FLORIAN BIEBER

LESS DIVERSITY - M O R E INTEGRATION: INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE C O N T E M P O R A R Y BALKANS1

Summary: This article surveys the state of diversity in Southeastern Europe by examining the nature of interethnic relations and diversity, minority rights protection and political participation o f minorities. During the past decade, state repression and hostility towards minorities have largely made way to including minorities in government and introducing comprehensive minority rights protection laws. These improvements at the level o f policy are often not matched in terms of general interethnic relations. Majority-minority relations remain burdened by the 1990s and Southeastern Europe is considerably more homogenous than it was in 1989. As a consequence, legal and policy changes are often the consequence o f international and in particular EU pressure rather than domestic processes. After a decade o f conflicts and the division of societies along ethnic lines in large parts of the Balkans, it would appear that interethnic relations still dominate what citizens o f Southeastern Europe are predominantly worried about. However, the politics o f identity and ethnicity has lost some o f its potency since the 1990s. Not only are all governments in the region democratically elected and do not draw on nationalist populist messages, ethnic tensions are not the most important issue on the mind of most citizens o f Southeastern Europe. Even in the tenser regions o f Southeastern Europe, such as the town of Bujanovac, divided between an Albanian and a Serb population in southern Serbia, the sight o f a low-scale conflict between the Serbian state and an Albanian insurgent group in 2000/01, interethnic incidents ranks only on the ninth place o f security concerns after issues such as drug use, traffic accidents and even the danger o f stray dogs. An exception to this regional trend is Kosovo with its unsettled status and divided population. Here surveys suggest that the political status (56 percent) and interethnic relations (6 percent) are concerns which together outweigh economic concerns, corruption and rule o f law.2 Elsewhere, unemployment, poverty and corruption consistently rank higher on the list o f concerns for citizens than interethnic relations. So does this mean that ethnic relations are only to be considered as a similar security concern as stray dogs? The significance o f interethnic relations, despite the
1. This article draws on a discussion paper written for the King Baudouin Foundation, 2004. 2. "Kosovo Early Warning Report," UNDP, 13 (2006), p. 41.

numbers, ought not to be considered a topic of concern only for students o f the history o f the region. Firstly, interethnic relations generally are not a prime concern for many citizens, which does not mean that they cannot be instrumentalized by political elites in the absence o f a satisfactory answer to all the other issues o f concern. As V. P. Gagnon has shown in his study of the demobilizing effects o f nationalism, ethnic distance and other indicators o f ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia were low only a few years before the outbreak of the war.3 Second, the perception o f the significance o f ethnic relations is notoriously asymmetrical. Whereas majorities often underplay the importance the issue, minorities are more frequently confronted with the importance o f ethnic belonging through experiences o f exclusion and other instances o f discrimination. This article will seek to survey interethnic relations in the Balkans, particular in the regions o f former Yugoslavia, in broad strokes to identify regional trends and local specificities. After examining the nature of diversity and the state of interethnic tensions, the article shall turn the evaluation of minority rights and the impact of the political empowerments of some minority groups in the region. Although it would be impossible to condense the diverse majority-minority regions across the region into one perspective, the article will argue that legal and political advances in comparison to the 1990s have been generally significant. At the same time, lack of implementation o f laws and often pro-forma measures betray insufficient commitment o f status to protect minority rights. Similarly, majority-minority relations remain burdened in good parts o f Southeastern Europe by the legacy of conflicts and interethnic tensions. The fact that the existing borders have been settled and accepted by all governments and groups (with the exception o f Kosovo) has also reduced the security threat minorities might pose or might be perceived to pose by majorities. Nevertheless, territorial autonomy remains a taboo, and as will be discussed in this article, majorities often remain suspicious o f the political participation o f minorities. The challenges o f diversity and tolerance A cursory glance at the nature o f ethnic diversity in Southeastern Europe in 2006 suggests that it is not countries which are the primary areas o f diversity, but regions and municipalities. Both in the political conception of the population majorities and the political parties, most countries are nation states. Arguably the region falls into two categories: States (including de-facto states) with a large dominant majority, including Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Kosovo, Bulgaria and Romania. Here majorities amount to around 80 percent o f the population or more and the largest single minority numbers less than 10 percent. The other group o f countries includes Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Montenegro and Bosnia, the largest community
3. V. P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004).

