Article III Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. NO

PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR

PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS .

What is the significance of the Bill of Rights? Government is powerful. If unlimited, it becomes tyrannical. The Bill of Rights is a guarantee that there are certain areas of a persons life, liberty and property which governmental power may not touch. What powers of government are limited by the Bill of Rights? All powers of the government are limited by the Bill of Rights. What in general are these powers? The totality of governmental power is contained in three great powers: police power, power of eminent domain and power of taxation. Why are these powers considered inherent powers? Because they belong to the very essence of the government and without them no government can exist. They belong to government as much as spirit and mind belong to the essence of man. A constitution can only define and delimit them and allocate their exercise among various government agencies. A constitution does not grant them. Name one major difference between the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and the guarantees that are found in Art. XIII on Social Justice. The Bill of Rights focuses on civil and political rights, whereas Art. XII focuses on social and economic rights. Moreover, the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are generally self-implementing, I.e., the can be appealed to even in the absence of implementing legislation. On the other hand, the social and economic rights guaranteed in Art. XIII generally require implementing legislation. What is police power? Police power has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. Negatively, it has been defined as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,

safety and welfare of society. The most frequently cited definition, however, has been Chief justice Shaws classic statement which calls police power the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. Ermita-malatw hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. Mayor of Manila L-24693, july 31, 1967. What is the scope of POLICE POWER? Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public to self-protection. For this reason, its scope expands and contracts with changing needs. The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police power are only interesting as illustrations of its rapid extension within comparatively recent years to pints heretofore deemed entirely within the field of private liberty and property rights. Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580. What is the scope of PERSON It includes citizens and aliens, natural or juridical. A as a general rule civil rights of aliens are of equal footing with citizens but such is not the case as regards political rights. What is the scope of LIFE? It is the right to a good life. Quality of living is emphasized in Art 2, Section 6 & 7 which promotes life of dignity and guarantees a decent standard of living respectively. How about the unborn? Art 2, Sec 12 gives the unborn In aca constitutional right to life What is the scope of liberty? Physical, spiritual and intellectual What is the scope of PROPERTY? Protected properties includes all kinds of property found in the civil code. It has been deemed to include vested rights such as perfected mining claim, or a perfected homestead, or a final judgement. it also includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. A license to operate a cockpit is not considered a protected property. It is merely a privilege withdrawable when public interest so requires it. In like manner, it has been ruled that a certificate of public convenience granted to a transportation company confers no property right on the route covered thereby.

A mere privilege, however, may evolve into some form of property right protected by due process, as for instance when a privilege. In this case, an export quota has been enjoyed for so long and has been the subject of substantial investment and has become a source of employment for thousands. How is Jurisdiction gained over a person or property? In actions in personam, e.g. action for recovery of a loan, jurisdiction is acquired by 1) voluntary appearance or 2) through service of summons upon the defendant. Service of summons may be effected personally, or by substitute service, or in exceptional cases by publication. In actions in rem or quasi-in-rem e.g.. foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, jurisdiction is derived form the power that court may exercise over the property. Jurisdiction over the person is not essential provided the relief granted by the court is limited to such as can be enforce against the property. Notice by publication is sufficient in these cases. The reason is that property is always presumed to be in the possession of the owner of his agent may be safely held under certain condition to know that certain proceedings have been instituted. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law kkkand its object or purpose - that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive - would suffivkce to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. 51 SCRA 189 / G.R. No. L-31195 / June 5, 1973 FACTS: The officers and members of the PBMEO, a legitimate union in PBM, informed the latter of their proposed mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift as well as those in the regular second and third shifts. PBM called a meeting the following day. It informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution emphasizing, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. So, PBM warned PBMEO that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who should fail to report for work the following morning would be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. The workers proceeded with the demonstration despite the warnings. PBM filed with the CIR a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a violation of R.A. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) and of the CBA providing for No Strike and No Lockout. PBMEO claimed that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration, that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. ISSUES W/N basic human rights of free speech are given priority over property rights. HELD Yes, human rights is given priority over property rights. The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the 2

sovereign people. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.

EL BANCO ESPAOL-FILINO vs. PALANCA 37 Phil 921 / G.R. No. L-11390 / March 26, 1918 FACTS Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng mortgaged his property in favor of El Banco Espanol-Filipino as a security for a debt owing to him to the bank. After the execution of the mortgage Tanquinyeng returned to China, his native country. He died there on 1910 without returnung to the Philippines. El Banco instituted an action for foreclosure on 1908. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. The court further directed that the clerk of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, the city of Amoy in China. This order was made pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. Since Tanquinyeng failed to appear he declared in default. A decision was rendered in favor of the bank. The court also ordered that Tanquinyeng should, on or before July 6, 1908, pay his indebtedness and deliver said amount to the clerk of the court. The payment contemplated in said order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court ordered the sale of the property. Seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of Tanquinyeng. He alleged that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over Tanquinyeng or over the subject of the action. ISSUES: 1. W/N the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage. 2. W/N those proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law. HELD: 1. YES Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its authority, or it is 3

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS As a procedural requirement, it relates chiefly to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement and application of laws. It is a guarantee of procedural fairness. Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a law which hears before it condemns. A. JUDICIAL PROCEEDING a) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. b) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings. c) The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard. d) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person. Jurisdiction over the property which is subject of litigation may result either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem wherein an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. Though nominally against persons, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure; they treat property as primarily indebted. They are substantially property actions. The court never had jurisdiction over the person of Tanquinyeng. However, this was immaterial. What was important was jurisdiction over the property. 2. Yes. As applied to a judicial proceeding, the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court of tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. It is evident that the actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

The failure of the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. ESPELETA vs. AVELINO 62 SCRA 395 / G.R. No. L-39276 / February 24, 1975 FACTS: Petitioner Espeleta bought products from private respondent Shell Philippines, in the total sum of P264,250.29 and that out of this sum your Petitioner allegedly paid P242,029.04 only leaving a balance of P22,221.25 still unpaid. So Shell filed an action against Espeleta for Recovery of Sum of Money. Espeleta alleged that the unpaid balance was only P14,376.79 and to be deducted from this amount was the sum of P8,711.28 value of the liters of gasoline not actually delivered by Shell during the period from January, 1972 to August, 1972, and the amount of P5,994.00 representing the cost of gasoline leakage and wastage caused by the leak of the underground tank plus the usual allowance for evaporation. He felt it necessary to present Adelfa Montano, a CPA, as witness to show to the lower court the true figures of the transactions after accounting. Unfortunately, Montano was a new employee in the Office of the Department of Local Government and Community Development at the time she was supposed to continue her testimony; and, therefore, could not disregard the orders of her superiors to make an urgent audit in Baybay, Leyte. So she informed petitioner about her unavailability. Hence, Montano failed to be present in court on the date set for her cross-examination. There was a motion for postponement, but this did not prosper. Respondent Judge Avelino on motion of Shell, ordered Montanos testimony on direct examination stricken from the records, and allowed Shell to present its rebuttal evidence. Espeleta claimed denial of due process because Montanos testimony was indispensable to his case and to disregard the same would be tantamount to not having been heard at all. ISSUE: W/N Espeleta was denied due process. HELD: YES 4

If respondent Judge were to be sustained, then clearly, evidence, which for petitioner was indispensable for his side of the case to be heard would be treated as non-existent. To that extent, he was not heard at all. While it is true that it is within a court's discretionary power to act on a motion for postponement/ continuance, it is far from unlimited. Due heed must be paid to the procedural due process mandate. Liberality should be exercised in granting postponements of trial to obtain presence of material evidence and to prevent miscarriage of justice. This is for the quite obvious reason: while the granting or refusal of motions for continuance/ postponement is discretionary, that discretion must be exercised wisely with a view to substantial justice. So procedural due process requires. In Luciano vs. Tan, the infirmity consisting in a refusal to grant postponement was cured by the Court reopening the case precisely to comply with such a basic precept. That approach ought to have been followed by respondent Judge when he was asked to reconsider not once but twice. He ought to have fixed a date for Miss Montao to be subjected to cross-examination, thereby complying with the constitutional safeguard of assuring the parties their day in court. PEOPLE vs. NAZARIO 165 SCRA 186 / G.R. No. L-44143 / August 31, 1988 FACTS: Nazario was a lessee of a fishpond located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and had a lease agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. Nazario refused and failed to pay municipal taxes amounting to P362.62 which is required of him as fishpond operator as provided for under an ordinance. Hence, he was charged and convicted of the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance. Nazario claimed that the ordinance in question is ambiguous and uncertain. The He contended that being a mere lessee of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or manager." The ordinances in question are No. 4, series of 1955, Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal, the salient portions thereof are herein below quoted:

Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon, shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. Sec. 1(a). For the convenience of those who have or owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial limits of this municipality, the date of payment of municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started operating before the year 1964. ISSUES: 1. W/N that the ordinance of the Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon, is null and void for being ambiguous and uncertain. 2. W/N the ordinance in question is unconstitutional for being ex post facto. HELD 1. NO. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. 2. NO. Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. Hence, it could be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) was being made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955 (date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 were in the nature of curative measures intended to facilitate 5

and enhance the collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had prescribed. Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been, since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12 imposed a retroactive penalty. As noted, it operated to grant amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964. It did not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one. ANG TIBAY vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 69 Phil 635 / G.R. No. 46496 / February 27, 1940 FACTS: The National Labor Union moved for the reopening of their case averring that new places of evidence are available. The Union alleged that employer Toribio Teodoros claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc. was false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. According to the Union, the supposed lack of leather materials was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work. The Union further alleged Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against them and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood. The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc ISSUE: Observance of due process of law in administrative proceeding [ex. before NLRC (CIR) ] HELD: The Supreme Court re-examined the entire record of the proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case and found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.

SC remanded the case to CIR and ordered the latter to reopen the case following proper procedure. SC held there are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in (administrative) proceedings of this character in order that due process may be served: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) The tribunal ( in this case, the CIR) must having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The tribunal or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The tribunal should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The fact that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character 6

CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR GR No. 111953 December 12, 1997 FACTS: At issue here is the validity of Administrative Order No. 04-92 of the Philippine Ports Authority which limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. The said administrative order specifically states that: all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs of the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only xxx all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance. Private respondent (UHPA) is a pilot association which questions the validity of said order on the grounds that: 1. There was no ample prior consultation before its issuance thus violating due process; 2. Since pilotage is a profession/work, it is considered as property therefore there is violation of the right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The trial court held that herein petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion for the arbitrary and whimsical issuance of the order. It also declared the order null and void. Thus, the PPA was enjoined from implementing PPA AO 04-92. ISSUE W/N there was violation of due process? HELD The Court held that with regard to the requirement of ample consultation prior to the issuance of PPA AO 04-92, there was valid compliance. It stated that whether or not the pilots were consulted, it does not taint the validity of the order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirement of notice and hearing.

The Court held however, that on the substantive aspect, the order is unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. The order unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement (this being the status quo prior to the said order). Renewal of their license now becomes subject to a rigid evaluation performance. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law. B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING a) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support thereof. b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented. c) The decision must have something to support itself. d) The evidence must be substantial. e) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. f) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of the subordinate. g) The board or body should in all controversial questions render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered. What functions of administrative agencies require them to give notice and to conduct hearings? Notice and hearing are not required in the exercise of their quasi-legislative function; but notice and hearing are required in the exercise of their quasijudicial function C. SCHOOL PROCEEDINGS/ ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE a) Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them. b) They shall have the right to answer the charges against them; c) They shall be informed of the evidence against them; d) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; e) The evidence should be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designed by the school to hear and decide the case; f) The penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense 7

MALABANAN vs. RAMENTO 129 SCRA 359 / G.R. No. L-62270 / May 21, 1984 FACTS Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University. They sought and were granted a permit to hold a meeting. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. They opposed the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. They were placed under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated the Manual for Private Schools for holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. ISSUE 1) W/N suspension was an appropriate property. 2) Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech. HELD 1) NO. SC held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the decision of Ramento, the penalty imposed being unduly severe. It is true that petitioners held the rally at a place other than that specified in the permit and continued it longer than the time allowed. Undeniably too, they did

disturb the classes and caused the work of the non-academic personnel to be left undone. Such undesirable consequence could have been avoided by their holding the assembly in the basketball court as indicated in the permit. Nonetheless, suspending them for one year is out of proportion to their misdeed. SC nullified the Ramentos decision, a much lesser penalty being appropriate. 2) YES. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. The assembly was to be held not in a public place but in private premises, property of respondent University. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Petitioners did seek such consent. It was granted. That there would be a vigorous presentation of views opposed to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture was to be expected. They believed that such a merger would result in the increase in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. NON vs. DAMES II 185 SCRA 523 / G.R. No. 89317 / May 20, 1990 FACTS Petitioners, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. were not allowed to reenroll for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.

The trial court dismissed their petition seeking readmission applying the Termination of Contract Doctrine. Petitioners urged the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz v. PSBA (QC) to the effect that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated. ISSUE Termination of Contract Doctrine encapsuled in Alcuaz vs. PSBA (QC) HELD It must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer. Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. SC held that the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them. The school has the duty to respect the rights of the student to free speech.

It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired. But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Thus, there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. LAO GI alias CHIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 180 SCRA 756 /G.R. No. 81798 / December 29, 1989 FACTS The DOJ Secretary issued Opinion No. 191finding Filomeno Chia, Jr., to be a Filipino citizen as his father Chia Sr., alias Lao Gi was found to be a Filipino citizen. However, DOJ Sec. later rendered Opinion No. 147 which cancelled Opinion No. 191 and set aside the citizenship of Chia, Sr. on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. A charge for deportation was filed with the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) against Lao Gi alias Filomeno Chia, Sr., his wife and children. The charge was amended alleging that said respondents refused to register as aliens and was further amended to include commission of acts of undesirability. CID set the deportation case against respondents for hearing. ISSUES 1. W/N CID has jurisdiction over deportation. 2. W/N Lao Gi and his family were denied due process. HELD 1. YES. There can be no question that the CID has the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against 9

petitioners and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by the petitioners (under the Immigration Act). 2. NO. SC directed CID to continue hearing the deportation case and if found to be aliens, to determine whether or not the petitioners should be deported and/or otherwise ordered to register as aliens. Under the Act, before any alien may be deported upon a warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration, there should be a prior determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground as charged against the alien. In this case it appeared that petitioners were charged with having entered the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection or admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry. After appropriate charges were filed in the CID the specific grounds of which he should be duly informed of, a hearing should be conducted, and it was only after such a hearing by the CID that the alien may be ordered deported. While it is not disputed that it is also within the power and authority of the Commissioner to require an alien to so register, such a requirement must be predicated on a positive finding that the person who is so required is an alien. In this case where the very citizenship of the petitioners is in issue there should be a previous determination by the CID that they are aliens before the petitioners may be directed and required to register as aliens. Before any charge should be filed in the CID a preliminary investigation must be conducted to determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the respondent for deportation. E. FIXING OF RATES a) Notice b) Hearing What is the rule in the fixing of rates? Fixing rates is judicial in nature. Hence, unlike in the exercise of quasilegislative power, it must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical purposes it is final as to the period covered. PHILCOMSAT vs. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218 / G.R. No. 84818 / December 18, 1989 FACTS PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, station(s) and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Previously, it was exempt from the jurisdiction of respondent NTC. However, pursuant to E.O. No. 196, it was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates. Implementing E.O. 196, NTC required PHILCOMSAT to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor. PHILCOMSAT filed with NTC said application. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for. The NTC granted and even further extended the provisional authority. However NTC issued an order directing PHILCOMSAT to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of 15% on the present authorized rates. PHILCOMSAT contended tha the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order violated procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process. ISSUES 1. W/N there the enabling act empowering NTC to fix rate and to exercise of its adjudicatory powers was an undue delegation of legislative power. 2. W/N the order denied PHILCOMSAT of procedural and substantive due process. HELD 10

