Mind Association

On the Project of a Universal Character Author(s): Jonathan Cohen Reviewed work(s): Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 63, No. 249 (Jan., 1954), pp. 49-63 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251190 . Accessed: 01/02/2012 13:13
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IV.-ON

THE PROJECT OF A UNIVERSAL CHARACTER

BY
JONATHAN COHEN

I
among logicians of attributingthe project of a universal character Le;bniz alone amongseventeenth to century thinkers. This attribution to be found, instance, L. S. Stebbing's is for in ModernIntroduction Logic,1 Cohenand Nagel's Introduction to in to Logic and Scientific in Method,2 M. Black's Nature of Mathematics,3 J. H. Woodger'sAxiomatic in Methodin Biology,4and in 0. Neurath's introductory article in the International Encyclopaedia Unified of Science.5 And it dates, I suspect,from the publicationof C. I. Lewis's Surveyof SymbolicLogic in 1918. Lewis mentioned that Leibniz acknowledged debt in a this connexion RaymondLully, AthanasiusKircher,George to Dalgarno and JohnWilkins. But he considered theirwritings contained "little which is directlyto the point".6 In this Lewis was obviouslyrightwith regardto Leibniz's conception of a calculus of reasoning, but wrong,as I shall try to show, withregardto the projectof a universal whichseems character, in factto have beenan intellectual in commonplace seventeenthcentury WesternEurope. This somewhat-neglected by-wayof philosophical history wortha briefreview,I think,not only is in orderto fixmoreprecisely respectin whichLeibniz was the the only seventeenth centuryprecursorof modern symbolic to logicians, but also because it draws attention an earlywideof spread philosophical muddleabout the construction artificial languages. of Lewis'ssummary Leibniz'sownideas,based on L. Couturat's La Logique de Leibniz, is quite sufficient show how much to withthoseofprevious thinkers Leibniz'sprojecthad in common on the subject. His universal character,in which he was interestedfrom the age of eighteen (1664), enthusiastically was to fillthreemain roles. It wouldbe whatmodernlinguists call an "internationalauxiliary language", enabling men of with one another. It would different nationsto communicate
'Pp.483ff. 4P. 13. 4 112. 5Vol.i,no. 1,p. 16. 49
2P.

DURING the last thirty years or so the practicehas grownup

3P.17. 6P.5,n. 5.

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" of providewhat Lewis calls a " logistic treatment sciencein for of system symbolism theexact expression a general, simplified of all-actual and possibleknowledge. And it wouldserveas an of instrument discoveryand demonstration.The firsttwo purposes could be achieved on Leibniz's view by devisinga a notationin which each single or basic symbolrepresented by wereexpressed combining notions and complex simpleconcept of in symbols on:eway or another. The number the appropriate would thus be as small as the numberof symbols fundamental conceptsin human thought,so that the notation, primitive could be learntin a few weeks. with its vocalisation, together the throughout worldsciencewould be developedin Moreover, the formof a single, unifiedencyclopaedia,scientistswould be able to attain the same degree of rigourin metaphysics and morals as in geometry and analytics, and nothing Leibniznever down. However, wouldeverbe written chimerical to did much himself develop this systemof symbolism though to others do so. He elaboratedonlya urging he was constantly few of the many analyses of complexnotionswhichwould be as shouldbe regarded concepts which to in required order establish of primitive. And he learntenoughabout twosystems notation to see that they would not serve his purpose. The earlierof these was based on the division of concepts into classes in accordance with their degree of complexity. Any concept of by could thenbe symbolised a fraction whichthedenominator the of the indicated number theclass and thenumerator number symbolising oftheconcept thatclass. LaterLeibnizconsidered in and complexconceptsby conceptsby primenumbers primitive the appropriateproduct, so that logical synthesiswould be and logical analymultiplication by represented arithmetical factors. into sis by resolution prime language and scientific But besides being an international was also to serveas an instrument character .Leibniz'suniversal of the by arid of discovery demonstration exhibiting implications nature" whatwas alreadyknown. It was to see intothe " inner like of thingslike a " new telescope", and guide our reasonings to an " Ariadne's thread". Leibnizattempted devisea calculus to of whichwouldoperateon theformulae his character thisend. of It is these fragments a calculus,expressedin a notationof and not at all restricted conceptvariablesand logicalconstants, whichjustify in possibleapplicationto Leibniz's own character, the claim that Leibniz anticipatedBoole. I shall tryto show that, apart fromsome minordetails,it is only this conception of a logical calculus as an ancillaryto his universalcharacter