accounts for less than 50%, whereas in Macedonia, the Macedonian majority numbers around two thirds. However, even in the "nation states" of the region, substantial areas are diverse. Thus, approx. 28 to 40 percent of the municipalities in Serbia and Croatia are inhabited by minorities amounting to more than 10 percent of the population. However, living in a majority environment does not mean that it is always the state majority dominating. In many regions, it is minorities at the state level who dominate the local level. Thus, for example in Central Serbia, the overwhelming majority o f the main minority groups (Bosniaks/Muslims, Albanians, Bulgarians) live in areas where they constitute a local majority. Interethnic issues are thus often locally concentrated and ignored by the capitals.

Diversity in municipalities and regions in select countries in Southeastern Europe.s The wars and the emergence and consolidation of nation states during the 1990s have reduced the degree of diversity across the region. While the return
4. The term "nation state" describes states which have a clear majority of one nation. Some states define themselves in terms of a nation state of the largest group (Croatia, Serbia, Romania), while others might not define the dominant nation. 5. Albania is not included, as the census of 2001 did not ask about the ethnic affiliation of its citizens. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not included as there has been no post-war census and there are no reliable population estimates. Data taken from the official population censuses in the countries (except Kosovo). Bulgaria (data for districts): HALIMOHAJIEH CTANCTH4ECKH IIHCTHTYT, HACEJIEHHE K1>M 01.03.2001 r. n o Objiacth 1 ETHFi9ECKA 1'PYIlA, Popis 1 stanovnistva 2001. http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census e.htm>; Croatia: Drzavni zavod za statistiku http://www.dzs.hr/; Kosovo (OSCE estimates, 2000-2006, prior to established of new municipalities in 2006): OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Municipal Profiles http://www.osce.org/ kosovo/13982.html; Macedonia: ApwasHHOT sason 3a cranicnixa, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002, Book XIII, 2005 http://www.stat.gov. mk/english/ glavna-eng. asp?br--18; Montenegro: Zavod za statistiku Cme Gore, Popis stano vnitva, domazinstava i stanova u 2003, Stanovnistvo. Nacionalna ili ethnibka pripadnost. Podaci po naseljima i opstinama (Podgorica, 2004) http://www. monstat.cg.yu/Popis.htm; Romania (based on counties) Populatia dupa etnie http://www.insse.ro/rp[2002 rezgen/ rg2002.htm; Serbia (data without Kosovo): Republiki zavod za statistiku, Popis 2002, Knjiga I: Nacionalna ili etnicka pripadnost-podaci po naseljima (Belgrade 2003), http://webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/ popis.htm.

