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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001 5 April 1989 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18,Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works which were published commercially and are no longer in print.
2. SCOPE
This reference publication is Mao Tse-tungs thoughts and philosophy of guerrilla warfare. It gives the reader a chance to learn about this type of warfare from one who lived and fought as a guerrilla for most of his adult life. It is important to understand his philosophy of guerrilla warfare because it is the basis of todays guerrilla forces. The book was translated and published with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.), in 1961. 3. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
M. P. SULLIVAN Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia
DISTRIBUTION:
TJI(
Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Retired). Reprinted with permission of Mrs. Belle Gordon Nelson Griffith.
INTRODUCTION 1 11 111 W The Nature of Revolutionary Profile of a Revolutionist Strategy, Tactics, and Logistics in Revolutionary War Some Conclusions Guerrilla War 3 12 20 27
Yu CHI CHAN (GUERRILLA WARFAIW) Translators Note A Further Note 1 2 3 4 5 What 1s Guerrilla Warfare? The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations Guerrilla Warfare in History Can Victory Be Attained by Guerrilla Organization for Guerrilla Warfare Operations? 37 39 4J
51
58 66 71 71 77 82 85 88
94
How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed ~he Method of Organizing Guerrilla Regimes
Equipment of Guerriks Elements of the Guerrilla Army
6 7
The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare The Strategy of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan APPENDIX
116
INTRODUCTION
A
consume engineers checked
of elecand
tronic boxes buried deep in the earth hungrily tapes, Scientists confer in air-conditioned offices; missiles are men who move about them silently, countdown begins, a tired man wearing a his knees, feet, is the with 3
almost reverently.
In forty minutes,
his back against a tree. Barrel pressed between butt resting on the moist earth a Browning canvas Draped automatic sacksone around holding three rifle. Hooked
home-made cloth
his neck,
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
warfare
three days supply of rice. The man stands, raises a water bottle to his lips, rinses his mouth, looks about him carefully, of the Browning and disappears ambush. It is probable tionary dozen in nature, countries that guerrilla during war, nationalist few years. and revoluThese outspits out the water, He slaps it again twice, In forty minutes, prepared corks the bottle, slaps tile stock
breaks may not initially be inspired, organized, or led by local Communists; indeed, it is probable t]lat they will not be. But they will receive the moral support encouragement circumstances as well. As early as November, Chinas Number 1949, we had this assurance Liu Shao-chi, Unions Trade from when, Two Communist, of international permit, Communism, expert advice and material and vocal and where assistance
speaking before the Australasian in Peking, revolutions he prophesied that would follow
Conference pattern. We
that there would be other Asian the Chinese of eighty-one that the up. A month
Parties
series of questions
to which
lntrodwtion
1s there a lilielihood of such wars recurring? Yes, there is. Are uprisings of this kind likely to recur? Yes, they are. But wars of this kind are popular uprisings. Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the CUPof the popular patie7ce overflows and they take to arms? Yes, there is such a likelihood. What is the attitude of the Marxists to such uprisings? A most favorable attitude. . . . These uprisings are directed against the col-rwl)t reactionary regimes, against the colonialists. The Communists support just wars of this kind wholehearted y and without reservations. * Implicit ment is the further infiltrated and assurance captured that any popular by the Communists tin@, movewill in ol}r
cl]arocter de~nitcly
This should not surprise us if we remember hundred millions less fortunate haps reluctantly, ples are dedicated at the conclusion to the perpetuation
than we have arrived, perthat the Western of the political, social, to America, Britain, or
and economic status cpo. In the not too distant past, many of these millions looked hope[ully France for help in the realization achieved only by a desperate Kwolutionary of their justifiable aspirathat
tions. Bllt today many of them feel that these aims can be revolutionary strug~]e we will probably oppose. This is not a hypothesis; A potential ensure situation where the government consistently it is fact, to
at least a minimally
decent standard
* World
on Guerrilla
Warfare
nucleus of a revolutionary for violent revolutionary In many countries, and the miserably small middle engineerslacks ceasing factional program, form of liberal rejected destitute,
are but two classes, the rich the relatively lawyers, by unIts to bankers, doctors,
is fragmented
which usually posits a socialized society and some parliamentary It is also move and
the exclusive and tightly knit possessing minority. by the frustrated it represents youth, irrevocably toward violent revolution. a package
To the illiterate
of promises
that experi-
ence tells them will never be fulfilled. People who live at subsistence of religion, understand basic: land, freedom level want first things to interested in freedom as we rags free enterprise better than be put first. They are not particularly of the press,
for their children, houses to replace their shacks, freedom from police oppression, medical attention, primary schools. Those who have known only poverty have begun to wonder why they should ments. They glassesexamples lose? When continue to wait passively not always through for improveRed-tinted the struchave we to is incipient. seeand
of peoples who have changed and they ask, What guerrilla situation
Introduction A revolutionary of military existing with action. war is never confined within the bounds
Because its purpose is to destroy an society and its institutions and to replace them new state structure, the constituent political, any revolutionary parts, in varying social, and with a dYtrue of to the orthodox
a completely
war is a unity of which importance, psychological. namic quality wars, whatever revolutionary are military, and
economic, in depth
it is endowed
that
their scale, lack. This is particularly guerrilla war, which is not susceptible frequently
type of superficial military treatment by antediluvian doctrinaires. It is o[ten said that guerrilla generalization
advocated This
warfare
is primitive,
is dangerously misleading and true only in the technological sense. If one considers the picture as a apparent, and the primitive than war is of logistical It can be form is understood to be in fact more sophisticated navies, and air forces. Guerrilla highly organized computers.
war or atomic war or war as it was waged by conarmies, for success on the ef%cient operation devices,
not dependent
mechanical
in any climate,
in any weather;
in swamps, in mount ~ins, in farmed fields. Its basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines. I-Ie is endowed Guerrilla warfare mans admirable with qualities intelligence, emotions, with, and will. ones, is dlercfow suffused and reflects,
While it is not always humane, it is human, which is more than can be said for the strategy of extinction. 7
Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla In the United out of soldiers. cally educated A trained
Warfare
trouble
to
keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics the opposite. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politiaware of the issues at stake. is much more than a guerrilla
and thoroughly
and disciplined
patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a home-rnacle bomb. His indoctrination accurately, intensely Guerrilla ganization, than Mao begins even before he is taught The to shoot is an and it is unceasing. loyal and politically end product
leaders spend a great deal more time in orwork instruction, agitation, and propaganda for their most important We must with patiently monotonous persuade, job is to says conin explain, discuss, regularity
Explain,
vincethese words recur many of the early Chinese has aptly compared water in which right, proliferate. guerrilla
essays on guerrilla
guerrillas
It is therefore
of all
and to keep it there, More guerrilla urgently than ten years ago, I concluded with the further an analysis of
warfare demanded
Although a wealth of material existed then, more has since been developed, no such study
lnwoc?zxbz has yet been undertaken aware. In Indochina in this country, so far as I am
(Che) Guevara were more assiduous. One rather interesting result of their successful activities has been the common identification But guerrilla for centuries, Revolutionary a martial
New
of guerrilla
warfare
warfare was not invented there have been guerrilla hero Francis Marion,
Those present at his birth would probably not have foretold future for him; the baby was not larger than a England lobster and might easily enough have been put into a quart pot. Marion grew up in South Carolina and had little formal schooling. He worked as a farmer. the In 1759, at the age of twenty-seven, raised to fight the Cherokees, borders of the Carolinas. the course much British When accepted Regiment. the Revolution a commission broke out, Marion in the Second immediately Carolina of the war to a very profithe sought that at first South that of these was later hostilities to be put he joined a regiment
He served for two years and in away in his mind the to good use against
Accordingly,
of twenty
ill-equipped assortment
on Guerrilla but
Wa+re
Marions
men
were
not long in proving that the appearance is not necessarily Marions guerrilla were continually
a reliable criterion of his fighting abilities. activities in South Carolina especially Cornwallis, Operating by them. Marions bases, which whose plans tactics were frewith the greathe changed
disrupted
garrisons, convoys, and trains. His information timely and accurate, for the people supported
The British, unable to cope with Marion, branded him a criminal, and complained bitterly that he fought neither like a gentleman such ubiquitous, nor like a Christian, intangible, and a charge orthodox antagonists operations as on a soldiers are wont to apply in all lands and in all wats to deadly Francis Marion.* However, grand Spaniards the first example of guerrilla scale was in Spain between 1808 and invading 1813. The army to the
* Bryant, in the Song of Marions Men, wrote some lines that showed that he had a better understanding of guerrilla tactics and psychology than many who have followed more martiaf pursuits: Woe to the English soldiery, That little dreads us near! On them shall come at midnight A strange and sudden fear; When, waking to their tents on fire, They grasp their arms in vain, And they who stand to face us Are beat to earth again; And they who fly in terror deem A mighty host behind, And hear the tramp of thousands Upon the hollow wind.
Introduction
mountains
were patriots
They were not revolutionists. Most did not desire a change in the form of their government. Their single objective was to help Wellington Spain. A few years later, peasants pushed again harried it, stumbling, the cudgel thousands starving of Russian and freezing, Cossacks and Napoleons Grande Arrm$e as Kutuzov down the iceas Tolstoi of anyones with stupid force the Frefich armies to leave
This dying army felt again and war, which, and majestic
of the peoples
was raised in all its menacing itself about no question no until fine distinctions, consistency, about perfect
the French
been driven out. A little more than a century feel the fury of an aroused were those who wielded were patriotic Only when Russians. Lenin came on the scene did guerrilla warlater, Hitlers case They armies fell back along the Smolensk the cudgel road. They too would But in neither revolutionists.
fare receive the potent political injection that was to alter its character radically. But it remained for Mao Tse-tung to produce twenty-five authority the first systematic that deservedly study of the subject, now endowed almost the years ago. His study, with
PROFILE OF A REVOLUTIONIST
PoLitical power comes out of the barrel of a gun.
MAO
TSK+TONG, 1938
M
Province, dustrious described pealed Chinese educational
AO TSE-TUNG, the man who was to don the mantle of Lenin, lvas born in I Iunan in central China, in 1893, His father, an into acquire several acres, and peasant. He was a
with this land, the status of a middle strict disciplinarian, The boy was in constant an ally in his mother, her methods to him. were But then opportunities able
and Maos youth \vas not a happy one. conflict with his father but found tactics (as he once her husband) his rebellious a tiny minority Nlaos prinxmy ap son of and of coping the father that with gave only whose indirect
to enjoy.
secondary schooling was thorough. lHis literary catholic; while a pupil at the provincial normal read omnivorously. nese philosophy, translations ~iograpl~ers. 12 His indiscriminate poetry, history, history Western and romances historians, and political
of many However,
introduction
titularly
appealed
success, the key to the future of China. His studies had led him to reject both democratic ism and parliamentary Time, would he realized, not accord her socialism as unsuited was running change, the privilege out for China, of gradual to his country.
of a relatively
painless
To survive to change
radically,
fast. But
after graduating
from normal
sity library. Here he associated himself with the Marxist study groups set up by Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu; here he discovered skys explosive Engels. Lenin, read his essays, pored over Trotand began to study Marx and and Communist speeches,
a man who had discovered China according The China the CCP was organized in the accepted
to create a new
to the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. When in Shanghai, in 1921, Mao joined. was not a nation China was, China Mao decided to change
of course, homogeneous; was chaos. The peasants, day to day at subsistence holdings The
families owned no land at all. Other millions cultivated from which they scraped out just enough peasant was fair game for everyone. robbed by landlords sustain life.
