Osmansko Naslijede I Muslimanske Zajednice Balkana Danas (Zbornik Radova)

BALKANLAR MEDENYET MERKEZ
THE BALKANS CIVILISATION CENTRE
OSMANLI MRASI VE GNMZ BALKAN MSLMAN TOPLUMLARI Konferans Teblileri (Saraybosna, 16-18 Ekim 2009) OsmanskO naslIjee I muslImanske zajednIce Balkana danas zbornik radova (sarajevo, 16-18. oktobar 2009) THe OTTOman leGacY and THe Balkan muslIm cOmmunITIes TOdaY conference Proceedings (sarajevo, 16-18 October 2009) editr \ urednik \ edited by: dr. Halit eren Balkanlar medeniyet merkezi \ centar za civilizaciju Balkana \ The Balkans civilisation centre 2011 Balmed metin blmleme, kelime vurgusu, dipnot dzeni vb. konularda yazarlarn benimsedikleri yntemler mmkn olduunca korunmaya allmtr. Metode podjele tekstova, naglaavanje rijei, ureenje fusnota itd. preneseni su onako kako su ih sami autori koristili. Methods of division of texts, emphasis of words, arrangement of footnotes, etc. are kept as adopted by each author. IsBn 978-605-88558-2-3 Birinci Bask \ Prvo izdanje \ First edition: stanbul mart mart march 2011 kinci Bask \ drugo izdanje \ second edition: sarajevo eyll septembar september 2011 Katalog Bilgileri \ CIP - katalogizacija u publikaciji \ Cataloguing in Publication Data Osmanl miras ve Gnmz Balkan mslman Toplumlar (2009: saraybosna) Osmanl miras ve Gnmz Balkan mslman Toplumlar: konferans teblileri, saraybosna, 16-18 ekim 2009 =Osmansko naslijee i muslimanske zajednice Balkana danas =The Ottoman legacy and the Balkan communities Today / editr Halit eren.- 2. bs., Gzd. grl.- stanbul: Balkanlar medeniyet merkezi, 2011. 235 s.; 24 cm.- (Balmed yaynlar; 2) metin Trke, Bonaka ve ngilizce. dipnot var. IsBn 978-605-88558-2-3 1. Balkan lkeleri--Tarih--kongreler. 2. Trkiye--Tarih--Osmanl devleti, 1288-1918--kongreler. 3. mslmanlar--Balkan lkeleri--kongreler. I. eren, Halit, 1953- II. k.a. III. seri. 949.6--dos22 Tasarm \ Dizajn i DTP \ Design: muhammed nur anbarl Bask \ tampa \ Printed at: arka Press d.o.o. sarajevo adresa: Hamdije emerlia 43, Tel: 033/720-840
Topkap kltr Park, Osmanl evleri, nu. 7, zeytinburnu 34010 stanbul T: 0212 565 39 70 F: 0212 565 39 76 bilgi@balkanlarmedeniyetmerkezi.org www.balmed.net
OSMANLI MRASI VE GNMZ BALKAN MSLMAN TOPLUMLARI

Konferans Teblileri (Saraybosna, 16-18 Ekim 2009)
OsmanskO naslIjee I muslImanske zajednIce Balkana danas

zbornik radova (sarajevo, 16-18. oktobar 2009)
THe OTTOman leGacY and THe Balkan muslIm cOmmunITIes TOdaY

conference Proceedings (sarajevo, 16-18 October 2009)
indekiler \ Sadraj \ Contents
nsz \ Predgovor \ Preface Halit Eren ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7, 9, 11 address of H.e. Prof. ahmet davutolu minister of Foreign affairs, Republic of Turkey ------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 IRcIca Genel direktr ve Balmed Bakan dr. Halit erenin a konumas ----------------- 21 The Imposing challenge of the Ottoman legacy Ahmet Alibai --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 The Ottoman legacy as a common layer of the Balkan muslim Identities Ferid Muhi -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29
TEBLLER \ IZLAGANJA \ PROCEEDINGS
Osmanl arivinin Rumeli aratrmalar asndan nemi nder Bayr -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39 Osmanl ariv Belgelerinde Bosnadan anadoluya Gler: 1877-1910 Cevat Ekici ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53 depicting the enemy: The Image of the Turk and the muslim in albanias High school Textbooks Olsi Jazexhi --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59 Roman emperors and Ottoman conquerors! Image of the Ottomans in the Balkans montenegro case Omer Kajoshaj---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 87 The Turkish muslim minority of Western Thrace-Greece Tzemil Kapza ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 93
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surviving elements of Ottoman legacy in the Balkans in non-muslim communities and cultures Dino Mujadevi ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 101 Integration of Religion within the Identity of the albanian muslims Musa Musai ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 113 migrations of Bosnians after the second World War migrations as an Indivisible Part of the History of Bosnian people since the Berlin congress, 1878 Sabina Pacariz -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 131 Ottomans Image in the Bulgarian History Textbooks from the communist and Post-communist era Aziz Shakir -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 139 Ottoman Tradition in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Reality and Historiographic Generalisations in the 20th century Ramiza Smaji -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 145 albanian Orientalism Enis Sulstarova ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 155 The Relationship between Ottoman cultural legacy and muslim minorities: contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Bulgaria Ahmed Topkev ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 183 Ottoman legacy in ulcinj: architecture, customs and speaking Suad Ukoshata ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 203 Turkish non-Governmental Organizations in the Balkans: Performance assessment Ramiz Zekaj ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 209 Ottoman legacy as Integrative component for Balkan muslim Identities Gafur Zharku ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 217
nsz
dr. Halit eren
BALMED Bakan
Balkanlar Medeniyet Merkezi BALMEDin Osmanl Miras ve Gnmz Balkan Mslman Toplumlar konusunda Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Babakanlk Trk birlii ve Kalknma daresi Bakanl-TKA ve Saraybosna leri Aratrmalar Merkezi (CNS) ile mtereken dzenledii uluslararas toplantnn teblilerinin yaynlanmasndan memnuniyet duyuyorum. Balkanlardaki kltr ve medeniyet zenginliklerini, Balkan kltrlerinin kendi aralarnda ve baka toplumlarla tarih ilikilerini ve kltr alverilerini incelemek, tantmak, bu konularndaki eitim ve incelemeleri tevik etmek, kltr miras varlklarn aratrmak ve tantmak, sanat ve mimar eserlerinin, tarih eserlerin korunmasn ve restorasyonunu salamak amalaryla kurulan BALMED, tm dnyadan bu konularla ilgili olarak alan uzmanlar bir araya getiren seminer ve konferanslar dzenlemektedir. BALMEDin bu dncelerle dzenledii toplantlardan ikincisi, bu kitabn konusunu tekil eden konferans olmutur. TKA ve BALMEDin Bosna-Hersek Temsilcilii ve Saraybosna leri Aratrmalar Merkezi tarafndan ibirlii iinde Bosna-Hersekin bakenti Saraybosnada dzenlenen ve gn sren Osmanl Miras ve Gnmz Balkan Mslman Toplumlar uluslararas konferans Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Dileri Bakan Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutolunun a konumalaryla 16 Ekim 2009da balamtr. Bu konferans ile Balkan corafyasnda Osmanl mirasnn durumu ve bugn bu corafyada hayatn idame ettiren Mslman toplumlarn iinde bulunduu artlar katlmclar tarafndan gndeme getirilmitir. BALMED, kltrel amal sivil toplum kurulular arasnda ilgili olduu konular ve faaliyet alan bakmndan tektir. Bu durumun bilinciyle 2006 ylnda faaliyete geiinden hemen sonra mmkn olduunca geni bir konular yelpazesi zerinde almay planlam, nceliklerin belirlenmesinde ise genel olarak dnyada ve zel olarak Balkanlar blgesi ve evresinde gnmzde uluslararas ilikilerde grlen ihtiyalar
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ve gelimeleri ve yine bunlarla balantl olarak, mevcut tarih ve kltr aratrmalarnn durumunu ve ihtiyalarn dikkate almtr. Buna gre BALMEDin, ncelikle yrrle koyduu projelerden biri, Balkan lkelerinde ve Trkiyede tarih literatrnde bulunan, blge lkelerinin tarihi hakkndaki anlatmlar ve deinmelerin ve zellikle, Balkan lkelerindeki tarih yazclnda Trk kltr ve tarihiyle ve/veya Balkanlardaki Osmanl ynetimi dnemiyle ilgili kaytlarn ve grlerin incelenmesini ve gerekirse dzeltilmesini amalamaktadr. Trkler ile Balkan milletlerinin her biri arasnda yzyllar sren siyasi, kltrel ve ekonomik temaslar neticesinde Trkler ve Trkiye ile ilgili olarak Balkan ve Gneydou Avrupa lkelerinde: Bosna-Hersek, Arnavutluk, Bulgaristan, Yunanistan, Makedonya, Kosova,Romanya, Srbistan, Karada ve tm blge lkelerinde bulunan tarih belgeler ve yaynlar ve ayn ekilde bu lkelerin toplumlarnn tarihi ve kltr hakkndaki Trkiyede bulunan ariv belgeleri ve yaynlar, byk nem tamaktadr. Bu lkelerdeki konuyla ilgili uzmanlar tarafndan karlkl gayretlerle, bu kaynaklar ve belgeler zerinde almalar yaplmtr. Bu almalarn gelime durumunun, kapsamnn ve ynelimlerinin bilinmesinden nemli ilm faydalar elde edilebilir. BALMEDden baka aratrma kurumlarnda ve niversitelerde de bu amala almalar yaplmaktadr. Ancak bu almalardan elde edilen neticelerin ilgili taraflarn bir araya geldii ortak platformlarda paylalmas, bunlarn hem akademik alandaki ilerleme iin, hem de bu alann tesinde toplumlarn birbirini daha iyi tanmas ve yaknlamas iin katkda bulunaca aktr. BALMEDin 2008de stanbulda dzenledii Gneydou Avrupa ve Balkanlarda Osmanl Tarihi Aratrmalar ve Tarih Yazcl konulu seminer, Balkan lkeleri ve Trkiyeden uzmanlar bu amala bir araya getiren ilk giriim olmutur. Balkanlar blgesi tarihi, siyasi ve idari ynlerinden olsun, sosyal, ekonomik ve kltrel zellikleriyle olsun, Osmanl tarihinin arlkl blmlerinden birini tekil etmitir. Ayn ekilde Osmanl dnemi, Balkanlar tarihinin en arlkl dnemlerinden biri olmutur. Tesirleri ve ortak hatras gnmzde devam eden bu tarih boyunca dil ve kltr alverileri, sosyal ve ekonomik ilikiler corafi yaknlk iinde gereklemi, ok ynl bir tecrbeyi miras brakmtr. Bu hatrann ve bu mirasn kavran ve yorumu, gnmzde ve gelecekte genelde toplumlararas ilikiler iin ve zelde tarih yazcl iin belirleyici olabilecektir. Tarih aratrmalarnda son on yllarda kaydedilen gelimeler sayesinde nyargl, tek yanl ve ksmi deerlendirmeler, yerini daha geni perspektifli gereki yaklamlara brakmtr. Bu konferansa, kitaba ve dier almalarmza katlan uzmanlarn oluturduu ibirlii ann gittike genilediini grmekten memnuniyet duyuyor ve bu ibirliinin Balkanlarda Osmanl miras ve gnmze etkileri ile ilgili almalarn gelimesine nemli lde katkda bulunacana inanyorum.
Predgovor
dr. Halit eren
Predsjednik BALMED-a
Raduje me objavljivanje radova sa meunarodne konferencije Osmansko naslijee i muslimanske zajednice Balkana danas koju je organizovao centar za civilizaciju Balkana Balmed u saradnji sa Turskom agencijom za suradnju i razvoj TIKA, koja djeluje u okviru parlamenta Republike Turske, i centra za napredne studije sarajevo (CNS). Balmed je osnovan s ciljem da istrauje i predstavlja kulturno i civilizacijsko bogatstvo u balkanskim zemljama, historijske odnose i razmjenu kultura balkanskih naroda meusobno i sa drugim drutvenim zajednicama, zatim da podraje i podstie edukaciju i istraivanja iz ovih oblasti, kao i da istrauje i predstavlja kulturno naslijee, te da titi i restaurira umjetnika, arhitektonska i historijska zdanja. Ovaj centar organizuje seminare i konferencije koje okupljaju strunjake tih oblasti iz cijelog svijeta. druga po redu konferencija koju je organizovao Balmed s ovim ciljem, tema je ove knjige. Trodnevna meunarodna konferencija Osmansko naslijee i muslimanske zajednice Balkana danas, koju su u sarajevu organizovali u saradnji TIKA, Predstavnitvo Balmed-a za Bosnu i Hercegovinu i centar za napredne studije sarajevo, zapoela je 16. oktobra 2009. godine uvodnim govorom prof. dr. ahmeta davutolua, ministra vanjskih poslova Republike Turske. uesnici na konfernciji govorili su o poloaju osmanskog naslijea na prostoru Balkana i okolnostima koje vladaju u muslimanskim drutvima koja i danas oivljavaju naslijee na tom podruju. Balmed je jedinstvena organizacija meu drugim udruenjima graana sa kulturnim predznakom koja se bavi gore spomenutim temama i aktivnostima. svjesni te situacije, odmah po osnivanju 2006. godine, napravili su plan rada sa irokim spektrom tema, koliko je to bilo mogue. u odreivanju prioriteta dali su znaaj iskazanim potrebama i dogaajima u savremenim meunarodnim odnosima u svijetu uope, a posebno na Balkanu i regiji, te stanju i potrebama postojeeg historijskog i kulturnog istraivanja koji su usko vezani sa gore navedenim. stoga, jedan od prvih projekata koje je Balmed stavio sebi u zadatak ima za cilj istraivanje onog to je napisano o historiji zemalja u regiji u historijskoj literaturi zemalja Balkana i Turske, a posebno istraivanje dokumenata i studija koje se odnose na tursku kulturu i historiju i/ili period osmanske vladavine na Balkanu u historijskim spisima balkanskih zemalja, te, ukoliko je
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OSMANSKO NASLIJEE I MUSLIMANSKE ZAJEDNICE BALKANA DANAS
potrebno, vriti odreene ispravke u tom smislu. Od velikog znaaja su historijski dokumenti i radovi koji se odnose na Turke i Tursku a koji, kao rezultat politikih, kulturnih i ekonomskih odnosa Turaka sa svakim od naroda Balkana, postoje u zemljama Balkana i jugoistone evrope: Bosni i Hercegovini, albaniji, Bugarskoj, Grkoj, makedoniji, kosovu, Rumunija, srbiji i crnoj Gori, te svim zemljama u regionu. na isti nain, od velikog znaaja su arhivski dokumenti i radovi koji se nalaze u Turskoj, a odnose se na historiju i kulturu drutvenih zajednica spomenutih zemalja. Obostranim i uzajamnim radom strunjaka za spomenute oblasti iz ovih zemalja nastali su radovi o tim izvorima i dokumentima. Obznanjivanjem stepena postignutog u tim radovima, sadraja i stremljenja tih radova, moe se postii znaajnija nauna korist. Pored Balmed-a, i drugi centri za istraivanja i univerziteti objavljuju radove s tim ciljem. meutim, jasno je da e razmjena rezultata proizalih iz tih radova na zajednikim platformama, na koju e doi zainteresovane strane, doprinijeti njihovom napredovanju na akademskom polju, te upoznavanju i zbliavanju drutava i izvan tog polja. seminar pod nazivom Istraivanje i historijski izvori o Osmanskoj historiji u zemljma jugoistone evrope i Balkana koji je organizovao Balmed 2008. godine u Istanbulu, prva je inicijativa koja je s tim ciljem okupila strunjake iz balkanskih zemalja i Turske. Historija Balkana ini jedan vaan dio osmanske historije, bilo u pogledu politike i vladavine, bilo u pogledu drutvenih, ekonomskih i kulturnih karakteristika. na isti nain, osmanski period ini jedan vaan dio historije Balkana. Odnosi i zajednika historija ostavili su u nasljedstvo mnogostrano iskustvo ostvareno kroz kulturnu i jeziku razmjenu kroz historiju sve do danas, drutvene i ekonomske odnose i geografsku blizinu. Poimanje i komentarisanje te prolosti i tog nasljea treba biti odrednica za sadanje i budue meudrutvene odnose uope, a posebno za pisanje historije. zahvaljujui napretku zabiljeenom zadnjih deset godina u historijskom istraivanju, djeliminim i jednostranim procjenama omoguen je istinitiji pristup sa irom perspektivom. Posebno me raduje to vidim da se iri mrea suradnje koju ine oni koju su prisustovali konferenciji, koji su dali svoj doprinos ovoj knjizi i koji uestuju u naim drugim projektima. Vjerujem da e ta suradnja doprinijeti razvijanju projekata o osmanskom naslijeu na Balkanu i njegovom uticaju na dananjicu.
Preface
dr. Halit eren
President of BALMED
I would like to express my pleasure on the publication of the proceedings of the International conference jointly organized by The Balkans civilisation centre (Balmed); Turkish cooperation and development agency (Tka); and the center for advanced studies-sarajevo (CNS) on the subject of The Ottoman legacy and the Balkan muslim communities Today. Balmed was formed to study and attract public attention to the richness of civilisation and culture in the Balkans, the historic relations and cultural interactions of the Balkan peoples among themselves and with other societies. It also aimed to encourage education and research on these subjects, to highlight common cultural heritage, and provide for the preservation and restoration of historic, artistic and architectural entities, as well as organizing workshops and conferences to bring together specialists in these fields from all over the world. The subject of this book is the second of these International conferences which was organized by Balmed in keeping with its objectives. The International conference on The Ottoman legacy and the Balkan muslim communities Today was organized in sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with Tka, Balmed Bosnia-Herzegovina Representative Office and sarajevo center for advanced studies. The conference was opened on 16 October 2009 with the opening address of Prof. dr. ahmet davutolu, minister of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey, and lasted for three days. during the conference, distinguished participants evaluated the state of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkan geography and the conditions under which the muslim communities have been living in this geography today. Balmed is unique among cultural non-governmental organizations with respect to its field of interest and activity. Balmed, conscious of this situation, planned to work on as wide a range of subjects as possible right after its foundation in 2006. In assigning the main priorities, present-day requirements and developments in international relations, and in conjunction with them, the state and needs of ongoing historical and cultural research were taken into account in general, and those pertaining to the Balkans and the surrounding regions in particular. One of the projects that Balmed gave priority, aimed at studying and amending if neces-
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THE OTTOMAN LEGACY AND THE BALKAN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES TODAY
sary, concerned the descriptions and references found in the chronicles of the Balkan states and Turkey about the history of the states in the region; specifically, the records and concepts kept in the Balkan states on Turkish culture and history and/or related to the period of Ottoman rule. as a result of centuries of political, cultural and economic contacts between the Turks and each of the Balkan nations, existing historical documents and publications on the Turks and Turkey found in the Balkan and southwestern european countries (namely, BosniaHerzegovina, albania, Bulgaria, Greece, macedonia, kosovo, Romania, serbia, montenegro and all others) and similarly, archival documents and publications in Turkey on the history and culture of these countries carry great importance. extensive work has been carried out on such sources and documents mutually by specialists on these subjects in Turkey and other countries. From the perspective of development, scope and orientation of such academic work, important scientific gains are possible. Research is being carried out in other institutions and universities for this purpose besides Balmed. However, it is obvious that pooling the results of such work on a common platform, in which all the concerned parties would attend, will further academic development; and will facilitate closer cooperation and acquaintance. The 2008 Balmed seminar in Istanbul titled studies and Historiography of the Ottoman Period in southeastern europe and the Balkans, was the first such initiative which brought specialists from Turkey and the Balkan countries together for this purpose. The Balkan region, through its history, politics and administration, as well as social, economic and cultural features, has been one of the essential elements of Ottoman history. similarly, the Ottoman period has constituted one of the most important parts of the Balkan history. This history, the effects and mutual memory of which is still alive, through language and cultural exchanges as well as social and economic relations as a result of geographical proximity, left a legacy of shared experiences. a thorough understanding and interpretation of this memory and shared legacy can be the determining factor in inter-communal relations in general, and chronicling in particular. as a result of recent developments in historical research, biased, prejudiced and partial evaluations have been replaced by a more objective approach from a broader perspective. I am pleased to see that the cooperation network of able specialists, who attended this major conference, contributed to the publication of this book and collaborated in our other studies has been spreading. I believe that this fruitful cooperation will contribute greatly to the intensification of works on the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, as well as its reflections on the present day.
Address of H.E. Prof. Ahmet Davutolu Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey
Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen; It gives me great pleasure to address this eminent audience on a crucial occasion. The distinguishing characteristics of the Balkan region derive from its peculiar geographic location in Afro-Eurasia, and its history is closely also linked to this geography. Broadly speaking, three main characteristics of the Balkans could be identified: First, the Balkan region has been a buffer zone in the geopolitical sense; a buffer zone in transition from Europe to Asia and even Africa, from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean, from the North to the South, and from the East to the West. The second characteristic of the Balkans concerns the intensity of geo-economic transactions. The Balkan region has been a region of intense economic transactions over the course of history. Since the antique Greek civilization, the Balkan region has been located on crucial commercial routes from the coastline to the inland areas of Eastern Europe, and from the East to the West. It was, and still is, a centre and crossroads for geo-economic transactions. The third characteristic of the Balkan region concerns the fact that the region has been a centre of geo-cultural interactions. Several cultures have interacted in the Balkans over the course of history including various peoples who came as a result of mass-migrations and mixed with each other. If you are placed in a region with these three crucial characteristics, namely geo-political buffer zone, geo-cultural interactions and geo-economic transactions, you are likely to face two alternative destinies in history: You could either be placed in the center of world politics, or you fall victim to global competition and become periphery of major global powers. Therefore, Balkan
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history could be read either as a success story; or alternatively, as a history of failures and being victim to global competition. Today when we talk about the Balkans, we tend to think that the region is placed in the periphery of Europe, rather than its center. Is the true that the Balkan region is really in the European periphery in terms of geography? Certainly not. In fact, the Balkan region is right in the centre of one of the most strategic locations in Afro-Eurasia. So why do we have such a widespread perception of periphery for the Balkans? If you asked, for example, to Mehmed-Pau Sokolovia (Sokullu Mehmet Pasha), he wouldnt say that Sarajevo, Thessaloniki or Filibe are located in the periphery of Europe or the Ottoman state. He would certainly stress that this region was right on the center of the world, similar to the way explained in a famous Nasrudin-hoda (Nasreddin Hodja) story. But, it was true under the historical circumstances. When we consider Balkan history, the first major imperial state which emerged from the Balkan region was the Alexandrian Empire. Although it emerged from the Balkans, the center of the Alexandrian Empire was not located in the Balkan region. There was no Alexandrian bureaucracy or police force in the Balkans and all the major cities of the Alexandrian Empire were located in Anatolia, Egypt, Iran and Afghanistan. This Empire had emerged from the Balkans, but its political and administrative center was not located in the Balkan region. During the Roman Empire as well, both in the Eastern and Western Roman Empires, the Balkan region was seen as a region in the periphery. The Roman Empire was reminded of the Balkans as a passage way only when the Romans decided to have a military preparation towards Asia. So, the Romans as well did not conceive the Balkan region as a central area in terms of their political establishment. The only positive exception to this historical neglect for the Balkans was the Ottoman state. During the Ottoman state, the Balkan region became a crucial center in world politics, beginning with the 16th century. This was a golden age for the Balkans. Whatever the potential responses that will be given, we are not arguing this because Turkey has inherited the Ottoman legacy, but this is an objective historical fact. The Balkan people were running world politics in the 16th century, and ethnically they were not all Turks; some were from Slavic origin, some from Albanian origin, some were from converted Greek origin. But they run world politics in harmony. The personality of Mehmed-paa Sokolovi (Sokullu Mehmet Pasha) was a perfect example. If there was no Ottoman state in history, Mehmed Pasha could have been an ordinary Serbian man dealing with agriculture or commerce. In those years, there were no de-
Address of H.E. Prof. Ahmet Davutolu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey
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veloped agricultural facilities in the Balkans. Thanks to the Ottoman state, he found opportunities to realize his potential and became one of the leading figures in world politics. Therefore, the Ottoman history is a history of Balkan region; it is a history on the central character of Balkan region in world politics. Not only in the political sense, because the main trade routes of the time were passing through the Balkans. Thessaloniki, which was a small town before, became the center of economic activities in the region. During the Ottoman era, Thessaloniki became one of the main centers of international trade activities. The bulk of the Mediterranean trade went through Thessaloniki. In order to understand the channels through the flow of money was realized, you need to follow the migration routes of the Jews. Why did Thessaloniki become the biggest Jewish community living in a city from the 16th to the 19th century? Because a significant majority in the population of Thessaloniki was made up of the Jews and they were monitoring economic developments and dealing with trade. Considerable trade links were formed between Thessaloniki and the North, in Euro-Asia. Mediterranean economies were linked to Eurasian economies through Thessaloniki and Istanbul. Similarly, Belgrade was like a village or a small town in the 14th century. But during the Ottoman period, Belgrade became the central city, pivotal city of Danube and Central Europe in the economic and cultural sense. Hundreds of mosques and churches were built with lively cultural activities. Sarajevo should be seen as a miracle, like a miniature of this heritage. If you understand Sarajevo, you can understand the whole Ottoman history. It resembles the case of key individuals who personify the spirit of certain centuries as a prototype of mentality. For instance, if you understand Hegel you can understand the German mentality of the 19th century. Similarly, Sarajevo is a prototype of the Ottoman civilization. Sarajevo has been the prototype of the Balkan region, and the global rise of the Balkans. Similarly, later in the 19th century, Mehmed Ali-paa (Kavalal Mehmet Ali Pasha), who was an Albanian from origin, not only became one of the leading figures of the Ottoman state but also the founder of modern Egypt. If there was no Ottoman tradition, Egyptians wouldnt see any Albanians in their lives, and Mehmed Ali-Pasha would have lived only as a Bey or intelligent person in his homeland. To reiterate, leading individuals constitute the prototypes of a civilization. We could learn from these examples that the Balkan region has a peculiar destiny because of its particular geo-political, geo-cultural and geo-economic characteristics. The Balkan region will either become the centre of world politics, or the victim of global competition.
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The Balkan region was divided after the 19th century and remained fragmented so far. Today whenever we speak of the Balkan region; we speak of divisions, ethnic clashes, rather than culture and civilization. The absence of geo-cultural interaction leads to cultural clashes; absence of geo-economic transactions leads to economic stagnation; and the absence of political authority leads to becoming a buffer zone for major conflicts. Now, it is time to reunite all these and rediscover the spirit of the Balkans. In order to alleviate the geo-political buffer zone character of Balkans and save the region from becoming a victim of violent conflicts, we have to create a new sense of unity in our region. We have to strengthen regional ownership of cooperation initiatives and a regional commonsense. Human beings are gray, like history. It is up to us to decide and to take initiative in order to solve our problems. As history is gray, a current perspective depends on the specific part of history you select to interpret current developments. Balkan history is not only a history of conflicts, on the contrary between the 16th and the 19th centuries, Balkan history was a success story. We can reinvent and reestablish this success by creating a new political ownership, a new multicultural coexistence and a new economic zone. Multicultural coexistence is very important because the rise of a civilization could only be understood by analyzing city structures and the cultural trends in these structures. If a city is uniform, it means that the civilization concerned is not diversified and rich. That indicates an inward-looking, closed society. For instance, before the Roman Empire, Rome was full of Romans and the people living in the city were just Romans. But later, when the Roman Empire was established, Rome became a cosmopolitan city. Similarly, Istanbul and many other cities could be given as examples. All Balkan cities were multicultural throughout history. We lived together and because of strong cultural diversity, there was a rise in multicultural interaction. In the 1990s, those who organized the massacres in Srebrenica and Eastern Bosnia, were barbaric people who did not want to tolerate differences in the cultural sense. The spirit of Sarajevo is the spirit of coexistence and the spirit of living together. As the Republic of Turkey, we would like to construct a new Balkan region based on political dialogue, economic interdependence, cooperation and integration, as well as cultural harmony and tolerance. These were the Ottoman Balkans, and hopefully we will reestablish the spirit of these Balkans. Critical writers call our approach neo-Ottomanism, therefore I do not want to refer to the Ottoman state as a foreign policy issue. What I am underlying
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is the Ottoman legacy; the Ottoman centuries in the Balkans were peace and success stories. Now we have to reinvent the underlying dynamics of that period and this is the basic foreign policy parameter for Turkey. I came to Bosnia for a visit of less then 24 hours, because Bosnia goes through a very critical transformation stage. I wanted to show our solidarity with Bosnia-Herzegovina. I wanted to show that we are here, we are with the Bosnians, and we will continue to be with the Bosnians. This transition is so important, because the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be protected in order to have security and stability in our region. If Bosnia-Herzegovina is not secure and stable, we cannot have security and stability in the Balkans. The Turkish perspective in this region is to reestablish a new regional order based on the understanding of a political dialogue, solving problems through dialogue, intensive economic relations and cultural coexistence and harmony. In the 1990s, we faced many difficulties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. When those difficulties occurred, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, and Kosovo turn their face to Turkey because of their special historical relations. This geopolitical buffer zone, geo-cultural interaction and geo-economic transaction characteristics of the Balkans are the same characteristics shared with Iraq and Afghanistan. We did witness similar problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq and Afghanistan because all these three states are the mini-models of their respective regions. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a miniature of the Balkans; you have Bosnians, Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox groups, Serbs and Croats living together. Similarly Iraq is a small Middle-East where Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Shiites, Sunnis live together. Afghanistan is a small subcontinent in Central Asia, where you see Tajiks, Peshtuns and Hazaras side by side. Therefore, these counties are critical countries. If they are governed properly, regional peace and stability could be achieved; but if there are serious administrative mistakes, the outcome will be violent conflict and regional crises. Turkey is a small Balkans, a small Middle East and a small Caucasia. There are more Bosnians living in Turkey then those living in Bosnia; more Albanians living in Turkey then those living in Albania; more Chechens living in Turkey then in Chechnya; more Abkhazians than those living in Abkhazia. Besides, we have Kurds, Arabs and Turks living together, because of the Ottoman legacy. For all these Muslim nationalities in the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East, Turkey is a safe haven and homeland. You are most welcome as well, because Anatolia belongs to you; and make sure that Sarajevo is ours. If you come to Turkey for whatever reason, you will be most welcome; but first and foremost we want you to be safe and secure here as the owners
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of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we have to deal with what happens in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a matter of responsibility. Despite all our political responsibilities, we intensified our efforts on Bosnia-Herzegovina. When we met with Secretary Hillary Clinton in Zurich to talk on the Armenian issue, I raised the Bosnian issue and we discussed Bosnia longer than the Armenian issue. Then, H.E. President Haris Silajdi came to Ankara where we had many deliberations last week and I decided to change my schedule and came to Sarajevo. A Western Diplomat reportedly asked Why are you, the Turks, parachuting on this issue to question our involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I responded to our Ambassador who brought the news that We did not go to Bosnia with parachutes, we went there by horse and stayed there with Bosnians sharing the same destiny. Our understanding is that whatever happens in the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East is just like a national issue. Whatever happens, one day I will be in Iraq, another day in Azerbaijan, or Bosnia, as Turkeys Minister of Foreign Affairs. Again, with Secretary Clinton I made a joke in June, saying When I sit in Ankara and make a one-thousand-kilometers-wide circle around my office, there are 72 countries all of which include our relatives. Every day in our Office at the Ministry, news could arrive from any of these countries and could change our schedule. This is a clear reflection of our historical depth which underlines our strategic depth. In June, I went to North Afghanistan to Mesari-erif (Mazar-i Shareef) and visited six cities. Usually when Western Ministers and diplomats visit the country, they usually meet at the Kabul Airport and return to their countries. Only the Turkish Ministers can safely visit six cities in Afghanistan in succession without any difficulty. Because, just like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan is our country, we do not feel as foreigners in Afghanistan. In Mazar-i Shareef, the governor of Belh sat next to me and started to ask: Oh Minister, we need a school, a hospital and a park. I called the TIKA Coordinator and asked him to take notes. The Turkish journalists traveling with us were surprised and said that He was requesting as if you are a Minister of Afghanistan, or he is the Governor of Konya. Indeed, he was so relaxed, because he thought that I have to meet those demands. For him Turkey is a great country and the Turkish Minister has a capacity without limits, he is supposed solve all their problems. It is our historic duty. After two or three weeks, I went to Sandak (Sandjak) with a delegation and there as well, the people of Sandak started to ask for a school and their needs. Because they were thinking that, the Turks were responsible to accomplish all those demands and they were right. For them, Turkey means a political center; for them Turkey is a place
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where they can go for a shelter; Turkish people or statesmen are capable people who could find solutions to their problems. We can not be weak, from their perspective. Therefore, our foreign policy must be proactive, we cannot ignore any of these geographies. For example, a Bosnian and someone from Dagestan in Russia may be far away from each other. One of them is a Russian citizen, or an Azari; and the Bosnian is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But in an apartment block in Turkey, a Bosnian, an Azari, an Albanian and a Chechen could live together. You may see that the countries we mentioned could be geographically far away. But in Turkey, people originally from these countries are living in the same house because of this historical legacy. Therefore, our foreign policy aims to establish order in all these surrounding regions; the Balkans, the Middle East and Caucasia. Because, if there is no order, then, we will pay the price together. For a diplomat from the West or another part of the world, the Bosnian issue is a technical issue to deal with, a technical diplomatic process. But for us, it is a life and death issue, it is so important. The territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina is as important for us as the territorial integrity of Turkey. The prosperity and security of Sarajevo is as important as the security and prosperity of Istanbul. This is not only the feeling or responsibility of our statesmen; this is the feeling and emotion of any individual Turk living in Turkey. During the Bosnian War, the first person who was martyred by the Serbs came from Bitlis in Eastern Anatolia. Did he think that Bosnia was a far away place? Absolutely not; he saw Bosnia as his own homeland. Today, I reminded to our leaders here as well that there were two large-scale spontaneous demonstrations in Turkey during my lifetime. One of them was in 1993 when there arrived news that the Serbs used chemical weapons in Gorade. The broadcast was made at seven or eight oclock in the evening and in two hours hundreds and thousands of people gathered in the streets spontaneously. If they were asked to walk Bosnia that night, they would not hesitate. This is the way we are linked to each other. In short, our history is the same history, our destiny is the same destiny and our future is the same future. Just like the rise of the Ottoman Balkans in the 16th century as the center of world politics, we will make these regions and Turkey the center of world politics in the future. This is the objective of Turkish foreign policy and we will achieve this. We will reintegrate the Balkans region, the Middle East and Caucasia based on the principle of regional and global peace for all humanity. Thank you very much for inviting me and Allaha emanet.
IRCICA Genel Direktr ve BALMED Bakan Dr. Halit Erenin A Konumas
Sayn Bakanm, Bosna Hersek Gvenlik Bakanm Sayn Sadk Ahmetovi, Sayn TKA temsilcisi, Sayn Saraybosna leri Aratrmalar Merkezi Direktr ve mensuplar, Kymetli Misafirler, Osmanl Miras ve Gnmzde Balkanlarda Mslman Toplumlar konulu uluslararas konferansn al vesilesiyle sizleri saygyla selamlyor, hepinize hogeldiniz diyorum. Sayn Bakanm, Balkanlar Medeniyet Merkezi BALMEDin T.C. Babakanlk Trk birlii ve Kalknma daresi Bakanl-TKA ve BALMEDin Bosna-Hersek temsilcilii ile Saraybosna leri Aratrmalar Merkezinin birlikte dzenledii bu konferans terifiniz bizler iin gerek bir onur ve iftihar vesilesi olmu, BALMEDin bu tarih gnne anlam ve nem katmtr. Zatalinize ve Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Hkmetine desteklerinden dolay mteekkiriz. BALMED, tarihte ve gnmzde Balkanlardaki kltr ve medeniyet zenginlikleri ile Balkan kltrlerinin baka kltrel havzalarla etkileim iinde geliim srelerini incelemek, bu kltrleri dnyaya tantmak, bu konulardaki bilimsel ve akademik incelemeleri tevik etmek, kltr miras varlklarn aratrmak, sanat ve mimarlk alanndaki tarih eserlerin restorasyonunu salamak gibi amalarla yl nce kurulmu bir sivil toplum kuruluudur. Stats ve hedefleri gereince faaliyetlerini Trkiye ve Balkan lkelerinde ilgili devlet kurumlaryla koordinasyon ve akademik kurumlarla ibirlii iinde dzenleyen BALMED, benzer alanlarda faaliyet gsteren dier kurulularla
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gl ilikilerin tesisine de nem vermektedir. Balkanlar kltr manzaras, daha ilk bakta gze arpan eitlilik ve canllyla gnmzde uluslararas kamuoyunda nemi gittike artan dinler ve kltrler aras diyalog konusunu dorudan artrp dndrmektedir. Blgedeki kltr mozayii buradaki toplumlarn dinler ve kltrler aras ilikiler asndan tarih boyu yaadklar eitli tecrbelerin bir aynasdr. Uyumun uyumsuzlua, adaletin adaletsizlie, yaknlamann yabanclamaya galip gelecei, dmanlklarn silinecei bir dnyaya dair bitmeyen araytan dnya toplumlar iinde Balkan milletleri ciddi bir pay almtr. Getiimiz yzyllarda Balkan kltr ve medeniyeti, ok dinli ve ok kltrl Osmanl sentezinin merkezinde yer almtr. Balkanlardaki Osmanl hakimiyeti bir medeniyet mozayiinin de tarihi olmutur. Osmanlnn ryas olan Efltunun ideal devletinin temelleri Balkanlarda atlmtr. Balkanlardaki alt yz yllk Osmanl tarihinin balca miras nfusun kltrel eitlilii olmu ve bu yap Osmanl idar sisteminin slamn evrensel hogr prensiplerini uygulayan zellikleri sayesinde uyum iinde korunmutur. Kltrel deer ve kimliklerini muhafaza eden Balkan toplumlar ayn zamanda Osmanl Devletinin blgeye verdii byk nem dolaysyla ok ciddi imar hizmetleri alm; vakflar, ktphaneler, okullar ve deiik inanlara ait ok sayda ibadethaneler ina edilmitir. Osmanlnn dnya tasavvurunda da Balkanlarn nemli bir yeri vardr. Modern Trk iirinin kurucularndan Yahya Kemal, 1884 ylnda hem anne hem de baba tarafndan Evld- Fatihan torunu olarak, o srada bir Osmanl ehri olan skpte dnyaya gelmitir. Kaybolan ehir adl iirinde Yahya Kemal, skpten Bursann ar Danda devam diye bahsetmektedir. skpteki ocukluk gnlerinin muhitinin ise uhrev bir lem olduunu belirtmektedir. Bu uhrev lemin son temsilcilerinden birisi olan bilge kral Aliya zzetbegovii bu vesile ile saygyla yd etmek isterim. Osmanl dneminde yzyllarca bar ve uyum iinde yaayan Balkan toplumlar sonraki dnemlerde ciddi sosyal karmaalar ve siyasi basklarla karlam, blgedeki kltrel farkllklar kt niyetli baz odaklar tarafndan istismar edilerek geni apl insani trajedilerin yaanmasna yol almtr. Tm bu tecrbeler Balkanlarn sosyal ve kltrel yapsna, mill ve kltrel kimlikler ile ortak toplumsal bilin oluumuna ve Balkan toplumlar arasndaki farkllklara ramen bir kader birlii ifade eden tarih miras ile ortak gelecek algsna yansmtr. Balkan medeniyetinin slam medeniyeti ve mslman toplumlarla etkileim sonucu gelien karakteri ve bundan doan zengin slam kltr miras yirminci yzyln sonlarna kadar pek gznne kamamtr. Ancak 1990lardan itibaren yerleen
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ok tarafl d ilikilere ak uluslararas politikalar tm milletler arasnda olduu gibi bu blge ile tarihten gelen irtibatlar bulunan milletler arasnda da ortak kltrel zemin zerinde glenen beraberlikleri desteklemitir. Birazdan rneklerini vereceim gibi, ayn da ak politikalar sayesinde salanan olumlu ortamda tarih ve kltr aratrmalar dhil olmak zere Balkan incelemeleri alannda hatr saylr gelimeler salanmtr. Bu erevede zellikle, toplumlarn birbirleri hakkndaki bilgilerini objektif ilm aratrmalar yoluyla tazeleyen ve gerektiinde tashih eden kurum ve giriimlerin uzun vadede toplumlar ve kltrler aras dayanmaya dorudan hizmet etmi olacaklar vurgulanmaldr. Hem BALMEDin hem de hlen Genel Direktrln yrttm slam Konferans Tekilt/slam Tarih, Sanat ve Kltr Aratrma Merkezi-IRCICAnn faaliyetlerinin dayand temel prensiplerden birisi budur. Toplumlarn ortak problemlerinin zmn hedefleyen uluslararas kltrel ibirlii projeleri balamnda Balkan lkeleri hkmetleri ve gerek akademik gerekse kltrel kurumlarla ilikilerimizde karlatmz olumlu yaklamlar almalarmz tevik etmitir. IRCICA imdiye kadar pek ou kendi konularnda kaynak kitap olarak kabul grm yzden fazla kitap yaynlamtr. Ayrca altm kongre, 300 civarnda konferans ve 220den fazla sergi organize etmitir. Dnyann eitli blgelerinde hkmetler, niversiteler ve kltr kurumlaryla ibirlii halinde dzenlediimiz ve o blgelerdeki slam medeniyeti tarihi, bilim, mimar, ehircilik, sanat, dil ve edebiyat, kltr miras konularn ele alan kongreler serisi iinde Balkanlarda slam Medeniyeti konusundaki kongrelerimize burada dikkatinizi ekmek isterim. Balkanlarda slam Kltr ve Medeniyeti ile ilgili olarak dzenlediimiz kongrelerden birincisi 2000 ylnda Sofyada, Yksek slam Ettleri Enstits, Bulgar Bilimler Akademisinin Balkan ncelemeleri Enstits, Sofya niversitesi Dou Dilleri ve Kltrleri Enstits, Sofya Mill Ktphanesi, Sofya Aznlklar ncelemeleri ve Kltrleraras likileri Merkezi ve stanbul SAR Vakf ile ibirlii iinde dzenlenmitir. Hem Bulgaristan hem de Balkanlarda alannda bir ilk olan bu kongreye Arnavutluk, Azerbaycan, Bosna-Hersek, Bulgaristan, Kanada, Kosova, Makedonya, Romanya, Srbistan ve Trkiyeden 63 deerli katlmc bildiriler sunmulard. Balkanlarda slam Medeniyeti konulu ikinci kongre 2003 ylnda Tiranda dnemin Arnavutluk Babakannn himayelerinde yaplmtr. Yzden fazla aratrmacnn doksan yedi bildiri sunduu bu kongre Arnavutluk Bilimler Akademisi, Arivler Genel Mdrl, Tiran niversitesi ve SAR Vakf tarafndan dzenlenmitir. Ayn temal nc kongre ise 2006da, Romanya Cumhurbakannn himayelerinde IRCICA ile
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Bkre niversitesi Trkiyat Blm ve Romanya Akademisi tarafndan ortaklaa dzenlenmitir. 2000 ylndan bu yana Balkan hkmetlerinin bu yksek seviyedeki himayesiyle dzenlenen bu kongrelerin drdncs 2010da Makedonyada, Bilimler Akademisi ile ortaklaa dzenlenecektir. Bu almalar dnda, IRCICAnn yazl kltr miras zerinde yapt bibliyografya almalar da Balkan ve Trk toplumlar arasndaki kltr alveriini ortaya karmaya yardmc olmaktadr. El yazmas slam eserleri ve kltr kaynaklar zerindeki almalarmz erevesinde 1990da yaplan ve Macar Bilimler Akademisi ile dzenlediimiz seminer Dou Avrupada bulunan ve Mslman milletlerin dillerindeki yazma eserleri konu almt. Ayrca katalog ve bibliyografyalarmzda OsmanlBalkan yazl kltr miras da dier blgelerin kltr tarihiyle beraber yer almaktadr. Osmanlnn son dnemlerinde Balkan lkelerinden gelip Trkiyeye yerleerek tarih, felsefe, mzik alanlarnda kitaplar yazan; Avrupada kan bilim, mhendislik, corafya kaynaklarn Trkeye eviren ahslar ile Trkiyeden Balkanlara gelmi Trklerin almalar kayda geirilmitir. Osmanl dnemi bilim tarihiyle ilgili on be ciltlik biyo-bibliyografyalar serimizde ise Balkan lkelerinde astronomi, matematik, corafya, mzik, tp, eczaclk, veterinerlik, asker sanatlar gibi alanlarda eser veren bilimadamlarnn almalar kaydedilmitir. Bu lkelerin ktphanelerinde bulunan ve Osmanl dneminde bu lkelerin dilleri ile Trke, Arapa ve Farsa yazlm binlerce yazma ve basma eser, burada yrtlm ilm ve edeb faaliyetin rnleridir. BALMEDin faaliyet alanna giren birok konuda gnmzde hala birtakm eksiklikler ve nemli ihtiyalar bulunduu grlmektedir. Bu ihtiyalar blge niversitelerinde katldmz toplantlarda, zellikle slam incelemeleri ve Trkiyat blmlerindeki grmelerimizde ve bahsettiim kongreler ile bibliyografya almalarnda aka ortaya kmaktadr. BALMED programna yakn zamanda alnacak nemli inceleme alanlarndan biri, Balkan lkeleri ile Trkiye arasndaki karlkl tarih literatrne dairdir. Baka bir deyile, Balkan lkelerinde yazlm Trk kltr ve tarihiyle ilgili veya Trk tarihine deinen kaynaklar ile, Trkiyede bulunan Osmanl dnemi tarihilerinin Balkan lkeleriyle ilgili tutmu olduklar kaytlar zerindeki incelemelerin ve bilgi birikiminin arttrlmas gerektii ilgili uzmanlarca tespit edilmektedir. Trkler ile Balkan milletleri arasnda yzyllar sren siyas, kltrel ve ekonomik temaslar neticesinde Trkler ve Trkiye ile ilgili Bonak, Arnavut, Bulgar, Romen belgeleri ve dier lkelerdeki belgeler ile bu toplumlarn tarihi ve kltr hakkndaki Trkiyede bulunan belgeler son derece hacimlidir. Yirminci yzyln ikinci yarsndan gnmze kadar bu alanlarda ilim adamlar tarafndan karlkl gayretlerle, kronikler ve ariv bel-
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geleri zerinde eitli almalar yaplm olsa da, bu alana daha fazla kurumsal destek verilmesi gerekmektedir. IRCICA ve BALMED dndaki aratrma kurumlar ve tabiatyla niversitelerimiz tarafndan bu alanlarda deerli almalar yaplmaktadr. Bu tr almalarn Balkan lkelerinde ve Trkiyede bu alanlara artan ilgi neticesinde ve ilk elden tarihi kaynaklar olarak byk nem tayan devlet ariv belgelerinin aratrmaclarn kullanmna almasyla gelieceini mid ediyoruz. Biz kendi amzdan, Balkan lkelerinden siyas tarih, sosyal tarih ve kltr tarihi uzmanlaryla yllardan beri srdrdmz ibirlii neticesinde karlkl olarak eserlerin Trke ile blge dilleri arasnda tercme edilip yaynlanmas dhil olmak zere birok alma gerekletirdik. Bugn de bu lkelerden ok deerli akademisyenlerle ilikilerimiz srmektedir. Son zamanlarda bu lkelerden uzmanlarla yaptmz ortak almalar arasnda, IRCICAnn daha nce Trke, ngilizce, Rusa, Arapa basmlar yaymlanan Osmanl Devleti Tarihi ve Medeniyeti kitabnn Bonaka basmn Saraybosna arkiyat Enstitsnn, Arnavuta basmn ise TKA ve Arnavutluk slam Dncesi ve Medeniyeti Merkezinin deerli ibirlikleri sayesinde gerekletirdik. BALMEDin nem verdii bir dier konu, Balkan lkelerinde Trk tarihi ve kltr incelemelerinin ve Trkiyede Balkan toplumlarnn tarih ve kltryle ilgili aratrmalarn gelitirilmesinde lisansst tezlerin oynad nemli rol dikkate alarak, bu almalar tevik edici programlar yrtmektir. Ayrca balangta deindiim gibi, Balkanlardaki mimar ve ehircilik miras da balca faaliyet alanlarmzdan birini oluturmaktadr. Bugne kadar IRCICA ve SAR Vakf bnyesinde yaptmz mimar inceleme ve koruma almalar, zellikle Mostarda 1994-2004 arasnda yaplan yllk atlyeler, Balkanlardaki Osmanl mimar eserleriyle ilgili yaynlarmz yoluyla edinilen tecrbenin aktarlmasn salam, ayrca eitli Balkan lkelerinde camiler, sebiller ve baka antlarn restorasyonu uluslararas ekip almalar yoluyla gerekletirilmitir. Bundan sonra da BALMED gerekli ihtiyalar yerinde tespit ederek eitli fonksiyonlar iin ina edilmi slam mimar mirasn temsil eden binalar restore etmek ve korumak iin projeler yrtecektir. BALMED Balkanlardaki tarih miras geni bir bak asyla ele alp bu mirasn kltrel kimliini korumak ve tantmak amacndadr. Bu dorultuda ilgili lkelerde kamu kurumlar, niversiteler ve sivil toplum rgtleriyle youn bir ibirlii iinde almalarn srdrecektir. Balkanlardaki Osmanl mirasnn ele alnaca bu toplant, Balkan lkelerindeki gen Mslman aydn ve bilimadamlarn bir araya getirmektedir. nmzdeki dnemlerde daha geni kapsaml, farkl din ve kltrlere mensup entelektel ve
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bilimadamlarn bir araya getirecek toplantlar yapmay planlyoruz. Bu toplantnn baarl gemesini ve hayrlara vesile olmasn temenni ediyorum. Szlerimi noktalarken, toplantmza eref veren T.C. Dileri Bakan Sayn Ahmet Davutoluna kranlarm sunmak istiyorum. Katklar iin T.C. Babakanlk Trk birlii ve Kalknma daresi Bakanl-TKAnn Bakan Sayn Musa Kulaklkayaya ve Bosna-Hersek Koordinatrne teekkr ediyorum. Bu konferansn dzenlenmesi srecinde saladklar yksek ibirlii ve nemli katklar iin Saraybosna leri Aratrmalar Merkezi Direktr Sayn Ahmet Alibaie candan teekkrlerimi sunuyorum. Ayrca bu toplantnn organizasyonunda fiilen en byk paya sahip olan BALMED Saraybosna temsilcisi Sayn Sleyman Mert Hangne de canugnlden teekkr ediyor, Sayn Bakanm ve kymetli davetlileri saygyla selamlyorum.
The Imposing Challenge of the Ottoman legacy

ahmet alibai*
Your excellencies Dear colleagues and students Ladies and gentlemen Good evening, Dobro vam vee, iyi akamlar and Assalamu alaikum Allow me first to welcome our guests to our beloved country often described as the country of three peoples, four traditional religions and a thousand problems real and artificial. We have gathered to discuss one of those problems; an issue that hovers over the heads of everybody when the nature of this and other torn Balkan societies is discussed, i.e., The Imposing Challenge posed by the Ottoman legacy. The issue is not a new one. It has been with us for decades and centuries but it has not been concluded in a satisfactory way for anybody. We here in the Balkans still hold parallel truths about our common past, we tell our children divergent stories, we teach them conflicting histories. To be fair to everybody, it is not an easy to settle this issue and leave it behind. For Muslims of the Balkans the dilemma is what to do with a legacy that constitutes a key component of their national identity but is perceived by their fellow citizens as their national tragedy. How do you mark, grieve or celebrate dates which simultaneously meant the end of the independence of your homeland and the beginning of your religious identity both very dear to you? For non-Muslims the challenge is equally formidable: how do you manage the
*director, center for advanced studies 27
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intense negative feelings about the Ottoman history that were inculcated in you by your family, your school, and your culture when you know that the same names, events and dates evoke opposite emotions in the hearts and minds of your neighbors next door. This is certainly not an easy intellectual and emotional exercise and I would like to emphasize both; cognitive and emotional sides of the process - even without any manipulation, fear and hate mongering on the part of extreme nationalists. When the issue is politicized, as actually is the case, the task of reconciling centuries of our common past with the requirements of the present and future common living becomes even more difficult. As organizers we hope that during these three days we will make some progress along this thorny road of reconciliation with our common past. We also hope that this conference will be an important step towards more intensive future cooperation between the Balkan intellectuals and researchers in various fields. As a Bosniak I must say that we are also very glad that the Republic of Turkey is back diplomatically in the region. We are hopeful that it will contribute significantly to the resolution of a number of burning issues. Finally allow me to express my gratitude to BALMED, TKA, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and a whole lot of people who made this event possible. I wish you a pleasant stay in Sarajevo. Thank you for your attention. Tesekkur ederim.
The Ottoman Legacy as a Common Layer of the Balkan Muslim Identities