of refugees has been one o f the pillars of international intervention since the mid-1990s to undo the 'ethnic cleansing' o f the wars, the returns have only been partly successful. By the end o f 2006, around 457,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned to areas where they now constitute a minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This return process has basically come to an end in 2002/3 with number o f refugees returning since turning into a trickle.6 Ever since the magical mark of one million returnees had been reached in 2004, the entire process has practical come to end, meaning that around half o f all refugees and IDPs remain displaced. The refugee return in Bosnia and Herzegovina has, nevertheless, changed the demographic balance in many municipalities, even if only a few changed their ethnic predominance, for example Drvar which switched from its post-war Croat-domination back to its pre-war Serb majority. In Croatia, the refugee return process has similarly essentially ended. Of the around 600,000 displaced Croats and Serbs, most internally displaced Croats have returned. However, among the approx. 300,000-350,000 displaced Serbs, only 120,000 - around a third - returned by April 2006. As the OSCE notes, two thirds o f these returns are not sustainable, i.e., are unlikely to be permanent due to limited economic opportunities and the age profile o f the returnees (OSCE 2006).7 Finally, Kosovo, has seen only limited refugee returns, amount to several thousand in 20012003, only to be undone by the March 2004 riots, resuming in 2005 at the same level. Although the right to return has been a key advance to both human rights and seeking to undue the policy of ethnic cleansing, the impact has been limited. Long-term sustainable returns are even in the best case, as in Bosnia, going to be significantly less than half of all those displaced. In Croatia and even more dramatically in Kosovo, the return is the exception from the rule. In short, we are left with the sobering picture that ethnic cleansing and population expulsions, save the massive population expulsion of the Serbian regime in Kosovo,8 have been largely successful. The post-conflict regions have become more homogenous since 1991 and restored diversity in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina has peaked already a few years ago and shows no sign of becoming sustainable. It is thus unlikely to stem the tide of ethnic homogenization and territorialization. In fact, in other parts of the region, the process o f separation might run the risk o f continuing in the future. Particularly in Macedonia, many observers have noted the trend o f the consolidation o f ethnically more homogenous regions, resulting largely from the 2001 con6. "Total Minority Returns in/to BiH from 1996 to 31 October 2006," UNHCR, 2006 www.unhcr.ba. 7. "Review. Report on Croatia's Progress in Meeting International Commitments since 2001," PC.FR/13/06, OSCE, June 9, 2006 8. During the 1998/9 conflict, in particular during the duration of NATO bombardment approx. 863,000 civilians fled Kosovo. In addition, some 590,000 citizens were internally displaced. Most, especially Albanians, returned en masse at the end of the conflict. See Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 90; HRW 2001.

flict. Similar demographic trends have occurred already in the 1990s in regions not directly affected by conflict. Both in Vojvodina and in Transylvania the number o f Hungarians has declined substantially in the 1990s. Authoritarian policies and discrimination are as much a cause, as are economic opportunities more readily available in the kin state Hungary than Serbs or Romanians respectively. Economic opportunities might increase the mobility o f minorities, whereas impoverishment and the lack o f perspectives can either foster violence or result in assimilation. Both the dynamics of refugee return, as the demographic development through migration highlight the trans-national nature o f interethnic relations in the Balkans. Interethnic relations are not only conditioned by relations to the kin state, but by a more complex network of interlinkages, which exist throughout the region. For example, the difficulties of refugees to return to Croatia facilitates extreme nationalism in Vojvodina, the citizenship policies of Croatia impact interethnic relations in Bosnia or ethnically motivated violence might result in attacks in Serbia against Roma, as happened in 2004. The transnational dynamics are not exhausted in the region, but the European Integration process has had a multifaceted and often contradictory impact on interethnic relations. For example, the EU integration perspective notably improved government policies towards minorities in Croatia; the closing in o f the Schengen border on the region has resulted in tens of thousands o f Macedonians applying for Bulgarian passports and brought about the Status Law in Hungary. These linkages suggest that while each country and region has to be treated separately due to its specific development, a dimension to the state o f interethnic relations continues to matter.9 Minority-majority relations in Southeastern Europe vary greatly. Nevertheless, it can been safely noted that in comparison to the 1990s, interethnic relations have improved dramatically. The absence of conflict and statesanctioned hate speech marks a fundamental shift from the dynamics o f interethnic tension. A strong legacy of the violence and tensions continue to impact interethnic relations across the region, in particular in the post-conflict regions. In addition, the above noted ethnic territorialization in the territory o f the former Yugoslavia has consolidated some of the tensions of the 1990s. With the exception o f small minorities, which have been under pressure to assimilate by virtue o f their size rather than any particular policies, members o f different ethnic communities often live separate lives. Thus, even areas long praised for their high degree of cross-ethnic communication, such as Vojvodina have experienced an increase in the development o f parallel lives. 10

9. D. Kostovicova and V. Bojii-Delilovi, "Europeanizing the Balkans: Rethinking the Post-conflict Transition," Ethnopolitics, 5, no. 3 (2006), 223-41. 1. 10. Florian Bieber and J. Winterhagen, "Ethnic Violence in Vojvodina: Glitch or Harbinger of Conflicts to Come?," ECMI Working Paper, 27 (2006), www.ecmi.de.