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on thatof whichdistinguishes Leibniz'sthought the subjectfrom and some of his contemporaries predecessors. Several of these character whichthey projected, somecompleted, universal and a hoped would fillthe same threeroles as Leibniz had in mind, at constituting once a mediumof international communication, a simplified notationfor science, and a method of discovery and demonstration. II The need foran international auxiliarylanguagewas widely felt in seventeenth centuryEurope for several reasons. The learned were increasingly using their own several vernaculars facedan immense linguistic problem insteadof Latin,merchants and wereconfronted on the new trade-routes, missionaries with the recentdiscoverythat the same difficulties. Consequently written Chinesewas used in the Far East as a means of interwhose differed communication languages greatly bypeoples spoken fromone another was of great interest. Indeed, it set the on speculation these patternforalmostall seventeenth-century discussedthem. and was referred by almostall wlho to matters, The ideal was not a new spokenlanguagewhichcould also be by written (like Lingua Franca or Pidgin-English) a systemof but by phonograms, a written languageconstituted a newsystem which couldalso be spoken. As suchit was intended ofideograms fromthe ciphering wordsor of to be something quite different even in the ancientworld. letterspractisedby cryptographers for was firstenunciatedby The programme its construction 1 he FrancisBacon in TheAdvancement Learning in 1605,where of " speaksofthe projectas " the mintofknowledge since " words as and acceptedforconceits, moneysare are the tokenscurrent " forvalues ". What he seeks is a systemof " real characters which,as in China, would " expressneitherlettersnor words " in gross,but thingsor notions and would be " as many, I suppose,as radical words". Scientithis Bacon mentioned projectagain in De Augmentis arUM 2 in 1623, where he added that "any book writtenin of characters this kind can be read offby each nation in their
1 Philosophical 1905,p. 121. Although ed. Works, J. M. Robertson, in century of was a language phonograms theseventeenth English written (N.B. how in his Essay, e.g.,Locke treatswordsas sounds but not as III, ix, 2, IV, viii,13, xi, 7, xxi,4, etc.) and had not yet become marks, later of the into language which standardisation its spelling theideographic modernised spelling my quotathe of it, transformed I have sometimes themto-day. understanding tionsso faras thisfacilitates 2 Ibid. p. 522.

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over its utility, own language". But he was not enthusiastic large number of apparently because of the inconveniently he characters thoughtit would require. Descartes thought he whenMersenne informed in him could circumvent difficulty this formulated apparently a Mr.Hardy.' by 1629 ofa similar project, " As soon as " the truephilosophy was known,the " clear and simple ideas " which are the basis of good science could be and discovered, enumerated airanged. It wouldthenbe possible for theseso thatthemostcomplex to devisea system symbolising notions could be as easily expressedas the largestnumbers, amongall possible because an orderwouldhave been established human thoughtssimilar to that prevailingnaturally among and the wholelanguagecould be learutin a fewdays. numbers, so Above all, this languagewould represent everything clearly to the humanjudgment that errorwould be almostimpossible and even peasantswouldbe betterable to assess the truththan can philosophers present. at Leibniz actuallytook a copy of this passage,2and added to on this it thecomment that " although languagedepends thetrue ". philosophyit does not depend on its perfection It could. and be established whilephilosophy was yet imperfect growas it help for knowledge grew. " Meanwhile wouldbe a wonderful the preserving what we know,seeingwhat we lack, discovering controversies means of attaining this,and above all forsettling where the correctness a chain of reasoningis at stake ". of But there were others beforeLeibniz who thoughtthat the principles character mathematicist on of c,onstruction a universal millennium. neednot wait forthe scientific Indeed the project of a universal characterof some sort and the from Descartes' time onwards, became a commonplace on as languages seemto have been designed often Baconianas on the lines. To theformer Cartesian belonged scheme typeprobably in drawnup by WilliamBedell, Bishop of Kihnore, 1633,which to he persuaded a Reverend Joh-nsto:n execute. The results lost in the Irish rebellion of their work were unfortunately of 1641.3 Of this type too were the projects of the elder 'Vos and Herman Hugo,4 and also those of Philip Labbe
1 Letter Mersenne 20 November, ed. 1629,Oeuvres, C. Adamand of -to P. Tannery(1897),vol. i, p. 76. 2 p. (1903), 27. de ed. Ineditts Leibniz, L. Couturat et Opuscules Fragments 3 G. Burnet, Bedell(1688),p. 79. Lifeof William 4 J. Wilkins,Essay towards Real Character and a Philosophical a (1668),p. 13. Language 5 0. Funke,Zum Weltsprachenproblem in Englandin 17 Jahrhundert, 1929,p. 53.