1. NO. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. In the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. Pursuant to EO 546 and 196, NTC is empowered to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. Under EO 546, NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Therefore, NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. 3. YES. a) Procedural due process As a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasijudicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to PHILCOMSAT and to no other. So, while NTC may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of PHILCOMSAT, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.

b) Substantive due process The inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition. In this case the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information without, however, divulging such sources. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said statements. SC held that the order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is null and void. Note: The Court here faulted the NTC for giving an interlocutory order reducing rates charged by PLDT. But in Radio Communications v. NTC (see below) the Court upheld the temporary rates granted by the NTC asserting that the law allows the NTC to approve temporary rate requested by a public service agency provided hearings are held within 30 days thereafter. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NTC 184 SCRA 517 / G.R. No. 66683 / April 23, 1990 FACTS PLDT filed an application with NTC for the approval of rates for digital transmission service facilities. NTC provisionally approved and set the case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law. 11

Later NTC issued a notice of hearing for PLDT's application. In the notice of hearing, Radiocom (and other petitioners) were not included in the list of affected parties. Radiocom alleged that neither NTC nor PLDT informed them of the existence of this provisional authority ISSUE 1) W/N Radiocom was denied of due process when NTC issued a provisional authority in favor of PLDT, without prior notice. 2)W/N notice and hearing are required. HELD NO. NTC found that the application involved in the present petition is actually an application for approval of rates for digital transmission service facilities which it may approve provisionally and without the necessity of any notice and hearing as provided in the above-quoted provision of law. Well-settled is the rule that NTC now is empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public Service Act, (the Board of Communications then) the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. As to the required notice, it is impossible for NTC to provide one to all parties affected, not all of them being known to it. More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing was published. Under the circumstances, the Commission may be deemed to have substantially complied with the requirements. SC dismissed the petition.

When do laws which interfere with life, liberty or property satisfy substantive due process? To justify the State in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 Is the requirement of substantive due process a rigid concept? Definitely not. The heart of substantive due process is the requirement of reasonableness or absence of exercise of arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts that depend on the circumstances of every case. What is the presumption when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty or property? Generally, the presumption is that the action is valid. (In rare cases, as in the imposition of prior restraint (Sec. 4), there is a presumption of invalidity.) Doctrine: Substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." US vs. TORIBIO 15 PHIL 85 FACTS Luis Toribio was charged of violating Act. No. 1147 for slaughtering his carabao. This Act regulates the slaughter of large cattle designed to preserve work animals needed for agriculture ( shortage of such animals was largely due to disease which decreased carabao supple). He contends that the law states no large cattle shall slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse upon permit from the municipal treasurer therefore it does not apply to him because there is no slaughterhouse in his town, Carmen, Bohol. He also contends that in requiring him to obtain a permit for the slaughter of useless cattle is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE W/N Act No. 1147 violates the due process clause? 12

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS As a substantive requirement, it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws; because if all that the due process clause required was proper procedure, then life, liberty or property could be destroyed arbitrarily provided proper formalities are observed.

HELD The Court held that the purpose of the ordinance was to regulate the threatened population of these animals because of its indispensability as a farm worker. The Court found that it is within public interest to regulate the killing of such animal. It therefore satisfies the requirement of substantive due process of public interest and absence of arbitrariness. As to the first contention, the SC held that the statute prohibits slaughter of large cattle both inside or outside the municipal slaughterhouse without permit since to do otherwise would defeat the clear legislative intent to preserve the carabao population. The lawful purpose referred to in this case is the right of the State to prevent the theft of cattle. While the means employed are not oppressive and in fact are very reasonable. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the Act regulating the slaughter of large cattle designed to preserve work animals needed for agriculture declaring it to be a valid exercise of police power. The limitation on the exercise of private ownership was for public interest and the means were reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of purpose and not duly oppressive. YNOT vs. IAC 148 SCRA 659 FACTS Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO626-A which prohibited the interprovincial movement of any carabao and carabeef; the confiscation and forfeiture of any carabao or carabeef caught; and the distribution of such articles by the Director of Animal Industry and the Director of the National Meat Inspection. The RTC sustained the confiscation. HELD The statute was held unconstitutional. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing. However, there are exceptions in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger such as the abatement of a nuisance per se. This protection of the general welfare is the function of police power. To be valid, police power must comply with two requirements: a. that the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and

b. that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose and not oppressive to individuals. The EO is an invalid exercise of police power because the method employed to preserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is violative of due process clause for lack of reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.

CHURCHILL v. RAFFERTY 32 PHIL 580 FACTS Act No. 2339 empowered the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight. The plaintiffs, owners of a certain parcels of land in Rizal upon which certain billboards were erected, admitted, in an agreed statement of facts that said billboards are offensive to the sight. However, they contend that said act is a deprivation of property without due process. HELD The act is not unconstitutional as the billboards are a source of annoyance and irritation to the public and interfere with the proper enjoyment of outdoor life by the general public which is certainly their right. Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public and thus fall within the scope of police power. But police power cannot interfere with the property rights for purely aesthetic purposes. Nevertheless, since the real and sole value of billboards is its proximity to public thoroughfares, the regulation of billboards is not so much regulation of private property as it is the regulation of public streets. PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO 104 PHIL 443

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FACTS A building permit was denied to the owner of a piece of land on the ground that any construction would destroy the view of the public plaza by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Fajardo claimed that his house was destroyed by a typhoon and he desperately needed a new place of residence and he has no choice but to erect a house on his property. The Court of First Instance convicted him of violating Ordinance No. 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur. HELD The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use and enjoy their own property. Hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power and amounts to taking of appellants property without just compensation. ERMITA MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATOR VS. CITY OF MANILA 20 SCRA 849 FACTS Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel, Motel Operators and other hotels are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating motels in the Ermita and Malate districts. They assail the validity of Ordinance No. 4760 promulgated by the municipal board of Manila and approved by Acting Mayor Astorga on the ground that it violative of due process for being unreasonable and arbitrary. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance are: a. Impose a P6,000 fee per annum on first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels; b. Require motel owners to refrain from accepting any guest without his filing up a prescribe form in a lobby open to the public; c. Require the maintenance of certain minimum facilities; d. Require the premises and facilities to be open for inspection by the Mayor or Chief of police; and e. Prohibit a person less than 18 years old from being accepted as a guest unless accompanied by his/her parents. Mayor contends that the ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a proper purpose which is to curb immorality since motels provide the necessary atmosphere for prostitution, adultery and fornification.

HELD The ordinance is constitutional. 1. Legislative actions are accorded the presumption of validity by the judiciary. Absence of some factual foundation to overthrow the statute, the presumption must be upheld. 2. It is a valid exercise of police power because it aims to safeguard public morals. 3. The issue of invasion of privacy and the right against selfincrimination, the court dismissed such contention on the ground that they were raised not by the proper parties. 4. The statute is not vague unless it forbids or prohibits the doing of an act that men of common knowledge must necessarily guess at its meaning and differs as to its application, this not being the case at bar. ACCFA VS. CUGCO 30 SCRA 649 FACTS The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Act (ACCFA) was a government agency created under RA 821. A CBA was entered into by the agency and its union. However, the union protesting alleged non-implementations of the said agreement which led to a strike which lasted for a month. In October 1962, the ACCFA Supervisors Association and the ACCFA Workers Association, together with the mother union, Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO) filed a complaint with the CIR for unfair labor practices. During the pendency of the case, the Agricultural Reform Code was passed. The said law caused the reorganization of the administration machinery of ACCFA and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). The unions thereafter filed a petition for certification election with the CIR praying that they be certified the exclusive bargaining agent of the agency. The trail court certified ACCFA Workers Association and the ACCFA Supervisors Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the agency. ACA opposed the jurisdiction of the CIR on the ground that it was engaged in governmental functions. The unions contend that ACCFA is performing proprietary functions.

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ISSUE W/N ACCFA is engaged in the performance of governmental functions? (Thus, not subject to certification election or collective bargaining of the respondent unions) HELD ACCFA is performing governmental functions. ACA was established to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture. Land Reform is certainly beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise and thus, purely a governmental function. Moreover, the law declares it as a government office. With regard to due process, the court declared that there appears to be substantive due process in land reform. The subject of the law is to assist land reform. The means to achieve such would be the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Such is deemed to be justified because there is just compensation provided by the government.