Ferid muhi*
In the last decade of the past millennium, twelve years ago, Turkey celebrated seven hundred years of the establishment of the Ottoman State, and since then the interpretations of its impact, influence and general historic significance are still bitterly confronted. Controversies about the real character of the legacy of this huge military, political, economic, cultural and spiritual system which lasted almost 650 years are radical, and evaluations of every single issue are, more often than not, diametrically opposed. But it would be wrong to conclude that the dispute on Ottoman legacy is nothing but another case of civilization clash of the type suggested by Huntington notorious book, which attempted to confront Occidental (Christian) perspective against the Oriental (Muslim) perspective. Odd as it may appear, when we talk about general reception of the Ottoman Empire, the views are sharply divided not only within the Muslim world, but even inside the Turkey. Some influential Turkish intellectuals with radical views holds that the very act of celebration of Ottoman Empire (Osmanli Devlet) was in sharp contradiction with the Turkish Revolution, stating that the new Turkish Republic is total and complete negation of Ottoman State. They went so far as to write open letters to the president of T.R. protesting against the celebration. In contrast to this, we strongly believe that the general logic of historic argumentation does not support such extremely negative attitude and polarization. Quite contrary, sound and objective argumentation goes in favor of the conclusion which confirm the fact of uninterrupted historic continuity of many basic philosophic,
*Professor, university of skopje. 29
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spiritual and administration organizational qualities which connects not only the political unity of Turkish history and Turkish people, but also of the elements of cultural unity on all its enormous territory, pointing to a number of fundamentally positive results embedded in the practice of Ottoman Empire, which are progressive and anticipatory even today. We would like also to emphasize the fact that Turkish state authorities, notably the president Suleiman Demirel gave clear and straightforward support to the celebration affirming the fact that Ottoman Empire and Republic values are not necessarily in collision with each other. Even Turkish Army, which did not take part in public discussion, has participated in the celebration, with a very positive and inspiring effect on general public mood and opinion. The fact that widely spread ideologically inspired practice of deionization of the past and uncritical affirmation of the present, with all its negative impact, did not prevail, but was forced to retreat, both in theory and in practice, is of utmost importance for science as well as for the affirmation of the principles of tolerance and understanding in Turkey, in the Balkans and in the European relationship. Speaking about the toponym The Balkans it should be said that it also preserved strong elements of this negative ideological reception, remaining without a good reason, a synonym for back warded, oriental, Islamic, barbaric, divided lands in permanent and irrational conflict. For a long historical period, more than 2000 years, Balkans unified and modeled Greek-Roman-Slavic communities, remaining Ottoman for more than 550 years of its most recent history. All this evidence still is not correctly recognized. We see that even today the term Balkans is replaced with descriptive floscula South-Eastern Europe.2 This is completely meaningless since it deprives The Balkans from all its history and cultural peculiarity. In Roman times, Balkan was known as Haemus, preserving its identity, and the Turkish name Balkan does the same, even much more explicitly and in stronger way. Although the term designates Mountain Chain, its further derivation discloses even more power and beauty. Divided in two words, Balkans consists of Bal and Kan namely Honey and Blood. Two most precious substances of life, unite in this syntagma means not only the sweet and healing qualities of honey, but also of life giving blood, energy, vitality, the virulent
2 critical and well argumented comments on the misusage of toponym the Balkans, see in the article of Prof. dr. Ilber Ortayli: The Balkans and the Ottoman Inheritance , published in The Great ottoman-Turkish Civilization, ankara 2000, Vol. III, pp. 241-245
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and creative power of Balkan people. Be as it is, there is nothing in the history of the Balkans, which would rightfully include any pejorative context in its name, nor which would justify tendency to erase this toponym, and much less to be ashamed of it. Great deal of arguments against such a negative attitude toward the Ottomans and the Balkans is deeply impregnated in the speech which the president Demirel delivered to the Grand National Assembly on October 1, 1999, where, among other, is stated:
The Ottoman empire of which we are the founders and the inheritors and whose seven hundred anniversary we are celebrating this year, has had a decisive role in the formation of mediterranean and european cultural milieu for 624 years. The fact that we are the heirs of world empire that has ruled over the meeting point of three seas, three continents and various cultural traditions has a direct impact on our past as well as on our future. It is therefore an imperative to understand our history properly and grasp its place in the history of humanity.3
With these introductory but indispensable clarifications, we could turn back to our main topic. The title clearly defines the topic, if not even the thesis, within two key points:
That Balkan Muslim identities share one or more fundamental common feature, with plausible conclusion that this feature/s integrate them into a kind of social or cultural unity;
1
That by its organization, structure and practice, it was the Ottoman legacy which created the factors capable to complete this process of integration.
2
Concerning the first point, it should be demonstrate that the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious composition of the population of Ottoman Empire did not prevent, at least in the Balkan territories, formation of a new type of social and cultural cohesion and interplay of different groups sharing basically common layer which resulted in creation of Balkan Muslim identities. As for the second point, it is necessary to connect the creation of Balkan Muslim identities, with concrete social, political and cultural practice of Ottoman Empire. The key point to be verified here is that the Ottoman Empire created and successfully implemented instruments to set the social, political and cultural conditions which not only did not prevented the process of integration, but even more, in fact does encouraged such informal
3
Website of the presidency: www.tccb.gov.tr
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processes of integration on deeper and higher, albeit informal level, resulting eventually in the formation of Balkan Muslim identities. The fact that ethnical Albanians, Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Pomaks, Torbessh (Gorans) living today in the region of the Balkans, recognize and share the common layer as Balkan Muslim identities, evidently proves the first point. The list of instruments via which Ottoman Empire imprinted its legacy in this common layer of Balkan Muslim identities, should include several key factors. Administration laws The first and indispensable factor for successful formation of common layer for the Balkan Muslim communities was its specific approach of Ottoman legacy to the population. Needless to say, any social group, tribe, nation or state depends entirely on its population. Demographic structure of Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and elsewhere included high percentage of non-Muslims. The process of integration, the must for every state, was confronted with an exceptional diversity of the population living in the Empire. Main canal for its integration was the conversion to Islam. In Anatolia lands, the process started before the Ottomans, as early as late tenth and the beginning of eleventh century. Islam conversion in the Balkans was dated in the first half of the fourteenth century. But while the conversion to Islam in the regions of Anatolia lead to the process of Turkicisation, this did not happen in the Balkans. The cases of conversion to Islam and Turkicisation where not going hand to hand, and the conversion to Islam without being Turkicised was the general rule and widespread practice. The Muslim Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks, Torbessh (Gorans) are widely known cases the practice of being Muslim without being Turkicised. The Muslims and non-Muslims had lived together for long time in Ottoman Empire. In the peak of ottoman Empire they lived in peaceful manner. So that the expression Pax Ottomanica was used to describe the peaceful and well arranged coexistence of the Muslims and non-Muslims. In this respect it is preserved the famous saying of Mahmoud II:I would like to see Muslims in mosque, Christians in the church and the Jews in synagogue. There are no differences among each other. I feel love to all and my justice is equal to all. All of them are like my own sons. But in reality, the differences remain to exist. Islamic Law categories the inhabitants of Ottoman Empire into two categories: Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims existed divided into different groups but the Islamic Law accepts Muslims as single entity.
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Non-Muslims were divided into two groups: Pagans and The People of the Book. In as much as the People of the Book lived in Ottoman Empire they were called Ehl-i Zimmet usually Zimmet comprising the Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and those who idolize the stars Sabils. The Christians were more populated, but the Jews had greater influence in economics. The Christians were categorized in two groups: Catholics (five groups); Non-Catholics (mostly Orthodox and Gregorians, plus five more sub-groups). In the beginning non-Muslims where from 20 ethnical groups. Among them 90% of Bosnians converted into Islam, as well as 80% of Albanians.4 It is important to say that the Ottoman Empire was multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multilingual state namely, that its population was far from being homogenous. Social and inter-cultural communication between Muslim and non-Muslim population, who were living together, was pragmatic and political imperative. They all were united by the drive to include into the dominant culture, be it through Islamisation or otherwise. Factor of economy The influence of capitation tax harac/ciziye generally is over exaggerated. Muslims two paid heavy taxes, in fact heavier than non-Muslims. Military service was obligation only for Muslims. The fact is that the State did not carry out Islamic conversion as its policy.5 Third factor - Islam Organized strictly and completely in accordance with the supreme Islamic values. The social reality, in all its complexity, was based on religious, philosophical, social, economical, educational and legal premises of Islam. Its mind, as well as its body, its ideal and its logic, its spirit and its will, its character and its emotions, all were conceptualized, organized and plasticized in strict respect of the fundamental postulates of Islam. The understanding of lawful and forbidden, concepts of pride and shame, esthetic standards of beautiful and ugly, criteria of truth and false, final goals of science, ultimate ideals of education all and every sector of social reality and
4 see instructive study of Yavuz ercan: non-muslim communities under the Ottoman empire (millet system). 5 For more detailed analysis of the composition of Ottoman empire population, from the first up to the last century of the Ottoman empire, see Yunus koc:The structure of Population of the Ottoman empire (1300-1900).
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subjective reception of the world, the life of each and every individual/citizens, was permeated and shaped to the tiniest details by Islamic World view Weltanschauung. It is correct to say that out of the last seven centuries of its history, at least six hundred years Turkey was the most powerful Islamic state in the world, strictly founded on the key principles of Islam paradigmatic for the world of Islam, and leading in all its social, economic, philosophic, cultural and organizational aspects. To recover its Islamic legacy therefore, means for contemporary Turkey the quest to regain self-respect, to re-adopt its true identity, to fully understand its integrity. In all key aspects on the level of philosophical concept, applied as political practice, and completed as the social reality, contemporary Turkey would do best to reintegrate elements of its Islamic character. By reclaiming and reaffirming its Islamic heritage, contemporary Turkey would not jeopardize its modern secular character, since it in no way contradicts its spiritual essence. It only will make greater its capacity to face the challenges of modern world successfully, as it will sharpen its self-esteem and self-consciousness, promoting thus contemporary Turkey to the status it deserves to its real splendor and significance as authentic political actor and genuine cultural factor of global importance. From the same perspective, it is necessary to point that the example of Turkey would have tremendous political, spiritual, and psychological implications on South Eastern Europe, primarily in the Balkans, where the legacy of Osmanli Devlet is still the strongest factor, making humanistic ideals and ethical values of Islam to be the most vital element of spiritual and axiological system of the region. On the other hand, the fact that the expression Islam and society by no means is to be automatically understood as another way to address the subject Religion and society, is, more often than not, completely overlooked. Correctly interpreted, the difference between this two key notions, would clearly demonstrate that the framework of the Religion-Society relationship should not be understood as sufficient to explore the entire scope and integrating character of Islam-Society relationship. This is because the notion of Islam is not a synonym for the notion religion. The root of the mental situation called religious belief in Islam goes much deeper. As such, Islam presents a kind of specifically structured, internally organized model aimed to coordinate, integrate and harmonize all aspects of social life, with Islam as its functional paradigm and its axiological alibi. I other words, while the etymological root of the term religion points to the internal ties connecting a group of people (Lat. Religare; to tied together, to bond)
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the root of Islam is Din. And the word (term) Din, derived from Arabic DYN, has at least four primary meanings, conceptually interconnected in a way that its ultimate meaning presents the connotative unity. These meanings are: 1. indebtedness; 2. submissiveness; 3. acceptance of the authority of judicious power which regulates the state of indebtedness; 4. natural inclination or tendency to look for the loan giver.6 At this level, we have to point at least to two moments: 1. that connotation of Islam should not be used as synonym for religion from which follows that history of religion/society/education relationship in non-Muslim countries can be of no conclusive, pragmatic, or comparative value for the same relationship in Muslim countries; 2. that the notorious division of social and political organization in two main types of society, generally labeled as theocratic and secular states does not function in societies in which Islam prevails. To separate religion from society and still preserve both to function and coexist normally, in non-Islamic social background is possible; In the states organized in accordance with the principles of Islam (Din), to separate Islam from society is impossible without destroying the authenticity and identity of both: the Islam and the society. The inability to understand this difference and to accept the fact that no society based on the principles of Islam could be divided into so called theocratic and secular state, led Ziya Goekalp to conclude in his notoriously cited book (The principles of Turkism, 1923) that everything related to Turkish example is good, and everything belonging to the Ottoman model is ugly.7 The result of this and many other ideologically inspired texts written in the meantime, was that the Ottoman and the Turkish elements have been regarded as two separate and self-denying entities. Against this and all similar totally un-argumented exclusive confrontation of the notions Ottoman and Turkish (wrongly understood as synonyms for theocratic and secular state), clearly and persuasively speaks the fact that the Ottoman legacy is still preserved and inherited in all its former territories, including the Balkan, strongly shaping Muslim identities to these days. The fact that the new Turkish Republic had defined itself as the inheritor and the continuation of Ottoman Empire should not be overlooked. And rightfully so. Among many other examples, it will suffice to point to the case of Sudi of Bosnia (late XVI century), and ibn Hamza of
6 excellent and exceptionally instructive discussion of all four primary significances of the notion Din, see in syed muhammad naquib al-attas: Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam, kuala lumpur 1995, pp. 41-91. 7 ziya Goekalp: ibid. p. 23.
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Algeria (same period) although both coming from most distant parts of the Empire greatly contributed to the Ottoman and Islamic humanism, exactly because for all people living in Ottoman Devlet, it was quite normal, and even substantial, share the same ideals and values in its vast territory. We could rightfully conclude that the process and long historic practice of shaping of ethnic identities in the Ottoman Empire decisively shaped all aspects of history of the modern Balkan region, becoming integral part of Balkan Muslim identities. The legacy of Ottoman Empire should be included into our understanding of this part of European social, cultural and political reality, in objective and historically correct manner. The Balkans have been the home to Greek-Roman-Slavic elements for more than two thousand years, including more than five hundred years of Ottoman Empire, which un-avoidable resulted in its basic unity expressed in organic interconnectedness of all aspects of its life. There were, of course, some negative elements in the Ottoman Empire legacy which affect these identities even today. The rough, or better to say the ruthless style of intervention of Ottoman State who tended to see itself as a sacred being, placing itself above all other values. This led to the absolutist approach requiring from its subjects absolute obedience such as it was represented in the case of abolition of the Janissary Corps 1826. But it is also true that the permanent idea which provided the continuity of the Ottoman Empire was the clearly defined system of state instruments which encouraged spiritual unity founded on the principles of voluntarily shared supreme values and ultimate goals expressed explicitly in the values of Islam. It is of utmost importance today to reclaim the positive impact of Ottoman legacy and culture, in order to eradicate internal ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts in the Balkans, and to reduce the social and political tensions which were the direct outcome of misunderstanding, or even of intentional falsification of the true meaning of Ottoman legacy. If we are to revive and to affirm the integrity of historical consciousness, we have to abandon the aberrations of even today prevailing ideologically distorted perception and replace it with historically correct and more productive understanding of the true impact of this most important and most influential period of modern history of the Balkans.
TEBLLER
IzlaGanja PROCEEDINGS
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Osmanl Arivinin Rumeli Aratrmalar Asndan nemi

nder Bayr*
Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Babakanlk Devlet Arivleri Genel Mdrl bnyesinde yer alan Osmanl Arivi Daire Bakanl dnya arivleri arasnda olduka mhim ve itibarl bir konuma sahiptir. nk ihtiva ettii belgelerin gerek says gerekse bu belgelerin bilimsel ve kltrel nemi itibariyle dnyann nemli arivlerinden biridir. Osmanl Arivinde 100 milyona yakn belge 365 bin kadar da defter bulunmaktadr; ayrca Osmanl Devletinin irtibat halinde bulunduu 40a yakn Avrupa, Kuzey Afrika ve birok Asya lkesinin tarihine ait bilgi ve belgeler de yine bu Arivimizde yer almaktadr. Btn bunlarn yan sra Trkiye Cumhuriyeti Devletinin hemen her brokratik kurumunun yakn dnem tarihine k tutacak belgeler de yine arivlerimizde bulunmaktadr. Cumhuriyetin ilk yollarndan itibaren Osmanl dnemi evrak zerinde dzenleme almalar devam etmitir. Osmanl Arivinde gerek manada tasnif almalar Hazine-i Evrakn kurulu tarihi olan 8 Kasm 1846 tarihinde balamtr. Bugn Devlet Arivleri Genel Mdrl Osmanl Arivi Daire Bakanl bnyesinde bulunan Hazine-i Evrakn teekklnden hemen sonra tanzim edilen ve hlen orijinal yapsn muhafaza eden rade tasnifleri, Hatt- Hmayun tasnifi, Divan- Hmayun Sicil Defterleri gibi tasniflerin yan sra, Ali Emiri, bnlemin, Muallim Cevdet ve Kamil Kepeci tasnifleri gibi II. Merutiyet ve Cumhuriyetin ilk yllarnda teekkl ettirilen deiik tasnif heyetleri tarafndan meydana getirilmi ve tasnif heyeti bakanlarnn ad ile anlan fonlar da mevcuttur. Merkez devlet dairelerinde, belgelerin saklanmasnda ve korunmasnda gsteri*
T.c. Babakanlk devlet arivleri Genel mdrl Osmanl arivi daire Bakan 39
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len arivcilik anlay, tarada grevli eyalet beylerbeyileri ve mahall kadlardan da istenmitir. Tara tekilat grevlilerine, karar ve ilemlerini defterlere kaydetmeleri ve bu defterleri muhafaza etmeleri emredilmitir. Kanun Sultan Sleyman devrinde Rumeli Beylerbeyi Mehmed Paaya gnderilen 943/1536 tarihli fermanda9 ... Bu hkm-i erfm sretini defterde kaydeyleyp ve kendsin dahi ayniyle defter sandklarnda hfzedp dim mazmn- erf ile amel eyleyesin... ifadesiyle defter sandklarna iaret edilmitir. Bu sandklarn sakland beylerbeyi arivlerinden, Osmanl Arivine vesika intikal etmemitir. Ancak baz eyalet merkezlerinde hl Osmanl dnemi vesikalarnn bulunduu bilinmektedir. ekoslovak aratrc Josef Blaskovicin bir makalesinde Gyngsteki bir vesikaya dayanarak Eri Divnnn, Gng kasabasnda 1647 ylnda kan bir yangn zerine toplanarak, drt yllk vergi ve hizmetleri affettiine dair ifadesinden, bir ksm eyalet arivinin korunarak gnmze ulat anlalmaktadr10. Osmanl Arivindeki ariv malzemesi ncelikle defterler ve belgeler olarak ayrlmtr, bunlar da yine Tanzimat ncesi ve sonras defter ve belge tasnifleri olarak incelenmelidir. Bu yazmzda Osmanl Arivindeki zengin materyal iinde bulunan yalnzca Rumeliye ait fonlar ve katalog bilgileri hakknda malumat verilmitir. Mhimme Defterleri Divn- Hmayn toplantlarnda mzkere edilen dahil ve haric meselelere ait siyas, asker, itima ve iktisad nemli kararlarn kaydedildii bu defterlere Mhimme Defterleri ad verilmitir. Osmanl Arivinde 961-1333/1553-1915 tarihleri arasnda tutulmu 419 adet Mhimme Defteri mevcuttur. XVI. yzyln ortalarndan XX. yzyln ilk yllarna ulaan bir dnem iinde, kk zaman blmleri hari ortalama 350 yllk zaman dilimi itibaryla, hibir dou ve bat devletinde bulunmayan kltr ve tarih zenginliini ihtiva eden Mhimme Defterleri, Osmanl Arivi defter serleri iinde phesiz nemli yer tutar. Bu defterlerin ana konularn; devleti ilgilendiren siyas, iktisad, kltrel, sosyal ve harp tarihine dair st dzey kararlar tekil eder. Mhimme defterlerinde Rumelinin muhtelif blge ve idarecilerine gnderilen pek ok hkm bulunmaktadr.
Kannnme, tf efendi ktp., nr. 1734, vr. 12a. j. Blakovi, Osmanl Hakimiyeti devrinde slovakyadaki Vergi sistemi Hakknda .. edebiyat Fakltesi Tarih Dergisi, stanbul 1979, say 32, s. 191.
9 10
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Kaymakamlk Mhimmesi Padiah ve sadrazamn ayn anda Dersaadetten ayrldnda, devlet ilerini tedvir etmek zere tayin edilen Sadaret kaymakamnn mstakil olarak akdettii divnlarda alnan nemli kararlarn yazld defterlere Kaymakamlk Mhimmesi denmektedir. Mhimme Defterlerindeki kaytlar, mahalline muhatap makama gnderilen berat ve fermanlarn suretleri hviyetindedir. Sadrazamn bakanlnda; kubbe vezirleri, Anadolu ve Rumeli kazaskerleri, defterdar ve niancnn katld Divn toplantlarnda alnan kararlar, padiah tasdikinden getikten sonra kronolojik sra iinde defterlere kaydedilmitir. Ahkm Defterleri Ahkm Defteri, Divn- Hmayndan kan hkmlerin kaydna mahsus olan defterlere genel olarak verilen addr. Bu hkmler, padiah adna hazrlanmasndan dolay ferman adn da alrlard. Hkmler konularna gre deiik defterlere yazlrd. Balcalar Ahkm- Mhimme, Ahkm- ikayet, Ahkm- Rs ve Tahvil olup, Divn Sicillerinin bir ksmn tekil ederlerdi. Muhteva itibariyle ikayet Defterlerinin devam olan bu defterler eyaletlere gre tutulmulardr. Tarih olarak ikayet Defterlerinden 104 sene sonra (Mora Ahkm Defteri hari) hepsi 1155/1742 tarihinden balayp, II. Merutiyet dnemine kadar devam etmektedir. Vilayet Ahkm Defterleri, eyaletlere gre u ekilde tertip edilmitir:
adana anadolu Bosna cezir ve Rakka diyarbekir erzurum Halep stanbul karaman mara mora zi ve silistre Rumeli sivas am- erif Trabzon
Bosna Ahkm Defterleri 1155-1285/1742-1867 tarihleri arasndaki hkmleri ihtiva eden 9 adet defterden olumaktadr. Bu defterlerde Bosnaya bal Banaluka, Bihke, Hersek, zvornik ve Travnik sancaklar ile Derbend, Gradika, Kostania, Pridor, Prinyavor, Tene, Kliva, Krupa, Petrova, Saneskimoet, Sazin, ania, elebi Pazar, Foa, Foynia, Visoka,
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Vigrad, Bileke, Gaka, stola, Konia, Liyobuka, Lubin, Novasin, Trebin, Berka, Blene, Graania, Gradaa, Kladani, Magley, Srebrenia, Vlasenie, Bugoyna - Akhisar, Glamoc, hlevne, Jobe, Jopanya, Prozor, Yaye ve Zenia kazalarna ait hkmler vardr. Rumeli Ahkm Defterleri 1155-1326/1742-1908 tarihleri arasndaki hkmleri ihtiva eden 85 adet defterden olumaktadr. Bu defterlerde Rumeli eyaletine bal Paa livas (Sofya), Kstendil, Vize, irmen, Krkkilise, Silistre, Nibolu, Vidin, Alacahisar, Vultrn, Prizren, kodra, Dukakin, Avlonya, Ohri, Delvine, Yanya, Elbasan, Mora, Trhala, Selanik, skp, Bender ve Akkirman sancaklarna ait hkmler bulunmaktadr. 986 Numaral Kmil Kepeci Kataloundaki Ahkm Defterleri 986 numaral Kmil Kepeci Tasnifi Katalounda 927-1168/1520-1658 tarihleri arasndaki kaytlar ihtiva eden 61-73 genel numaralarda kaytl 13 adet Ahkm Defteri mevcuttur. Bu seride iki adet 61 ve 62 nolu, 927 (1520-1521) ve 951 (1544-1545) tarihli iki adet Rumeli Ahkm Defteri mevcuttur. Muhtelif ve Mtenevvi Defterler Divn- Hmaynun deiik kalemlerine ait veya mstakil olan defterler bu balk altnda toplanmlardr. Deiik tarihli olup, 1 Numaral Mahzen Defterinde s. 199-201 ve s. 276da kaytldr. Fakat tasnif faaliyetleri srasnda bu defterler, muhtelif ve mtenevvi olmaktan karlp ait olduklar fonlara datlmlardr. Bu grupta 3 numaral ve 1251-1279 (1835-1863) tarihli Rumeli Jurnal Defteri Kmil Kepeci Tasnifi, Divn- Hmayn Divn Kalemi 986 numaral katalogda yer almaktadr. Tahvil (Nian) Kalemi Defterleri Bu defterlerde timar kaytlar mevcuttur. Timarn ait olduu blgeyi (nahiye ve bal olduu sanca) gsteren baln altnda timar sahibinin ismi ve timarn intikal ekli an-tahvl-i ... eklinde yazldr. Bunun altnda timarn gelirini oluturan yerlerin isimleri, hsllar ve genel yekn yer almaktadr. Daha sonra timarn verili aamalarn anlatan izahat ile tezkirenin verildii tarih kaytldr. 986 numaral Kmil Kepeci Tasnifi Katalou 406 adet defter bulunmaktadr. Defterler analitik envanter sisteme gre tasnif edilmitir.
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Bb- l Mektub-i Sadr- l Kalemi Defterleri Sadaret Mektupuluu kaleminden yaplan baz yazmalarn kaytlarna mahsus defterlerdir. 986 numaral Kmil Kepeci Tasnifi Katalounda 1-38 numaralarda kaytl 1186-1228/1773-1813 tarihleri arasndaki kaytlar ihtiva eden 38 adet defter mevcuttur. Bunlardan 6s Rumeliyle ilgilidir. Tahrir Defterleri Tahrir defterleri, Osmanl mparatorluuna dhil memleketlerin sosyal, demografik ve ekonomik tarihine ait, benzeri baka hi bir yerde bulunmayan mufassal istatistik kaynaklardr. Bu defterler 835-1300/1431-1882 tarihlerini ihtiva ederler. Defterhnede muhafaza edilen Tahrir Defterleri 1086 numaraya kadar olup mkerrerleri ile birlikte 1.100 adettir. Bunlarn dnda Maliyeden Mdevver Defterler Katalounda da tahrir defterleri bulunmaktadr. Bamuktaa Kalemi ve Bal Birimlerine Ait Defterler Muktaac-y Evvel Kalemi de denilen bu bro muhtemelen XVI. asrn ortalarnda kurulmutur. Bamuktaa Kalemi, zellikle Rumelideki Filibe pirin sahalar, Kratova, Kili, Varna, bril, sak, Tolc, Main, Ahyolu gibi Tuna nehri kysndaki btn iskele ve tuzlalarn muktaa hesaplarn denetler, bu muktaalar hakknda kan emir ve nizamlarn kaytlarn tutar ve muhafaza ederdi. Bu arada baz vazife, has ve salyne tahsislerine de bakard. Rumeliye ait eminler ve dier grevlilerin beratlar, hkm ve tezkireleri de bu dairedeki ktipler tarafndan yazlrd. Grld gibi grev alanna giren muktaalarn byk ounluu Rumelide bulunmaktayd. eltik Rsmu Kalemi Defterleri (D.RS.) Anadolu ve Rumelideki baz eltik nehirleri ve pirin ekim alanlarnn gelirlerine ait hesaplara bakard. Ayrca, Hristiyan cemaatlerin ruhan reislerinin pkeleriyle ilgili hesaplar da tutard. Haremeyn Muhasebesi Kalemi ve Bal Birimlerine Ait Defterler (D.HMH.) Bu kalemin bir ad da Evkf Muhasebesidir. Haremeyne (Mekke ve Medine) ait ve bunlara bal vakflarn kaytlarn tutar ve her sene muhasebelerini kontrol ederdi. Seltn denen byk camilerin vakflarna ve bu camilerde hizmet eden grevlilerin
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maalaryla ilgili ilemlere bakard. Mekke ve Medineye ait olup stanbul ve Rumelide bulunan vakf arazilere taalluk eden defterler ve kaytlar burada tutulurdu. stanbul ve Rumelideki din grevlilerinin din vazife ve tayinlerini mutazammn vesikalarn hazrlar ve bunlar Maliye Kalemine gndererek oradan beratlarnn kmasn salard. Ayrca baz kiilerin uhdesinde olan Haremeyn mlikneleri ve bunlara dair artlar ve baz Haremeyn muktaalarndan tertip edilmi olan eshm ve ciht tevcihleri ile evkfa mlhak olan esnaf ve sanat erbab nizam ve baz emirler ile ilmuhaberler de buradan yazlrd. Bunlarn yan sra baz kale neferlerinin mevciblerini, mtekid ve duc vazifelerini de yine bu kalem denetlerdi. Haslar Muktaas Kalemi ve Bal Birimine Ait Defterler (D.HSK.) Padiah ve hanedan azalaryla sadrazam haslarnn kaytlarnn tutulduu, senet ve emirlerin yazld ve sakland kalemdir. Bundan baka det-i anm gibi gelir kaynaklarnn hesaplar da burada tutulurdu. zellikle Rumeliyle Gneydou Anadoludaki baz muktaalar ve mahall kalemler ve bunlarn gelirlerinden vezir vs. haslarna karlk ayrlan tahsisat ynetirdi. Evld- ftihnn (Rumeli fatihlerinin evldyla Rumeli blgesi fetholunduka Anadolunun muhtelif yerlerinden getirilip buraya iskn edilmi olanlar) muayyen maalar, vergiden muafiyetleri ve dier imtiyaz ileri de buradan yrtlrd. Haslar Muktaas Kaleminin bal birimi olan det-i anm defterler 54 adet olup, 919-1251/1513-1835 tarihleri arasndaki kaytlar ihtiva eder. Kk Evkf Kalemi Defterleri (D.KEV.) Tanzimattan nce ayr dairede idare edilen vakflarn bir blm Kk Muhasebe Kalemi de denilen bu kalem tarafndan ynetilirdi. Dierleri Haremeyn Muhasebesi ve Anadolu Muhasebesi kalemleridir. Bu kaleme bal olarak bulunan vakflar; stanbul, Rumeli ve Anadoludaki baz vakflardr. Bu vakflarn idar ileri, hesaplar, tayin ve tevcih gibi ileri Bbssade aasnn idaresindeki bu kalem tarafndan yrtlrd. Ayrca nezareti sadrazamlara ait sadaka tevliyetleri adl kk tevliyetlerin defter ve hesaplar da burada tutulurdu. Maden Muktaas Kalemi ve Bal Birimlerine Ait Defterler (D.MMK.) Maliye kalemlerinden birisi olan bu kalem, byk gmrk muktaalarn, Anadolu ve Rumeli Kptlerinin cizyelerini, Eflk ve Bodan Voyvodalklarndaki kefere cizyeleri-
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ni, Erdel Krall ve Dobrovnik Cumhuriyeti kefere cizyelerini, Serin ve Derin Gmrk Muktaasn, Mzn- Harr Muktaasn, Emtia Gmr, Efren Eyas Gmr ve Duhan Gmr muktaalarn, maden muktaalarn, aphne muktaalarn, kantar resmlerini, istiridye ve midye karcl, haha rsmu muktaalarn, Darphne muktaalar ve Simkehne muktaasn idare eden ve her sene muhasebelerini hazrlayan brodur. Mteferrik Konulu Defterler Yukarda belirtilen serler dnda kalan hususlar iin de Mteferrik Konular adl bir katalog tekil olunmutur. 632 numaral Mteferrik Konular Defter Katalounda yekn 565 adet defterin hlsas verilmitir. Bunlardan 8 numaral olan Rumelideki ahincilerin simleri ve ahincibalarn Tatbik Mhrlerini ihtiva eder Meclis-i Vl Riyaseti Defterleri (MVL.) Tanzimat ile birlikte Osmanl Devlet Tekilatnda yerini alan messeselerden biri de Meclis-i Vldr. Islhat hareketlerinin icap ettirdii yeni nizamnmeleri hazrlamak, memurlarn muhakemesiyle megul olmak, lzum gsterilen devlet ilerinde rey vermek zere 27 Zilhicce 1253/24 Mart 1838 tarihinde tekil olunmutur. Tanzimattan sonra ilerin oalmas mnasebetiyle Meclis-i l-i Tanzimat ve Meclis-i Ahkm- Adliye birletirilerek yine Meclis-i Vl-y Ahkm- Adliye ad altnda bir meclise kalbedilmi ve bu meclis, dre, Tanzimat, Adliye adlaryla ksma ayrlmtr. Hlsa Defterleri: Anadolu, Rumeli, Dersadet ve Arabistandan gelen tahriratn hlsa kaytlarn ihtiva etmektedir. Genel evrak kayt defteri olan Mzekkere Defterleri, meclisten eitli makamlara yazlan tezkirelerin Hlsa Kayt Defterleri, gelen arzuhallerin kaydedildii stida Defterleri bu nevi defterlerdir. Mhim ve ad hususlarn zetleri de ayr ayr defterlere kaydedilmitir. Ayrca, irdesi karlmak zere Sadaret vastasyla padiaha arz edilen evrakn hlsa kaytlarnn tutulduu Maruzat Defterleri vardr. Aynen Kayt Defterleri: Anadolu, Rumeli, Dersadet ve Arabistandan gelen evraktan grlerek karara balananlarn mazbatalarn ihtiva eder. lk yllarda bu mazbatalarn cra Defterlerine kaydedildii grlr. Bu sebeple cra Defterleri, tutulduu ylllardaki btn mazbatalar iine alr. Meclisten eitli makamlara yazlan tezkirelerin aynen kaytlar da, Tezkire Defterlerinde tutulmutur. 1253-1284/1837-1867 tarihleri arasndaki kaytlar ihtiva eden 478 adet Meclisi-i Vl Riyseti Defteri mevcuttur.
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Temettut Defterleri (ML.VRD.TMT.) Temett vergisi, tccar ve esnafn senelik kazanlar zerinden alnan vergiye verilen addr. Temett vergisinin ad daha sonra Kazan Vergisine evrilmitir. Temettut Defterlerinde kaza, ky gibi iskn merkezleri hane hane ele alnarak herkese ait ahs mal varl, emlk, arazi, hayvanat, rn vb. bilgiler kaydedilmitir. Temettut Defterlerinin tasnifi ve kataloglanmasnda o tarihlerdeki idar taksimat esas alnmtr. Defterler, iindeki bilgiler esas alnarak alfabetik olarak eyaletlere ayrlmtr. Her eyalet de kendi iinde alfabetik olarak kazalara ayrlmtr. Defterler 1256-1261/1844-1845 tarihleri arasnda toplam 17.747 adettir. Bu defterler analitik envanter sisteme gre tasnif edilmitir. 514 numaral defter Ni, Rumeli, Selanik, Silistre, Sivasa aittir. Rumeli Mfettilii Defterleri stanbul dndaki Osmanl devlet dairelerinden getirilen evraklar arasnda Rumeli Mfettilii evraknn nemli bir yeri vardr. Rumeli Mfettilii 1877-78 OsmanlRus Muharebesi neticesinde imzalanan ar artlar hav Ayastefanos Anlamasnn tdil edilmi ekliyle kabul edilen Berlin Anlamas gereince zellikle Avusturya ve Rusyann mdahaleleri neticesinde tedric olarak Kasm 1902de tesis edilmitir. Daha nce Kosova, Manastr ve Selanik olmak zere idar, adl, asker ve mal sahalarda yaplmas dnlen slahat almalar, daha sonra dier civar vilayetler de dikkate alnarak Yanya, Edirne ve kodrann da ilavesiyle Mfettiliin yetki sahas alt vilayete karlmtr. Sadarete bal olarak grev yapan Rumeli Mfettilii, bazen Sadareti atlayarak dorudan Sarayla yazmalarda bulunmu, fevkalde grev ve yetkilerle donatlm bir messesedir. Bu yn ile gnmzdeki Olaanst Hl Blgesi Valiliine benzetilebilir. Mfettiliin ilerinin daha kolay ve hzl yrtlebilmesi iin Sadarette drt kiiden oluan bir komisyon bulunmakta idi. Rumeli Mfettilii evrak ierisinde, belgelerin yansra 244 adet de defter tespit edilmitir. 1319-1327/1901-1909 tarihlerini hav bu defterler, muhtelif mevzularda Sadaret ile Rumeli Mfettiliine bal sancak ve kazalar arasndaki muhbert kaytlarn ihtiva etmektedir. 423 numaral katalogda Rumeli Mfettiliine ait 1319-1327 (1901-1909) senelerine ait 244 adet defter bulunmaktadr.
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Byk Kale Kalemi Defterleri (D. BKL.) nemli bir gider kalemi olan Byk Kale Kalemi genellikle Mora ve Arnavutluk dnda kalan byk kalelerin, mstahkem mevkilerin erzak, cephane, onarm ileri ve personelin maa ilerini yrtrd. Ayrca Yerli Kulu askerlerinin (Msr, Badat, Lahsa, Musul, Diyarbekir, Van, Bosna, Budin, Tmvar, am, Halep, Kars ve Erzuruma yenieri ve onlarn tekilatna uygun olarak ulufe ile kullanlan askerler) yoklamalarna bakard. Bu kalem ayrca Hazne tezkiresi vermeye de yetkiliydi. Bosna-Hersek blgesindeki btn kaleler Byk Kale Kalemine bal iken Podgorice Kalesi Kk Kale Kalemine baldr. Kk Kale Kalemi Defterleri (D. KKL.) Mora, Arnavutluk ve civar ile Hersekin baz kalelerinin yerli kulu neferatnn mevcib (askerlere senede drt defa ve ayda bir muharrem, Reblhir, Receb ve evval aylarnda verilen cret, ulfe) hesaplarn tutard. Mevcibleri ocaklk olarak nehirlerin vridatndan veriliyorsa havaleleriyle tevcih tezkireleri de bu kalemden verilirdi. Maliyeden Mdevver Defterler Tasnifi 1945 ylnda Maliye Bakanlndan yn halinde devralnan 26.000e yakn defterin tasnifidir. Muhtelif Maliye kalemlerine ait defterler olduu gibi, arazi tahriri, saray, yenieri, mevcip vs. gibi dier cins defterleri de ihtiva etmektedir. Tasnif yaplrken nce eski harflerle her defterin nsha fii karlm ve filer kronolojik, numara sras ve konularna gre olmak zere grup halinde kutulara yerletirilerek aratrmaclarn istifadesine sunulmutur. Defterler 830/1427 ylnda balayp 1346/1927 ylna kadar gelir. eltik Rsmu Kalemi Belgeleri (D.RS.) Bu kalemin bir dier ad da Varidt- kk- San Kalemidir. eltik Muhasebesi Kalemi de denilen bu kalemin grevi; Hristiyan cemaatinin ruhan liderleriyle Rumelideki eltik nehirleri bakanlarnn pkelerine ve beratlarna bakmakt. Kk Evkf Kalemi Belgeleri (D.KEV.) Maliyenin gelir kalemlerinden olup, nezareti sadrazamlara ait olan sadaka tevliyetleri adndaki kk vakflarn defter ve hesaplarn tutard. Bu kaleme bal olarak bulunan
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vakflar; stanbul, Rumeli ve Anadoludaki baz vakflardr. Bu vakflarn idar ileri, hesaplar, tayin ve tevcih gibi ileri Bbssade aasnn idaresindeki bu kalem tarafndan yrtlrd. ark Rumeli Belgeleri (A.MTZ.R.) 1877-78 Trk Rus Harbi sonucu olarak 13 Haziran 1878 Berlin Kongresinde Balkanlar ile Bat Trakyann kuzey hududu arasnda ark Rumeli vilayetinin kurulmas kabul edildi. Vilayet; Filibe, Pazarck, Zara-i Atik, Hasky, slimye ve Bergos sancaklarna tbi 28 kaza ve bunlara bal yaklak 1.300 kyden tekil edilmiti. ark Rumeli Nizamnmesi Osmanl Devleti, Almanya, Avusturya, ngiltere, Fransa, talya ve Rusya tarafndan 26 Nisan 1879da imzaland. Aleko Paa vali tayin edilerek ark Rumeli vilayeti resmen 17 Mays 1879da kuruldu. Ancak daha sonra Aleko Paann Rus kumandan ile ibirlii yapmas sonucu blge, Bulgar nfuzuna girmeye balad. Aleko Paa grev sresini doldurup ayrlnca Vilayet Mstear Gavril Efendi vezir rtbesi ile vali tayin edildi. Bir sre sonra milislerin desteine gvenen Bulgar Liberal Partisinin 18 Eyll 1885te yapt bir hkmet darbesi ile vali tutuklanarak ark Rumeli vilayeti Bulgaristan ile birletirildi. ark Rumeli belgeleri 1296-1327/1879-1909 tarihleri arasndaki muhabert kaytlarn ihtiva etmektedir. Yldz Saray Arivi Belgeleri II. Abdlhamid devrinde Yldz Saraynda biriken defter, belge ve gazetelerden oluan fondur. Bu fonda, II. Abdlhamidin zel olarak ilgilendii konular, Sadaretten Saraya sunulmu, ancak irdeleri sdr olmam tezkireler, ahslarn Yldz Sarayna sunduklar eitli arza, rapor ve ihbarlar, Kmil Paa, Cevdet Paa, Namk Kemal, Midhat Paa vb. nemli ahsiyetlerin metrukt, d basnda Devlet-i Aliye ile ilgili kan yazlar, albm ve resimler, kanun ve nizamnme suretleri, Abdlhamide ait husus el defterleri ve czdanlar ile haritalar bulunmaktadr. Devletleraras ilikiler, ark Rumeli, Ermeni ve Msr meseleleri, Girid hadisesi, snr olaylar gibi nemli devlet problemlerinden zaptiye jurnallerinde geen ad vukuata kadar bu dnemin eitli zelliklerini yanstan bir fondur. Sadaret Husus Maruzat Evrak (Y.A.HUS.) Sadaret makamnn, yaplan ilerin neticeleri, dahil veya haric baz mesele ve
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hdiseler hakknda padiaha bilgi vermek maksadyla, Saraya takdim ettii husus maruzat muhtev olup, umumiyetle beyn- hl ve arz- malmattan ibarettir. Yldz Sadaret Husus Maruzat byk bir ekseriyetle haric meseleler, zellikle ark Rumeli, Ermeni meseleleri, Girid hdist, Msr meselesi, talyann Afrikaya dahli ve benzeri hdiseler, devletleraras mnasebetler ve Osmanl Devletinin takip ettii siyaset bakmndan ve ayrca, d basnda Osmanl Devletini ilgilendiren yazlar ve bunlarla ilgili yazmalar cihetiyle ehemmiyet arz eder. Perakende Evrak Mfettilikler ve Komiserlikler Tahrirat (Y. PRK. MK.) 1293-1326/1876-1909 tarihlerini kapsayan ve 4273 adet belgeden oluan bu katalog, u belgelerden olumaktadr; Mfettilik ve Komiserlikler tahrrt, Rumeli Vilyt Mfettilii ve Rumeli vilyetleriyle ilgibi belgeler, Msr Fevkalde Komiserlii (Msr ile ilgili belgeler), Bulgaristan Komiserlii (Bulgaristan ile ilgili belgeler), Mfettilik ve komiserlikte grevli personelin yazlar ve gnderen ve alan belli olmayan fakat Rumeli vilyt, Bulgaristan ve Msr Fevkalde Komiserlii ilgili yaz, layiha ve msveddeler. Dahiliye Nezareti Tesr-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu (DH.TMK.S.) 1312/1894 ylnda kurulan bu komisyon, adndan da anlalaca gibi slahat ve muameltn hzlandrlmas iin kurulmutur. Bu fonda yer alan belgelerin konular genel olarak yledir: Rumeli ve Anadolu vilayetlerindeki slahat faaliyetleri, zellikle Anadolu Vilayat Mfettii akir Paann denetimi altndaki slahat hareketleri, ziraatin gelitirilmesi ve slah iin yaplan almalar, idari ve mlki taksimattaki deiiklikler, jandarma tekilatnn kurulmas, zabtiye alaylarnn jandarmaya tahvili, vergi dzenlemeleri ve vergi tahsilinin tahsildarlara braklmas, Osmanl Devleti bnyesinde bulunan yabanclarn ynetimde nfuslar orannda temsil ve istihdamlar, sosyal ve ekonomik konulardaki dier slahat faaliyetleri. Emniyet-i Umumiye Mdriyeti Seyrsefer Kalemi (DH.EUM.SSM) Grevi esas itibaryla, yurda giri ve klarn denetlenmesi, yurt iindeki seyahatlerin kontrolnden sorumlu olan Seyrsefer Kalemine ait olan 1333-1340/1915-1921 yllarn kapsayan bu katalogda yer alan belgeler u konular ihtiva etmektedir: Seyahat Varakas talepleri; yurt iinde ve yurt dnda seyahat edecek yolcularn listeleri; Seyahat Varakas ile seyahat eden yabanclarla ilgili bilgiler (saylar, tabiiyet, kimlikleri)
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ve raporlar; Balkan Treni ile gidip gelenlerin listesi; seyahat edecek yolcular hakknda muameleleri gsteren talimatnmeler; baz zel kiilere seyahatleri esnasnda kolaylk salanmas; pasaport vize ilemleri; tren veya vapurla gelip giden yolcularn kontrol; emniyet mfettiliklerinde ve Isttlt memurluklarnda grevli polisler ile ilgili ilemler. Vilayet ve Mfettiliklere (Tara Arivleri) Ait Belgeler Bilindii gibi Osmanl Arivinde muhafaza edilen ariv malzemesinin byk ounluu, Osmanl Devletinin stanbuldaki merkez devlet dairelerine aittir. stanbul dndan getirilen belge ve defterler tara evrak olmas dolaysyla, merkez evrak fonlarndan ayr tutularak tara evrak (TR.) kodu altnda tasnif edilmitir. Arivimizde bulunan tara arivleri evrak, Kbrs ve Rumeli Mfettilii evrakdr. Rumeli Mfettilii Belgeleri (Taradan Gelen Belgeler) (TFR.) 1902 ylnda ihdas edilen Rumeli Mfettilii; Manastr, Selanik, Kosova, Yanya, Edirne ve kodra ile bu vilayetlere bal sancak, kaza ve nahiye ve kylerine ait tahrirat kaytlarn ihtiva etmektedir. Rumeli Mfettilii buralardan Bulgar, Rum, Srp ve Arnavut ekya eteleri ile fesat komitelerinin zararl faaliyetleri; yabanc devletlerin zabitleri tarafndan yrtlen jandarma ve polis tekilat; konsoloslarn faaliyetleri; Patrikhne faaliyetleri gibi nemli konularda gelen yazlarn dnda, dier idar, mal, iktisad, siyas, zira, adl ve ticar konulardaki btn resm yazlar ihtiva etmektedir. Kendisini aan konularda padiah ve sadrazamn emirlerine gre hareket eden Rumeli Mfettilii, ilerin sratle yaplabilmesi iin iyi bir denetleyici ve organizatr olmutur. Rumeli Mfettilii Evraknda, umumiyetle u hususlar yer almaktadr: Tyin ve terf ileri, maa talepleri, ete ve ekya faaliyetleri, vergi ve iltizm ileri, Rum-Bulgar mezhep atmalar, ad trden adl ve hukuk vakalar, idar yolsuzluklar, jandarma ve polis tenkisat, blgenin imar faaliyetleri, Rum ve Bulgar papaz ve daskallarnn blc faaliyetleri vs. Rumeli Mfettilii 12 kalemden ibaret olup, evrak u ksmlara ayrlmtr: Rumeli Mfettilii Arzuhalleri Rumeli Mfettilii Edirne, Yanya ve kodra Evrak 3 Rumeli Mfettilii Jandarma Miriyet ve Kumandanl Evrak 4 Rumeli Mfettilii Konsolosluk, Sefret ve Mfettilikler Evrak
1 2
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Rumeli Mfettilii Kosova Evrak Rumeli Mfettilii Makmt Evrak 7 Rumeli Mfettilii Manastr Evrak 8 Rumeli Mfettilii Mteferrik Evrak 9 Rumeli Mfettilii Sadaret ve Bakitbet Evrak 10 Rumeli Mfettilii Selanik Evrak 11 Rumeli Mfettilii Umum Evrak 12 Rumeli Mfettilii Defterleri Katalou
5 6
288.213 belge 244 deftere sahip bu fonun 37 adet belge, 1 adet de defter katalou vardr. Byk Kale Kalemi Belgeleri (D.BKL.) nemli bir gider kalemi olan Byk Kale Kalemi genellikle Mora ve Arnavutluk dnda kalan byk kalelerin, mstahkem mevkilerin erzak, cephne, onarm ileri ve personelin maa ilerini yrtrd. Ayrca Yerli Kulu askerlerinin (Msr, Badat, Lahsa, Musul, Diyarbekir, Van, Bosna, Budin, Tmvar, am, Halep, Kars ve Erzuruma yenieri ve onlarn tekilatna uygun olarak ulufe ile kullanlan askerler) yoklamalarna bakard. Byk Kale Kalemi ile Haslar Kalemi evrak iinde bulunan hccet-i zahriyeler dier evraktan ayrlarak, muktaa isimlerine gre kendi ierisinde kronolojik sraya konduktan sonra her yln bitimine tekabl eden dosyalarda toplanmlardr. Bu durum katalog sahifelerinin aklamalar ksmnda gsterilmitir. Kk Kale Kalemi Belgeleri (D.KKL.) Mora ve Avlonyada bulunan kalelerin ve mstahkem mevkilerin erzak cephne, onarm ileri ve personelin maa muamelelerinin yrtld yerdir. Ayrca bu kalelere ait ocaklk (kale muhafzlarnn veya ehir yerli neferlerinin ulufelerine karlk olarak tahsis olunan r veya rfi haslat) eklindeki mevaciblerine bakmak da grevleri arasndayd. Eylt- Mmtze rdeleri Eylt- Mmtze, Osmanl mparatorluuna bal husus imtiyaz anlamalaryla idre olunan eyaletlerdir. Bunlar, devlete makt bir vergi ve bazlar sefer zamannda asker vererek, dahil ilerinde tamamen serbest bulunurlard. Muhtelif tarihlerde g-
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rlen Eylt- Mmtzelikler unlard: Mekke eriflii, Msr Hidivlii, Sisam Beylii, Cebel-i Lbnan Mutasarrfl, Kbrs Adas, Bulgaristan Prenslii, Bosna-Hersek, Krm Hanl, Erdel Krall, Eflk-Bodan Voyvodal ve Aynoroz Emaneti. Bu teekkllerden 1908 inklbndan sonra elde kalanlarnn imtiyazlar ilga olunmutur. Mesil-i Mhimme rdeleri Hazne-i Evrakn kuruluu srasnda yaplan ilk tasnif talimatnmesi esaslarna gre Abdlmecidin tahta k tarihinden itibaren H. 1265 ylna kadar mhim meselelere dair irdeli evrak blmlere ayrlarak gruplandrlmtr. Sadaret Eylt- Mmtze Kalemi Belgeleri (A.MTZ.) Eylt- Mmtze, idare ekilleri muhede ve imtiyazlarla belirlenmi ve dahil idreleri husus kanunlara tbi olan yerler hakknda kullanlr bir tabirdir. Vilyt- Mmtze ve Muhtre de denirdi. 1908 Temmuz inklbna kadar her trl imtiyaza mazhar olan yerler unlard: Msr Hidivlii, Sisam Beylii, Cebel-i Lbnan Mutasarrfl, Kbrs Adas, Bulgaristan Prenslii ile Bosna ve Hersek. Bu eyaletlere taalluk eden iler, Bb- lde Eylt- Mmtze Kalemi Mdrl tarafndan grlrd. Eylt- Mmtze Kalemine, bu eyaletlerden hemen her mevzuda (bilhassa adl, iktisad, asker, marif vs.) tahrirt havale olunur ve icb eden yerlere sevk olunurdu.
Osmanl Ariv Belgelerinde Bosnadan Anadoluya Gler: 1877-1910