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and Edward Somerset,second Marquis -of Worcester.' At and dictionary Ipswichin 1657 Cave Beck publisheda grammar By all entitled Character, which The Universal ofsucha language, one Conceptions, may in thenations theworld, understand another's theirown MotherTongues. writing readingout of one Common of In his prefacehe remarked" This last century years,much hath been the discourseand expectationof learned men, conwhichifhappily the out character, cerning finding of a universal so anomalous variations contrived, as to avoid all equivocalwords, and superfluous synonomas. . . would much advantage manand be a singularmeans of prokind in theircivil commerce, and in all pagating sortsoflearning truereligion theworld: such a characterbeing to be learnedin as few weeks as the Latin in." Similarworks yearsto be perfect tongueusuallyrequireth in werepublishedby J. J. Becherat Frankfurt 1661 (Character, and by AthanasiusKircherat universali), linguarum pro notitia who provided Nova et Universalis), Rome in 1663 (Polygraphia into and out of his language for Latin, Italian, dictionaries French,Spanish and German. Beck, Becher and Kircherall make muchuse of numeralsin theirnotation,whichis mostly bnilt up by numberingEnglish or Latin words in their alphabetical order; and Becher and Kircher acknowledgea researches of Johann Tritheim, debt to the cryptographic published early in the sixteenthcenturyunder the title of of Polygraphia. The syntax,accidence and word-order their the languages is, roughly, highestcommonfactorof Romance, and their dictionariespreTeutonic and Semitic grammars, of suppose a one-one correspondence meaning between the vocabularies of all ordinary languages. So that in effect a their languages are systemsfor ciphering limitedgroup of languages on a unitarypattern. No Japanese, for instance, could read his vernacular directly out of their sentences, thoughhe could no doubt learn to translatethem. But each of these authors neverthelessclaimed to be expounding a universal real character,in Bacon's sense (like the modern code of nautical signals) and not a mere cipher international of limitedapplication. to seems to have been the first designa universal Mersenne this type,forhe mentions achievement languageofthe Cartesian in a letter of 1636 or 1637.2 He was soon followed by
1A century theNarnes as of and Scantlinys suchinventions at present of and 1663. to I can call tomind havetried perfected, 2 Adam-Tannery, cit., vol. i, p. 572. op.

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F. Lodwick,la London merchant, A. Comenius,2 Czech J. the educationalist,and Sir Thomas Urquhart, the translatorof did Rabelais. Mersenne not describehis systemin detail,and there seems no evidence that Comeniusever workedout any details. But Lodwick wrote two books on the subject. The firstof these was published in 1647 as A CommonWriting, not whereby although understanding theother's one two, language yet thehelpthereof communicate mindsonetoanother. by may their and the second, which was largely a refinement the first, of appeared in 1652, as The Groundwork, foundation or laid (or so intended) the for framing a newperfect of and language an universal or common are writing. Lodwick'scharacters made up of signs fora largenumber basic rootsand of " distinctional of marks" around each sign which signify the derivativeformrequired. Some of thesederivative called " abbreviatives consist forms, ", of a small range of variationsaround each radical notion. Its for contradictory, instance,can be signified this way. The in other derivativeformsarise fromthe inflexions necessaryto producea verb,noun,adjective and adverb,witha largerange of moods, tenses, cases, etc., from each abbreviative. The schemeis tidierand moresystematic resulting than,say, Beck's. And in 1652 Lodwick was clearly of the opinion that "the proper namesof things givethemsignification the work, to is we suppose, of a sound philosopher, who fromthe knowledgeof thingsand theirorderin nature,should give them names accordingly, that in themby theirname, by whichin describing the naming theymay be known". Lodwickwas convinced too that his characterwould " much assist the true knowledge of " whichis at present things muchhindered by verbalambiguity and vagueness,and he pointedout how it would be of greater use to sciencethan to poetryor rhetoric.3But his published schemewas stillveryfarfrom the degreeof simplification which Descartes thought it possible. Moreover, was only an outline, for Lodwickdidnot,likeBeck,provide lexicon hisLanguage. a for AlthoughLodwick was interested enoughin the problemof
" 2 Cf.D. Abercrombie,Forgotten Phoneticians pp. 3 ff., Transacin ", tions the of Philological Society (1948). I amindebted Mr.Abercrombie to for drawing attention Lodwick. Somefurther to my references seventeenth to century Englishdiscussions the projectare to be foundin an article of by R. F. Jonesin Journal English of and Germanic xxxi (1932), Philology, p. 315 ff. 2 Mentioned a broadsIeetof G. Dalgarno's, in in MS. Sloane 4377 in theBritish Museum. Cf.J. A. Comenius, Pattern Universal A of Knowledge (1651),tr.J. Colrer. a In his notebook, MS. Sloane 897.