BALACUIT VS. CFI 163 SCRA 182 FACTS Petitioner Balaquit, Tan and Carcel were managers of Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater and the Diamond Theater respectively. They filed a case with respondent CFI praying that Ordinance No. 640 of Agusan del Norte be declared unconstitutional. The assailed ordinance provided that movie theater owners should charge half-price for children between 7 and 12 years old. Petitioners also contend that the issuance of said ordinance is not within the power of the Municipal Board. On the other hand, the Board invoked the general welfare clause of the Butuan City Charter which empowered it to enact laws or ordinances necessary for sanitation, safety, morality, peace and general welfare. CFI ruled in favor of the Board.

AGUSTIN VS. EDU 88 SCRA 195 FACTS Letter of Instruction No. 229 required all motor vehicles to be equipped with a pair of early warning device (EWD) and authorized the Land Transportation Commission to issue the implementing rules. Petitioner assails the validity of said law because it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Land Transportation Commission. HELD The LOI was issued in the valid exercise of police power. It was intended to promote public safety. Since the EWD is universal among the signatories to the 1986 Vienna Convention, any motorist who sees the EWD will conclude that a motor vehicle which is disabled exists. The Court also reasoned out that a motorist who sees the built-in blinking lights or reflectorized tapes of a motor vehicle will not immediately get adequate advance warning. The blinking lights may be those of a law enforcement car or an ambulance. This confusion may then give rise to collision or increased danger thereof. With these, the Court held that the law in question is a valid and reasonable measure to promote public safety. The means employed is likewise just and reasonable.

HELD The ordinance is unconstitutional. The ordinance is an invasion of personal and property rights. Police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and reasonable relations must exist between the purpose of the law and the means employed to achieve such purpose. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the parent. For the benefit of the parents, the cost is passed on to the theater owners. There is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. It must be noted that a theater ticket is a property right. An owner may dispose of it in any way he wishes as well as fix its price. The right to fix the price is an attribute of property and is within the ambit of the due process clause. NDC and NEW AGRIX VS. Phil. VETERANS BANK 192 SCRA 257

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FACTS Agrix marketing Inc. executed in favor of Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated in Los Baos, Laguna. However, during the existence of the mortgage, Agrix went bankrupt. To salvage Agrix Group of Companies, the then President Marcos issued PD 1717 which: 1. Ordered the rehabilitation of Agrix to be administered by petitioner NDC 2. Provided for the procedure for the filing of claims against Agrix by creating a claim Committee 3. Provided for the extinguishment of all mortgages and liens attached to the assets of Agrix. Pursuant to PD 1717, Philippine Veterans Bank filed a claim with the Claims Committee for payment of his loan credit. However, NDC invoked PD 1717 and petitioned RTC for cancellation of the mortgage lien. The RTC, through Judge Guerrero, annulled PD1717 on the ground that it violated separation of powers, impaired the obligations of contracts and violated the equal protection clause. Petitioners now contend that property rights are subject to regulations under the police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare. HELD In order that a legislative act in the exercise of police power be valid, it requires a lawful subject and a lawful means. 1. The interest of the public as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify states interference. 2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In the present case, public interests are wanting to justify states interference. The decree was issued only to favor a certain group of individuals/investors. The means employed to rehabilitate Agrix also falls short of the requirement that it must not be duly oppressive. The right to property in all mortgages and liens are destroyed by virtue of said law. The right to private property is destroyed by a legislative fiat without regard to the private interest in favor of another private interest.

Doctrine: Liens and encumbrances constitute private property and such cannot be taken from one in favor of another without any known public purpose and just compensation. MARANAW HOTEL VS. NLRC GR No. 110027 November 16, 1994 FACTS Gina Castro was dismissed by Century Park Sheraton Hotel for failure to meet the standards required during her probationary employment contract. She thereafter file a complaint for ULP with reinstatement, backwages and damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor. Maranaw appealed to the NLRC but failed to post the required appeal bond because it contended that the LA erred in the computation of backwages. Gina on the other hand filed a motion for execution of the decision of the LA. However, the LA did not act on this. NLRC reversed LAs decision and stated that the dismissal was valid. It also affirmed the award on backwages but modified the manner of computation. Maranaw assailed such decision because if the dismissal was valid, then backwages should therefore be not awarded. ISSUE Can the NLRC order reinstatement and backwages despite contrary ruling that a dismissal was valid? HELD The Court invoked the provision of the Labor Code under Art. 223 which states that insofar as reinstatement is concerned, it shall be final and executory even pending appeal. On the basis of such provision, the Court held that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion. 1. Although the reinstatement aspect of the decision is immediately executory, it does not mean that it is self-executory. There must still be a writ of execution. 2. Reinstatement is only at the option of the employer. Such right belongs to the employer. 3. The immediately executory pending appeal phrase under Art. 223 requires a writ of execution. This is a substantive requirement of the due process law. 16

BENNIS VS. MICHIGAN No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996 MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES GR No. 111097 July 20, 1994 FACTS PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 for the purpose of centralizing and regulating all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea which fall under the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The corporation decided to expand its operation in Cagayan de Oro City. As part of its plan, it leased a part of a building owned by Pryce Properties Corp. Inc. However, the City Council of Cagayan promulgated the following ordinances: 1. Ordinance No. 3353 which prohibited the use of buildings for the operation of a casino. 2. Ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibited the operation of casinos. Pryce seek relief from the CA which favorably rendered a decision declaring the ordinances in question as invalid. CDO and Mayor Magtajas thereafter went to the SC. Petitioners main contention rests solely on its alleged power under the Local Government Code to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. The law also gives them the power to suppress or impose penalties for the establishment and maintenance of gambling and other prohibited games of chance and such law does not provide for any distinction on what gambling or other games of chance which falls under it. ISSUE W/N the ordinances in question are valid? HELD NO. The Court pronounced that in order for an ordinance or any statute to be valid, it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. Furthermore, it must not be unfair, oppressive, partial and discriminatory. Lastly, it must not prohibit trade but rather regulate it and it must not be unreasonable and consistent with public policy. The ordinances runs counter to what PD 1869 provides. If it is upheld, then PGCOR will be an ineffective source of revenue. The games of chance under the PAGCOR are deemed allowed by law. Thus, they do not fall under the prohibited games contemplated in the Local Government Code. CRUZAN VS. Dir. MISSOURI No. 88-1503 June 25, 1990 FACTS Due to a fatal car accident, petitioner Nancy Cruzan lies in a Missouri hospital under a persistent vegetative condition. Her case is virtually hopeless as she lives only under artificial hydration and nutrition. The State is bearing the cost of her care. Hospital employees refused, without any court approval, to acquiesced to the request of her family to terminate her artificial sustenance, since this would obviously cause her death. 17 FACTS John Bennis, together with a prostitute were arrested by the Detroit Police for having sex inside his car. The car was confiscated for being a public nuisance under a Michigan statutory abatement scheme. Bennis wife Tina complained on the forfeiture of the car because she is a joint owner over the property. She said that she had no knowledge of that incident (husband using it for illegal purposes) and being the innocent-owner, she was deprived of due process by reason of such confiscation. The CA reversed the decision of the trial. However, the Supreme Court of Michigan reverted it back upholding the trail courts decision. ISSUE W/N Tina Bennis was deprived of her right to due process? HELD NO The Michigan abatement scheme did not deprive her of her right and interest over the forfeited car without due process. Jurisprudence dictates that when a thing is used for illegal purposes, it can be forfeited in favor of the state regardless of the knowledge of its owner. The acts of her husband bind her and thus, her claim of innocence is untenable. The forfeiture proceeding did not violate the 14th amendment because the government is not required to compensate the owner of a property when it has taken possession over it through lawful means under its exercise of governmental authority other than eminent domain.