cevat ekici*
G olgusu tarih boyunca kesintisiz bir ekilde eitli sebeplerle devam etmitir. Bu gler eitli kavim ve milletlerin isteine bal olarak gerekletii gibi, istek d birok sebeple de olmutur. Bahsettiimiz insan hareketlilii yerkre zerinde baz sosyal, siyasal ve kltrel sonular da beraberinde getirmitir. Asl yerlerinden ayrlan topluluklar anayurtlarnda oluturduklar kltrel, sosyal, din birikimlerini yeni yurtlarna tamlar ve yepyeni sentezler meydana gelmesine sebep olmulardr. Gmenler iin en byk sorun yeni yurtlarna uyumdur. Bir daha geri dnmemek zere yaplan glerde en ideal artlar aranmtr. Bu artlarn genel erevesini ise tabii ki g edilen yerlerdeki iklim ve coraf artlarn asl vatana azam derecede benzemesi oluturur. Bir dier ve vazgeilmez husus ise inan ve deerlerin yaknldr. Gmenler uzun yllar ya da yzyllar yeni yurtlarnda gmen olduklar hatrlatlarak yaarlar. Fiziksel zellikler, dil ya da lehe farkllklar bu hatrda tutmann en belirgin sebepleridir. Yerlilerle gmenler arasnda din, dil, rk gibi tm zellikler benzese bile bazen bu konularda gerginlikler de yaanr. Yenilerin kendilerini kabul ettirmeleri zaman alr. Bu husus genellikle byle olsa da baz gmenler iin durum byle deildir. Trkiyede bulunan Bosnal gmenler uyum sorunlar yaam olsalar bile gnmzde bu tr sorunlar yoktur. Bosnadan gnmz Trkiyesine glerde entegrasyon sorunlar ortak kltr ve inan deerleri sebebiyle minimum dzeyde kalmtr. Bu husus daha sonralar da neredeyse tamamen ortadan kalkmtr.
*devlet arivleri Genel mdrl, Tantm Hizmetleri koordinatr 53
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Gmenlerin bir dier zellii de yeni yurtlarna entegre olsalar bile anayurtlarn unutmamalardr. gal ve sava gibi zorunlu artlar sebebiyle geride braklan akrabalar, emlak ve araziler bu hatrda tutmay salayan en nemli amillerdir. Kiiler arasnda devam eden bu irtibat, kltrler ve devletler arasnda oluacak ilikilerde de nemli bir durum olarak ortaya kmaktadr. Dank olarak yerleen gmenler eitli dernek ve vakflarla yeni yurtlarnda ilikilerini diri tutmaya almaktadrlar. Bu dernek ve vakflarla organize olan gmenler ayn zamanda geride braktklar yurtlarnda bulunan akrabalar sayesinde birer kpr durumundadrlar. G ve gmenlerin genel karakteristiinden sonra Bosnadan Trkiyeye yaplan glerin tarihi ve ariv belgelerine gre Bosnal muhacirlerin yerleim yerleri, karlatklar sorunlar gibi hususlardan bahsetmek istiyorum. Bu alma bu konuda giri niteliindedir. Baz rnek ariv belgelerinin incelenmesi ile g srecinin doru anlalabilmesi, muhacirlerin akraba ve gemileri ile irtibatlarnn doru salanabilmesindeki nem vurgulanmaya allacaktr. Bosnadan ilk defa gler Avusturyann Berlin Anlamasndan sonra blgeyi igali ile balamtr. Avusturyann Mslmanlara ynelik eitli hukuk d uygulamalar ge sebep olmutur. Bosna-Hersekte bulunan drt yz bin Mslmann g blgede nfus dengesini Hristiyanlar lehine deitireceinden Osmanl Devletinin ileriki yllarda burada yapabilecei hamleleri sekteye uratabilecekti. Ayrca byk lde gerekleebilecek gn eitli sosyal ve iktisadi skntlar da beraberinde getirmesi kesindi. Yine Osmanl Devleti bu yllarda i ve d skntlar sebebiyle ekonomik olarak hayli zor durumda olduundan gmenlere istedii gibi imknlar salamaktan mahrumdu. Bu sebeplerden dolay Osmanl Devleti ge scak bakmyor ancak btn bu olumsuzluklara ramen g etmek isteyenler olursa onlara da olumsuz cevap vermeme karar alyordu.12 Bu erevede balayan glerin ilk merkezlerinden birisi stanbul olmutur. stanbulda youn olarak toplanan muhacirlerin btn vilayetlere iskn iin artlarn elverili olup olmad sorulmutur. Bu soruya:
zmir Valisi, menemende ziraate elverisiz 10.000 dnm arazi ve emede sahilde 140 hane isknna elverili arazi olduu, edirne valisi, midyede 140, ahtaboluda 20 hanenin, kastamonu Valisi, Bartnda 100 sinopta 500 hanenin, konya Valisi, antalya sahilinde 700 hanenin,
12
Y.a.Res, 3/7
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stanbul Belediyesi, silivri ve Terkosta vakf arazilerinden Istranca merasyla elecek ve Balabanburnu isimli yerlerin iskna elverili olduunu
bildirmitir.13 skdara gelen muhacirler ise Hazine-i Hassaya bal iftlik arazilerine yerletirilmilerdir. Bu muhacirler 32 hane olup, toplam nfusu 139dur. Bunlar 32 erkek, 29 kadn, 44 erkek ve 31 kz ocuundan olumaktadr. Bu muhacirler Varna yolu ile Gradika kasabasndan gelmilerdir.14 Bir taraftan gler devam ederken Avusturya Devleti Bosna-Hersekte Mslmanlara eitli ikenceler yapyor, mezarlklar imha ediyor, arazi yazmnda miras hukukunu iniyordu. Osmanl Devleti bu gibi durumlarn nne geilmesi iin Avusturya nezdinde gerekli giriimlerde bulunmak iin karar almt.15 Ayrca Trkiyenin bakenti olan Ankara ehrine yerletirilen muhacirlerden bahsetmek gereklidir. Temmuz 1901 ylnda 1457 hanede 6802 muhacir Ankarann eitli yerlerine yerletirilmitir.16 Yerleim mevkilerinin de isimleri deitirilerek yeni isimler verilmitir.
Yerleim Blgesinin Eski smi Yerleim Blgesinin Yeni smi
Gelinen ehir
Hane Says
Haymana kazas
Tuzla Hersek mihiyac Travnik Banaluka mostar Bihke saraybosna Travnik Tuzla
74 11 6 26 57 4 1 15 31 12
rdek Gl kesikkavak Yayla koyak ingirli Barutlu Holar reni karapnar pnarlar Tatarhamzal zir merkezi nceiz emen
Burhaniye kadiriye sleymaniye Hamidabad ahmediye Bayezid Tevfikiye Fatih
dH.mkT, 1343/20, 17 aralk 1883 Y.mTV, 53/10, 28 Temmuz 1891 15 Y.a.Res, 117/77, 14 austos 1902 16 Y.mTV, 218/79
13 14
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Gelinen ehir
Hane Says
Yerleim Blgesinin Eski smi
Yerleim Blgesinin Yeni smi
zir kazas
Bihke Banaluka saray Tuzla Travnik Banaluka mostar saraybosna Bihke
16 23 4 49 25 28 3 237 2
afar Hacuzun dutluca, kapakl, surtak
zll- Hamidi Halimiye mesudiye
sivrihisar kazas
sivrihisar mahmudiye(Gm) Orhaniye(Pelek) Osmaniye(Bapnar) mecidiye(Yayla) Hdavendigar(kucaz)
Ankara ve stanbul dnda Bursa, negl, Karamrsel gibi Trkiyenin eitli ehirlerinde iskn gerekletirilmitir. Avusturyann 1909 ylnda Bosnay ilhak etmesi zerine Osmanl Devleti ile Avusturya-Macaristan Devleti arasnda 26 ubat 1909da 9 maddelik bir protokol imzalanmtr. Bu protokoln 3. maddesi Bosna-Hersek halkndan isteyenlerin Osmanl topraklarna glerini serbest brakmaktadr. Bu gmenler geldiklerinde Osmanl tebaas saylacaklardr.17 mzalanan bu protokolde gmenlerin Bosnada kalan emlak ve arazileri hakknda Osmanl kanunlarnn geerli olacana dair bir hkm olmad iin muhacirler haklarnn mdafaas iin Bosnadaki ilgili mahkemeye bavurmak durumunda kalmlardr.18 Gmenlerin arazileri zerinde istedikleri gibi tasarruf etme haklarn veren protokole19 gre Bosna-Hersek ahalisinden olup, ilhaktan nce Osmanl topraklarna gelerek nfus czdan alanlar ile bir yldan fazla ikamet edenlerden geri dnmek isteyenlere Osmanl vatanda gibi davranlmas, dierlerine ise Avusturya vatanda gibi davranlmas ngrlmtr.20
17 HR.Hm.O, 36/4 18 HR.Hm.O, 29/2-4 19 HR.Hm.O, 29/2-1 belge sra16/1,2 20 HR.Hm.O, 29/2-1
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Sonu Gmenlerin ounlukla maddi birikimleri ya asgari lye inmitir ya da kaybolmutur. Bu husus onlarn giriimci yanlarn kuvvetli bir ekilde n plana karmalarna sebep olur. Yeni yurtlarnda kendilerini topluma kabul ettirmek ve baarl olmak durumundadrlar. Bu sebeple gmenler yerli toplumlar iin de bir eit enerji kayna olurlar. Bosna-Hersekli gmenler de geldikleri gnlerden beri enerjik ve Trk toplumuyla bark bir ekilde yaamaktadrlar. Bu almada zellikle Bosna-Hersekten Trkiyenin iki nemli ehrine yaplan gler incelenmitir. Bunun sebebi corafi olarak aralarnda mesafe bulunan bu iki toplumun iletiiminde, byk ve nemli ehirlerde yaayan gmenlerin karar alma mekanizmalarna yakn olularnn etkisidir.
Depicting the Enemy: The Image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albanias High School Textbooks
Olsi jazexhi*
Turks as the other of the Albanian In his book Escaping from the East: Albanian Orientalism from Naim Frashri to Ismail Kadar (2006) Enis Sulstarova has amply demonstrated the Orientalist spirit permeating the literature, historiography and contemporary political debates that underscore the modern identity of the Albanians. Even though Albanians are supposed to be a predominantly Muslim nation and their contribution to the Ottoman Empire is well known,1 with the creation of Albania after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the national narrative of the Albanians was constructed in a way that portrays Europe and the West as their main aspiration. The tendency of the Albanian speaking elites to distance themselves from the Ottomans became a political necessity since the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from Europe became apparent, and the Albanian Rilindas2 and their Austro Hungarian patrons, worked for producing another type of Albanian in oppositione to the Turk.3 As a result, the general trend of Albanian national romanticism has been to depict the Ottomans and their empire in Albania as an era of obscurantism, while the Albanians from collaborators are depicted as opponents of the Turks. Even though many Albanian speaking Muslims associated and even imagined themselves
Ph.d., Free lance Researcher. sami Frashri: VePRa 9 , Personalitete shqiptare n Kamus al-Alam t Sami Frashrit, lOGOs-a shkup 1994 2 The word Rilindas and Rilindja are used in the albanian historiography for describing the so-called national re awaking of the albanians. The term is very similar with the Italian Risorgimento 3 for more on this subject see the editorial of Fatos lubonja, Prpjekja nr. 20/2005, Religion and Albanians
* 1
59
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as Turks,4 the national narrative of the Albanians, maintains that they are ancient Europeans, and the Ottomans their other. Fatos Lubonja has noted that the depiction of the Ottoman period as an era of a total obscurity and the subsequent distancing from the Ottomans, served the nationalists aim for creating the myth of reborn Albania that emerged thanks to her national heroes who fought with riffle and pen against the obscurantist Turk. The imagined historical record of the Albanian that one can read in Albanian history textbooks, finds him portrayed as being one of the most ancient peoples of Europe. The narrative shows the Albanian being first a Pelazgian and Illyrian, than progressing through his Illyrian states and Rome, transiting through Byzantium, invaded by the Ottomans and then culminating in the 20th century when he creates his modern nation state.5 As Nathalie Clayer has shown, this teleological narrative of the Albanian was the main platform on which European romanticists and Albanologists depicted the Albanian during the 19th century, while they were discovering the Greek. People from Johann Georg von Hahn to Ami Bou, Byron, Ippen, Hecquard, Leake and Pouqueville were some of the most important Western romanticist and scholars who built their theories and predictions on the Albanians. Their discovery of the Albanian had an important impact on the works of Albanian Rilindja which used their theories for constructing the imagined community of the Albanians.6 Even though the thinkers of the so-called Albanian national re-awakening were not a monolithic block and their ideas on the imagined Albanian varied substantially (often depending on their religious, linguistic or regional affiliation), an important theme that united them all was their depiction of the Turk as the other of the Albanian. One of the reasons why Albanian nationalists projected the Turks as such is related even to the loyalty that many Albanian-speaking Muslims had towards them and the popular identification that many Muslims made with the Turks.7 Sami Frashri, one of the most important Bektashi-Muslim Rilindas, who laid the platform of Albanian nationalism in his book Shqipria, 'ka n, sht e do t bhet?, (Albania What Was, What is and What Will Become) (1899) noted with concern the absence of nationalism among his people:
see for example my forthcoming article: Olsi jazexhi, Turks into Albanians, at Prpjekja nr. 26/ 2008 see Historia e Popullit shqiptar 4, shtepia Botuese e librit shkollor 2003 6 For more on this subject see naTHalIe claYeR, Aux origines du nationalisme albanais. La naissance dune nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe, Paris, karthala/ceRI, coll. Recherches internationales , 2007 7 Olsi jazexhi, Turks into Albanians, Prpjekja nr. 26/ 2008 (forthcoming)
4 5
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In our birthplace, religion is more important to the people than nation; thus
a Greek for example after changing his faith changes his nation too, and if he becomes Catholic he says I am a frnk (Frank), if he becomes a Muslim he says I am a Turk. 8
The absence of nationalism was noted with concern even by Vaso Pasha, a Catholic Rilindas, who in his famous poem Oh Albania, Poor Albania recognized that the Albanians were:
... split in hundred factions, some say we have faith and some we had deen, some Im Turk, some I am latin, some Im Greek, some I am slavic.
In the conclusion of his poem Vaso Pasha, like many other Rilindas, was appealing to the Albanians to: not look to churches or mosques, because The faith of the Albanians is Albanianism! However, when Albania was created as a state by the Great Powers in 1913, the imagined Albanians did not show themselves ready to become a nation as the Westerners and the Rilindas expected them to be. The civil religious war that engulfed the country from 1913 to 1915, where many Sunni Muslims wanted to remain with Turkey and proclaimed themselves Osmanlis, the Orthodox wanted Greece and many Catholics sided with Serbia and Montenegro; shows the difficulty that a country with three faiths had to undergo before becoming a nation. The politicians who ruled Albania from 1920 to the middle of 20th century had to fight for transforming the three existing Ottoman millets into a nation, and make Albanianism their civic religion. Politicians like Ahmet Bey Zogu who ruled the country from 1920 to 1939, undertook Occidentalizing and secular reforms and legitimized their rule in the name of Westernization. But the opposition attacked Zog and his regime by comparing them with their Ottoman predecessor and labeling Zog a sultan, an oriental satrap and depicting his reforms as being Turkish.9 The political tradition of the Albanian elites that demonizes the Turks, the Ottomans and the Orientals and portrays them as source of backwardness, fanaticism, the old and the other is labeled by Sulstarova as a desire for Escaping from the East or as an Albanian form of Orientalism. This syndrome, which is at the cornerstone of
8 9
sami Frashri, Shqipria, ka n, sht e do t bhet?, Bukuresht 1899, (Prishtine 1999), 67 enis sulstarova, Orientalizmi Shqiptar, Prpjekja 20/2005, 42 60
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the modernization process in Albania, was vigorously pursued even by the communists. The communist regime which proclaimed its messianic mission of liberating and emancipating the Albanians from their feudalist past, replaced the Occidentalizing slogans of their nationalist predecessors with their plea of creating the new man of socialist realism. They accelerated the process of secularization and modernization of Albania by declaring war on all the religions and finally banning them in 1967 and declaring Albania the first atheistic state of the world.10 However the communists singled out the cultural remains of the Ottoman Empire as the worst heritage that the country had to get rid off if it was to be really modern. The anadollaks (Anatolians), beys, aas, kulaks, hojas, dervishes, Muslim and Christian clergy and their believers become part of communists jargon, for depicting the enemies of progress. The cultural war against the Ottoman traditions that the communists undertook during their rule was known as lufta kundr zakoneve prapanike or the war against obsolete practices. This war was conducted through arts and media, school textbooks and state propaganda. The communists removed hundreds of Turkish words from the Albanian language during their reforms for the purification of the language.11 While in media and arts, they singled out Muslim and Turkish officials as symbols of the feudal past that had to be eradicated in order of creating the new man of socialist realism. Hundreds of novels and movies produced during these times [e.g. The Bloodstained Land (1976)12, The Second November (1982)13 and The Prefect (1948)14] depict the pre-communist establishment of Albania as feudalistic and Ottoman. Here the Muslim clergy and the feudal rulers are shown talking in a Turkish-loaded language, while suppressing the free and progressive Albanians. Albania is depicted as suffering under the Turkish yoke [e.g. Life or Death (1979) movie15], while Islam and the Quran are shown as source of inspiraanton logoreci (1977) The Albanians: Europes Forgotten Survivors, london Victor Gollancz ltd. 155 11 kristina jorgaqi, Ndrhyrjet e Planifikuara Pr Zvendsimin e Huazimeve N Shqipen Standarde, Prpjekja 09 / 1996: 159 167. 12 see: Tok e Prgjakur (1976), kinostudio shqipria e Re. screenwriter: kio Blushi and nexhati Tafa. Producers: Ibrahim muo and kristaq mitro. The movie is based upon the novels of naum Priftit litari i zjarrt and Fortesa of Teodor lao. available at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=5534412945423304241&q=kico+blushi&ei=9tlcsmdcG5eG2wklllj0ca 13 Nntori i Dyt (1982), kinostudio shqipria e Re. screenwriter: kio Blushi and dhimitr shuteriqi. Producers: Viktor Gjika. available at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=51371499642207436 12&q=nentori+i+dyte&ei=F85YsPbTloTw2QlY06z8dg 14 Prefekti (1948), Producer: Besim levonja. available: http://video.google.it/videoplay?docid=120 0725622549714798&q=prefekti&ei=0ihdsI3weIem2gl4_dmncQ&hl=it 15 Liri a Vdekje (1979), kinostudio shqipria e Re. screenwriter: Vath koreshi. Producers: Ibrahim muaj
10
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tion for the Turkish zealot who wants to eliminate the Albanian language and nation. The main thesis of the communist historiography and art was that the Ottoman invasion and its five hundred years rule upon Albania cut the country apart from her natural development in Europe and plunged it into five hundred years of darkness. Communists fight against the Ottoman past was very successful. Ermal Hasimja has shown that by 1989 they had managed to wipe out almost totally the Muslim names from the new generation of Albanians educated in the schools of Tirana.16 The thesis of Turkish obscurantism and Muslim fanaticism continues to dominate much of the Albanian intellectual establishment even after the fall of communism. When Fatos Nano, become Prime Minister of Albania in 1997 he declared that his government would reverse the effects of the last 555 years of history referring obviously to the Ottoman period and its sympathisers.17 The myth of Ottoman obscurantism versus Albanian bravery haunts the Albanian culture today in all its aspects, since the hundreds of images that communism created in literature, painting, sculpture, movies and dramas have made this cultural legacy almost inescapable. 18 The image of the obscurantist Turk follows the Albanian everywhere in his life. When he attends his primary school and gymnasium, when he watches the movie Scanderbeg (1953) where the Turks are shown destroying Greek and Roman statues, when he reads novels like The Castle (1970) or The Perverse Year (1990) of Ismail Kadare, when he watches the Prefekti comedy, or the latest movie of Fatmir Koi Time of the Comet (2007)19 or reads the novel of socialist politician Ben Blushi, Living in an island (2008), Albanians are taught to view the Turks as enemies of civilization. Extracts from the above novels and works of art are to be found even in the Albanian history and literature textbooks that we shall analyze in this paper. A collateral damage of Albanian elites imagined war with their Turkish past is even Islam, which as Ismail Kadare declared in 1991 has no place in Albania, since:
albanias future is towards christianity, since it is connected with it culturally, old memories and its pre-Turkish nostalgia. With the passing of time, the late Islamic religion that came with the Ottomans should disappear (at first in albania and
and kristaq mitro. available at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-161569636879001462 16 ermal Hasimja, Emra dhe identitete: prse nuk quhem Besim?, universiteti europian i Tirans. Online at: http://www.hasimja.com/files/emra%20dhe%20identitete%20perse.htm 17 Olsi jazexhi, The Political Exploitation of Islamophobia in postcommunist Albania, International Islamophobia conference, Istanbul. december 2007 18 enis sulstarova, ORIENTALIZMI SHQIPTAR, Perpjekja 20/2005, 42 60 19 a presentation of this movie can be found at: http://www.timeofthecomet.com/index.html
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then in kosovo), until it will be replaced by christianity or, to be more exact, the christian culture. Thus from one evil (the prohibition of religion in 1967) goodness will come. The albanian nation will make a great historical correction that will accelerate its unification with its mother continent: europe.20
Research scope In order to better understand how the Ottomans, Turks and Islam are represented in the school textbooks of Albania, we have selected the main history and literature texts that were used in Albania as of 2007 for teaching gymnasium students during their four grades of the high school system. The books that we shall analyze are the following: Letrsia 1 (Literature 1) for the 1st grade gymnasiums, Shtpia Shkollore Albas 2006 (b) (hereafter Letrsia 1) 2 Letrsia dhe Gjuha Shqipe 2 (Literature and Albanian Language 2) for the 2nd grade gymnasiums, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor e Re, 2004 (hereafter Letrsia 2) 3 Letrsi dhe Gjuh Shqipe 3 (Literature and Albanian Language 3) for the 3rd grade gymnasiums, Shtepia Botuese e Librit Shkollor e Re, 2004 (hereafter Letrsia 3) 4 Letrsi dhe Gjuh Shqipe 4 (Literature and Albanian Language 4) for the 4th grade gymnasiums, Pegi, 2007 (hereafter Letrsia 4) 5 Historia 1 (History 1) for the 1st grade gymnasiums, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 2003 (c) (hereafter Historia 1) 6 Historia 2 (History 2) for the 2nd grade gymnasiums, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 2000 (hereafter Historia 2) 7 Historia 3 (History 3) for the 3rd grade gymnasiums, Shtpia Botuese Media Print, 2006 (hereafter Historia 3) 8 Historia e Popullit Shqiptar 4 (the History of the Albanian People 4) for the 4th grade gymnasiums, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor 2003 (c) (hereafter Historia 4)
1
Despite the frequent change of the school curricula in Albania,21 the content of
Ismail kadare, nga nntori n nntor, 1991, quoted by Rexhep Qosja in Gazeta sHQIP, 15.06.2006 erind Pajo (2007), albanian schoolbooks in process of societal transformation: review notes in christina koulouri, ed.: Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History of Education, Thessaloniki: centre for
20 21
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the books has not changed a lot from what the Albanians where taught about the Ottomans during the era of communism. As Adanir and Kostovicova have noted, the Balkan historiography concerning the Ottoman Empire has been ideologically engaged since 1945. The ideological role of history was altered following the demise of communism in Albania, but not removed.22 The overwhelming majority of the authors who wrote the books we shall analyze here are people who were educated during the era of communism. As a result the themes that were produced during the era of communism about the Ottomans and the Turks have not changed a lot even in the post-communist editions. Kostovicova notes that the altered content in the Ottoman period primarily concerns the Albanian self-presentation rather than the Ottomans. Changes meet ideological imperatives of the period in which the textbooks are written, but the dominant perception of the Ottomans remains unchanged.23 From a survey that I have done to the names of the authors who wrote the books of Historia 1, 2, 3, 4 and Letrsia 1, 2, 3, 4 they are dominated by men and the majority of them bear names or surnames that indicate a Muslim origin. Muslim named authors are followed by Orthodox Christians, while the Catholics constitute a minority. Nevertheless, the religious names or surnames of the authors should not be overestimated here, since religion was not practiced, but rather fought against during the generation of the authors of our textbooks.24
Indications on the religious name or surname of the authors Authors name Muslim Orthodox Catholic Total
History 4 History 3 History 2 History 1 literature 4 literature 3 literature 2 literature 1 Total
6 5 2 3 6 4 3 3 32
1 1 2 2 5 2 1 2 16
0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4
7 6 5 5 12 6 6 5
democracy and Reconciliation in southeastern europe: 447 448 22 denisa kostovicova, The Portrayal of the Yoke: The Ottomans and their Rule in the post-1990 Albanian-language History Textbooks, Internationale schulbuchforschung, 2002 (Vol.24). 257-278 23 Ibid 24 religion was violently prohibited in albania from 1967 - 1990
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Authors being male or female
Sex History 4 History 3 History 2 History 1 literature 4 literature 3 literature 2 literature 1 Total
Men 6 3 4 3 7 4 5 3 35
Women 1 3 1 2 5 2 1 2 17
Total 7 6 5 5 12 6 6 5
In spite of the number of authors with some form of Muslim ancestry, one must note here that writers covering the bulk of the history lessons dealing with the Ottoman Empire and the Turks in Albania are overwhelmingly Orthodox Christians. The greater part of the information about the Ottomans in Historia 1, Historia 2, and Historia 4 where some 131 pages are dedicated to this history, comes from Petrika Thngjilli. Other authors who contribute are Llambro Filo, Ilira Sulo and Gazmend Shpuza. In Letrsia textbooks the identification of who writes what is more difficult. Another important observation that we must make here, is related to the cultural content of the books. In literature textbooks for example, the foreign literature offered is from overwhelmingly Christian, American and European authors and there are no texts coming from foreign Muslim authors. When it comes to Albanian authors, these literature textbooks have Christian authors who dominate over the Muslims. In Letrsi dhe Gjuhe Shqipe 4 textbook for example, the works of 14 Christian Albanian authors are offered in contrast to 5 Muslim-named authors.25 In Letrsia 3 there are 8 texts coming from Albanian Christian authors and 3 from Muslims.26 In Letrsia 2 the writings of 14 Albanian Christian and 6 Muslims authors are presented.27 While in Letrsia 1 we find the works of 2 Christian and 2 Muslim Albanian authors presented.28 However the names of Muslim named authors does not mean
see: Letrsi dhe Gjuh Shqipe 4 (2007), Pegi, Tirane, 324. I have to specify here the term author with muslim names since people like Ismail kadare or Faik konica have denounced Islam or called on albanian muslims to revert back to christianity in some of their writings, and their clasiffication as muslims would be abusive. 26 Letrsi dhe Gjuh Shqipe 3, shtepia Botuese e librit shkollor e Re, 2004, 423 424 27 Letrsia dhe Gjuha Shqipe 2, shtpia Botuese e librit shkollor e Re, 2004 28 letrsia 1, shtpia shkollore albas 2006, 3 5
25
67
that they should have pro-Ottoman or pro-Muslim feelings. On the contrary, many works that are given by Muslim named authors (e.g. Kadare, Konica, Frashri) are anti-Turkish and anti-Ottoman, and Kadare can be singled out for his anti-Muslim bias. Anti-Ottoman remarks can be found even among many Christian authors, who in some cases show even signs of anti-Semitism. The books that we are using for this research are the officially approved textbooks that the Ministry of Education and Science of Albania requires all state and private gymnasiums of the country to use. The school textbooks are usually prepared by the Institute of Pedagogical Studies which is a branch of the Ministry of Education.29 In contrast to many other researches in this field, which study only the history textbooks for finding the representation of the other, here, I am making use of the literature textbooks as well. The reason is that literature is as powerful as history for promoting the values of a society. As we shall see below, the texts of literature that are taught in the schools of Albania are too nationalistic and anti-Ottoman and reflect the historical understanding / interpretation of the history that the Albanian state maintains as politically correct. Ottomans: the Asiatic horde that enchained the brave Albanian nation Scanderbeg and national resistance In the Xth section of Letrsia 3 textbook, the gymnasium students of Albania are presented with the life and the deeds of Marin Barleti, a Catholic priest who wrote the Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum Principis. Barleti is presented to the schoolchildren of Albania as one of the most excellent representatives of Albanian humanism. He is portrayed as a European humanist who escaped Albania when the Ottoman Asian Hordes cut off the Albanian culture from European Renaissance. The reason why Barleti is held at great esteem in Letrsia 3 and other Albanian textbooks is related to his historical masterpiece on Scanderbeg, the national hero of the Albanians.30 Even though Barleti claims that Scanderbeg was a Bulgarian,31 the national historiography of Albania maintains him to be the national hero of the Albanians. Scanderbeg was used by Albanian Rilindja to symbolize the modern identity of the Albanians. He was used even by Enver Hoxha, who as Egin Ceka has shown,
29 erind Pajo (2007), op. cited: 445 461 30 Letrsia 3, p. 129 130 31 Fatos lubonja, Historia, letrsia dhe libri T jetosh n ishull i Blushit, korrieri, 12 may 2008
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used the myth of Scanderbeg for legitimizing his grip on power and building the civic religion of his regime.32 Nowadays, the myth of Scanderbeg is used in the Albanian textbooks as a symbol of national unity and Albanians European identity. However his transformation into the national hero of the Albanians is one of the main factors, for the negative perception that the Ottomans and the Turks receive in Albanian textbooks. The history of the Turkish Ottomans vis--vis the Albanians is dealt at great length by Historia 4.33 This textbook which is named Historia e Popullit Shqiptar 4 (the History of the Albanian People 4) seeks to teach the history of the nation to 4th grade gymnasium students. When dealing with the Ottomans, Historia 4 depicts them as coming into the Balkans during the XIV and XV centuries, at times of great divisions and fatality for the peoples of peninsula. The Ottoman Turks are shown to be economically, militarily and politically superior to the peoples of peninsula. They are depicted as inrushing the Balkans from Asia and no ruler of peninsula can do anything about them. However, Albanians are shown as standing to the challenge and helping the Balkan peoples resisting the Turks. Albanians are shown resisting the Ottoman Turks in a number of battles. The textbooks of Historia 1 and 4, claim that Albanians contributed of the troops to the anti-Ottoman coalition at the Battle of Kosova. Contrary to the Serbian narrative, which claims that it was the Serbs who killed sultan Murat I, Historia 4 maintains that his killing was made by an Albanian boyar. The Serbian boyar, Milo Obili who is supposed to have killed the sultan, here is named Millosh Kopili or Milosh the Bastard. Kostovicova has interpreted the attempts of Albanian historiography to Albanianize the Battle of Kosovo as an attempt which aims to suit the imperative of national unity behind a national claim to territory in the post-1990 period.34 Historia 4 textbook dedicates some 107 pages or 28 lessons of the book (that is 1/3 of the book) to the history of the Ottoman Empire in Albania. Historia 4 maintains that with the defeat of the Balkan coalition in Kosovo, the Albanian states (which never existed) lost their independence. Albanians are shown as being one people, while the Ottoman sultans are shown as not only invading the Albanian states but even as taking infants and kids as hostages from Albanian princes in order
egin ceka, Ndrgjegje historike. Muzeu Kombtar dhe Muzeu i Sknderbeut si institucione t religjionit civil shqiptar t komunizmit, Prpjekja nr. 21/ 2005: 121-147 33 Historia e Popullit Shqiptar 4, shtpia Botuese e librit shkollor 2003, 64 34 kostovicova, Op. Cited. 272
32
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to secure their obedience.35 By reading the headings of Historia 4 we understand that the historical relationship between the Ottomans and Albanians is reduced to a narrative of conflict and defiance. Some of the titles of the lessons are: The Albanian resistance against the Ottomans, General uprisings and the League of Lezha, The Victories of Lezha League, The Great Battles of 60-s, The continuation of war after Scanderbegs death, The war of liberation against Ottoman domination, Albanians conflict with Istanbul, Anti-Ottoman uprisings and the beginnings of the national re-awakening, The uprising of Kosovo in 1910, The implementation of total Ottoman domination in Albanian lands etc.36 The first lessons that Albanian students learn about the Ottoman history in Albania can be found in the chapter the Albanian - Ottoman War of the XVth century. The second lesson of this chapter presents to the readers the figure of Scanderbeg. A painting that accompanies the lesson shows Scanderbeg in a valiant pose, rallying the docile Albanians to fight against the Turks. The picture has an underlying note saying the return of Scanderbeg to Kruja. Scanderbeg is depicted as coming back to Albania with some hundred co-nationals after having escaped the Turks. With him, the Albanians are depicted as being antemurale martyrs of Europe. They are shown as fighting some 25 successful battles in 25 years, against the most powerful sultans of the time, Murat II and Mehmet II.37 Historia 1 shows that after the Serbian defeat at Kosovo, only Scanderbeg and Jnos Hunyadi were able to resist to the Turks.38 The first 7 lessons of Historia 4 that deal with the presence of the Ottomans in Albania are dedicated to the deeds of Scanderbeg. Here the Ottomans are portrayed in awe-inspiring colors. Exceptions to this depiction of the Ottomans can be found only in one of the lessons of Historia 1 dealing with the creation of the Ottoman Empire. Here the Ottomans are shown to be tolerant towards Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews.39 Nevertheless in Historia 4 the Ottoman Empire and the Ottomans are presented in negative terms. Scanderbeg, who according to the author led the national resistance, is depicted not only as being the commander-in-chief of the nation but also as the defender of Europe against the Turk. After narrating at length the deeds of Scanderbeg and the nation, the text-writers conclude that because of the
Historia 4 2003: 65 Historia 4: 345 346 37 Historia 1 2003: 165 38 Ibid 39 Historia 1: 159 160
35 36
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remarks he gained from many European personalities and his very important role in resisting the Turks, Scanderbeg deserves the title hero of the nation.40 The texts that deal with the deeds of Scanderbeg are accompanied by paintings of him and other Albanian warriors, presented in warlike positions and their names often written in Latin,41 so that the reader can have the impression that they fully belonged to the nobility of Europe. In the textbooks of Historia 4 and Letrsia 1, 3, 4 the mythicization of Scanderbeg goes hand in hand with the vilification of the Ottomans. The Turks are shown as burning, robbing and smashing Albania, and enslaving or slaughtering its population.42 The Turkish invasion is blamed for the destruction of cities, culture and political life of the country. The Ottoman invasion is shown to have cost Albania the loss of her best architectonic achievements like castles, cathedrals, churches, monasteries, works of art, documents and monographs.43 Ottoman sultans like Bayezid II are publicized as ruthless butchers. They chop off hands and feet of their Albanians prisoners and throw them from mountains. Children and women are sold into slavery. Mehmet II is shown as the greatest tyrant among the Turks while his soldiers massacre the Albanians.44 Whereas Murat II burns everything he finds on his way marching against Albania.45 Pashas, Timars and Resistance After dealing with the resistance of Scanderbeg, Historia 4 textbook covers the reforms that the Ottomans undertook in Albania after instituting their rule. The establishment by them of the feudal - military system is shown in better terms than the invasion. The authors recognize here that many Albanian towns were rebuilt after the Ottoman invasion.46 However, Albania of the XVI and XVIII centuries is depicted as a country in conflicts and wars of liberation. Some of the titles used for describing this time are the war of liberation from Ottoman domination, the insurrection of the XVI century, Albanian assemblies, Balkan assemblies and military
Historia 4 2003: 66 79 see pictures of the chapter albanian Ottoman War of the XVth century on Ibid 2003 42 Historia 4: 79 43 Historia 4: 77 44 Historia 4: 75 45 Historia 4: 64 46 Historia 4: 81 83
40 41
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insurrections.47 Albanians are portrayed as cohesive freedom-fighters resisting the Ottoman yoke. In one of the lessons illustrating these Albanian wars the author inserts a painting from Eugene Delacroix the Mounted Greek Warrior48 with an underlying note: an episode from the war with the Ottomans.49 Despite the fact that during these times many Albanians were part of the Ottoman state and it was they who crushed most of these local rebellions and banditries, nothing is mentioned about it. The idea one gets by reading Historia 4 is that all Albanians fought the Ottomans, while the beys, the spahis and all other locals who sided with the Ottomans are treated like foreigners.50 Only Historia 2 recognizes that some Albanians contributed to the development of the Ottoman State during the XVI and XVII centuries. Here, the author mentions Koi Bey from Kora and Mehmet Pashe Kprl from Berat who are shown as apt individuals who strengthened the Ottoman state. However, the author does not refer to them as Albanians but mentions only their city of origin. After dealing with the establishment of the Ottoman rule, Historia 4 deals with what the Albanian history calls the era of the Great Albanian Pashaliks. The XVIII and XIX centuries were times when the Ottoman Empire started to disintegrate. Local ayans from the Arab peninsula up to the Balkans resisted the central government, establishing their autonomous rule.51 This period was followed by the modernizing era initiated by Sultan Mahmut II who crushed the local ayans with the aim of centralizing the empire, and creating a new army based on western models.52 However the textbook authors fail to address the general context but treat the local Muslim ayans or the pashas in a nationalist framework and build a teleological timeline of conflicts that culminates with the pashas who are shown as being inspired by Scanderbeg. The autonomy that is professed by local pashas is interpreted as an attempt to create an autonomous Albania and their problems with each other or with the central government are simplified as the conflict of the Albanians with Istanbul.53 Historia 4 pays a special attention to two powerful pashaliks that existed in Al47 Historia 4: 85 87 48 a copy of eugene delacroix mounted Greek Warrior painting can be found online at: http:// www.greece-athens.com/page.php?page_id=177 49 Historia 4: 85 50 see Historia 4: 85 88 51 shaw, stanford j. (1971) Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 17891807. Harvard university Press, 211 283 52 shaw, stanford j. (1976-1977). History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey. Vol II, cambridge university Press, 1 - 55 53 Historia 4 2003: 96
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bania in this time: the Bushati family of Northern Albania and Ali Pasha of Janina. The Bushatli pashas are depicted as religiously tolerant, fighting against foreign pashas and wanting to create an Illyrian Confederation in memory of Scanderbeg and throwing off the Ottoman yoke.54 On the other hand Ali Pasha of Janina is depicted as a cunning and violent religious fanatic. However, Ali, in the same way as the Bushatlis, is shown as wanting to create Albania.55 The author makes no mention of Ali Pashas and the Bushatlis role in defending the Ottoman Empire, or their suppression of Greek and Serb rebels. Their wars against the Venetians and other Europeans are largely ignored, and all their history is depicted as a conflict between Albanians and Turks. The conclusion of the story of the Great Albanian Pashaliks shows that the Albanian pashas failed to unite for creating Albania. The Turks defeated them. Their conflicts and those of other Albanian rebels of this period are absurdly presented as national movements aimed at removing non-Albanian officials from their land. But their endeavors and those of many other Albanian leaders, who come after the pashas, are shown as coming to a tragic end. Mehmet Reshit Pasha massacres all the leaders of Albania in a meeting that he organizes for them in August 1830.56 Tanzimat reforms and Albanian national awakening After dealing with the pashaliks, Historia 4 explains the changes that happened in the empire during the Tanzimat reforms. The authors of Historia 4 and Historia 3 maintain that the destruction of the Albanian pashaliks and Tanzimat reforms were like a second invasion for Albania.57 The teleological narrative built claims that the period from 1830 until 1912 is an era of National Reawakening for the Albanian nation, when the Rilindas fight with rifle and pen for wanting to return Albania in its glory as in the time of Scanderbeg.58 The reforms undertaken by the Ottomans at the time are shown as two-sided. On one side the authors praise the reformers of Sultan Mahmut II who wanted to introduce European reforms in the empire, while on the other hand they condemn their implementation in Albania since they replaced Albanian officials with foreigners who did not know the Albanian traditions. The Tanzimat officials are shown to have spoken the language of stick and violence. Another im Historia 4: 89 91 Historia 4: 92 95 56 Historia 4: 96 98 57 Historia 3 2006: 132 58 Historia 4 2003: 108
54 55
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portant objection that the text-writers have for the Tanzimat reforms is connected to the implementation of the millet system, whereby the Ottomans classified the Muslims as Turks, the Orthodox as Greeks and the Catholics as Latin. Such as a move, is viewed by the writers as being harmful and divisive for the Albanian nation.59 However, the authors recognize the development of Albania during the Tanzimat era and show that in these times Albanian towns, trade and emigration expanded. The following chapter which deals with the Eastern Question, the Congress of Berlin and the creation of Prizren League (1878), is shown as a new pinnacle of Albanianism. The authors depict the events leading to the creation of Prizren League in a teleological manner. Contrary to the facts, they portray the creation of the League and the conflicts that Muslims of northern Albania had with the invading Balkan armies and later with the Ottomans, as a national conflict. The League of Prizren is shown as an organization that was set up by the National Movement of the Albanians by ignoring its pan-Islamic character and the demands of the Muslims of Kosovo for preservation of Shariah, loyalty to the sultan etc.60 Kostovicova notes that the post1990 textbooks of Albania and Kosovo have played down the close association of Muslim Albanian conservatives with the Ottoman state, and reassert the argument of a unified nation.61 The authors of Historia 4 show the League as being nationalistic whereas the ulamas who organized it are depicted as putting Albanianism before the faith.62 In order to illustrate the creation of the League the authors have inserted a painting from Shaban Hysa that was produced in Albania in 1978, depicting League members as swearing to fight for the nation, while they are watched by Abdyl Frashri, a nationalist of Bektashi affiliation from Southern Albania. The authors connect the concerns of Kosovar Muslims that created the League with the activities of Albanian Rilindas who were in Istanbul and wanted to develop the Albanian language against the Greco Ottoman reaction.63 The Rilindas are thus depicted as Albanians who fight with Pen for Mmdhen the motherland. After dealing with the events following the Congress of Berlin, Historia 4 deals with the birth of the Young Turk movement. The authors show it as a joint venture between the Albanians and the Turks, who wanted to remove the absolute rule of
59 Historia 4 2003: 110 and Historia 3 2006: 132 60 For more on the Islamic Identity of the league of Prizren see: Olsi jazexhi (june 2007), Mbi identitetin islamik t Lidhjes s Prizrenit, konf e Bashkesise Islame te kosoves, Prizren, kosova 61 kostovicova, Op. Cited. 273 62 Historia 4 2003: 119 125 63 Historia 4: 135 138
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the sultan and stop foreign interference in the Empire. The authors recognize the role played by Albanians in the movement. Historia 2 gives a lot of attention to the Albanians who formed the Young Turk movement in order of opposing the bloody sultan Abdlhamid II.64 However when the Young Turks come to power they are shown as following reactionary policies and terrorizing the Albanians. In response to terror, Albanians have to fight against the Young Turk anti-Albanian obscurantism.65 The authors make no mention of the great support that the Young Turk policies got in Albania but depict the whole Young Turk era as an era of war and resistance. The authors bring the centuries-long Albanian Turkish affair to an end in 1912 when the Albanian nation who had resisted alone for three to four years the Turkish armies declared its independence on 28 November 1912. Even here the authors fail to show the resistance that many Albanian speakers made to the idea of creating an independent Albania, or even to the fact that Albania was created as a state in 1913 at the behest of the Great Powers. On the contrary, with the proclamation of independence, Albanians are shown as putting an end to their five centuries of submission to Ottoman domination and having at least, the possibilities to escape from the backwardness in which foreign rule had degraded their country.66 Islam: a Turkish leftover on the Albanian soil On November 10th, 2005, the President of Albania, Alfred Moisiu, gave a speech in the Oxford Forum, entitled: The inter-religious tolerance in the tradition of Albanians. In his speech, the president said that
Islam in albania is not native a religion but was brought into the country by the Ottoman army
and
Islam in albania was not spread at the time of its origin and is not a residing religion, but a notion inherited in the languages and religious literature of those who brought it as a norm, Islam in albania is a shallow Islam. If you scratch any albanian just a little you will uncover his christian roots.
The president went on to say that You will find 15 centuries of Christianity in every
Historia 2 2000: 115 Historia 4 2003: 149 66 Historia 4: 161 165
64 65
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Muslim of Albania and that it is not true that in our country there is a Muslim majority population but from the viewpoint of a religious timeline, all Albanians are Christian. The president concluded
that until the appearance of the Ottoman political, military and religious factors, for the average albanian, the important thing was being a devout christian.67
The above remarks that shocked the Muslim Forum of Albania and many Albanian Muslims in 2005, are, in fact the official view, which Albanian school textbooks convey about the history of Islam in Albania. In Letrsia 2 textbook, gymnasium students get this explanation about the Islamization of Albania:
The High Porte managed to slowly Islamize albania during the modern era, at a time when the pressure for abandoning christianity was very high, as for example in the middle of the XVII century. It is probable that an important factor was the dhimmi system, whereby non-muslim citizens of the Ottoman empire were forced to pay taxes in order to protect themselves. This tax was increased without limit until the christians would decide to embrace the religion of the subjugator, by benefiting after this a full status of a citizen of the empire. 68
The students of the gymnasiums of Albania get three kinds of views about Islam in their textbooks. Their first information about Islam comes from the Historia 1 textbook. Here, in the lesson Birth and spread of Islam they learn that Islam was born in Arabia, when a man called Muhameti proclaimed a new religion called Islam. The new religion that Muhameti offered to the Arabs was monotheistic, like Judaism and Christianity. The author then shows that Muhametis teachings against the gods of the Arabs caused a lot of anger. In order to save themselves from the persecution of the rich of Mecca, Muhameti and his followers left Mecca for Medina in 622, in a migration that is known as Hajj [sic]. While in Medina, Muhameti preached a holy war against the infidels. But in 630 Mecca surrendered to Muhameti, who was known as the Prophet by now. Thereafter the Bedouin tribes embraced Islam. After the death of Muhameti in 632 Abu Bekr become a Caliph and created the Caliphate. The fourth Caliph of Islam, Ali, was Muhametis cousin and son in law. However the killing of Ali in 661 from the leader of Syria who proclaimed himself a caliph divided
see: The Muslim Forum df Albania, Press Release: Su: The President of Albania, Alfred Moisiu, insults the Muslims, date 11/11/2005. available at: http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/ pershtyp7.html 68 letrsia 2 2004: 28
67
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the Muslims into Shia and Sunni.69 After narrating the early story of Islam, Historia 1 deals with the achievements of the Islamic Civilization in the lesson The Islamic Culture. Here, the author recognizes the fact that Muhammad laid the foundation of a new society. Based on his teachings the Arabs are shown as developing a great civilization. Muslims are shown tolerant towards Christians and Jews but not with the others. The author recognizes the fact that Islam increased the role of women in the society. However, Muslim women are shown as still being in an inferior position to that of men. The limitation on womens freedoms that are taught by the Quran, made them to wear burkah (pere) when going in public. To illustrate the oppressed position of women, the author places one painting of two Muslim women. They are shown in a crumpled and funny dress, one wearing a burkah and another keeping a Bedouin hijab in form of an umbrella at the top of her head.70 If Arabian Islam is generally portrayed in positive colors, Historia 3, which deals with religions in todays world, shows Islam as a religion with a large spread during the XXth century. But here the spread of Islam is shown as being parallel with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, which has created problems of terroristic character in the world. Islam is also shown as being revived in many of its branches during the 20th century, such as into Shiism, Ismailism and Alawism. Islam has even been used as a political ideology against America in Iran.71 Finally, when it comes to Islam in Albania, the textbooks link its presence to the Ottomans. Historia 1 shows that it was the Ottomans who brought Islam alongside their empire. The Ottomans are shown as building many mosques and turning old churches into mosques.72 In Historia 4 the process of Islamization is shown as going hand in hand with the establishment of the Ottoman domination over Albania.73 According to the author the first centres of Islamization were the cities which were populated by Turkish colonists who built the first institutions of Islam. The lesson Religions in Albania of Historia 4 deals at length with the process of Islamization of Albania. Here the Islamization is shown as a process that had much more success in the cities and less in the villages. Islamization is shown as having been achieved by two means: freewill and compulsion. The author maintains that the Albanians
Historia 1 2003: 99 101 Historia 1, 103 71 Historia 3 2006: 240 241 72 Historia 1 2003: 166 167 73 Historia 4 2003: 104
69 70
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of border provinces embraced Islam in order to protect their ethnicity against the Slavization and Hellenization. The same thesis is shown even in Letrsia 2 where the authors have inserted one article from Roberto Morocco della Rocca who claims that in the modern epoch Islam separated the Albanians from the Christian Slavs, by becoming a barrier against foreign cultures.74 Here Islam is shown positively as defending the borders of the nation. However, the other face of Islamization is that of compulsion. The idea that Islam was imposed by terror and that it is a foreign religion to the Albanians can be read in some textbooks in a blatant way, such as in of Letrsia 2.75 While in many other texts this can be understood by the way how the Turks who bring the Islam are depicted. In Historia 4 the Albanians living in cities are shown as embracing Islam for economic reasons, since trade and military career were monopolies of Muslims. In order to remain Christian, every male (15 80 years old) had to pay a head tax, which increased continuously. But in some regions of Albania some people are shown to defend Christianity by practicing two religions simultaneously. In the face of states compulsion they were declared Muslim but in private, Christians. The authors of Historia 4 show that if a Muslim wanted to become a Christians he had to suffer heavy penalties, such as imprisonment or death. Muslims are shown as being supported by the state and the system, while the Christians were unprotected people.76 To enforce the idea that Islamization was achieved through compulsion the author gives a number of missionary reports at the end of the lesson Religions in Albania. Here one can read reports where people of Dukagjini have become Turks (Muslims) only by changing their names, but in their hearts remain Christians. Another insert shows that the Ottoman states and Albania in particular is filled with people who claim to be Muslims but are Christians at heart. They have converted out of fear of paying the haraj. In another insert the Albanians are shown as naming their children first in the church by the priests, and later naming them as Muslims. And in another insert the Albanians are shown as irreligious lot, and that Islam is practiced among them without any conviction and for this reason it has lost its particular character.77 The last heading of the lesson Religions in Albania talks about the religious tolerance of the Albanians. The toleration here is dedicated to the ancestors of the Al letrsia 2 2004: 10 letrsia 2 2004: 28 76 Historia 4 2003: 104 105 77 Historia 4, 106
74 75
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banians, the Illyrians from whom the Albanians inherited paganism. Albanians are depicted as pragmatic people in their history who shifted their religion for personal benefits. The author attributes some points even to the Quran which allows religious tolerance. However the greatest attribute for the tolerance of the Albanians is attributed to Bektashism, which, is claimed to have a democratic organization and for this reason it embraced the Christian viewpoints. At the end the author attributes a part of the religious tolerance of Albanians to the fact that Albanians are indifferent towards religions and their national self-consciousness is more important than the faith.78 Good Turks, bad Turks and turncoat Albanians who love the Turks Even though the general tendency of Albanian textbooks is to project the Turks as ruthless invaders, there are cases when the Turks are depicted as good human beings. The lesson: The national Turkish Revolution. The Turkish Republic of Historia 3, talks with sympathy about the Turkish nation. Here the author explains the events that lead to the creation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal. Atatrk is depicted as a great military strategist who fought against the anti-nationalist sultan and foreigners for creating Turkey. The sultan is shown as: the representative and defender of old feudal powers, conservator and traitor of national interests who had agreed to divide his own country.79 Under the leadership of Atatrk, Turkey is shown as a country that entered in the path of progress, emancipated the women, and built a national laic and democratic education. The author praises even Atatrks introduction of the Latin alphabet, which replaced the old one that was hard to learn for the masses.80 However the case of Atatrkist Turkey is the only exception when the Turks, suddenly become good Turks, and Turkey becomes a progressive nation. If we were to rate the textbooks of Letrsia and History for greatest number of negative depictions and epithets given to the Turks, the books of Letrsia stand in the first place. Here dozens of poems, stories and commentaries talk about the Turks in frightening manner. Gjergj Fishta for example in his poem Lahuta e Malcis shows the relations of the Turks with the Albanians in the following manner:
Ibid Historia 3 2006: 82 80 Ibid