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phonogramsto devise a new phonetic notation, which was publishedin the Philosophical Transactions the Royal Society of in 1686 under the title of " An Essay towardsan Universal Alphabet", his universal language was ideographic. And seemsto havebeentheonlyseventeenth-century Urquhart thinker who based his new language on phonograms. Unfortunately mostofUrquhart's was manuscript lostat thebattleofWorcester in 1651. But an " Introduction the UniversalLanguage" to was saved, and published the next year.1 Urquhartclaimed that he had " couchedan alphabet materiative all the words of the mouth of man, with its whole implements, able to prois nounce", and brought" all these wordswithinthe systemof a language,which, reasonofits logopandocie, by may deseivedly be intituledThe Universal Tongue". So that " thereis not a wordutterableby the mouthof man, which,in this language, hath not a peculiar signification itself ". Indeed, "as, by accordingto Aristotle, there can be no more worldsbut one, becauseall thematter whereof worlds be composed in this; can is so therecan be no universallanguagebut this I am about to divulgeuntotheworld, becauseall thewordsenunciable in it are contained ". Yet " this worldof wordshath but two hundred and fifty primeradicesupon whichall the rest are branched ". had noticedthat " no languageeverhithertoframed Urqulhart hath observedany orderrelatingto the thing signified . .; . forifthe wordsbe rankedin theiralphabetical series, things the represented them will fall to be in severallpredicaments; by and if the thingsthemselves categorically be classed,the words whereby theyaremadeknown notbe tyedto anyalphabetical will rule ". This " imperfection however, would be remedied ", in his ownlanguage, where there wouldbe " a proportion between the sign and the thing signified Accordingly, ". among the sixty-sixadvantages which Urquhartclaimed for his scheme, he assertedthat " soonershall one reach the understanding of thingsto be signified the words of this language,than by by those of any other,for that as logarithms comparisonof in absolute numbers,so do the words thereofin their initials respectively vary accordingto the nature of the thingswhich they signify Moreover, "for definitions,divisions and ". distinctions, language is so apt; . . . for the affirmation, no negation and infinitation propositions, hath properties of it unknown any otherlanguage,mostnecessary knowledge; to for . . . and . . . in mattersof enthymems, syllogisms, and all
'In Eskybalauron, 1652. Republished with slight alterationsin 1653. Logopandecteision,

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manner illativeratiocination, is themostcompendious the of it in world". In 1653 an anonymousSpaniard is said to have published at Rome a schemefora universallanguage on Cartesianlines, whichhe proposedto achieve by dividing all concepts into classesand sub-classes numbering and boththe concept-class and the concept within its class.' And by 1654 a universal character Cartesian on lineshad also beenprojected SethWard, by professor astronomy Oxfordand previously lecturer of at a in mathematics Cambridge, thought " a misfortune the at who it to world, thatmyLord Bacon was notskilled mathematics, in which made him jealous of their assistance in natural enquiries ". Ward, like Descartes, thoughtthat the number of dif[erent characters requisitefora universallanguage on Baconian lines wouldbe so large " thatthe tradition learning facilation of or of it wouldbe butlittleadvancedbythismeans. But it didpresently occurto me,thatby thehelpoflogicand mathematics might this soonreceive m:ighty a for being resolved advantage, all discourses in sentences, those into words,wordssignifying either simple notionsor being resolvableinto simplenotions,it is manifest that if all the sortsof simplenotionsbe foundout, and bave symboles assigned them, to thosewillbe extremely in respect few ofthe other,. . . the reasonoftheircomposition easilyknown, and the most compounded ones at once will be comprehended, and yet will represent the veryeye all the elements their to of composition, and so deliverthe naturesof things: and exact discoursesmay be made demonstratively without any other pains than is used in the operationsof specious analytics."2 Ward neverdevelopedthese ideas in detail, but two friends of his did-George Dalgarno and John Wilkins-though the extent of their debt to him and to each other is in doubt.3 whotaughtfor Dalgarno,an Aberdonian thirty yearsat a private in Oxford, beenmaturing thoughts the grammmar-school had his on subject duringthe later fifties. In a letterto Samuel Hartlib (the publisher-philanthropist friend of Comenius), for and instance,dated 20 April 1657, he criticises-quite rightlyCave Beck's Universal Character " nothing as else but an enigmatical way of writingthe English Language ", and speaks more favourably a "treatise" publishedin 1647, which is of
1 L. Couturat, Logique Leibniz(1901),p. 51. I have beenunable de La to locatea copyofthisscheme. 2 Vindiciae Academiarum (1654),p. 21. 3 0. Funke,op. cit.,pp. 37 ff. Cf. Dugald Stewart's remarks quoted in the MaitlandClub'sedition Dalgarno'sworks(1834),pp. v ff. of