The State Trial Court however authorized the termination, finding that Cruzan, considering her state, is entitled to the right under the State and Federal Constitutions to direct or refuse the withdrawal of deathprolonging procedures. The State Supreme Court reversed. While the court recognized the right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent, it cannot be applied to the case at bar. The Court upheld the State Living Will statute under a state policy of favoring the preservation of life. The alleged statement of Cruzan directed to her housemate regarding her wishes to die did not expressly show her intent. It also rejected the argument that her parents have the authority to order the termination of her treatment. The Court said that no person can assume the choice of an incompetent in the absence of a Living Will statute or clear or convincing evidence of the patients wishes. HELD Cruzan has no right under the US Constitution to require the hospital to terminate her treatment under the surrounding circumstance of her case. First of all, the SC recognized the power of Missouri to require that evidence of an incompetents wishes. Like Cruzan, be proved by clear and convincing evidence. a. A competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment. However, this guaranty does not apply to incompetent people. Incompetent persons are unable to make informed and voluntary choice to exercise that hypothetical right or any other right. b. Missouri has a general interest over the protection and preservation of human life. Thus, it may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of an individuals choice between life and death. The State Supreme Court did not commit error in declaring that the intent of Cruzan was not shown by clear and convincing evidence. Cruzans pronouncement of her desire to withdraw her treatment to her housemate is not enough to warrant a definite determination of her intent to cut-off her life-prolonging medication/care. The Due Process clause does not require a State to accept the substitute judgment of close family members in the absence of proof that their decision symmetrically reflects the intention of the patient. However, inasmuch as the State may require the showing of clear and convincing evidence to establish patients wishes, it has the right to disregard close

family members judgment, although qualified, and instead rely specifically to such wishes of the patient which may be established. CORONA vs. UNITED HARBOR G.R. No. 111953 / December 12, 1997 FACTS The PPA has the power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession. PPA promulgated rules which mandate that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued another administrative order which was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance." ISSUE W/N Adm. Order No. 04-92 w/c limits the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation violates their right to substantive due process of law. HELD Yes. PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted only 18

after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal ". It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPAAO No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Cayat, a native of Baguio was convicted of violation of Act No. 1639(secs. 2 and 3): "SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. "SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereon, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court." ISSUE W/N Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause. HELD No It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW What is the meaning of equal protection of law? The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under it, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. The goddess of justice is portrayed with a blindfold, not because she must be hindered in seeing where the right lies, but that she may not discriminate against suitors before her, dispensing instead an even handed justice to all. Does equal protection prohibit classification? It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 Illustrative Cases Doctrine: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. PEOPLE vs. CAYAT. G.R. No. 45987 / May 6, 1939 FACTS

19

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class. It applies to a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture. Doctrine: Equal protection of the laws does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not The Power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification. ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ. G.R. No. L-7995 / May 31, 1957 FACTS Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. This Act has a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. ISSUE W/N RA No. 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws. HELD No.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. The objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. This is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. A law was passed prohibiting aliens from engaging rights in the retail trade. Valid? The purpose of the law was to remedy a demonstrated harmful strangehold by aliens on the retail trade; a valid purpose, therefore. The distinction made between citizens and aliens is substantial and reasonably related to the valid purpose, because citizens and aliens is substantial and reasonably related to the valid purpose, because citizens owe greater allegiance to the state and conversely the State owes greater protection to citizens. Doctrine: Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. VILLEGAS V. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO G.R. No. L-29646 / November 10, 1978 FACTS 20

Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila. Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. In his petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho wanted the ordinance declared null and void ISSUE W/N Ordinance No. 6537 violated equal protection clause. HELD Yes The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. The ordinance in question violates the equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. DUMLAO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980 FACTS This is a Petition which seeks to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." ISSUE W/N Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is violative of equal protection clause. HELD The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is not well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable Persons similarly situated are similarly treated. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies. Lastly, it is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable. A law is passed prohibiting women from becoming licensed bartenders. Valid? The object of the law is to protect the morals of women. The physical and psychological differences between men and women make the distinction reasonably related to the valid purpose. (refer to case below) 21

GOESART VS. CLEARY 335 US 464 FACTS Act 133 of the Public Act of Michigan was passed, prohibiting females to be licensed as bartenders unless they be the wives or daughters of the proprietor of the bar. ISSUE W/N there was a valid classification as regards bartenders. HELD The USSC held that the law is valid because its purpose is to prevent social problems by preventing prostitutes from masquerading as bartenders. If the father or husband is the owner, there is greater certainty that the bartender is not a prostitute. The Constitution does not require situations that are different in fact or in opinion to be treated in law though they were the same.

The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The ordinance does not meet the requirement of reasonable classification. It taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. Even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Doctrine: The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 113811 / October 7, 1994 FACTS Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Barnabe Machitar. He was suspended until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides for preventive suspension pending criminal case. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds process and equal protection." 22

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY vs. ORMOC CITY. G.R. No. L-23794. February 17, 1968 FACTS The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause. ISSUE W/N Ordinance No. 4 is violative of the equal protection clause. HELD Yes.

ISSUE W/N Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 which suspends PNP officers for over 90 days violates the equal protection clause. HELD The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serous offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. Doctrine: The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them differently. LIM vs. PACQUING. G.R. No. 115044 / January 27, 1995 FACTS ADC's franchise was revoked by Presidential Decree No. 771, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments. ADCs position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. ADC insists that it was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai. ISSUE W/N PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection.

HELD No. There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree. ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Doctrine: It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. SISON, JR vs. ANCHETA G.R. No. L-59431 / July 25, 1984 FACTS This case is a constitutional challenge on the validity of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135. The assailed provision further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents. Petitioner as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, "he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers." ISSUE W/N Section 1 of BP Blg. 135 violates the equal protection clause. HELD Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. To repeat, it is enough that the classification must rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. 23

Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income.

search and seizure clause is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed wit power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. When is a search a search? The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA G.R. No. 83988 / September 29, 1989 FACTS This is a petition which seeks the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional. The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. The NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. ISSUE W/N checkpoints constitute unreasonable search, thus violative of the Constitution. 24

SECTION 2. THE RIGHT PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS ,

OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY AFFIRMATION BY OF THE THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION AND THE UNDER OATH HE OR MAY COMPLAINANT WITNESSES

PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.

What is the purpose of this provision? The purpose of this provision is to protect the privacy and sanctity of the person and of his house and the other possessions against arbitrary intrusions by State officers. Does the provision prohibit all searches and seizures? No. What it prohibits are unreasonable searches and seizures. When are searches and seizures unreasonable? The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by the

HELD No Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. When are checkpoints allowed? It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. (refer to the preceding case) Are inspections at checkpoints equivalent to warrantless searches? Routine inspection and a few questions do not constitute unreasonable searches. If the inspection becomes more thorough to the extent of becoming a search, this can be done when there is deemed to be probable cause. In the latter situation, it is justifiable as a warrantless search of a moving vehicle. (refer to preceeding case) VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA. G.R. No. 83988 / May 24, 1990 FACTS Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of checkpoints. ISSUE W/N checkpoint is a warrantless search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution

HELD It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. The routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on motorist's right to "free passage without interruption", but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter. Lastly, the Court's decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. Doctrine: It is not the police action per se which is impermissible and which should be prohibited but the procedure used or methods which offend even hardened sensibilities. Requisites of a Valid Warrant What are the requisites of a valid warrant? (1) it must be issued upon "probable cause" (2) probable cause must be determined personally by a judge; 25

(3) the determination of the existence of probable cause must be made after examination of the complainant and the witness he may produce by the judge (4) warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized (5) it must be for one specific offense (6) under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge may issue warrants What is the procedure in the issuance of a search warrant? (1) the police submits affidavits before a JUDGE (2) the judge should be stationed in the Regional Trial Court with jurisdiction over the property to be searched (3) the judge interviews the applicant for the warrant and if the judge determines probable cause, the warrant is issued. But no case is yet filed in court (4) the object seized is deposited in court (5) the fiscal then files a case in court What is the procedure in the issuance of an arrest warrant? (1) a complaint, usually by affidavit is first filed with the fiscals office (2) the fiscal then issues a subpoena addressed to the respondent to submit a counter affidavit (3) the fiscal then determines whether there is prima facie case to file an information in court (4) the judge then determines whether to issue the warrant. The judge is duty bound to issue the warrant if he should find the evidence to be insufficient the fiscal cannot compel the judge to issue the warrant. What is probable cause? Probable cause means such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that are in them sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them. It is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. What are the other important points regarding probable cause? (1) It must be defined in relation to the action which it justifies (2) Probable cause means probable cause of something specific, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, not absolute certainty, merely probable cause (3) Probable cause is a factual and practical concept which is not necessarily technical