Ethnic distance in select countries of former Yugoslavia" While it is difficult to engage in a cross-regional comparison o f interethnic relations, the regular surveys o f ethnic distance carried out in former Yugoslavia offer some regional perspectives. 12 Generally speaking, a majority basically accepts minorities, as exemplified by willing to living in the same country as the respective minority, as well as neighbors and as friends. This acceptance seriously declines either as interethnic relations become more intimate (marriage to close family member or oneself) or imply greater authority for the minority members (boss, or leading position in the country).With the ex11. The table is based on data for representative surveys on ethnic distance. Croatia: B. Banovac and 2. Boneta, "Ethnifka distance i socijlna (dez)integracija lokalnih zajednica," Revija za mct/o/ogt/M, 37, nos. 1-2 (2006), 21-46; for Serbia: "Istralivanje javnog mnenja Srbije," CeSID, 2006 www.cesid.org; for Montenegro: "Vrijedosne orientacjie i etnika distanca u Cmoj Gori," CEDEM, (2004) www.cedem.org.yu; for Bosnia and Herzegovina: S. Puhalo, "Etnika distance gradana Republike Srpske i Federacjie BiH prema narodima biv5e SFRJ," Psihologtia, 36, no. 2 (2003), l41-56. 12. The surveys compared here are taken at different times between 2002 and 2006, with different sample sizes (although all claim to be representative) and variations on the questions so that the results are strictly speaking not fully comparable.

ception of attitudes towards Bosniaks/Muslims and Serbs in Montenegro, there is no majority in Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for having any minority in a leading position in the country or in close family relations. This trend indicates continued strong skepticism o f the majorities towards the political aspirations of minority communities. The increased ethnic distance in countries affected by the conflicts o f the 1990s can be traced to these conflicts. At the same time, it would be false to consider these to be naturally declining as the memory o f the conflicts might be fading. In fact, the opposite might be the case. Studies on ethnic distance in Serbia suggest that while there has been a decline since the 1990s, ethnocentrism is most pronounced not only among over 60 year olds, but also among 20-23 year-olds. Furthermore, there has been an increase in ethnic distance from 2002 to 2003.13 This trend points to the fact that the generation which grew up during the 1990s has been particularly affected by nationalist propaganda in media and the educational system. Bar political crisis around which nationalist parties and movements mobilize, such as the riots in Kosovo in March 2004 and the response in Serbia, this distance between members o f different ethnic groups is going to express itself primarily in the consolidation of parallel social networks rather than in outright conflicts. Nevertheless, this trend suggests that a decrease in the significance of ethnicity takes longer and requires more substantial efforts than merely ending the conflicts themselves. Minority rights between high standards and limited implementation Recent years saw tremendous progress in regard to the legal framework regulating minority rights in the region. In 2002, both Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia passed new liberal legislation on minority rights. One year later, Bosnia-Herzegovina similarly passed a law on national minorities. Finally, in 2006, shortly before the referendum on independence, Montenegro finally passed a minority law. Already in 2002, the entities of BosniaHerzegovina had to amend their constitutions to provide for more inclusion to the non-dominant 'constituent' nations. Similarly, Macedonia has been adjusting its constitution since the signing o f the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 to incorporate greater rights for minorities, in particular the Albanian community. The other countries o f the region - Albania, Bulgaria and Romania - have not seen similarly significant changes in the legal framework in recent years, but generally legal standards have developed favorably towards minorities. The new legislation in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is closely modeled on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and draws on the relatively progressive Hungarian

t3. "Human Development Report 2005, The Strength of Diversity," UNDP, Belgrade, 2005; "Public opinion poll: Attitudes towards ethnic minorities. Summary of the Key findings," Strategic Marketing Research and International Republican Institute (SMMRI), Belgrade, 2005.