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probablyLodwick's CommonWriting.' He publishedhis own et Character Universalis LinguaPhilosophica, ArsSignorum, vulgo in 1661. In this workhe drew up a " Lexicon Grammaticosimpliomnium et seu Philosophicum, tabulae rerum, notionum quam naturalium, tam artefactarum ciorum,et generaliorum, methodo praedicamentali rationes et respectuscommuniores, ". ordinatas,complectentes There were seventeenirreducible categoriesaccordingto Dalgarno, and he designatedthem by of letters whicheach was the initialletterof all names seventeen of letters each underone catogory. The secondand third falling to it and sub-sub-class which referred, the namesignified sub-class necessary, where specialisation for provisions further and therewere of forinstance,in orderto deal with the classification plants. to couldalso be prefixed a wordin orderto denote letters Certain etc. The language twoextremes, the its opposite, meanbetween parts of between different distinction drew no fundamental and speech,forits authorheld that all these,even prepositions notions(though from primitive his couldbe derived interjections, herein favourof six pronouns). Instead, he made an exception designedto show whenand how therewererulesof word-order a word was being used adjectivallyor adverbially; and inby flexionsof tense, mood and voice were signified special by Dalgarno claimedto have discovered a processof sulffixes. Englishand Latin usage, " analysislogica", applied to ordinary the that his systemadequatelyrepresented normalarticulation of it ofhuman thought. In thisrespect is a crudeanticipation the analysis of conversationallanguage practised by symbolic logicianslike Reichenbach. But Dalgarno's systemis also a ". Thoughhe criticised of precursor whatLewis calls " logistic some features of Descartes' philosophy he was thoroughly spirit. He attackedtheBaconian imbuedwithitsmathematicist contemtheory,popular among many of his experimentalist a ", was no use for " doctrina praedicamentalis that poraries, there system. He held of in an arrangement all knowledge an ordered a and logic constituted singleart, the that, whilemetaphysics analogous was thisartand linguistics precisely difference between so and the between symbolised its symbol, that to the difference therewould be but one scienceof whenthe two werecorrelated Dalgarno believed not only that his them all. Accordingly, would make it mucheasierforthe youngto universal character learn the principlesof true science and the correctpractice oflogic,but also thatthe analyseswhichit made possiblewould ". rerum cognitionem And in et lead " in penitiorem interiorem
t

Cf.MS. Sloane 4377.