Mm
Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
afflicted by stark
It is difficult for an American of small communities in which water, disposal. there The no electricity,
today to conceive
in which no public services no schools, no streets, and no communities officials who in his own plot beneath within no paved
of these
fear of army press gangs and of provincial tary roads and dikes. The Chinese peasant,
to work on mili-
walk until he was laid to rest in the burial the cypress trees. This was feudal China. this society were the ingredients to pieces. An external factor had for almost a century the unrelenting in exacting
that were soon to blow it contributed and greed of into and Russians j~lridical, and China record in these and
to the chaos of China: vied with corrupt financial one another concessions
pressure
from a succession
in his youth
Introduction
after
Chiang
Kai-shek Army, in
of the went to
Revolutionary
The
province
to the peasants like leeches and whose exactions impoverished. and redistribution eager such to retain the stabilizing a radical In the circumthis necesof the land. the support in Chisocial
kept the people sary reform: of the gentry society), dynamite. revolution While
there was only one way to accomplish expropriation the Nationalists, (historically considered and until eliminated. himself extremely north
element solution
But in Maos view, there could be no meaningful unless the power of this class had unpopular armies to
been completely
with the landed gentry in Hunan, of the Kuomintang Wuhan, was established rated a number the vanguard were marching
the revolutionary
on the Yangtze, where a Nationalist in December, of Communist divisions in March, 1926. These elements.
of Chiangs
army reached
Mao Tse-tung meantime up. The the left-wing Communists this period,
government walked
out;
Soviet
packed their bags and started for home. During literally the Communists were having own troubles, and these were serious. The movement Those a rugged
secret police had fled to the south and One of the first to reach this from Hunan. stronghold,
borderlands.
agitator
Chu Teh (who had arrived in April, 1928) began to molcl an army. Several more extensive. ganda patriotic operations supposed nature, chieftains were induced gradually join the Communists, District whose operations became landlords under Red
Principally
these activities were of a propawere asked to make secure base area, troops who were clirective was Committee directive o(fensive that in On
of 193o, an ominous
received at Ching Kang Shari from the Central of the Party, then dominated required followed the Communist armies to take the
by Li Li-san. This
against cities held by the Nationalists. were not entirely of that month, successful a serious Communist the thirteenth 16 defeat at Changsha
Introduction in the history of the Chinese the ultimate responsibility shoulders Communist for it rested Party was taken; equally on the
of Mao and Chu Teh. These two agreed that the was to abandon immediately Comin
only hope for the movement devising. munist Moscow Tevolution Marxist peasant? correctly vinced number
the line laid down by Moscow in favor of one of Maos own Basically the conflict that split the Chinese Party wide open and alienated revolved dogma gauged about this question: on the to be based Was the traditionalists
the Chinese proletariatas and had was conThis deciout with Mao was that the
industrial
prescribedor their
Mao, who knew and trusted the peasants, revolutionary that the Cl]inese and too apathetic Party, consistency. wrong. of Kremlin urban proletariat
reoriented History
was thereafter
Moscow
infallibility
challenged
by Peking. In October, belief 1930, the Generalissimo, with great fanfare was launched really were in the misguided with no difSuppresHow to become by Supa Bandit was now that he could crush the Communists
sion Campaign, This Nationalists The campaign by companies, Campaigns, apparent. platoons,
in December.
ran away
followed
on Guerrilla
Warfare y decided to
the Generalissimo of his German well-trained, and methodical by artillery every village
reluctant advisers
and
inched and
of mutually
supporting converted,
The Communists,
isolated from the support of the peasants found themselves deprived of food and informathe Commumorale sagged. It was to shift the base to march
of almost 6,000 miles was begun. This was indeed one of the fateful migrations its purpose, nist Party. Reds fought lished. columns mountains Tibet How many pitched during however, of history: the to preserve the military power of the Commubattles and skirmishes this epic trek cannot air attack. They now be estab-
that for days on end their crossed innumerable and subboth tropical
arctic climates.
As they marched toward the borders of and swung north, they sprinkled the route with situations, but they were
cadres and caches of arms and ammunition. The Reds faced many critical tough and determined. as usual, Every natural obstacle, and there were many, was overcome. Chiangs provincial troops, ineffective 18 were unable to bar the way, and the
Introduction
exhausted
remnants
found
shelter
in the loess caves of Pao An. Later, after the base was shifted to Yenan, Mao had time to reflect on his experiences embodied in Yu Chi Chum and to derive from them the guerrilla war which he theory and doctrine of revolutionary
19
IEult
STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND LOGISTICS IN REVOLUTIONARY WAR
The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy.
M
organization,
action
control of the state, but only that it is a possible, natural, and necessary in an agrarian-based tionary war. Mao conceived series of merging base areas situated
this type of war as passing phases, the first of which and preservation and difficult
through of regional
is devoted terrain.
consolidation,
in isolated
Here
volunteers are trained and indoctrinated, and from here, agitators and propagandists set forth, individually or in groups of two or three, to persuade and convince and to ento supply the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside willing
list their support. In effect, there is thus woven about each base a protective 20 belt of sympathizers
Introduction
food, recruits, and information, The pattern of the process is conspiratorial, clandestine, methodical, and progressive. Military operations will be sporadic. and tertorism elements multiply; In the next phase, direct action assumes an ever-increasing importance. collaborationists Acts of sabotage and reactionary are liquidated.
Attacks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts; weak columns are ambushed. The primary purpose of these operations other essential radios. equipped ceed with As the is to procure particularly guerrilla improve, arms, ammunition, medical force political supplies becomes and and better material, growing
agents proliberated
of the inhabitants
OE peripheral
One of the primary objectives during the first phases is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the movement, so that it gradually designed acquires the quality of mass. Local home guards or militia are formed. The militia is not primarily equipped guerrillas. to be a mobile fightand bettering force; it is a back-up for the better-trained nated and partially lantes, They voluntary Their
The home guards form an indoctritrained reserve, They function as vigiforce merchants particularly to make obnoxious kidnap
informers
and collaborators.
the revolution.
Phase I (organization, consolidation, and and Phase 11 (progressive expansion) comes of the enemy. It is dur21
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
tional battle, This phase may be protracted Such negotiations opposition. are not originated rarely the purpose of arriving at amicable Revolutions are made only to further then, is undertaken to buttress a position
by revolutionists arrangements
compromise;
the strategic design, Negotiation, of gaining political, social, economic) from the
side, whose aim is only to create conditions line and guarof a victorious situation. guerrilla What bold, and
that will preserve the unity of the strategic antee the development Intelligence operations. his supply,
Where
does he propose to do? What his morale? or stupid expect and imaginative soft? Guerrillas detailed pervasive.
tough, efficient, and well disciplined, the members service to provide questions. intelligence In a guerrilla nets are Guerrilla the answers
or poorly trained
of their intelligence
introduction
The
local cadres put the heat on everyone, all conceivable it they do. guerrillas deny all information
without
re-
gard to age or sex, to produce And produce As a corollary, fog. Total inability Campaigns, characteristic thousands
selves to their enemy, who is enveloped to get information during plaint of the Nationalists of the French
as it was later of the Japanese in both Indochina feature of unseen of all guerrilla eyes intently he strikes
enemy
stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around study his every gesture. his antagonists Because gage under superior When
out, he hits the air; as intangible as fleeting guerrillas always because enof
knowledge
of terrain,
their advantoge
fight only when the chances of victory are weighted ily in their favor; if the tide of battle unexpectedly
against them, they withdraw. They rely on imaginative leadership, distraction, suTrise, and mobility to create a victorious Sihlation before battle is joined. The enemy is dcccivcd and again deceived. Attacks are sudden, sharp, vicious, nature; enemy to agitate importance and of short duration. to dislocate Many are harassing The in others designed and confuse than the enemys plans and mind of the Mao once re23
his commanders.
and the will of his leaders is a target of far more the bodies of his troops.
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
facetiously,
that
guerrillas
must
be
They
their effort is always to keep the Only in this way can they reof action. trap, to from an running are must of in into a baited
as fluid as possible, to strike where and when the them. and so be assured of freedom to lure the enemy or to distract his attention offensive. over a wide region commander to commands and applies take advantage
area in which a more decisive blow is imminent, away is thus, paradoxically, Guerrilla necessarily be familiar local subordinate operations decentralized. with The This conducted
local conditions
opportunities. districts.
decentralization because
of technical
The enemys rear is the guerrillas front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical fashion: equipment, problems are solved in a direct and elementary source of weapons, Mao once said: We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemys own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke. 24 The enemy is the principal and ammunition.
Introduction
taxfrom
Defectors
Chiang Kai-sheks American-equipped divisions were numbered in the tens of thousands. When they surrendered, they arms, turned jeeps, in mountains tanks, guns, of Americanimade bazookas, mortars, individual radios, and
automatic
weapons. to examine Maos strategical to military concept and tactical action of the of Yin-Yang. and male, of the and pervasive. and aggression. In terms
It is interesting This
theories in the light of his principle seems to be an adaptation Chinese philosophical they ancient of
of unity of opposites.
Briefly, the Yin and the Yang are elemental opposite polarities, represent is endless. dark and light, Their reciprocal dialectic, cold and heat, interaction recession
female
from ~vhich the synthesis is derived, An important concealed weakness, of minutes. within strength. of the Yin-Yang there is weakness, and within that they
It is a weakness of guerrillas
operate in small groups that can be wiped out in a matter But because they do operate in small groups, rear they can move rapidly and sec~etly into the vulnerable of the enemy. In conventional struction; tactics, dispersion
in guerrilla
to confuse the enemy and to preserve guerrillas are ubiquitous. It is often a disadvantage
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
but the very fact of having recently tied conventional tracks. The guerrilla
to transport columns to
travels fast. He turns the hazards of terrain to his advantage and makes an ally of tropical rains, heavy snow, intense heat, and freezing and dangerous, an unsuspecting found. The cold, Long night marches are difficult to but the darkness enemy. disadvantage, is equally some advantage true: In each The
Yin
shields
his approach
is to be apparent is not
wholly Yin, nor the Yang wholly Yang. It is only the wise general, said the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, who is able to recognize dlis fact and to turn it to good account. Guerrilla Chinese tactical doctrine pronounced may be summarized
Sheng
Tung,
in four
Chi
characters
Hsi,
[in the] East; Strike [in the] West. the all-important principles of dison the other; to
Here we find expressed fix the enemys attention least anticipates Guerrillas
simulation; they create pretenses and simultaneously guise or conceal their true semblance. Their tactical cepts, dynamic pattern.
ltv
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Historical experience is written in blood and iron.