minority law of 1993. 14 As such, the legal framework is at first glance exemplary. In particular, all four countries do not only secure minority rights, but furthermore establish minority councils which have a degree o f selfgovernment in the domains affecting communities. As such, the laws extend beyond 'conventional' minority rights, such as the use of minority language, culture, education and minority language media, by affirming the collective nature o f minority rights (in addition to the individual rights and need for protection from discrimination) and acknowledge the need to involve minorities themselves in the implementation o f these laws. This progress in terms o f legislation, however, has been fragile and tentative, suggesting that change is only partly driven by local actors. International pressure through the Council o f Europe and the monitoring o f the EU has yielded some legal advances, but often reversals cannot be prevented. Thus, the high degree of protection secured by the Charter for Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro was unceremoniously abandoned together with the state by both Serbia and Montenegro. The Federal law became obsolete as well with the end o f the joint state. In Montenegro, parts of the minority law referring to guaranteed seats in parliament for minorities were declared unconstitutional by the constitutional court. Finally, neither the new Serbia constitution (nor the draft Montenegrin constitution) provide the degree o f minority protection expected. This trend suggest that international minority rights conditionality is limited, especially considering other issues, such as cooperation with the ICTY and other larger political discussions - such as the status o f Kosovo or independence for Montenegro - which might cancel out the effects o f a minority rights conditionality. This discrepancy between ambition and reality is even more visible in regard to the, implementation o f these laws. A number o f factors have caused the delays in the implementation o f the new minority rights frameworks in the region. First, the new laws have been at time very ambitious considering the country's financial and political environment, such as the minority law in BosniaHerzegovina. In other cases, the laws have been vague and require more detailed legislation to fill the framework, as has been the case with the Federal law in Serbia and Montenegro. Second, there has been considerable reluctance o f governments to implement the existing minority rights frameworks. The legislation was in most cases part o f a local consultative process, but largely based on the international obligations o f the countries. Especially the post-conflict states, which had to address their legacy of nationalist authoritarianism, were pressured by the EU, OSCE and other key international organizations to adjust the minority rights framework. After the passing o f the law, there has been little willingness by governments in these countries to further pursue their implementation.
14. Zakon BiH, 2003; Zakon Cma Gora 2006; Ustavni Zakon Hrvatska 2002; Zakon SRJ 2002.

This neglect should be primarily attributed the lack of interest in minority rights by governments in the region, rather than outright opposition to the legislation. This lack o f interest is borne out of three reasons. First, other reform initiatives have received higher priorities and reformist political parties have been more interested in investing their energy in fields of economic reform. Second, a number o f the minority rights provisions have significant costs associated, such as state funding for minority councils and education in minority languages. Considering the shortage o f funds, financial means are only reluctantly allocated to minority rights based needs. Finally, nationalist reflexes often let minority-based concerns be disadvantaged over other funding priorities. These reasons for the neglect o f minority rights implementation have been exacerbated by the segmented political representation. As parties in the region remain largely divided along ethnic lines, parties o f the majority mostly receive no or only few votes from minorities. As a result, governing parties often lack a sense o f urgency, as their constituencies are not directly affected or might even not favor minority rights. Generally, progress in the implementation o f minority rights has come from governments which either included minority parties, as currently in Croatia, or when parties have a multiethnic electorate. The lack o f implementation o f minority rights has been exacerbated by the inadequacies of international monitoring. The only international mechanism, which allows for reasonably comprehensive reporting on minority rights is the Council o f Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. State reports in the first monitoring cycle which ended in 2004 have, however, often been delayed. Both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia submitted their report some four years late. Nevertheless, this instrument has been key in soliciting shadow reports from various NGOs which influenced the statements of the CoE on the state reports. The convention is, however, largely based on a cooperative relationship with states and little leverage exists to induce more substantial changes with governments. Thus, conditionality in the domain o f minority rights remains limited to the EU. As has been noted for Central and Eastern Europe, the EU conditionality for minority rights has been weak in effect due to the absence o f clear monitoring criteria and transparent requirements. 15 Similarly in Southeastern Europe, the EU reports in the context of the Stabilization and Association process have been weak and vague, as exemplified by the following excerpt - the only mention o f minority rights - in the Commission report on the SAP from 2003: "The general situation in terms o f respect for human rights and protection o f minorities has progressed but there is a need for further improvement in a number o f countries as regards for example implementation of legislation, equality
15. J. Hughes and G. Sasse, "Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs," Journal oJ Ethnopolirics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1 (2003), 1-36.