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view of the widespreadcontemporary interestin stenography and in the physiology speech,sightand hearing, is hardly of it surprisingthat Dalgarno made two furtherclaims for his Character.' He assertedthat it producedthe best short-hand so far invented, and also that it could be used for conveying knowledge the deaf and dumb. (His specialisedworkon the to latter subject, Didascalocophus, the Deaf and Dumb Man's or Tutor, was not published 1680.) till JohnWilkins, and Cromwell's brother-in-law first co-secretary (withHenryOldenburgh) the Royal Society, of had published as longago as 1641a book on cryptography which devotedone in he chapterto the problemof a universalcharacter.2 In 1668 he published Essay towards Real Character a Philosophical his a and Language. This workhad been commissioned some time previouslyby the Royal Society,and would have been published if muchsooner London'sgreatfire 1666had notdestroyed of most of the printedsheetsand a great part of the manuscript. As befitted sponsorsit was a much largerand morethorough its undertaking than Dalgarno's,thoughon the same generallines. Wilkins was aided in it by threecollaborators, expertin botany, zoologyand lexicography, respectively. There were now forty irreducible categoriesor summa genera and a vast range of subordinateclassifications.A much wider range of ordinary linguistic usage was examined, and as a resultWilkins adopteda distinction, whichDalgarno,thoughhe had himself once drawn it, had come to the conclusionwas not fundamental. Wilkins firmly distinguishes his languagebetweenwhat he calls " inin tegrals" (corresponding nouns,verbs, to adjectivesand adverbs) " and what he calls " particles (corresponding pronouns, to conjunctions, prepositions, inflexions, and interjections the copula). " Therewas a muchmorecomprehensivealphabetical dictionary, wherein Englishwordsaccording theirvarioussignificances all to are eitherreferred theirplaces in the philosophical to tables or explained by such words as are in those tables ". Wilkins' character, Dalgarno's,couldbe vocalisedin theform a dislike of tinctspokenlanguage,as well as translated into any written or spoken vernacular. But Wilkinsalso devised an entirely new notation (looking a printed on page something a crossbetween like Pitmanshorthand and ancientSyriac)forwriting character. his Wilkins believed in the same two fundamentalrequisites for the construction a universalcharacteras did Dalgarno. of
2

Ms. 10Cf. Sloane 4377. or Secret, Mercury, the Swift Messenger, 105ff. pp.

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of the was The first necessity " so to contrive enumeration things any as and notions, that theymay be fulland adequate,without of as redundancy deficiency to the number them,and regular or as to theirplace and order". The second basic requisitewas and notionthat thesemarks a thing so to contrive markforevery as to, shouldhave " a dependance uppn,and relation one another, mightbe suitableto the natureof the thingsand notionswhich ", they represented and that thus, " besides . . . helpingthe likewise would be highly memory. . ., the understanding improved,and we should, by learningthe characterand the natures". Indeed, likewise their in be namesofthings, instructed would" contribute muchto the thathis system he feltconvinced in by clearingof some of our moderndifferences religion, ununder the that shelterthemselves maskingmany wild errors, unphrases, which being philosophically disguise of affected folded, and renderedaccordingto the genuine and natural and importance words,will appear to be inconsistencies conof tradictions. And several of these pretended, mysterious, profound notions,expressedin great swellingwords,whereby some men set up forreputation, beingthis way examined,will appear to be eithernonsenseor veryflatand jejune ". Thus, about Chinese)had while Hobbes (as a resultof his knowledge for critiqueof ontology, instance, achieved an ad hoc linguistic those who spoke a languagewhichlacked a by askingwhether verb " to be " would ever use or be worried the notionsof by " entity " essence", and the like,' Wilkinswas apparently ", deflationary purposesby systematic proposing achievesimilar to language. Here again he analysis in termsof a philosophical Dalgarno,who had claimedforhis own character, was following in a dedicatoryletter, that " veritates philosophicaevariae vel transcendentales, extravaaperientur, Nullasdarenotiones v.g. potius quam philosogantes,ut de uno, vero,bono,fabulantur, ". phantur metaphysici And, like Dalgarno, Wilkins shared of thatthe construction sucha universal Descartes'belief neither nor Urquhart's millennium charactermust await the scientific messiah. He hopedthat that self-confidence he was thelinguistic of othermembers the Royal Societywould developand improve the to his system. In order examineitsutility Society appointed of a special committee, amongthe members whichwereRobert Wren,JohnWallis and RobertHooke.2 Boyle, Christopher
1 Leviathan, Schriften, pt. iv, ch. 46. Cf. Leibniz, Philosophischen vol. iv, p. 145. (1865-90), ed. Gerhardt Book of the Royal SocietyunderMay 14, 1668. 2Entryin Journal in by Register Thereis no traceofany report thiscommittee the Society's catalogue. Bookorin itslibrary

