Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006 Senate vs.

Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al. G.R. No. 171396 03 May 2006 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. OVERVIEW: This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the following bases: The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President; Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued: February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend. February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I. February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military. The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan. The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows: Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.

Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al. The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand. ISSUES: 1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic; 2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that the said proclamation has none of it; 3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble. HELD: 1. The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case. 2. Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove. 3. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. CHREA vs. CHR (GR 155336, 25 November 2004)Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association (CHREA) vs. Commission onHuman Rights [GR 155336, 25 November 2004]Second Division, Chico-Nazario (J): 4 concur Facts: On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act 8522, otherwise known as theGeneral Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to AllConstitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers theappropriations of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). These special provisions tacklesOrganizational Structure and the Use of Savings. On the strength of these special provisions, theCHR, through its then Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Recia and Commissioners Nasser A.Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia, promulgatedResolution A98-047 n 04 September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification schemeamong selected positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creationof ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five ProcessServers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners. On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of certain positions in the Commission. It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of other positions. To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution,authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under PersonnelServices. By virtue of Resolution A98062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR collapsed thevacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffingmodification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, oneChemist III, three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget andManagement (DBM) with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary BenjaminDiokno denied the request. In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnelmodification scheme, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-National Capital Region Office,through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that thesubject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantillareclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of the Commission on Human Rights EmployeesAssociation (CHREA), in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requestedthe CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREAstood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as

creation of positions. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied thesame on 9 June 2000. Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the CSC,CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, andreclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. The CHREA filed the petition for review. Issue: Whether CHREA is a proper party to bring the suit in Court. Held: It has been held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is inimmediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, CHREA,which consists of rank and file employees of CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting tothe demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed,the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up theCommissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for PersonnelServices, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, arederived. Further, the personality of the CHREA to file this case was recognized by the CSCwhen it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC- National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in theCourt of Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands betied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as todo so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. Jaworski vs Pagcor Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! Jaworski v. Pagcor G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004 Facts: On March 31, 1998, PAGCORs board of directors approved an instrument denominated as Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming, which granted SAGE the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCORs casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia Ll. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document. Pursuant to the authority granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza outlets. Petitioner Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, P.D. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCORs franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869. Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the commonly accepted definition of gambling casinos, clubs or other recreation or amusement places as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law. Issues: (a) Whether respondent Pagcor is authorized under PD No. 1869 to operate gambling activities on the internet?

(b) Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it authorized respondent Sage to operate internet gambling on the basis of its right to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other amusement places under Section 10 of PD 1869? (c) Whether Pagcor acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted authority to Sage to operate gambling activities in the internet? Held: In their separate Comments, respondents PAGCOR and SAGE insist that petitioner has no legal standing to file the instant petition as a concerned citizen or as a member of the Philippine Senate on the ground that he is not a real party-ininterest entitled to the avails of the suit. In this light, they argue that petitioner does not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to impugn the validity of PAGCORs grant of authority to SAGE. Ordinarily, before a member of Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the government there must be an unmistakable showing that the challenged official act affects or impairs his rights and prerogatives as legislator. However in a number of cases, we clarified that where a case involves an issue of utmost importance, or one of overreaching significance to society, the Court, in its discretion, can brush aside procedural technicalities and take cognizance of the petition. Considering that the instant petition involves legal questions that may have serious implications on public interests, we rule that petitioner has the requisite legal standing to file this petition. Respondents likewise urge the dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition because under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, these remedies should be directed to any tribunal, board, officer or person whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. They maintain that in exercising its legally-mandated franchise to grant authority to certain entities to operate a gambling or gaming activity, PAGCOR is not performing a judicial or quasijudicial act. Neither should the act of granting licenses or authority to operate be construed as a purely ministerial act. According to them, in the event that this Court takes cognizance of the instant petition, the same should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to observe the hierarchy of courts. In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming operations. The petition is GRANTED. The Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID. KMU Labor Center v Garcia G.R. No. 115381. December 23, 1994 07/05/2010 0 Comments Facts: LTFRB Chairman Remedios A.S. Fernando submitted the following memorandum to Oscar M. Orbos on July 24, 1990, to wit: With reference to DOTC Memorandum Order No. 90-395 dated 26 June 1990 which the LTFRB received on 19 July 1990, directing the Board "to immediately publicize a fare range scheme for all provincial bus routes in the country (except those operating within Metro Manila)" December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses December 6, 1990, private respondent PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-the-board increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometer for ordinary buses. December 14, 1990, public respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase. On February 17, 1993, the LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587: The control in pricing shall be liberalized to introduce price competition complementary with the quality of service, subject to prior notice and public hearing. Fares shall not be provisionally authorized without public hearing. (Section V. Rate and Fare Setting) Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. Said increased fares were to be made effective on March 16, 1994. On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. Second, the establishment of a presumption of public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed transport service without having to prove public necessity is illegal for being violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. On March 24, 1994, the LTFRB issued one of the assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of merit. PBOAP, DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. and the LTFRB asseverate that the petitioner does not have the standing to