before the law, missing persons and the right to property."'6 Since, the quality o f the EU reporting has improved in terms o f detail. The 2006 progress reports, for example, have been devoting several pages rather than just a few paragraphs to minority rights protection. While a number o f international organizations have been following minority rights and interethnic relations in the region, in particular the local OSCE and Council o f Europe offices, there has been a lack o f systematic and constant effort which would allow for concerted international pressure in the implementation o f laws. Monitoring should, however, be only one side of international efforts to advance the protection of minorities. Frequently, members o f government or parliament willing to advance minority rights are in need o f external support in the implementation o f laws, ranging from financial aid to expertise and PR. Such support has in the past been often insufficient and minority rights improvements appear as a "test" for the country's degree of democratization rather than a subject o f joint efforts. Minority politics Minority political participation is where minority rights and social attitudes towards minorities meet. Conventionally, minority rights include approaches to avoid discrimination and affirm the cultural distinctiveness o f the community. The political participation has not been the primary focus o f minority rights. Both recent minority rights legislation in the region, as well as some international approaches, most notable the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation o f National Minorities in Public Life drafted under the auspices o f the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities, have included provisions on the political participation o f minorities. Most importantly, practice suggests that minority rights are often not implemented without political representation. Thus a report from Human Rights Watch contrasts municipalities in Croatia where Serb parties participate in government local government with those where they are excluded despite constituting a significant share o f the population: when Serb parties are included in local government, the number o f Serbs employed in the local administration is substantially higher." Similar experiences at local and national levels are common across the region.'8 Thus political representation can be viewed as a minority rights or more importantly as an enabler of minority rights. Political participa-

16. Commission of the European Communities (EC), "Report from the Commission: The Stabilisation and Association Process for South East Europe," Second Annual Report, (COM) 139 final, Brussels, March 26, 2003, p. 8. 17. Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Croatia: A Decade of Disappointment Continuing Obstacles to the Reintegration of Serb Returnees," 18 (7D), 2006, p. 19. 18. See for Serbia HLC 2002; for a number of case studies, see N. Dimitrijcvid and P. Kovacs, Managing Hatred and Distrust: The Prognosis jor Post-Conflict Settlement in Multiethnic Communities in the Former Yugoslavia (Budapest: LGI, 2004).

tion can take three forms, representation in parliament, the establishment o f elected minority bodies and finally participation in government.'9 It has been a feature o f minority politics in the Balkans that most minorities have either opted for this own political representatives, as has been the case with most large and geographically concentrated minorities, whereas others have withdrawn from the political system. This might be a function o f disagreement with the larger political system or state, or a consequence o f insufficient political mobilization and organization, as is the case with Roma across the region. With the partial exception, majority o f mainstream parties have been unable to attract the votes o f minorities. The configuration of the party system along ethnic lines is largely a consequence of the unwillingness of majority parties to seriously incorporate minority community concerns, often due to fears o f alienating the majority. While the larger minorities are generally represented in the parliaments o f the countries o f Southeastern Europe, smaller minorities are often excluded due to electoral threshold or lack of political organization. O f the larger minorities, Roma generally suffer from a lack o f political representation and, with the exception o f few countries in the region, such as Macedonia, are not represented in parliament. While Bulgaria and Macedonia do not have minority specific electoral laws to ensure their representation, other countries have adopted some degree o f positive discrimination in the electoral system. Romania has set aside one seat for every minority which does not manage to cross the threshold. As a result some 20 MPs hail from minorities other than the larger Hungarian minority. Similarly in Kosovo, 20 seats in the 120member parliament have been set aside for minorities. Irrespective o f the participation o f minorities and the additional seats minorities might gain through proportional representation, 10 seats are reserved for Serbs and 10 for all other minorities. Croatia has established a special country-wide electoral district for minorities, allowing minorities to chose whether to vote for their minority MPs or for the electoral district of their residence. Curiously, o f the 8 seats reserved for minorities some are 'shared' between several minority groups, i.e., between Albanians, Bosniaks, Slovenes and Montenegrins. Montenegro has also established a special polling unit, covering a geographical area where most Albanians live and thus ensuring that this community can elect its own representatives. In Serbia, the 5 percent threshold was abolished in 2004 for minority parties, meaning that only the 'natural' threshold for each parliamentary seat applies. The electoral systems and institutional set-up in most countries o f Southeastern Europe have thus largely ensured minority