78 79
79
Pesqind vjet kishin kalue cse te buk'rn kt shqipni Turku e mbante n robin krejt tu'e la tmjern n gjak, frymn tue ia xanun njak, as tue lan, jo drit me pa. kurr t keqen pa ia da rrihe e mos e len me kja
\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
Five hundred years had passed since this beautiful albania enslaved by the Turk she was covered all, her in blood suffocating her to death forbidding her from seeing light keeping her in a long nightmare whipping and never letting her cry.81
Naim Frashri is probably more influential than any other author of Rilindja on inspiring the Albanians to hate the imagined Turk. His poem Histori e Skenderbeut that in many cases is memorized by the Albanian schoolchildren, teaches the national narrative that many Albanians remember for the rest of their life as the God-given story of their nation. Frashris poem depicts Albania as a prosperous country, living in some glorious past:
kndo, ngjll, urtsin edhe gjith mirsit, sknderben e trimrin, Qi dha shqipris drit. Ish ver e po qeshte moti, lulet kishin lulzuar, e mbreti Gjon kastrioti n fron rrij duke menduar. \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ sing you angel for the wisdom and for all the goodness for scanderbeg and his bravery who gave light to albania it was summer, the weather was nice flowers had bloomed and the king Gjon kastrioti was meditating in his throne82
And then the Turks come. Frashri shows them coming in awesome manner. They present a letter to their king and ask from him Albania. As the story goes, the Albanian king Gjon, is terrified by the mighty Turks, offers to them his kids as hostages and then Albania is invaded by the Turks which are described in the following manner:
Turqit duall ng azia edhe n evrop erdh Rrmet, posi mizria e shum gjakra derdh \ \ \ \ The Turks climbed from asia and in europe they came in millions moving in a horde and so much blood they spilled83
The poem of Naim continues in 18 pages of Letrsia 1 where students are presented throughout the poem with the Turkish atrocities, the return of their king, Scanderbeg, the betrayal of some of his Albanian commanders and the resistance of their national
letrsia 1 2006: 76 Ibid: 91 83 Ibid
81 82
80
hero. These myths are reinforced in the textbook even by the comments of the authors, and the required homework that teachers must make with the students. In page 105 for example students are asked:
can we say that albanians managed to defend the european civilization in their 25 years of war? What were the harms that the Ottoman yoke caused to our country during the past five centuries, when they cut us from the european civilization?84
The myth of Turkish obscurantism is reinforced even in the introduction of the poem of Frashri where Dhimitr Shuteriqi comments:
naim wants to mobilize the albanians to war, their last war of liberation: against that eternal beast, the empire of the sultans, and her present sultan, abdlhamid, whom our Rilindas rightfully depicted as a monster (remember here the poem sulltani from cajupi). He was the bloodsucker of the albanian nation, by denying to this nation its language and nationality, by keeping it in the worst political and social slavery, in the worst oppression and backwardness. But the albanian now woke. He is in his path of national awakening. and he did never let his sword down. scanderbeg and his deeds was nothing more but the greatest demonstration of our national spirit - naim thinks.85
In the Letrsia books there are dozens of references that show the Albanian nation born out of the war with Turkey. The majority of the Albanian Rilindas are shown to have fought against or fought by the Turks. One example is Asdreni (Aleksander Stavre Drenova) who is shown to have taken part in a congress that wanted to unite the Albanians to fight Turkey.86 Ndre Mjeda is shown to have been arrested by the Turks, because of a petition that he made against the Ottomans in 1902.87 In Letrsia 4 there are even Greek authors like Nikos Kazanzaqis who hate and fight against the Turks, because Greece was at war with Turkey, one was fighting for freedom, while the other had invaded and did not give her freedom.88 The Turks are shown as slaughterers, butchers, dog-hearted, kidnapers of women, girls and children, even in the stories of Mitrush Kuteli.89 However apart from evil Turkey, the books of history and literature are filled even
Ibid: 105 Ibid: 90 86 letrsia 4 2007: 22 87 Ibid: 31 88 Ibid: 177 89 Ibid: 146
84 85
81
with references to collaborator Albanians who adore their oppressive masters. These Albanians are usually shown as traitors, enemies of the nation against whom real Albanians should feel disgust. The most famous example of the Albanian traitor is Ballaban Pasha, an Ottoman general of Sultan Mehmet II, whom Albanian history depicts as a national traitor. This impression is reinforced even in Letrsia 1 where Ballaban Pasha is portrayed by the following:
muhameti brofi n kmb dhe mblodhi trimat cilit nga ju ia bn zemra T m sjell ktu sknderben u prgjigj vetm Ballabani arbreshi tradhtar \ \ \ \ \ \ muhamet jumped to his feet and he gathered his bravest men which one of you will ever dare to bring here scanderbeg responded only Ballaban the unfaithful albanian90
Other traitors depicted in Letrsia 1 are people like Hamza Kastrioti and Moisi Dibrani, who betrayed Scanderbeg to the Turks.91 But apart from the early Turkish invasion, Muslim Albanians are depicted as people loving Turkey and hating Albania, even in narratives that are dedicated to independent Albania. Ismail Kadares novel The Perverse Year (1990) which is offered in Letrsia 1, demonizes the Muslim population of Central Albania who wanted to remain with the Ottoman Empire. Kadare depicts them as depraved, uncivilized, headstrong Turkomans who hate Albania. Kadare shows these Muslims as being organized in the armed bands of Essad Pasha. They roam Central Albania, beating their drums and wanting the return of Turkey. Their portrayal grows quite brutish when they are shown screaming Dum Babn (we want the Father), meaning the Turkish sultan, and singing an unbearable song: For Janah we left, but arrived in Jahanam / Albania you whore, poisoned our way.92 Muslim Albanians receive further negative depictions even in other stories, such as The autumn of Jeladin Bey by Mitrush Kuteli. Here, Kuteli depicts Jeladin Bey as one of the many dim-witted servants of Father Sultan. As with all the other beys of Ottoman Albania he is shown to abusing the rayas sexually, physically and economically.93
letrsia 1 2006: 60 Ibid: 102 92 letrsia 2 2004: 204 93 Ibid: 141 148
90 91
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Conclusion
In this paper we have summarized the main examples of how Turks, the Ottomans and Muslims are depicted in high school textbooks of Albania. The Ottomans appear as merciless rulers and suppressors of Albanians and, in many cases, their rule in Albania is simply labeled as a yoke. Since the Islamization of Albania was achieved during the Ottoman rule, Islam is overwhelmingly viewed as the religion of the invader. These negative depictions are part of the modern identity of Albanians. They first appeared in Albania during the Rilindja period of late 19th century, when a group of chiefly Christian nationalists wanted to cut Albania off from the Ottoman Empire. The vilifications of the Ottomans continued even during the time of the Kingdom in Albania, and were officially popularized during the communist era. By demonizing the Turks and the Muslims, Albanian policy and history makers have tried to construct an immaculate impression of Albanian nationhood. The Ottomans are the dreaded other. In order to make their point, Albanian textbook writers have identified the Ottoman Turks as enemies of the nation, against whom a superhuman nation is imagined to have fought. Factual information that shows the Albanian contribution to the Ottoman Empire is conveniently ignored and discounted, thus presenting a history that is utterly deformed. To convince Albanian students about their past enmity with the Turks and the glorious heroism of their ancestors, history and literature textbooks allocate a great amount of space to the history of the Ottomans in Albania. The textbooks analyzed in this paper make use of literary fiction, and isolated past incidents to misrepresent the Ottomans and their rule, and to simplify the history of Ottomans in Albania as history of war and conflict. Part of Albanians fight with the Turks is even Islam. If during the era of communism all the religions were prohibited in Albania, Islam - being more directly connected to the Turks - was treated more distastefully than the others. Albanian textbook writers depict Albanians as being Christian at heart, sometimes irreligious, but defenders of Europe, who were accidentally or violently Islamized. In the contemporary Albanian cosmology, Christianity is linked to the West, while Islam is understood to be an intrinsic feature of backwardness associated with the Orient.94 The depiction of the Turk as the other has left a negative and warped impact on the ways Albanians perceive their history and identity. As a result of this distorted
94
erind Pajo (2007), op. cited: 457
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narrative, an accurate history of the Ottoman Empire is little known in Albania and Turks are imagined in murky colours. In the recent years, a number of Turkish diplomats have understood this handicap and are complaining to Albanian authorities about the distorted views that Albanian textbooks make of them.95 Muslims too, suffer from misperceptions in Albania because of this manipulation of history. In the recent years they have demanded the rewriting of their history,96 a notion that was impossible during the era of communism. However, the present war on terror has made the situation much harder for them and in the past years a number of Christian or ex-enverist politicians have openly attacked the Islamic identity of the Albanians.97 If during the era of communism, Islamophobia and Turkophobia were part of states propaganda against religion, with the fall of communism a number of Albanian intellectuals, and organizations are questioning the designs of Albanias past history. As Europe is increasingly becoming a reference point in the political and cultural debates among Albanians, it is hoped that a more pragmatic view will be taken into consideration, for the better portrayal of Muslims and Turks in Albanian schoolbooks. However, until now, no European organization has raised this concern and the negative depictions are still going unnoticed in the school textbooks of Albania.
References Articles and conference papers Denisa Kostovicova, The Portrayal of the Yoke: The Ottomans and their Rule in the post-1990 Albanian-language History Textbooks, Internationale Schulbuchforschung, 2002 (Vol.24) Egin Ceka, Ndrgjegje historike. Muzeu Kombtar dhe Muzeu i Sknderbeut si institucione t religjionit civil shqiptar t komunizmit, Prpjekja nr. 21/ 2005 Ermal Hasimja, Emra dhe identitete: prse nuk quhem Besim?, Universiteti Europian i Tirans. Online at: http://www.hasimja.com/files/emra%20dhe%20identitete%20perse.htm Erind Pajo (2007), Albanian schoolbooks in process of societal transformation: review notes in Christina Koulouri, ed. : Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History of Education, Thessaloniki: Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeastern Europe Enis Sulstarova, Orientalizmi Shqiptar, Prpjekja 20/2005
nis rishikimi i historis m Turqin, Gazeta start, 29/03/2008. available at: http://www. gazetastart.com/?faqe=shfaqlajm&lajmid=2310 96 letter from mFa to the head of Osce mission in albania: The Muslim Forum of Albania apeals to OSCE to help fighting Islamophobia and racism in Albania, june, 03, 2008. available at: http://www. forumimusliman.org/english/osce.html 97 see some of the press releases of the muslim Forum about these incidents. They can be traced at: http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/
95
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Fatos Lubonja, Feja dhe Shqiptaret, Prpjekja nr. 20/2005 Fatos Lubonja, Historia, letrsia dhe libri T jetosh n ishull i Blushit, Korrieri, 12 May 2008 Kristina Jorgaqi, Ndrhyrjet E Planifikuara Pr Zvendsimin E Huazimeve N Shqipen Standarde, Prpjekja 09 /1996 Olsi Jazexhi, Nga Turq n Shqiptar, Prpjekja nr. 26/ 2008 (furthcoming) Olsi Jazexhi, The Political Exploitation of Islamophobia in postcommunist Albania, International Islamophobia Conference, Istanbul. December 2007 Olsi Jazexhi ( June 2007), Mbi identitetin islamik t Lidhjes s Prizrenit, Konf e Bashkesise Islame te Kosoves, Prizren, Kosova Nis rishikimi i historis m Turqin, Gazeta Start, 29/03/2008. Available at: http://www.gazetastart.
com/?faqe=shfaqlajm&lajmid=2310
Books Anton Logoreci (1977) The Albanians: Europes Forgotten Survivors, London Victor Gollancz Ltd. 155 Enis Sulstarova (2006), Arratisje nga Lindja, Tirane, Dudaj Nathalie Clayer (2007), Aux origines du nationalisme albanais. La naissance dune nation majoritairement musulmane en Europe, Paris, Karthala/CERI, coll. Recherches internationales Sami Frashri, Shqipria, 'ka n, sht e do t bhet?, Bukuresht 1899, (Prishtine 1999) Sami Frashri: VEPRA 9, Personalitete shqiptare n Kamus al-Alam t Sami Frashrit, LOGOS-A Shkup 1994 Shaw, Stanford J. (1976-1977). History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol II, Cambridge University Press Shaw, Stanford J. (1971). Between old and new: the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 17891807. Harvard University Press Documents Letter from MFA to the head of OSCE mission in Albania: The Muslim Forum of Albania apeals to OSCE to help fighting Islamophobia and racism in Albania, June, 03, 2008. Available at: http://
www.forumimusliman.org/english/osce.html
The Muslim Forum of Albania, Press Release: Su: The President of Albania, Alfred Moisiu, insults the Muslims, date 11/11/2005. Available at: http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/pershtyp7.
html
Textbooks
1 2 3 4 5
Letrsia 1, Shtpia Shkollore Albas 2006 Letrsia dhe Gjuha Shqipe 2, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor e Re, 2004 Letrsi dhe Gjuh Shqipe 3, Shtepia Botuese e Librit Shkollor e Re, 2004 Letrsi dhe Gjuh Shqipe 4, Pegi, 2007 Historia 1, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 2003
6 7 8
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Historia 2, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor, 2000 Historia 3, Shtpia Botuese Media Print, 2006 Historia e Popullit Shqiptar 4, Shtpia Botuese e Librit Shkollor 2003 Movies
Tok e Prgjakur (1976), Kinostudio Shqipria e Re. Screenwriter: Kio Blushi and Nexhati Tafa. Producers: Ibrahim Muo and Kristaq Mitro. The movie is based upon the novels of Naum Priftit Litari i Zjarrt and Fortesa of Teodor Lao. Available at: http://video.google.com/
videoplay?docid=-5534412945423304241&q=kico+blushi&ei=9tlcsmdcG5eG2wklllj0ca
Nntori i Dyt (1982), Kinostudio Shqipria e Re. Screenwriter: Kio Blushi and Dhimitr Shuteriqi. Producers: Viktor Gjika. Available at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=513714996
4220743612&q=nentori+i+dyte&ei=F85YsPbTloTw2QlY06z8dg
Prefekti (1948), Producer: Besim Levonja. Available: http://video.google.it/videoplay?docid=12007

25622549714798&q=prefekti&ei=0ihdsI3weIem2gl4_dmncQ&hl=it
Liri a Vdekje (1979), Kinostudio Shqipria e Re. Screenwriter: Vath Koreshi. Producers: Ibrahim Muaj and Kristaq Mitro. Available at: http://video.google.com/videoplay?doc
id=-161569636879001462
Time of the Comet. Available presentation at: http://www.timeofthecomet.com/index.html
Roman Emperors and Ottoman Conquerors: Image of the Ottomans in the Balkans Montenegro Case
Omer kajoshaj*
every montenegrin Orthodox, belonging to serbian or montenegrin nation, was he illiterate person or an academic, thoroughly settled in his vocabulary the term Turkish occupation of the Balkans (novak kilibarda, 2000)
My father used to say I am Turk Alhamdulilah he meant Thanks God I am a Muslim, however my first hero was Skenderbeg, son of Kastriots who protected the European Christiandom from the Turks. I could not understand how an Albanian peasant can be a Turk and neither could he believe that I admire so much the Skenderbeg. He had his reasons and I had mine too. His were kinship and religion, mine nationalism and animosity. Many factors shaped the perception of Ottomans within the people who lived in Balkans in the last century. Since the Turkish Empire didnt collapse within the night its aftermath lasted for very long, and to the certain degree it can be said that it still last. Montenegro as a state with multinational and multireligious society can serve as a good example of how propaganda machinery can shape and reshape perceptions toward others. In the peak of brotherhood and equality ideology of Communist regime not only orthodox Montenegrins and Serbs, or catholic Albanians and Croats but also many Muslim Albanians and Muslim Muslims (today Bosniaks) had an aversion for the Turks. The demonization of Turks was a necessity in order to overlook long-lasting enmities between varieties of people who continued to live in Balkans as autochthon
*
director, Foreign Relations, the Islamic community of montenegro 87
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people overlapping claims as the lords of the lands of Balkans. By having the common enemy brotherhood and equality was bound to last forever. Therefore, not surprisingly even at the wedding ceremonies patriotic songs of heroes who fought against Turks predominated. As an Albanian (of Montenegro) at the primary and secondary school in the subject of Albanian literature I learned that majority of our greatest writers were Roman Catholics or Christian Orthodox. If it happened to be a Muslim, such as the grate Naim Frasheri, then he was a Pantheist, God is the Nature, a very progressive philosophical religion. The rest were illiterate. Because of Turks we were left five hundred years behind the rest of European people. We could not ever forget nor forgive what Turks did to us! However, as everything in this world is changeable, including thoughts, beliefs and perceptions, the brotherhood and equality collapsed! It was so unreal and fragile that, within the night changed to enmity and divergence and ended on suicidium. Then the fellow become foe and vice verse. After the independence of Montenegro on 2006 a new Era of cooperation with Turkey started. Although it is mostly based on diplomatic level and some attempts on trade and business cooperation. The Republic of Turkey opened its Embassy in Podgorica and assigned an ambassador. TKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) office was opened and so far it implemented different projects in many regions of the country, a Montenegrin Turkish friendship association was founded. Many Bosniaks and Albanian Muslims have re-found close relatives in Turkey. That means it was not only the religion but also the kinship which bounce these people. Prominent intellectuals, writers and patriots were rediscovered such as: Ali Riza Ulqinaku and Avdo Medjedovic. However, generally speaking not much has been changed in the perception of Ottomans/Turks when we talk about Montenegro itself because the Muslim community is only 20% of the total population. The important question is what is today offered to the children and pupils in order to have a different perception from the one which dominated in the Balkans through XXth century. There is no a single book in Albanian, Bosnian or Montenegrin language which treats modern Turkey. This fact is not limited only within the borders of Montenegro. The governmental curriculum through its history text books continues the same path, unfair and unscientific when it comes to Ottomans/Turks. Pupils of the first
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year in Middle School on the fifth chapter will learn about Roman Empire and the pupils of the second year in the Middle School on the fifth chapter will learn about Balkan Peninsula at the time of the Ottoman Conquests. Strangely, it seems that the Romans were emperors and Ottomans conquerors! Montenegro In understanding the Montenegrin perception of Ottomans / Turks / Muslims it is essential knowing the concept Montenegrin itself. Generally speaking Montenegrin should be understood as acronym for all citizens of Montenegro, however it is not so! Based on the census 2003 only 43.16 % of the total population said that are Montenegrins. Despite the fact that the number of total population is significantly lower than in neighboring countries (the total population based on 2003 census, 670.000), Montenegro is considered as the most multiethnic one. There is no a dominant majority nation or ethnic group! Although the four main nations are: Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians, when talking about the perception of Ottomans of past or contemporary Turks the order would be; Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians and Bosniaks. Serbs For the Orthodox and Catholics of Montenegro the Turks are eternal culprits. Miroslav Krlea, a Croatian author (died Dec. 29, 1981), once said: Montenegrins, snow fell on abljak, should we blame Turks for! The Serbs can never forget the Battle of Kosovo Polje June 15, 1389, nor can they forgive Turks for what happened on it. Not because of the Battle outcome itself but because The Battle of Kosovo is the Serbian principal concept of their history, heritage, tradition and national identity. The Orthodox Serbian Church is very influential on shaping the Montenegrin orthodox Serbs perception of others, probably more than in Serbs of Serbia itself. This is a contemporary phenomenon which is very linked to the ongoing conflict between Serbs and Montenegrins. For Serbs the Ottomans, Turks, Bosniaks and Albanians (Muslims), are the enemy and Montenegrins are the traitors, those who, today, collaborate with Turks against Serbs. The main spokesman of this front battle is the current Metropolitan of the Met-
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ropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral, Archbishop of Cetinje and performer of the duties of the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), mr Amfilohije Radovi, and one of theirs main bible is the poem The Mountain Wreath. The Mountain Wreath (Gorski vijenac), is a poem and play, a masterpiece of Serbian / Montenegrin literature, written by Montenegrin Prince-Bishop and poet Petar II Petrovi-Njego, published in 1847. The play is based on a historical event in Montenegro that took place toward the end of the 17th century, known as the Extermination of the Muslim Converts. (Istraga Poturica). Although the historical facts about this event are somewhat uncertain, it is known that at approximately that time Montenegrins attempted to solve radically the problem of many of their fellow members who had agreed to being converted to Islam. The fact that Njego used this event only as a general framework, however, without bothering about the exact historical data, underscores his concern with an issue that had preoccupied him throughout his entire life: the struggle against Ottoman domination. This preoccupation continues to concern majority of Montenegrin Serbs, even today, one century after the Ottomans left! Montenegrins When talking about Serbs and Montenegrins, for sure, there is a difference between them, however not very visible, and many times confusable. This difference almost vanished within the whole XXth century. In 1921 Podgoricas Parliament was abolished and Montenegro was annexed to Serbia. Although the AVNOJs Yugoslavia produced Republic of Montenegro and Montenegrin nationality there was no any vivid kind of Montenegrin patriotism on the scene. But, before the last Montenegrin breath Yugoslavia collapsed. And, in June 3, 2006, Montenegro became the 192nd member state of the United Nations. Following almost a decade of negotiations, Montenegro, after the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, entered first into a loose state union of Serbia and Montenegro in 1993.The thirteen years of transition to full independence in 2006 passed without any serious civil or political rights violations. On the beginning of pluralism in 1990 the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (Liberalni Savez Crne Gore - LSCG) was founded. It was the first political party to advocate independent Montenegro, and was a strong supporter of the independence idea throughout its existence. It was also the only party that openly opposed to Montene-
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grin involvement into war in Croatia and bombing of Dubrovnik in 1991. Many Bosniaks and Albanians joined the Liberal Alliance, although, looking from todays perspective, it was a paradox for the simple fact that Liberal Alliance in all its political rallies used the war flag and emblem of King Nikola (Kralj Nikola), who on 1912 conducted massacres on Muslims, Bosniaks and Albanians, through all new Montenegro. Muslims know this and know that to be or not to be was the question when they had to vote in Referendum for Independency on May 2006. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslims, Bosniaks and Albanians, said Yes in the Referendum, means that their presence was crucial for Montenegro and Montenegrins itself in achieving their long lasting dream, the statehood. From this point the Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Albanians of Montenegro are in the same frontline against Serbs of not wanted state of Montenegro. This not only affects the Montenegrin perception of Ottomans, Turks, Bosniaks, Albanians, as well as Muslims in general, but, to the certain degree it obliges them to reconsider the history of their past. And, for sure, it worsen even more Serbs attitude toward Bosniaks and Albanians. Today many historians like ivko Andrijaevi and Zvezdan Foli, writers like Novak Kolibarda and publicists like Rajko Cerovi, publicly, through writings or speech, will demonstrate a diferent Montenegrin perception of Ottomans, modern Turks, Bosniaks and Albanians. In one symposium held on the year 2000, Novak Kilibarda said:
In the Balkans, from ancient times onward, swapped many civilizations that disappeared after a long period as the state-legal formations, but remained as a permanent religious affiliation and cultural recognition. Invader, who was many, not only in the Balkans, last year, two, four or seven, was and went, often leaving the occupying consequences. civilization, however, when the state - political blossomed and went, left lasting achievements.
Albanians The percentage of Albanians is low comparing to the three other nations who live in Montenegro. It goes around 7% of the total population, around fifty thousand. However it is very important minority because of the fact that in the two neighboring countries, Albania and Kosovo, live close to six million Albanians. Although the Orthodox people, Montenegrins, Serbs and others, were Albanians eternal enemies, they had (and to the certain degree have) a strong aversion toward
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Ottomans. The national identity of Albanians was formed within the fall of the Ottoman Empire, as a modern nation whose aspiration was Europe and the West. Consequently, in order to achieve this task they needed to run far away from the East as well as from their past. However, the Slavic enmity, Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins, made them tramped between the East and the West. Who was really the enemy! Consequently, even today, their perception of Ottomans falls between the saviours and eternal culprits. Yes, the question What Albanians think about Ottomans is big, yet, the question what Albanians think about themselves is bigger! Bosniaks The Bosniaks who live in Montenegro similar to all Bosniaks of Former Yugoslavia were deprived of having their its own national identity. Through eroding their tradition and weakening their religion, they were destined for full assimilation to somewhat else, far from their origin and the similar rest. A new generation of no-identity was formed, the Muslims by capital M! But, it was not followed by the second one. Majority of Bosniaks who live in Montenegro after redefining their national identity, re-found their close ties with the Modern Turkey and the past Ottomans, as well as the period between the two. The kinship ties are so many that it forms the perception of the same belongingness. As the history recognizes the remaining of the past, when talking about the Bosniaks and their possibility of having any kind of animosity towards Ottomans as conquerors, it remains in the level of rare individuals. However, the Bosniak issue is not yet completed. There are in Montenegro still a significant number of Muslims by capital M.
The Turkish Muslim Minority of Western Thrace-Greece

Tzemil kapza*
The Region Western Thrace is located in the northeast part of Greece between the rivers Evros and Nestos, in the East and in the West, and Rodopi Mountains and the Aegean Sea, in the north and in the south. It is one of the nine regions of Greece. Its area is 8575 square kilometers and it is divided into three provinces. Xanthi, Rodopi, and Evros. According to population census of 18th March 2001, the total population of the Thrace region is: 362.038
Xanthi:101.856 (approximately 40% of the total population is Turkish minority) Rodopi: 110.828 (approximately 50 % of the total population is Turkish minority) evros: 149.354 (approximately 15-20 % of the total population is Turkish minority)
According to the above figures the total population of the Turkish Muslim Minority of Western Thrace is estimated 127.000 (All Greek citizens, members of the Minority living in Greece including the Greek citizens living in Europe, USA, Australia and Turkey, the overall population of Greek citizens members of the Turkish Muslim Minority of Western Thrace becomes approximately 150.000) Continuing Violations againstthe Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace Members of the Muslim Turkish minority who have been living in this region for centuries identify themselves as ethnic Turks. The legal status of this minority was es*
journalist and Turkish minority activist from Western Thrace 93
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tablished with the Peace Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923, the bilateral agreements signed between Greece and Turkey and the international instruments concerning human and minority rights which Greece has signed and ratified. In recent years the situation has relatively improved in Turkish minoritys living conditions and constitutional rights under governments policy of Equality before law and equal citizenship. Yet there has not been progress in the field of minority rights. Greece alleges that equality among citizens policy provides sufficient reforms and continues to ignore its obligations regarding the rights of the Turkish Muslim Minority by violating the bilateral and international treaty obligations to which is a party. As I will explain in the next section of this paper, Denial of the Turkish Identity, Occupation of Our Charitable Foundations and practice of the state appointed muftis instead of our elected muftis continue unabatedly. More than 60.000 people still suffer from the deprivation of the article 19 of the citizenship law and the situation of minority education continues to be as miserable as ever. Denial of Ethnic Identity One of the major issues is the violation of the minority to identify itself as Turkish. In the 1950s, Greek authorities made it obligatory for the minority to be named as Turkish and its members as Turks. This policy later changed. On the other hand the Greek authorities continue to use the term Greek minority for the minority in Istanbul. But on the other hand the designation of the minority associations as Turkish is still forbidden. Xanthi Turkish Unions 25 years struggle with the Greek law, has been finalized with the European Court of Human Rights notification on 27 March 2008 in writing. (Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis v Greece (no. 26698/05) The Court held unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 11 and 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Now, the Turks of Western Thrace are expecting Greece to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision and act accordingly. Freedom of Religion There has not been any progress towards the settlement of the outstanding institutional problem of Muslim religious leaders, the Muftis. The European Court of Human Rights concluded on two instances, i.e. Serif versus Greece (14 December 1999Case No: 38178/97) & Aga versus Greece (17 October 2003-Case No: 50776/99 & 52912/99), that Greece violated Article 9 of the ECHR. Given the finding that there
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has been a violation of Article 9, State continues to disregard minoritys elected Muftis and works through a number of appointed officers who lack credibility and respect even among their own people. The authority of the individuals appointed by the State to the Offices of Mufti in Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotiho is disputable since they are not recognized by the minority population. The minority, on its part, expects the government to cease interfering in the field of divine conscience and finally recognize minoritys right to elect its own religious leaders. Muslim Charitable Foundations Muslim Charitable Foundations (Waqfs) constitute an essential part of Minoritys cultural, historic and religious heritage. The government has appointed the people who currently hold positions in the governing councils of the Muslim Foundations. Disregarding their financial immunity, the State continued to impose excessive taxes and legal sanctions on the properties owned by the Muslim Charitable Foundations for ages. Minoritys inability to govern and have access to the accounts of these Waqfs also prevents them from dispensing the revenues obtained thereof towards societys vital needs, such as the maintenance and improvement of schools and repairs or build mosques. Although Minister of Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyanni announced the removal of taxes from the Waqfs on 9 February 2007 in her visit to Thrace, no action yet has been taken. The new law (Law no: 3647/2008) passed on 7 February 2008 was prepared without taking into consideration Minoritys opinions and proposals. The Greek State should recognise that the new law cannot be accepted or applied in its current form. Mosques in Western Thrace Mosques and minarets are one of the most important parts of the Muslim Turkish minoritys religious and cultural life. Although the historic monuments inherited from the Ottomans have been subject to systematic eradication, as of the year of 2006 there are 301 mosques in Western Thrace. 24 are closed and 277 of them still operate. Most of these mosques have minarets. In the last years only 14 minarets were built across the region. Much permission for building or restoring mosques and minarets are still pending in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education. Building a minaret up to 16 meters high was easier until the year of 2004. Since then, permissions for building mosques and minarets up to 16 meters and higher are still pending.
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There are 161 mosques in Komotini. 157 operate and 4 are closed. 11 new mosques and 12 new minarets were built in Komotini in the last years. The total number of mosques in Xanthi is 115. 97 mosques operate and 18 are closed. 10 new mosques and one minaret were built in the last years. 23 out of 25 mosques operate in Alexandroupolis, while 2 new mosques and one minaret are to be built. Permission Procedure The law no 1363/1938 which was later replaced by law no 1672/1939 conducts the procedure of getting permission to build any kind of house of prayer as well as mosques and minarets. This law later was changed by the new law 1577/1985. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of this law the height of the minarets has been reduced from 16 m and over to 7.5 m. However in the same paragraph, there is a deviation (discretionary power) which gives the right to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education for reasonable and special cases to give permissions for the heights of minarets 16 m and over. According to this law, permissions for mosques, minarets and any other kind of house of prayer needed the authorization of the bishop of the region. The authority, which was given to the regions bishop was transferred to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education in 1997. The Bishop of Komotini and Maronia region in many cases used the right to veto or postponed the permits. Furthermore in some cases he recalled his permissions. For example in July 1995 the Bishop of Komotini and Maronia region signed the 16m permission of the Peleketi (Arabacky) minaret. The same bishop in 13 November 1996 recalled his permission of 16m and reduced it to 12m on the bases of the Greek Orthodox communitys objections living in the same village. After the transformation of the authorization of the bishop to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education, up to the year of 2004 many applications for building minarets were approved. However, this is not the case since then. Many applications for building mosques and minarets up to 16m were refused or not answered at all by the Ministry. Applicants complain that the deviation (discretionary power) of article 21 is used more for political pressure rather than positive measures. MP of Rodopi Region Ahmet Hacosman, led a question to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Education in 15 May 2008 regarding the permissions for building
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minarets in the Venna (Demirbeyli), Kallindirio (Kalenderky) and Filira (Sirkeli) villages of the region of Rodopi. Minister of Education and Religious Affairs of the period Evripidis Stilianidis in his answer stated that the law permits of the length of the minarets is only 7.5 m and that the bill should be implemented. The problem mentioned above is still to be resolved. The issue in question is not only limited to the heights of the minarets. The Greek Administration often raise difficulties for giving construction permits for restoration attempts of old mosques. In some villages, restoration permit applications of the members of the Minority have either been repeatedly denied or procrastinated. In some cases, because the restoration applications have been denied, these old ruins present a danger to the community of the villages. Expelled Citizens Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law (no: 3370/1955) was an obvious case of racial discrimination and a flagrant violation of the fundamental right to citizenship. It was in breach of the Greek constitution and international law. It provided that: A citizen of non-Greek origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared having lost Greek citizenship. On 23 January 1998, Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship was repealed by the Greek Parliament. This act was welcomed both by the international community, as well as within the ranks of the Turkish minority. However abolishment did not include a retroactive effect. The Minister of Interior on April 2005 announced the number of Muslim Turks deprived from the Greek citizenship until 1998 was 46.638. So far, no steps have been taken in order to reinstate thousands of unlawfully expelled citizens and their children who continue living abroad. Education There are 193 minority primary schools, two secondary and high schools in Western Thrace. The curriculum of these schools is bilingual. The statue of the minority education system in Western Thrace was established by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne and the bilateral agreements signed between Greece and Turkey. All these schools have autonomous status. According to international and bilateral instruments these schools are managed by the minority. In the last decade the situation of the private minority education has been changed and the mother tongue (Turkish) curriculum
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has almost collapsed. In this paper you will find the latest information about the Turkish minoritys educational system and the changes in it. For the development of a community in political, social and economic level, education plays a decisive and major role. Taking this into account, the role of the education gets more importance while we are referring to the minority groups within majorities. In Western Thrace region of Greece, minority education has been subjected to pressures caused by numerous problems accumulated over the years. The status and the principles governing the minority education have undergone radical changes due to the interventions, which have been an extension of the political, social and economic circumstances, and difficulties that have dominated the region for decades. Consequently, an extremely complicated set of regulations has emerged, which is inconsistent within itself and incompatible with the delicate balance established by bilateral and international agreements that Greece signed and ratified. According to articles 40 and 41 of the Treaty Peace of Lausanne of 1923, Turkish minoritys education has an autonomous statue. These articles provide equal rights for the minority to establish, manage and control at their own expenses any school. However local authorities systematically undermine the autonomy of the minority education system trough different ways such as selection, training and appointing teachers to these schools. Minority students are subject to a 6 year compulsory education, thus unable to benefit from the 9-years compulsory education applied to the Greek majority since 1976. There are no longer well-trained teachers for the instruction in Turkish. By establishing nurseries teaching only the Greek language in almost every village inhabited by Turks, Greece violates the right of the minority to learn the mother tongue, which is protected by national, international and bilateral instruments. In its current form, the Minority Education System does not reinforce and promote relations between the State and the Minority. On the contrary, it creates tension and crisis of trust. This state of affairs not only undermines the obligations that Greece has undertaken by treaties and agreements, but it also contradicts with the EU legislation. The current distorted structure of the Minority Education drives the minority children who enjoy both Greek and EU citizenship, into becoming inadequate, second-class citizens.
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Recommendations Respect the collective usage of individual right and recognise the existence of a Turkish ethnic and linguistic minority in Greece. Ratify, without delay and without reservations, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Sign and ratify, without delay and without reservations, the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Demand that Greek authorities take steps to ensure the immediate rectification of the unfortunate consequences arising from deprivation of Greek citizenship on the basis of former Article 19 of the Citizenship Code for all persons concerned, especially ethnic Turks. In particular, we urge the authorities to genuinely facilitate these persons recovery of their citizenship by removing any obstacle, including the need for them to go through the naturalisation procedure. To ensure the revision of the new law No: 3647/2008 regarding the pious foundations (Waqfs) passed by the Greek Parliament and entered into force on February 29, 2008, which was prepared without taking the opinion and will of Western Thrace Turkish minority and recognise that it cannot be accepted or applied in its current form. Ensure immediately that freedom of association is guaranteed by the Greek Constitution for all persons concerned and demand that the Greek authorities abolish all restrictions to the freedom of association for ethnic minorities, especially ethnic Turks. Remembering that it is prohibited using the denomination Turkish in names for associations by the Supreme Court which suited a prohibition procedure against the Turkish Union of Xanthi founded in 1927 and ruled out the foundation of the Cultural Association of Turkish Women of the Region of Rodopi, we urge the Greek State to immediately end the abuse of the right of freedom of association so that civil and political rights of ethnic minorities are guaranteed for all persons concerned. We further urge Greece to respect and act according to the recent written notifications of European Court of Human Rights on the cases of Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece (no. 26698/05) and Emin and Others v. Greece (no. 34144/05) which resulted in favour of the said associations. Ensure the equal opportunity for the instruction in mother tongue and the state language. Greece should also take immediate steps to ensure that the rights to education for the ethnic minorities are guaranteed so that children in Western Thrace have a bilingual preschool education. Remembering that the ethnic Turkish mi-
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nority has the right to take education in its native language according to the Treaty of Lausanne, we in particular urge the Greek State to abolish the discriminatory clauses of the new Preschool law that anticipates the Greek language is a must in preschool education. To revise the new law which is not in line with the right to the free flow of information, freedom of expression and pluralism and makes the appropriate urgent changes, as the recent law on media (Law no: 3592/2007) fail to guarantee the use of minority languages in the media. To ensure the full implementation of the provisions of the 1990 CSCE/OSCE Copenhagen Document that Greece has signed and ratified. To take into consideration the Resolution adopted on the eleventh session of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on Muslim Communities and Minorities in non-OIC member states. (OIC/SUM-II/2008/MM/RES/final, 13-14 March 2008).
Surviving elements of Ottoman legacy in the Balkans in non-Muslim Communities and cultures
dino mujadevi*
The topic of this paper, assigned to me by organizers, is clearly stated in the title. Nevertheless, let me begin by stressing my limitations as an author concerning the topic, although I belive that I have something to say about it. Im a younger professional historian with the education in field of history and Turkic studies. My previous research concentrated on political history of the 16. century Ottoman rule and 20. century communist rule in Croatia. Given the broadness od subject Im writing about this time, I had to step out of area of my immediate expertise and go sometimes in areas Im less familiar with. Therefore I chose to be short on some of these questions and more extensive on others. Due to my limited knowledge and experience, I focused mostly on surviving elements of the Ottoman influence in Western Balkans; Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia that is. Other parts of Balkans were included when my knowledge made it possible. I must also mention that I tried to distance myself from any type of bias, both Eurocentric or pro-Western and Islamo-centric or pro-Ottoman. As I am familiar with sources and literature produced by both sides, I tried to adress Ottoman legacy in Balkans from both perspectives and choose what I deem to be real and relevenat for us today. May I state clearly that I dont support cultural relativism and I certainly dont accept cultural supremacy of neither Western, neither Ottoman culture. I firmly belive that both traditions cannot be judged or dissmised as a whole and that they both have different positive and negative sides. Islamic and Ottoman culture has
* croatian Institute for History, departement for History of slavonia, syrmia and Baranja in slavonski Brod; lecturer of Islamic civilisation at Philosopical Faculty, departement of Turkology, zagreb. 101
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been for centuries dismissed and despized by Western authors. Classical and Modern Western culture has been in last decades totally deconstructed by postmodern and Islamic authors. I think it is not prudent to reject totally or accept exclusively any one of these sides. It is time to be open to arguments of both sides, separate irrational judgments from serious observation and to create picture of past and present based on reality. The Ottoman conquests in 14, 15. and 16. centuries and subsequent Ottoman rule in Balkans were some of most important historical events (or rather series of events) that ever happend in Southeastern Europe. The influence of Ottoman arrival and dominance is paramount in history of Balkans and is still effecting lives of dozens of millions Muslims and non-Muslims in this area. There are only few events in regional history which had impact comparable to Ottoman one. Among them we can count Roman conquest in 2. and 1. century BC, Slavic migration in 6. and 7. century and advent of Christianity in early Middle Ages. My oppinion is that even modern catasthropes like both World Wars and Balkan War in 1990s. cannot match the lasting effect of Ottoman conquests.2 Possibly the most important Ottoman legacy for non-Muslims in Balkans is Ottoman influence on Nation- and state-building in 19. and 20. century.3 Let me explain this point. By annexing the territories and destroying political elites of the small Balkan Christian kingdoms Ottoman State in 14. and 15. century managed to unite virtually whole Balkan Peninsula ending the political fragmentation that existed before. It is fair to speculate that history of this area would be very different otherwise, because modern nation-state building in modern times would be happening in probably more fragmented enviroment and would end up with very different situation than it is today. It is very risky and probably not very scholarly to speculate on outcomes of alternative history of Balkans, but allow me to engage in this game for a minute. If there were no Ottomans, non-Muslim nations and/or ethnic groups in Balkans would be probably more numerous and smaller than they
2 For general introduction to history of Ottoman conquests, rule, decline and legacy in Balkans see. l. s. stavrianos: The Balkans since 1453. london 1958, p. 33-214.; Historija naroda jugoslavije, vol. 2. Beograd-zagreb 1961.; Peter F. sugar: southeastern europe under Ottoman Rule 1354-1804. seattle 1977.; john V. a. Fine, jr: The late medieval Balkans. ann arbor 1987, p. 406-611.; Georege castellan: History of Balkans. new York 1992, p. 49-322.; l. charles Brown: Imperial legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the middle east. new York 1996, p. 45-99.; mark mazower: The Balkans. a short History. 2000., p. 55-90. 3 For general survey about nation-state building in 19-20. centuries Balkans see charles and Barbara jelavich: The establishment of the Balkan national states. seattle 1977.
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are today. What actually happened and what is my justification of this hypothesis? Here are some examples. During the Classical period Ottomans eleminated several Byzantine and Serbian states or proto-states in 14. and 15. century. Byzantine emperor and his dynasty were removed permanently from power in Constantinople, but Ottomans also ended the independent rulers that broke way in past from central power of Byzantine empire, such as lords of Trapezunt and despots of Morea. Before the final conquest of Serbian Despotovina in the middle of 15. century, Ottomans eliminated series of other independent Serbian feudal lords like Mrnjavevis in Macedonia. Simmilar situation was in Bosnia. It wasnt only Bosnian kingdom that was elimineted. Independent feudal lords in Podrinje and Herzegovina region, like Kovaevii and Kosae, were also removed permanently.4 Once under Ottoman rule Greek, Serb and other Christian groups were included in millet system which allowed for cultural and ecclesiastical autonomy for these communities. In absence of Christian political elite non-Muslim population was led by church elite which was in turn allied, and somtiems related to, Ottoman ruling establishment. With official Ottoman blessing, Greek and Serb Ortodox Churches in 16. and 17. century united the whole Serb and Greek population under its wings in Ottoman realm, but also succeeded to spread its rule or influence over other surrounding Balkan Christian groups in Ottoman territory. In absence of regular Catholic hierarchy Catholic Franciscan province of Bosnia during the 16. and 17. centuries enlarged its influence managed to unite Catholic population in Bosnia and surrounding regions under its jurisdiction. Some of these ecclesiastic arrangements under Pax Ottomanica resulted with changed confessional and ethnic situation in the field. The Greek Ortodox Church (Patriarch of Constatinople that is) managed to get a lasting grip on Albanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian and partially Vlah Ortodox population. Serb Ortodox Church manged to incorporate parts of Vlah population and even temporarily some Catholics in Bosnia. In time, some of non-Greek or non-Serb Christian groups were fully assimilated into dominant culture of their Church. For example Ortodox Vlahs of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro, were assmilated into Serb identity with help of Serb Ortodox Church even before modern nationalist movement in 19. century although they were considered as group separate from Serbs in mediaeval
4
For history of christian states in 14. and 15. c. in Balkans see Fine, The late mediaeval Balkans, p. 217-404, 453-611.
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Serbian state. Greek and Serb Churches under Ottoman rule could transgress preOttoman political fragmentation, unite and even expand population gravitating to etno-confessional culture which was associated with them. This cultures became foundation of national and nation-state building movements in 19. century and resulted in ethnic framework of today. Without Ottoman intervention in history of Balkans we would be probably witnessing several separate national identities and states in place of contemporary unified and monolitic Serbian or Greek national identities and states. 5 Somewhat differtent is example of Ottoman influence on ending of political fragmentation in Croatia. Its Western part never came under Ottoman rule, but became nucleus for future Croatian statehood and nationalism precisely because of Ottoman influence. Untill the early 16. century Croatia and Slavonia were two sepatate autonomous dominions although historically connected under Hungarian crown, but Ottoman excursions and conquests of parts of their territory led in first half of 16. century to their de facto political unification due to reasons of defence and mere survival. Modern Croatian nationalism emerged in 19. century from the this political tradition and shared Catholic culture of united Slavonia and Croatia. Without Ottomans there would probably be separate Catholic groups of Croats, Slavonians and Dalmatians!6 Migrations of Christian population, either fleeing from Ottoman army or rule, either as a result of Ottoman state policy of resettlement, besides its influence on creating and spreading of some ethnic and religous identities, left one other lasting blueprint. That was mixing of different ethnic identities in relatively small area. Probably, nowhere in Europe so many ethnic and religous groups co-existed, for better or for worse, as in some parts of Balkans during Ottoman rule. Beside the fact that Muslims, Christians and Jews coexisted freely, but sometimes uneasily, it is worth noting that different Christian ethno-religous communities lived dispersed and mixed. Probably most famous example is territory of Ottoman eyalet Bosnia where two different South Slavic Christian communities, Roman Catholics and
For history of millet system and above mentioned christian communities in Balkans see: laszlo Hadrovics: le Peuple serbe et son eglise. Paris 1947.; steven Runciman: The Great church in captivity. cambridge 1968.; sreko m. daja, konfessionalitt und nationalitt Bosniens und der Herzegowina, mnchen 1984. 6 For history of national unification in croatia see Ivo Banac: The national Question in Yugoslavia. Ithaca 1984.
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Ortodox, since 16. and 17. century have lived allmost all over the area, but largely dispersed, living side by side.7 Large areas where one group lived exclusively where rare. This ethno-religous pathchwork created serious problems during the nationalist revival and state building period in 19. and 20th century. Serb and Croat nationalisms in Bosnia and Croatia competed for the same territories. One solution for this problem was supporting the idea of Yugoslav unity, which aimed to nullify reciprocal exclusion and ethnic fragmentation, wich was clearly leading to conflict. The other solution was exclusion itself chauvinism and genocide which sadly expressed themselves in Second World War and during the Balkans wars 1991-1995. It is needless to say that this Ottoman influence on very forming of national identities and respective movements is virtually unknown today in these countries. Classic nationalistic historiography in Balkans does not except, or rather mentally blocks, Ottoman influence in this respect. By accepting it would deny nationalist mantra that national identites always existed in this or very simmilar form and that forming of the national state was always on mind of nationally consicious people during of pre-history of Balkan nations. Reality is that non-Muslim nations in Ottoman Balkans didnt exist at all or existed in a way which is very remote from modern idea of nation. Sadly, today even serious scholars, acquiented with fashionable postmodern theories, are unaware of the basic historical facts and do not have historical perspective. They do not question contemporary national identities as constructs of historical coincidence or forces from outside, but only concentrate on social, linguistical and cultural deconstruction of modern national identities and its contents. My oppinion is that is needed and fair to fully acknowledge Ottoman essential influence in forming the framework from which modern national and ethnic identities emerged. To put it plainly some of contemporary nations such as Croatia wouldnt probably exist if it was not for Ottomans!8 In addition to expanding the enviroment for future nationalist movements of non-Muslim groups in Balkans, Ottomans provided one more service for them. Shaking off the Ottoman yoke, removing its aledgedly very oppresive rule and
7 For history of Ottoman Bosnia see Hazim abanovi: Bosanski paaluk. sarajevo 1959.; noel malcolm: Povijest Bosne. zagreb sarajevo 1995, p. 57-143.; mustafa Imamovi: Historija Bonjaka. sarajevo 1998, p. 95-342. 8 On topic of myths and misconceptions, especially concerning the Ottomans, in historiography in Balkans, see Historijski mitovi na Balkanu (zbornik radova). sarajevo 2003.; ulf Brunnbauer (ed.): (Re) Writing History: Historiography in southeast europe after socialism. 2005.
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backward culture and even Muslim population that came along with it, became rallying point, main theme and even the chief purpose of above mentioned national movements in 19. and 20th. century. As it is too well known, in mental maps of non-Muslim nationalists Ottomans became proverbial others, sholarly example of a undisputed fact that national and nationalistic and other movements are alway based on total exclusion and negation of certain entity and its sometimes extremely irrational moves are fueled on hate towards it. It is cliche, nevertheless worth repeating, to say that 19. and 20th century national cultures of above mentioned and other non-Muslim etnic groups in Balkans, are significantly dependent on antiOttomanism. It is no exaggeration to note that flight from the Ottoman and Muslim political and cultural realm became most important obsession in new Balkan states. Non-Muslim groups in Balkans even today havent recovered fully from this fixation. Main cultural texts in this cultures, such as early modern vernacular literature or more importantly epic oral poetry, are usually dealing with war with Turks and are still thought in schools reproducing in this manner negative stereotypes about Ottoman rule. Historiography of these ethnic groups is still mainly closed for accepting Ottomans as anything other then foreign intrusion that stopped earlier, aledgedly normal, historical developement. Ottoman influences on developement of material culture and Muslim victims of Christian persecution are almost never mentioned. Even though anti-Ottoman and recent ethnic wars eneded and ethnic persecution and discrimination of Muslims stopped, non-Muslim groups in Balkans are still largely culturally dependent on fear and hate of Ottomans and Muslims to define their identities. It is somewat ironic, but nevertless true, to count this as continous Ottoman influence among non-Muslim ethnic groups even today. One of the most importan aspects of Ottoman influence on modern nonMuslim population is linguistic one. This aspect has several sides, but one of the most unknow, yet by far the most important, is Ottoman influence on spreading of languages and dialects of non-Muslim groups. This problem is closely related to the question of spreding or disappearing of certain Balkan ethnic groups and developement of political or qusi-political entities both inside Ottoman realm and in its proximity, which has been disscused previously in this report. Firstly, Ottoman military excursions and territorial advances in 15. and 16. century in Balkans led to large migration of Christian population towards regions under Christian rule which were at that time considered safe. Deserted areas that came under Ottoman rule were resettleded by largely Christian immigrants from east. Simmilarly territories that
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remained under Christian rule were populated by new Christian immigrants, mostly fleeing before the Ottoman advance or coming directly from Ottoman territory.9 One of the most striking examples for that process is difference between lingustical situation in Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia before and after Ottoman conquests in 15. and 16. century. The most important feature of these changese is large spreading over these areas of neo-tokavski Southern Slavic dialect, largely spoken by Ortodox Vlah population, and paralel spreading of variant of old tokavski dialect, spoken largely by Catholic Vlah population. Vlahs of both Christian denominations replaced lingustically and culturally different Catholic population of Una and Vrbas valley, inner Dalmatia, Lika, Banija and contemporary Slavonia and Vojvodina, which left in organized or unorganized fashion for secure places in western Hungary and Austria. Linguistical implication of these events are immense for whole Southern Slavic area. tokavski dialect in different forms became exclusive language of Ortodox Christians and Muslims of South Slavic origin and also most common dialect among Catholics of Bosnia and Croatia. Solidly akavski Catholic city of Dubrovnik od Middle Ages by late 17. century was speaking in neo-tokavski dialect closely related to language of Ortodox Vlahs of eastern Herzegovina which expanded due to migrations during the Ottoman conquest! During the era od nacional renaissance among Serbs and Croats in first half of 19. century neo-tokavski was selected by both national groups as basis for standard Croatian and Serbian languages. Serbs choose it naturally because it was almost universal vernacular among them. Croats took it because it was language of Baroque literature of Dubrovnik, understendable to most of Croats, but also in hope of cultural unification of Croats and Serbs under common Yugoslav identity. Among other notable examples of Ottoman influence on language patchwork of non-Muslim groups in Balkans one should mention spreading of Albanian language to the north and east by means of settlement in places which previous inhabitants left and by assimilation of domestic population. Albanian speakers in these areas were both Muslim and Catholic.10 It is of course very well known and documented that Ottoman-Turkish language, official language of state and lingua franca among non-Turkish subjects of Empire, exercided great influence on languages of non-Muslim etnic groups under and in
see. Historija naroda jugoslavija, vol. 2. For history of croatian and other south slavic literrary languages see: zlatko Vince: Putovima hrvatskoga knjievnog jezika. zagreb 1990.
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proximity of Ottoman rule in Balkans. Untill 19. century this influence was primarily over spoken everyday language of non-Muslims since literary and liturgical languages of the eccesiastical elites were either classical and fossilized versions of spoken language (in case of Greeks) or outright foreign dead languages (Latin among Catholics, Greek among Ortodox Albanians, Old Slavic among Serb, Bulgarians and Macedonians), which were unpenetrable for influences of everyday life i.e. OttomanTurkish language. Everyday vernacular languages of non-Muslim groups were influenced mostly and significantly by Ottoman-Turkish vocabulary and to the lesser extent by its grammar and phonetics. Ottoman-Turkish loan words formded the bulk of words used for items and ideas of material culture, expecially those related to urban life, housing in general, hygene, trade, traffic, crafts and military. It is worth noticing that loan words actually reflect the fact Ottomans had tremendous influence on material culture, urban culture in particular, of non-Muslim population in Balkans, which will be explained later. Paradoxally, the nationalist revival in 19. century, which was concentrated on aim of liberations from all forms of Ottoman presence, led to introduction of many Ottoman-Turkish loan words to standardized versions of national languages. This happened because nationalist intellectual elite rejected old ecclesiastical languages and embraced vernaculars or earlier forms of literary languange close to it. These idioms were, of course, immensly infuenced by Ottoman-Turkish language. Inspite of the fact that some of the Ottoman-Turkish loan words were replaced by words coined from the indigenous lingusitical roots or Western loan words, these national standard languages even today contain many Ottoman-Turkish loan words, some of them essential to the vocabulary. Very interesting is example of Ottoman-Turkish linguistical influence is a Croatian case. After accepting the neo-tokavski dialect, which was significantly influenced by Ottoman-Turkish vocabulary, in first half of 19. century as a basis of national language for Croats, Ottoman-Turkish loan words were introduced by press, literature, birocracy, military and school system to every part of what is today known of Croatia, even to the speakers of dialects that didnt previously use Ottoman-Turkish loan words at all. Ottoman-Turkish loanwords accepted by national elite were ironically seen as more Croat or natioinal than German, Italian and Hungarian loan words. Ottoman-Turkish loan words penetrated households in Zagreb, Meimurje, Gorski Kotar and Hrvatsko Zagorje which were never under Ottoman rule and had little or no conntact with Ottoman culture! The Ottoman influence on historical and contemporary popular cultures of non-
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Muslim ethnic groups in Balkans was probably the most defining outside factor for these cultures since advent of Christianity in early Middle Ages. One of the most striking examples concerns musical influence. Traditional urban and rural folk music of Balkans was largely shaped by Near Eastern and Central Asian influences brought in by Ottomans. Instruments, style of singing, playing, dancing, whole melodies and complete lyrics were taken over in Balkans, sometimes in completely unchanged fashion. Contemporary commercial popular music in Balkans is somewhat sad and distorted reminder of this process.. Other nobale areas of Ottoman influence on nonMuslim cultures are traditional oral poetry and storytelling, dressing (today only visible for those fammiliar with folk costumes), cuisine, social relations (courtship with women, family, community) Non-Muslim historians and other intellectuals from Balkans and West have been describing Ottoman rule since early 19. century as having been catastrophic for non-Muslims. To prove this such authors usually listed real or aledged Ottoman war atrocities, de-christianisation as opposed to islamization, misgovernemet, religous and social opression of Christians, but probably most important and at the same time the most speculative allegation against Ottomans was that Ottoman rule separated Christian Balkan natiosn from main currents of thought and material developement that led to political and cultural enlightment and emancipation, industrial revolution, creation of modern national states, which was typical for the other parts of Europe. According to this narrative Balkans even today remaines backward in every aspect compared to Western Europe because of Ottomans who separated it long enough from Western influences. In addition to being culturally oppressive and conservative, Ottomans aledgedly didnt bring themselves nothing new and valuable to Balkans and actually destroyed existing order and introduced social regression.11 Oppinion of this autor is that Ottoman culture, as Muslim culture in general since 12. century, was indeed conservative and static. Although Ottomans menaged, generally speaking, to advance Balkans socially and materially during their rule compared to situation before 15. century, they were not open to change themselves beyond that level. Radical social and material progress of Europe in 17., 18. and especially 19. century was not possible in unreformed Ottoman enviroment. In addition to being itself conservative, Ottoman state untill 19. century prevented
11 For this school of thought see e.g. Branislav urev: jugoslavenske zemlje pod turskom vlau, do kraja 18. stoljea. zagreb 1962.; also see this authors contributions in Historija naroda jugoslavije, vol. 2.
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Western influences from outside to spread significantly over its territory. Nationalist revivals and state building movements of non-Muslim groups in 19. century Balkans had to build their cultures and states, modelled on Western examples, from scratch. This should be taken literally because signs of previously dominant Ottoman culture were destroyed or marginalized and institutions were dismantled. In this enviroment building of modern nation-states was slow and painful; modernization in Balkans was constantly delayed during this era. The burden of building modern nationstates in Balkans was extremely heavy on living Christian and especially Muslim population. Wars with Ottomans and Christian rivals, partially legacy of ethnic fragmentation of Ottoman era, materially and mentally exausted Balkans societies in 19. and 20. century. Even after winning independence, new national states in Balkans tried largely unsuccesfully to reach Western level of developemnt and make up for the time lost between 15. and 19. centuries. As I prevously said, I accept the notion that Ottoman rule in effect prevented early developement of societies built on Western European model in Balkans. However, it would be unjust to blame only Ottoman closed, static and inherently religous culture, as opposed to Modern European culture, for failure of Balkan states with non-Muslim majority to reach Western European level of developement. Other factors influenced contemporary relative social and material backwardnes of these areas. We should also count in constant wars and instability of Balkans after 18. century, which was caused jointly by Christian Balkan states, Great Powers and Ottomans themselves. The other reason for delayed moder devolepemnt in Balkans could be found in cultural difference of Balkan cultures, namely Ortodox Christian cultures, from Western cultures which were based on Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Mediaeval and later Ortodox Christianity shares some qualities with Ottoman Muslim culture: it was basically static and conservative culture oriented towards spirituality. Oppostion between Ortodox traditionalists and pro-Western reformers still today deeply divides Ortodox cultures in Balkans. To my knowledge the most spectacular and clearly visible example of Ottoman influence on social fabric, material developement and culture can be seen in my home country of Croatia. Inspite all historical and cultural regions Croatia is even today divided in two distinguishable regions, Western and Eastern. Border between them and cutting the country in half is approximative to the Ottoman-Habsburg border established during 16. century. Eastern Croatia, once Ottoman territory in 16. and 17. century, was settled during that time largely by Ortdox and Catholic pastoralists
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coming from Bosnia and beyond. It is needless to say that this population was culturally shaped Ottoman experience. After Habsburg and Venetian reconquista at the end of 17. and 18. century Western institutions, farming, industry and social and culutral influences began to spread, but It is still today behind in every aspect of social developement compared to Western Croatia which has been continously politically and culturally dependent on West during the time of Ottoman rule in Eastern Croatia. Eastern Croatia is today politically conservative, economically pasive and dependent on state support. It is also culturally simmilar to the rest of Balkans. Although Ottoman rule effectively slowed and even prevented full modernization in Western fashion in Balkans, it is completely false to belive that Ottoman rule in Balkans was a step back in respect of social and material progress. Of course, Ottoman arrival was usually violent and accompanied with considerable cost in human lifes and material destruction. But, in the long run the result was, generally speaking, a positive one if we take in account higher standard of civilisation that emerged afterwards and affected the life of non-Muslims. The change was dramatic. Mediaeval Balkans had no big towns in inlands and population density was low. The only significant urban life was present at coasts of Egean and Adriatic seas. The crafts and mining were largely underdeveloped. Communications and roads were rare and rudimental. The area was largely politically divided and unsecure. During the Ottoman classical period Balkans emerged with new, previously unseen, urban and road network. Population, non-Muslim included, considerably grew and trade and crafts flourished freely without major political and security impediment for significant period of time. Big towns as Skopje and Sarajevo, as many others smaller ones, developed in inner Balkans, sometimes on places where prevously only very small villages existed. The city of Sarajevo was untill the middle of 19. century probably the largest and most populous town in territory of former Yugoslavia. To put it rather simple, Ottoman arrival was actually to my oppinion one step forward in improvement of general social and material welfare, but it eventually stopped there and couldnt go further to match developements in Europe.12 It is needless to say that economically flourishing Ottoman Balkans that benefited Muslims and non-Muslims is largely forgotten and unknown even for
12 For history of cities and towns see nikolaj Todorov: The Balkan city 1400-1900. seattle-london 1983.; For history of sarajevo during classical Ottoman age see Behija zlatar: zlatno doba sarajeva. 16. stoljee. sarajevo 1996.
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contemporary educated and informed non-Muslims. Historical memory, produced by historiography, literrature and school systems, concentrates only on real and fictional disadvantages of Ottoman system for non-Muslims. Although non-Muslims were realy politically marginalized and more vulnerable to state opression, narrative of mainstream Balkan historiography greatly exgerates their plight. Social and material advance that non-Muslims experienced after Ottoman conquest is even today largely ignored. In a somewhat desperate, but understandable push to catch up with West non-Muslim nationalist elites in Blakans irrationally erased Ottoman legacy from their memory and sometimes even from the face of the Earth. NonMuslim nationalists of the past couldnt conceive any progress outside the framework of modern Western current. According to them social reforms and material couldnt be achieved in any type of harmony with Ottoman legacy or even on basis of it, so Ottoman legacy in every aspect had to be demonized and dismantled. Such a manic quest for modernisation eventually empoverished their societies and didnt bring about desired goals of achieving Western ideals. By avoiding or removing its Ottoman past Non-Muslim Balkan societies are loosing important experience and at the same time waging constant war aginst themselves. Non-Muslim intelecual elite should understand that only by fully incorporating and appreciating Ottoman legacy, which is after all these decades of cleansing still living, especially in popular culture, neurotic nature of political, social and cultural situation could be avoided. In order to stop running from themselves Non-Muslim societies should stop being biased and accept and make peace with Ottoman past. My oppinion is that vice versa should be applied for Muslims societies in Balkans, which should stop glorify uncritically Ottomans. Only by full reciprocal appreciation of what was valuable about Ottoman experience and what was truely negative about it, the Ottomans could stop being problem and some sort od shadow that is haunting both non-Muslims and Muslims even today.
Integration of Religion within the Identity of the Albanian Muslims

