to hesitate to enter into any mutual cooperation with neighboring country. Ayub expressed concern over development on the northern and North-West borders of the subcontinent, referring to what was happening in Tibet and to the roads which were being built by the Russians in Afghanistan. So in May 1959, Ayub offered Nehru a plane for joint defense of the subcontinent against external threats. He believed that this joint agreement will helpful to defend ourselves from North and we should look outward instead of facing each other. However, Ayubs offer of joint defense was turned down by Nehru with ridicule and contempt. He was reported to have said, in a message sent through the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi that the question of joint defense did not arise because the broader approaches of India and Pakistan to world affairs were fundamentally different. Nehrus main objection to Ayubs proposal was that India is unaligned whereas Pakistan is a member of a particular bloc.

A second Ayub Nehru meeting in September 1960, at the time of signing the Indus Water Treaty, Nehru showed his cool attitude towards Ayubs overtures. India had demonstrated shown this title enthusiasm due to Ayubs suggestions for joint defense plane or his plea for the settlement of outstanding disputes, particularly that over Kashmir. In 1962, Pak-US friendship was coming to an end. The Sino-Indian conflicts of 1962 induced the United States to rush to India huge arm aid on the age-old basis: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. After getting armed aid by the USA, India embarked upon an ambitious plane of expanding her armed and air forces to threaten the existence of Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistans foreign policy remained in favour of western bloc because of Pakistans threat by her neighboring country. The United States failed to give Pakistan any help to resist Indian aggression. On the other hand, India kept herself non-aligned and adopted policy of containment towards Pakistan by developing amicable relations with Soviet Union. Further, she always condemned Pakistan over Kashmir issue and tried to eliminate her influence and position among the nations of Asia and Africa. During the second phase of alignment, both countries met many times on their basic disputes but they could not achieve their outstanding goals. Ultimately, all hopes of ending the long, costly disputes between India and Pakistan under external pressure were dashed to the ground.

Bibliography:
1. Chaudhury, G. W. Pakistans Relations with India 1947-66. London. Oxford University Press, 1968. 2. Sattar, Abdul. Pakistans Foreign Policy (1947-2005). Karachi. Oxford University Press, 2007. 3. Amin. Shahid. M. Pakistans Foreign Policy: A Reapprial. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 4. Talabot, Ian. Pakistan: A Modern History. Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 1999. 5. Burke. S. M, Lawrence Ziring. Pakistans Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis. Karachi. Oxford University Press, 1990. 6. Wright, Dnis. India-Pakistan Relations 1962-69. Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt (Ltd), 1989. 7. Jalalzai, Musa Khan. The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Kashmir, Afghanistan and Internal Security Threats 1947-2004. Lahore: Ariana Publishers, 2003. 8. Erown, W. Norman. The United States, India and Pakistan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.

References:
1. Shahid. M. Amin, Pakistans Foreign Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), P. 45-51 2. 1- G. W. Chaudhary, Pakistans Relations with India, 1947-60, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), P. 231-35. 3. Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, (Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 1999), P.126-138. 4. Chaudhary, Pakistans Relations with India, 1947-60, P.251-257 5. S. M. Barke, Pakistans Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), P. 98-105. 6. Abdul Sattar, Pakistans Foreign Policy, 1947-2005, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), P. 57.