19. F. Bieber, "Balancing Political Participation and Minority Rights: The Experience of the fonner Yugoslavia," in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and ECMI, eds, Minorities in Democracy (Skopje, 2003), pp. 37-44; OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 1999; K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection. Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000).

participation. At the same time, the systems have a number of flaws, either in terms of abuse (e.g., in Romania) by politicians arguably not belonging to the minority in q u e s t i o n or in terms o f design favoring some minorities over others (Montenegro). An additional problem associated with the parliamentary representation o f smaller minorities is the lack o f influence that such MPs have. Generally, they cannot impact parliamentary procedure and at time have been described as mere "window-dressing". In some cases, the minority MPs, relying on the parliamentary majority to preserve their seats, might be little more than bolstering the government coalition without any benefit for the minority. Minority specific bodies of representation have become increasingly popular in the region. In Serbia and Croatia, where national councils have been established by recent minority laws to grant the communities a degree o f selfgovernment and make them the main interlocutors for contacts with government and ministers. In Croatia, these bodies are directly elected, while in Serbia they are chosen through a complicated system o f electors that has been subject to criticism. Similar councils are foreseen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, but are yet to be established. In the other countries o f the region, other minority bodies exist, but are rather self-organized than being accorded specific competences by the state. Minority-specific institutions can be viewed as an important supplement to parliamentary representation. As parliamentary representation usually does not translate into the ability to substantially impact votes, institutions such as minority councils can have a greater impact on the areas of concern for the community, such as education or minority language media. In the first half o f the 1990s, the only country in Southeastern Europe which included minorities in its government was Macedonia. In the rest o f the region, such a form o f recognition of minorities seemed unlikely and often unimaginable. More than a decade later, all countries in the region have included minorities in government, ranging from the Serb minority support for the HDZ government since 2003, the Hungarian minority party's participation in the DOS government in Serbia (2000-2003), the various Albanian parties participating in Macedonia since 1991, the Turkish-dominated Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria and the Hungarian parties' participation in the previous and the support for the current government in Romania. Finally, the predominantly Greek Union for Human Rights Party in Albania has also been included in government since 2001. The incorporation o f minorities, represented by minority parties, is of a particular significance. The importance o f this development can been seen as deriving from two different aspects. First, inclusion in the executive provides (potential) access to power which is not only o f advantage in the implementation of minority rights, but also a symbol o f minority empowerment in what in
20. C.-C. Alionescu, "Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania," Southeast European Politics, 5, no. I (2004), 60-75.