dr. musa musai*
Introduction
Events and phenomena experienced in one of the earliest inhabited centers of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, both in the past and the present have preserved their importance on world scale. Except for being a significant stage for subjects of philosophy, culture and civilization, the Balkan territories were equally important for wars and conflicts. Alongside Christianity, which was spread earlier, Islam was also spread in the Balkans, which in fact was the reason for the beginning of a new period in these parts. Although there are different opinions among historians regarding the period of the spread of Islam here, one fact seems to be undeniable in this regard, and that is that after the 14th century for at least five centuries one culture and spirit of a State governed by Islamic norms was prevalent in the Balkans. Hence, the presence of the Ottoman Authority remains to be an undeniable historical fact.1 Indeed, to investigate the integration of the religion-identity amongst the Albanian Muslims in such conditions is not to be taken easily, particularly when one has to analyze the Islamic as well as the Ottoman cultural heritage among the Albanians. Also, there is something else that should not be left without mentioning, and that is the detachment of contacts of a considerable part of the Albanian corpus (in particular those in Albania), with any sort of religious values for a long period of time. But, this in no case sweeps away the importance and significance of studying and
* Professor, university of Tetovo 1 nexhat Ibrahimi; Islami n trojet iliro-shqiptare gjat shekujve, logos-a skopje 1998, p. 207-211. 113
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investigating the integration of religion within the identity of the Albanian Muslims; on the contrary, it makes it even more attractive and more important. Hence, one of the primary problems of our study is the formation and stratification of the identity among the Albanian Muslims (and here we mean their national and religious identity), as well as the positions of religion vis--vis identity. It should be noted that when we say Albanian Muslims, in this study we mean the Albanians from Albania, Kosova and Macedonia. The issue of religion or of the religious concept among Albanians is not a subject that can be analyzed by or responded to only one person, but as such it pertains to the sentiments, attitudes and deeds of each and every member of that belief. So, its understandable that to analyze the religious life as a complex issue in full involves many segments in the life of a society, and in particular of people who live by it for more than 600 years. This is why we say that Islam among Albanians is not merely a cultural and religious heritage, but rather it is present in every footstep of Albanians living in the abovementioned territories; it is a belief by which Albanians breathe and live. One can see it in every pore of life, which is verified by this study as well, performed in the field of Psychology of Religion. Along with the echo of dissolution of the Eastern Block in the 1990s, the spirit of these changes was felt in the Balkan Peninsula too. In particular, with the dissolution of the ex-Yugoslav republics a new period of the history in these parts begun. The newly created situation and the wars waged during the 1990s, were the forerunners of the fact that it will be impossible for the people of the Balkans to have a little bit longer peaceful period. At the same time, after the fall of communism in Albania for the first time in 45 years the freedom of expression and belief was felt. Given the subjects as well as the socio-cultural events which are incorporated within the framework of this study, the primary issue of this research can be set forth as the question: What is the present situation of the integration of religion within the identity of the Albanian Muslims? Is there any relation between the religious and sociocultural (demographic) factors within this integration? And in that respect what is the relation or relations between variations of religiousness and the events or phenomena that are thought to have influence on the individual and social identity? In this context the knowledge regarding the identity and conditions of the religious life (religiousness) in correspondence with the research model are being gathered through a questionnaire prepared within previously determined criteria
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and frameworks. In this study effort has been done to describe and determine the interrelation and impact between the socio-cultural and those factors or variations of religiousness, derived as a result of factorial analysis implemented in this study. Based on the situation the relation between socio-cultural features and actions, attitudes and common points of the system of belief was analyzed. The primary purpose of the study was the determination of the social integration, whose social index is the relation identity-religion and pointing out to the patterns regarding the reflectors of the cultural and religious identity of the Albanian Muslims, who live in various socio-cultural and geographical environments. As an appendix to this purpose was the preparation of comparison between various groups according to demographic variations (like gender, age, marital status, education, incomes, country, region and alike), aiming at determining the socio-cultural factors arising differences in perception of compositions of the religious life, like worship and social relations, relation towards conditions of religious belief, the consciousness of religious and social solidarity, respect towards traditional and religious values, and the perception of social and religious sentiment. Within the framework of the exposed issue of this study some other sub-issues will be also reviewed as complementary and complete composition of the main issue, namely:
1
To what degree are the religiousness and religious positions of the representative group (respondents) of this study consisting of Albanian Muslims? How has the same group moulded the composition of the social and religious identity? Are there any differences and similarities in the structure of the situation of religiousness and identity of Albanian Muslims from the aspect of factors like the country, age, gender, region, education and socio-economic situation? Does religion have any influence in their social life? If yes, in what directions it is oriented? And what are the differences between them with regard to the perceptions of the religious life and social identity? The method of study
In the theoretical part of the study by using documentary techniques and methods efforts have been made to offer explanations and acquiring knowledge in the most objective way and with certainty on the topics of discussion. In the applicative part
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of our study the investigating model was chosen, while in the efforts for acquiring knowledge the most appropriate and most efficient technique was proven to be the questionnaire technique of inquiry and while analyzing the data the statistical techniques were used. Results are part of the inquiry performed in 2004 in Albania, Kosova and Macedonia with more than 900 participants. The data collected by the questionnaire applied have been introduced in the statistical analyzing program SPSS 11.0 and all evaluations made here are a result of that program.
3
The results of concrete analysis
Under this subtitle, by using the method of Principle Component Analysis aiming to determine the sub-dimensions of variables of our study, primarily the values of the index of homogenous dispersion of data were checked, like the values of the appropriate (adaptable) representation of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin between the Bartlett Test of Sphericity and supporters of concrete analysis regarding how comprehensive were their mutual statistical interrelations. To confirm if the statistical data do represent a homogenous dispersion, the adaptability of the representation value at Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin must be above 50. This value in checking of our measurer was 94.2. For suggesting that their mutual interrelation was with appropriate comprehensiveness it is necessary the degree of the comprehensiveness control of Bartletts Test of Sphericity to be less than .05. Regarding our measurer we have to admit that this value was very comprehensive with the degree (,000). Attitudes and actions that reflect the religious and social life of the Albanian Muslims are gathered in 5 dimensions. In this regard the attained results after concrete analysis for each dimension are presented separately (See tables 1,2,3,4,5). In the first two columns of the tables the number of questions of the questionnaire as well as the value of factorial points is given (like ,786). In the third column are the data of the sub-factors or issues that are collected under that dimension, namely the text of the questions asked. Follows the number of those who have answered to the questions of the religiousness questionnaire (N), and than for each particular saying an arithmetical average (X) is given attained at the measurers base where 5 grade evaluations are done, and in the last column the standard deviation is given.
Integration of Religion within the Identity of the Albanian Muslims Table 1: The dimension Worship and social relations in the measurer of the religious life among the Balkan muslims (Factor-1)
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No. quest. q.33 q.32 q.42 q.41 q.30 q. 46 q.52
V.F.P* ,786 ,731 ,725 ,719 ,670 ,668 640
Questions Perform five daily prayers Read the Quran I do my buy-sell at a muslim I observe religious norms in dressing If I dont have any obstacle I go to mosques I solve social problems relying on religions beliefs do you attach importance for your neighbors and friends to be religious or not? How much do you care that the party you are voting to attach importance to religion? How important is for you the religious belonging in the issue of finding your spouse? What is your position on premarital relations boy-girl and how you evaluate them? On your opinion what is the role of religious leaders in formation and safeguarding the national identity? What is your personal and your familys view and action regarding the slaughtering of qurban? do you agree with the idea that muslims should perform their marriages with religious ceremony?
N 854 854 854 854 854 854 854
Arith. Aver. 3.25 3.09 3.59 3.61 3.36 3.70 3.63
Std. Dev. 1,453 1,342 1,220 1,218 1,392 1,232 1,158
q.57
,637
854
3.63
1,279
q.39
,556
854
4.15
1,155
q. 51
,532
854
3.23
1,417
q.56
519
854
3.80
1,105
q.34
,515
854
3.40
1,439
q.38
,513
854
4.17
1,036
Factor 1: Worship and social relations
Clarifying of the variation % 34.982
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According to the analysis in Table 1 it is clear that the first factor at the Measurer of Religious Life consists of 13 questions that are inquirers of the religious life/religiousness and we called it the Dimension of the Worship and social relations. Sayings that compose the second factor of the Measurer of Religious Life, generally reflect the positions and worldviews that involve fundamental issues of the belief of Islamic religion. We named this measurer as Relation to the religious beliefs. Based on final results of the analysis made until now it is possible to order the sub-factors involved in this dimension of the religious life according to the influence and importance attached to them. If we take as a basis the concretely estimated points and arithmetical averages of the collection of common beliefs, which pertain to this dimension, we say that in the first three places are placed accordingly: 1) Muhammad a.s. is the Messenger of God (v.f.p2 : ,794; arith.aver.=4.76); 2) The Quran is the Word of God (v.f.p ,777; arith.aver.=4,73) and 3) All explanations of the Glorious Quran are true and valid at all times (v.f.p. ,741; arith.aver.=4.61).
Table 2: The dimension of Relation to the religious beliefs in the measures of the religious life for the Balkan muslims (factor-2)
No. quest. q.12 q.11 q.15 q.14 q.16 q.13 q.17 q.10
V.F.P* ,794 ,777 ,741 ,684 ,673 ,621 ,609 ,560
Questions muhammad is the messenger of God The Quran is the Word of God all explanations of the Glorious Quran are true and valid at all times? I believe that There is the hereafter after death Ibadats are useful and should performed regularly The good and the evil comes from God Religion helps in perception of comprehensiveness of life and in many answers in that regard Im a person with complete belief
N Arith. Aver. 862 862 862 862 862 862 862 862
Std.Dev. 4.76 4.73 4.61 4.53 4.51 4.37 4.47 4.27
Factor 2: Relation to the religious beliefs
Clarifying of the Variation % 6.962
value of factorial points.
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In the dimension that we called The consciousness of social and religious solidarity, actions and attitudes that involve beliefs and religious sentiments common to this population are gathered, such are the sayings: A Muslims should circumcise his son; actions like participation in funerals and on condolences increases the consciousness of companionship and responsibility, visits to the family for Eid celebrations strengthen the sentiments of closeness and support among the relatives. These are actions that in fact present common visions and thoughts united around the thoughts, sentiments and religious beliefs of Muslims in these parts.
Table 3: The dimension of Social and religious consciousness in the measurer of the religious life for the Balkan Muslims (Factor-3)
No. que. p.50 p.37
V.F.P ,689 ,670
Questions muslim male children must be circumcised Participation in funerals and going for condolences is a religious duty among muslims The visit of relatives in religious celebrations are very important and strengthen the sentiments of closeness with each-other How important are religious celebrations to you
N 864
Ari. Av. 4.63
Std. Dev. ,775
864
4.45
,795
p.36
,585
864 864
4.57 4.09
,676 ,974
p.40
,563
Factor-3: Social and religious consciousness
Clarifying of the Variation % 5,206
According to these results it can be seen that while clarifying the social dimension of the religious life mostly on the surface come the actions like mortuary and condolence ceremonies, child circumcision, celebration of religious ceremonies and visits to the relatives. According to the analysis in Table 4, it is clear that the fourth factor at the Measurer of religious life consists of 3 questions that detect or are the inquirers of the religious life/religiousness of the Balkan Muslims. Given the sub-factors that fall within these factors, we named it as the Dimension of Respect for the inherited and religious values.
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Table 4: Dimension of Respect for the inherited and religious values in the measurer of the religious life for the Balkan Muslims (factor-4)
No. que. q.49
V.F.P ,772
Questions Holding of Mawlid protects the Muslims from misfortunes and brings them good Holding of mawlid strengthens the awareness of brotherhood and companionship among muslims Respect must be shown to the men of science and religion need respect
N 864
Ari. Av. 3.45
Std. Dev. 1,190
q.22 q.19
,719 ,463
864 864
3.80 4.40
1,034 ,710
Factor-4: Respect for traditional and religious values
Clarifying of the Variation % 4,105
Religious beliefs that are included in the 4th table, represent socio-cultural values and traditions that play an important role within the religious life. These inherited values are mostly interrelated with some ceremonies of mawlid, as well as the respect towards men of science and religion. Results of Table 5 form the 5th factor pertaining to our measurer of the religious life. Given the sub-factors that are involved within this factor, we defined it as the dimension of Religious and social perception of the religious life.
Table 5: The dimension of Religious and social perception in the measurer of the religious life for the Balkan Muslims (Factor-5)
No. que. q.55
V.F.P ,704
Questions does national sentiments come before the religious ones among the muslims of your country are the muslims of your country believers with little religious knowledge What is the situation with support among the muslims in your country?
N 862
Arith. Av. 2.68
Std. Dev. 1,145
q.18 q.45
,604 ,478
862 862
2.27 3.06
1,478 1,248
Factor-5: Religious and social perception
Clarifying the Variation % 3.733

3.1
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Demographical features and religious life of Albanian Muslims
Studies performed so far regarding the relation between religion and identity, show that more or less deeper and determining influence have the beliefs and religious positions in the relation of the individual with other people, in moral actions, in the worldview as well as with individuals sentiments and thoughts in general. If we want to take an example in formation of the character of a certain individual, who represents the afterwards formed personality, or let us say the socio-cultural features that come from the surrounding unto the person, it is impossible in all these processes not to recognize the role and influence that religion has upon these relations.3 In this study religiousness represents the relation pertaining to the conditions of the Islamic religious belief and worship, as well as the relation with tradition, customs and habits that are extended and have their impact on the system of moral and religious values, which fall within the culture of the Muslim societies of these parts, because actions and attitudes, thoughts and sentiments, values and common belief that direct and give meaning to the life of the individual and society are factors that establish the relation and provide continuity between the past, the present and the future of a society of a people, religion is lived and experienced within this cultural heritage by virtue of language, tradition and customs. Transitory social and cultural periods experienced by the individual and the society, changes that occur as a result of modernity, the level of the economic and technological development and alike, or in a word the social and cultural factors of impact are the main causes of radical changes within human minds. This change will show itself with respect to the spectrum of treatment of religion as well as in search for answers to the needs of time within the religion itself. Religion is continuing its existence within the system of relations that in vertical and horizontal line regulate the life of the individual and of the society. In this regard it is recognized that in the way the worldview of the religious life and religiousness among the Albanian Muslims is determined it is as such a direct or indirect reflection of the daily life of individuals and societies vis--vis societies and conditions of the Islamic belief and performance of acts of worship. As emphasized above in given explanations, by religious life we mainly mean
3 uysal, Veysel; Din Tutum Davran ve ahsiyet zellikleri, m.. lahiyat Fakltesi Vakf Yaynlar, stamboll 1996, f. 87; Gnter kehrer, Din Sosyolojisi transl. m. emin kkta, Din Sosoyolojisi, evaluated by Y. aktay-m. e. kkta, Vadi Yaynlar, ankara, f. 74.
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the age in which one lives, the way in which the Albanian explains or presents his religious identity and personality in the religious and social spirit. Hence, our aim regarding the use of the notion religiousness stands in the fact that by it we deal with the relation of Albanian Muslims towards the system of moral and religious values laid down in their culture, as well as the main issues with regard to the conditions of belief and practices of worship as such. What kind of relations are there between the religious life and some demographical features, such as gender, marital status, country, level of education, incomes? Which demographical factors have influence and aid to the religious life of Albanian Muslims? In the direction of finding answers to questions as these above, analysis have been made, which as their base have had the data or results of this study, among which the factors that comprise the religiousness have been treated as dependant changes, while demographical changes as independent variations. According to the conclusions of the performed analysis it was noticed that several factors of independent changes have opened the way to the differences of dependent changes, namely of changes in religiousness, while some others not. As a clarifying example for this we can see that regarding the positions and actions towards the second dimension of religious life, which we named as relation to the conditions of belief, as well as in the third factor of religiousness named religious and social consciousness of solidarity, there is no substantial difference in the positions and actions between female and male gender in relation to these two factors. Features such as religion, gender, ethnic identity, country are integral parts of the identity, but at the same time they are defined as demographical features too. Under this subtitle, in order of determining and investigating the relation and differences between demographical features with the variables of religious life according to the varying states of variables the techniques of T-Test and ANOVA were used. In these analyses the demographical features such as gender, age, marital status, country, level of education and occupation are taken as an independent variable, while 5 factors (variables) of the religious life are reviewed as a dependent variable. In the tables bellow are reported only those averages of results in which the significant difference between two different factors is noticed. With respect to the demographical variables one of the independent factors that can have impact on the religious life and that can open the way to differences between respondents is gender.