T
movements content taneity; guerrilla
HE FUNDAMENTALDIFFERENCEbetween patriotic partisan is that resistance and revolutionary gtlerrilla the first usually lacks the ideological of spon-
that always distinguishes is characterized is organized it begins and then movement is rarely
the second. by the quality and then begins. and terminates when movement terminates A revolutionary
A resistance
is organized.
liquidated
the invader is ejected; a revolutionary it has succeeded or is liquidated. experience suggests that
in displacing there
a revolutionary guerrilla movement the first phase and has acquired the
segment of the popu-
support of a significant
segment
will vary; a
decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent. In addition port, such factors as terrain; program and popular supthe quality communications; 27
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warj%re
of the opposing
leadership;
the presence
or absence
of
material help, technical aid, advisers, or volunteers from outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent government movement are naturally relevant to the ability of a situations will to survive and expand. guerrilla for example,
suggested during the latter period of its first phase, a rough expectation of survival and growth might have looked something like Figure I. Had an impartial analyst applied such criteria to Vietnam six to eight months before the final debacle, he might have produced a chart somewhat like Figure H. Here Determinants guerrillas, in balance. superior tuary. Two others, tactical A, B, H, and I definitely Castro) favored the who also (unlike Although ability the had an available sanchad demonstrated an experi-
enced observer might have been justified in considering military efficiency equal; the French were learning. While other determinants may no doubt be adduced, those used are, I believe, valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative. These show that Castros chances of success might have been estimated These analyses may be criticized ated after the even~ outcome
28
three
in Cuba
and Indochina
la
Introductwn dieted emerged Phase I. At the present the development restricted week: +
PENTAGONA
new and fiendishly ingenious antiguerrilla weapon is being tested by the Navy. Its a delayedaction liquid explosive, squirted from a flame-thrower-like gun, that seeps into foxholes and bunkers. Seconds later, fed by oxygen from the air, it blows up with terrific force.
some time
before
the
respective
movements
had
and consolidation
\s being devoted
to
of this in News-
approach
that
guerrillas
will
confox-
identifiable guns
and retire to the nearest of%cers club. To anyremotely the philosophy war, this sort of thing is panaceas. operabe and sur-
of revolutionary funny.
not hilariously
are no mechanical
I do not mean to suggest that proper weapons and equiPment will not play an important made to improve cally reduced communication, there part in antiguerrilla food, medical, tions, for of course they will. Constant gical packs. Weapons in weight; and ammunition efforts should
31
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
ing a maximum
And the search for new and effective weapons must continue. But we must realize that flame-thrower-like guns and bullets challenging are only a very small part of the answer and complex problem. in a revolutionary and scope of the has become matter; would of reto a
The position of active third parties guerrilla war and the timing, nature, assistance sponsibility however, given great importance, Basically,
this is a political
for a decision
devolve upon the head of state. Any assistance given should, stop short of participation be restricted training. of aid is often critical. If extended to the aid must be given while it is still the movement; if to the during the is vulnerof life and operain combat. of a third party should and technical The possible timing incumbent revolutionary to advice, materials,
government,
same critical period, that is, when the movement able and its existence death.
From a purely military point of view, antiguerrilla and eradication. In the brief definitions
tions may be summed up in three words: location, isolation, of each term, it are not terrain and possePawill be well to bear in mind rigidly compartmented.
Location
involves
Introductwn ration of guerrillas from their sources of information movement and resettlement reliable fl~xibility and presupposes and
Eradication
extreme
operational
degree of mobility.
Parachutists
and helicopter-borne
troops are essential. must be used against effort must be made the guerto induce They must be constantly Every harried and con-
The best source of informaand bold speci~c leadership qualities is absoin mind. under different ineffective
tion of the enemy is men who know the enemy situation. Imaginative, lutely essential. must
Co7nrnanJers and leaders at every echelon
be selected
these
Officers and NCOS who are more than competent normal conditions when confronted situations Finally, will frequently with of guerrilla be hopelessly and totally warfare. of whether the dynamic
characteristic
on destruction that
in the same medium? convinced White history they rilla war is impossible. Russians (which valid criteria, occupation
cannot,
he is correct.
that under
circumstances,
Mao Tse-tung gests the need for a careful factors in each individual Mao Tse-tung considered predictable. contends
analysis of relevant
situation. that the phenomena (and I believe them. about we have it is or, if guer-
are subject
If he is correct
And if historical
teaches us anything
34
TRANSLATORS NOTE ,
I
warfare. pattern
the undeclared
will enter
which
Communist Red
of the Fourth
Army, is no novice in the art of war. Actual battle experience with both regular him as an expert. The influence of the ancient thought military philosopher Sun Tzu on Maos military will be apparent to those and guerrilla troops has qualified
who have read The Book of WaT-. Sun Tzu wrote that speed, surprise, and deception were the primary essentials of the attack and his succinct
Hsi (Uproar
less valid today than it was when he wrote it 2,400 years ago. The tactics of Sun TZL1 are in large measure tics of Chinas guerrillas today.
37
the tac-
Mao Tse+ung
on Guwrdla
Warfare
Mao
says that
unlimited
guerrilla
warfare,
with
vast
time and space factors, established This seems a true statement torical ganized examples of guerrilla from the military, nothing
a new military
of view as those in China. as yet encountered strictly limited guerrilla I have tried to present as the Chinese language dium for the expression
Corps have
war. Thus,
the transla-
tion of some of the modern idioms not yet to be found in available dictionaries is probably arguable. I cannot vouch for the accuracy the liberty purely repetitious. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH Captain,
Quantico,
of retranslated
quotations.
USMC
Virginia
1940
38
A FURTHER NOTE
Yu Chi Cbz
years ago, but I see no need to amplify it. is frequently essays entitled
War),
confused
Ti (Strategic
in an English version in 1952 by the Peoples Publishing IHousc, Peking. There are some similarities in these two works. I had hoped to locate a copy of Yu Chi Chan in the Chinese to check my translation so. Some improvement from the Chinese. standard Japan; English but have been unable to do with is always possible in any rendering
I have not been able to identify titles all the works cited by Mao. there are, naturally, Maos fundamental moment numerous thesis.
Mao wrote YZJChi Chan during Chinas struggle against consequently referThese For inences to the strategy to be used against the Japanese. in no way invalidate stance, when resistance of ultimate dissociates victory Mao writes, The
itself from the masses of the people that it dissociates Japanese, over the
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
Kai-shek.
However,
time both sides were attempting to preserve the of a united front. Our basic policy, he said, is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front. Party then, or at any other time. Its basic policy guerrilla by Mao was the basic weapon in the pro-
This was, of course, not the basic policy of the Chinese Communist was to seize state power; the type of revolutionary war described tracted and ultimately
successful process of doing so. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.)
Mount
]Z@,
Vernon,
1961
Maine
40
n
WHAT IS GUERRILLA WARFARE?
I
stances, natural. dented
N A WAR OF REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER,@lerri]]a operations are a necessary China part. This is particuof a people a nation
larly true in a war waged for the emancipation who inhabit a vast nation. whose techniques and victorious characterized This are undeveloped imperialism.
tions are poor. She finds herself Japanese the development warfare
armies. If we fail to do this, we will find it operations must not be considered struggle. as an They
difficult to defeat the enemy. guerrilla independent form of warfare. result They are but one step in the oppressor of their at a time
Revolution,
total war, one aspect of the revolutionary are the inevitable and oppressed extdurance. Japanese said: when the latter reach
a peoples
are not only natural operations cause they, themselves Guerrilla lacking
as but one aspect of our total or mass war beof independence, and objectives incapable of providing warfare has qualities may employ When a solution to the struggle. peculiar
itself. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment gressor nation. against a more powerful pierces deep her territory in general the invader into the
heart of the weaker country a cruel and oppressive manner, ditions of terrain, climate,
obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage those who oppose him. In guerrilla advantages enemy. During develop the progress into orthodox of hostilities, guerrillas to the purpose warfare, of resisting and defeating
we turn these
gradually
in conjunction
with other units of the regular army. Thus the regularly organized troops, those guerrillas who have attained that status, and those who have not reached velopment revolutionary war. There that level of decombine to form the military power of a national can be no doubt that the ultimate and in its method of application, distinctive of guerrilla resistance characteristics. warfare We to national must have a political
result of this will be victory. Both in its development guerrilla policy. country first discuss the relationship Because warfare has certain ours is the
of a semicolonial
against an imperialism,
our hostilities
united
anti-Japanese
in order emancipa-
to gain our political goal, which is the complete tion of the Chinese steps necessary in the realization 1. Arousing 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. There and Achieving Establishing Equipping Recovering Destroying Regaining and organizing internal bases. forces. national strength. strength. enemys national lost territories. guerrilla accord warfare with
unification
separately antiof of
action who say, as does Jen Chi Shari, The one. Those who maintain
this simple
view have lost sight of the political effects of guerrilla defeat. What is the relationship a political cause the people to lose confidence
goal and the political and will result in our warfare warfare to the peomust fail,
as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the of the people and their syrnpath y, cooperation, be gained. The essence of guerrilla On the other 43 in character. and assistance cannot
is thus revolutionary
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
nature,
guerrilla
basically derives from the masses and is supported it can neither their sympathies not comprehend not understand guerrilla on guerrilla action, nificant Shari). have exist nor flourish and cooperation, guerrilla say: action, Only There the distinguishing if it separates There and regular who
war, who
troops
operations. say:
type of operation
there is no place for the masses of the people there are those who ridicule by wildly asserting of the war undermine Ching, resistance that
of resistance
The moment
dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment victory What that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate for guerrilla warfare? Though over the Japanese. is the organization bands that spring from the masses of the peoat the time of their
all guerrilla
formation, they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units, Such units may originate locally, in the masses of the people; from an admixture people, 44 of regular they may be formed groups of the intact. army units troops with
Warfare)
may consist of a squad of a few men, a battalion men, or a regiment All these must have leaders who are unyielding policiesIesolute, must loyal, sincere, be well educated in revolutionary
technique,
-confident, able to establish cope with counterpropaganda. be models for the people. leaders will gradually strengthening Thus eventual Unorganized of banditry of guerrilla Chi Shari), repute, indulge
severe discipline,
at first prevails; they will estabhsh discipline them and increasing guerrilla warfare victory will be attained. cannot
in their forces,
tory and those who attack the movement and anarchism action. They hoping militarists,
for disappointed
and bandits
We do not deny that there are corrupt in unlawful activities. that Neither might
nor that there are people who under the movement of organization, were we to judge and temporary study the corrupt has at the present symptoms guerrilla phenomena
the guise of guerrillas do we deny that of a lack be serious We should to eradicate and to inis indeed
time symptoms
we have mentioned.
phenomena efficiency.
cannot
be solved immedi45
during the course of the war. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. Evil does not exist in guerrilla undisciplined
On Guerrilla
warfare
and in
What
is basic guerrilla
of the people. to come from the west; avoid the solid, withdraw; When deliver a lightning engage a harass guerrillas
from the east and attacking the hollow; enemy, blow, seek a lightning
decision.
they withdraw
when he advances;
him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemys rear, flanks, and other vulnerable and there hausted he must be harassed, Only and annihilated. spots are his vital points, attacked, dispersed, exin this way can guerrillas guerrilla there action and can be no armies. But, in of command. we have men-
carry out their mission of independent coordination victory Guerrilla spite of the most complete if mistakes warfare preparation,
with the effort of the regular are made in the matter based on the principles
46
Warfare)
is based on the masses of the people does not in that the organization units in a war of counterrevolutionary the Russian Revolution; against character.
examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla tilities during in China; of the Abyssinians the Italians
past three years; those of the last seven years in Manchuria, and the vast anti-Japanese in China guerrilla war that is carried today. All these struggles have been carried on in manpower, and all have development. policy.
the interests of the whole people or the greater part of them; all had a broad basis in the national been in accord with the laws of historical
They have existed and will continue The second type of guerrilla the law of historical units organized by the Japanese; churia here cite the examples furnished by Denikin
to exist, flourish, and to national directly contradicts Russian guerrilla those organized in Abys-
those organized
by the Italians
by the puppet governments in Manand Mongolia, and those that will be organized traitors. All such have oppressed the to the true interests of the They are easy to in the people. 47
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
If we fail to differentiate rills hostilities arrive guerrilla might mentioned, ate their effect when
between
it is likely that we will exaggerby an invader. the invader that can organize warfare.
applied
units from among the people. Such a conclusion our confidence in guerrilla
As far as this matter is concerned, we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles. Further, we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely class type. In the former case, the whole people of a nation, carry on a guerrilla national without regard to class or party, of the than the much broader struggle that is an instrument
is the basis of a struggle of class type. Of a general guerrilla war, it has been organizing extent guerrilla a nation is invaded, people become sympathetic guerrillas to one another and all aid in to what the
are developed,
(Civil
same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners feature perhaps lutionary of internal necessitates of internal
War
in Russia).
of guerrilla purity.
warfare One
in a civil struggle
class may be easily united in a national class groups. units are faced with
the problem
WPresumably, Mao refers here to Lessons of Civil War, by S. I. Gusev; first published in 1918 by the Staff Armed Forces, Ukraine; revised in 1921 and published by GIZ, Moscow; reprinted in 1958 by the Military Publishing House, Moscow.-S.B.G.