maintain the instant suit. They further claim that it is within DOTC and LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and establish a presumption of public need in applications for certificates of public convenience. Issue:Whether DOTC Department Order No. 92-587: Defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009: Promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 is violative of the Constitution, Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Whether, the twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is constitutional. Held: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 is both violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. The twenty (20%) per centum fare increase imposed by respondent PBOAP on March 16, 1994 without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on June 20, 1994 is hereby MADE PERMANENT insofar as it enjoined the bus fare rate increase granted under the provisions of the aforementioned administrative circulars, memoranda and/or orders declared invalid. Ratio: DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, and the order dated March 24, 1994 issued by respondent LTFRB are hereby DECLARED contrary to law and invalid insofar as they affect provisions therein: (a) delegating to provincial bus and jeepney operators the authority to increase or decrease the duly prescribed transportation fares; and (b) creating a presumption of public need for a service in favor of the applicant for a certificate of public convenience and placing the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service to the oppositor. LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 is INCONSISTENT with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. The provision does not put the burden of proof to the oppositor but the applicant. In view of legal standing: The principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. Court brushed aside this technicality because 'the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions before this court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. In view of DELEGATION Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service. The Authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. In view of Transcendental Importance One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will be

authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's is inconsistent with Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. G.R. No. 134958 January 31, 2001 PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City, respondents. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Before us is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on March 25, 1998 and the order dated August 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43930, a petition for prohibition originally filed with the appellate court to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing DENR Special Order Nos. 31, as amended by 31-A and 31-B, series of 1990, Special Order No. 25, series of 1993 and all other administrative issuances relative thereto, for having been issued without prior legislative authority.1wphi1.nt In 1990 the Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no. 311 entitled "Creation of a Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region". The special task force created thereunder was authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral and claims within the said area, and after due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim) in accordance with existing laws.2 On January 15, 1993 the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 253 entitled "Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide" and Department Administrative Order no. 02,4 containing the Implementing Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25. In 1990, the same year Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the land they, respectively occupy inside the Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of Baguio City. Also pursuant to the assailed administrative issuances the Heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an application5 for certification of ancestral land claim over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions of the land occupied by the petitioners. Petitioners claim that even if no certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued by the DENR in favor of the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents issued by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they applied for, including the portion occupied by herein petitioners. Petitioners also allege that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the improvements they introduced within the area they actually occupy and if not for the petitioner's timely resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would have been totally evicted therefrom. Hence, this petition for prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing the assailed administrative issuances and from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said administrative issuances are void for lack of legal basis. The Court of Appeals6 held that the assailed DENR Special Orders Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known as the National Integrated Protected Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect "for pre-empting legislative prerogative" but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No. 25, and its implementing rules (DAO No. 02, series of 1993) by the appellate court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the DENR under section 13 of RA 7586, which reads: "Section 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights over Them. Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest arising therefrom shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected areas: Provided, that the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent: Provided, however, that all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned indigenous community."7 The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review of the appellate court's decision on the ground that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Special Order No. 25 and its implementing rules. The petitioners seek to enjoin the respondent DENR from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land claim filed by the Heirs of Carantes. Petitioners contend that in addition to the failure of the DENR to publish the assailed administrative issuances in a newspaper of general circulation prior to its implementation, RA 7586, which provides for the creation of a National Integrated Protected Areas System, does not contain the slightest implication of a grant of authority to the DENR to adjudicate or confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities. It is contended that the said law only grants DENR administrative and managerial powers over designated national and natural parks called "protected areas" wherein rare and endangered species of plants and animals inhabit.8 The petitioners further allege that the subsequent passage of in 1997 of Republic Act 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, wherein the power to evaluate and issue certificates of ancestral land titles is vested in the National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People (NCIP) is unmistakable indication of the legislature's withholding of authority from the