3.2
123
The religious life according to countries
Another independent variable that pertains to the religious life is the factor country (or state). As it is known, the environment or the country in which one lives, opens the way to some differences with respect to the worldviews of religious life among people who live in Balkan countries, and this was confirmed by our observations. One of geographical and socio-cultural influents that we have analyzed in our study, was the factor country as an integral part of the identity. Thus it was analyzed and investigated wheather the differences between countries where Albanian Muslims live, are an influenting factor that opens the way to the differences regarding the religious life among them. So, to answer the questions regarding the factor country and the religious life we should look at the results offered by the Sheffe testing.
Table 6: Differences between Respodents of three countries with respect to the dimensions of the religious life
Factors of Religiousness Worship and social Relations Relation Between Beliefs consciousness about Religious and social solidarity Respect towards Traditional and Religious Values Religious and social Perception
Country 1) macedonia 2) albania 4) kosova 1) macedonia 2) albania 4) kosova 1) macedonia 2) albania 4) kosova
N 293 275 285 293 275 285 293 275 285
Arith. Average 3.88a 3.06c 3.69b 4.64a 4.33c 4.60b 4.53b 4.11c 4.51c
Std.S. ,596 ,942 1,004 ,466 ,728 ,608 ,625 ,666 ,474
F 50.163
P ,000 a-c b-c ,000 a,b,c ,000 a,b,c
16.719
38.032
1) macedonia 2) albania 4) kosova 1) macedonia 2) albania 4) kosova
293 275 285 293 275 285
3.96 3.84 3.79 2.53a 2.61c 2.77b
,742 ,749 ,793 ,585 ,958 ,898
3.470
,016
6.368
,000 a,b a,b-c
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According to the results of this table the averrage of our respondents who live in Albania in three of five dimensions has reached lowest points. Thus, for example, in the dimension Worships and social relations there is a clear difference between the average of Albania (3.06) and averages of Macedonia (3.88) and Kosova (3.69). In the dimension Relation between conditions of Belief the significant difference is noticed between the state of Albania with Macedonia and Kosova. Likewise the religious positions and actions that pertain to the dimensions Worships and social relations and Relation towards conditions of the belief, significant differences can be also noticed between the averages that reflect the conscience of religious and social solidarity. According to the results regarding the conscience of religious and social solidarity, respondents from Albania have attained lower grades than those of Macedonia and Kosova. The difference between the averages of these countries was significant in the level p<,05. Such result enables us to give possible explanation regarding this issue. According to what we can read from these data we can say that this difference is a result of belief and religious convictions. As an illustration we can mention the case of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, when Muslims of Macedonia (predominantly Albanians) gave an unprecedented contribution as far as the solidarity and assistance to the Bosnian community fled from the war is concerned. Such fact can quite obviously be a strong argument of what the cultural heritage of the Ottoman period has offered to people with different ethnic identities. As to the country-factor, it was noticed that regardless to the country of origin of the respondent, as far as actions and positions involved within the dimension of the religious life Worship and social relations, all Albanian Muslims have positive opinion vis-a-vis this dimension of the religious life. When analyzing the averages that reflect the positions based on the country-factor, it becomes clear that Albania in the dimension worship and social relations, has lower average compared to other countries.4 The same situation can be noticed in the dimensions relation towards the conditions of belief and consciousness for religious and social solidarity (See Table 6) Starting from these data, the significant difference that came out on the surface between respondents from Albanian and two other countries, in fact can be explained due to the extremely negative influence that the period of communist rule
4 William Plomer, Yanya Sultan, translated by murat Belge, doan Yayn Holding a.., Istanbul 1995, pp. 12-20.
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had on the religious life in that country. Nevertheless, if we compare our results with the results of certain previous studies pertaining to the religious issues in Albania, they show that Albanias population has a positive increase regarding the religious positions and actions.5 The lack of differences between Macedonia and Kosova, in the dimensions of religiousness like worship and social relations; relation in conditions of belief; consciousness for religious and social solidarity, in fact confirms the fact that Muslims who live in these countries have approximate positions and actions regarding the integration of the identity-religion. In the dimension respect towards inherited and religious values, which falls under the dimension of religious life, it is clear that respondents from Macedonia have the highest average (3.96), while respondents from Kosova have the average (3.79), lower than others. From this we can conclude that positions and actions that among Albanian Muslims are accepted as inherited and religious values (such as the positions that holding mawlid adds to the sentiments of solidarity and brotherhood among Muslims and the need of showing respect to men of knowledge and religion), continue to be practiced in these parts. But, it must be stated that the performance of the abovementioned social and religious activities does not continue to be of the same intensity as in the past, but that there is a down-fall.
3.3
Some demographical factors and Requested Features at a Muslim
One of the goals of our study was the analysis and determination of the relations between thoughts and positions of Muslims regarding the requested features at a Muslim (dependant variable), of course it is about those virtues and thoughts that are acknowledged as positive in general and the demographical factors (independent variable), like country, gender and age. Under this subtitle we have gathered the results that are indexes of relations between the demographical variables, positions and actions regarding the Requested features at a Muslim. Results of the study show that between the variables gender, marital status, incomes and education and of the dependent variable (requested features) in the statistical aspect there is no significant relation or any distinctive difference between
5
compare the data of Table 2 in in particular see ali m. Basha, Islami n Shqipri gjat shekujve, Tirana 2000.
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the participating groups in this study. The results of ANOVA testing show that there are distinctive statistical differences between the groups of variables country. The results of Sheffe test and comparisons made between groups by this test show in particular that the difference between the averrages that reflect the positions and thoughts of respondents are on a significant statistical scale (p<,05). With regard to what the measurer features requested at a Muslim consists of, we can say that these features imply the sincerity and pure heart, believer and patriot, one that doesnt leave the worships, even if one leaves the worships he is still a believer and is useful for other societies. Results of Table 7 reflect that features requested at a Muslim are in general accepted by the respondents. If we look at the averages that reflect the power of orienting the inclination of appropriating these features it would become unbderstandable that the lowest inclination of appropriation is among the respondents of Kosova (aver.=4,55), while the highest inclination of appropriating these features is among those of Macedonia (aver.=4.63).
Table 7: The impact of Factors Country one the Requested Features at a Muslim
The Measurer of a Requested Features at a Muslim Features (sincere-pure hearted, believerpatriot, worships .....)
Country
Aver. Attain.
Std.S.
1) Macedonia 2) Albania 4) Kosova
293 275 285
4.63 4.56 4.55
,4424 ,4635 ,5126
5.655
,001 a-b
Albanian Muslims and their Expectations
In this part of our study, the way of relation between demographical features of Albanian Muslims and their socio-economic expectations are investigated. Regarding these issues two questions were made to respondents aiming at observing their thoughts and positions vis-a-vis the subject matters.
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The Country and the Will of Albanian Muslims regarding the issue in which Country they want to live
Under this sub-title results of the Chi-Square test are presented, performed with the purpose of determining the relation between demographical features and socioeconomic variations. These analyses provide data regarding the relations that shed light on the relation between the dependent variation, which in this case is country, gender and educational situation and options that show the desire in which country they want to live.
Table 7: Distribution of positions of respondents with respect to the factor country and their desire in which country they want to live
4.1
Appropriate Oportunity for Education
Freedom of Religion and of Conscience
Solve Economic Problems
Question 59: In which country you would like to live?
The Country Accessed in EU
Developing the CulturalNational Identity
Other 8 2.7 21.6 11 4.0 29.7 18 6.3 48.6 37 3.3 100
Macedonia
N Row (%) Column (%) N Row (%) Column (%) N Row (%) Column (%) N Row (%) Column (%)
154 52.9 41.4 82 30.0 22.8 117 41.1 35.8 353 40.9 100
42 14.4 31.8 42 15.4 31.8 47 16.5 36.4 131 14.7 100
35 12.0 25.0 61 22.3 46.4 38 13.3 28.6 134 17.2 100
34 11.7 35.1 41 15.0 39.8 22 7.7 25.1 97 11.4 100
18 6.2 17.9 36 13.2 38.7 43 15.1 43.4 97 12.4 100
291 100 34.3 273 100 31.8 285 100 33.9 849 100 100
Albania
Kosova
Total
DF: 15 Chi-Square:71.592 p=.000 Albanian Muslims in a scale of 40.9 percent have expressed their will to live in a country that enjoys freedom of religion and conscience. If we come to analyse the de-
Total
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sire for the country in which there is a freedom of religion and conscience, with respect to the factors country and gender, regarding this subject by the very fact that Muslims of Macedonia come in the first place (52.9 percent), while in the last one those from Albania (30 percent), one may think that Muslims of Macedonia, regarding the freedom of religion and that of conscience have faced more obstacles than others. According to our results it is clear that as far as Albanian Muslims are concerned the factor religion and religious freedom occupies a very important place among social living conditions of a country in which they would prefere to live. Starting from these data we can say that religion is within the identity of Albanian Muslims and that the integration of religion-identity is in a very high level. After all nalaysis made our evaluation stands in the fact that: the results show that Albanian Muslims are interested for all dimensions and aspects of religion. This means that they are interested for everything Islamic, even if it is a piece of land, in defending their rights the move in concordance with the religious conscience, or because they safeguard and cultivate religious sentiments, they have sure positions and actions in this regard. They have made their own Islamic identity as their common symbol, and it is understandable that reloigions is the most important factor in the integration of their tradition, customs and cultural identity. Thus, within the framework of this study we can observe that not that Albanians have any reserve regarding their religious identity, but on the contrary they clearly emphasize that religious life is an inseparable part of them and even if they are not able to perform all religious duties, tey at least have positive attitudes vis-a-vis them. This is an observation that rejects the dilemma of some intelectualls who by all means try to wash the brains of people with some so-called pro-Western and modern ideas, which in reality have clear Christian hidden agenda. If the Islamic population itself expresses its positive idea regarding their religious identity, it is not just nor democratic someone, covered by the veil of missionary and rottary clubs to make efforts to move away by all means the Albanians from the Islamic religion with the pretext as if Europe is not prepared to accept us as such. In conclusion let us say that this study has brought to light the religious and socio-cultural components that made possible the integration of the religion-identity of Albanian Muslims, it succeeded in codification of certain knowledge and basic data regaring the personal and social commonalities of Albanian Muslims, as well as the possibility all these data and results to be evaluated under the spectrum of the psychology in general and of the psychology of religion in particular.
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Bibliography
Aleksandre Popovi; Balkanlardaki slam, prkthe n gj. Turke: Komisioni, nsan Yaynlar, Stamboll 1995. Ali M. Basha; Islami n Shqipri gjat Shekujve, Tiran 2000. Allcock, B. John; Explaining Yugoslavia, Hurst & Company, London 2000. Bahadr Grbz; Balkanlar ve Trkler, izgi Kitabevi, Konya 2002. Balkanonline 1, http://www. Balkanonline. Net/ulkeler/Kosova.html, (27 Ekim 2001). Bieber Florian; Muslim Identity in the Balkans Before the Establishment of Nation States, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000. Bogdan Szajkowski and the others; Islam and Ethnicity in Eastern Europe, Muslim Communities in the Europe. Faton Abdullahu; Dimensionet e Identitetit Qytetrues, Kultura, Feja, Politika-Rilindja, Prishtin 1998. Gnter Kehrer, Din Sosyolojisi, perkth. M. Emin Kkta, Din Sosoyolojisi, Vlersuar nga Y. AktayM. E. Kkta, Vadi Yaynlar, Ankara. Habil entrk, Sosyal likilerimiz ve Din, Milli Kltr Gusht, Numri: 75, Stamboll 1990. H.T Norris; Islam in the Balkans Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World, Hurst & Company, London 1993. Hysamedin Feraj; Skic e Mendimit Politik Shqiptar, Logos-A, Shkup 1999. Ilija Aceski; Etnocentrizmot, Konfesionalnata Pripadnost i Opestvenata Dezintegracija, Bezbednost, revija za kriminalistiki, kriminologi i krivino parvo, Yl: 33, br. 1 1993, Skopje. Jens Reuter; From Religious Community to Nation-The Ethnogenesis of the Bosnian Muslims, Islam The Balkanas and The Great Powers (XIV-XX Century) International Scientific Conference 1996, Historical Institute, Belgrade 1997. Maria Todorova; Imagining the Balkans (Balkanlar Tahayyl Etmek), prkth. n gj. Turke Dilek endil, letiim Yaynlar, Stamboll 2003. Mustafa Selver; Balkanlara Stratejik Yaklam ve BOSNA, IQ Kltr Sanat Yaynclk, Botimi i Par, Stamboll 2003. Nuray Bozbora; Osmanl Ynetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusuluu`nun Geliimi, Boyut Kitaplar, Stamboll 1997. Srdjan Vrcan; The War in ex-Yugoslavia and Religion, Social Compass, 41 (3), 1994. Veysel Uysal; Din Tutum Davran ve ahsiyet zellikleri, M.. lahiyat Fakltesi Vakf Yaynlar, Stamboll 1996.
Migrations of Bosnians after the Second World War migrations as an Indivisible Part of the History of Bosnian people since the Berlin congress, 1878
sabina Pacariz*
After the Berlin Congress, 1878, the Balkans faced huge demographic changes. Muslims as a factor of actual power, from a privileged position of people/class close the authorities, having the leading role in the society, became subject of unbearable pressure, resulting in exile. They were aiming at the center of the weakened Empire, following its lines of withdrawal, sharing a tragic destiny of sicknesses and terror. It was an era of nationalism, where the young Balkan states understood aggressiveness as tool of preserving their own national identity. Following the example of the Great Powers, their models of mononational states, the new-born states on the Balkans were practically unaware of their position. They perceived formation of their specific national identity as a matter of grabbing territories and repression of the Muslim communities. Muslims were not only terrorized and expelled, but also the ones who decided to stay were exposed to humiliation and psycho-physical terror, being disabled on all levels: economic, social, political, cultural. They prevented from exercising their religious and cultural identity, and in the place of the already migrated Muslims, nonMuslims of the domicile country were immigrating, enjoying full privilege of the ruling system. Hundreds of thousands of people migrated towards the inner parts of the Empire. This tendency of external alteration of everything that seemed Ottoman was also followed by extreme change in the peoples mentality: the culture of tolerance, of multiethnicism, multiconfessionalism now existed only in the past.
*Free lance Reasearcher from macedonia. 131
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Socio-political position of Bosnians during WW II Subject of violent Chetnik repression Sandzak included in the plans of Great Croatia and Great Albania as well Resistance forms of local people Potential autonomy of the Sandzak region Injustice under Partisans rule Bosnian people were not spared from chetnik attacks even during the WWII. Moreover, the war was seen as necessary for saving Serbianism. Draza Mihajlovic, the leading figure of chetniks, was very eager to fulfill his historical mission of creating ethnically homogenous Great Serbia. He and his army formations were oriented towards ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandzak from the non-Serb elements, which would potentially result in migrations of Muslim communities towards Turkey, their original homeland. They were extremely cruel in their acting, aiming at every single Muslim human being, devastating whole villages and permanently altering the demographic maps of certain areas. Officially such attitudes were far from being loudly outspoken, since Turkey had a specific political position within the Ally strategy. The relation of Turkey towards the Bosnian people in the Balkans, as well as the position of Bosnians in Turkey, their political and state orientation, was under constant examination from Germany and Italy. Moreover, the Refugee Government recommended avoiding international conflicts. Bosnians, or to use the vocabulary of that period, Muslims were interesting for other great plans as well. The Ustashas (Croatian nationalistic army formations) proclaimed Muslims as Croatians of Islamic religion, the flower of the Croatian people which now that the Turks left became particularly aware of their Croatian origin. The plans of Great Croatia stretched throughout whole BiH, reaching Sandzak as well. Local Bosnian people, especially the groups showing resistance to chetniks repression, were a subject of manipulation, serving as a helping tool in their Anti-Serb actions. Even the Great Albanian plans of Kosovo were intermingling in the Sandzak region, anticipating parts of Sandzak, up to Bijelo Polje and the Javor Mountain. Even though they were being in obviously under-privileged position, certain groups of Bosnians showed resistance to the psycho-physical violence they were exposed to. The leaders of such formations, who protected the civilians of their specific area, even nowadays enjoy the status of heroes among the local people. Unfortunately,
Migrations of Bosnians after the Second World War
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these groups didnt act in a uniquely organized manner, they were not a part of a larger general strategy for protection of the Muslim people, but the contrary, each of them was referring to the domicile area of its members. Of course that there were certain examples of coordination, but taken as a whole they didnt share any clearly prcised concept of action. Additionally, the leaders of these groups cooperated with the foreign ocupator, which seems understandable when the long years they suffered under terror are being taken into consideration. Being constantly harassed, manipulated, perceived as unnational element no wonder they did so. Later not only that they paid for their sins, but this was used as a common argument for passing death sentences for whole families, even in cases when it wasnt true. As the end of the war was approaching, a wholly new aspect for Sandzak was uprising autonomy in the frames of the Federative State of Yugoslavia. The Forces of the National Liberation created the federal state in 1943, and one year later the State Antifascist Assemblies were constituted as highest legislative and executive bodies of each federal unit. In such an environment constitution of a State Antifascist Assembly for Peoples Liberation of Sandzak (SAAPLS) was initiated, which was supposed to be the highest political and representative organ of the Peoples Liberation in that region. The first session of the Initiative Board of SAAPLS (ZAVNOS) was held in the town Prijepolje, where the idea was accepted with great admiration, being seen as a historical opportunity for termination of the long years of suffering. Later on, on the 20th of November, 1943, in Pjevlja, according to the instructions of the highest leadership of NL, in the presence of 252 delegates ZAVNOS was established. Ten delegates were elected to represent ZAVNOS on the second meeting of AVNOJ in the city of Jajce, Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, these 10 delegates never reached Jajce. According to the official interpretation, it was due to the bad weather conditions. Off-record it was due to the poor coordination with the Montenegrin delegation, which additional to its bad organization of their supposedly joint travel to Jajce, was also lobbying for attribution of Sandzak to Montenegro. The idea of separate identity of this region never saw the light of the day, since it was considered that there is no cultural or ethnical need for such action. In order to calm down the situation, guarantees for preserving the special religious and cultural identity of Muslim people were given where Sandzak would no longer be a region with not enough schools but too much gendarmerie. On the 7th of August, 1945, in Belgrade, on the Third Meeting of AVNOJ the division of the Turkish administrative unit of Sandzak was confirmed: the Priboj, Milesevo, Sjenica, Stavs
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Zlatars and Dezevo area were part of the Federal Republic of Serbia, and the Pljevlja and Bijelo Polje area belonged to Montenegro. Whether the previously planned autonomy was a real plan or just a means of political manipulation, necessary for a short period, may be unbiased to judge. It is important to add that Aleksandar Rankovic personally stressed this fact as an argument to prove the positive attitude of KPJ towards the unity of Serbia. The main question that was asked in this period, and that also becomes very essential issue in the forthcoming policy is whether someone was revolutionary or contra-revolutionary during the war. On the basis of decisions of being contra-revolutionary death sentences were being executed, even to whole families and innocent people. Decisions were being brought by individuals, by short manner procedures. The fact that they were geographically distant from the administrative centers of power worsened the situation even more. In the executions, the selective approach was more than obvious: from November 1944 till January 1945: 29 Bosnians, 1 Serbian, 1 Croatian, 1 Hungarian and 1 Austrian were condemned to death. Continuity of migrations after the WW II Characteristics (region, time period etc) It should be stressed that in the period after the WW II only Bosnians from the Sandzak region started moving to Turkey, unlike the period previous to the War. It is due to proclaiming Bosnia and Herzegovina a federative republic within Yugoslavia, which enabled them to enjoy certain privileges and protection. In such surroundings Aleksandar Rankovic and his followers were not too much influential on this area, which practically saved these people from exile. The migrations started right after the War and lasted until early seventies, when the politically administrative system of Yugoslavia slowly starts changing. These events were of essential meaning for the Bosnian population, resulting in termination on migrations at the time. The events that took place during the WWII left very strong marks in the memory of the Bosnian people. The discriminatory policy didnt change after the War either, creating continuous pressure in all spheres of life of the Muslim people, making them feel even stronger that the place where they were born and lived is not actually their homeland. The reasons or the so called pushing factors of migration existed in all levels: economic, socio-political, and cultural.
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Economically back-ward This was the situation with Sandzak even before the War; investments here were symptomatically low, almost no industry, and high unemployment. There was no larger factory or industry, and in the ones that existed workers were forced not to fast Ramadan, because it ruined their productiveness and the spirit of the collective. General development lagging behind other regions There was very poor infrastructure, education was performed on a bad level, not enough schools, and almost 40% of illiterate people after the War, very few people graduated of university. Medical personnel and hospitals were lacking resulting in many sicknesses, high mortality rate, even hunger appeared. Nationalization of properties peasants were especially affected. Now that their whole properties were nationalized, they were practically jobless. People started buying cheap products from the state shops/markets, so they faced pretty low prices. Denial of their special national identity Bosnians were not recognized as separate people, having their specific national identity. They were simply Muslims and had to choose between being Serbian or Croatian Muslims. The ones who didnt want to leave their homes declared themselves as Serbs, while the ones who were leaving declared as Turks. Everyone was aware that these two groups actually belonged to the same people, but it wasnt in their interest to admit so. Later on, the actual trends in Yugoslavian Foreign Policy (namely the leadership of the Nonaligned Nations) contributed a lot to the recognition of the special national identity of Bosnians. Pressure on exercising their religious rights and freedoms Even though the Constitution formally consisted an article for respecting religious freedoms, the praxis showed quite the opposite. In 1950, a Law for Abolition of Wearing Veils / Hidab was brought. Lower religious schools (mektebs) were closed. Seriate courts were repealed even earlier. Only one Islamic organization was allowed to work, and it was under strict control, with a constantly observed school for higher religious education (medresses). The Muslim Printing House in Sarajevo was closed and edition of Islamic school-books was forbidden. Hundreds of mosques were ruined even during the war, and many of them were later turned into museums, store houses, even stalls. Many Muslim grave yards were turned into parks or used as locations for construct-
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ing buildings and other objects. The ruining of the traditional yards with high walls around the Muslim houses, the so-called avlija also deeply affected the psychology of Muslims, they felt terror in their very houses. The vakuf properties also suffered a lot through the process of nationalization. The situation in this aspect started slowly improving by the end of the 1960s, when Islamic countries started being important factor in the movement of Unaligned countries. Hidden police repression and abuse of official state functions When we speak of police pressure we may not omit the figure of Aleksandar Rankovic, the Minister of Interior in post war Yugoslavia. He was a very close collaborator and a friend of Tito since the war days and practically the second/third ruling man in the state. Up closer he was a Serbian nationalist oriented towards highly centralized model of federal government, where Serbia would have the main word. The inhuman torture of thousands of Muslims in Sandzak and Kosovo was result of his ruling strategy. Of course everything was done in hidden manner, whereby tortured people were threatened with death if they talk about it. Being suspicious of cooperating with the external enemy men were brought to police stations where they were beaten and tortured in various ways, leaving them lifetime health consequences. The International Agreement between Republic of Turkey and Social Federative Republic of Yugoslavia for Repatriation of families Here we should mention that even before the War, 1938, there was a convention between Turkey and Yugoslavia for moving of Turks to their homeland, but the outbreak of the war aborted its implementation. The post war years were a period of very quality international relations between these two countries, so in 1953 this issue was reactivated. Due to certain economic provisions the Agreement was never ratified, but it maintained functioning as Gentlemens Agreement. Officially the goal of the Agreement was to enable repatriation of families of Turkish origin, whereby in law relatives were also considered as relevant in this process of reuniting with the ones who already left. This was the form through which many Bosnian and Albanians, declaring themselves as Turks, gained the opportunity to leave to Turkey. Interpretation of the pushing factors from the official authorities point of view The official authorities did not talk much of the existence of such migrations and did
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even less to stop it. In the very few situations when the subject would come to the fore, it was interpreted as resulting from economic reasons, neglecting the fact that Serbian population didnt migrate in such massive numbers (even when they did, it was to other parts of Serbia), plus the fact that Turkey compared to Yugoslavia at the time was in a much worse economic position. Some interpretations were that these people simply want to reunite with their already left relatives, or that they wanted to live in a country with a stronger religious matrix. All together, nothing was done in order to prevent it. Moreover, the emigrants who were leaving to Turkey were the only group of emigrants from the territory of whole Yugoslavia who had to oblige not to return to the country, unlike those who were leaving to Germany, Italy etc. Macedonia as transition point on the way to Turkey As a result of the initiative of the leading people of Sandzak, who were trying to somehow slow down the migrations, the procedure for dismissing from Yugoslavian citizenship was notably aggravated. But the migrants found a new way, this time through Macedonia. The necessary procedure was to live as a declared Turk in Macedonia for at least two years, right after they were gaining the right to leave to their homeland. Macedonian authorities remained deaf on the pledge of Sandzak leadership to stop the processes, defending themselves with giving dismissal only to real Turks. Thousands of people poured into Macedonia, which was a transition point to their final destination. A certain number of Bosnians (round 17 000 nowadays) stayed in Macedonia, mostly of personal reasons. The dismissal of Rankovic, followed by Constitutional and Federal Reconstruction = Deceleration of Migrations On the Fourth plenum of the Central Committee of Yugoslavian Communists, in 1966, at the Island of Bryony, Rankovic was dismissed from his function of Yugoslavian Minister of Interior, because of Disrupting the development of socialistic selfgovernment and misuse of his function in the National Security Service. He was deprived from all his state and party functions, soon after which he retired. The real sin of Rankovic was that actually he had put himself above the state, even daring to eavesdrop on Tito. Very soon after this event the question of misuse of state function was raised on all levels. The inner controls of the State Security Services became frequent, slowly giving positive impact in terms of improving the situation of the once harassed
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population. Steadily migrations start decelerating, resulting in complete hold of the process by the beginning of seventies. In terms of state issues, the dismissal of Rankovic provoked shift in the centers of power, transitioning from the federal to the republican level. Changes on many state levels took place, but one that is very important to mention is the new Yugoslavian Constitution of 1974, by which Bosnians were finally recognized as federative nation. Having all the above-mentioned data into consideration; round million of people migrated under a special status of having no right to come back, obviously changed demographic cards of whole region, can we really say that Yugoslavia was a country of brotherhood and unity!?
Ottomans Image in the Bulgarian History Textbooks from the Communist to Post-Communist Era
aziz shakir*
Introduction This study is an illustration of the negative impact the Bulgarian history (and literature) textbooks from the last decades had, and still have, upon the local MuslimTurkish minority, in particular and (regardless of their ethnic origin and religious affiliations) upon the last generation, as a whole. Hopefully, the humble number of scientific and popular researches aimed at reducing this impacts duration soon will increase and facilitate the idea for developing a new set of methods not only for writing, but also for teaching history textbooks, describing our past and contemporary neighbors at least as normal humans. As a matter of fact, nowadays Balkan history textbooks attract a great deal of scholarly attention. The 1989-1990 revolutions in Eastern Europe motivated the urgent re-evaluation of the communist monochromatic interpretations of the past and the justification of the new geopolitical pro-western re-orientation. Nevertheless in most cases the concrete results achieved by the mentioned scholarly attention are destined to be announced during international conferences like the one we are present today and consequently: remain unheard by the local textbook authors, whose efforts to change the long term status quo are far from sufficient. Hopefully the advanced processes of democratization of the ex-socialist societies and the ongoing European integration will prompt higher levels of awareness in the educational sphere, and thus lead to a fruitful re-examination of the common historical past, still lacking a collective memory in terms of promoting an intercultural understanding.
* dr., Higher Islamic Institute, sofia; sabanc university, stanbul 139
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This research was initially inspired by an accidental conversation we recently had with a brilliant high school student in Sofia who happened to visit Istanbul and was shocked by the total lack of correspondence between her expectations shaped by the descriptions of the Turks and the Ottoman capital found in her history textbooks and the concrete impression she had just got from a weekend spent there. She decided to share her amazement with the words: I expected to see there some cottages and backward people and what I really saw was an architecture surpassing in its excellence even the one I happened to observe in my favorite European city: Venice. I visited many great cities, but this was the best Ive ever seen. After this conversation I took an interest in young Bulgarians attitudes toward the most demonized historical and geographical neighbor: namely the Ottoman State and the Ottomans, their descendant: The Turkish Republic and its citizens: the contemporary Turks, and last but not least: the common approach towards the local Muslim minority (consisting mainly of Turks, Pomaks and Romans) considered by most Bulgarian nationalists an inconvenient remnant from the so-called Turkish yoke. As we all know, nowadays the easiest and most sufficient (and at the same time relatively objective) method of getting this kind of information is to examine random web sites containing chats of young people discussing various political, historical, religious etc. topics or: to have a look at the commentaries following articles dealing with the same topics, published in on-line newspapers, magazines, internet forums etc. Thirdly we checked the contents of the main sources relied on and cited in the mentioned chats: no doubt, these were the history and literature textbooks taught in the Bulgarian elementary and high schools. At this point we reached a most striking conclusion we later came across in one of Bulgarias most renowned Ottomanists Maria Todorovas articles called Bulgarian Historical Writing on the Ottoman Empire. There she would disappointedly admit that the most striking feature of the dominant discourse about the five centuries long Ottoman rule described as the saddest and darkest of all periods in Bulgarian history is the amazing continuity over time. With other words, despite of the drastic political change, Bulgaria as an ex-socialist country from the Eastern-European block underwent in the last two decades and despite of the total revision of all school programs (mainly in the field of social sciences) the history textbooks regarding the Ottoman period successfully preserved their major characteristics: anti-logic, supernationalistic, too subjective, full of contradictions. But let us introduce you to the mentioned characteristics by means of giving concrete examples taken from a dozen of Bulgarian history textbooks released in the
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communist and post-communist era, sorted in two major items aimed at monitoring Ottomans image in general:
The Ottoman as a conqueror and as a ruler; in other words: the Ottoman in war and peace:
During the socialist and post-1989 era the textbooks including in their syllabuses the Ottoman period was (and still is) being taught in the 5th, 9th, and 11th grades. Usually, the material was divided into two main sections: 15th-17th century, preceded, of course, by the dramatic story of the conquest taking place in the end of the 14th century and 18th-19th centuries the last period being called a National Revival at the end of which, as a result of the Russo-Turkic War in 1878, Bulgaria gained its official independence from the Ottoman State. In the period 1945-1989, the educational system was extremely centralized and for each grade the Ministry of Education approved only one textbook. The grip of control was loosed after 1989 by the adoption of alternative textbooks for each grade. As a result each Bulgarian elementary and secondary school had to give preference to one of two or three textbooks prepared by separate teams of authors and adopt it for its teaching program. A propos in the long list of new authors there are no Muslims at all. Having in mind that some of the texts include whole passages dedicated to Islam, the Bulgarian Ministry could afford if not an author, at least an adviser appointed by the Grand Muftis office in Sofia. The large number of new history textbooks in the post-communist years led to a wide diversity of perspectives commenting otherwise fixed topics with a wider range of nuances. However both the binary division of the Ottoman period and most of the stereotypes regarding the Ottomans image remained unchallenged until recently. For nearly half a century the Bulgarian history textbooks persistently used to call the Ottomans Turks. That is why they are full of Turkish expressions such as Turkish troops, Turkish enslavers, Turkish fanatics, etc. For example, in History for the 7th Class, the word Turkish and its derivates are used 194 times and the term Ottoman only once. In History of Bulgaria for the 10th and 11th Classes the proportion is again too drastic to be the fruit of a mere coincidence: Turks, Turkish and Turkey are used 166 times, while the adjective Ottoman is used only 4 times. In Fatherland History for the 4th Class the term Ottoman is not used at all. We guess the propaganda machine decided to preserved small students brains from eventual needless question marks. We fully agree with the opinion of the Bulgarian re-
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searcher M. Isov: the only local author to offer a separate monograph concerning the Ottomans image in Bulgarian historiography, called by the way The Most Different Neighbor, who explains the overwhelming majority of the term Turkish used instead of Ottoman with the fact that the Bulgarian communist regime expected from the totally obedient educational system to create in students minds a negative image whose object should not be considered as one left behind: in the historical past, but a real one still representing a major threat to the modern Bulgarian state: namely, the Turks, who happen to inhabit not only its southeastern neighborhood: the Republic of Turkey founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, but also Bulgaria itself. Nevertheless in certain periods when the Turkish-Bulgarian relations underwent some improvement, there were sporadic attempts for reducing the explicit clichs condemning the Turkish enslavers. For instance this phenomenon can be observed in Bulgarian History for the 7th Class, released in 1946/47, i.e. in the very beginning of the so-called socialist period. But in the rest of the cases the negative image of the Ottoman Empire was directly transferred upon Turkey that not only represented the capitalist world, but with its second biggest NATO army stood as a major political and military threat for relatively small Bulgarian state. One of the crucial issues triggering the absolute negation of the common Ottoman legacy is the fact that Bulgarian politicians and thus historians never accepted the otherwise obvious fact that for almost five centuries the Bulgarian lands were a significant part of a multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual mixture called Ottoman State and that Bulgarians as subjects of the latter more or less actively contributed to the formation of the common cultural environment whose traces today are seen in the architecture, language and everyday life in all Balkan states. This historical selfdenial deprived the Bulgarian researchers (hopefully only temporarily) of the chance to explore the material and intellectual heritage gained in the course of centuries by their own ancestors. Instead (for the sake of announcing the Ottomans enslavers) they preferred calling their forefathers slaves, whose only right was to cultivate the land, deal with livestock and pay (like forty different) taxes to their oppressors, who like real sadists were fond of constantly torturing their subjects by kidnapping their children, raping their wives or forcibly Islamizing them. (I am almost sure that Ottomans behave almost in the same manner in the Greek and Serbian history textbooks). Contrary to the statements found in the history textbooks (for example in History for the 8th Class printed in 2005) that the Ottoman Empire is actually Turkish or Islamic the Bulgarian academicians agree that in the latter ethnic Turks were never
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a majority. Most of the time, they formed like 1/4th or even less from the total population. A great number of high officials originated from Christian families (and some of them even preserved their religion despite of their posts) from all over the Balkans: Albanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks etc. All these facts were well-known to the Bulgarian historians, but they wouldnt dare sharing them with their young readers. It will be fair to say that some historians had the good will to do so, but they knew in advance that their eventual texts would never pass the censorship. In all textbooks printed in the socialist era the Ottomans were announced enslavers and consequently the Bulgarians: slaves, as for the five centuries of Ottoman rule they were logically named Turkish slavery and Turkish yoke. As a matter of fact this terminology was initially used in the second half of the 18th century by a Bulgarian monk Paisiy of Hilendar, whose only book called Slavo-Bulgarian History can rather be determined as pure literature, than as a history book supported by serious sources. Having in mind that the monks major purpose was urging the Bulgarian Christians to recall their glorious past and fight against the Ottoman slavery and Greek orthodox influence it is more than natural to expect pathetical expressions of this sort. Unfortunately, most of the time the writing style used in the Bulgarian history textbooks was rather literary than historical. As a matter of fact, the most expressive terminology used to describe the Ottomans is initially found in the literature textbooks taught in the elementary school full of myths that the history textbooks from the secondary school fully justify. The myths concerning the Ottoman rule are the second major item we would like to share emphasize: But before that let us give an example how strong the stereotypes created by the literary terminology can be: In one of the most moderate history textbooks written in the post-socialist period: the History for the 11th Class of the Secondary Public Schools printed in 1996 with authors V. Gyuzelev, K. Kosev, M. Lalkov, L. Ognyanov, M. Radeve, on p. 110 we read a passage in which it is explained why the term Turkish slavery is not correct and that it carries only an emotional intensity by which Bulgarians deny the non-European centuries in their history and that this term is already rejected by the Serbian, Greek and Romanian historiography. Despite of this confession in the pages to follow from the same textbook we meet again and again the terms Turkish instead of Ottoman and slavery instead of rule.
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Modern Myths and Pseudo-folklore as Major Sources for Shaping Ottomans Image in the Bulgarian History Textbooks
2
During the 3rd quarter of the 20th century the most important obstacle in front of the Bulgarian historiographys ambition to proof its main thesis about the nature of the Ottoman presence in the Bulgarian lands was the considerable lack of firsthand sources. To fill this gap historians started manufacturing theories that were easily applied in the school programs where thanks to its popular language the historical discourse did not acquire a brilliant academic apparatus. Secondly they prepared a special selection of secondhand sources whose long-term emotional impact over childrens imaginations was guaranteed. These included pictures (Kanits), films (Time for separation/ in Bulgarian Vreme razdelno), songs (Davash li davash Balkandji Yovo hubava Yana za turska vyara/ Balkandji Yovo are you giving Yana to the Turkish faith; Yovo answers: More voyvodo, glava si davam, Yana ne davam/ I am giving my head, but not Yana etc.), vitas of Christian saints who died for their faith after being lynched by the Turkish population (St. Georgi of Sofia); Priests stories (some proven to be fake, but still used as sources) Myths about the mass conversions to Islam; The opposition: good Christianity-bad Islam; Contradictions about the reasons for the conversion and its scales; When the Muslims are Christianized they do it because they want to live as Christians in the newly found Bulgarian state (1912-1913); Demonizing Islam etc. Myths about the demographic catastrophe the local population underwent during the conquest years; plague and conversion to Islam, considered as reasons for the demographic catastrophe; Bulgaria lost its relations with Europe and lost 5 centuries of its natural development in history; Not a single bad word about life in medieval Europe; The Balkans saved Europe by stopping Islam within the Balkans; I guess my presentation was mostly critical, but there are positive things too.
Ottoman Tradition in Bosnia and Herzegovina The Reality and Historiographic Generalisations in the 20th century
Ramiza smaji*
We will not say anything new if we say that the history of the entire Balkans demands a critical reinterpretation, a deliverance of the pseudo-mythical and pseudo-historical webs in which it is entangled. The modern times ask for the rational reconstructions, complex and asymmetrical images of the past, and they ask for the historical events to be described in the entirety. Numerous researchers of the Balkans approach this subject from the narrow national standpoints, ignoring the history and the achievements of other ethnic groups and multinational societies and states to which they once belonged. The trend of modern globalization, however, can be also recognized through prettifying the past; through demands for the revision, but without difficult recollections. The history of the Ottoman Empire is the history of all nations that lived in it. For the long time, it has been interpreted with prejudices, with the superficial conclusions, which, in the historiography of the European, and particularly Balkan states, remained immune to the counterarguments emerging from the opposite experiences and findings. The science has turned the Ottoman state into an internal place of disposal of the European stereotypes and the misguided passions, treating the Balkan countries as an exotic zone between the European civilization and the mystical Orient. The conference on the expansion of Islam and on the Islamic culture took place in 1991, and it brought upon it the great attention of the scholar circles, with the results of the researches.1 Unfortunately, those new findings in science, and the numerous
* 1
Historical Institute, sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina irenje islama i islamska kultura u Bosanskom ejaletu, Orijentalni institut u sarajevu, 7-9. mart 1991./ Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, 41/1991, sarajevo 1991. 145
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scientific works that appeared in the years that followed, do not change anything in the attitude toward history if the social circumstances are such that an irrational awareness, a simplified and symmetrical image of the past, is still desirable. Richard Holbrooke said that, in the USA, the most famous book in English language about Yugoslavia was Rebecca Wests book Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, from 1930s; and its standpoints that the Turks ruined the Balkans and that Muslims were racially inferior influenced the two generation of the readers.2 Philippe Gelez recently wrote the guide for the research of the Islamization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he failed to mention the above-mentioned conference in 1991.3 Those collectivepsychological stereotypes do not come any more as the consequence of the lack of knowledge, but it seems that we are facing the historiographical organized oblivion. Here, we would like to express some of our observations regarding the terminological field. In elaboration of Ottoman period of Bosnian and Herzegovinian history most of the problems are on terminological field and some authors attitudes towards key processes which were happening during five centuries of Ottoman Bosnians history. By this presentation we would like to stimulate for more efforts on field of terminological differentiation, for as much as without adequate naming of terms which are the subject of research interest in elaboration of Ottoman period of Bosnian and Herzegovinian history there is no final cognition of them. When it is about Ottoman period of Bosnia and Herzegovina history, definitely the most present terminological problem is anachronism of Turkish and Ottoman adjectives. If not used in terminological way these two adjectives could be understood as synonyms if used in spoken language, but no way in scientific alley, especially not in educational alley. Although there were scientists who earlier took care of semantic distinction,4 authors hold onto precise naming, some of whom pointed out this occurrence,5 today only some authors hold onto precise naming, while those similar terminological inaccuracies became unnoticed and even legitimate firstly thanks to media. If we take some units published in last decade, original Bosnian and foreign
Richard Holbrooke, Put u Dejton, Beograd 1998, p. 20. Philippe Gelez, Petit guide pour servir ltude de lislamisation en Bosnie et en Herzegovine avec le recueil des sources connues, ainsi quun commentaire sur lutilisation qui a t faite de celles-ci, les ditions IsIs, Les cahiers du Bosphore, XXXVII, Istanbul, 2005. 4 One of them is alija Bejti, who among other peaces has one titled spomenici osmanlijske arhitekture u BiH, Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju i istoriju jugoslovenskih naroda pod turskom vladavinom, III-IV, 1952-53, sarajevo, 1953. 5 nenad Filipovi, Osmanska Bosna i Osmansko carstvo u djelu stvaranje jugoslavije 1790-1918 of milorad ekmei, Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, 40/1990, sarajevo, 1991., pgs 433-457
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but directly having to do with Bosnia, we get the impression that the reason for all present historical anachronisms is double: it is about authors who we dare to say have mindless affinity to that quite light practice or it is either about those who by particular use wrong terms tend to reach appointed goals. Thus we pick out the practice of translation as a special case. In sources of Ottoman proveniences Ottoman sultanate is most frequently called Devlet-i Aliye-i Osmaniye, which means Glorious Ottoman State, universal theocratic Islamic state whom all followers of Ottoman Sultan, Turkish, Bosnian, Albanian or others, found as their state. Naming that state Turkish we underline its national and negate its universal character. It is another issue that the modern Turkish historians will rather use for e.g. expression Osmanl Trkesi (Ottoman Turkish), rather than Ottoman which is the result of inclinations in their national emancipation. At a certain moment, terminology can be so neglected that to even respected linguist Ekrem auevi who knows the issue of inadequate equalization of Old Turkish and Ottoman language very well and consistently appeals to it, happened that the same conference paper presented during two meetings which had five months between has been done differently, so in the first one he says that: Generally it is known that conquests of Hungary by Turks..., but in the second one: Generally it is known that conquests of Hungary by Ottomans....6 Of course, historical anachronism is also present at authors who deal with other periods. In the first meeting with various terminological solutions in Robert J. Donies writing, we would doubt that the translator in the aspect of professional terms transgressed the soul and letter of the original one, but that demolishes nonchalant objection of the author himself: I avoided the term Austro-Hungary. In the book I use the word Austria instead of Hasburg Monarchy.7 This is an example of conscious historical anachronism which is justified from general view of understanding to a large number of western scientist. On the other side, Jozef Matuzs Ottoman Kingdom also tends to that general understanding, but the reader easily gets to know the original terminological forms. Although, it happens to him to make careless mis With reference to presentation submitted in two meetings: znanstveni skup Matija Antun Relkovi i Slavonija 18. stoljea (zagreb-Vinkovci-drvar, 24.-25.04.1998.) and Internationalet kongress fr trkische studien 13. cIePO symposium (Vienna, 21.-24.09.1998.). Both are unified and published as one enlarged text in: Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, 47-48/1997-98, pgs. 67-84 7 Robert donia, Islam pod dvoglavim orlom, Muslimani BiH (1878-1914), zagreb-sarajevo, 2000, p.13.
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takes such as: When Turkish expansion was at climax South Slavenian states under Ottoman dispensation were divides....8 (pointed by R.S.) Of course that language endures synonyms, but terminology is a sensitive field for them and in it synonyms usually are not synonyms. Terminological diversities can be of phonetically, morphological or lexical nature. This time we will not hold onto this division, but pay attention to the use of correct meaning. When it is about real adequations it is possible to determine completely freely and individually for the certain term. But, is it the same to use constructions Bosnian Pasaluk or Bosnian Ejalet? Of course not. Lets just Pasaluk of Beograd which had never pasaluk, but a part of Sandjak of Smederevo. How to equalize it with ejalet then, beglerbegluk, on the top of which was pasa with three tugs or vizir who under him had Sandjak beys? Hazim abanovi named his great study in 1959 Bosnian Pasaluk (Bosanski paaluk) but younger generations as Ahmet Alii, Enes Pelidija etc. have noticed the importance of adequate naming in modern knowledge discourse and applied that in their monographs: Regulation of Bosnian Ejalet from 1789 until 1878 (Ureenje Bosanskog ejaleta od 1789. do 1878. godine), Bosnian Ejalet from Karlovac to Poarevac peace (Ureenje Bosanskog ejaleta od Karlovakog do Poarevakog mira)... Also the meeting held in 1991 was named Spread of Islam and Islamic Culture in Bosnian Ejalet. Problems with naming administrative-directive units, and military ones too, are of various characters. It is known that varo is a Hungarian word which originally means suburb of town, castle and generally open town quarter. Varo in Ottoman sources implicates town type quarter which is completely or mostly inhabited by Christians.9 Everyone whom at least comparatively interested practice of recruitment in some military systems knows that between terms devirma and the tribute of blood (danak u krvi) exists semantic distinction. Today Olga Zirojevi gives us ingrained interpretation: Devirma is the tribute of blood, gathering of healthy Christian children for janissary corpus.10 Devirma really is selection of capable children for janissaries, but also for high palace service, Christian in the case of Bosnia. Regulator of some source not rarely finds himself in dilemma if high function of danegir (person who will taste the food prior to Sultan) can find its adequation in taster? Real adequation are very rare also in unavoidable use of words as are arapa, top, duhan, restrain in usage of Ottoman terms and words in original form is misun josef matuz, Osmansko Carstvo, zagreb, 1992., p. 476. Behija zlatar, zlatno doba sarajeva, 1996. 10 Olga zirojevi, srbija pod turskom vlau (1459-1804), novi Pazar, 1995, pg 174
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derstandable. Even if it would come to discuss about justification of usage of term donation for timar in the writing of Josef Matuz, Nenad Moaanin, translator of Ottoman Kingdom, gives a good example for the word orbac which translates by Turcism orbadija, and related to this says: Authors German adequation is untranslatable (suppenmeister), because the translation would be artificial and too long, or completely partial, e.g. master of soup (besides, soup is not pottage!).11 With this explanation there is no place for language purism. In any case we have to keep in mind that 19th century in Croatia remembers the period in which foreign words and expressions were almost unwillingly expelled from literary language and were created many neologisms to replace them. Of course, Croatian language was at that time overfull with Germanisms but also from German languages imposition, so it can be rather considered as a fight for the Folk language right and for self-assurance.12 The most frequent usage of some term is possessors practice, if he will consider more suitable translation or original name. That the language is living matter can be seen from sources which are published in translation, completely or partially in last ten years. It is obvious for example flow of term gebran from atheists to nonMuslims, as such frenzy practice of keeping source names.13 However, it is obvious there is still no consequence of that practice, so it happens that in the text are quoted unknown concepts to non-Ottomans, in footnote, of course, are brought their meanings, but in further text come translation and source terms in combination, even in brackets. Processors, respectively translators could confirm that even 90% of terms on field of Osmanology are not confirmed double forms. Terminology is not just a problem, but a big nodosity in which intersect many questions from those which come from insufficient cognition of appointed concepts by professional historians to the problem of large politicians presence in science to which term manipulation is a method and tool for demonstration. Today terminology depends on most different viewpoint, sometimes on very skillful ones, sometimes objective, and sometimes completely subjective, particularistic, chauvinistic, even on dilettante ones. We would not want to step in unproductive intellectual and hastily argue who is
nenad moaanin, Translators word in: josef matuz, Osmansko Carstvo, zagreb, 1992, pg. 220 look for it: ljudevit jonke, Knjievni jezik u teoriji i praksi, zagreb, 1964. 13 Poimenini popis Bosanskog sandaka iz 1604. godine, monumenta Turcica, Orijentalni institut u sarajevu, sarajevo, 2000.
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and who is not right. Unfortunately, terminological inexactness are mostly present in one circle of Serbian historians who deal with Ottoman period. Most of them are limited by their own obstruction of stereotypes about their people and ChristianIslamic confrontation throughout many centuries. In confrontation with those there is no fright from even extreme vulgarism and all this make unhealthy feeling that we lost our idea of essence of historiography itself.14 The most often motive for pour of so called scientific theories are controversies on field of historical demography. There also appears a problem of inadequate naming, a lot more serious than that of usage of Ottoman and Turkish Kingdom. It is especially when questioned origin and existence of some people on particular place , which will for long be field of most precised and most incoherent viewpoints. Key disagreement are still about terms in sphere of national. Milorad Ekmei, a man with complete conscience about importance of terminological plan in science discourse, will always speak about Serbian presence in Bosnia, Serbians in Bosnia, but Bosnian Serbs or even Bosnian Orthodoxes never. This authors depression because it is being striked on continuity of Serbian presence in Bosnia since early Slovenian inflow is incoherent.15 Turkish archival material which he thinks is necessary to Serbian people brings complete opposite truths. In building of Ottoman provenience which has to do with Bosnia, names Serbs and Croatians indicate units which came from Serbian, respectively Croatian territory differently from domestic Christian (orthodox and catholic) population.16 Vlachian groups whom movements are carefully noted down in notebooks are still being brought up when continuities want to be resurrected, but they hesitate in themes which reveal too much present mix of blood at Vlachs. Presence and essence of names Bonjak and Bosnian language deserve more detailed elaboration. We will allow ourselves only the ascertainment that in the seg In sarajevo is from 5.to 8th april 2001. Held seminar on History curricula and Textbook in Bosnia and Herzegovina. during the debate it was obvious that it is necessary to work more on showing a good will to hear a different opinion and arguments in not only professional and knowledgeable, but also in human atmosphere. 15 Work collection from international scientific meeting held from 13 until 15th december 1994 in Belgrade named Bosna i Hercegovina od srednjeg veka do novijeg vremena, Belgrade 1995, pg. 15 16 Only some facts: In notebook of year 1468 among timars is also a timar of ne serbian, a man who came from serbian areas: Td 0-76, OIs nr 216. The same case is with croatian: Bosnian armys registration before the battle on moha 1526, 263 man have folloving remark croatian, compared to Bosnians registered with them who have written next to their names Bosnia. For more details see in: a. alii, Popis bosanske vojske pred bitku na mohau, POF, sv. XXV/1975, sarajevo, 1977.
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ments, in which were interested some modern authors, only their own attitude is fortified, which resulted that Bosnian etnicum and the name Bonjak itself refers to stratums of Bosnian residents which accepted Islam17, but writings like those of Filip Lastri from the second half of 18th century, for which he has himself emphasized that they are in Bosnian language, ignore with suspicion meaning of term Bosnian in that time.18 Needs for regulation and eventual standardization of our educational scientific terminology is always activating from the start, however, it most rarely happens in debates which theme is connected to language filed. In the meeting about spread of Islam and Islamic culture in Bosnian ejalet in 1991 was an extremely interesting polemic between referent dr. Darko Tanaskovi and dr. Hilmo Neimarlija about conception of Islamic and Muslim.19 Great differences are present in defining concepts in agriculture. That in one hand is not surprising, knowing that in procession of agrarian relations in last 10 years have been more interested economical, polythological and social scientific disciplines than historiography itself. Besides extremely important accomplishments of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Ottomans Historians in brightening timar-spahi system, odorous country, hakk-i tesarruf, position of raja, tax etc., agrarian relations are still being defined through chiftlik system. That is one of the reasons why the most frequent mistakes are made in the simplest concepts. Other than the concept chiftlik itself, the concept of raya is in case among the most frequent ones, for majority nonOttoman conquered population (Muslims and Christians), a concept which since 19th century refers only to non-Muslim residents. What a delusion! Two thirds of raja in first half of 19th century were Muslims and one third Christians. That was a result of simplest identification of chiftchi and rajetin. While rajetin is a freeman who farms its property and gives appointed taxes, chiftchi is similar to bondsman and he is a laborer. He can be the one who pays one third of tax or one half. We underline this also similar to bondsman, because western authors almost regularly use this expression, although it is not about adequation. Regularity of this access to practice is surprising, if it always stands out in theory that in situation when
mustafa Imamovi, Historija Bonjaka, sarajevo Three writings of Filip lastri from Oevje, rare collection in special collections nuBBiH 19 see: irenje islama i islamska kultura u Bosanskom ejaletu, Orijentalni institut u sarajevu, 7-9. mart 1991./ Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, 41/1991, sarajevo 1991.
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terms besides general meaning get specific peculiarity in one time and space, and they correspond to only given time and space, they cannot be mechanically used as synonyms of marks in other space. Attention is not paid to essential transformations which certain term undergoes through space and time, and other than that, tolerations of introduction to some basal institutions happen. So Noel Malcolm, author who writes in tone with modern tendencies of historical science, speaks about timar-spahi system, mentions inheritance, not paying any attention to odjakluk-system in Bosnia.20 Inherited property will at us be defined as a possession on land of miri which can be tilted by one pair of oxen. By this interpretation, maybe the most important thing related to Bosnian inherited property wont be figured out: It is not inheritable nowhere in Rumelia other than in Bosnia. In every country it is possible to sow on this land, reap and to sell harvest, but inherited property can be sold or left to families only in Bosnia.21 In defining essence of some terms in agrarian relations of Ottoman period furthest went dr. Alii, even if we feel obliged to warn about its permanent devotion to historical anachronism, so it often happens to be also used the term Turkish-Ottoman Turks in one thematic sequence, all in the same meaning. More recent works on Ottoman sources bring more light in appearance than already generally accepted facts. Today is, e.g. is concept filurija in terms dictionaries most frequently found explained as a tax which pay Vlachs at random for each house.22 Filuriji would by analogy be Vlach who pays filuri, which is not the complete meaning of that concept. Thanks to perfection of Ottoman administration today we know that filuriji can be also a muslim to whom is made that concession, because inheritances under filuriji very often were held by various civil servants-bearer of administrative jurisdiction in sandjak, spahije, ulema, craftsmen, etc.23 This is only a segment of our cogitations which we hope will indicate the necessity of terminological division, whilst this problematic doesnt lack of topicality have proved until now many debates about above partly mentioned problems. Of course
noel malcolm, Povijest Bosne: kratki pregled, zagreb-sarajevo, 1995. sadk albayrak, Budin Kanunnamesi ve Osmanl Toprak Meselesi, Istanbul 1973, p. 421. 22 see term index in: a.s. alii, Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. Do 1832. godine, sarajevo 1996, p. 421 23 snjeana Buzov, Vlasi i bosanskom sandaku i islamizacija, scientific meeting expansion os Islam and Islamic culture in Bosnian ejalet, POF 41/1991, sarajevo 1991, pp.84-99.
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that some of our information must not be considered a norm but as our attitude and at a certain degree professional opinion. History, especially ours, is still not ready for undertakes as those which presented unique Yugoslavian terminological nomenclatures of certain sciences and professions, but we can do that much so that in practice are used terms which bring essential concepts meaning and correspond to our language sense. Marc Bloch says that documents are not the pure past, but instead, they are witnesses whose answers depend on the questions asked. After several years of work on researching the documents and materials of the Ottoman provenance, I think that the access to and the usage of the archival materials have become problematic in several aspects. The limited communication among the historians, archival institutions, the flow of literature, as well as the situation in the wider region, where people write much about Bosnia and Herzegovina all this make just one part of a bigger mosaic of problems. The science must avoid the routine and ghettoization, surpass the antiquary approach to the historical materials, the sterile and superficial description of events. It is necessary to go beyond the autistic existence in the local coordinates, to move out of the boundaries of the research conceptions and the mental transfer of the historians. A multi-perspective approach to the events of the 15th century demands an objective presentation of the positions of all its protagonists. Nevertheless, the children never observe the history with the eyes of their fathers, so each generation has to reevaluate the history in a new and different way. However, there are many things that are not researched, and the value of the historiography is also measured through what it did not research.
Albanian Orientalism1
enis sulstarova*
Forward! On the four horizons, the red flag is flaming, The wind of the east is overwhelming the wind of West. One hundred communist parties Revolutionize the orbits and again forward the sunrise rushes the earth. Ismail kadare, my century [shekulli im], 1961 The only thing of interest to me is the orientation of albania, its anchorage to the West. albania is fed up with the east...east is worse for albanians than it is for the Polish, for the czechs, for the Hungarians, because for albania the east means the soviet, chinese, Ottoman east...To put it differently, the east is a disaster, a calamity. all the time the albanian culture, the albanian aspiration, strives to cut the links to east. Ismail kadare, Barbarian Times [koh barbare], 1999
Introduction: Strategies of Orientalism