(4) Probable cause must be based upon the personal knowledge of the applicant or witness (5) Only the judge and the judge alone makes the determination of whether or not probable cause exists as to the issuances of a search warrant or a warrant of arrests. What is the probable e cause for an arrest? Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested? What is the probable cause for a search? Probable cause for a search would mean such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonablebly discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Who may determine probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant? Only a judge. What is the purpose of the requirement that the judge must have personal knowledge? To convince the magistrate of the existence of probable cause. And unless the applicant has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the application, he cannot convince the judge of said probable cause. The judge must asked searching questions What is the meaning of personally in the search and seizure clause? The judge, in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. He may also rely on the fiscals report or if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. What kind of examination must the judge do? The examination must be probing and exhaustive not merely routinary or pro forma. The examining judge must not only rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his inquiry on the intent and justification of the applicant. 26

May the judge rely solely on the prosecutors certification that probable cause exists? NO. The judge must make an independent determination of probable cause. He cannot rely solely on the certification of the prosecutor of the existence of the same. If such happens, then it is the prosecutor who makes the determination of the existence of probable cause, who is not vested with such power by the Constitution. Are affidavits of the complainants and of the witnesses sufficient aids for determining probable cause? No. A written deposition and need for examination cannot be dispensed with because such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause and to hold a person liable for perjury if his declaration is found to be false. Define oath An outward pledge by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of responsibility to God. Define affirmation A solemn and formal declaration that an affidavit is true, this being substituted for an oath in certain cases. What is the meaning of particularity of description? A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law- by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure, or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relations to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. As regards property, the description of the nature of the goods to be seized must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given. In cases such as these, substantial compliance is fulfilled when the officer of the law who executes the warrant is in a position wherein he is able to identify the articles to be seized. As regards person, ideally the person sought to be seized must be identified by name.

Does a John Doe warrant satisfy the requirement of particularity of description? Yes, provided it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. The warrant must clearly indicate the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served by stating his personal appearance and peculiarities, his occupation and place of residence and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified. But John Doe warrants should be the exception and not the rule. What is the purpose of requiring particularity of description? Its purpose is to prevent abuse by the officer enforcing the warrant by leaving to him no discretion as to who or what to search or seize ALVAREZ VS CFI OF TAYABAS RIZAL 64 PHIL 33 FACTS The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to the CFI judge of Tayabas an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, petitioner was keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used in connection with money-lending activities for which he charged usurious rates in violation of the Anti-usury Law. He did not swear to the truth if his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable source. On the basis of this affidavit the judge issued the search warrant after which the police searched Alvarez' store and residence. HELD Search warrant is not valid. Though taking into consideration the nature of the articles, the warrant passed the description test because a general description would seem sufficient, the judge should not have relied on hearsay information alone. It is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witness for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. PEOPLE VS VELOSO 48 SCRA 169

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FACTS On May 1923, the Parliamentary Club located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo City of Manila was raided by virtue of a search warrant issued by Judge Gardino. Veloso, who was then a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippine legislature was found to be the manager of the said gambling house, Veloso resisted the police, he even hit one policeman. The people present were all charged with gambling but Veloso was the only one convicted since there was substantial evidence against him. Veloso now contends that the search warrant was invalid being a John Doe warrant. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant is valid? HELD The search warrant is VALID. Even though the search warrant only mentioned John Doe, the particulars were stated namely: gambling house at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila. It is understandable that name of the accused cannot be ascertained since the place was not a residence, all the more it was a gambling house camouflaged with the name of Parliamentary House. However, it should be noted that John Doe warrant should be the exception rather than the rule. The best description possible of the person arrested is to be given in the warrant, but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, place of his residence and other circumstances by which he can be identified.

HELD (1) NO, it made a general accusation and not of a specific violation. (2) NO. Warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners regardless of whether or not they were legal or illegal. (3) NO, because the search warrant was not avail to impugn a specific act neither was it able to cite the particularities of the items to be seized. Here, the Supreme Court abandoned the Moncado ruling that ruled that even if the searches and seizures were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence. Supreme Court admits the exclusionary rule that articles illegally seized will not be used as evidence because it is the only particular means of enforcing the constitutional injuntional against unreasonable searches and seizures CENTRAL BANK VS MORFE 20 SCRA 507 FACTS First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization Incorporated is a registered non-stock corporation whose main purpose is to encourage and implement savings and thrift among its members by extending financial assistance in the form of loans. On February, 1962, Central Bank issued a circular wherein the public is prohibited from transacting business with organizations such as the petitioner. Because of this, Central Bank applied for search warrant alleging that First Mutual has been receiving deposits of money, has transacted business of savings as a mortgage bank without having complied with RA 337 and that certain materials being used or intended to be used in the felony is to be found as the place designated. Judge Cancino issued a search warrant. Judge Morfe rejected the legality of the warrant pointing out that the search warrant must be able to point to specific banking transactions of the First Mutual with specific persons. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant is valid? HELD YES. The search warrant was validly issued. The failure of the witness to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove that he has no personal knowledge of specific illegal transaction.

STONEHILL VS DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 FACTS Petitioner wants to invalidate the 42 search warrant issued against him by respondent judges, which ordered the seizures of "Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).," as for violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal code. Articles were seized in the offices and residences of the petitioner.

ISSUES (1) Whether or not search warrant impugned specific acts? (2) Whether there was particularity in the description ? (3) Whether or not search was valid?

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20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP. VS COURT OF APPEALS 164 SCRA 655 FACTS 20th Century Fox sought the assistance of the NBI on the conduct of searches and seizures of films in videotape outlets all over Metro Manila which are allegedly engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted videotapes. The NBI were able to obtain search warrants but the videotape outlet owners are assailing their legality for lack of probable cause. 1. HELD Illegal for lack of probable cause Personal knowledge is required in establishing probable cause The NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of the offense. It is only the counsel for 20th Century Fox, who was also a witness, who had personal knowledge that the tapes confiscated were pirated tapes. The search warrant must contain a specific description of the articles seized A search warrant issued for the alleged violation of Anti-Film Piracy law which did not describe with particularity articles to be seized but instead listed articles and appliances generally connected with a legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes, is in the nature of a general warrant. The presentation of master tapes at the time of application for search warrant is necessar for the validity of the search warrant (this requirement was overruled by the Columbia case) COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC. VS FLORES 223 SCRA 761

FACTS A search warrant was issued against respondent for reproducing pirated video tapes of copyrighted films included equipment used in the unlawful sale, lease, distribution or possession of the pirated video tapes. As a result television sets, videocassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other machines belonging to respondent were seized. Respondent filed a motion asking for the return of the equipment and accessories on the ground that their possession was not illegal per se and that they were not being used in the sale, lease, distribution or possession of the pirated videotapes but were being used for reproduction. The court granted the motion. ISSUE Whether or not probable cause was established? HELD NO The basic requirement for the validity of search warrants in cases of this nature is the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which pirated films are supposed to have been copied. In this case, the fact remains that there is need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold, leased or distributed are pirated tapes.

2.

3.

BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP 133 SCRA 802 FACTS Col. Abadilla applied for search warrant against metropolitan Mail and We Forum for printing, publishing and distributing newspapers that were subversive.. Search warrant was issued and was served. Petitioner wants to nullify such search warrant and demands the return of the articles seized. ISSUES (1) Whether or not other articles seized which did not belong to Burgos Sr., should be confiscated also? (2) Are the machineries capable of being a subject of the search? (3) Whether or not the search warrant was valid?