DENR to confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities.9 Finally, the petitioners claim that the validity of the questioned DENR special orders cannot be based on the constitutional provisions regarding the protection of cultural communities as the said provisions are policy statements to guide the legislature in the exercise of their law-making powers and by themselves are not self-executory. The Solicitor-General filed memorandum in behalf of the respondent DENR praying for the affirmance of the appellate court's decision. The respondent argues that the subject DENR special orders were issued pursuant to the powers granted by RA 7586 to the DENR to protect the socio-economic interests of indigenous peoples. The land occupied by the petitioners is within a "protected area" as defined by the said law and is well within the jurisdiction of the DENR. The respondent likewise claims that the petitioners are estopped from contesting the validity of the DENR administrative issuances considering that their relatives applied for certificates of ancestral land claim (CALC) under the said special orders which applications were, however, denied. The petitioners should not be allowed to challenge the same administrative orders which they themselves previously invoked. The respondents do not contest the ruling of the appellate court as regards the nullity of Special Order no. 31, as amended. The sole issue before us concerns the validity of DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993 and its implementing rules DAO no. 02. The petitioners' main contention is that the assailed administrative orders were issued beyond the jurisdiction or power of the DENR secretary under the NIPAS Act of 1992. They seek to enjoin the respondents from processing the application for ancestral land claim filed by the heirs of Carantes because if approved, the petitioners may be evicted from the portion of the land they occupy which overlaps the land applied for by the Carantes heirs. From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground. We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioners' memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the heirs of Carantes under the assailed DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners' asserted right to possess the land by reason by the implementation of the questioned administrative issuances. A justiciable controversy has been defined as, "a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest"10 which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.11 Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot.12 Subject to certain welldefined exceptions13 courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity.14 In the case of PACU vs. Secretary of Education15 the petition contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the future. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does not amount to a justiciable controversy. The questioned regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a private school whose permit to operate has been revoked or one whose application therefor has been denied.16 This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged right of the petitioner to possess the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the DENR. The petitioners' allegation that certain documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice it to say that by the petitioners own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of Carantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes' application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at some future time. Borrowing from the pronouncements of this Court in the PACU case, "They (the petitioners) have suffered no wrong under the terms of the lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain."17 If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners possession thereof even without prior approval by the DENR of the claim of the heirs of Carantes, the case is simply one for forcible entry. Wherefore, for lack of justiciable controversy, the decision of the appellate court is hereby set aside. DENR V. DARAMAN Facts: On or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or licensetherefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989. The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified that he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. He then took hold of the vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt marked as

Exhs. B and series. ISSUE: WHETER OR NOT Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already owned by the government. HELD: Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law. A comparison of the provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. The original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same is vested in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations. NHA V. PASCUAL FACTS: On August 3, 1959, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2616 was enacted providing for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate and the sale of the lots to present bonafide occupants. Thereafter, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was designated as administrator of the Tatalon Estate Housing Project by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1261. Pursuant thereto, petitioner NHA awarded in 1983 Lot 3, Block 12 of the Tatalon Estate Urban Bliss Project (TEUBP), containing an area of 65 square meters, to Dolores Maranan, since she was included in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants. On May 25, 1983, a Transfer Notice was given to Maranan and a Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed on May 31, 1983. Respondent Pascual however, assailed the award of the subject lot to Maranan by filing a letter-complaint7 on February 14, 1983 before the General Manager of NHA, alleging that she is the rightful beneficiary of the said lot being the actual occupant thereof and for having resided in the Tatalon Estate since 1968. Pascual averred that after marrying Aurelio Pascual in 1975, they used the subject lot for their domicile and operated a motor shop as well and were included in the 1976 Census. However, sometime in 1983, their house was demolished and relocated to an inner lot. ISSUE: whether the award of the subject lot to Dolores Maranan can still be nullified and set aside by the courts HELD: It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. In the case at bar, since petitioners decision was seasonably appealed by respondent, the same has not attained finality and the principle of res judicata does not apply. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that respondent is a qualified beneficiary. The award in favor of Maranan being null and void, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in her name should be cancelled. Respondent is a qualified beneficiary and entitled to be awarded the subject lot as it appears that she is the only person who pursued the claim against the wrongful grantee. Otherwise, it will be the height of injustice should the subject lot be granted to some other applicants who did not pursue a claim over the subject lot. CARINO V. CHR FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. Investigate vs. Adjudicate "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Alcuaz FACTS: By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications. Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulationof the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communicationsdoes not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power. HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the case at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and reasonable. Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 11 SCRA 317 (1964) FACTS: In an alleged letter-petition, petitioner was charged with black market of electric meters and that its meters were installed in bad faith to register excessive rates. Petitioner received a communication from General Auditing Office (GAO) that it will be audited. PSC issued subsequently a subpoena duces tecum requiring petitioners to produce before PSC, during a conference scheduled for April 10, 1962, certain book of accounts. Petitioner moved to quash such subpoena. The conference was postponed twice until it was finally cancelled. In May 1962, PSC issued an order, which after finding that petitioner had an excess of revenues by 18%, lowered the present meter rates of petitioner. Hence, this petition for certiorari is instituted. ISSUE: WON notice and hearing is required RULING: Yes. In support to its special defense, respondent PSC maintains that rate-fixing is a legislative function; that legislative or rulemaking powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice or hearing. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Here, the order exclusively applies to petitioner. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact, whether the petitioner is making a profit more than 12% of its invested capital which is denied by the petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of the said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi- judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Indeed, Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of CA No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing. Wherefore, we hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order complained of partakes the nature of quasi-judicial function and that, having been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of the due process clause, and hence, null and void. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Garcia FACTS : Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below

the LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year. This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range." Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal. HELD: Yes. Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. x x x However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service. 2. 3. Tan vs. Director of Forestry G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in her capacity as Secretary of the Board, petitioners, vs. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAMON P. NADAL, respondents. U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioners. Bonifacio A. Alentajon for private respondent.

ROMERO, J.: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the people, the U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by the public clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist profile of the U.P studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end the application form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows: Statement of the Student

I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information which I have furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that any willful misinformation and/or withholding of information will automatically disqualify me from receiving any financial assistance or subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the University. Furthermore, is such misinformation and/or withholding of information on my part is discovered after I have been awarded tuition scholarship or any form of financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse all financial benefits plus the legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of the reimbursement without prejudice to the filing of charges against me. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my home/residence to verify the veracity of the information provided in this application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension of withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges. Student's Signature Statement of the Applicant's Parent or Guardian I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the information which my son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this application together with all the documents attached. I further recognize that in signing this application form, I share with my son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and completeness of the information supplied herein. (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my home/residence to verify the information provided in this application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges of my son/daughter/dependent. Parent's/Legal Guardian's/Spouse's Signature 1 From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program. One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate falsification or suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form. To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. 2 In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. 3 On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, wellpaying employment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, was shouldering the expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers. 4 Noting further discrepancies between Nadal's application form and the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following: That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a student of the College of Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) recipient (Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) benefits which he filed for schoolyear 1989-1990, and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of Scholarship and Student Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance Service) voluntarily and willfully withheld and did not declare the following:

(a)

That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and

(b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A., in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico, which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, and further amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988). 5 On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT 6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June 1992]." As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action." 8 The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On November 26, 1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR meeting on January 25, 1993. 9 On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Education, thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that, after a close review of Nadal s case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find Mr. Nadal's appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10 At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as an immigrant 'TNT' in the United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. 11 Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly against the advice of his counsel. 12 The motion was placed on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day before said date, Senator Shahani wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal's case be deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting. On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with Nadal's case as the sole item on its agenda. Again, Nadal's motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred. At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal Falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews." He added that "the respondent's eligibility for his AdeMU high school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way establish that he is 'not guilty as charged' before the SDT," since the formal charges against him do not include withholding of information regarding scholarship grants received from other schools. At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive session where the following transpired: The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the Secretary to reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following decisions of the Board in executive session, with only the Board members present. A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty as charged of willful withholding of information in relation to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which

he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the Executive Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes, pending verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila University of Ramon P. Nadal's statement in his STFAP application that he was granted scholarship while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received financial assistance, then the conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman requested the President to make the verification as soon as possible the next day. In answer to a query, the Chairman clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo, there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision. The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes. The Chairman himself did not vote. 13 In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty" as the members voted as follows: six members guilty, three members not guilty, and three members abstained. 14 Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. 15 On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that "after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to pay for (his) financial obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature take its course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding the case. 16 However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed: After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows: a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;