Edward W Saids seminal study Orientalism (1978) continues to draw attention in the academia and to be employed to study the processes of othering in different contexts. According to the wide-spread use of the term, Orientalism refers to degrading representations of cultures and peoples that privilege modern, rational, civi*
lecturer, university of Tirana. The argument of this article is based on a book-length essay published in albanian language Arratisje nga Lindja: Orientalizmi shqiptar nga Naimi te Kadareja [escape from east: albanian Orientalism from naim Frashri to Ismail kadare] (sulstarova, 2006; 2nd rev. ed. 2007). I wish to thank you Besnik Pula and Ridvan Peshkpia for comments on an earlier version of this article. 155
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lized Europe/West, against backward, irrational, barbarian others in different regions of the world. Scholars, who have been inspired by his work, have nevertheless revised Saids thesis to fit the cases of othering within Europe (e.g. Wolf 1994; Todorova 1997; Fleming 1999; cf. Fleming 2000). In modern times variations of Orientalism have been perpetrated within European countries and societies by political and cultural elites in the processes of constituting national identities and for building up support for certain regimes of power and social stratification. The very concept of modernity deploys the techniques of Orientalism, because modernity refers to a series of abstraction and extrapolation specific to the history of West, by which absences, lack of or deformations of it are detected in other parts of the world (Sardar 2002: 77-78). During the last two centuries, Western Orientalism has been internalized by modernizing societies in other regions of the world, becoming part of the local discourses and identities. As Makdisi puts it, in an age of Western-dominated modernity, every nation creates its own Orient (2002: 768). In this framework, studying the case of former Yugoslavia, Bakic-Hayden (1995) developed the concept of nesting Orientalism, referring to the construction of the oriental others by the nations comprising the federation: Bosnian and Albanians were perceived to be more oriental than Serbs and Macedonians, while the former more oriental than the Croats and Slovenes. This kind of hierarchy based on considering other nations less European or more Asiatic had a sinister influence in the preparation and execution of ethnic cleansings during the Yugoslav succession wars of the 1990s (see Cigar 1994). Some scholars make the distinction between external Orientalism, directed against perceived other nations and societies and internal Orientalism, employed in the discourses by political and cultural elites in a given society against social categories and that are perceived as unfit or resistant to the projects of the construction of modern national identities. External and internal Orientalisms, however, should not be seen as mutually exclusive but rather as gradations of the same basic discursive strategy, by which even the victims of Orientalisms become victimizers of oriental others. The case of Jewish Orientalism is a revealing example of the external-internal continuum. The roots of Jewish Orientalism lie in the stigmatization of Jews as Orientals within Europe. In their post-Enlightenment emancipation the Jews were granted citizenship rights in France and Germany but on the condition they disregard their Asiatic appearance and customs and assimilate to the modern ways of the dominant society. With time, fully integrated Western Jews downgraded Jewish
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refugees coming from Eastern Europe, because of their un-modern appearance and primitive behavior. Behind this Jewish external-internal Orientalism lied the fear that the newly coming Jews could jeopardize the position that Western Jews had gained in their societies. After the creation of the state of Israel, Orientalist strategies have been employed by Israeli Jews coming from Eastern Europe (Ashkenazim), to secure their upper political and social position against Jews coming from Middle East (Mizrahim), whereas both groups have been discriminating against Palestinians and other Arabs (Khazoom 2003; see also Gerber 2003; Piterberg 2001). Using this framework, this article examines the Orientalist strategies used by Albanian intellectuals for forging modern Albanian national identity. Being a European, but a developing, ex-communist country with a majority Muslim population, Albania has frequently been the target of pejorative stereotyping by Western travelers, politicians, literature and media (Alpion 2002; 2005). Despite this, Albania has developed its own brand of Orientalism, because, since the end of nineteenth century, its processes of modernization have been framed along a West-East axis, with Albanians struggling to escape from the consequences and pollution of their national European identity by a series of Eastern/Oriental Others. Here, we trace the main characteristics of Albanian external-internal Orientalism, through an analysis of the works of the main intellectuals in four institutional periods of the countrys modern history. Starting with the National Awakening period, Orientalism became an essential tool in the struggle against the Ottomans and in the conceptualization of an ancient Albanian nation of European roots. This is exemplified in the works of the national poet, Naim Frashri and his brother Sami. In between the two world wars, Orientalism was employed both by establishment intellectuals in their imagining of an organic and revived Albanian nation emerging against the degeneracy of the past, and by radical intellectuals in their class struggle against the oriental landlords. A close reading of the works of Albanias world renowned writer Ismail Kadare published in the period 1960-1990, reveals that Orientalism was crucial in the construction of the communist New Man and in justifying the lonely road of Albanian communism, against the Ottoman past, the Ottoman landowning class of the beys, religious obscurantism, at the same time defending the enlightened and European character of the Albanian variety of Marxism-Leninism from Asiatic Russian and Chinese revisionists. The concluding section of the paper deals with contemporary Orientalism, after the collapse of the totalitarian system. The difficult transition of Albania towards democracy and market economy is legitimized by the political and intellectual elites
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through the slogan going to Europe/West. The new national identity is articulated by intellectuals in opposition to Eastern threats of communism and, especially since 9/11, against Islam. National Awakening The period from the League of Prizren (1878) to the proclamation of independence of Albania (1912) is known as the National Awakening (in Albanian Rilindja Kombtare). It was during this time that Albanian nationalists in Ottoman vilayets, in Istanbul and diaspora began articulating the idea of the nation and a national language and literature developed along the way. Similar to other Balkan nationalisms of the period, the Albanian nationalist intellectuals ideal was a modern national state according to the model of the advanced national states of the Western Europe. What they wanted to accomplish was, on one hand, to instill among Albanians a modern national identity, by disassociating especially ethnic from religious identification, through which frequently a Muslim Albanian passed for a Turk and an Orthodox Albanian passed for a Greek. On the other hand, Albanian intellectuals wanted to present before the European powers the credentials of the Albanians as an old European nation, capable for an independent and civilized life, but presently under the yoke of barbarian rule, in order to obtain their support for the nationalist struggle. To achieve this two fold aim, in their discourse they appropriated in large part the contemporary European discourses about the division of the humanity into races and nations. In this framework they made use of the post-Enlightenment Orientalist stereotype of the despotic Turk (irakman 2001), in order to oppose to it the image of Albanians as an old, indeed oldest, and pure European nation, longing to get rid of the Asian barbarism. In his programmatic work, Albania, Its Past, Present and Future, Sami Frashri wrote:
What are the Turks? a savage nation coming from the deserts of north asia with goads in their hands. By their ferocity they occupied the most beautiful countries of the civilized world; and after they robbed, overturned and burned them, today are holding them under such a poverty and tyranny that terrifies the whole world. One of these countries that are moaning for hundreds of years is poor albania, which suffers under this tyranny more than the others, because of the negligence of albanians. The Turks are like those peoples who passed on the earth like hail and snow. Where are today the Huns, Vandals, mongols, avars, Goths and so many savage peoples that once invaded half of earth by burning, overturning and shedding blood? The Turks had no right to live longer than their friends; they have had a gratuitous life till now, and have no right to
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live a day longer, because till now they have not founded a nationality and government like the whole world, but still wish to live forever with savagery. They are going to lose and must lose for the sake of the humanity; but what business do they have with us, that they want to take us with them in their demise? What business do we have with them? did we came [to europe] with them? never! We are not Turks coming from the deserts of asia. We are the oldest people of europe; on the ground of europe we have the right to our claims more than any other nation (s. Frashri 1999: 71-72).
Sami employs the then popular image of the barbarian and despotic Turks to make the case that the contemporary Turks have not changed even slightly since their brutal appearance in Europe centuries ago. As an Asiatic people, they have remained incapable of progress, demonstrated by the fact that they have not yet established a national state and government, as it is has become the rule in the advanced Western European countries. Against the mirror of the Turks, the Albanians are presented as autochthonous European nations, who have the right to independence and progress once they rid themselves of the Asiatic invaders of their country. Similarly, Samis brother, Naim, considered the national poet of the Albanians, defined the Albanian nations using the Orientalist mirror of the Turk. His major poem, The History of Scanderbeg, opens with an idyllic picture of medieval Albania, before the coming of the Turkish invaders, characterized by wisdom, peace, wealth, honor, hope, friendship and besa (N. Frashri 1967: I, 80-84). This golden age was interrupted when A big beast, Coming from Asia, Spread like a shadow. It was a damned nation, With cunning in tongue, With cruelty in eyes, With a satanic heart; Wherever came from or went to Brought mourning with him, Killed, severed and impoverished, Where he stepped, grass would not grow . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Civilization drowned in the sea Darkness rose like a cloud
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Spread on earth were ignorance, Blood, death, wilderness! (ibid.: I, 90-100, 109-112). During much of the poem, Naim juxtaposes the Albanian hero, Scanderbeg, a fifteenth century prince who led the 25-year war of Albanians against the Ottomans, with a series of the corrupted, Asiatic and despotic Turkish characters. It should be remembered that the cult of Gjergj Kastrioti Scanderbeg was at the center of the literary production during Rilindja, as the Albanian nationalists at the nineteenth century thought of their task as a completion of what Scanderbeg had begun. According to the Naims poem, when Scanderbegs father was forced to surrender Gjergj and the other sons as a hostage to the Turks, his closest friend and adviser protested by saying that the future princes and rulers of Albania will for sure be corrupted by the base and devilish Asiatic vices (ibid.: I, 397-400). The third song of the poem presents to us a view of Adrianopolis, the then capital of the Turks, depicted by Naim as a chaotic city with Asiatic inhabitants who looked as if they came directly from the gates of hell, all of them lacking in physical appearance and virtues. Over them rules sultan Murat, whose desire was to invade and plunder all of Europe, destroying its nations (ibid.: III, 35-40). Following the advice of his father, Gjergj and his brothers live apart from the Asiatic crowd and conserve their Albanian virtues (ibid.: III, 45-48). In vain their father, Gjon, sent for help from European kingdoms against the Turks; Europe at that time, says Naim, was in the deep sleep of ignorance and fanaticism; it was not like today, it took Rousseau and Voltaire for Europe to wake up (ibid.: IV, 17-28). In the meanwhile, the uprising of Albanians led by Scanderbeg, who deserted the Turkish army and returned to the fatherland, served to protect Europe from the fury and barbarism of the Turks: If it was not for Albania, The blind Europe, all of it Would be taken by Turkey, It would not be saved (ibid.: XIV, 265-268). Throughout the poem, the brave and virtuous Albanian hero sees himself in the mirror of the most degraded human beings on earth, sultan Murat, his son Mehmet and various generals of the Turkish army, including the Albanian renegade Ballaban Pasha, all beaten by Scanderbeg. This binary opposition served as a symbolism of the
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antagonism of the Albanian nation and the Turkish one in the eyes of Albanian nationalists in the 19th century. They freely made use of Orientalist stereotypes about the Ottomans, found in Western newspapers and travelogues of that time, to contrast the Turk to the imagined European, virtuous and pure Albanian nation, longing for liberty and emancipation form Asian yoke and barbarism. Both Sami and Naim Frashri were not Western travelers to the Orient, looking for adventure and exoticism, nor colonial rulers making a career by civilizing the natives. Istanbul was their home, more so than their place of birth in Southern Albania. But living within a cosmopolitan milieu shaped by the intellectual currents of European Enlightenment, Romanticism and nationalism (Ypi 2007) they appropriated the European Orientalist discourse for giving an answer to what they felt was their most fundamental and pressing question at the time: the fate of the Albanian nation at the threshold of the demise of the Ottoman empire. Interwar period An Albanian journalist of the interwar period once wrote that the Albanian state started its life formally in 1912 and de facto in 1920 (Koa 1999: 88). This is a correct observation, given that the proclamation of the independence of Albania in 1912 in the middle of the Balkan War was followed by partition at the hands of the London Conference, by internal strife and civil war in the internationally recognized Albanian state, then by its dismemberment by the armies of the European powers and neighbors during the First World War. Only after the Peace Conference in Paris reconfirmed the existence of the Albanian state, could the Albanian political and intellectual elites devote their energies to the state-building and nation-building processes, till 1939, when Albania was invaded again, this time by fascist Italy, at the eve of Second World War. During the short, but convulsive interwar period, Albania tried to modernize itself by adopting elements of governance and administration from the West. For a time it did experiment with democracy, until it ended up at the autocratic rule of president and then king Ahmet Zogu. Politicians and intellectuals of the period presented the modernizing reforms as the Occidentalization of Albania. They argued that the country had to leave behind the negative Oriental influences of the centuries of the Ottoman rule. The Ottoman heritage represented backwardness, ignorance, barbarism, in a word, a period of decline in the national destiny. Independence and the creation of the Albanian state were
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seen as the opportunity to cure the Eastern influence and to catch up with the Occident, where nationalist intellectuals believed that Albanian people belong. The journey from East to West was a journey from barbarism to civilization. Upon crowning king of Albanians, Zog declared to a foreign journalist that Albanians were centuries behind the civilized Europe and that he was resolved to guide and teach his people the Western way of life (Fischer 1996: 182). The opposition, presenting itself as the true modernizers, did not think this way. Fan Noli, a staunch rival of Zog, used to mock his Western pretensions by calling him the clown of progress, Oriental and anadollak (see Noli 2003: 292-3). In the Albanian Orientalist discourse of the period and afterwards the word anadollak meant both an inhabitant of Anatolia (i.e. the Turk) and someone that subscribes to old and backward mores, who is rude, dumb and at the same time despotic. It should be recalled that also the word Turk in the usage of the Ottoman elites in Istanbul before the nineteenth century retained the meaning of ignorant peasant or nomad of Anatolia, often with derogatory connotation (Kushner 1977: 2). Thus, Albanian politicians and polemicist in the twentieth century, when speaking of anadollak were referring to Orientals inside, those persons continuing the old habits of the Ottoman period, having a backward mentality and obstructing the path towards modernity and West. An explosion of Orientalist discourse occurred in the middle of 1930s. This was a period when the regime liberalized its control over the press and allowed some criticism of the government and the bureaucracy, but not of the king and the royal family. By making this move, King Zog was trying to strengthen the internal legitimacy of his rule in the face of the suffocation by Mussolini whose aim was to turn Albania into an Italian protectorate or dependency. The opportunity was exploited by young intellectuals, who in the absence of political parties or other legal political organizations, made use of the columns of a plethora of journals and magazine to present their views and programs for the modernization and progress of the country. Despite differing viewpoints, they had in common the fascination with the West and were worried about the place of Albania in a fast-developing Europe. This was the master topic of the debates. The young intellectuals, most of whom have had a Western education or some other contact with Europe held different conceptions of West (Elsie 1997: 365). For some it was represented by the rising power of fascism and they called for a disciplined Albanian society under the enlightened dictatorship of the king. Others, while venerating the technical achievements of the West were critical of the social inequalities generated by capitalism and aggravated by the Depression and of
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the imperialist policies of the European powers towards developing nations. Often employing an Aesopian idiom to escape official censure, these left-wing intellectuals pointed to the danger that fascist Italy represented to Albania. Nevertheless, the common denominator of their discourses was the Orientalist strategy of demonizing their opponent. The latter might be corrupt officials and bureaucrats, the class of beys - big landowners who followed the old despotic ways of the Turk - the bigoted clerics and obscurantists of religion, or the lazy mentality of the common people. Emblematic of the Orientalist discourse of the period was an article by Krist Maloki, Occidental or Oriental, appearing in the Catholic review Hylli i Drits in 1937. Reviewing the contemporary debates in the press, he argues that a battle line passed across Albanian society.
The toughest war that waits the albanian youth is ante portas! This war differs from other because it is directed against an invisible enemy, but which is very dangerous for the endurance and salvation of the nation. The future war is a war of albanian youth against an enemy which lies within its own heart, it is a war of the creative mentality against the destructive mentality, it is a war of an outlook of light against an outlook of darkness, and it is a war of albanian Occidentalism against albanian Orientalism (maloki 2003: 638).
In this war it is the duty of the intellectuals is to reveal to the youth where stand its trenches and the armies tents (ibid.), therefore Maloki goes on to delineate the two opposing mentalities. The Oriental mentality is part of the Oriental Albanian personality. An Oriental Albanian is foremost one who leads a lazy life. He does not take care of others and like a parasite satisfies his needs by sucking from the social body (ibid.: 639). Second, he is devoid of ideals and moral principles and he is ready to sacrifice everything in order to gain richness, goods and positions; his only ideals are sponging and the office, consequently, when needed, he can pass for a patriot or traitor, monarchist or Bolshevik, progressive of reactionary (ibid.). The Albanian Oriental is a lonely wolf, he has no sociability and the only society he knows is the company of wolves who hunt together but also tear out each-others throats. Unlike other intellectuals who seek the origins of Albanian Orientalism in Asia, the Ottomans or in Islam, Maloki argues that its roots lie even farther in history, in Eastern Christianity and Byzantium. In the fateful year 740 A.D. the Roman Empire was divided in two and the Albanians fell under the jurisdiction of the Byzantines, whose corrupted bureaucracy has rotten their national-collective and aristocratic virtues. Even the collective spirit of the wandering Turks was corrupted when they took over the Byzantine
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Empire and continued its system of administration (ibid.: 640-641). The next type is the Occidental person, the one who sacrifices for a sublime ideal and the common good. This quality characterizes, says Maloki, the behavior of European peoples, such as the English, French, or Germans. Nevertheless, since the dawn of modern times, there are Europeans who do not conduct themselves in such a way any longer.
unfortunately, the history has taken a backward turn since the beginning of the last century [nineteenth century]. With the development of industry and the spread of trade without any limit, Oriental appetites and lust appeared in the midst of european peoples, the honest gods of innocence were overturned by the waves of greedy and heartless capitalism (ibid.: 643).
As a remedy to the Orientalization of Europeans, Maloki looks favorably to the latest collectivist and totalitarian ideologies in Europe, that aim, according to him, to forcefully make the citizens Occidentals once more, because true Occidentalism is condensed in the fulfillment of a duty that is in harmony with the self-sacrifice for a high social ideal (ibid.). Given this statement, it does not surprise that Maloki, in another article published a year before, rejoices that liberalism has not taken root among Albanians, because liberalism means limitless competition with every means, unscrupulous and heartless competition... in short an Oriental fraud [dallavere orjentale] (Maloki 2005: 162). He praises the geniuses of Hitler and Mussolini who have given new national ideals to the masses. Similarly he calls for the adoption in Albania of an authoritarian and collectivist regime, like those existing in Austria, Estonia and Italy. The example of Maloki reveals that Albanian intellectuals of the interwar period, while continuing the stereotyping of the Oriental Turk, and considering him as the significant other of the Albanian identity, increasingly turned to what they felt was the most pressing issue: the Westernization of Albanian state and society. Consequently, the Orientalization of internal elements of Albanian culture and segments of Albanian society was revealed as a useful tool. Orientalism helped to blur the difference between the national struggle with the social one: emancipation from the Orient meant overcoming and erasing the corruption of the long Turkish (and Byzantine) invasion of the Albanian nation.
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Communism During the communist period, two sources fed Albanian Orientalism. The first one was, of course, the tradition of national struggle for the liberation against the Turks. Rilindja Kombtare (National Awakening) was considered a foundation of the Albanian nation and the Turk continued to serve as a negative mirror to Albanian identity. The official historiography asserted that the Turkish invasion had severed the links of Albanians with medieval Europe, thus impeding the normal evolution of the Albanian society. The Albanian resistance under the leadership of Scanderbeg in the fifteenth century was presented at the same time as the defense of the European civilization. In the Gjergj Kastrioti Sknderbeu museum in Kruja, there is a glass map on which appear the phases of the Ottoman invasions in Europe. Beneath that a thick black iron chain represents the Turkish yoke. The caption of the panel reads: The Turkish invasion of the fifteenth century represents a second stage of the Arab invasion [in Europe] of the eighth century. As in Poitiers..., this time as well a danger threatened the whole European development. European development is presented as an internal, continuous feature of the continent, independent from what happens in other regions of the world. Outside the circle of civilization roam the barbarians, i.e. Arabs, Mongols and Turks who from time to time turn into a threat to European civilization. This threat must be repelled at any cost; therefore, the Albanian resistance to Ottomans takes on a European dimension. The second source was the Albanian version of Marxism-Leninism. Marxism, as a modernizing Euro-centric ideology already contains the germ of Orientalism. According to Marx, Oriental societies have to follow the lead of European ones. Despite the evils of colonialism, it was a necessary stage toward the world-wide spread of capitalism (Said 1978: 153-4; Mackie 2002: 93-5). The Bolsheviks also considered themselves a Europeanizing force amidst the Asiatic masses of Russian peasants, and Lenin and Trotsky considered Peter the Great to be their direct predecessor. Marxism-Leninism and Albanian nationalism were blended together to fill the of legitimacy following the breaking off of links with the Soviet Union and later with China, the main sponsors of Albanias communist modernization. As the country was entering a period of international isolation, which lasted from the 1960s to the late 1980s, the regime felt the need to emphasize the rightness of the lonely road of Albanian communism. The resistance to so-called Soviet and Chinese revisionism was linked to the previous traditions of Albanian resistance to the foreign invaders, first
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and foremost to the Ottoman Empire. In official doctrine, Albania was presented as a European communist country, which was confronting Western capitalism but also opposing the Eastern revisionism of the Soviet and Chinese communist parties. An image of Albania that stands stoically against the tempests of the times is constructed in the main literary products of Ismail Kadare during communist period. One may find in it a series of Oriental Others, against which Albanian identity is revealed, an identity formed around the motif of resistance. The first is the resistance against the Turk. In line with the strategy of external Orientalism, Kadare in his works delineates five moments of the Albanians relationship with the Turks. The first one is the moment of anguish: the encounter with the Turks, who are a menace not only to Albanians, but also to Europe. In some of his historical novels and poems, medieval Albania is represented as a normal feudal society at the edge of Europe, keeping continuous relationships with the rest of the continent. The Turks who have arrived to the doors of Albanian principalities want to turn this world upside down. A character in one of the novels, a Catholic Albanian priest, looks with terror at the territory across the border held by the Turks and to himself in aberration says: A few steps away from me begins what they call the Islamic realm. A few steps away begins Asia (Kadare 1981a: 221). The same character in a conversation with a European monk on his way to Byzantium mentions the common danger of the Turks and the later thoughtfully replies: Yes, where you stand is the edge of Europe (ibid.: 172). The moment of Ottoman invasion is the moment of the Asiafication of that part of Europe. In a poem about the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Kadare writes: Alas, the great peninsula dawned as Europe and set as Asia (Kadare 1981b: 320). The Turkish invasion stops the development of history itself; in describing the signing of the vassalage of some Albanian princes to the Turks, he writes:
The Turk did not touch them. nothing had changed, except one thing, which seemed small, trivial... It had to do with the date at the top of the letters. Instead of the year 1379, they, in accordance to the Islamic calendar - and this was one of the few demands of the Ottomans - had written: hijri 757. They were so miserable! They had turned the clock back six hundred years and still laughed and joked. What a horror! (kadare 1981a: 230).
The Ottoman invasion has transferred Albania and the entire Balkans from Europe to Asia and backwards as well. Next comes the moment of uprising, the period of Scanderbeg, best captured by Kadare in his novel in the novel Kshtjella (The Castle), which tells about an Albanian castle surrounded by the Ottoman army, but also
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parallels the image of socialist Albania surrounded by capitalism and revisionism in the twentieth century. A homogeneous group of Albanians stands opposed to the heterogeneous hordes of degenerate and fanatic Asians. One anonymous defender at the walls looks at the enemy camp and speaks for his people:
Below was asia with all its mysticism and barbarism. We looked at that dark sea and thought that that was their world, their way of life they wanted to bring to us, together with the chains of servitude (kadare 1981c: 9).
The resistance of Scanderbeg is followed by half a millennium of Ottoman rule. For Kadare this is the moment of darkness, which he illustrates through the story of Haxhi Milet, a messenger from Istanbul who brings half a million of headscarves [ferexhe] to cover up all the women and girls in the Balkans. In another work, he claims that
The Turkish invasion is the biggest material and spiritual catastrophe of albanians in our entire history. It is the heaviest drama ever experienced by the albanian. It was not only the invasion. It was much more, much deeper, much graver, and irreparable than that. The whole world was overturned, with its castles, borders, freedom, economy, worldview, language, mores, and art. It was the apocalypse in the pure meaning of the term (kadare 1981d: 146-7).
The moment of dawn represents the beginning of the break of Albania with the Ottoman Empire, the past, and backwardness. It is at the same time the hope that Albania will turn to Europe. This is the time of the great ayans, among them the most famous Ali Pasha Tepelena, who tried to rule independently from the sultan. They seem to continue the struggle of Scanderbeg, but they cannot accomplish his deed. The reason for their failure is that they are Orientalized rulers, thus not very different from the sultan they wished to replace.
and people murmured that scanderbeg was one of the greatest men of european Renaissance, not only because he was a great strategist, but, foremost because he undertook a new action in his time: the successful uprising of a state against a superstate. and this according to them was not only a big idea, but a universal one. By contrast, he, ali Pasha has risen up against the emperor not for great idea, bur for material interests and misty ideas (kadare 1981e: 103).
The moment of deliverance comes when, at last, Albania wins the independence and escape from the throes of the Oriental forces, which strive to keep her attached to the East. Orientalist strategies are employed in Kadares work to portray Khrushchevs Soviet Union and Mao Tse Tungs China, both of whom are held responsible by Enver
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Hoxha for adulterating the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, whose only true bearer in Europe has remained Albania (Hoxha 1982: 789-90). Upon betraying MarxismLeninism, the revisionists have turned away from the road of reason, Enlightenment, and progress, and have become backward. To Albania, the pressure of Khrushchev to follow his political course is no different from the threats of capitalism and the previous empires the country has survived. No surprise then that, to the Albanian poet, the sickle on the Soviet flag assumes the same significane as the Ottoman crescent (Kadare 1981f: 214). To another character, an Albanian literature student in Moscow during the 1960s, the whole atmosphere betrays the return of Oriental despotism. The dawn of the day, symbolizing the dawn of the first and biggest socialist country, seems to be the beginning of an Oriental darkness, which he, with the Turkish word for evening, aksham [Albanian spelling of Turkish akam]:
Aksham, - I though, - what a marvelous word! Tonight is just aksham. It is not evening, nor soir, still less vjecher, but it is aksham. Aksham over the frozen Russian steppes, over the telephone of the night watchman, over the cities, kolkhozes, the memoirs of the civil war, snow, over the soviets of the sixteen republics. Aksham over the most expansious state in the world (kadare 1981g: 263).
Similar tropes are employed by Kadare in his major novel about the break up of relations with China, The Concert at the End of Winter. One of the central characters is Mao Tse Dung himself, who, together with his wife, Jiang Qing, is planning the sinefication of the whole world, so they can become its rulers. Maoism is presented by Kadare as an opium that will stupefy the peoples of the world. As long as Albania is the only European ally of communist China, they want to use it as a base for the sinefication of Europes brain;
If you stupefy europe, then you have stupefied the whole world. The brain of europe is the worst (kadare 1988: 124)
his wife had taught Mao. Albania would be the first European country to be sinefied, to be followed by other countries and this would be the first colossal victory of Asia over Europe. The millennial revenge (ibid.: 55-6). Mao wants to succeed where the Ottomans failed. If one looks for a Marxist reasoning or strategy in this plan, he is searching in vain, because the true inspiration of Mao is not Marx but Genghis Khan. Not to build something new, but to destroy, erase everything that (European) reason has created (ibid.: 123-4). But Enver Hoxha, the positive character of the novel unmasks the evil plan of Mao Tse Tung and saves the country and the whole Europe
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from the threat coming from Asia under the disguise of the newest revolutionary doctrine. Maverick Albania was again serving Europe, not only by carrying the torch of true socialism, but also by keeping Asian barbarism at arms length. The Concert at the End of Winter was a response to the political changes in Europe during the Gorbachev era. Dissident writers from the Central European countries were calling out to the West not to forsake the kidnapped Europe, in Kunderas terms. Kadares novel, despite its praise of Enver Hoxha and its scorn at Western capitalism, should be read in this light. In Albania, the late 1980s were a time when the totalitarian state was experimenting with a top-down liberalization of the country by which the party leaders wanted to win back the dissatisfied intellectuals. Like the intellectuals of Central Europe, Kadare hoped that Western Europe would be grateful to Albania for dispelling fears from a Soviet or Chinese threat in her neighborhood, despite that Albania had one of the harshest dictatorships and was arguably the most isolated state on the continent. Having observed the uses of external Orientalism in the works of Kadare, we can turn to his portraying of the Oriental categories within socialist Albania. Again, in this respect his work can be taken to exemplify the outlook of the official ideology at that time. The Oriental characters in his work are typically members of the old overthrown counter-revolutionary classes, kept in check by the class struggle, but who hope that one day will come to power again. They are presented as supporters of Eastern forces. While the communist regime, objectively, is a protector of the best traditions of European civilization, the Albanian bourgeoisie hopes to regain its lost power through the help of revisionism. When she hears of the break up of relations with China, Nurihan, an old ex-bourgeois woman, is filled with joy: Whence arose this blessed wind that is reviving us all? Far, far away. The desert of Siberia. Nurihans oasis! (Kadare 1981h: 25). One of the representatives of the old classes goes so far as to learn the Chinese language and to turn into an authority on Maos work, because he thinks that no one in this century has done more for the overthrown bourgeoisie than Mao (Kadare 1988: 385). He exclaims that he likes more the socialism of Mao then pure Western capitalism:
no matter how absurd it seems, between the West and the chinese I would chose the chinese, and this is not because I dont love the West, on the contrary, I want to have it in a more safe form...a West in socialist clothes would be more protected, more truthful than the naked, authentic europe. such a West do we need, a deceptive and masked one, otherwise we will always be in danger. Besides, the West might not like us any
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more, we are old, we are changed, we are no more fit for the authentic europe... Our only chance is the chinese (ibid.: 652-3).
As the work of Kadare demonstrates, Orientalism was present in cultural and intellectual productions during the Communist regime in Albania. Of course, contemporary Europe and the West remained despised entities, but one can find positive references to European enlightened revolutionary traditions, whose heir the Albanian communists considered themselves. If the national resistance tradition of Albanians, Communism and revolution were progressive, then the Turks, counter-revolutionary forces, including the Soviet and Chinese revisionist and the representatives of the old classes were the enemy and they were often portrayed through Orientalist strategies and themes. Communist Albania was not emulating the West, as it presented itself as the model for other countries in the future, but surely it was rejecting the backward, retrograde and, arguably, Oriental past. Transitional Albania Since the democratic revolution of 1990-91, Albanian identity has been reshaped by the work of intellectuals in the new context of transition, also under the foreign influences that flooded a country that had been almost totally isolated from the world for a quarter of century. In contemporary discourse, the transition is thought to include the period between the fall of communism and the integration of the country into the European Union (EU). Two of the most popular slogans, encapsulating the desires of the masses in the years 1990-91 were Freedom, Democracy, and We want Albania to be like Europe. In dominant political and intellectual discourses integration in the EU is considered as a telos of historical progress, a view is also stimulated by the Brussels bureaucracy. Indeed, the signing of the Association-Stabilization Agreement of EU with Albania in 2006 was greeted by political analysts and social scientists in the country as an inaugural end of the transition period. With the start of the process of Albanias acceptance to NATO on 4th April 2008, the government sponsored the printing of leaflets which read: Albania in NATO. Now it is secure in a European future. Critics maintain that the abuse by the politicians of the integration motif as an end in itself and not a means to other ends, points to a moral crisis of the political elite (Feraj 2003: 26-33, 38-41). In a sense, integration has been sanctified up to the point that one cannot argue or criticize it without being treated as blasphemous; the more popular desperation with the political situation of the country continues to rise, the more EU integration is seen as the only way of salvation. Thus, the goal of integration cannot
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be contested and its discussion remains beyond the limits of public debate (Kajsiu 2006: 7). Meanwhile, repeated surveys show that integration to EU is associated by the overwhelming majority of citizens with the free movement of people across borders, reflecting popular disdain over the tight visa regime of the EU with Albania and the wish of many Albanians to leave the country for a better life elsewhere. During the years of transition, intellectuals have considered the integration of Albania to the EU (and NATO) within an identitarian framework. In this intellectual discourse, Albanians are described as an ancient people of European stock who have always wished to be a part of Europe and Western civilization. The blame for Albanias exclusion from Western development for many centuries is placed upon a series of Eastern others both outside and inside Albanian society. The period of Albanias rule by the Ottoman Empire (sometimes inclding the prior period of Byzantine rule as well) is still taken as the most Oriental portion of the countrys history and serves as a standard against which to judge the subsequent history of the Albanian state. In this respect, contemporary Albanian Orientalism is the continuation of that of previous periods, but with the important difference that the modernization process under the Communism is in toto included in the rubric of East. Now the East is the thread that links the Ottoman Empire with the failed communist modernization of the country. The Turks, Russians, Chinese and Albanian communists are treated together as part of an Eastern front that has strived to detach Albania from the West/Europe. Another difference of contemporary Albanian Orientalism with that of the previous period is its strong emphasis on Islam as representing a new danger, reflecting the global atmosphere created after 9/11 and the war on terror. The National Awakening in general did not discuss Islam as an issue because of its motto that Albanians religion is Albanianism. Islam was present in the Orientalist discourse of the interwar period, but it was downplayed as a remnant of the Ottoman past and, at most, as a period that applied cultural breaks on Westernization. During Communism, Islam, alongside Albanias other religious traditions, was considered as a tradition of bigotry and as a perpetuator of ignorance, against which communism was to educate the atheistic New Man. Only after the fall of Communism did Islam assume the role of the new Other with which Albanian society had to struggle with. Although freedom of religious practice has been re-established in Albania, still a major part of intellectuals consider Islam, with its public rituals and practices, as strange, exotic, Asiatic, ignorant, backward, a breach of secularism and religious tolerance, and for some, even as a possible bridge for bringing terrorism to Europe. By insinuation, the true religion
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of Albanians is thought to be Christianity, especially Catholicism, foremost because it links Albanian history and culture with that of Western Europe. Orientalism and fear of Islam are enhanced in public discourse by what the poet Ervin Hatibi calls the forced Islamization of the opponent (Hatibi 2005: 233-238), meaning the use by politicians of Islamic symbols and names to denigrate their rivals, through associating them with backwardness, ignorance, terrorism, in a word, with generalized evil that Islam implies. The media also discusses Islam under the rubric of paranoia and the danger of Islamic terrorism in Albania (Bumi 2004: 75-6). In the following, we will look at some works by Albanian intellectuals and their use of Orientalism to defend the right of Albania to a place in Europe/West. In 1992, the historian and literary critic Aurel Plasari published a short book, The Line of Theodosius Reappears: Which side will Albanians choose? [Vija e Teodosit rishfaqet: Nga do tia mbajn shqiptart?]. This was the period when the last Communist government fell and was replaced with Albanias first non-Communist government since 1945. But it is also the time when Yugoslavia was disintegrating mired in nationalist wars and the Albanian-inhabited Yugoslav province of Kosova was under the police rule of Belgrade. The book opens with the observation that the transitions in Eastern European states are occurring in two speeds: Central Europe is leaving communism in a peaceful way, while in the Balkans wars are erupting and the transition is proving to be violent and calamitous. Even within Yugoslavia, a line is appearing between, one side, Slovenia and Croatia that are more progressive and, on the other side, Serbia, which is appealing to retrograde nationalism. How can one explain these differences? The key to understand it, according to Plasari, is the different historical fates of the peoples in the region. Some have been for centuries under Western Latin and German cultural influences, while others under Eastern Orthodox and Ottoman cultural ones. This divide geographically corresponds to the fateful line drawn by the emperor Theodosius in the year A.D. 393 to divide in half the domains of Rome, in order to rule them more efficiently. Since then different cultures, mentalities, indeed total historical fates, have formed in the two sides of the line. The Albanian inhabited lands were cut in two parts and the historical destiny of Albania, says Plasari, has always oscillated between West and East. To resist the pressure of the Byzantine and Slavic worlds, the Albanian medieval princes turned to Catholicism and the latter served as the backbone of the state of Scanderbeg opposing the Oriental menace of the Turks. The later conversion to Islam of a part of Albanians meant that they lost the epicentric force needed for the establishment of their nation-state: Not belonging to
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a single religion, especially not to a Western religion, Albanians would not form their own national culture, which would have kept them united around itself, as a nation (Plasari 1992: 22). The clash between West and East was a determining factor that delayed the national awakening of Albanians. Their turn towards the West was the determining factor that established the nation-state in twentieth century. To this end helped the fact that a minority of Albanians had conserved the Catholic religion and at crucial moments, they were able to win the sympathy of the West. The West-East clash determined the front-line between Albanians during World War II and afterwards: Communism spread among the Orthodox Christians and Muslims, but with much difficulty among the Catholics. The eradication of the Catholic clergy by the regime of Enver Hoxha meant that Communist Albania was severing its ties with the West and was embracing the East. The rule of Hoxha was not simply Stalinism, but a Stalinism of the Orient (ibid.: 50-1). Now that Communism is over, Plasari warns against a new danger, Islam. According to him, if by uniting Albania with Kosova, one hopes for the creation of an Islamic republic from the Gulf of Arta to Danube, this will be interpreted as a move against the West and Albania will find itself isolated once more (ibid.: 52). It is the case; he says in a later work, that the idea of Europe was gestated at the time of the Crusades, through a symbiosis of the continent with Christianity (Plasari 2005). Under these conditions, Islam will always be the Other to Europe. Among Albanian intellectuals, Plasari, serving now as the director of Albanian National Library, is one of the most ardent supporters of Huntingtons thesis of the clash of civilization. The events of 9/11 have proved Huntington right, he says in an article published in the first anniversary of these terrorist acts (Plasari 2002). He is also the Albanian translator of Oriana Fallacis The Rage and the Pride (2002), the original version in Italian written immediately after 9/11 and considered by many as a work of bigotry with racist overtones against Muslims in general, including the Albanians. But in the introductory text to Fallacis essay, Plasari invites the Albanians to bow with gratitude before Fallaci and to kiss her hand, for she has written the naked truth, without hiding behind political correctness (Baleta 2002: 11-2). But, lately he has criticized Huntington for leaving outside the West the Orthodox Europeans. In a move that revises his own thesis in Line of Theodosius, he claims that the Orthodoxy doctrine first spread in the Balkans not from Constantinople, but traveled from Rome towards Constantinople, until the emperor Justinian, of Illyrian origin, proclaimed it as the true faith in the Church of Saint Sophie. According to Plasari, with the entry of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU, the misperception of Orthodox Christianity as an
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Eastern religion will be finally be corrected (Plasaris 2005: 103-4). Another supporter of Huntington and associate of Plasari is Piro Misha, a writer and publisher. In 1997 he published a book of essays titled Searching the Roots, or the Return of Albanians in History [Duke krkuar rrnjt ose kthimi i shqiptarve n histori], where he retakes the thesis of Plasari about the destiny of Albanians between two clashing civilizations. The author remembers that during a visit in the city of Prague he is overtaken by a sensation of historical continuity, something he doesnt feel in Albania. On the contrary, what he experiences in Albania is historical discontinuity. He asks why there are no threads that connect contemporary Albanians to the ruins of Butrint, the churches of Voskopoja, or the icons of the mediaeval painter Onufer, and he finds the answer, unsurprisingly, in the Turkish invasion of the country (Misha 1997: 2-8). Being in between two worlds, the West and the East, is the most determining factor in the history of Albanians, according to Misha. In his account, like that of Plasari, the short historical period from the decline of the rule Byzantine and Serbian Empires in Albanian territories and their invasion by the Ottoman Empire, is the golden age of the entire Albanian history. The reason is that at that time the Albanians were developing at the same pace of Western Europe, before being interrupted for five centuries by the Ottomans. With the arrival of the Ottomans, Albanians entered into a dark tunnel, at the other end of which they came out Islamized, Orientalized, and with a broken identity:
These centuries [of Ottoman rule] constitute a continuous and dramatic degrading process of the whole [albanian] society, of all its structures, a continuous penetration, at times brutal or peaceful, of the civilization of the invader in all the tissues of society, by reversing, fighting, erasing, suppressing and distorting to a large extent the previous civilization they found there (ibid.: 28-9).
During the Ottoman period Albania was detached from the mother continent and become a frontier zone of an empire whose heart was so far away, in Asia (ibid.: 30). Misha says that the isolation the country at this period made possible the existence of the variation of Albanian autarchic communism (ibid.), which he considers an amalgam of Russian Stalinism, Chinese radicalism, Byzantine mentality and Oriental despotism (ibid.: 43). At last, in the present times Albania is open to the West, but Misha is worried that the double-faced identity that Albanians have formed in the last centuries will not be appropriate to integrate them into Europe. The main danger to integration with Europe is the contamination of Albanian traditional versions of Islam with the Islamic
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ideas and currents coming from Arab lands: A country like Albania has no interest to be perceived as Islamic. This is especially true if one takes into consideration the contemporary world context! Albanian Islam is and must remain an integral part of European civilization (Misha 2003: 127). In other words Misha accepts the opening up of the country to outside influences, except for the religion of Islam, which should remain in a kind of national quarantine, vaccinated against Arab influence (see Hatibi 2005: 124). This is because the opening up of Albania should be only toward one direction and it should close its doors forever the East, so as to give up its centuries of identitarian vacillation. Mustafa Nano is one the most known political analysts in Albania. In 2002 he published a short essay Europe Destination X [Europa, destinacioni X], which offers an interesting example of the evolution of Orientalist discourse in transitional Albania. This is because while he follows the footsteps of Plasari and Misha, he nevertheless tries to deconstruct their Orientalism, by rejecting their historical teleology. According to him the binary opposition, West-East has turned into a commonplace clich in Albanian mentality. By classifying China, India, Russia, Turkey, Greece, Serbia, etc., in the East, the Albanians during transition are in fact projecting undesired phenomena in their transition to Others. So, in the Albanian mind China is identified with Communism, India with poverty, Russia and Greece with Orthodox Christianity, Turkey with Islam, Serbia as simultaneously as a Slav and Orthodox Christian country. In the same manner, Albanians identify with the West such things as capitalism, wealth, Catholicism and Protestantism. Albanians pretend to be part of the West, but they in fact possess all the qualities they project onto their Eastern Others (Nano 2002a: 6-7). To escape the present reality they search for historical ties that would bind them to the West. All this happens because, according to Nano, Albanians have always suffered from an identarian uncertainty and consequently they have not been able to develop in the last centuries a strong identification with their culture. Instead, their cultural identification is double-faced and weak:
like some of our forefathers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who, because of their weakness, uncertainty, and thin religious consciousness, had chosen to turn into muslims, but in essence remaining crypto-christians, nowadays we have chosen to be Westerners, while in essence we remain crypto-easterners (ibid.: 910).
Thus, Orientalism comes full circle. Nanos analysis applies the same essentialist method of Plasari and Misha. Nano, however, searches for a more secure basis for his brand of Orientalism: If we agree that by the East we will understand something
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disparate or opposed to the West, it should be accepted that we are Easterners in our roots (ibid.: 39). Nano says that Albanians, by claiming to be of Western history and vocation, in fact hide their real envy and desire: the wealth of the West. By expressing the wish to join Europe, they in fact only desire its riches (ibid.: 16). The mentality to be rich at any cost is common to all Eastern countries, and the public sphere of Albania is dominated by Eastern politicians and intellectuals who just pretend to be Westerners, argues Nano (ibid.: 43), in a tone that is similar to Maloki writing some seventy years before him. Even Nano cannot resist the temptation to delve into the question of Islam, and he does this in an article published the same year, which he himself admits, constitutes a variation of the same topic about Albanian identity that he has investigated in the above mentioned book. The article is titled Searching for roots, or searching for the self [N krkim t rrnjve, ose n krkim t vetvetes], which shows a resemblance to the title of Mishas book. However, resemblances do not stop here and continue in the argument of the article. In short, Nano writes that the Islamisation of Albanians occurred not because of external factors only, but also because of their perennial weak identity, which made it easier for them to abandon Christianity for the material goods that Islam offered to them. The same opportunism in going on today, because Albanians, attracted by the West, do not seem to feel any more an attachment to Islam. Anyway, the majority of Muslims are like me, i.e. not necessary atheists, but not Muslim in essence (Nano 2002b). Therefore the process of de-Islamization of the country is a natural one under the influence of the wealthy West. Consequently, Nano wants to revisit the thesis that Muslims constitute seventy percent of the population. At this point, one may ask why for Nano, Plasari, Misha and other secular, or even declared atheist intellectuals, problematize Islam in Albania? Why it is important for them to urgently reject at any cost that the majority of Albanians are Muslims? Arguably, because they identify Islam with an Eastern menace to the integration process with the West. They take for granted the incompatibility of Islam with Europe. In their view, an Albanian Islam, one that would be accepted in Europe, one without veils and long beards, without calls for prayer from minarets, without animal sacrifices - in short, a privatized Islam unseen in the public sphere, an invisible Islam, which in all respects will be a de-Islamized Islam. Similar concerns are not voiced about Christianity and its rites, as they see it as a normal religion, fit for the process of Europeanization of Albania. Similar sentiments reappear in speeches of Albanias high officials. Alfred Moisiu, then President of Albania, claimed before the Oxford Forum on November
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9th 2005 in London, that the true essence of Albanians is the Christian heritage, and if one scratches the surface of every Muslim Albanian, one is going to discover the Christian core lying underneath (see Brisku 2006). This concern with the Eastern identification of Albania was raised once more in the late polemic between two of the most distinguished Albanian intellectuals, the writer Ismail Kadare and the Kosova writer and scholar Rexhep Qosja. The polemic of press articles lasted for several months in 2006 and nearly all public intellectuals of Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, and the diaspora were involved. All this started when Ismail Kadare, in his European Identity of Albanians [Identiteti evropian i shqiptarve], expressed the concern that just when Albania was signing the opening of the Association Stabilization Agreement with EU, some intellectuals, among them Rexhep Qosja, were talking about the Albanian identity divided in half between West and East. The truth, according to him, is that Albanians are among the oldest peoples in the European continent, a founding people in its plane (Kadare 2006: 20). Arguments that speak for the Europeannes of Albanians are plenty, from geography; the IndoEuropean roots of the Albanian language and even race: the Albanian population, as that of the whole continent, is white (ibid.). The Ottomans were very severe in the countries of the enemy continent, because their declared aim was the destruction of the whole of Europe (ibid.: 24-5). Despite this, the Oriental culture of the invaders could not erase the essential Europeanism of Albanian culture. The Oriental poetry of some Ottoman-era Albanian poets, the bejtexhinjt, was full of homosexual and pedophile motives, it is interpreted by Kadare as part of an Ottoman strategy to effeminate Albanians, and because of that was rejected by them (ibid.: 30). On the contrary, the Albanians, together with the other Balkan people, were the agents of Europeanizers in the midst of Ottoman Empire:
The destiny demanded of the Balkan peoples, among them the albanians, without them or europe being aware of it, to be europes commandos in the heart of the Ottoman world. as such, they have always been, although painfully, at the roots of europe (ibid.: 62).
Although Qosja criticizes Kadares essentialist, even sometimes racist, approach to the question of Albanian identity, he nevertheless stays within the West-East and Christian-Islam confrontation paradigm. In addition, he betrays his Orientalist inclinations when he speaks of the undesired instances of non-Europe in the everyday politics and lives of Albanians. As negative instances of non-Europe among contemporary Albanians, he mentions the cultural traits inherited from primitive tribalism,
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totalitarian communism and the un-European remnants of Oriental despotism (Qosja 2006). The project of modernization of transitional Albania has as its horizon the integration into the EU. Consequently, contemporary Orientalist strategies of the intellectuals are the following. First, the Turk remains the essential Other of Albanian identity, and he is held responsible for detaching Albania from the mother continent, for backwardness and for Albanias befalling to a Communist dictatorship. Second, what during Communism was a continuous class struggle against the previous oppressive classes of property owners, clergy, etc., now continues as a moral sentencing of these people who made common cause with the Turk and oriented Albania towards the East. Third, Islam is considered, within Albanian Orientalist discourse, as an Eastern religion, and especially Islamic fundamentalism, sometimes called Arabic Islam, is seen as the next Oriental threat impeding Albanias path towards Europe/ West. Today, Islam condenses the external and internal Oriental Others of Albanian European identity. As a civilization or way of life different from the Western life, it can be interpreted as the newest incarnation of the Eastern menace to Albania. Given that a part of Albanians are Muslims and some of the later still continue to practice the religion in their life, Islam turns to the Oriental within Albanian society and provides the continuing historical link with the hated Turk. Conclusion Albania provides an interesting case for the study of Orientalism, because it demonstrates that Orientalism is a mainly a cultural discourse that enters and persists in various contexts and has neither fixed geography, nor any fixed subjects and objects. Said originally meant Orientalism to be a representation of the colonial peoples by European powers, an academic knowledge and cultural imagination interlinked with systems of colonial domination, but he warned that Orientalism is not synonymous with colonialism. Orientalism can be employed by colonial peoples to define themselves and others. It can also be employed in the absence of colonial experience and within Europe, as Balkan Orientalisms attest. Orientalism can be used to designate groups or traditions within a state or society, hence the term of internal Orientalism. Indeed, the only stable feature of Orientalist discourse may be the two opposing signifiers, West and East, and this opposition serves as a nodal point for the arrangement of a whole series of binary oppositions.
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Since the National Awakening period, in the last decades of nineteenth century to the transition period after the fall of communism, the project for the creation of a modern society, nation-state, and cultural identity has been framed along a West-East dichotomy. Intellectuals in different periods of Albanias modern history have conceptualized the modernization of Albania as an escape from East and a movement towards the West/Europe. During the National Awakening the significant Other of Albanian national identity became the Turk, the barbarian and Asian invader who was to blame for the regress that the ancient European nation of Albanians had undergone under its rule. In the interwar period, when the Albanian state achieved a relative stability and attempted meager modernization reforms that it could afford, intellectuals of the time called for the overcoming of the effects of the Oriental rule. They identified the struggle for the Occidentalization of the state and society as a struggle between Occidentals and Orientals. Some of these intellectuals ended up in desiring right or left wing dictatorships to revolutionalize Albania. Communist Albania presented itself as a modernizing country that had radically broken with the past class society. Despite that the West was the bourgeois and imperialist world, the Orientalist strategies served the purpose of othering those parts of the past, especially the Ottoman period, against which to create the image of the new Albanian man. Later, as Albania followed a lonely road towards socialism, Orientalism proved to be a useful tool to be employed against Russian and Chinese revisionism, as was the case with the literary products of Ismail Kadare. While communism Albania was on the track of European Renaissance and Enlightenment and moving ahead towards the future, Russian and Chinese communists were regressing towards Oriental despotisms of the past. In the years of transition, while the goal is the integration of the country with the EU and NATO, the communist past is itself orientalized and seen as a cultural consequence of Ottoman and Byzantine rule. Had Albania for centuries been part of the Western world it would have had another fate. Nevertheless, the intellectuals claim that Albania now has the chance to definitely turn to the West, but it has to overcome the next Oriental threat, Islamic fundamentalism, the struggle against whom is complicated by the existence of Albanian Muslims. Contemporary Albanian Orientalism, as it is the case with Orientalism in general, is based on binary, homogenizing and essencializing concepts that cannot serve to adequately understand the complex political and social dynamics of Albania and offers but a poor understanding of the contemporary world context (see Said, 2003). After a long isolation, Albanian society is open to a myriad of influences, something
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which was unimaginable two or three decades ago, when official doctrine put cultural and ideological issues in a fixed state. Orientalism cannot provide an answer to the challenges in a globalized world, given the fact that an opening to a part of the world and a hermetic closing towards another is simply not possible. Having its roots in the imperialist endeavors of European powers, Orientalism cannot but frustrate the Albanian project of building a democratic and free society, based on the respect of human rights and dignity for all. It is true, as explained above, that Orientalism is a constitutive part of the imagining of Albanian modern identities, but as Foucault reminds us to live in the modernity must be, foremost for intellectuals, to ascribe to an ethos or
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and at the same time the historical analysis of the limit imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them (1997: 319).
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The Relationship between Ottoman Cultural Legacy and Muslim Minorities: Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Bulgaria
ahmed Topkev*
The topic of this brief work is quite extensive simply because the goal is not to exhaust it, but to outline its three components and pave the way for further and deeper research. The main Ottoman cultural heritage in Bulgaria is presented first. Then the largest Muslim minorities and some of their more important issues are introduced. Finally, the priorities of the modern Turkish policy towards both previous matters are traced. Ottoman Cultural Heritage in Bulgaria In general, Bulgarian scientists studied the Ottoman period have sought to define an anti-Ottoman Bulgaria, one Bulgaria of resistance and rebellion (Lory 2002: 9). Among the Bulgarian authors rare are those who really accept the idea of Ottoman influence on Bulgarian culture (Lory 2002: 11). This initial underestimation of the Ottoman culture, which today remains an axiom, allows Bulgarian researchers to avoid the question of Ottoman cultural influence (Lory 2002: 12). And yet, it cannot be denied that during its presence and rule in todays lands of Bulgaria from 1396 to 1878 the Ottoman Empire created a myriad of cultural heritage, which is bequeathed not only to Muslims, but to all citizens within the country and which, to this day, continues to serve the needs of Bulgarian citizens, to be a popular tourist attraction and to evoke admiration. The present part aims to describe, in a general way, the main Ottoman inheritance in the various fields of life such as architecture, economy, everyday life, spiritual life, language, as it should be pointed
*lecturer, Higher Islamic Institute, sofia. 183
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out that each point may be subjected to a separate and more exhaustive research. The huge stock of Ottoman literature and archives preserved in the Bulgarian National Library St. Cyril and Methodius will also be mentioned as a particular case of Ottoman heritage.
Ottoman architectural heritage

Ottoman architectural heritage in the Bulgarian lands includes official, religious and administrative buildings, and buildings for civil use: public baths (hamams), commercial buildings, those for giving shelter, bazaars, caravansarays, inns ... (Lory 2002: 110). Muslim religious monuments are numerous and are one of the most enduring monuments from the Ottoman domination not only in Bulgaria but also on the Balkan Peninsula. They reflect the major political, social, economic, social, demographic and cultural changes in the years of the Ottoman Empire. Professor Tatarla makes an interesting classification of the most important Ottoman mosques and the mosques as a whole in the Bulgarian lands, according to some basic trends in their appearance and spreading: Mosques of the period of the Ottoman arrival in the Balkans Mosques of the flowering period of the Ottoman Empire - from the middle of the 15th century until the end of the 16th century. Mosques of the period of decline of the Ottoman Empire (Tatarla 2003: 18-21). Mosques built after the Liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 (Tatarla 2003: 154). Mosques of the period of transition to democracy and free market economy (Tatarla 2003: 158). Here I will mention only several more interesting points with regard to the mosques from the Ottoman time in Bulgaria. The earliest Ottoman mosque buildings and inscriptions in Bulgarian lands, known by now, are from the late 14th century. The oldest preserved and functioning mosque in Bulgaria is the Eski Mosque (Old Mosque) in Haskovo from 1395 (Tatarla 2003: 55). Today most of the mosques from the Ottoman rule are nationalized, not acting, declared cultural monuments (Tatarla 2003: 168), turned into churches, museums, etc., consigned to oblivion, wallow in misery, and about to collapse completely and fully. Such mosques are: the Ibrahim Pasha Mosque in the city of Razgrad (nationalized and not functioning), the Buyuk Mosque in the city of Sofia (currently used as National Archeological Museum), the Bayrakli Mosque in the city of Samokov (cur-
The Relationshep between Ottoman Cultural Legacy and Muslim Minorities
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rently functioning as a museum), the Black Mosque (currently used as an Orthodox Church) in the city of Sofia, the Karadzha Pasha Mosque in the city of Gotse Delchev (declared a cultural monument, but completely forgotten and is about to collapse fully), and a lot more. Unlike them, the Banyabashi Mosque in Sofia, built in 1576 by the eminent Ottoman architect Sinan, one of the few preserved Ottoman mosques in Bulgaria, at the same the only preserved and acting mosque in the capital of the country, almost always accompanies luxury travel guides to Sofia. In such a work the authors dared to publish the thought-provoking message Make haste to pray, before death surprises you (Kadiyska et al. 2006: 150), an inscription inscribed over the entrance to the hall of prayers.
Ottoman heritage in economy

Turkish-Ottoman movable and real property in Bulgaria the Waqf consists of religious buildings (mosques, dervish lodges, tombs or mausoleums) and profitable lands allocated for their costs, religious schools and libraries, religious and other belongings. (Lory 2002: 81-82). Rice is one of the main crops brought to Bulgaria by the Ottomans. The cultivation of roses was also introduced by the Ottomans (Lory 2002: 81-82). Even today Bulgaria is proud of the Rose Valley and known around the world for its rose oil. Here it should be noted the railway line Rousse-Varna, an Ottoman product of contemporary civilization, which some historians are inclined to undervalue. However, given that this is a very expensive investment in a crisis period of the empire in order to encourage investment to continue in this region, speaks volumes about the state that it did not differentiate between Anatolia and Rumelia. Of course, this line was of an undoubted benefit to the trade, economic development, and in general to the Varna and Russe areas (Akyaldaz 2002: 123-145).
Ottoman heritage in everyday life

In the Balkans, the connoisseurs of good meals are the Turks. Bulgarians learnt from them the most complicated recipes, as the Turkish names of various soups and dishes prove that (: soup; : stew or casserole; : dish), roasted in the oven (: moussaka or meat-and-vegetable hash; : kavarma or dish of highly seasoned fried meat), stuffed vegetables (: hot dish made of grape
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or cabbage leaves stuffed with meat and rice), roasted meat (: kebab; : meatball) or preserved food (: dried meat; : corned meat; : flat sausage), without forgetting the white small loaves, pastries and eastern sweets (: fast-food bread topped with sesame seeds; : pretzel; : baklava or sweet pastry; : Turkish syrup-soaked shredded sweet; : Turkish delight; : halva) and others (Lory 2002: 133). Lory also argues that yoghurt has a Turkish origin (Lory 2002: 132). Let me not forget that coffee was taken from the Turks (Ottomans) as well (Lory 2002: 135). Bulgarians inherited the taste for water as a beverage from the Ottomans. Indeed, the Turks are great masters of the fountains. They have the custom to gather, to try and rank the water with different flavors, as our tasters taste wine of different vintages. (Erdic quoted in Lory 2002: 135) For Bulgarians the cold and clear fountain is wealth to be envied (Lory 2002: 135). Let us finally note in relation to nutrition that in Bulgarian language a great part of the kitchen vocabulary, this sanctuary of home life, is of Ottoman origin. Even Bulgarian home, field belonging to the woman and less accessible to foreign influences, was quietly permeated by the Ottoman material culture over the centuries. Here are a few words as an example of the everyday vocabulary for which there is no Slavic equivalents: : pan; : pot; : jar; : box; : lid; : tray; : Turkish coffee-pot; : colander or sieve; : grater; : bucket (Lory 2002: 135).
Ottoman heritage in spiritual life of the Bulgarian people

The love for nature and the enjoyment from it are recognized features of the Turkish population. The love for greenery and flowing water is expressed also by the abundance of fountains and large ornamental trees in the cities. Harmony in nature is one of the most important elements of the Ottoman pleasure and the proverb states: Three things drive away wrath: flowing water, green grass and nice face. Bulgarians, no doubt thanks to the Turks, acquired the habit to organize outings or picnics (Lory 2002: 146). As to music, : bagpipes and : shepherd s pipe are real Bulgarian musical instruments, but the words themselves are also of Turkish origin (Lory 2002: 147). It should be noted the inheritance of a vicious practice from the Ottomans - to-
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bacco. Tobacco, the other pillar of the Ottoman pleasure was permanently planted as crop and engrained as a vicious habit in Bulgaria before 1878. The use of tobacco was introduced by the Turks in the late 17th century (Lory 2002: 147). Even some politeness formulas were borrowed from the Turkish language or were adapted to the Bulgarian language. Thus, : many greetings meets the Turkish ok selam; : you are welcome again, welcome again or come again meets the Turkish gene buyrun (Lory 2002: 156). The significant influence that Turkish language exerted on Bulgarian language cannot be hidden. The most important impact on the very structure of language to note is the semantic transition of verb forms in stories to express an action which the speaker did not witness. Tenses for indirect retelling enriched the verb system of Bulgarian with a whole range of nuances. In addition, Bulgarian acquired both suffixes which allow nouns to be formed, respectively for professions or abstract derivatives. The influence of Turkish language is felt most at lexical level. In 1929 Professor Tsonev listet around Turkish 2000 words in the literary language and Bulgarian dialects. Most of the words of Turkish origin are nouns and verbs; the adjectives and linking words are relatively less numerous. Turkish words often appear to have Bulgarian endings. Turkish vocabulary affected public and military life, as well as craft and agricultural tools, clothing, kitchen, human body and kinship (Lory 2002: 171). Along with all this, the Ottoman imprint remains clearly visible on the map of Bulgaria. Many names of mountains, plains, rivers, towns and villages, neighborhoods and streets across the country are of Turkish origin, and sometimes even more numerous than the Slavic toponyms (Lory 2002: 173). Cities such as Kazanlak, Kardzhali, Harmanli and Pazardzhik have retained their Turkish names until today, and Haskovo, Sevlievo have names adapted to the Bulgarian names (Lory 2002: 174). Bulgarians have made efforts to clean up the language of words of Turkish origin. Cleansing in the proper names is, of course, applied to the surnames. In the 30s of the 20th the (Native Speech) magazine indicated hundreds of family names (surnames) of Turkish origin, recommending that their holders replace them with Bulgarian names. Some patriots have translated names into Bulgarian, for instance, Mirazchiev into Naslednikov (in Turkish miras and in Bulgarian mean legacy). (Lory 2002: 174). The Ottoman past is often presented as a birth spot, prevented the country from going its light and virtuous path, which Bulgarians scarcely imagine. Undoubtedly, Bulgarians have reason not to want to deepen the issue of the Ottoman influence.
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Firstly, it represents an alibi, which partially exempts them from responsibility for their failures, particularly at apprenticeship in democracy (Lory 2002: 176). Lory takes the view that the study of the Ottoman heritage in Bulgaria has been rather onesidedly carried out, has been analyzed only through the eyes of Bulgarian historians who have negative attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire (2002: 183).
Ottoman archives in St. Cyril and Methodius National Library

