Should the legitimacy of rulers be seen almost entirely as the result of patron-client relations?

A comparison between Nigeria and India

Essay 1 Alexandra Wicksell 300066 David Harris Comparative Political Sociology of Asia and Africa 153400067

2367 words (excluding bibliography)

12-12-2012

Introduction Migdal famously argued that where the state is weak, the society is strong; Fragmentation of social control and the difficulties in political mobilisation have led to a pathological style at the apex of the state, the politics of survival (Migdal 1988;264). In order do assess whether legitimacy of rulers can be seen almost entirely as the result of patron-client relations, I will look at Nigeria and India. With the comparative method of most-difference cases (David Laitin) I have chosen two cases from different continents, with very distinctive historical and cultural backgrounds. Despite this the two countries still share the centrality of patron-client relations. In order to understand how these two countries have had such different outcomes of the colonial experience, we need to look at the processes and mechanisms that produced them. How do the patron-client relations work and why are they operating differently in Nigeria and India? I will look at the shared features of the two that have contributed to the centrality of patron-client relations. Both share a British-colonial past, however, very differently experienced, Nigeria was indirectly ruled whereas British colonialism in India was a direct rule. I will argue that due to colonial rule they are now both dependant on patronage and clientelism, however, the different structural conditions present in post-colonial India and Nigeria have produced two different types and levels of neopatrimonial systems, which illustrates the problems with granting patronclient relations the single factor for legitimacy. It can be agreed that it plays a significant role for the legitimacy of the rulers, whether it is destructive or constructive for stability, democracy and development will be discussed in this essay.

Patron-client relations Max Weber developed the conceptual framework of patron-client relations based on two primary concepts of his political sociology; domination and legitimacy (Erdmann&Engel 2006;7). Along these lines he established three ideal types of domination legal, traditional, and charismatic (ibid) and argued that they all produced legitimacy. Patrimonialism is on of Webers concepts of traditional domination and it has been widely used to describe a system of personal rule in which the ruler dispenses offices and benefits to subordinates

in return for loyalty, support and services (Ikpe 2000;147), through this patrimonial lens we can better understand the lack of modernisation. Weber described the characteristics of a patrimonial state as a government based on a personal ruler where there is no separation between public and private for the state officials. Today, neopatrimonialism is used to explain many weak states, Erdmann & Engel argues that Bratton and VD Walle definition reflects the more general understanding of the concept; to characterise as neopatrimonial those hybrid regimes in which the customs and patterns or patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 62). Chabal and Daloz argues that there are double consequences of this system; on one hand, public service remains personalized by way of clientelism and nepotism; on the other, access to the public institutions of the state is seen as the main means of personal enrichment (Chabal&Daloz 1999;9).

Gellner sees patronage as a form of power, and usually an intriguing one since it goes against the egalitarianism what is highly valued in the West. Gellner argues that patron-client is favoured under certain conditions; It is the incompletely centralised state, the defective market or the defective bureaucracy which would seem to favour it (Gellner 1977;4). Therefore, weak states, like Nigeria, have a deeper-rooted system of informal patron-client networks. Whereas in India, these networks substitute where the state is inefficient. The patron-client relations reflect broader socio-cultural norms and routines, and underlying patterns of connections between all classes and ethnicities. How do we then explain the sustainability of the patron-client relations in Nigeria and India?

Pre-colonial and colonial Nigeria and India Nigeria and India are two very different countries, both in terms of history, population, geography, society, culture etc. However, patrimonial societies were present in pre-colonial time both in Nigeria and India, the importance of the community and personal relations has survived and resisted both

colonialism and modern state building. Legg argues that social change at the mass level tends to lag far behind the structural changes effect at the center. Thus, in its actual operation, the system constantly tends to swing back in to the clientelistic mold of its predecessor (Legg 1972;166-67).