48
similar
in that
they both
employ
the
same military methods. National guerrilla warfare, though historically of the same consistency, has employed varying implements as times, peoples, and conditions of the Opium War, since the Mukden ducted Spanish by the incident, Moroccans These differ. The guerrilla and those employed The guerrilla the against French aspects in China conthe and those of the fighting in Manchuria warfare
was not exactly similar to that which we conduct differences express the characterAlthough fact we Wars in of all these peoples in different periods.
similarity
have
independent
W ar-
and, therefore,
every period
in On Guerrilla
the conditions
and the political ideas that obtained, the national characteristics, customs, and degree of civilization. It is necessary formulas to be completely unsympathetic to and rules and to study with and economic aspirations. sympathy situations These
realization changes
we fail to apply
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
War-fare
truths of revolutionary error of believing impact of Japans has lost its historical olden days, guerrilla with
guerrilla Tou
war, we will fall into the Hsi Sheng army, the that under the unit % guerrilla
strategy
but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today. These opinions are harmful. of the characteristics rived placing national peculiar war, but insist on applying from past history, our hostilities guerrilla struggles. If we do not make an estimate to our anti-Japanese to it mechanical guerrilla deof formulas the mistake
we are making
as all other
If we hold this view, we wilI a stone wall and we hostilities. war of resistance war, which, atof and the extent strength, the decision,
tacks the enemy in every quarter, assists our regular pure expression military separable strength
area under his control, increases our national ments used to inflict defeat organized on our enemy.
instru-
of anti-JaPanese
50
2
THE RELATION OF GUERRILLA HOSTILITIES OPERATIONS TO REGULAR
T
organization, matter JVhen
hostilities,
that is, the war of position and the war of movefrom guerrilla warfare. There differences such as those in supply, tactics, com-
ment, differ fundamentally are other readily apparent armament, mand; in conception of military considered
equipment,
of the terms front and (rear; in the responsibilities. from the point of view of total numcombat units, of several score of organ-
bers, guerrilla
they may vary in size from the smallest, or several hundred several thousand.
or the regiment,
ized units. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other depends guerrilla groups, units. As a result of this, organization In the case of is of a low primarily largely upon local circumstances. of equipment
the standard
Mao Tse+ung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
The
strategy
of guerrilla in orthodox
warfare operations,
is manifestly
unlike There is
that employed
of the former is constant is nothing characterizes formation situation opment There comparable orthodox
in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle; there to the fixed, passive defense war. In guerrilla general general war. also in the matter of leadership warfare, into a positional features deployment, that the transdefensive and develare
of reconnais-
and command. In guerrilla warfare, small units acting independently play the principal role, and there must be no excessive interference with their activities. but In orthodox warfare, particularly of initiative command highest all supporting in a moving situation, subordinates, a certain degree in principle, to the guerrilla Stratewith those
is accorded
is centralized.
This is done because all units and must coordinate warfare, adjacent Only this is not
only undesirable
units can coordinate of the regular with adjacent strictures units. When
to any degree.
gically, their activities can be roughly correlated forces, and tactically, units of the regular by the quality
rily characterized
be remembered, 52
Warfare}
primary
themselves have no rear. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10,000-mile* of certain march of the Red Army or as in the case in Shansi Piovince), it cannot can. units operating
operate as guerrillas
As to the matter of military responsibilities, those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy; to harass and weaken communication; independent large forces; to attack enemy bases capable lines of to establish operations of supporting all these battle
in the enemys rear; to force the and to coordinate armies on distant of differences warfare,
enemy to disperse his strength; fronts. From the foregoing between guerrilla seen that it is improper the Eighth campaign summary
warfare
tinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. While Route Army is a regular army, its North is essentially guerrilla in nature, Eighth China Route for it operates forces to of orthoat Ping
in the enemys rear. On occasion, however, Army commanders dox mobile Hsing warfare have concentrated were evident
powerful
strike an enemy in motion, and the characteristics in the battle Kuan and in other engagements.
On the other hand, after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, the operations of Central Shansi, and Suiyuan, troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. In this connection,
* It has been estimated that the Reds actually marched about 6,000 miles. Sea Introduction, Chapter 11.S.B.G.
53
Mao Tse-tung
on Gu-mills
Warfare
the precise out guerrilla temporary identity necessary orthodox temporarily Likewise, gradually
Chiangs
instruccarry their
brigades units
would retained
In spite of such
and after the fall of Feng Ling Tu, they not only lines but often found it of the fact that in the situation, may to do so. This armies may, function guerrilla develop is an example to changes formed units
as such, employ the tactics of orthodox these units function innumerable gnats, which,
as a group
devils, and as they grow and attain practically guerrilla While operations, to Imperial perishing. activities Japan. to confuse
proportions, that
they will find that their victim is not only exhausted It is for this very reason are a source of constant orthodox mental
it is improper
with guerrilla
it is equally improper
to consider that there is a do exist, similarand this fact must be clearly the relationship as a warfare and with the minimize
ities appear under certain conditions, if we wish to establish or if we confuse of orthodox the function
mobile operations
Yu Chi Chan (Guen-illu Warfare) that of the regular armies. If we agree with warfare
to emancipate
Chang
Tso war
is the primary
itself,
or with
Kao Kang, who believes that Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppn?ssed people, we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla operations hostilities. What these zealous friends niche, we cannot I have just quoted them do not realize is into their proper Then, not of our responand that
this: If we do not fit guerrilla promote only would mine those who oppose would
realistically,
sllo~lld properly be carried out by orthodox forces. In the meantime, the important guerrilla function of coordinating activities only with the regular were forces would applied, be neglected. warfare regular in purpose, is our forces and the Furthermore, strategy if the theory that guerrilla actually we would be divided would decline.
would be weakened, guerrilla hostilities form the regular our first reliance
If we say, Let us transand do not place expect to see as war of resistance. from those of the warits to end beyond
on a victory to be gained by the regular of the anti-Japanese can be divorced from beginning
armies over the enemy, a result the failure The concept that guerrilla regular
forces is incorrect.
specific conditions,
Mao Tse-tung
on Gawrrilla Warfare An opinion that admits of such war. guerby and pracneces-
and assume orthodox characteristics. the existence Equally the purely of guerrilla
does not properly estimate the potentialities dangerous orthodox. is the concept This opinion corrupt their rilla war on the ground
that war has no other aspects than expressed phenomena behind which of some certain
those who have seen the guerrilla regimes, observed have seen them persons have indulged
tices. These people will not admit the fundamental sity for guerrilla
They say, Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations, This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the peoples guerrilla war. A proper tween essential. operations ticularly conception effort of the relationship and that of the that exists beregular forces is guerrilla during insofar
We believe it can be stated this way: Guerrilla the anti-Japanese become as the enemys war may for a certain feature, parHowbecause its paramount
ever, if we view the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that our regular Guerrilla decision. operate both conditions, respective 56 warfare Orthodox as guerrillas, develop forces are of primary it is they who are alone capable of producing assists them in producing forces and may under the latter regular may, certain the decision. this favorable conditions certain own However, their under
guerrilla
forces and
development
Warfar-e)
To clarify the relationship orthodox agreement war and guerrilla With guerrilla
between
must be mobility. times combine sisted by general battlefield that this situation such combination
Both ~f these are asIt is true that on the positional; it is equally evident it is true true that after the For
of equipment
in a general strategical
counterattack
to recapture
it would be normal
to use Loth mobile and positional methods. However, the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement. cannot arrive at the victorious while we must promote solution guerrilla If we deny this, we of the war. In sum, as a necessary we must neither as conducted by
warfare
strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations, assign it the primary orthodox forces. position stitute it for mobile and positional warfare
57
3
GUERRILLA WARFARE IN HISTORY
G
ihe
a product
of
earliest
fought by every class of men against invaders sors. Under The difference, many guerrilla wars in history characteristics,
their peculiar
of those whose blood was shed in them. wars waged hostilities But by the peasants that
a pity it is that the priceless experience cannot be marshaled today to guide has been that
from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialisms. experience help the fighting Chinese rilla warfare and should ,ultimate victory. 1812, the Frenchman all of Europe, totaling several Napoleon, hundred in the thousand Russia was invaded Russia at the ln September, recognize the necessity for guerconfirm them in confidence of
and artillery.
At that time,
Warfare)
The
operations.
sians formed nine guerrilla men each. These, carried French on partisan Army. When with warfare
Army was withdrawing, blocked the way and, carried out counterthem. anand defeating
The army of the heroic Napoleon nihilated, and the guerrillas cannon, and rifles. Though various factors, and depended army, the function the regular extremely country
captured many officers, men, the victory was the result of largely on the activities of of the partisan groups was
important. The corrupt and poorly organized that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army and won the war guerrilla groups her ability to organize
led by the most famous soldier of Europe in spite of the fact that were hindered ment regimes was not fully developed. in their operations and arms was insufficient.
At times, guerrilla
and the supply of equiPIf we use the Russian the fist and the
From 1918 to 1920, the Russian Soviets, because of the opposition internal to organize and intervention themselves of foreign imperialisms territories and the disturbances of White Russian groups, were forced and fight a in the rear of the army 59
in occupied
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
were many Red Russian guerrillas. These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemys rear but also frequently occasion, White the guerrillas prevented completely his advance. destroyed been defeated On one by regular a retreating
Red forces. Kolchak, Denikin, the Japanese, and the Poles, owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas, were front. Thus poverished ever-moving The reached several forced to withdraw was the
(The
troops
from
the im-
manpower
development thousands
into propaganda
groups known as silver-haired units; there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle aged; the young men formed combat units, and there were even groups children. These, guerrilla demned secondary Among the leaders were determined on general they political opposed work among
the
for the
who carried
although warfare,
doctrine
to oppose
it. Experience
the fundamental
to them and assist in the accomplishment Many of the guerrilla until in battle
forces (Lessons of the Civil regimes in Russia they were able to dis-
gradually
developed
See p. 48 n.S.B.G. 60
Warfare)
regulars.
The
army of the
seven months in 1935 and 1936, the Abyssinians political reasons that there were disparty, and of the
lost their war against Italy. The cause of defeataside the most important sentient unstable war political groups, There with no strong government
to adopt a positive policy guerrilla a purely operations. passive deto defeat the is a was con-
the AbYssinians
fense, with the result that they were unable In addition Even small and sparsely populated
Army and its equipment to withstand seven months. scale guerrilla Moreover, ing 140,000 During operations
a mechanized
force of 400,000
that period, there were several occawas combined with largetotalsteadto strike the Italians heavy blows. and casualties been Had this policy
it would have been difhcult to have named At the present time, guerrilla and if the internal an extension of such activities quesis political
in Abyssinia,
activities
In 1841 and 1842, when brave people from San Yuan Li fought Taiping Uprising, the English; War, guerrilla again from 1850 to 1864, during tactics were employed the and for a third time in 1899, in the Boxer to a remarkable 61
Mao Tse-twzg on Guerrilla degree. when Ching Particularly guerrilla was this so during were
operations
to flee for their lives. In these wars, there were no guiding rilla action. Perhaps these guerrilla with regular carried out in conjunction victory guerrilla was not gained
in both political and military affairs, and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity, guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory. From 1927 to 1936, the Chinese most continually At the very and employed beginning, a positive Red Army fought policy alguerrilla tactics constantly. was adopted. bands, the As these over
Many bases were established, Reds were able to develop armies fought, new guerrilla regimes a wide area. These those of the regular
many victories gained by guerrilla troops relatively few in number, who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. combined guerrilla both strategically The leaders of that They period properly primarily operations and tactically. with a war of movement depended
upon alertness. They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs and military operations. They developed 62
Warfare)
units.
