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Aquinas's Moral Theory Author(s): Ralph McInerny Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 31-33 Published by: BMJ Publishing Group Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27716553 . Accessed: 12/04/2012 01:23
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Journal of medical ethics, 1987, 13, 31-33

Moral

theories

Aquinas's
Ralph Mclnerny

moral

theory

University ofNotre Dame, Indiana, USA

The moral theory of St Thomas Aquinas

has a theological as well as a philosophical

(1225-1274)
aspect;

their knows.

truth Such

can

be

decided

truths may

to what anyone by appeal to be true because be believed

indeed
theoretically theology.

Thomistic
complete I shall here

moral

philosophy,

while
into moral the moral

is subsumed in itself, be concerned only with

God revealed them, but in their case belief can be replaced by knowledge. De fide truths, like the
incarnation cannot well If what has and been be known and general trinity to be true in this life. revealed can resurrection, as de fide truths contains we would be known, expect of pagan in the the up teachings Thomas this happens, holds; Exactly philosophers. of Aristotle, in the writings interest his insatiable hence as truths which to show latter

on the philosophy of Aquinas, but first a word of considering his moral philosophy without possibility
his moral theology. discussing Thomas As a Christian, accepts as true because they propositions a great number of revealed have been

as by God. A proposition is defide if (a) it is accepted true (b) because God has revealed it and (c) there is no
way independent that Christ believes persons resurrection. three Thomas Thus, that there are and divine, is human in God and that there will be a general to decide its truth. feature of the de fide neither can that,

all of which were becoming available in Latin for the

first time. philosophy of how can we now ought be to defined act as which that is Moral knowledge The to be

It is another other than God's

independent of religious belief for its acceptance.

moral Aristotelian that moral philosophy Like ethics. Aristotle, is a version of of Aquinas he will take the end

while
something

its truth can not be decided

say-so,

by appeal

to

such

some propositions be known to be false. Although Christians have described faith dramatically as the
as acceptance Thomas Aquinas true of what among actions that is known them. as one these are ordered love to one's to be false, is not human

De fide
also God. be

truths are chiefly about God, but they can

should

such of practical considerations, as to how are in effect judgements precepts can A certain kind of action the end is to be achieved. or bad to the degree as good that it is be assessed too are subject to the end desired. But ends conducive the beginning to moral the actions appraised agent. human not for appraisal. which with Good agent; ends Aristotle, of attaining the means to the nature of reference As with are and means ends are those are and means sought and are them, the human the are

about

The injunction about the is such a truth. What as oneself neighbour to Moses were which of the Decalogue given precepts revealed Are on Mount Sinai? obviously they not truths? one seems that is to charity the injunction While incumbent upon theft the believer are moral as believer, it would seem

ends bad

befitting those which

Human

Law. ismeant is what This thus fitting. by Natural are synonymous actions and moral actions a human as counts action? What Aquinas. done Not with every to a human deliberation, consciously, or activity that can truly event act. as a human counts person are what when dropped, falling of man' activities but not that human come under acts. acts. the It is one

odd

to think

the prohibitions

of murder,

lying,

Anything voluntarily. be ascribed Digesting, Thomas

maintains

religious and large the Ten Commandments or believer are moral person, any human principles of he is guilty as true. Either should not, recognise is necessary. or further confusion precision gross and revealed' not does Thomas 'being identify is a necessary revealed de fide'. though Being 'being of being de fide and some truths not sufficient condition have been revealed which need not have been because

and adultery is contingent

upon that by

whose acceptance precepts in fact Thomas belief. And

ageing, calls 'acts and

Thinking are moral human actions, sway of thought to be growing, beard thing for Socrates's to grow a beard. for Socrates Human we

all other

it is another

we do, acts are teleological; that is, whatever are responsible Actions do for some end or purpose. and the question we are answerable for them, because

Key words
Moral theories; moral theory of St Thomas Aquinas.

asked is: 'Why did you do that'? If it is granted that

each and it could for some end, act is undertaken every human a vast number of is simply there be that

32 Ralph Mclnerny

disparate

and

unrelated ordered the course the ends sick. to

ends. further in order There we

But

clearly

some

had when senses virtues constituents of rational

the virtues The the virtues the

of rational human

are objectives to pass studies to cure order superordinate were some human

One objectives. to get the degree in subordinate act. What end we actions it. there cited is such two an reasons of would all and if there that a have

are had.

are

for which

ultimate

single bad. The end; Like ultimate for

persons ultimate

superordinating If there were, for assessing criterion do? those thwart

practical virtues. in the third sense, moral activity some well It is now clear that single 'Performing of man's ultimate kind of act' is not a good description end.