most cases are self-defined nation states. Secondly, government participation is a symbol o f recognition. Whereas inclusion in parliament suggests some basic legal recognition and electoral support, participation in government suggest that minority parties are accepted by the country's majority. This symbolic recognition essentially enhances the legitimacy o f minority parties and lifts them to a rank comparable to majority parties. The types o f arrangements which brought minorities into government have varied, from the inclusion o f one minority party or coalition with a majority party (e.g., Bulgaria and Romania), to the participation of minorities in large pre-election coalitions (e.g., Serbia). Diverse has also been the duration o f these minority-majority governments, ranging for more than fifteen years in the case o f Macedonia to the brief experience in Croatia (since 2003) and Serbia (2001-2004). The duration suggests that minority parties have come to power for different reasons. In some cases, it was part of the overall democratization movement against semi-authoritarian rulers, as in Serbia or in Slovakia. In other cases, the inclusion of minority parties expresses the commitment of the majority political parties to include minorities into government (e.g., Macedonia). An addition factor favoring the establishment of inclusive governments lies with the European Union. Although neither part of the acquis communtaire or the Copenhagen criteria, broad and inclusive governments have been favored by the EU .2 Finally, in a number o f cases, minorities have been able to provide majorities in otherwise polarized political systems where grand coalitions among majority parties appeared undesirable, as has been the case in Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria. With variations in duration, origin and reasons for their establishment, we can consider these coalitions a regional trend, but it would be premature and improbable to consider this development the development of a regional power-sharing tradition. The success o f minority parties in securing substantial changes for their communities or minorities overall has been modest. Generally speaking, however, there has been frequently disappointment among minority communities over the inability o f minority parties to accomplish notable changes despite participation in government. In some cases, as in Romania, this has lead to a split of the previously unified minority grouping and a radicalization within the community. Common understanding22 of minority rights today suggest that political participation either constitutes a form of minority rights in its own right or at least is crucial in implementation minority rights more generally. Whereas this certainly holds true, political representation in state governments in itself has often not visibly advanced the protection o f minority

21. M. Brusis, "The European Union and Interethnic Power-sharing Arrangements in Accession," Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 1 (2003). 22. OSCE and HCNM, Lund Recommendations ... ; T. Malloy, National Minority Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005); Henrard, Devising an Adequate System ....

rights. While general expectations might have been too high, there are structural reasons why minority participation might not always result in significant improvement for minority communities. Ministers from minorities often either lack power to advance a minority agenda and are constrained by the need to represent the general population in the field of their ministry. Furthermore, minority ministers generally do not have influence on policy areas lead by other ministries. Considering that minority issues cannot be reduced to one sphere of governance, be it culture or education, means that minorities might be in government, but have little impact on key decisions taken by government. Minority participation in government often risks becoming little more than window dressing. This is not to suggest that the experience of minority inclusion in government has been entirely negative. In fact, the most positive impact has been at the symbolic level, where attitudes towards minorities have improved and the political participation o f minorities as minorities has boosted the legitimacy o f minorities and their parties through government pafiticipation. Conclusion Southeastern Europe is too diverse to allow for one conclusion on the state of diversity. It is exactly these diverse experiences which best describe the reality o f the region. Unifying is the commitment o f dominant political elites to European integration and democracy. This orientation marks a departure from the 1990s when a diversity o f different development paths or "transitions" appeared to exist in Southeastern Europe. Transformation of the region suggests a gradual approximation towards European integration. Today, Southeastern Europe is less multiethnic and diverse than it was in 1989. Not only wars, but also large 'migratory movements, such as the emigration o f most Germans from Romania, have made large parts o f the region more ethnically homogenous. While some refugee returns have recreated some pockets o f diversity in regions which were deliberately targeted by campaigns o f ethnic cleansing, the un-mixing of populations has largely not come to end, neither has been broadly reversed. Current and future challenges are likely to arise from migration to Southeastern Europe, a topic which has received little attention, but considering substantial Chinese populations across the region, not to be neglected. Furthermore, migration within Southeastern Europe has been low, conditioned by limited employment opportunities and obstacles to movement, but might expand in the future. All this might not "recreate" diversity, but it will lead to different forms o f interethnic relations and diversity across the region, resembling some large European trends o f diversity and migration. As this article has demonstrated, the primary feature of minority-majority relations is the inclusion o f minorities into social main stream and the political structure. Whereas in the 1990s, minorities were often considered a security threat by states and majorities, ties between majorities and minorities have shifted to the level o f rights and EU integration, both rhetorically and in terms o f state policies. Across Southeastern Europe, minorities have entered politics,

joined governments and become respectable partners for mainstream political parties. Still, the impact for many minority members has been limited. European standards, often invoked, and national legislation are only slowly trickling down to citizens. While in the 1990s the primary threat to interethnic relations came from state authorities, often stereotypes and prejudice from majority populations constitute the primary obstacle for the further improvement of minority status. International minority rights instruments have lack the tools to grapple with this challenge to interethnic relations where conditionality and EU requirements have less impact that in changing state policy.

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