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HELD (1) YES. Sec. 2 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that: a search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property (a) property subject to the offense (b) property stolen or embezzled and other products or fruits of the offense (c)property used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense. Above rule does not require that property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. (2) YES. Machineries in question remain to be movable property susceptible to seizure because petitioners do not own the land or the building. (3) NO. There must be with the application, a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials that Burgos has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization like printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in printing, publication and distribution of said newspapers as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature will not suffice. CORRO VS LISING 137 SCRA 541 FACTS Search warrant issued by Judge Lising against Philippine Times for the seizure of printed copies, manuscripts, drafts, newspapers dummies, subversive documents and even typewriters used as instruments in committing the crimes of inciting to sedition. Search warrant was executed on the same day. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant was valid?

HELD NO. Search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be. The evident purpose and intent is to limit the things to be seized to those, particularly described in search warrant - to leave officers of law which no discretion regarding what articles should be seized. Statements in search warrant were mere conclusions of law, it failed to state the particular articles to be seized and does not give sufficient probable cause. SALAZAR VS ACHACOSO 183 SCRA 147 FACTS Rosalie Tesoro filed in case of illegal recruitment against Hortencia Salazar. Pursuant to the complaint, Secretary of Labor issued warrants of arrest and seizure to Salazar. ISSUE (1) Whether or not the Secretary of Labor is validly allowed to issue arrest warrants? (2) Whether or not Sec. 38 (c) of the Labor Code stating that the Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority constitutional? (3) Whether or not the search warrant is valid?

HELD (1) NO. Article III Sec. 2 is clear, it is only a judge who may issue sear and arrest warrants . Mayors and even prosecuting body are not allowed to do so. (2) NO. Only a judge can issue search warrant. The authorities must go through the judicial process. (3) NO. It was in the nature of a general warrant. The only exception to the rule is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens whom the President or the Court of First Instance may order arrest following a final order of deportation. BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. VS RUIZ 37 SCRA 823 FACTS Misael Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue wrote a letter to Judge Ruiz, requesting that a search warrant be issued against petitioner company, so he sent Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon and witness Logronio. Since Judge Ruiz was busy hearing on another case, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the 30

statement of Logronio. Afterwards, the judge merely asked the stenographer to read Logronios statement and asked Logronio to take an oath regarding his statements. Hence, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued and served on petitioner-company. ISSUE Whether or not search warrant was valid? HELD NO. Judge should personally examine the witnesses. In this case, investigation was done by the Deputy Clerk of Court. He just asked Logronio if what he said was true and did not ask any question. The search warrant was for four different offenses: violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and 73; violation of Sec. 53; violation of Sec. 208; and violation of Sec. 209. For a search warrant to be valid, it must be for one specific offense. The search warrant does not particularly describe the thing to be seized, for instance, unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnar, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970." SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR 167 SCRA 393 FACTS President Corazon Aquino filed a complaint for libel against the petitioner, who were publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in Beltran's column of October 12, 1987 entitled, "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration" "If you will recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her bed, while the firing was going on - perhaps the first Commander in chief of the AFP to have to do so." Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal denied his motion after finding a prima facie against the petitioners and filed the case in court which thereafter issued warrants of arrests against the petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE WHETHER
WARRANT WAS VALID WHEN JUDGE DID NOT PERSONALLY EXAMINE THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES.

HELD The addition of the word ''personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officer as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrests. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence if probable cause and on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. PLACER VS VILLANUEVA 126 SCRA 465 FACTS Petitioner City Fiscal of Butuan City filed information in court attesting that preliminary investigation has been conducted and that there is probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and herein accused is probably guilty thereof. However, Judge refused to issue warrant of arrest alleging that there is no probable cause. ISSUE Whether or not the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the existence of probable cause obligates judge to issue warrant of arrest? HELD NO. Judge has to rely on his own determination as to the existence of probable cause. Though the fiscals determination is of some basis it is not conclusive to compel the judge.

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LIM, SR. VS FELIX 194 SCRA 297 FACTS ON MARCH 17, 1989, CONGRESSMAN MOISES ESPINOSA AND HIS SECURITY ESCORTS WERE ATTACKED AND KILLED BY A LONE ASSASSIN AT THE MASBATE DOMESTIC AIRPORT. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED AND JOLLY FERNANDEZ AND NONILON BAGALIHOG WERE IMPLICATED AND PROBABLE CAUSE WAS DEEMED TO EXIST. RESPONDENT JUDGE FELIX ISSUED A WARRANT OF ARREST WITHOUT BAIL RELYING SOLELY ON THE REPORT OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. ISSUE Whether or not the arrest warrant was valid?

arrested. Furthermore, it bears stressing that in the determination of a probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of technical rules of evidence of which his (the average man) knowledge is nil. What is necessary is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but just a probable cause. Evidence required to establish guilt is not necessary." PEOPLE VS COURT OF APPEALS 291 SCRA 400 HELD The place the police officers have in mind in applying for a search warrant must be the same place the Judge should have in mind when he issues the warrant. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant the particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself. There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that any evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search and seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. COLUMBIA PICTURES APPEALS 262 SCRA 219 ENTERTAINMENT, INC. VS COURT OF

HELD NO. It is a requirement that the judge must have personal knowledge. Even though he can consult the preliminary investigation, his decision should not be completely based at that. Consequently, records of the preliminary investigation were still at Masbate at the time the judge issued the warrant, so there can be no personal knowledge and examination. EXTRA CASES: PEN VS DE CASTRO 293 SCRA 3 FACTS A warrant of arrest was issued under the name John Doe. The City Prosecutor filed an amended information naming Alelio Pen as the John Doe referred in the warrant. Judge De Castro ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation. Then, she directed the issuance of an alias warrant for the immediate arrest of Pen. Pen submits that De Castro acted with grave abuse of discretion in causing the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest although the City Prosecutor was not yet through with the preliminary investigation. HELD A warrant can be issued if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Probable cause is defined as such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Specifically, the probable cause to warrant arrest requires such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that such an offense has been committed by the person sought to be

FACTS A SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED AGAINST JINCO FOR POSSESSING PIRATED VIDEOTAPES, POSTERS, ADVERTISING MATERIALS AND OTHER ITEMS USED OR INTENDED TO BE USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE, LEASE, DISTRIBUTION, CIRCULATION OR PUBLIC EXHIBITION OF THE SAID PIRATED VIDEOTAPES.

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ISSUE

Whether or not the search warrant is valid?

HELD YES. The presentation of the master tapes of the alleged pirated tapes is not an absolute requirement to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Contrary to the ruling of 20th Century, which was not given retroactive effect in this case, which affirmed the lifting of the search warrant because the master tapes were never shown, the Supreme Court held that the master tapes are mere "guideposts in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. The articles to be seized were also particularly described in the warrant. OPLE VS TORRES 293 SCRA 141 FACTS Petitioners assails the constitutionality of A.O no 308 issued by the President Ramos on Dec. 1996 which is the Adoption of National ID reference system. It shall be a system among the key basic services of the government and social security. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The Administrative Order is predicated in two considerations: 1). The need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; and 2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. Although it is not compulsory, petitioner assails its constitutionality on he basis that it violates the constitutional guarantee on privacy ISSUE clause. WON the Administrative Order violates the Right to Privacy

the use of any individuals own psysiological or behavioral characteristics. Most biometric measurement is used to very that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN. 2. Biometrics however, is not merely limited to fingerprinting. It is a new science that used various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. AO 308 does not specify what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who sill seek its coverage. Considering the number of options available to the implementators of the AO, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy is not groundless. 3. AO 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. The indefiniteness can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. 4. AO 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. It lacks proper safeguards against abuses by the government. 5. The Right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living ina mass society. The threats emanate from various sources governemnt, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat conmes from the executive branch of the government which by issuing AO no. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that AO 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. The right to privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights, in Section 1(Due Process Clause), section 2 (Rt. To be secure in ones houses, papers, and unreasonable search and seizures), section 6 (liberty of abode), section 8 (right to form unions associations and societies), section 17 (against self-incrimination) Other zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a 33

HELD It cannot be argued that the AO is broad, and vague, that if implemented would certainly violate the right to privacy. 1. The heart of the AO lies in its Sec. 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number as a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of Biometrics Technology and computer application designes. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data to determine an individuals identity through

public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The RPC makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on Priviledged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. WATEROUS DRUG CO. VS NLRC 280 SCRA 735 FACTS Catolico is a pharmacist at Waterous Drugs. Company control clerk Valdez informed the company that she noticed an irregularity in the remittances involving Catolico and YSP Inc., during the latters purchase of 10 boxes of medicines. According to Valdez, the price of the medicines per box was P320, however it was recorded as P384, leaving a P64 difference. Ms. Saldana, a co-employee of the accused saw the refund money amounting to 640 in an envelope which was handed to Catolico. Catolico was put under preventive suspension and was later dismissed. Catolico filed a case at the NLRC for illegal dismissal. She further complains that Ms. Saldana violated her right to privacy as she was not supposed to open the envelope which is not addressed to her(Saldana). Hence, the evidence should be held inadmissible. ISSUE HELD WON the evidence should be admissible.