Created in 1879, the Oriental Department of the National Library in Sofia preserves the biggest collection of Oriental manuscripts in Bulgaria, around 3800 volumes. The archival collection is third largest Ottoman archive in the world after the collections in Istanbul and Cairo, having around 1,000,000 archival documents in Ottoman Turkish and 5,000 in Arabic (Marcheva 2002: 69). For each historian and specialist in Ottoman history the collection of Ottoman archives in the Bulgarian National Library is an invaluable and indispensable source. Major Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria Most probably due to their very existence Muslim minorities in Bulgaria are regarded as descendants of the Ottomans, although many historians claim that Islam existed th on Bulgarian territory before the Ottoman conquest in the mid-14 century. For example, Lory argues that it cannot be denied today the presence of groups of Turkish origin on the Balkan Peninsula after the 7th century: Proto-Bulgarians (hordes of Asparukh and Kuber), Vardar Turks, Pechenegs, Kumans, Tartars, before the arrival of the Ottomans. Also, Islam is not unknown. Khan Tervel and Prince Boris wondered what to do with Saracenic books (2002: 47). Eminov claims that some of the Turkic tribes - Cumans and Pecenegs- entered the Bulgarian lands during the 11th century. While the Pecenegs were assimilated into the local population, some of the Cumans kept their scattered communities in the Rhodope and the Pirin Mountains. It was exactly there that they came into contact with some Muslim inviters from North Africa and the Middle East and embraced Islam (Eminov quoted in CEDIME-SE: 4). Pope Nikolay in his replies to Tsar Kaloyan in about 717 took a stand on the question of the sacred books of the Saracens. This shows that in Bulgaria since then Islam has been known. But, in fact, Islam entered Bulgaria and the Balkans during the Ottoman rule (Tatarla 2003: 63). Bulgarian historians, certainly, do not accept the hypothesis that Muslims lived in the Bulgarian
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lands before the 14th century to be able to present and develop their theory of forcible Islamization during the Ottoman rule. There are three main Muslim minorities in Bulgaria: Turks, Pomaks, and Roma or Gypsy Muslims. I would first like to draw your attention to the Pomaks in Bulgaria not only because I have a Pomak origin, but because their situation is most delicate and have always been an object of state assimilation policies. It is well-known that the Balkan-wide disputes on the origins of the Pomaks are endless. Because of the controversy about their origin, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey have all claimed Pomaks as their own. Scholars in each country have presented history to serve their own national myths about the origin of this population (Eminov 1997: 101). Bulgarian historians argue that Pomaks are Muslim today only because they were forced to convert to Islam by the Ottomans during the seventeenth century. Greek historians have their own version too. They state that the Bulgarian Muslims are descendants of the Thracians and the Ancient Greeks (Zhelyazkova quoted in CEDIMESE: 5-6). Thus the claim goes that they were first Hellenized, then Latinized, Slavicized, Christianized and finally Islamized. Those of them who stayed in the mountains are pure descendants of these ancient tribes (GHM Report, www.greekhelsinki.gr quoted CEDIME-SE: 5-6). I personally support the Turkish historians and scholars who claim that Pomaks are of Turko-Cuman origin and that they were settled in Western Thrace, the Rhodope and the Pirin Mountains after the collapse of a Turkic Cumano-Peceneg Union in the 11th century (Zhelyazkova quoted in CEDIME-SE: 6). For example, Memisoglu calls them Pomak Turks and traces their origin to the Cumans who settled in the Rhodopes during the eleventh century. Moreover, he asserts that the Cumans were converted to Islam prior to the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans, presumably by Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East who made sporadic contacts with Balkan population from the end of seventh century on. When the Ottoman Turks moved into the Rhodopes during the fourteenth century the Cumans were already Muslims and aided the Ottomans in conquering the area. Christian Bulgarians called the Cumans pomagac (helper or collaborator). This name was later shortened to Pomak (Memisoglu quoted in Eminov 1997: 103). Thus, the Pomaks are perceived as the oldest Turkish population in Europe, as pure-blooded Turks (GHM Report on the Pomaks, www.greekhelsinki.gr in CEDIME-SE: 6). On the other hand, many other historians blame Turkish historians and scholars for having dispensed linguistic and cultural arguments and having emphasized the Islamic religion of the Pomaks as
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proof of their Turkish origin. In the censuses in Bulgaria from 1878 to the last one in 2001 there were no category ethnic group Pomaks. Therefore they identify themselves as Bulgarians or Turks. And this allows the Bulgarian state to call us Bulgaro-Mohammedans (Bulgarian Mohammedians) or Bulgarian Muslims. For me these two labels are offensive and I would like to have the ethnic group Pomaks as an option which I and all citizens in the Republic of Bulgaria may choose to identify themselves. It is known that the numbers are not unimportant and have always played a key role in giving rights to people and citizens no matter where all over world. Nowadays no reliable statistics are available on the number of Pomaks in Bulgaria. What is for certain about them is that today they live in compact communities in the Rhodope mountains in southern Bulgaria from the Mesta River valley in the west to the Haskovo-Kardzhali line in the east. A small number of Pomaks also live in several villages around Lovech on the northern slopes of the Balkan mountains. Some of these are families of Pomak activists: the inhabitants of the village of Hadzhijska, for example, were resettled there from the Rhodopes between 1948 and 1952 as a punishment for resisting government efforts to assimilate them. Although these families were given permission to return to their native villages in 1954, some chose to remain in their new communities. Compact Pomaks settlements are also found in the adjoining regions of the northern Greece and the Republic of Macedonia (Eminov 1997: 101). The changing attitudes of various Bulgarian governments towards the Pomaks are illustrated by a number of name-changing campaigns carried out during the twentieth century. They were forced to replace their Turkish/ Muslim names with conventional Bulgarian names four times this century, in 1912, 1942, 1962, and 1971-4, and allowed to reclaim their original names four times, in 1913, 1945, 1964 (partial restoration), and 1990. The name-changing campaigns of 1912 and 1942 were also marked by intense missionary pressure upon Pomaks to convert to Orthodox Christianity, and thousands were converted (Eminov 1997: 101). All the above indicates that the origin and history of Pomaks is unclear and obscure. Since I am not very competent in this field, I would like to urge historians and specialists, not only those present here, to do fair, impartial, unbiased research and once for all to clarify the origin of this population, to find their real roots, and thus to bring to an end the political games with Pomaks not only in Bulgaria, but also in Greece, Macedonia.
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The next major Muslim minority, which will be mentioned, are the Roma Muslims. Very little information is available on the Muslim Roma in the Ottoman Empire. This is due to the fact that the administration of the Empire was not organized according to the ethno-linguistic principle, but according to the religious principle (millets), and thus registration took place according to the subjects religion (CEDIME-SE: 6). Unlike Pomaks, Roma are recognized as an ethnic group. However, we cannot provide statistics for the number of Roma Muslims as well because the Roma population in Bulgaria is divided into Roma Muslims who speak their mother tongue Romanes, Turkish and Bulgarian language, and Roma Christians who do not speak Turkish but only Romanes and Bulgarian. Another reason for the impossibility to provide accurate statistics on the number of Roma Muslims in Bulgaria is that the Roma, in the same way as Pomaks, often describe themselves as either Turks or Bulgarians. Thus, by declaring themselves Turks or Bulgarians, Roma try to avoid the social stigma. What can be said about them without any doubt is that the Roma Muslims live throughout the country, although most lived in or near other Muslim communities (Eminov 1997: 72). The largest Muslim minority in the country are Turks. According to the results of the 2001 census, 746,664 Bulgarian citizens (or 9.4 per cent) identified their ethnic affiliation as Turks. In the district of Kardzhali in southeastern Bulgaria they were in the majority, with 61.6 percent of the district population. In the district of Razgrad in northeastern Bulgaria Turks made up 47.2 percent of the district population. Other districts with significant Turkish populations included Targovishte (35.9 per cent), Silistra (34.3 per cent), Sumen (29.1 per cent), Ruse (13.9 per cent), Burgas (13.8 per cent), Dobrich (13.1 per cent), Haskovo (11.2 per cent), Sliven (10.5), and Blagoevgrad (9.3) (National Statistical Institute, Ethnos). According to the last 2001 census in Bulgaria the total number of Muslims in Bulgaria is 966,978 or 12.1 per cent of the whole population (National Statistical Institute, Religion). They are predominantly Sunni, but there is a small group of Shiite Muslims, called Alevis (Alians) or Kizilbashi. The relations between the two groups are normal and relatively unproblematic. The religious practices of the Sunnis are more visible to the wider public than those of the Shiites (CEDIME-SE: 44). Regardless of their ethnicity, after the Liberation of Bulgaria all Muslims experienced and were subjected to many difficulties, many mass deportations to Turkey, other strict regimes, of which the most severe was communist regime. In general, since 1989 Muslims in Bulgaria have been enjoying many rights. They have no prob-
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lems with practicing Islam. The Constitution proclaims the freedom of religion and creed (CEDIME-SE: 46). However, Muslims are still far from being completely integrated into the Bulgarian society (CEDIME-SE: 46) because during the years of collectivization in the late 1940s and early 1950s the Muslim community as a whole was affected by the expropriation of the vakif (pious foundations) property. Collectivization affected also the privately owned land of the individual people. Deprived of their own property, Turks and Pomaks had to earn their living working for the socialist-style cooperatives. They were employed mainly in tobacco growing, as well as in other types of agricultural work and in the mining industries (CEDIME-SE: 15). Currently the situation has not changed. Muslims as a whole are still engaged in tobacco growing and other types of agricultural work, in the mining, construction and textile industries, and in other lowskilled jobs. And yet, the social gaps between Bulgarians and Muslims have become smaller, but little, over the course of the 1990s (CEDIME-SE: 46). After 1989 the defense of Muslim identity was pursued mainly at two levels. At the political level, the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was officially founded in 1990 with the aim to represent the interests of the Turkish minority and the other Muslims in Bulgaria. Since 1990, the MRF has been constantly represented in the Bulgarian Parliament. The party has a secular ideology, which defends Islam as far as it concerns the human rights of the Muslim population in Bulgaria (CEDIME-SE: 17). The leadership and the institutions of the Muslim community in Bulgaria defend Muslim identity at the religious level. Religious affairs are within the authority of the Supreme Muslim Council, the Chief Muftis office and the offices of the regional Muftis, the imams, and the local Muslim boards. Today, the highest body in the regulation of the Muslim affairs is the National Conference, which elects the Chief Mufti and the Head of the Supreme Muslim Council. The Supreme Muslim Council is the administrative body of the Muslim community. It consists of the Chief Mufti and the sixteen regional Muftis. The regional Muftis are subordinated to the Chief Muftis office which is focused not so much on the administration, but on the spiritual affairs of the Muslims. The Chief Mufti is considered to be the spiritual leader of the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria (Chief Mufti s Office, Structure). The restitution of the vakif property is very important for the ability of the Muslim community to finance itself and not to rely on subsidies from the state. Part of the vakif property already restored provides financial aid to some of the regional muftis offices
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as well as to the Sofia-based Chief Muftis office. However, the finances coming from that property and from the state are insufficient. According to the Denominations Act the state can allocate funds if demanded by the denominations in Bulgaria. The Muslim denomination has received 20 million leva (around $11,000) since the beginning of 1998, an amount, which Muslim leaders find highly insufficient (CEDIME-SE: 33). As to Islamic religious education in Bulgaria which is crucial for the development of Muslim communities in the country, it can be said that it consists of three secondary schools, located in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad and the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. The graduates from the secondary schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any study field. The Higher Islamic Institute is still not accredited by the Ministry of Education of Bulgaria because does not have its own building. This is how the non-reinstated property hinders the development of Muslim minorities. Apart from them, there are year-round and summer Quran courses (Chief Mufti s Office, Education). There are three newspapers in Bulgaria that focus on Muslim issues. These are the monthly Muslumanlar (Muslims), the publication of the Chief Muftis Office; the weekly Zaman (Time), which is the Bulgarian edition of the eponymous publication in Istanbul and the monthly magazine Umit (Hope), which is published by the Balkani Foundation chaired by a Turkish citizen (Yalimov quoted in CEDIME-SE: 42). There are no Turkish, Bulgarian Muslims or Roma private radio stations in Bulgaria. The only way information on Islam is spread is through the Bulgarian National Radios broadcasts in Turkish. These are broadcast twice a day for half an hour. The programs are prepared in Sofia and the signal is then transmitted to regional radio stations. However, religious topics are rarely covered (CEDIME-SE: 43). The Chief Mufti has the right to address the Muslim believers on national TV during major religious festivities. However, the procedure is quite complicated, since the Mufti has to write a special letter to the board of directors of Bulgarian National TV and to obtain their permission (Hadzhi quoted in CEDIME-SE: 43). The Chief Muftis Office and the Higher Islamic Institute have their own websites (www.genmufti.net; www.islamicinstitute-bg.org) that are still insufficiently developed and are only in Bulgarian, which in turn shows that the Muslims in Bulgaria have a long way to go in their development and improvement in the era of high technology and communications.
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Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy towards Bulgaria Bulgarian-Turkish relations in recent years has been characterized by dynamic and stable development based on accepted principles of international law, good neighborliness and mutual benefit. The base document for development of bilateral relations is the Treaty of friendship, good neighborliness, cooperation and security signed on May 6, 1992 in Ankara (Bilateral relations). It has been established practice of regular meetings of state and government leaders and foreign ministers of both countries. A significant number of visits have been made at high and the highest level over the last years. In terms of the visits of Abdullah Gul, Recep Tayyip Erdoan and Blent Arn to Bulgaria and respectively some Bulgarian leaders visits to Turkey the modern Turkish policy will be traced as regards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, its spiritual and secular development, Islamic religious schools, Ottoman architectural heritage, and Ottoman archives in the National Library. In recent years Turkish state and government leaders have repeatedly said that the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is a bridge between both countries Turkey and Bulgaria, have always shown a warm attitude towards it. First, during his visit to Bulgaria as Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on 12-13 May 2003 Gul was quoted as saying Bulgaria is our friend, neighbour, and soon will be our ally as well and also that the Bulgarian ethnic model is an example to follow not only in southeastern Europe, but also in the reconstruction of Iraq, and seeking a peaceful solution in the Middle East (Sahan 2003b). And his second visit to Bulgaria was covered in the following way:
after the informal meeting of NATO in sofia the Turkish deputy Prime minister and Foreign minister abdullah Gul, coming to Plovdiv by land, performed the Friday prayer at the muradiye mosque. abdullah Gul received information from the chief mufti mustafa alish and the reg ional mufti of Plovdiv Hasan ali about the historic mosque and its forthcoming restoration. On leaving the mosque abdullah Gl warmly and sincerely asked the gathered hundreds of citizens, How are you, my brothers? In this view many citizens could not hold their tears. (mehmet 2006a)
On his second visit, Gul visited the southeastern Bulgarian town of Kardzhali with a predominantly Turkish population, which was featured in the Bulgarian edition of
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Zaman newspaper. From the article we learn that the Turkish Foreign Minister was given a warm and affectionate welcome by the citizens of Kardzhali. Abdullah Gul who visited a church and the mosque in Kardzhali expressed best wishes that the local atmosphere is reflected in other areas of the world simply because tolerance in Kardzhali is an example for the whole world. The citizens did not have a memory of another Turkish minister of his rank having visited the town (Suleyman 2006a). Bulgarian Foreign Minister Solomon Passy s visit to Turkey on 26-27 May 2004 was covered in Zaman-Bulgaria by a material entitled with the words of the then and present Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin are a bridge in our bilateral relations (Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin). During the visit of Bulgarian Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev to Turkey on 17-18 January 2006 Erdoan once again stressed that
The Turkish minority in Bulgaria is playing an active role in the development of the relations between both countries and that it is the cause for establishing a common bridge of friendship. (eken 2006)
Arn also emphasized that the basis of good relationships between Bulgaria and Turkey are Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin. In an article entitle Aranc: Our bilateral relations are excellent. The Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly was also quoted as saying that:
With pleasure, we have witnessed how the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin are playing a major role in our bilateral relations and how they are increasingly being integrated into the political and social life of Bulgaria and how they contribute to the consolidation and development of the country. during this visit we have been convinced once again that the importance attached to Turkey is visibly growing in Bulgaria like it is in every country. (suleyman and Huseyin 2006)
The highly warm and caring attitude of the Turkish state and government leaders to the Turks in Bulgaria reached its zenith on 28 March 2008 during the visit of Erdoan to Kardzhali where at the meeting with citizens of Turkish origin gave them very clear messages. Here are part of his words:
We consider you a bridge in relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. Be devoted citizens of the country where you live. Of course, you will learn the language of the country where you were born, you will work for the future of the country where you live, but in parallel with that, you will keep your religious values, your language, cultural values, traditions and hand them down to the future generations.
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We consider the difference not disuniting, but one enriching feature. We call this unity in diversity. We come from such a civilization. We love people not because of their ethnic and religious affiliation, nor because of their public position, but only because of the creator. Our brothers who endured long years of severe suffering, today live in a free and democratic environment. Thanks to that they contribute to the economy, politics, prosperity, peace and security of Bulgaria. You are paving the way for alliances between the two countries. let the historical problems go down in history. let us pass on to the future not abhorrence and hatred, but love, peace and fraternity. You are loyal citizens to Bulgaria. The obligation of those citizens living in this country to be loyal coincides with the obligation of the democratic values to maintain their own ethnic, cultural and religious values. I am glad to see that a considerable path has been walked concerning the issue of studying Turkish as a mother tongue compared to the past. I believe that in this respect certain difficulties will be overcome and thus the desired standard will be achieved. You always have a special place in our hearts. Within the shortest time with the permission of God the almighty we will promote the change and development of kardzhali. kardzhali is always in our minds. (Tunca and alkac 2008)
Erdoan also stressed that Kardzhali has qualities to be an outstanding example for the whole world because different religious groups live together in friendship and brotherhood aiming at one goal. The mayor of Kardzhali Hassan Aziz in turn determined the arrival of Erdoan as a historic visit (Tunca and Alkac 2008). The second important pillar of the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey are the Islamic religious schools in Bulgaria. What should be underscored here is that the Turkish foreign policy is directed towards the Turkish minority, but nevertheless it concerns and is of benefit to all Muslims in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Bulgarian state nowadays tries to protect the traditional Islam in Bulgaria. This was done in June 1998 by the signing of an agreement between the directorates of religious affairs of Bulgaria and Turkey. The agreement, concluded on 12-15 June 1998 during the visit of Lyubomir Mladenov director of the religious affairs, Mustafa Hadzhi chief mufti, Hussein Karamolla chair of the Supreme Muslim Council at the invitation of the director of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs Mehmet Nuri Ylmaz, reveals interesting points about Turkish foreign policy concerning the Islamic schools in Bulgaria. The contract includes the following terms which Turkey has to fulfill:
The Turkish directorate of Religious affairs provides quality and reliable teachers for the schools.
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It provides specialists to expound and present Islam to muslims in Bulgaria in the period of the month of Ramadan and the sacrifice Feast days. The Turkish directorate of Religious affairs also sends hodzhas or specialists for the Quran courses in the summer months. It provides textbooks and materials for the Islamic schools in the country.
The Bulgarian Directorate of Religious Affairs in turn engages in assisting in the duty-free passage of the school materials and in providing visas for the teachers. This agreement is aimed at preaching not fundamentalism but real Islam. According to the needs of the schools the number of teachers may change, however, it is approximately 15 teachers. Regarding the sponsorship of the schools, the then and current Chief Mufti Mustafa Alish Hadzhi was quoted as saying that: We divided the schools between the regional muftis. We will try to solve the financial side with the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs and with the help of people. (Change in the Islamic religious schools!). For the time being the agreement in question has been abided by. On the second day of his visit, i.e. on 22 June 2006 the Chairman of the Turkish National Assembly made a visit to another secondary Turkish school in Bulgaria - the Druzhba private school. In his address to the students he said: You are children of Bulgaria and should work for the good of this great country and you will be a bridge between our two friendly and allied countries. I know that the Bulgarian leaders are pleased with you and I am here to congratulate you for that. On his leaving a student gave Arn a Bulgarian national flag (Suleyman and Huseyin 2006). The third pillar that the Turkish foreign policy includes is the Ottoman heritage and its preservation. Again, during the visits of Gul, Erdoan and Arn we learn that the Turkish state is directly concerned about the Ottoman legacy, takes concrete steps towards its protection and spares no effort and no expense to fulfill it. In May 2003 during his meeting with the then Chief Mufti Selim Mehmet Abdullah Gul said that he expects certain Waqf and mosques to be restored and also added
as we protect their monuments [in Turkey], in the same way we shall take steps towards the preservation of our monuments here. (sahan 2003a)
In July 2004 during the visit of Recep Tayyip Erdoan to Sofia there were talks between Bulgaria and Turkey on protection of cultural monuments. During a joint press conference held together with his Bulgarian counterpart Erdoan put on the agenda
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some indispensable questions for Turkey. He requested that the Turkish-Ottoman heritage in Bulgaria is preserved, Erdoan wanted concern to be showed for the cultural monuments and expressed bitter disappointment with the mosque Tash Kopru (Stone Bridge) in Plovdiv turned into a pub. As he said that during his mandate as mayor of Istanbul the Bulgarian church in Balat was restored and also that a church was repaired in Edirne. Erdoan added that he expects similar attitude towards the local Ottoman-Turkish monuments of culture. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha replied that he would engage in that (Sahan 2004). In June 2006 during his visit to Bulgaria the Chairman of the Grand Turkish National Assembly Blent Arn visited the Sofia Mosque where the Chief Mufti Mustafa Alish Hadzhi personally accompanied the guests and presented them the mosque (Suleyman and Huseyin 2006). During the same visit Arn and the delegation accompanying him went to the Friday prayer at the Muradiye mosque in the city of Plovdiv. Here met by the Plovdiv regional mufti Hasan Ali, they received information about the mosque. Before the Friday prayer Arn did not ignore the overwhelming desire of the citizens and made a brief speech. In his speech Arn said:
I want to give huge congratulations from Turkey. The neighborhood and cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey are at a very good level. The muradiye mosque, in which we are now, is approximately 700 years old. This temple has survived for years on end and has reached today. as you know, the Istanbul metropolitan municipality has authorized the Tayap company to restore the temple. This temple will soon be available at your service in a completely renewed look. (mehmet 2006b)
Arns visit to the National Library in Sofia in June 2006 shows that Turkey is not only aware of the priorities in its foreign policy towards Bulgaria and knows how to assert them, but also does not disregard the details about it. On the second day of his visit Blent Arn also visited the Oriental Studies Department of the National Library. It was reported that the department director Professor Stoyanka Kenderova emphasized that after 1930s, when the negative sentiments against the Ottoman Empire were prevailing, the Bulgarian state purchasing the Ottoman archives as secondary raw materials and subsequently realizing that these are important historical documents, kept them. Kenderova said that they are a in good dialogue with the Turkish counterparts and mutually explore the Ottoman archives (Suleyman and Huseyin 2006).
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As the guest delegation showed interest in the hand written works they were shown a copy of the Quran from the 16th century, a small-size copy of the Quran from the library of Prince Ferdinand, a catalog from the time of Sultan Selim from the Osman Pazvatoglu library of Vidin, and other exhibits which they carefully examined. The director of the Department of Oriental Studies Stoyanka Kenderova gave Arn a book entitled The Ottoman Libraries. Later the director of the Slavic Department Elisaveta Bosakova showed a bible with a luxurious silver lining from the 17th century, as Bosakova said that with it she wanted to show how powerfully Bulgarian art was influenced by the Ottoman era. The director of the National Library Boryanka Hristova gave Blent Arn a CD presenting the works in the library. And in turn, Blent Arn gave her the book Examples of Turkish Architectural Monuments published by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and to the Department of Oriental Studies he gave a medal. Arn congratulated the competent for the efforts made at the preservation and study of the Ottoman documents (Suleyman and Huseyin 2006). The Turkish foreign policy would not be the same if there were not any Muslim minorities and Ottoman cultural heritage in Bulgaria. Thus, it may be concluded that the presence of the Muslim minorities and Ottoman heritage determines the contemporary Turkish foreign policy towards the Republic of Bulgaria, and that the three components Ottoman Cultural Legacy-Muslim Minorities-Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy towards Bulgaria are inextricably interwoven. The problems pertaining to the Ottoman architectural legacy and Muslim minorities still remain. However, it has to be admitted that the Turkish foreign policy is adequate, deserves admiration, and very soon will enjoy the fruits of its labor.
Bibliography
Akyldz, Ali. Balkanlar a Osmanllardan Miras Bir agdas Medeniyet rn. In: Balkanlar da slam Medeniyeti Milletleraras Sempozyumu (21-23 Nisan 2000: Sofya) Balkanlar da slam Medeniyeti Milletleraras Sempozyumu Teblileri/ editr Ali aksu; nsz Ekmeleddin hsanolu stanbul: slam Tarih, Sanat ve Kltr Aratrma Merkezi, 2002; pp 123-145. Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin are a bridge in our bilateral relations [ ]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 31 May-6 June 2004: A24. Bilateral relations. http://www.big.bg/modules/news/article.php?storyid=21751. Retrieved on 2009-10-01.
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CEDIME-SE: Center for Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe, Muslims of Bulgaria, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Bulgaria.html. Retrieved on 2009-10-01. Change in the Islamic religious schools. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 1-7 July 1998: A1-2. Chief Mufti s Office, Education, http://genmufti.net/en/education. Retrieved on 2009-10-01. Chief Mufti s Office, Structure, http://genmufti.net/bg/aboutus/structure.html. Retrieved on 2009-10-01. Eken, Nuri. Bulgaristan-Trkiye ilikilerinde yeni bir dnem balyor [A new period in relations between Bulgaria and Turkey started]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 23-29 Jan 2006: A3. Eminov, Ali. Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria. New York: Routledge, 1997. Kadiyska, Tanya, and Mariana Savova, Elena Blazheva. A Walk in the Streets of Sofia - guide-book. 2nd ed. Sofia: KRAS PLUS Ltd.: 2006. Lory, Bernard. . 1878-1900 [The fate of the Ottoman heritage. Bulgarian urban culture 1878-1900]. Sofia: AMICITIA, 2002. Marcheva, Reni. Problems of Preservation, Conservation and Restoration of Manuscripts from the Oriental Department of the National Library of Bulgaria. In: The International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans (April 21-23, 2000: Sofia) Proceedings of the International Symposium on Islamic Civilisation in the Balkans = / edited by Rama M.Z. Keilani and Svetlana Todorova; preface by Ekmeleddin Ihasnolu. Istanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 2002; p. 69. Mehmet, Taner. Abdullah Gl Muradiye camiinde Cuma namaz kld [Abdullah Gul performed Friday prayer at the Muradiye Mosque]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 1-7 May 2006a: A3. Mehmet, Taner. Plovdiv i ziyaret eden ilk TBMM Bakan olduum iim mutluyum [I am happy that I am the first Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly visited Plovdiv]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 26 June-2 July 2006b: A3. National Statistical Institute, Ethnos, http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Ethnos.htm. Retrieved on 2009-09-30. National Statistical Institute, Religion, http://www.nsi.bg/Census/Religion.htm. Retrieved on 2009-09-30. Sahan, Mehmet. Bulgaristan ve Trkiye arasnda dostluk ilikileri tazelendi [Friendly relations between Bulgaria and Turkey were restored]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 12-18 July 2004: A1, A3. Sahan, Mehmet. Trkiye Dsileri Bakan Gl Bulgaristan dan memnun ayrld [The Turkish Foreign Minister Gul happily left Bulgaria]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 19-25 May 2003a: A10. Sahan, Mehmet. , , [Bulgaria is our friend, neighbour, and soon will be our ally as well]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 26 June2 July 2003b: A21. Suleyman, Beynur. Krcali deki hogr tm dnyaya model [Tolerance in Kardzhali is an
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example for the whole world]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 8-14 May 2006a: A1, A4. Suleyman, Beynur, and Tayfur Husseyin. Arn: kiki ilikileriz mkemmel dzeyde [Aranc: Our bilateral relations are excellent]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 26 June-2 July 2006: A1-2. Tatarla, Ibrahim. ( 1) [Turkish religious buildings and inscriptions in Bulgaria (part 1)]. Sofia: Favorit - AM, 2003. Tunca, Erkan, and Omer Alkac. Erdogan: Bulgaristan ile tm sorunlar zlecek, ticaret hacmi 10 milyar dolara ikarilacak [Erdogan: All the problems with Bulgaria will be solved, trade volume will be increased to $10 billion]. Zaman-Bulgaria newspaper 31 March-6 April 2008. Available from: http://bg.zaman.com.tr/bg-tr/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=127. Retrieved on 2009-10-02.
Ottoman Legacy in Ulcinj: Architecture, Customs and Speaking

suad ukoshata*
Something about history
Ulcinj is the last town on the Montenegrin coast, situated just 13 km from the river Bojana, which represents the border between Montenegro and Albania. As is it known, this town falls under Ottoman Empire on the year 1571 and remains like this until 1878, with The Congress of Berlin. Ulcinj was known with its own marine, and it is believed that first Muslims came on this town through the seamen. To make this fact stronger, there are some tellings that the oldest mosque in the territory of Ulcinj is the Seamens mosque, from the period before Ulcinj became a part of the Ottoman Empire. However, massive converting of the people of this part in Islam began on the XVIIth century. During the Ottomans, Ulcinj got totally oriental view. There started to be built mosques, hamams, drinking-fountains, sahat-kula, hans, streets, cobble-stoned streets (paving stone) and tombs (turbes). Everything was adapted for the new masters. From that period, in the entrance of the City market in the Old town remained a flagstone written in Ottoman Language. Its translation means: God bless this castle of Islam until the Day of Judgment. These high pillars, like body with soul, are the deeds of Gods power and beneficence. Oh you weak (man), pray for this fortification of Islam, on which, in the name of the truth, I wrote this chronogram: Blown rosebud. The year 1130 AH. Ulcinj also had long and rich marine and trade tradition. The marine of this city had its culmination of expand in the XVII, XVIII and through XIX centuries. Marine
*Teacher, madrasa in Podgorica 203
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trade of Ulcinj citizens with their own ships were developed with big harbors and trade centers of Adriatic Sea, Levant and Mediterranean. During the period of Ottoman Empire (1571-1880), Ulcinj with its trade fleet was its main pillar in the Adriatic. The seamen of Ulcinj, brave and skilled, did not accept the Ottoman Empire very few. Until the nomination of Mehmed Bushatli for Scutari for vizier, Ulcinj was a small republic.
2
Comparison between past and present
With such an oriental look, Ulcinj entered under regency of Montenegro in 1878 by the decision of The Congress of Berlin. The inhabitants of the city gave up, only after the pressinon of big forces, two years later. According to some tellings of old ulcinians, The Prince of Montenegro, Nikola, sent in Ulcinj Montenegrin people from the poorest level of his nation, so they started to be servants of ulcinian families, while their first houses were very weak. Communist ideology in Balkans, behind which were hidden many Serbian nationalist ideas, which propagated disbelief to God All-mighty, during fifty years, succeeded not just to destroy ideologically the believers of this city, but also its architecture, intending to destroy everything that smells in Islam. The destroying of Ulcinj began with the holiest thing for Muslims, with mosques. In the northern entrance of Old city there was Meterizi mosque, which, after entering of Montenegrins, in 1880, was in a ruined situation. Seeing it like this, the Prince Nikola gave the permission for rebuilding of a new mosque. Intending to inform the Muslims with this permission, on September 19th, 1891 he wrote:
To my faithful mohammedans of the city of ulcinj, namely mohammedans to the settlement of meterizi, on the place of old, almost ruined mosque on the same settlement. In the sign of my constant love to you, my loyal citizens, and my permanent wish that you may feel free and advanced in your faith, I ordered for you to accept 3.000 grosh as my help to rebuild the above mentioned mosque. nikola.2
But, instead of building a mosque, with merits of our man at the same location on the basement of the above mentioned mosque there is built an orthodox church of San Nikola3, in glory of God for the soul of heroes that died in year of 1878 liber2 3
Ruzhdi ushaku jusuf lika, ULQINI nga dritaret e kohs, ulqin 2006., page. 27. Prof. dr. erbo Rastoder, Istorijsko-metodoloki okvir izuavanja muslimana u Crnoj Gori 1878 1912. (I part), almanah 5-6/99, page. 131.
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ating Ulcinj, as it is written at the memorial-plate. Duke Simo Popovi, the secretary of Prince Nikola, with the stones of overthrown mosque as with stones taken from the facade of the Old city walls, built the mentioned church, also his own house in harbor of Ulcinj. A similar situation also had another mosque. In the year 1931, government of that time ruins the Seamens mosque, which is to be considered as the oldest mosque in Ulcinj, built before Ottomans came in this territory. The minaret of this mosque was 36 meters tall, on the top of which was put the lantern, whose light was the sign for seamen that they are coming close to the lovely town. This mosque hangs on their name. At the same way, in 1967, the government ruined one more mosque, the mosque of Meraja. First building that is used as mosque since the Ottoman period was the mosque of Hajji Halil Skura, today known as church-mosque, which until 1689 was a catholic church (built in 1510), remained as mosque until 1942/3, when was devastated, and from 1975 without any decision was taken from the possession of Islamic community and became a part of museum complex. In the year of 2001 Islamic community started proceeding to bring it back on its possesion, but the state organs again were determined for keeping the building as a museum! Then, Ulcinj had a lot of fountains, many of them were close to the main street. All of them were removed during the 80s of last century. The most flagrant case that was planned to be realized was the last one in the end of 80s of the XXth century, when the communists wanted to ruin all mosques in the town with pretext that they intend to build another one, much bigger than others, in the suburb of the city. First mosque that had to be ruined was the mosque of Lamit where I am the imam now. In front of ruining weapons that wanted to start the job that early morning was the head imam of that time, rah. Ibrahim ef. Bajramovi, who said: First, you have to kill me, and than you can ruin the mosque. Thus, their miserable plan went down. Another visible devastation was the destroying of the main road of the town, on which, being unconscious for what they were doing, even the Muslim citizens participated on destroying the road. In fact, government of that time allowed the citizens building of buildings with high dimensions, destroying a unique uniform oriental appearance of this part of town, where all the buildings were of one height and building material, from wood. Those, and surely more ruins are enough to understand the non-humanity con-
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duct of government people of that time in relation with Islamic-Ottoman architecture in this town. The town having all those elements inside of it was called the meeting of east and west, a town which until the end of 80s of the XXth century was visited by millions of tourists. The fact of rebuilding of this legacy, undertaken by Islamic community or local authorities (municipality)
3
After falling of communist system and after stabilizing the political situation in Balkans, after the wars of 90s of the XXth century, among Muslim believers of this part came to soul revival, on the ideological and in architectural aspect as well. So, Islamic community in this town succeeded in 2001 to rebuild the building of ex-Islamic primary school, so called mekteb, which was ruined during the bombardment of Ulcinj from fascists, in 1943. Some of the pupils of this school are still alive. In this building today there are the offices of Islamic community of Ulcinj, kindergarten, library, reading hall, small conferences, etc. Meanwhile, Islamic community succeeded to bring back 2-3 nationalized business locals that were taken by communists. For one of these locals there is being made a project for its revitalization or bringing back the old oriental appearance, as it is bezistan in Sarajevo. In 2008 it was began the rebuilding of the Mosque of Seamen, mentioned above, and it is believed to be in function until the end of this year. There is no doubt that this object will bring back to this part of town the oriental-Islamic spirit that it possessed until 1931. It is soon expected to begin with the jobs on revitalization of Hamam, which is found near the Mosque of Pasha and its origin is from the Ottoman period, precisely from 1719 at the time when the mosque was built. This kind of hamam is the unique one in Montenegro. On the process of revival of old architecture of the town there is also incorporated the municipality of Ulcinj. This year, the municipality of Ulcinj succeeded to cobblestone a big part of the centre of the town, and this was the first phase of the jobs and it will be continued. Like this, existing asphalt was taken off, under which was hidden one beautiful fountain the deed from Ottoman period. It was called Fountain with stairs and it was covered with asphalt in the communist period, but it is rebuilt again and now it is in function. Such a deed was not expected well from all the citizens! New cobble-stoned street gave to the city another look, more oriental.

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Present traditions originating from Ottoman period until today, including hygienic aspect, food diversity, etc.
At the same time with Islam, Ottomans brought so many traditions, which were accepted by the domestic inhabitants. From the hygienic aspect, the town of Ulcinj was full of fountains, as I said before. Then, almost each house had a kind of dish made from stone called dybek which was used by women for washing the laundry. These kinds of dishes can be found today in many houses, although not in use, they are conserved with a special sympathy as something worthy from our history. Also, the pronounced need of Muslims for water made that almost each house in their gardens has its own well, and really if you walk through the city, you will rarely find a house without a well. Even that most of them are not in use, because they are replaced with the city water supply, they are preserved and embellished, in dependence of interesting of each one. More interesting than these, there are different foods, which worthy Ulcinian women make, especially in specific moments, as Eids, iftars through month of Ramadan, different family celebrations, etc. For example, as in Istanbul, in Ulcinj you can find yaprak, sarma, pide, kofte, kebaps, hurmashitza, baklava, halva, sutla, etc. All these receipts are inherited since the Ottoman times and with the most special care are cherished until nowadays. Surely, most of them are replaced with speed foods as well as with Mediterranean ones, but besides them they are not forgotten and they are made in special occasions. Those are not just prepared inside houses, but even in restaurants, offering a menu from most attractive for all visitors of Ulcinj. Even for non-Muslims. Treatment of some terms with Turk, Arabic and Persian origin, used even by non-muslims
5
The majority of the inhabitants of Ulcinj are Albanians and speak their own mother language Albanian language. And, as it is known, Albanians include people with Muslim and Christian belief. But, no matter of the belief, until today in their vocabulary one can hear using words with different origin, like Turkish, Arabic or Persian language. It is worth to be mentioned the fact that these words became a part of Albanian vocabulary, but not just in their language. For curiosity, even the Montenegrin language accepted and now use these words, no matter was it in spoken or written form. Even more, they do not have other alternative! Wishing not to load this theme
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in quantity or time, I have selected about twenty-five of those words with their meanings: AKLLAGI smooth stick. Bos.=Oklagija...; BAKLLAVA dessert. Bos.=Baklava...; BUREK kind of food. Bos.=Burek...; ESHME fountain. Bos.=esma...; DUQAN store. Bos.=Duan...; FILXHAN kind of dish. Bos.=Fildan...; GURRABI kind of dessert. Bos.=Gurabija...; GJEMI ship. Bos.=Barka, amac...; JAPRAK kind of food made from grape leafs. Bos.=Japrak...; JORGAN kind of cover from wool, cotton... Bos.=Jorgan...; Bos.=Komija...; MUSAFIR guest. Bos.=Musafir, gost...; PITE food from paste. Bos.=Pita...; QORRSOKAK blind way. Bos.=orsokak, slijepi put...; QYP dish from clay. Bos.=Posuda od gline...; SAHAT clock. Bos.=Sat...; SUTLIJASH (SUTLA) kind of dessert. Bos.=Sutlija... TAZE fresh. Svje...; TEZE mothers sister. Bos.=Teze, tetka...; XHEZVE dish for cooking the coffee. Bos.=Dezva...; XHUMA praying, day. Bos.=Petak, dan dume...; YRNEK model. Bos.=Model...; ZANAT craft. Bos.=Zanat...; From mentioned words, I would like to distinguish words Akllagi, Bakllava, Burek, eshme, Gurrabi, Japrak, Jorgan, Komshi, Musafir, Pite, Qyp, Sutlijash, Teze, Xhezve, Zanat, and many more, for which there is no space and time to be mentioned. These words do not have other alternative, although in the dictionary someone can find some words that correspond with Albanian language. While words eshme, Kaish, Komshi, Qorrsokak, etc., are used mostly from Bosnian people. It is so interesting that all Albanians, Muslims and Christians, call Friday as juma-day, in some situations even by the Montenegrins. I hope that all introduced details clearly show the big influence that the Ottoman civilization has in architecture and in speaking, legacy that has been ready accepted by the inhabitants of these areas. Beside the period of stagnation and systematic devastation almost one hundred years, there are some positive impulses to recall some elements from that time. This thing, positively understood, is a motivation more for inheritors of that big civilization to express an intended interest in giving their contribution to recall something of all that what was before. I am grateful to the organizers of this conference for a wonderful possibility to participate here and I congratulate all participants for their observations not to remain just talked words and written sentences, but an impulse to deal and realize for commonweal.
Turkish Non-Governmental Organizations in the Balkans: Performance Assessment

Ramiz zekaj*
The numerous non-governmental organizations have already become part of the development of the civil society in the Balkans and beyond. They come from various countries and belong to different ethnicities and religions. The importance and the potential that the contribution of NGOs activity represents in each country are also reflected by the fact that their activity is regulated by a special law from the governments and parliaments of the countries concerned. In addition to this significant indication, there are also the different financial reports that give evidence to such activities, which even the public bodies of the country where they work, cannot provide. At this point, the presence of the Turkish NGOs in the Balkan region is no exception, even it can be said with certainty that they are a factor in itself, taking into account their very competitive number in the region and also the role they play in the public life. It is not difficult to mention, such organizations one by one or in a selective way, as the Balkan geographical space asks for a deeper access in the treatment of this phenomenon, especially when the studies so far are quite limited. However, with the materials collected for this paper, we believe to achieve together an evidence of the performance and the contributions of these organizations, even though by any given example, it can be implied the assessment of one NGO more than another or the challenge of any of them, excluding the others. On the contrary, the examples fall in harmony with the general spirit of the topic, and specifically they are only in service to the elaboration of a certain phenomenon or practice that these NGOs have offered,
*director, albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and civilization, Tirana 209
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somewhere so successful and productive and elsewhere counterproductive. Their activity includes a wide range of activities and projects that can be summarized as: Humanitarian level. Sanitary aspect. Education and schooling. Development and progress of countries where they operate through development projects. The Fundamental cause, as that to protect the human rights. Affinity and support of the Turkish communities living in the region. Strengthening the bilateral ties (in the cultural, historical context, etc.) between the countries where they operate and the Turkey as the result of a relatively long historical and common stripe (connections) between them: here we intend the Ottoman Empire and its undeniable influence on the cultures of their countries. Preservation of the common cultural heritage in terms of its physical and wider significance, considering it as the best bridge where stable and productive relationships could be built. Cultural and scientific level, with the support and publication of research, historical, scientific works, which are of incomparable value in the global era that we live, where intercultural exchange between civilizations is the alpha and omega of the efforts for influence. Religious level, with everything it implies. The last, from its rendering, but among the most important ones, is the religious level. Today, the absolute majority of the Muslim populations in the Balkan region are of local indigenous origin. A part of their ancestors embraced Islam before the arrival of the Ottomans in the region. But, in reality, it can be said that their positions in a new social status were consolidated with the establishment and governance of the Ottoman state for almost 5 centuries. We must take into consideration that it is not a relatively long time that separates us from the communist period, when most of the Balkan countries were involved in the Eastern Block and in some of them there were installed dictatorial regimes the most typical example being Albania. The truth is that from this period, the countries of this region have inherited problems of the most different kinds, which, although we
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live in a stage of integration processes in the European Union, continue to be present. These issues are different: political, economic, cultural, etc. It is naturally understood that these countries, by implementing the general reforms outlined in the framework of EU integration processes, are on the road towards the consolidation of the democratic norms and standards. But this does not mean that these processes are not accompanied by various problems. Our societies daily display current and inherited problems, and often they relate to the respect of the individual rights. At this point, there have been cases when even the international bodies of justice have not succeeded in preventing the violations of human rights in the Balkan region in general, or worse, they have failed in preventing the crimes and the ethnic and religious genocide cases as in Bosnia, Kosovo etc. In relation to the early and current developments of the Balkan region, whether political, economic or cultural spheres, it is worth mentioning that the contribution of the Turkish NGOs has been and will be in the service of the consolidation of these democratic standards that are aimed at to be achieved. The role that they play is not at all more minor and modest as compared to the role of their European sisterly organizations and those of the Islamic world. In the most legible way, it appears in the public and humanitarian sector. Significant and interesting is the information that the OECD reports for the year 2006, which says: Turkish NGOs have exceeded foreign assistance. Turkish NGOs as Kimse yok mu? (Is there anyone?), Deniz Feneri (Lantern) and Cansuyu ( Juice of Life) donated to the countries in need 78 million USD in 2006. Following, I am citing the source according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):
The Turkish non-governmental institutions spent 1 billion USD for aid in 2006, while the Turkish government shared only 700 million USD.
Here, we also have the case of Bosnia, where many Turkish humanitarian organizations provided a major contribution in tackling the humanitarian crisis. Perhaps a better coordination of humanitarian work of the Turkish NGOs with those of other Islamic world will have an impact and prestige in the international arena, as well as a good precedent for the fruitful cooperation in this regard. It is known that our region has always been in trouble by ethnic wars and genocide against humanity on the basis of a not only ethnic but also religious separability.
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Kosovo was a case similar to Bosnia, but not with the same dimensions and factors. Public interest in the Balkan region countries is much wider than that of humanitarian. Respect for human rights, fundamental issues of economic and political nature belonging to minorities, religious harmony and coexistence, are areas where the Turkish NGOs have had their word. Just to illustrate it, we bring here an interesting example, which certainly it is not alone. It has to do with the protest of the TurkishAlbanian Brotherhood Association to the massacres committed by the Greek state against the am population 65 years ago. The fact that the protest was organized before the Greek consulate in Istanbul, where it was set a Black Wreath, convincingly demonstrated the sensitivity of Turkish NGOs in terms of respect for human rights. The General Secretary of the Association, Mr. Kamil Bitish, read a press release through which he called on Greece to meet the requirements of the am population. We are convinced that there are many cases of solidarity of the Turkish NGOs with the right causes in all countries of the region, although there is room for questions. For example, it cannot be tolerated the apathy and silence of the Turkish cultural and religious NGOs in the case of exclusion of some girls with hijab (scarf) from the faculty, a concrete case in Albania. Personal initiatives and those of local organizations with modest activity reached to sensitize the office of the peoples advocate and that of the human rights with its headquarters in Helsinki, and even the prime ministerial cabinet, which brought a change in the course of the problems. In the Ottoman heritage of this region we can say that with the withdrawal of the Ottomans from thousands of historic buildings were systematically destroyed. Those that remained were used either for purposes other than those which they were built for or were left to ruin for lack of maintenance. These valuable buildings, repaired and restored, should be returned to the Muslim communities, and the legal proceedings must start in every region to return those buildings. The Turkish NGOs in this direction have realized commendable work in sensitizing the authorities. But is it sufficient only the sensitizing? It is needed that, being in direct relationship, the NGOs have to cooperate with the state institutions, even to take initiatives and ask for their responsibility. Initiatives should not consist only in verbal efforts. They should try to provide support and funds for financing the reconstruction of these historic buildings, by offering to these relevant institutions serious credibility and image. As a result of the previous regimes, the Muslim communities in the region have
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been prohibited from the practice of their cultural and moral values and from conveying these values to the new generations during the period of oppression in the last 130 years. Knowing that the Balkan countries have within their bosom communities of different ethnic, religious and cultural origins, greater efforts are needed to be done by the Turkish NGOs to fill the created gap, for the recovery of the forgotten elements, with the organization of the regional conferences, as well as to convey the spirit of interfaith tolerance and harmony. History, being an essential part of the identity of a nation, state and beyond, but also the reference point in the management of the appropriate behaviors to various phenomena and in the establishment of relations with others, comprises a key role not only in Balkan societies, but it rises globally, too. The partial writing of history affects the construction of identity and values in the Balkans. However, the history of the Balkans cannot be understood apart from the Ottoman history. Among the Balkan nations it should be created a common language and a sensitive feeling. The common historical legacy should be regenerated and through the writing of history, it should be prohibited the dissention and elimination. In various countries of the Balkans, due to the secession from the Ottoman Empire, history, which relates to the Ottoman period, relying on some nationalist motives was written with bias and with a deviated perception of the reality of that time. Often we encounter speculations not based on historical facts about the Ottoman period. The involvement and the contributions of the Turkish NGOs in this area are different for various countries of the Balkans. But, the efforts are not everywhere the same. It is noted that where there are minorities of the Turkish communities, the activity of the Turkish NGOs is more intense and sensitive. But here, also it cannot be overlooked the role of institutions and Non-Turkish NGOs that have undeniable contribution in this direction. Perhaps, because of the nature of the problem and the characteristics of each country, at this point the Turkish NGOs should cooperate more closely with the local ones, not only for the different sensibilities of the country but also for obtaining experience. A pleasing example for this recommendation, although we do not have to do with an NGO, is the cooperation of TKA itself with the AIITC in the framework of the publication of the Albanian translation of the work of IRCICA History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilization in 2 volumes. While as far as the religious issues are concerned, the voice of cooperation for the good of the nations where these NGOs operate should be principal. The tendency
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for influence and hegemony can be useful on one side always in the administrative plan but also, equally harmful on the other hand, because it stimulates division and prejudices, and fights against the diversity of thought. There must be respected the contributions of all partners in the process of the invigoration of life and of the Islamic activity in the Balkan region. Otherwise, we would have a repetition of mistakes, which would be inexcusable at this time. The Turkish NGOs, with the experience they have, should help in improving the religious institutions in the Balkans. The channels of communication should always be maintained. The theologians, representing and engaged in the activity of Islamic communities, should be quite qualified, with a more global vision about religion, and not at all exclusive. It is necessary for the Turkish NGOs to welcome the internal discussions, so that to determine the appropriate areas for the cooperation among different theological orientations within Islam in the countries of the region. At this point, we are convinced that the Turkish NGOs have reached undeniable achievements in schooling and educational plan. The recovery of the madrasahs and the establishment of various colleges in the region have been not only a qualitative step, but a new spirit in the perception of all the functionality of the educational system in Islamic communities. Nowadays, the graduates in these Madrasahs and Colleges have justified the serious efforts of the Turkish NGOs towards the private education. Not less than two months ago, two youngsters from the Madrasah of the town of Kavaja in Albania won the third place in the international competition for young inventors. I note that this institution, after the bilateral agreements with the Albanian Islamic Community, is managed by the SEMA foundation. However, there is still room for discussion, taking into account the specificities of each country. What we can say with full right is the need for the establishment of schools of theology, Islamic institutions and joint research institutes. There should be promoted exchange programs for the students, and international meetings should be held to get together the youngsters of the region. The Turkish NGOs should be more active in this sphere. The number of media means that broadcast in accordance with the cultural context of the region should be more diversified; radios, television stations, magazines, books and newspapers should be supported and more translations should be made. The peoples of a significant part of the Balkan countries are under pressure and in the open rivalry with the activity of the Christian missionaries, which is quite normal for the conditions under which democracy is developed everywhere in the world today.
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But the question arises: where are we in this competition? The local NGOs have to be supported even more strongly by the Turkish ones in the framework of facing these tendencies. There must be carried out scientific studies; there should be formed a coordinating council among the Muslims to lead the domestic, Turkish, etc NGOs, in connection with this issue. We are convinced that these are only some aspects of the performance of the Turkish NGOs activities in our region and not a full analysis of it. I also believe that this conference can be considered a strong starting point for preserving the Ottoman heritage in the Balkan region. I hope that other activities will follow this one and more profound analyses about this purpose will be exposed in the future. Short information about Turkish NGOs in Albania: Istanbul Humanitarian Cultural Brotherhood Association Address Rruga Bogdani nr.7 Tirana The main activity is educational and learning. This association manages the madrasahs of girls and boys in the city of Shkodra, giving to them a high education standard. Istanbul association is an NGO with the objective in learning the students religious and scientific studies, have the license of the ministry of education. Organizes short religious courses and foreign languages. Meanwhile helps the poor children, peoples in the dormitory, gives support for medical trainings, etc A big number of the students of these madrasahs have different activities cultural and artistic, association offers iftars for the people during the month of Ramadan, etc. Sema Foundation Address - Rruga Muhamet Gjollesha Tirana Sema foundation is an NGO; the main role is to support the education in Albania. Foundation sponsors the educational activity in the madrasah of Tirana, Kavaja, Cerrik and this year the Korca madrasah. It is known for a high level of education in the ambient of these madrasahs to prepare the students. Foundation organizes other activities as the mawlid of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) being present members of the government and the state. Organizes conferences and symposiums in collaboration with the Islamic com-
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munity. Follows the student life in the universities after madrasahs. Albanian-Turkish Islamic Waqf Association Address Shkozet Durres The activity of this Waqf is related with memorization of the Holy Quran to the students in the main building of the Waqf in Shkozet Durres, to the memorization center. Meanwhile it has also some branches, as in Gose Kavaja, near the Gose mosque. As it has branch for boys in Bushat-Shkodra, in Peshkopi, in Kukesi, in Elbasan, in Perrenjas, in Puka and Tepelena. There are branches for girls in Durres and Perrenjas. In these centers have full accommodation around 450 students, whom in morning time are following the madrasahs, mechanics or middle school and during afternoon time different free computer courses, English, Turkish, sewing, and handicraft. These courses are programmed in collaboration with Albanian Muslims Community. This Waqf organizes excursions with students in different places of Albania. During the summer it has free courses. Requested by a.m.c. it organizes two years courses preparing imams. Prizmi printing house Prizmi printing house is founded in Tirana in 2003. Main activity is the publication, promotion, and symposiums.. Organizes dinners and iftars and works for the interreligious tolerance. This printing house has published 25 kind of books distributed in different events. It has the exclusivity to publish Fethullah Glens books.
Ottoman Legacy as Integrative Component for Balkan Muslim Identities

Gafur zharku*
Indeed We have sent forth our messenger with clear messages and We sent down them the Book and the Balance, so that men establish a justice (Quran 57: 25)
The Ottoman legacy itself is obvious and has deep impact through the Balkan. Within the diversity its reflected around the Balkan environment. When you across into the land of Balkans, imagine; it encompasses the picture and landscape of Ottoman legacy. Even today after 100 years, the spirit of Ottoman legacy is still alive. Sarajevo when you are taking the breath and again saying the Sarajevo, before you fly a memory as a movie picture of bloody 20 centuries. However the Sarajevo and place when we are standing up accept our breath with Salaams and Merhaba. Begova Xhamija with dignity gives us strength to continue our steps to walk away into the street of Sarajevo with Kalderma. The discourse of Balkan ethnicity is it distinguished with national identities of people within it, as an Albanians, Bosnian, Turks, Torbes and others. Balkan from western point has singular coherence. The Ottoman legacy can be perceived as a common layer or module for Balkan Muslim identities only within Islam as a denominator. Moreover with the Islamic heritage they are interlinked. Islamic heritage into their daily life create the link for time and space, for the interaction between the past and present. This interaction in present is still a live; its relationship is in a vicious circle, with the potential to increase in future. We cannot predict the future; its not in our audience, legacy and tenets, the prediction without sapience. The work toward the Islamic framework give us hope achieving a falah salvation in our time
*Institute for sociological, Political & juridical Research 217
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and akhirah. The differ perception and prejudices into the geographically Balkan area cannot keep the identity of Muslims community as a unit into integrated framework without Ottoman legacy. The basic Ottoman concept was based on the man -human being as an honored one from the other creature. The man is in need for rest of people for sustenance in society. Continuance of social life is possible only through solidarity and reciprocal help.2 The nature of Ottoman legacy itself has integrative component, its embraces the diversity of nation, cultures and impetus for social change and Islam as a vehicle for development of Muslim identities. Ottoman legacy has gained a root into differ nation thorough a century, with functional principle based in just value system. Different perception about this system in recent past and todays reality is fulfilled with the misperception conducted from different worldview and appreciation about Ottoman legacy with Islam as a denominator. The Fonteka dictionary o Modern thought 1982 provides a definition: Worldview refers to a general conception of the nature of the world particularly as conceiving or implying system of value principle. Any total philosophical system may be so styled which derives practical consequence from its theoretical component. From our point of view the Ottoman legacy has own system of value principle based mostly on Islamic tenets. Therefore when we discuss about the legacy, thus implies differ or variety of worldview. Our concern is for generally accepted social phenomena, which can interact in cohesion. Moreover, in searching a module for common ground we need to develop intercultural communication. Before delving into discussion on the systematic nature of Ottoman legacy, it is important to define what system is. A system is defined as the functional component that together makes certain sector of the ethico-economic order work.3 The Ottoman legacy has produced just value system which therefore, refers to an integrated whole as a part of Islamic order. An order is thus a totality of several systems integrated together through the bond of ethical relationship.4 Various systems therefore in Islamic order are linked through the ethical propositions of Islam. These claims about the Ottoman legacy reality in forming the authentic Muslim identity is significantly affected and shaped by set of influential factor: the level of socioec F. smer, Trkmenler, 3rd ed., Istanbul, pp. 929-1299; O. Turan, Trk Cihan Hakimiyeti Mefkuresi Tarihi, pp. 247-463 taken out from: History of Ottoman State, Society and Civilization, Tirana: aIITc, 2009. 3 choudhury , m. a. and malik, u. a. 1992. The Foundations of Islamic Political Economy. london: macmillan. 4 Ibid
2
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onomic development in ottoman era, socio and cultural factors and environment. To simplify, nowadays this interaction is reflected in culture, in the language, music, food and architecture. Many scholars share the same view about the deep Ottoman cultural imprint into the Balkan societies. Noel Malcolm describing the Albanians notes:
albanians to their language, culture and way of life reflect many influence form which have absorbed. such a linguistic legacy of latin and strong cultural imprint of the Ottomans5.
The Ottoman legacy has significant impact into the Balkan Muslim Communities through the institutions as Islamic Communities, Mosques, Schools-Medresah, Waqf and other foundational institution. The institutions generate and produce potential and capacity to revive the foundational axiom or the philosophical, cultural, economical foundation of the ottoman civilization. Therefore, the temptation to bring closer the foundational axiom of Ottoman legacy into the Muslim communities as a part of Ummah legacy is a challenge itself. In our daily practice, we are developing them through formal and informal ways. The lack of institutions brings the disbalance in Muslim society today. To achieve the equilibrium as a Suleiman Kanuni did, thus must be backed substantially. But the intellectuals have a potential to move toward goal and policy, to create space and prerequisite and to operationalize the institutional framework, rather reducing a responsibility to take action. Moreover its an Islamic methodology which strives for individual that working and searching solution toward Ummah concern same time a solution for whole humanity. As a Muslim scholar Kahf stipulates:
The economy closer to objective of the system represents the stable ground of the system.6
All this effort need to be sustained by divine guidance of Allah i.e. Quran and Sunnet which means through a mechanism of accountability based in divine Law. In other way with economic vocabulary expressed that in Islamic filtered system economic effort take place through the process of cooperation and competition.7 In contem noel malcolm, myth of albanian national identity: same key element; edited :stefanie shwandler, sievers & Berud j. Fisher page 83 6 kahf, m. 1989. Islamic economics and Its methodology, in a. Ghazali and s. Omar (eds.), Readings in the Concept and Methodology of Islamic Economics. selangor darul ehsan: Pelanduk Publications. 7 ahmad, k. 2003. The challenge of Global capitalism, in j. H. dunning (ed.), Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford university Press.
5
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porary dimension the cooperation and competition are also core values in European perspective and globally. In an Islamic perspective, competition avoid a conflict between the self and socially interest. Moreover in Ottoman state are more explicated and weighted. They where developed and supported under state umbrella, with the mechanism to overcome individual and government failure or the regulatory mechanism to balance social failure. Equivalent the regulatory mechanism where in function, to ensure social justice, for example the the Hisbah, Waqf, Zeqah ectr. In other world the Ottoman state has developed unique system for that time i.e. Islamic Economy. Therefore we need to emphasize that
the Islamic economy is different from the other economic system of world as it calls for a different institutional setup and unique role of government to achieve the goals of Islamic society8
Gregory and Stuart rightly argues that in order to distinguish an economic system from another, we need to focus and compare their fundamental elements. In this discourse we are going to mention the statement of the founder of political economy who notes
in whatever science these are systematic differences in opinion, the cause will be found to be, a difference in their conceptions of the philosophical method of the science, the parties who differ are guided, knowingly or unconsciously, by different views concerning the nature of the evidence appropriate to the subject. They differ not solely in what they believe themselves to see, but in quarter whence they obtained the light by which they think they see it9
The ottoman state role was based in Islamic value principle ,their government with a role to achieve goals of Islamic society under Islamic economic system or toward just system which system better explains Muslim economist Chapra who transmit to us the circle model developed by Ibni Haldun and says
The strength of the sovereign (al-mulk) does not become consumed except by implementation of the sheriah, The sheriah cannot be implemented except by a sovereign (al-mulk), The sovereign cannot gain the strength except through the people (el-rijal) the people cannot be sustained except by wealth (al mal), wealth cannot be acquired except through development (al-imarah) development cannot be attained except
arif, m. 1989. Towards establishing the micro foundations of Islamic economics: The Basis of the Basics, in a. Ghazali and s. Omar (eds.), Readings in the Concept and Methodology of Islamic Economics. selangor darul ehsan: Pelanduk Publications. 9 mill, j. s. 1836. On the definition and method of Political economy. Reprinted (1995), in d. Hausman (ed.), The Philosophy of Economics. cambridge: cambridge university Press.
8
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through justice (el adl) justice is the criterion (el mizan) by which God will evaluate mankind and sovereign is charged with the responsibility of actualizing justice10
To develop the spirit of Ottoman legacy we need to determine the existing realm of our reality and than to create a prerequisite or filling the gap of the current system till to the recommended level. To analyze the factor of cooperation and competition and interdependence and importance should be given to these factors to attain desired development. We are aware of act of differ nation leaving each other but we cannot dismiss the interdependence. A system is able to survive in a environment if it is able to maintain its distinguished features and provides something that is useful to the environment in which it is working.11 Differ opinion and analysis about Ottoman legacy impact in the Balkan we have also from some western scholars. For Suzan Gangloff
the Ottoman legacy is still subject to speculation and its place in the collective memory subject to reconstruction.12
She also notes: Historical, cultural and affective ties between Turkey and Muslim in Balkan are real. She also calls for objective and critical analysis of this relationship, concluding that: this relationship should contribute to overcoming the weight of the past. In this context is interested to emphasize the Bulgarian Newspaper 24 Chasa where is mentioned:
Turkish boots have not treaded on Bulgarian soil since 1878...but we must not fear the ghost. The Turks are our allies and for nearly 90 years now we have had perfect relation and they have never in the past century attached as ruthlessly like other neighbors have done.13
The attempt to revive the Ottoman legacy as a diversity or multiculturalism is a trend and trendy. To analyze the Ottoman legacy from Islamic economic perspective, my intentions are explicable in the way for goals and policy to lead human behavior toward just system. The same idea shares the Addas Waleed noting that: the purpose of Islamic economics is to identify and establish order that conforms to Islamic scripture and tradition.14 Our purpose today is to explain the Ottoman tradition and
chapra, m. u. 2000. The Future of Economics: An Islamic Perspective. leicester: Islamic Foundation. Beer 1979 12 suzan Gangloff ,The Impact of Ottoman legacy on Turkish policy in the Balkans november 1995,http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org 13 24 chassa, reprinted in Bulgarian telegraph agency, july 4 1999. 14 addas Waleed a.j. International Islamic university malaysia ,15 january 2008,mPRa paper
10 11
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to overcome misinterpretation. The Ottoman legacy itself has the component and spirit of cooperation, interdependence in relation man-society and prosperity of society as a collectivity, respect for diversity, not selfishness as a virtue. This dimension derives from Islamic tenets, is not only a theory of reality, its incorporated by the truth and practice taking care for Muslim and non- Muslims, for their right and freedom. Thus we find that Islam accords primacy to the pursuit of spiritual interest i.e. adherence to divine instruction in worldly affair as an ultimate act of worshipand not only insistence on the human pursuit of Material interest alone as a primacy goal of satisfaction in economic endeavors.15 This entire dimension can be in function for better communication internally and externally, because he derives from universal message. Conclusion We need to operationalize the Revealed Knowledge into practice. Although Knowledge sharing and Research and Development need to be improved to achieve the objective. Support to Muslim communities in form establishing universities, institutes and centers to research in particularity The Ottoman legacy. Replacing the Ottoman legacy in our contextual way of life is not a temptation to break the links with external reality. The Ottoman legacy can play important role into Balkan Muslim Community internally end externally for cooperation and creation of relationship which will assist in managing and further acceleration of their development processes. Thus is a condition for
effective dialogue which will identify the objective of each party and goes about achieving them gradually and search common characteristic in each culture and promote them with the aim of creating more understanding16
Moreover we cannot be self absorber entity but Creative Open minded entity internally and externally. In this occasion we want to present some verse from two great personalities, first Suleiman the Magnificent the most famous verse:
The people think of wealth and power as the greatest fate, But in this world a spell of health is the best state
15 16
Ibid al Ghatan and Galal, 2007, arab and muslim issues in a changing world, manama: Bahrain, Bahrain center for studies and Research.
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What men call sovereignty is a worldly strife and constant war Worship of God is the highest throne, the happiest of all estates and second from abdul Hammed second: my lord I know youre the dear One (al-aziz) and no One but you are the dear One You are the One and nothing else my God take my hand in this hard time my God be my helper in this critical times
Muslim scholars as an inheritor of Muhammad (PBUH), in this critical time has a great burden for whole humanity.

Osmansko Naslijede I Muslimanske Zajednice Balkana Danas (Zbornik Radova)

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Osmansko Naslijede I Muslimanske Zajednice Balkana Danas (Zbornik Radova)

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BALKANLAR MEDENYET MERKEZ

THE BALKANS CIVILISATION CENTRE

BALKANLAR MEDENYET MERKEZ

THE BALKANS CIVILISATION CENTRE

OSMANLI MRASI VE GNMZ BALKAN MSLMAN TOPLUMLARI

OsmanskO naslIjee I muslImanske zajednIce Balkana danas

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indekiler \ Sadraj \ Contents

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The Imposing Challenge of the Ottoman legacy

THE OTTOMAN LEGACY AND THE BALKAN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES TODAY

The Ottoman Legacy as a Common Layer of the Balkan Muslim Identities

OSMANSKO NASLIJEE I MUSLIMANSKE ZAJEDNICE BALKANA DANAS

The Ottoman Legacy as a Common Layer of the Balkan Muslim Identities

Website of the presidency: www.tccb.gov.tr

OSMANSKO NASLIJEE I MUSLIMANSKE ZAJEDNICE BALKANA DANAS

The Ottoman Legacy as a Common Layer of the Balkan Muslim Identities

OSMANSKO NASLIJEE I MUSLIMANSKE ZAJEDNICE BALKANA DANAS

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