in its various activity then have as its good will the of the speculative intellect, of and the virtues intellect,

be good ones would the bad ones those which Thomas Aristotle, end of all we do. holds

as good or to that conducive

that

Aristotle

is to act of human action The ultimate objective the well but that turns out to mean achieving rationally These virtues virtues of rational activity. (in the plural) or can be ranked in terms of dignity in two ways, either of the in terms Virtues of priority and necessity. use of our mind and wisdom such as science speculative are more as perfective is of the activity which desirable such to man form. Moral in its purest virtues, peculiar as temperance and justice, will be more come first; if they do not, circumstances the acquisition virtues of speculative will like Aristotle, obtain. Thomas, ultimate consisting to mean which It the human end, in contemplation. that there is some is the human is sometimes good, This our should activity necessary conducive are unlikely of speak happiness, not be and to to the as taken of this

thinking

'happiness'. that all

we a name so. First, for it, viz have it is the assumption of legislation Second, can overt acts the for be regulated which is thus taken or to be the ultimate Aristotle itmakes of human commanding prohibiting. for assuming end

commonweal, for criterion takes sense action The of that human these is. good

as prima to ask what

reasons facie in fact the ultimate

for man will be the fulfilment or task which or function activity

or perfection is peculiar

to

a thing is If you know what agents. a basis have it is a good for deciding whether a knife of its type. If a knife that is for cutting, is a good one. the eye If the eye is for seeing, a function one. Does man well is a good have sense? function? Thomas's on his of affirmative answer Is there some peculiarly human

for, you instance cuts well that task sees or in this

single good without to be taken

the virtue to

qualification. an objection

to say: stealing and spoiling the and cheating are peculiar to human and, since beings as immoral, are generally such activities regarded to the human is no guide human behaviour distinctively procedure environment But of course the distinctively human function good. can be performed or badly. That well is the point of as performing of virtue it well. The activities speaking mentioned are precisely instances of performing it

between earlier distinction a man. can be truly a number of activities Quite to human are not peculiar or ascribed which beings

to this question relies acts and acts human

badly. Thomas Aquinas is scarcely guilty of saying that

act every human What criteria human on action from end moral the ultimate the natural this is just as such good. are for distinguishing there bad? It is here that Thomas's with his Thomas should be connected would good talk of teaching

proper to them. All of the following may be true (a) Socrates is falling, (b) Socrates is hungry and (c)
Socrates tells Xanthippe he is going to the Agora to

engage in dialogue. The subject of (a) could be any physical body, of (b) any animal, but only humans in (c). engage in the kind of activity mentioned
human Peculiarly activity the analogy of the examples the human consists good rational The variety activity difficulty of things, well. is that and we 'rational are back activity' again humans the do can mean a to the point of do is truly on Thus, activity. in the previous paragraph, in performing quite simply is rational

reply to talk of acting for ends and of rational objection: as peculiar as perfective to men, talk of virtue activity law. What it remains it is since Alas, formal, purely with of the good different notions compatible radically life. I may define with virtues connected rational activity undertaken of are some There another's to my classical is in relation ignorance, advantage, conception no way to to others telling etc and of as taking untruths may We the law take there is in the are are

of that activity, is all well and good. Indeed, it is quite

useful.

even if whatever that saying as rational describable activity, are infinitely and we various,

do things humans seem not to have a unified achieved view. One thing we can do is sort out some major meanings It can first of 'rational activity'. as such, of all be taken to mean the activity of thinking an activity the way Sometimes which things aims are. at ascertaining the this Call theoretical truth about thinking. an eye to like other

advantage when they embrace disagree.

you

justice.

adjudicate moral would that

disagreement by argument. on a natural The Thomistic doctrine a response to that view. Thomas effect objection common embedded which no adventurous that what to be incoherent. of nature He human of to know. on holds guidelines in the very one can claim. is difficult fail

directing

choosing. than thinking be called the word function

is engaged in with thinking some than other activity thinking, Call this practical Activities thinking. which come under

action the human That may it makes

which

agent and an seem manifest and and

activity to express a settled way of performing used we can say that the human well. Thus, good

rational

the sway of reason can sense. Virtue in a further is a is

Reflection is to maintain

law precepts Thomas By natural self-evident of the practical precepts

its opposite. means the first use of reason,

Moral

theories:

Aquinas's

moral

theory

33

he discusses evident reason. most

them on an analogy with the first and self or speculative use of of the theoretical precepts we form will be an instance notion of the Any notion, 'being'. Any and use judgement in the of same we make sense be the

of murder, arguments are which essentially precepts precepts

and lying. Thomas theft, adultery to the effect that these are kinds always destructive and of everywhere the good and

general

wrong for man. These to more

fashions of activity because are

will have embedded in it the primary judgement that a

thing cannot and not be. primary simultaneously In the practical our mind,

of great generality in two ways.