They
then deterwhich
upon a ten-year
during
Japanese war. There is no doubt thatthe internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact and that the experience gained during our internal imperialism. struggles to us are There has proved many to be both necessary against Japanese and advantageous
who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. SLlcb leaders must work with the people; they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy. After September 18, 1931, strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three northeast provinces. cruelties Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the at the exand deceits practiced by the Japanese
pense of the people, and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven periods. exploded years, The struggle can be divided guerrilla Ma Chan Salvation irito two activity Shari Army During the first, which extended 1933, anti-Japanese in all three provinces. from September
and Ssu Ping Wei established Heilungkiang. Li Tu and the Self-Defense respectively.
an anti-Japanese
regime ,in
Warfare
guerrilla They
units.
The
of these forces unceasingly, but goal, improper commancl and army, the
harassed
the Japanese
because there was an indefinite leadership, failure to coordinate operations to delegate whole unified. enemy. During January, improved. cided Chinese finally warfare, portant guerrilla the second period, proper political result
and to work with the people, and, finally, failure functions to the was feeble, and its strength was not the camby our from of
organization As a direct
of these conditions,
paigns failed and the troops were finally defeated which has extended
This has come about because great numbers because of the participation units. The guerrillas
in the anti-Japanese
of the fine work of the volunteer the people and in the northeast, and powerful regiments
influence.
units hamper
the Japanese
their control in the northeast, a Nationalist are not merely of transient contribute kIowever, National 64 to our ultimate
revolution victory.
participation organization
of the people is not general; internal political is still in its primary stages, and the force the Japanese and the puppet policy governments is continued ExperiBut if present
will be overcome.
war will develop to even greater they have devised to cheat the
and that, in spite of the cruelty of the Japanese extinguish provinces. experiences such of China and of other counnatural and prove that in a war of revoluare possible, if the present anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in the
they cannot
hostilities
war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory, such hostilities must expand tremendously. experience is written in iron and blood. We campaigns being waged Historical in China present
today are a page in history that has no precedent. will not be confined solely to China in her war but will be world-wide, anti-Japanese
65
4
CAN VICTORY BE ATTAINED BY GUERRILLA OPERATIONS?
the war of resistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation of all elements The of our own strength particulars of such a comparison and are comparison with those
one phase
of
several, First, the strong Japanese During she had made comparative production
the course of her invasion of China, progress and in the development of excellence monarchy her raw
and skill in her army, navy, and air force. But in spite of this industrial progress, she remains endowments. an absolute of inferior physical Her manpower,
materials, and her financial and insufficient to maintain to meet the situation a vast area. manifested Added
resources are all inadequate her in protracted warfare or by a war prosecuted feeling over now
presented
by the Japanese people, a feeling that is shared by the soldiers is not Japans army. Furthermore, China
YIJ Chi Chan (Guerrilla only enemy. Japan is unable in the attack on China; in excess of that number opponents. be victorious area. Their speedy tions, the invading strategy Japanese must
Warfare) to employ her entire strength at most, spare more as she must hold any other possible considerato a vast primary
she cannot,
decision.
years, it will be most difficult for Japan the strain. In the war, the Japanese lines of communication routes for the transport portant considerations and peaceful brigands
for her are that her rear be stable to wage war over a vast She cannot of places, and
and that her lines of communication lines of communication. and fight in a number
tact. It is not to her advantage area with disrupted disperse her strength her greatest ruption powerful organized manpower advantage
in her rear and disIf she can maintain points to engage important them our Japa-
communications,
units in decisive battle. Another in captured areas and with strength. Certainly,
it is not to her
sipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. It is for these reasons 67
on Guerrilla
Warfare
the Japanese bandits. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhwei has absolutely China country backward. country facilities a country established is a country that This the truth of this assertion. half colonial and half feudal; and conclusion. it is a
is politically,
militarily,
war; they all favor the application The establishment the anti-Japanese bases behind
enemys places
lines will force him to fight unceasingly expends people; his resources.
in many
at once, both to his front and his rear. He thus endlessly We must unite the strength we must strike of the army with that of the spots in the enemys of of
the weak
flanks, in his front, in his rear. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal his strength. change Thus will become of his forces and dissipation in the relative position the time will come when evident a gradual
ourselves and our enemy, and when that day comes, it will be the beginning Although The 68 of our ultimate victory over the Japanese. is great, it is unorganized. invaded our country not
Warfare] but to carry out the violent, policy of their government, regard to race. For this comwithout
rapacious, pelling
murderous
of the Chinese
we must unite
the nation
to parties or classes and follow our policy of resistance the end. China Abyssinia. China
today is not the China of old. It is not like today is at the point of her greatest hisof Communists strengthened and
torical progless. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised; the rapprochement Nationalists war front has laid the foundation that is constantly being for an anti-Japanese and ex-
army, and people are all working with resources and the economic nation. are waiting to be used; the unor toward the goal of pro-
an organized
tracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it, we shall still gain final victory. iNot only must those behind in every part of the country. Japanese as fathers oath that have taken our lines organize The for resistterritory those who to abject ance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied are few in number, they would prefer and death
slavery arc many. If wc resist with this spirit, what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours? The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivi-
lized lines. For that reason, Japanese of all classes oppose tllc po]icics of their governnlent, as do vast international 69
Mao Tse+.wzg on Guerrilla Warfare groups. On the other hand, because Chinas cause is righteous, our countrymen countries, win. The progress Chinese people guerrilla of the war for the emancipation of the will be in accord with these facts. The will be in accord correlated with these of operations with those of to guerincluding of all classes and parties are united. in many foreign the even Japan itself. This is perhaps to oppose the invader; we have sympathy most important
war of resistance
70
F
1. 2. 4. These How 3. What What
OUR POINTS MUST BE CONSIDERED under subject. These are: bands formed? of arming guerrillfi band?
thk
are guerrilla
me the methods
of
armed guerrilla
those who
have had no experience stand and on which indeed, How The ways: they would
GUERRILLA UNITS ARE ORIGINALLY FORMED unit may originate in any one of the following
a) From the masses of the people. b) From regular army units temporarily purpose. c) From regular army units permanently detailed for the
detailed, 71
Mao Tse+urzg on Guerrilla d) From the combination unit recruited f) e) From the local militia. From deserters of a regular
Warfare
from the people. from the ranks of the enemy. and bandit groups.
no doubt, all these sources will be unit is formed from the people, assemble the
In the first case above, the guerrilla the people. This is the fundamental of the enemy most valorous their leaders call upon elements, them
army to oppress and slaughter to resist. They arm them the nation
with old rifles or bird that call upon the peoand for and aid In some or the call many of a among approve
guns, and thus a gtterrilla unit begins. Orders have already been issued throughout ple to form guerrilla other such where combat. movements, units both for local defense cannot fail to prosper. leaders
If the local governments they the local government all fled, the on the sympathy
and their
sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country) the people to resist, and they respond. units are organized. teachers, men, blood. Shantung, In circumstances usually Thus, guerrilla
the duties of leadership young students, soldiery, last drop Chahar, 72 fixed profession, Suiyuan, professional of their
fall upon the shoulders other educators, and those without in Shansi, Anhwei,
Warfare)
and
other
provinces,
extensive
guerrilla
hostilities
have
broken
The amount
of such activity is the best proof of the foreThe more such bands there are, the better be. Each district, each county, of guerrilla should be squads, which, or, I am a arts. You that between
when assembled, form a guerrilla company. There are those who say: I am a farmer, student; the farmer I can discuss literature There This is incorrect. is no profound
and the soldier. You must have courage. and if you have education,
simply leave your farms and become soldiers. That you are farmers is of no difference, is so much the better. When military units. hostilities are the university times valiantly of war, and after and aggressively, several you take your arms in hand, you become
you may become a leader of troops, and there will be many regular question, soldiers who will not be your peers. of guerrilla warfi~re units the fountainhead
is in the masses of the people, who organize guerrilla from themselves. The second type of guerrilla ized from small detached commenced, guerrilla units
of the regular forces temporarily for the purpose. For example, since hostilities many groups have been temporarily A regiment warrant, of the regular detached
from armies, divisions, and brigades and have been assigned duties. army may, if for the 73 circumstances be dispersed into groups
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla operations.
Warfare
puTose Excluding
of carrying
on guerrilla
As an example China.
of this, there is the Eighth as an army, it is divided on guerrilla coordination hostilities. of guerrilla
the periods when it carries on mobile operations into its elements and these carry unit is essensituations, the operations This type of guerrilla activities
tial for two reasons. First, in mobile-warfare is necessary. Second, until guerrilla missions but regulars. regular of guerrilla of regular Historical hostilities
with regular
oped on a grand scale, there is no one to carry out guerrilla experience army units are not able to undergo campaigning units engaged over long periods. in guerrilla
operations
extremely adaptable. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. They must understand that initiative, discipline, and the employment of stratagems are all of the units utmost importance. is but temporary, to the organization after the departure As the guerrilla status of regular
their leaders must lend all possible support of guerrilla units from among the people. that they hold together of reguof the regulars. assigned guerrilla duties.. This
The third type of unit consists of a detachment lars who are permanently
type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy, and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organizathe borders of tion, we may take the Wu Tai Shari district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi these provinces, 74 area. Along units from the Eighth Route Army have
Warfare)
for guerrilla
operations.
Around
these small cores, many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. In areas in which of supply, cannot withdraw there is a possibility this system should of cutting be us?d. the enemys lines Severing enemy that forces
supply routes destroys his life line; this is one feature be neglected. conduct If, at the time guerrilla the regular from a certain
area, some units are left behind, operations operations in the enemys in the Shanghaiof regular forces.
rear, As an example of this, we have the guerrilla bands now their independent area in spite of the withdrawal
The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units. The regular or a company, guerrilla commander. forces may dispatch a squad, a platoon, in miliwhich is placed at the disposal of the local If a small group experienced affairs is sent, it becomes the core of the applied, the intensity of guerrilla warfare
tary and political local guerrilla and if properly can be extended. methods militia,
unit. These several methods are all excellent, In the Wu Tai Shari area, each of these above is formed from the local home guards. In every North
China province, there are now many of these groups, and they should be formed in every locality. The government has issued a mandate to depart county, to the effect that the people are not from war areas. The officer in command of the the commander of the peace-preservation unit, the to obey this mandate. They 75
on Guerrilla
Warfare at their
The sixth type of unit is that organized come over from the enemythe employed disaffection ganda by the Japanese. and foment
efforts
Immediately after mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained, built politically and reorganized been accomplished, and the units reOnce this has units. guerrilla militarily.