b. Ordering respondents 'to uphold and implement their decision rendered on 28 March 1993, exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT No. 91-026; c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least P150,000.00.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for. 17 The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court declared that the only issue to be resolved was "whether or not the respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal's) right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents' counsel whether they were amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel replied in the negative, asserting the University's prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of discipline. 18 On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following Order: The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident (application for preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order and opposition thereto). For lack of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30 p.m. In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not be rendered moot and academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva, President of the University of the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella, members of the U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili, the officers, agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby temporarily restrained from implementing their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 entitled University of the Philippines vs. Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon Room, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court. SO ORDERED. Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile

witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued the following Order: The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the herein petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on his (the Chairman's) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While he main issue of violation of due process raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 21-026 and from suspending the petitioner for one year. It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there must be a right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the March 29 Board meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, in administrative proceedings, a respondent's right to due process exists not only at the early stages but also at the final stage thereof. With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well as to other UP personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this case had already been filed, the Court is convinced that there now exists a threat to the petitioner (respondent in SDT Case No, 91-026) that the decision of the Board of Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully withholding information material to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at any time, especially during the enrollment period, and this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. The injury thus caused would be irreparable. "Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. Where the damage is susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not irreparable." (Social Security Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962). IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in the instant proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents, their officers, agent(s), representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending petitioner, upon the latter's filing a bond in the amount of P3,000.00. IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order, raising the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied due process in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal. Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not real parties in interest who should file the same. 21 A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 'Interest' within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest." 22 Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline by withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have the effect of subverting a commendable program into which the University officials had devoted much time and expended precious resources, from the conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public funds allocated to the State University. Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. 23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be served on "the president or secretary thereof'." It is in accordance with these legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality. 24 No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of an academic institution to refuse admission to a student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 25 wherein certain law students were dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter of admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore, beyond the province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.

One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondent's counsel: "What was conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on March 28, 1993." 26 With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non v. Dames II 27 that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," 28 the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining in Non v. Dames II and in the instant case. In the former case, the students were refused admission for having led or participated in student mass actions against the school, thereby posing a collision between constitutionally cherished rights freedom of expression and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for having breached the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the students were not afforded due process for even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to have been a mere afterthought on part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate until the BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda. In any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was "supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him." 29 Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he was "not morally convinced that there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because there was no direct evidence that his mother received income from the United States and this income was sent to the Philippines to support the studies of the children." 30 Two regents shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed that, upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU about Nadal's alleged scholarship as a student in said institution. Consequently, no definitive decision was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993, Much less was a verdict of exoneration handed down as averred by respondent. Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting where all twelve members of the BOR were present, that all of them participated in the voting held to reconsider the previous day's decision. He stated "I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the voting again on the ground that there was already a final decision, but there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration can be decided by the board, and a majority of the board ruled that the matter can be reconsidered again upon motion of the chairman." 31 At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that he was not guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio, the final decision was that which was rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no other decision was made by the Board with respect to the same issue." 32 Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge." 33 Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. 34 It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light of the foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student

days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." (Emphasis supplied for emphasis) Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty and integrity are requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification of good moral character is one of the documents that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for disqualifying him. To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue operating. In more relevant terms, through its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to exercise its academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in the implementation of the critically important STFAP. At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is encompassed by the right of academic freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court stated that a school or college which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students." Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 37 the Court further expounded: Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools. Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Emphasis supplied.) On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39 Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University's exercise of academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the University officials helplessly watching him complete his academic requirements for taking the Bar. 40 In the event that he be allowed to continue with his studies he would, in effect render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension

legally imposed upon him by the BOR's final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting certain facts or as in instant case, withholding vital information and stating downright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violated the rules and regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying it's operations. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus. SO ORDERED. Case Digest on Cuevas v. Bacal G.R. No. 139382 (December 6, 2000) November 10, 2010 FACTS: Respondent passed the Career Executive Service Examination. She was appointed Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office. Later, she was designated as acting chief Public Attorney. Upon change of administration, respondent was appointed Regional Director. Respondent argued she was removed without cause. HELD: The rank level of respondent is Rank level III. The position of Chief Public Attorney required rank level I. As respondent does not have the required Rank, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent and she cannot claim the right to a security of tenure.