The experience of British colonialism was very different in India and Nigeria. While India became an important part of the British Empire during a longer period, the British colonized Nigeria only for a short period in history. British rule in Nigeria was indirect while in India they had established a direct rule. This had a large impact on the post-colonial modern state building and the divergences between the two states. The British adopted very different policies due to the very different societal organizations they were facing. Tribes dominated Nigeria, and the interaction between the colonizers and the natives remained weak throughout the whole period, chiefs were responsible for most of the contacts and therefore they also remained powerful both during and after colonial rule. In India however, the British India Company had been present since the 1600, and therefore a more natural ground for interaction was already present. While limited funding and focus on exporting resources to Europe hampered the African colonialism, India adopted the British education system and therefore fostered a more western-educated governing class. The outcomes of two different colonial experiences by the same European power have established very different post-colonial governments, which have also shaped diversity in the patron-client relations. The nature of the relations is fundamentally different and therefore they serve different functions in the two countries. I would argue that it complements the formal institutions in India whereas in Nigeria they undermine them. Nigeria inherited the colonial state structure, which became problematic for state building, since the colonial state was nothing like a modern state in Europe, in fact the Nigerian state today looks very much like the colonial one. Chiefs and other traditional authorities have inherited the colonial administrative system, Mamdani refers to this as decentralized despotism (Mamdani 1996). Just like the neopatrimonial state, the colonial state was bifurcated, centralized by the

settlers but also decentralized with an indirect rule by native chieftaincies (ibid;109).

Nigeria and neo-patrimonialism In a public lecture, Lonsdale argued that political communities have been very small and African states, throughout history, pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial, have been relatively weak (Lonsdale 2010). This is because of the unusually strong personal relations that have substituted a centralised state. Historically, households have been responsible for organising their own subsistence on their own land, with their own labour, conducting their own litigation, doing their own marketing (ibid.). Therefore, the state had very little purpose.

Post-independent Nigeria was not a unified nation with a shared culture; the political and cultural differences between the ethnic groups divided the country and prevented a democratic development. Instead the years after independence were occupied by civil war and coups, followed by military dictatorship. What keeps Nigeria together is not a strong state, but an extensive network of patron-client relations. These networks are to a large extent corrupted, since they are not legitimate in a bureaucratic sense. Smith argues that not only the elites reproduces the corruption, people from levels of society are involved on an everyday-basis in the social reproduction of corruption even as they are also its primary victims and principal critics (Smith 2007;5). However, corruption in Nigeria is not identical to the Western notion, the collective conceptualization of corruption reveal the complex intertwining of popular morality, contemporary social processes, and postcolonial statecraft (ibid.). Everyday practices of corruption is possible through patron-client relations and through these Nigerians imagine and create the relationship between state and society (ibid.;6). Patronage relations exist in every culture and institution all round the world () but while in Europe such behavior is known to be against the rules, in Africa patronage sets the rules (Londsdale 2010).

In Nigeria, much of the legitimacy of the rulers is based on the material

benefits that are distributed through the patron-client relations. There is a need for a mass-participation for these to survive and legitimise the rulers; everyone is a patron to a lesser person and a client to a more powerful person (ibid.;13). These networks produce a corruption that is ubiquitous in Nigeria, but greedy elite politicians are not the only ones to sustain it, even though they are the highest beneficiaries of its survival. In a country where it is estimated that almost 60% of the population lives under one U.S dollar per day neither the formal nor the informal mechanism can constitute the basic needs of the population. However, it is a common understanding even among the poorest people that it is through the social connections of patronclientelism, and increasingly corruption, that people control wealth and power in Nigeria (ibid.). So despite the popular opinion that elites have hijacked the patronage system and perverted it to serve their own interests (Smith 2007;12), the population reproduces the system in hope for better living conditions. The legitimacy of the rulers becomes weakened when the revenues becomes scarce. The competition for control over oil revenues in Nigeria following the collapse of oil prices in the 1980s, is good example of how vulnerable the patron-client networks based legitimacy really are. As a result of this, the competition intensifies along with poverty and inequality (ibid.14). Bretton and van de Walle argues that shrinking economic opportunities and exclusionary rewards are a volatile recipe for social unrest (Bretton &Van de Walle 1997;89).