In regard to this type of unit, it may be said that political work among them is of the utmost importance. The seventh type of guerrilla from bands of bandits organization This, is that formed although difand brigands.
ficult, must be carried out with utmost vigor lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantage. pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas, correct their political beliefs to convert In spite of inescapable types of guerrilla great mountain a vast sea of guerrillas. differences Many bandit groups to them. in the fundamental said, Tai Shari is a and it is only necessary
bands, it is possible to unite them to form The ancients because it does not scorn the merest handAttention paid to the enlistof guerrilla that
ful of dirt; the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams. ment and organization every source action will increase of guerrillas of every type and from is something
in the anti-Japanese
War-fare]
THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES Many activities of military knowledge, regimes of those who decide do not know to participate in guerrilla For
the methods
of organization.
of organization
that requires solution. Even among those who have military there are some who know nothing they are lacking The subject because in that particular
of specific units the area where we may take a and individual with the sub these, are apcommander Under
all guerrilla
of such
organization,
area in the enemys rear. This area may comIt must be subdivided formed to accord or battalions
and political,
staff, the aides, the supply are controlled with acts in accordance organization, The locally,
officers, and the meclical perby the chief from the commander.
orders
of propaganda
development.
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
these smaller
divisions
within
each
To each
district, a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. Under their direction, military and political headquarters in accordance able. Although correspond functionaries guerrilla harmonize committee with are organized. Tasks are assigned troops availof the number of guerrilla
the names of the officers in the district area, the number assigned in the former case should be reduced to handle and to affairs, a the memsources,
to the least possible. In order to unify control, troops that come from different military operations of from seven to nine members This and local political committee,
should be organ-
bers of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers, should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters. All the people in an area should arm themselves organized bat group, the other a self-defense and be into two groups. One of these groups is a comunit with but limited guerrillas are organized first of these second While type is the unit
is the small unit, the platoon or company. to six units may be organized. the battalion fundamentally than its own,
belongs to the county in wllicb it was organWhile in areas other with local their it must operate in conjunction
of their manpower,
Warfare)
knowledge information
and their
The third type is the guerrilla regiment, which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. If sufhcient manpower is available, a guerrilla brigade of from two to four regiments tion. A squad, leader. the smallest may be formed. of organizaof from unit, has a strength
Each of the units has its own peculiarities nine to eleven men, including rifles, with the remaining manufacture, assistant signed work. such squads form a platoon. leader, a political The platoon and when
Its arms may be from two to five Western-style men armed bi~d guns, spears, or big swords, Two to four This, too, has a leader and an acting independently, it is aspropaganda the
remainder
of its weapons
being bird guns, lances, and big which, and a an assistant leader,
swords. Two to four of such units form a company, like the platoon, political has a leader, ofhcer. All these units are under commanders
vision of the military they operate. The battalion and its personnel from company units entirely
unit must be more thoroughly than the smaller units. not deprive should be superior. If a battalion units, it should
of their manpower
small area, there is a peace-preservation the militia, or police, regular guerrilla dispersed over it.
79
Warfare
The
guerrilla
is the
regiment. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. In an independent guerrilla regiment, there may be ten men per squad, three squads per platoon, three platoons per company, three companies per battalion, and three battalions form a brigade. vice-commander, In North lished. These to the regiment. and a political guerrilla may be regiments Two oficer. of from two to four comare comfrom the are shown of such regiments a Each of these units has a commander, cavalry units should be estab
China,
panies, or battalions. All these units from the lowest to the highest batant guerrilla units and receive their supplies central government. in the tables. * All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defense units, the basis of which is voluntary service. As a first step, they must both military arresting suppression and harass combatant procure arms, then they must Their the be given and political and training. responsibilities of the enemy, of a guerrillaweapons hinder, They assist the Details of their organization
are: local sentry duties, securing information traitors, preventing armed enemy propaganda, When
dissemination
to certain have
self-defense
furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded, carriers to take food to the troops, and comfort missions to provide
See Appendix.S.B.G.
80
Warfare)
the troops with tea and rice. If a locality can organize such a self-defense the people. guerrillas organization unit as we have described, Thus the people the traitors canthe peace of to assist the step in not hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb will continue
to our re~ular armies, (The is a transitional forces. for some time in The youth organizafor the purpose of conscription. Such units are
units
have been of some help. and the confidence organizations was almost These were
the people was thus not gained. widespread, system was, therefore, cooperation
negligible. of
supplanted
organizations, voluntary
localities.
selves, Only in case of military to remote places, and when a weapon even if the weapon
must support them, Each member of these groups must have lance, or a spear, In all places where the enemy operates, these~lf-defense units should or revolvers, locality, 81 organize within themselves a small guerrilla to leave its native group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla self-defense
The puToses
organization of inculcating
of these
tioned in this book because such units are useful the people with military These groups should ical knowledge,
ized not only in the active war zones but in every province The people must be inspired This is extremely 5.+ anti-Japanese to establish military organization a system of military important. to cooperate We must not force them, for if we do, it will be The organization army similar to that we have mentioned
to control
as a whole, it is necessary
areas and districts along the lines we have indicated. The organization of such areas and districts is shown in Table 6. EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS In regard to the problem of guerrilla be understood which ment require is based simple equipment. upon the nature The equipment, standard it must of equipthe
equipment
of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. For example, those who are as-
signed the task of destroying railroads are better-equipped than those who do not have that task. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want, or even what available they need, but must be based on what cannot be furnished is for their use. Equipment
Unfortunately, this table, as well as Table 6, was omitted from the edition of Yu Chi Chan available to me.S.B.G.
82
War(are)
immediately
but must
be acquired
gradually.
These
are
points to be kept in mind. The question ply, distribution, blankets, munition eventually. furnished Other for propaganda is established, with of equipment includes the collection, supand replacement of weapons, ammunition, materials, The supply transport, and facilities and ambe solved big work. but of weapons can bird always guns,
communication
Ievolvers, weapons
swords, and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. elementary are added and as many newAfter a period type rifles as are available 0( resistance, transport successful ment by capturing companies attack, are distributed.
it is possible to increase the supply of equipit from the enemy. we will capture be established hand In this respect, the for in any transport. disare the easiest to equip, the enemys
and repair of rifles and for the grenades, bayonets. too much on an armory. The
enemy is the principal For destruction in enemy-controlled gether demolition preparation must be organized As for minimum one suit of winter
of railway trackage, bridges, and stations materials. Troops must be trained and a demolition in the
requirements,
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
tees, and a blanket. coat. In acquiring captures maintain and rilla made from
Each man must have a haversack this clothing, the enemy, in guerrilla should may we cannot depend
or on for
a bag for food. In the north, each man must have an overfor it is forbidden
forces, all the clothing be furnished stationed confiscate clothing in each guer-
representatives
of the government
from those best able to afford are unnecessary. with from is not necessary in lower up are equipped by contributions
groups, uniforms
groups, but all units from regiment both. This material the regular In the guerrilla forces and by capture
army in general,
ticular, there must be a high standard of medical equipment. Besides the services of the doctors, medicines must be procured. general, Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy supplies, they must, in If Western medicines China for some portion depend are not available, The problem of their medical upon contributions. lccal medicines of transport
than in the south, for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Small guerrilla units need no animals, but regiments manders furnished nature 84 and brigades will find them necessary. Comup should be and staffs of units from companies
have to share a horse. Officers whose duties are of minor do not have to be mounted.
Propaganda guerrilla
materials
Every
large
graph stone. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. They mirst be supplied with chalk and large brushes. In guerrilla areas, there this should be a printing press or a lead-type press. instructions,
For the purpose of printing training material is of the greatest importance. In addition accomplished to the equipment guerrilla to have field glasses, compasses,
listed above, it is necessary and military of guerri]la maps. An these things. hostilities of the National-
Because of the proved importance in the anti-Japanese ist Government with what and tile colnmanding
oLls war zones sl]oLlld do their best to supply the guerrillas they actually I-Iowever, themselves. need and are unable be repeated themselves. equipment guerrillas it must that guerrilla
ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY The term element refers to the personnel, war, entire its officers must loyalty as used in the title to this section both officers and men, of the guergroup fights in a protracted men whose qualibe b~ave and positive
of the people. An officer should have the following ties: great powers of endurance
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
hardship
he sets an example
them; he must be able to mix easily with the people; his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. If he wishes to gain victories, he must study tactics. A guerrilla officers of this caliber would be unbeatable. that every guerrilla of such qualities. group with officers enduring I do not mean
group can have, at its inception, which can be developed The most important
dowed with good qualities the course of campaigning. ity is that of complete cipation. not present, particular habitants civilians. with nothing If this is present,
natural qualif it is
loyalty to the idea of peoples emanthe others will develop; can be done. When officers are first
selected from a group, it is this quality attention. of the locality in which relations In addition,
The officers in a group should be inthe group is organized, them and the local be familiar are not enough between
If in any locality
effort must be made to train and educate the people so these and the potential terial increased. can be no disagreements
officers native to one place and those from other localities. A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight, his social condition but only men bear the hardships war. 86 or position is no consideration, and determined can in a protracted who are courageous of guerrilla
campaigning
missed from the army. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The opium habit must be forbidden, ditioned advantage and a soldier who cannot upon keeping of certain break himself of the habit should be dismissed. It is a fact that during and patriotism the purpose continually and induce of betraying educate Victory in guerrilla the war the enemy war is conmay take for
the membership
people who are lacking in conscience them to join the guerrillas them. Officers must, and inculcate therefore, patriotism and
the soldiers
in them. This will prevent the success of traitors. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered punishment been should and expulsion by them. meted influenced summon and expelled, out to those who have
thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. This procedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor, some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However, the work of eliminating with dleir elimination Chinese nments and bandits traitors in the army begins goverbe from among the people. who have been converted should
or as groups. They should be well But care should be used during those whose idea is to
to distinguish
fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons.
87
(3
THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
political
to be used in attaining that goal. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political that are the life of both the guerrilla tionary warfare. First of all, political trination mitted of both idea of anti-Japanism. activities Through depend them, upon leaders the indocwith the military and political activities armies and of revolu-
Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction, and if it is forgotten, of the enemy war of long duration, become shaken we may succumb to the temptations In a that the peoare likely to to understand or be overcome with discouragements.
revolt. Without
our goal of driving out Japanese ing a free and happy China, viction The political goal must
imperialism
and establishconindiof
and lose their determinant ion. of guerrilla Hence, zones and their national a concrete not only to guerrilla with the realizahas issued a
for
awakened.
the political systems used is important tion of our political pamphlet entitled
War, which should
troops but to all those who are concerned goal. The Sys&nz of National be widely distributed that should
Kuomintang
Organization
throughout
guer-
rilla zones. If we lack national the essential unity and t}le people. A study and comprehension
this war and of the anti-Japanese portan t for officers of guerrilla militarists minded only in the profession militarists exists between is a method
affairs and political affairs are not identical, to isolate one from the other. It is to be hoped pared or are preparing that the world of human
it is impossible
to the oppressed peoples of the world. No matter how long this war may last, there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. The war that we are 89
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
fighting
is a
part of the war for the freedom the independent, A conception militarist plained There sidered to him. are three under the additional broad activities,
of all human
fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. like this is difficult for the simple-minded be carefully must exto grasp and it must therefore matters
that
be conactivities. to
question
of political
destruction of the unity of the enemy. The methods for achieving these unities are discussed in pamphlet
Activities
Number
4 of this series,
Guerrilla
entitled
in Anti-Japanese
Warfare.
