Analysis

January 7, 2013

Summary: As the country moves into 2013, Turkeys domestic politics appears polarized, characterized by uncertainties about the future and the ability of the country to meet them. A glance at Turkish politics will lead any observer to identify some persistent problems as well as others that have become more important recently. Many are linked with each other, and not all lend themselves to concerted policy action by the government and the opposition. A shortlist of these would include the writing of a new constitution, the addressing of the Kurdish aspirations for ethnic recognition and rights, the redefinition of the position of the military in Turkish politics, the functioning of the Turkish judicial system, and the declining character of Turkish democracy.

2012 Goes, Problems Remain!

by lter Turan

OffiCes Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw Tunis

As the country moves into 2013, Turkeys domestic politics appears polarized, characterized by uncertainties about the future and the ability of the country to meet them. This is surprising for a country that has managed to escape the vagaries of the crisis many European economies are facing, and which is constantly reminded by its political leadership that it has been enjoying high rates of economic growth and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Yet, a summary glance at Turkish politics will lead any observer to identify some persistent problems as well as others that have become more important recently. Many are linked with each other: solving one may entail a partial solution of another, and what happens in one domain affects others. Not all lend themselves to concerted policy action by the government and the opposition. And, they are affected not only by what had happened in the past but also by what may transpire in the future, such as in the case of the pending presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015, respectively. A shortlist of these would include the writing of a new constitution, the addressing of the Kurdish aspirations for ethnic recognition and

rights, the redefinition of the position of the military in Turkish politics, the functioning of the Turkish judicial system, and the declining character of Turkish democracy. Turkey Fails to Write a New Constitution After the 2011 elections, the leaders of all parties represented in the Turkish parliament acknowledged that the current Turkish constitution, prepared under military rule and guided by security considerations, should be replaced by one written by elected civilian governments. Soon, a parliamentary mechanism to draft the new text was devised. Under the guidance of the speaker, a committee to which each party with a parliamentary group (20 members of parliament) would appoint two representatives would be established. The committee would operate on the basis of unanimity. A year and a half later, little progress has been made. Several difficulties have stood in the way. There are fundamental differences among parties even on some introductory provisions, which may appear to be non-issues to outsiders. Take the example of what

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the citizens of the country are to be called: Are they Turks, the people of Turkey, the citizens of the Turkish Republic, or something else? To the ethnically based Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), calling the citizens of the country Turks would point to aspirations to ethnic homogeneity that belies the multi-ethnic nature of Turkish society, reconfirming the policies of denial of Kurdish existence that have prevailed since the beginning of the republic. To the strongly nationalistic Nationalist Action Party (MHP), on the other hand, the people of this country are Turks and searching for other names is in itself a divisive undertaking. Similar issues abound. Progress is slow. The optimism that had characterized the post-election period has been replaced by pessimism that the parliament will fail to get a new constitution before the next elections in 2015. More recently, the debate about whether the country should move to a presidential system has resurfaced, with strong backing from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan. All the opposition parties dislike the idea and it is a major stumbling block to the writing of a new constitution. But the debate itself is hardly new. The late president, Turgut zal, and then his successor, Sleyman Demirel, both elected while serving as prime minister, initiated discussion on the adoption of a presidential system arguing that it would bring greater political stability. The public displayed certain skepticism toward the debate, judging that former prime ministers found it frustrating to adjust to a prestigious job possessing mainly symbolic powers. This time, however, the situation is different. The current prime minister is pushing the change with the clear intention of preparing the office for 2014 when, everyone expects, he plans to run for president. It appears that the particular system he has in mind is one where the checks and balances that characterize the U.S. system will not be operative. He has already made comments indicating that he envisions an executive system not constrained by other branches. Since all other parties are opposed to it, the interjection of changing the parliamentary system into the constitutionmaking process has insured that little progress will be made at this stage. The efforts of the speaker do not constitute sufficient credible stimulus for the process to continue. Is the process then dead? Not necessarily, if the current interparty mechanism is bypassed. Prime Minister Erdoan may decide to try to change the constitution without incorporating the opposition in the process. The current constitution details two ways to change the constitution. A two-thirds majority of the whole house is sufficient for the parliament to affect the change directly with presidential approval. But if a proposed change receives more than three-fifths but less than two-thirds of the whole house (367 >n> 331), then it may be adopted if backed by a majority in a public referendum. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a few votes short of the 331 deputies that would be required to submit amendments to voter approval. It may try to find these few votes by either trying to join forces with one opposition party (none seems to be ready) or attracting defectors from other parties. Such a plan may not succeed, however, since some AKP deputies are also said to be unsure about the desirability of change. The failure in October of a constitutional amendment to move the local elections ahead signals that any plans may encounter difficulties at the implementation stage. During 2012, the hope that the Turkish parliament might provide the country with a civilian constitution were dashed. A patchwork of changes before and after the elections of 2011 has helped reduce the political role of the military in politics and brought some changes to the judicial system. Kurdish Problem Continues In contrast to previous Turkish governments, the AKP government was thought to move the solution to Turkeys Kurdish problem from the security to the political domain. In 2009, a modus vivendi between the Turkish government and the PKK was thwarted by a crowded welcome that the BDP organized at the border where a band of militants were to surrender. The general public saw the incident as a show