relate

specific

is 'good' and the first nongainsayable concept that the good should be pursued and done and precept The is the evil avoided. theory does not say that 'being' first forms anyone is of a being. and affirmation simultaneously word that the first idea he utters, only is not 'An So too one's first sentence its true'. contradictory But all human cannot discourse be is

as the selection of the term 'law' suggests, First, are taken to be presupposed these precepts by positive are in conflict laws which with law, such that positive them are not morally A law may binding. incorporate a natural law its prohibition degrees extensions distinguishing sanctions. Such character and murder against by an eye to punitive do not of course share in the with precepts which are always

guided by that basic truth. Knowledge

we have. If this in any knowledge common of natural precepts

of it is implicit are implicitly

are the

the works, analogy are law precepts

everywhere moral Second,

of general moral the same.

is embedded extension

embedded

in our actions and which

of a generalised kind that knowledge in various in a given culture is an ways of those very general and universally binding law. law alike. It does that No not at all follow all morally well more will all moral for ideal or since Once know

agents. recognised by all human for the precepts The basis of natural law seek, ends we naturally instinctively goods we a number Thomas of such recognises inclinations. First, in this there is the nature we

are natural which precepts the theory from of natural ordered persons peoples, concrete Natural positive. societies look for will look The alike.

desire. natural all

share with

and inclination regard we have a natural things, to preserve For us to be is to live, so ourselves in being. us to seek nourishment. nature in this sense inclines Second, we share a nature with all animals and in this an inclination to reproduce and ourselves regard have our rational nature to raise our young. inclines Finally, us to live in society the truth, particularly and to pursue are goods about God. The of these inclinations objects we moral cannot inclinations our pursuit The most and direct desired evil not want, are not given what what Thomas we are. These means natural by natural law are directive of be done rationally

task, for societies, is to make the moral persons, and this can be done in numberless ways. can law precepts be either negative

moral

are more easily negative applicable are wrong acts which in their kind. they prohibit an action is seen to be an instance of this type, we The like

to do. Positive what we ought precepts or 'Be just' are not so easily applicable. acts may be instances of just action alone does courage, constituents and not and of

'Be brave'

Many possible and the precept Justice, cardinal realisable

law. The

of natural precepts of these naturally desired goods. that good should precept, general means as that we on of should they bear is the note

not to perform. tell us which wisdom these temperance, of the human good are infinitely but entail diversity both only permit It is the and actions which always moral The and

cultures.

of persons thwart these

avoided, our actions

ideals which Thomistic The first and positive. less formally prohibitions

natural of practical of food and sex should be regulated by reason pursuit For one thing, it is impossible for us to is self-evident. it is such goods For pursue another, unconsciously. these natural clear that without rational direction, inclinations fulfilled. must they take would The are more precepts into account bring guidelines desire by by likely formulated to fc>e thwarted by natural of the sway would of than reason reason. counsel

Reason goods. law are directives

these naturally of law. Precepts our reason. That

are evil. everywhere consists of three philosophy second is the moral

stage

is that of natural enshrined

stages. law precepts, negative level of positive law or codes: admit of here both exceptions. of singular sense of the

there Finally, application, the prudential decisions, (in the classical of natural term) order. Neither knowledge

prescriptions is the level of

the finality under the which blinding limbs of sexual

inclinations

Prescriptive regulating trespassing

can ethics legal code nor a reasonable actions will be good. Good action is the product of not and is character character, simply knowledge, acts of a given kind until our hearts formed by repeated are moral for inclined virtue, the right to good a person reason to exercise and in Thomas into account. is the Michael in P Grace Professor of Dame, of Notre Catholic insights and action. Given is enabled enjoy influence thinkers. and doing good to do the it. right character, deed

law, a sane assure that our

for that the good is, it is false to suggest man is to thwart the attainment of goods men naturally these in so pursuing will consist Virtue desire. role in that their constitutive desired goods naturally human is fostered. and fulfilment well-being law that Thomas of natural the precepts on a level of less generality than 'Pursue recognises or 'Do good and avoid evil' are the prohibitions virtue' Among

by frustrating be false. That

amputating the activity

oneself, controlling and regulating birth intercourse would

The moral
continues Catholic find taking

philosophy

of St Thomas
today Friend arguments on and well

Aquinas
both foe non alike worth

Ralph Mclnerny Medieval Studies Indiana, USA.

the University