A revolutionary
that is estabobedi-
lished on a limited
to their superiors must be exacted. but the basis conscience. is ineffective. must be the individual of compulsion
In any revolutionary army, there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned, and, therefore, within such an army, discipline in guerrilla forces, the necessity is self-imposed. for discipline Although exists. This discipline ranks is not as severe as in the ranks because only when it is, is the soldier
of orthodox
must be self-imposed, 90
Yu Chi (Xan
[Guerrilla
Warfare)
completely
the army, and it is the only type that can that exists between of%cers is externally officer and imposed, man is
discipline
exists between
by indifference
idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal conception feudal type will one and is not in accord with discipline. internal Discipline and unity of a self-imposed destroy of the fighting charof
strength. A discipline self-imposed is the primary acteristic of a democratic system in the army. A secondary liberties accorded characteristic is found officers and soldiers. enjoy political but discussed, the soldiers live under of the emancipation
in the degree
army, all individuals tion, for example, be encouraged. not only be tolerated
liberty
Further,
in such an army, the mode of livtrue in the case of guerrilla the same conditions
their men, for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration war. It is incorrect the hardships the unification both horizontal and confidence so vital in in all to that to hold to a theory of equality of war. Thus
things, ljut there must be equality of existence in accepting and dangers within we may attain of the ofhcer and soldier groups, the group a unity
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
is, from lower to higher unity is present that combat factors. There
echelons.
It is only when
such
units
is also a unity of spirit ihat should exist between The Eighth Route Army put Rules and the a code known as The Three
1. All actions are subject to command. 2. 3. Do not steal from the people. Be neither selfish nor unjust.
Remarks:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.* 2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7, 8. Be courteous. Be honest in your transactions. Return what you borrow. of women. Replace what you break. Do not bathe in the presence Do not without authority search the pocketbooks
of those you arrest. The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.
hlany people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemys rear.
+ In summer, doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds. S.B.G. 92
Warfare)
the
people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? ciplined We troops who make the peo~le further our mission who, like the fish out of its native element, of destroying propagandizing his troops, by treating It is only undisenemies the enemy and by cannot live. soldiers we their
his captured
93
7
THE STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN
I
question example,
T HAs BEEN DEFINI~LY DECIDEDthat in the strategy of our war against Japan, guerrilla orthodox methods. activities of the regular guerrilla strategy must If this were out army and
coLdd be carried
close to the scene of operations directly complementary be no question of guerrilla and able speedily
to them. In such a case, there would strategy as such. Nor woLlld the were as strong as Russia, for to eject an invader. a weak country The quesof vast size, has by the
to the point where it has become possible war characterized such is not actually Although these may at first glance
to adopt the policy of a protracted operations. seem to be abnormal case. Because Japanese the territory garrison functions exterior 94 troops. or heterodox,
of guerrillas
first, to conduct
Warfare)
siderations. its vast time and space factors, Iishes a new military process, the focal point of which
China today. The Japanese are apparently recall a past that saw the Yiian extinguish the Ching conquer of the British as China fantastic equipped the Ming; that witnessed to North Central America Empire
attempting to the Sung and the extension that As far are and India;
today is concerned,
and without reality. Todays China is better than was the China of yesterday, and a new type hostilities is a part of that equipment. of the situation, If our disand makes
of guerrilla too optimistic aster. Though war strategy tilities Each methods
he courts
of guerrillas
is inseparable
from
differs
type of warfare
suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with that confront aspects of guerrilla
success to the special situations Before we treat the practical on which strength. all military A military
action is based. This can be stated: destruction policy based on this axiom is con95
Mao Tse-tung sonant with a national of a free and prosperous of Japanese demanded imperialism. that government
on Guerrilla
Warjare
towards the building of this policy Is the sacrifice are necessary ourselves; the
It is in furtherance
sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. All the considerations from this axiom. Its application and strategical conceptions of military action are derived is as apparent in all tactical as it is in the simple case of
the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position. All guerrilla methods should development listed below: 1. Retention of the initiative; alertness; carefully planned defense; tactical speed on exprotracted; tactical operations units start from nothing we select to ensure of our own strength and grow. What and of
tactical attacks in a war of strategical in a war strategically terior lines in a war conducted 2. Conduct of operations regular 4. army. establishment of bases, A clear understanding 3. The between 6.
of the relationship
that exists
Warfare)
The enemy,
though
numerically
quality of his troops and their equipment; hand, are strong numerically considerations
opment of the policy of tactical offense, tactical speed, and tactical operations cally nature, speaking, lines in a war that, strategiin character, protracted in lines. Our strategy
and conducted
along interior
is based on these conceptions. in the conduct Although dox warfare, the element
of all operations. of surprise is not absent in orthoto apply it than hostilities. of guerrilla In the latter, speed is troops must be secret must be taken can be no of
there are during guerrilla essential. The movements and of supernatural unaware, procrastination of a negative
rapidity;
the enemy
speedily. There
clefense; no great
attack in a violent and deceptive form. there may be cases where the attack will extend an enemy group), an attack action with it is more profitable maximum speed. to over a period of several days (if that length of time is necessary to annihilate launch warfare. conditions, and push tactics of defense The
If a delaying
ckLles, river crossings, and villages offer the most suitable for it is in sLIch places that the enemys arrangeand he may be annihilated. than we are, and it is true 97 ments may be disrupted
Mao Tse-tung
on Gz~en-i!la Warfare
that we can hinder, distract, disperse, and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. Although able to concentrate the principle weaker enemy tracted tactical in order to destroy to guerrilla positive guerrilla an enemy. warfare. of it a prolightning-like in proper on exterior If we and warfare desirThus, is the warfare of such dispersed units, it is sometimes of concentration is applicable by gaining by employing
this struggle
concentrations cannot
our enemy.
ture them. The total effect of many local successes \vill be to change the relative strengths destruction international tionary of Japans military sympathy evident imperialism, alertness, and the matter in warWhat is meant by initiative of the opposing forces. The power, combined ~vitb the to cause and tile revoluwill be sufficient
tendencies
fare? In all battles and wars, a struggle the initiative ;l~hen goes on between the- side that ilolds the initiative role becomes destruction.
the opposing
lines. This
is what
Japan
is doing. manpower
There
several weak points as far as Japan these is lack of sufficient is tl)e underestimation sulted in the differences in turn, direction gradually operations have been of her military compelled is her cruelty to the inhabitants
is concerned.
for the task; another areas; a third which mistakes has rein the cliques, which, she has been in China in the over plans of strengtl],
her manpower
while, at the same time, the many arguments and disposition loss of good opportunities are frequently for improvement
of her strategical the Jalmncse more than of rcsourccs, that Fler offensive pointed Sl]e can never alrea(ly has
posi(ion. This exp],]ins tllc fact that although able to surround military
troops, they l)ave never yet been able to capture a few. The Japanese ened by insu~]cicncy the barbarism continues conquer When suing passing JapanH!. has Characterized machine of manpower, ina(lequacy
of l]er troops, and the genera] stupidity tile conduct of operations, in extent. but because 0[ the weaknesses day will come-indeed,
she will be forced into a passive role. China was passite, but as we warfare, with both guerrillas from the
enter the second phase of the war, we find ourselves purand regulars operating on exterior lines. ThLIS, tvitll each of initiative
99
Mao Tse-tung
ow Guerrilla
Warfare
is especially
serious for guerrilla unknown to reguand the lack of if they keep of the
forces, who must face critical situations of the enemy unity and experience within
enemys insufficient vast territories; guerrillas countrymen; ers, guerrillas Both guerrillas can
manpower,
he is a foreigner confidence
of millions
weaknesses while, at the same time, our own are remedied. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are, in actuality, sources of strength. For example, the very fact that most guerrilla advantageous enemys unable obtained When rear. With by orthodox groups are small makes it desirable to appear liberty and disappear such activities, forces. with more than the initiaof into to the enemy of action and for them in the is simply be
to cope, A similar
can rarely
tive, Any error, no matter how slight, in the estimation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas unable a passive role. They will then find themselves beat off the attacks of the enemy. It is apparent arrangement pessimistic 100 that we can gain and retain of the situation and political only by a correct estimation of all military estimate
will operate
Ya~Chi Clzan (Guer-rillu Warfare) position, with consequent mistic estimate, duce the same result. No military leader is endowed to seize the initiative. so after a careful arrangement When a guerrilla by heaven with an ability leader who does and on factors involved. of the situation a poor estimate is to extricate on the situation. It is the intelli~nt and political either loss of initiative; an overly opti-
of the military
the part of its leader or pressure into a passive position, No method employed situation can be prescribed
can, if necessary,
is at such times that the good leader recognizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative, Let us revert to alertness. realize that to operate in gaining the initiative tive situation To conduct
command.
and vital in its effect on the relaour forces and those of adjust their operations and to prevailing to local
in these
factors and make necessary tions to accord with fisherman, who, with and to pLIll them water, the strength obstructions
his nets, is able both to cast them of the depth or the presence
Warfare
leader As the of
concentration,
the enemy
be concentrated
rillas must disperse, harass him, and demoralize When by the enemy, guerrillas of the ground withdraw. 3. When rillas disperse. 4. When the availability disperse
disperse. 5. Guerrillas
ments over a
in order to promote
wide area. of the circumstances caution that prevail at the time in certain matters: as a not be
Regardless
of dispersal,
1.
A relatively
be retained
central divided
responsibilities. 102
proceed, method
Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them, and there is opportunity ,to fall upon him and destroy enemy him. Concentration is on the defensive may be desirable and guerrillas when the wish to destroy
isolated detachments in particular localities. By the term concentrate, we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary remaining guerrillas are assigned and delaying of conducting In addition When generally the enemy, of destroying for the task. The of hindering isolated groups, or of forces, he will guerrillas missions
mass propaganda. to tile dispersion and concentration of guerrillas, them. The what is termed alert shifting.
what place they wish to fight. If they find that they cannot fight, they must immediately shift. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal. group has destroyed may be shifted second detachment. to another For example, area to attack after a guerrilla at one place, it and destroy a an enemy detachment Sometimes,
for a unit to become engaged case, it must move immediately. When Their the situation
with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. tactics must deceive, tempt, and confuse They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack 103
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
strike
him from the west and the south. They rapidly disperse. They must move at night. Guerrilla initiative is expressed
in dispersion,
tion, and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas and obstinate, however, field severely damaged. Skill in conducting guerrilla
they will be led to passive positions understanding intelligence the things that
have discussed but rather in their actual application of battle. watches the ever-changing the right moment and thoughtful Careful guerrilla understand planning observers. is necessary of guerrilla situation
constantly
for decisive action is found only in keen if victory is to be won in method do not action. A plan is necesa prudent studied, include
of the size of the unit involved; The situation of duties must be carefully made. Plans
plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case an assignment must
both political and military instruction; and equipment, civilians. Without and the matter
of cooperation
or to operate alertly. It is true plans, but even so, only followThe attack must must be considered. and retained
ing a positive victory that results from attack. must be made on guerrilla not permit 104 themselves initiative; to be maneuvered
into a position
Warfare)
to attack is forced upon them, Any victory will result from and alert control. Even in defense, all our toward a resumption of the attack, our enemies is entirely of our efforts must be directed
for it is only by attack that we can extinguish useless as far as extinguishing of only temporary forces is concerned. rillas and regular This troops.
our enemies is concerned and is valid both for guerare of degree of execution. guerrillas and the
only; that is to say, in the manner The relationship orthodox Generally between forces guerrillas speaking,
must
be appreciated.
types of cooperation
1. Strategical 2. 3. Tactical
cooperation.
Battle cooperation. who harass the enemys rear installations are weakening of resistance. spirit They and
his transport
him and encouraging are cooperating in Manchuria with orthodox had forces
strategically. no functions
until the war in China started. Since that time, their function of strategical kill one enemy, an)munition, cooperation make is evident, expend group for if they can one round of in its advance 105 the enemy
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
southward,
our powers
of resistance
ately increased.