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III In view of Leibniz's greatinterest the detailsof Dalgarno's in and Wilkins'universal characters is surprising he seemsto it that have read theirbooks rathercarelessly one respect. To an in exampleof Dalgarno's character whichbelongedto him Leibniz appendedthe comment 'that, as he " had said to RobertBoyle ", and HenryOldenburgh Dalgarno and Wilkinshad not sufficiently grasped the magnitudeof the thing and its true use, " fortheirlanguageor character achievesthis alone, convenient betweenthose sunderedby language,but the communication one as truereal character, I conceiveit, wouldbe thought of the most apt instruments the human mind,with an invincible of ". power for discovery, memory and judgement Leibniz's in misunderstandingthisrespect echoedin 1901byL.Couturat was in his comprehensive studyof Leibniz's logic whichimmediately on becamethestandardworkof reference the subject.2 It may be that Lewis's error arose from too relying muchon Couturat's to thoroughness.I hope, however, have made it clear that in conceivingof a universalcharacteras an importantnew intellectualtool,withpowersnot possessedby ordinary languages, Leibniz was anticipated not onlyby Wilkinsand Dalgarno,but also by Ward, Urquhartand Descartes. It is only in thinking to ofa logicalcalculusas an ancillary hisuniversal character which would be usefulforeliciting implications that Leibniz seems to have had no precursor. Yet Leibniz, as is well known,was in not inspired thisdirection, onlyby readingHobbes' elliptical remark " Per ratiocinationem intelligocomputationem but ", also by his earlyacquaintancewithRaymondLully's ArsMagna whichKircherhad revisedand developedby 1665.3 Kircher's a like Lully's, comprised table of fundamental system, notions, fromwhichthe permissible combinations speciallysymbolised, of symbols could be read off as theorems. But apparently Kircherdid not associate his own universalcharacteror polythe method. After earlypublication graphiawiththisscientific to ofhis de ArteCombinatoria (1666),in whichhe sought develop the ideas of Lully and Kircher, Leibniz shows, in several
II, I, i, 2. Bacon had notedin hisNovum Organum, xxvii (Phiilosophlical ed. postulatethatif p. Works, Robertson, 335) that " The mathematical theyare equal to one anotheris are two things equal to the same thing in with conformable the ruleofthe syllogism logicwhichunitesproposiin tionsagreeing a middleterm." Cf. Locke, Essay, IV, xii, 15 for a on speculation the subject.
2 Op. cit., p. 76; cf. p. 60. 'Op. cit.,vol. vii,p. 7. (1669). Cf. Hobbes, De Corpore, 3Ars Magna Sciendi,Amsterdam

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discussions his projectfor a universalcharacter,'too much of of to importance experiment expect a respectforthe heuristic enquiriesalong the lines of completeanswer to all scientific that the withhis doctrine Lully's method. But in conformity is predicateof any trueproposition "'contained" in its subject, Lully's art, as Bacon did, as " a he was far fromcondemning but a mass and heap methodof imposture. . . , beingnothing ofthe termsof all arts,to the end that theywho are readywith ".2 the to the termsmay be thought understand artsthemselves the to it In conclusion may be of interest reviewbriefly main of in reasonswhyBacon was correct hislowestimate theprospects of a universal character,and why the seventeenth-century mathematicists'project of one which should constitute at a communication, simplified once a medium of international notationfor science,and a method of discoveryand demonmuddleand neverof the slightest was a philosophical stration, directhelp to any merchantor scientist,even thoughit may the to have done something inspire later workofmen indirectly like Linnaeus and Lavoisier. No doubt Kepler's laws, for instance, were not deducible within any of the proposed of systems. No doubt a Cartesian misconception the logic of scientificargument,and an Aristotelian preoccupation ratherthan the study of with the problemsof classification motion,were oftenmajor factorsin the muddle. But there were also other factors. It was clearly a mistake to think that the same language could serve adequately both as an auxiliary and also as a scientific unspecialisedinternational terminology.J. R. Firth3 has claimed,indeed,that Descartes one envisagedtwo kindsof universallanguage,a philosophical based on a logical systemand an ordinaryone for " esprits ". But Descartes' remarkson the subject do not vulgaires like to lend themselves this interpretation.He clearlythought, that any languagewouldbe far easier Urquhartand the others, withthe factsofnatureas systemato learnifit wereisomorphic tised by science. Dalgarno even reproducedin one of his RichardLove, dated May 1658,from broadsheetsa certificate, that two to of then professor divinityat Cambridge, the effect of youngbachelors arts, after spendingtwo hours a day for a in fortnight the study of his character,had learnt to communicate with one anotherin that language and to translate into,or out of,it. anything
2