Prime Minister Erdoan has already made comments indicating that he envisions an executive system not constrained by other branches.
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of force against Turkeys government, which was already seen as too accommodating, and the opening was terminated. Since that time, the government has pursued a twopronged approach. On one hand, it has treated the PKK and its affiliated political organizations as exclusively security questions. Counter-terrorism laws have been employed to arrest and bring civilians to trial, including local elected officials who were thought to extend support to or facilitate the activities of the PKK. These have been buttressed by military actions against terrorist bands that operate in the mountainous countryside of Turkeys southeast as well as in the Qandil mountain region in Northern Iraq. On the other hand, the government has initiated policies that are thought to accommodate Kurdish aspirations of recognition of ethnicity. The opening of a Kurdish language channel on Turkish State Television, the initiation of Kurdish language, history, and culture programs at some universities, the publication of books in Kurdish by the Ministry of Culture, and the restoration of the original Kurdish names of towns and villages that were given Turkish names are but a few examples of this approach. Furthermore, the government has pursued policies to stimulate economic growth in the region. But 2012 was a challenging year. The PKK tried to implement a plan to acquire political and administrative control of the southeastern countryside. A combination of effective military operations and the arrest of alleged civilian collaborators by the government led to its total failure. The government, while uncompromising in its insistence that PKKs armed action was totally unacceptable, has demonstrated a recent willingness to communicate indirectly with Abdullah calan, the PKK leader currently in prison after it became known that such discussions had already taken place with a variety of PKK representatives inside and outside of Turkey earlier. 2013 offers some hope that PKK terror may end, and that Turkeys Kurdish problem will be transferred exclusively to the domain of democratic politics. Impediments, nevertheless, remain. A miscalculation like that of 2009 is always possible. Prime Minister Erdoan sees a potential ally in the MHP in shaping his political future, but the nationalists are the least compromising on recognizing non-Turkish ethnicity. As is typical in ending terrorism, some PKK elements may reject any agreements. Their recalcitrance

2013 offers some hope that PKK terror may end, and that Turkeys Kurdish problem will be transferred exclusively to the domain of democratic politics.
may be supported by some of Turkeys neighbors, who have traditionally seen in the PKK a nuisance asset they can employ against Turkey. Civilian Control of the Military A Never Ending Process of Justice As may be recalled, starting in 2008, special prosecutors initiated court proceedings against a number of highranking retired and active duty military officers for having conspired to organize a set of activities that would set the political stage for a military takeover. Since that time, the cases have multiplied and have to come to include an ever-increasing number of officers. While there is no question that holding conspirators to account for their deeds no matter how high their rank ought to be welcome in a democracy with a history of interruptions by the military, the particular way justice has been administered has been problematic:

Many officers, including chiefs of staff and force

commanders, have been kept in custody or under arrest without having specific charges leveled against them while prosecutors have searched for evidence to prepare their cases; after long prison stays for fear that they might destroy evidence or escape the country, though these are almost non-existent contingencies; to defame the accused;

Those in custody or under arrest have not been released

Evidence that has no bearing on a case has been leaked

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Inadmissible evidence as well as that which was clearly
Turkish politics to one of a clash of negotiable economic interests over which democratic competition is usually built. In the future, 2012 may be remembered as a year of missed opportunity or, alternatively, a critical juncture.

tampered with has been admitted, while the defendants have sometimes been denied the opportunity to contest it; and support to the defense have been taken off cases.

Judges and prosecutors that have expressed occasional

Only one case has been concluded so far. In the so-called Sledgehammer case, several high ranking ex-commanders have received sentences of 14 years or more in prison. Other cases that have been continuing for the past four years are yet to be concluded. There is no question that the trials have removed any doubts that the democratic control of the armed forces has finally been achieved. Yet, the particular way it has been achieved appears to have undermined the publics confidence in the rule of law and in a judiciary guided by high ethical and professional standards. How welcome it would have been to achieve the first goal without challenging the second. 2012: A Critical Juncture? The deterioration of the character of Turkeys democracy has already been dealt with recently in these series1 and there is no need to repeat those comments here. But a concluding observation is in order. Speaking on the eve of the AKPs electoral victory in 2011 at his partys headquarters, Prime Minister Erdoan sounded conciliatory, saying that he would be everybodys prime minister. At the time, he raised hopes that he might help overcome the fundamental cleavage in Turkish politics between modernistsecularists and traditional-religionists that has polarized the countrys politics ever since the beginnings of Turkeys modernization under the Ottomans and the republic. 2012 clearly marked the abandonment of the politics of conciliation. Instead, the prime minister, picking and choosing from different periods of republican history and referring to incidents out of context, developed an idealized past of oppression by modernist-secularist cadres out of which his party has led the oppressed to salvation. While much of the electorate may not find this argument as credible as Prime Minister Erdoan may hope, it does not help repair the polarization of society along cultural lines and transform
1 lter Turan, Turkeys Diminutive Democracy, On Turkey Series, German Marshall Fund of the United States, November 19, 2012, http://www.gmfus. org/archives/turkeys-diminutive-democracy/

About the Author

lter Turan is a professor of political science at Istanbuls Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His previous employment included professorships at Ko University (1993-1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the chair of the International Relations Department (19871993), and the director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East (1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Committee and a vice president of the International Political Science Association (2000-2006). He is a frequent commentator on Turkish politics on TV and newspapers.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

About the On Turkey Series

GMFs On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkeys current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellectuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers. To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www. gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database. gmfus.org/reaction.