Such guerrilla
action has a positive action Another Chin-Pu, the period example who Tungwhen
on the enemy nation and on its troops, while, at the same time, it encourages of strategical operate our own countrymen. is furnished Ping-Han, during cooperation by the guerrillas
Pu, and Cheng-Tai the invader when he held garrisoned our regular
began when
cities in the areas, and was intensified forces counterattacked, of tactical cooperation, when guerrillas in an effort to we may cite the both north and
south of Yeh Men destroyed the Tung-P~1 railway and the motor roads near Ping I -lsing Pass and Yang Fang Kou. A number organized of Honan. guerrillas Guerrilla of small operating bases were established, guerrilla action in Shansi complemented Similarly, during the south Shantung in the frve northern commanders provinces on the Hsuchow front. units disposiand to indecotheir and the
activities of the regular forces both there and in the defense campaign, with cooperated
the armys operation mand of regiments must cooperate function tions, undermine pendent, would operation 106 to harass their
in rear areas and those in comwith the situation. their transport, action were It is their
in accordance them,
to determine
morale.
If guerrilla result
In order to accomplish
Warfare)
mission units
and improve
of cooperation,
guerrilla com-
must be equipped
some means
of rapid
two-way radio sets are recombattle area are responforces. Their transport, and sentinels. prinEven of the that to gather
sible for close cooperation cipal functions information, without regular The contribute importance. a strategical until tured precise
with regular
to act as outposts
to the general success, should be assumed. of bases is of particular can be restored only by carry out some be capConsequently, This is so because this war is a cruel and procounterattack, and this we cannot indeed, and become guerrilla most of itmay warfare
part of our country-or, by the enemy task to develop Thus the enemy intensive
area and convert the enemys rear into an additional will never order to subdue the occupied to become increasingly A guerrilla territory,
located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation and development. Ability to fight a war without istic of guerrilla without a rear area is a fundamental over a long period characterof time shows u: I07 action, but this does not mean that guerof base areas. History
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
many examples and it is fanciful ized by banditry guerrilla prehend The consider:
1.
of peasant
revolts that were unsuccessful, characterSome could succeed in this era are preswar, if we
and before such leaders can comof base areas in the long-term understood
The various categories of bases, Guerrilla areas and base areas. of bases. of bases.
2. 4.
Guerrilla
bases may be classified accor{ling to their locabases; second, plains bases; and, of bases in
last, river, lake, and bay bases. The advantages lished are at Chang are strongly protected. Po Chan,
areas are evident. Those which are now estabWLL Tai Shari, T~il~eng
Shari, Tai Shari, Yen Shanj and Mao Shari. Il~ese bases Similar bases S11OU1LI established be not satisfactory for guerrilla warin in all enemy rear areas. Plains country operating fare cannot be established Hopeh case, Whether 108 is generally bases, Lut this does not mean that guerrilla flourish in such country there. The extent of guerrilla we can count development
Yz.tClzi Ckan (Gz~errillu Warfare) over long periods of time is questionable. establish small bases of a seasonal our barbaric This we can do because not have the manpower run and because in plains country crops are growing. when advances, We can, however, nature. enemy simply does
or temporary
to occupy all the areas he has overof China anywhere. is so numerous Seasonal when bases when the
the population
in the winter
the rivers are frozen over, and in the summer the enemy is otherwise the guerrillas occupied. When
drawal into mountainous country, they should leave behind them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they place the next. and this is one little attenexamples of the establishment must be one place one day and another There are many historical aspect of our activity tion. Red guerrillas Lake region. We
held out for man y years in the Hungtze should bases in the Hungtze in territory
and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses con trolled by the enemy There guerrilla occupied is a difference by the enemy free use of, the water routes. between
so as to deny him access to, and the terms base area and surrounded by territory Tai Shari, of Wu Tai of base areas. is a guer109
Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
W m \ ar e
rills area. Such areas can be controlled while they actually physically departure, rather there, control reverts to a puppet
by guerrillas
gover-
for example, was at first a guerrilla government the people, organized mountains, and inspired assisted
functioned in the
guerrillas
transformation
Such a task is extremely diilcult, for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. In certain tiguous garrisoned areas, such as the cities and zones conthe guerrillas out. These are unable to drive guerareas remain to the railroads,
the Japanese
and puppets
Ixxwll]c guer-
rilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to dle activities Obviously, in any given area in the war zone, any one of three situations may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands; it may be lost to the Japanese between to see that either is assured. in the establishment of bases tl~c ar!nct] gtlermust be used and to train to Japan, to arm and puppets; Guerrilla or it may be divided leaders should endeavor last of these situations Another point is the cooperation the combatants.
essential
rilla bands and the people. All our strength to spread the doctrine the people, to organize units,
guerrilla bands. This doctrine must be spread among the people, who must be organized into anti-Jap:~nese groups. llleir political 110 instincts must be sharpened and their nlar-
Warfare)
tial ardor increased. of liberty, Japanese can the young power. are not organized, eliminate
If the workers,
the farmers,
the lovers
they will never realize their own antiOnly the united strength of the people recover the measure of political and improve what factors in our the economic be proprotection
traitors,
power that has been lost, and conserve we still retain. We have already touched What
on geographic economic
discussion of bases, and we must also mention aspects of the problem. adopted? to commerce
tection to mean that people must contribute money in proportion to tile nloney they nave. Fanners will be required traitors, to furnisl~ a certain is pro}libited. over the entire periphery share of tllcir crops to guerrilla troops. Confiscation, except in the case of businesses run by
of the base area if we wish to attack the enemys bases and and develop our own. This will afford us equip, and train the people, thus policy the policy as well as the national to organize, guerrilla
the devel-
opment and extension of base areas; at other times, organization, training, or equipment of the people. Each guerrilla of attack guerrilla base will have its own peculiar In general, the enemy, his gains, will attempt numerous and defense.
problems in an en-
to extinguish
bodies of troops
Mao Tse-tung
on Guerrilla
Warfare
and
the encirclement
broken
by counterattack.
ing our main forces to attack one of them by surprise harassment. At the same time, other forces should When one column
enemy garrison
troops and operate on their lines of supply has been disposed In a there are to one of the others. Guerrillas
and communication.
divisions must cooperate to form a primary force to counterattack the enemy, or the area from which a secondary force harasses and hinders the enemy After defeating him.
advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. tions to relatively When tions may traitors in those places. the inhabitants be extended have been inspired, equipped, and organized, cities and to include ne~v volunour operalines of All teers accepted, trained, communication We must confine our operaand small areas and destroy the enemy
not strongly
these are our duties in offensive strategy. Tl~eir object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. expanded; attacked 112 Then our military activities and our organization the masses of the people It is of great must be zealously of the enemy that importance and with equal zeal, the strength and diminished. work among
Warfare)
guerrilla
During
such times
as the enemy is on the defensive, rest and instruction The development desperate conquer
of mobile warfare is not only possible war is a struggle. If China were able to of long-term
but essential. This is the case because our current and protracted the Japanese there bandits would speedily
be no question warfare
scale. Hence, there would be no question and the war of movethe case. In order and qualmore trainbe hostilities into mobile Primarily, Political is actually
of guerrilla
nature,
men must join the armies; then the quality jng must be emphasized nique The of handling Our improved. a gradual regimental internal from
our weapons,
formations bureaus
and military,
supply, medical, and hygiene units. The standards munication standards equipment of discipline must not be forgotten.
113
Wm-fure
guerrilla cannot
formations
and beformations,
If it were,
ift
guerrilla action would be too limited in scope. time, guerrilla coordinated, cerned, activities, to be most with regular not only insofar
the same
must
be in
are con-
but additionally
troops operating
the same areas. This coordination zone commander and his staff. In guerrilla for strategical general purposes
of the war-
base areas, the commancl must be centralized and decentralized command units, for tactical purtakes care of the their coordinapolicy regmding of commmd units,
This
strategical
of all guerrilla
as,
is
naturally, determined
true lower pendent Each turn appointed by higher by inferior natul-e inferior and
situations
arise.
can be
bet~veen
in orthodox
communications strategy
guerrilla
for unified
districts
and
these alc
in
are divided
Each
to be taken more
but cannot
or less complete
114
APPENDIX
OTEs
1. Each squad consists of from 9 to 11 men. In case men or arms are not sufficient, the third platoon may be dispensed with or one squad organized as company headquarters. 2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting. 3. If there is insufficient personnel, the medical section is not separately organized. If there are only two or three medical personnel, they may be attached to the administrative section. 4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks, any member of the company may be designated to prepare food. 5. Each combatant soldier should be armed with the rifle. If there are not enough rifles, each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances, and big swords can also be furnished. The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions are assigned to platoons, it may be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others. 6. The strength of a company should at the most be 180, divided into 12 squads of 11 men each. The minimum strength of a company should be 82 men, divided into 6 squads of 9 men each.
1 COMPANY
Political Mobile
Executive
Fir~hird
Platoon I Squad
r Platoon
Company Headquarters Message Section Administrative Section First-Aid and Hospital Intelligence Section
Section
Platoon 1 Squad
I Squad
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, RA~ Company Leader Political Officer Executive Officer Company Headquarters Message Section Chief Signal Administrative Section Public Relations Duty Personnel Barber
GUERRILLA
PERSONNEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1
Chief
Rifle Rifle
Cooks
Medical Section Chief Assistant First Aid and Nursing Intelligence Section Chief Intelligence Platoon Leaders Squad Leaders Nine Squads (8 each) TOTAL
10
1 1 4 1 9 3 9 72 122
TABLE ORGANIZATION
GUERRILL4 Battalion
Politicai
Officer Headquarters
Officer
I Machine-Gun Section
Message Center Medical Section
I
I Administrative Section
First Company
Second Company
Third Company
- -----i I
Fourth Company
NOTES
1. Total headquarters of an independent guerrilla battalion may vary from a minimum of 46 to a maximum of 110. 2. When there are 4 companies to a battalion, regimental organization should be used. 3. Machine-gun squads may be heavy or light. A light machine-gun squad has from 5 to 7 men. A heavy machine-gun squad has from 7 to 9 men. 4. The intelligence section is organized in from 2 to 4 squads, at least one of which is made up of plain-clothes men. If horses are available, one squad should be mounted. 5. If no men are available for stretcher-bearers, omit them and use the cooks or ask aid from the people. 6. Each company must have at least 25 rifles. The remaining weapons may be bird guns, big swords, or locally made shotguns.
ii
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION, GUERRILLA REGIMENT RANK Regimental Commander Political Officer chief of Staff Operations Section Operations Officer Clerks Intelligence Section Intelligence Officer Personnel E RSONNE1 t 1 1 1 1 15 1 36 1 36 ARM Pistol Pistol Pist 01 Pistol
Personnel Administrative Section A~ministrative Officer Clerks Runner Transport Section Chief of Section Finance Traffic Manager supply Drivers Medical Section Chief of Section Doctors Nurses Total, Regimental Headquarters Three Battalions (441 each) TOTAL
1; 1 1 1 1 5 1 2 15 137
Pistol Pistol
60 Pistols 36 Carbines 124 Pistols 300 Rifles 184 Pistols 936 Rifles
1323
1460
TABLE
OF ORGANIZATION, GUERRILLA (INDEPENDENT) PERSONNEL 1 1 1 2 1 1 10 2 3 1 Carbine Carbine Carbine Pistol Pistol Pistol
BATTALION RANK Battalion Commander Political Officer Executive Officer Battalion Headquarters . Signal Section Administrative Section Section Chief Runner Public Relations Duty Personnel Barbers supply Cooks Medical Section Medical O~ficer Stretcher-Bearers Nursing Intelligence Section Section Chief Intelligence Machine-Gun Section Total, Headquarters
10
I 6 4 1 30 As Available 75 366 441 Pistol Pistol As Available 34 Pistols 12 Carbines 9 Pistols 288 Carbines 43 Pistols 300 Rifles
I
I
I