1 Eg. in a

op. to letter Oldenburgh, cit.,vol. vii,pp. 11 ff. bk. Scientiarum, vi, ch. ii (op. cit.,p. 533). De Augmentis 3 The Tongues Man (1937),p. 70. of

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JONATHAN COHEN:

Now,thestructural which servesan international simplification abolitionof grammatical auxiliarybest,of course,is a sweeping infiexions-a simplification which all these languageswere far from carrying out. But,whenwordsare constructed a system on of parallel to the [cientific classification the thingsto which for they refer, theirmeaniings more,not less, difficult nonare scientists to avoid confusing. Moreover, though naming, description, classification, generalisation, reasoning, explanation and prediction themaintasksofscientific are speechand writinag, no-onewould now denythat these are far frombeingthe only purposes which we require an everyday language like an international auxiliaryto serve. But the range and flexibility of meaning is an whichwe expectfrom unspecialised vocabbulary quite inappropriate a taxonomicnotation,say, like that of for is modernchemistry. Again,scientific theory best servedby a associalanguagewhichcarriesover the least possibleirrelevant tions from non-scientific discourse. But an international auxiliaryis mosteasilylearntif its radicalsare alreadyfamiliar and these are therefore best drawn from words already in international currency, in L. Hcgben's Interglossa. as * Finally,while an unspecialised language must be capable of it applicationto all fieldsof human experience, has yet to be shownthat the ideal of a systematic can terminology usefully operatenot onlyat the levelofeach individual sciencebutalso at the level of scienceas a whole. We can organise richness the of ournon-scientific vocabulary intotablesofsynonyms, antonyms, whichacknowetc., like those providedby IRoget'sThesaurus, ledgesWilkins'spriority its field,and this may be usefulfor in writers cross-word or solvers,say, who are at a loss fora word. Or we can minimise numberof wordsand grammatical rules the in an unspecialised language,as in Basic English,and this may makeit easierfor foreigners learn. Orwe can design to languagepatterns the courseof whatR. Carnap1 calls " pure syntax" in and " pure semantics and fromthe study of these formal ", structures, from as othermethods analysis, may be able to of we discern logical principles-" general syntax"-underlying all possiblelanguages. Or we can construct interpreted an axiomsystemforsome part of natural science, as J. H. Woodger2 has triedto do forembryology, genetics biological and taxonomy. This, as Woodgerclaims,may for a time give order to the recordsand direction his activities. But experimenialist's to
1 LogicalSyntaxof Language, A. Smeaton(1937),p. 7, and Introtr. duction Semantics to (1942),p. 1. 2 The Axiomatic Method Biology in (1937).

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ifwe tryto do all thesefour things oncewe mayfailas badlyas at Dalgarno and the others failed, since projects like Roget's Thesaurusand Basic English,on the one hand, and Carnap's or Woodger'sconstructions, theother, on have littlein common. The former bound to accept unquestioned taskswhicha are the languageis called upon to perform are concerned and insteadto regulate one way or another shapesand soundswithwhich in the it performs them,while the latter are interested primarily in systematising taskswhich the someor all la,nguages or should can perform and are comparatively indifferent the shapes and to sounds whichare used forthis. Moreover, unlessthe unityof science, someimportant in sense,can be shownto be morethana metaphysical speculationor a restrictive programme, is not it surprising find that in practice scientistspreferto follow to Bacon's principle that " uniformity methodis not compatible of withmultiformity matter". of Accordingly, the impossibility combininga practicable of international auxiliarywith an adequate scientific terminology has been stressedin this centuryboth by linguistsand by scientists.l When, for inst,ance,Peano published the fifth volume, Formulairede MatheJmatiques of (1908) in Interlingua it was only his meta-language that was this uninflected Latin. 2 But, since some philosophers are still prone to talk about the properties " a perfect of language" as ifthe criteria linguistic of perfection were a uniquelydetermined of compatible set ideals, it is perhaps worth of whilepointing theerrors theseventeenth to century an illustration thisphrase'smisleading as of character. of Universitw St. Andrews
1 E.g. W. Ostwald International in Language and Science (1910), p. 55, and J. H. Woodgerin International Encyclopaedia Unified of Science, vol. ii, no. 5, pp. 1 ff. 2 E.g. B. Russell, Introduction Mathematical to Philosophy (1920), p. 183,but cf." Logical Atomism in Contemporary ", British Philosophy, First Series (1924), p. 377; cf. also J. R. Weinberg, Logical Positivism (1936),p. 25.