India Contrary to Nigeria, India has experienced a steadily growing democracy since independence 1947. The historical practices of clientelism has lost its capacity to bring victories, either because there are too many claimants or the rewards demanded by claimants have risen too high. Therefore incumbent governments have regularly been ousted from power by dissatisfied voters () in the post-clientelist regimes, politicians have had to seek other ways of attracting voters (Elliot 2011;70).

Despite the still high level of corruption in the country there has been a shift in India away from clientelism, towards more legitimacy in the democratic state. Dissimilar to Nigeria, caste/community-based voting only accounted for less than half of the votes in the 2009 Andhra election. Instead the other half voted based on the government performances. The economic growth that is absent in Nigeria have in India enabled the government to make major investment in irrigation and welfare schemes (ibid.;72). In contrast to the poorest people in Nigeria that have no other options than redistribute the corrupted patron-client networks in order to survive, the lower castes in India are the ones that have disengaged from clientelist politics, as they see an increase in governmentbased welfare distribution. But just as Nigerian rulers are dependant on the availability of economic opportunities to support their legitimacy through patrimonial networks, the regime in India cannot be sustained if the economy does not continue to grow (ibid.;74). Manor on the other hand demonstrates both the creative potential of Indias democracy and the failure of many leaders at the state level to make adequate use of it (Manor 2000;819). To illustrate this he argues that the so called fixers bring three important qualities to the political process in India: knowledge, skills, and attitudes (Manor 2000;819). These include an extensive contact and understanding of the people at the grassroots level as well as the political system at higher levels. They are driven by gut-level understandings that most of the time- serve the cause of democracy quite well (ibid;821). Does this then undermine the Weberian argument that patronclient relations must go for a modern state to gain legitimacy? I would not argue so, because these fixers help legitimize the democratic system, since they do not fall under the category of corruption. when a state government becomes decidedly corrupt, its net effect on fixers eventually becomes negative, therefore the fixers actively work against corrupted patron-client relations. In the right conditions these fixers can make a difference to people at the local level in a modest but significant way (ibid;822). The role of the fixers is also an outcome of geographical and cultural factors, since India is the second largest country in Asia after China and its multilingual character can complicate the reach of democracy. Therefore the fixers can have a

greater impact than the central state in many instances. Kitschelt&Wilkinson calls this party clientelism, they argue that the democratic accountability in such a system does not result primarily from politicians success in delivering collective goods (). Instead, clientelistic accountability represents a transaction (Kitschelt&Wilkinson 2007;2). Patron-client relations of this kind can form some sense of accountability of the rulers, and still remain responsible.

Conclusion Legitimacy of the rulers is gained through the patron-client relations both in India and Nigeria, however, the divergences in the nature of these relations lead to different outcomes that either foster democracy, like in India, or nurtures inequality and corruption in Nigeria. Therefore, the legitimacy in Nigeria is more vulnerable than in India, as the patrimonialism tend to benefit a smaller percentage of the population, and in times of shrinking economic opportunities, social unrest is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the rulers. Nigeria is much more dependant on the efficiency of the patron-client relations, this is because they are substituting the states role in distributing welfare. India on the other hand, is reliant on the patron-client relations to sustain the democratic state and make the government-people relations more sufficient through the so-called fixers. Therefore, the legitimacy of the Indian rulers is in need of, but not dependant on the patron-client relations, due to their fast growing economy, and ability to distribute resources to the people through these relations. The Nigerian leaders on the other hand, is dependant on the patron-client relations in order to sustain their position, because if they fail to distribute the resources efficiently, there is no state to back them up, hence they lose the support of the people. The future in both countries very much depends on the economic growth, the likelihood that any of these countries leaders will be independently legitimate without their patron-client bases is not very likely, however the nature of them can change. This happened in India, where there has been as shift from a longstanding patronclient politics, often in coercion with the authorities, to a modern type of short term clientelism (Elliot 2011;49).

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