Must a search always be accompanied by a valid search warrant? No. There are certain exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence that allow for searches and seizures even in the absence of a valid search warrant. Valid Warrantless Searches 1. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest REQUISITES: 1. Incidental as to person, time and place 2. Limited to the person of the accused 3. Immediate 4. Within the immediate vicinity of the accused limited to the articles within reach, which may be used by the accused to protect himself or to injure the arresting officer and to evidence that may be destroyed 5. Seizure only of evidence - fruits of the crime, objects of the crime, articles used, articles used in the commission of the crime, and articles which man be used as a means of committing violence or escape 2. Search of Moving Vehicles REQUISITES: 1. Probable cause 2. Exigent circumstances 3. Seizure of prohibited articles in plain view REQUISITES: 1. Incriminating evidence 2. Open to the eye and hand (and to smell) 3. Discovery inadvertent 4. Officer has a right to be in that position to have plain view 4. Customs inspection REQUISITES: 1. Officers acting in their official capacity 2. May be made anywhere except in dwelling house 3. Goods illegally imported, irregularly released or duties unpaid 5. Where there is a waiver of right REQUISITES: 1. Right exists 2. Actual or constructive knowledge of that right 3. Intention to relinquish that right 34

It is admissible. The court finds no reason to reverse the decision of People vs. Marti that the Bill of rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel of Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. However, since she was denied due process, her dismissal was held to be based on hearsay and therefore she was reinstated plus backwages. What is the exclusionary rule? Evidence obtained in violation of Section 2 Article III shall be inadmissbile as evidence for any purpose in any proceeding (Section 3 Article III). This is also known as the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine. Warrantless Searches and Seizures

6. Armed Conflict (wartime) 7. Others a. Conduct of "Areal Target Zone" and "Saturation Drives" in the exercise of military powers of the President (Guazon vs. De Villa) b. Checkpoints (Valmonte vs. De Villa) REQUISITES: 1. Abnormal times 2. Limited to visual Search 3. Vehicle not searched 4. Passengers not subjected to body search c. "Stop and Frisk" Situation (Malaccat vs. CA) What is entrapment? Is a buy-bust operation a valid means for capturing violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act? A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. It is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserves full faith and credit. What is the Plain View Doctrine? This simply means that object within the sight of an officer who has a right to be in that position to have that plain view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. What is a "stop and frisk" situation? When an officer is justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is presently dangerous, he may conduct a limited protective search for concealed weapons. The purpose of this limited search is not so much to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without risk of violence. What are the requirements for a valid warrantless search? 1. Existence of probable cause 2. Exigent circumstances NOLASCO VS PAO 147 SCRA 509 FACTS Mila Aguilar Roque was arrested while inside a public jeepney. About half an hour later, her house was searched by virtue of a search warrant that turned out to be void for being in the nature of a general warrant. The law enforcers now claim that despite the invalidity of the search warrant, the objects seized from the house of Roque were still admissible as evidence, the search being done after a valid arrest. HELD The search is still not valid A search incidental to a lawful arrest bust be made within the vicinity of the arrested person and must be done immediately. PAPA VS MAGO 22 SCRA 857 FACTS Acting upon a reliable information received the day before that a certain shipment of personal effects allegedly misdeclared and undervalued were to be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila, officers of the Manila Police Department conducted a surveillance at the gate of the customs zone. They intercepted 2 trucks that contained such items, and upon order, seized the vehicles and its contents. The trial court ordered that certain goods be released. HELD The trial court was without jurisdiction to order the release of the goods. The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for purposes of enforcing customs laws, from the moment goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Tariff and customs Code does not require any search warrant issued by a competent court before police authorities can effect a seizure except if such is to made upon a dwelling house.

PEOPLE VS CFI RIZAL, BR. IX 101 SCRA 86 35

FACTS The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center received a report one week earlier that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles inside a blue Dodge car. Respondents were caught inside a blue Dodge car on their way to Tropical Hut in EDSA from Angeles City. Found in their possession were 11 boxes of bracelets and watches, for which customs taxes have not been paid. Charged with smuggling, they argued that the watches and bracelets were inadmissible as evidence for being seized without a warrant. HELD Searches and seizures without a warrant may be made upon probable cause that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure. Persons exercising authority under the customs law may effect a search and seizure without a warrant made upon probable cause. The requirement that a warrant must be issued judicially borders on the impossible considering that the time, place, things and persons to be searched must be described particularly to the satisfaction of the judge. In the case of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle, such particularity of description cannot be accomplished since contraband may be easily transported.

warrant. More importantly, the seizure in this case was made on a moving vehicle, the taxicab carrying Lo Ho Wing. ROAN VS GONZALES 145 SCRA 687 FACTS Judge Gonzales issued a search warrant without taking any depositions. He merely asked the complainant if he understood the affidavit that he executed because such was not yet subscribed and sworn to. By virtue of the search warrant executed, Roan's house was searched and all they found were unlicensed firearms. None of the articles described in the search warrant was found. HELD The search warrant is void A valid search warrant requires that the issuing judge determine probable cause after asking the complainant searching questions. The judge cannot rely solely on the affidavit. Further, items seized by virtue of a void search warrant is inadmissible as evidence even if possessed illegally since such were not in plain view. The law enforcers had no right to be in the place to have a view of the unlicensed firearms. The search conducted by the law enforcers was tantamount to fishing for evidence. PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT 198 SCRA 401 FACTS Police officers set up a checkpoint after receiving reports that a foreigner from Sagada was transporting prohibited drugs. After a few hours, the bus carrying the accused was stopped. The police officers noticed a bulge on the waist of Malmstedt and asked for his passport. When the accused failed to comply, the police officer asked him to bring out what was bulging on his waist. The bulge turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. When the accused was asked to alight from the bus he got his two bags which contained a teddy bear each. It was only thereafter that the accused produced his passport. The accused was then brought to the police headquarters where the teddy bears were cut up and found to contain hashish. HELD Search valid. The search was incidental to a lawful arrest where a crime was actually being committed. Under the circumstances of the case, there was probable cause for the NARCOM officers to believe 36

PEOPLE VS LO HO WING 193 SCRA 122 FACTS The Philippine Constabulary, upon receiving a tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of contraband goods and gunrunning, carried out a deep penetration scheme to infiltrate the syndicate. Through one of their operatives, they learned that Lo Ho Wing, a business who was said to be engaged in the smuggling of prohibited drugs, was due to arrive from China in two days and was said to be in possession of the prohibited articles. Upon arrival at the airport, Lo Ho Wing boarded a taxicab. The police agents went after the taxicab and later intercepted tea tin cans containing shabu after searching the luggage of the suspect. HELD Search valid Although the information regarding Lo Ho Wing's arrival was received two days prior to the seizure, such information is insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search

that the accused was then and there committing a crime. The receipt of information that a foreigner coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and the failure of the accused to produce his passport gave rise to probable cause. Note: (Dissenting Opinion) The search is illegal because the law requires that there first be a legal arrest before a search of the body and the belongings of the accused may licitly be made. In this case, it was in fact illegal possession that retroactively established probable cause. PEOPLE VS TABAR 222 SCRA 144 FACTS A police team conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving information that there are marijuana pushers in Puerto Prinsesa. The police informant acted as a poseur-buyer to Arriesgado, a minor, nephew of Tabar. Following Arriesgado, they apprehended Tabar who was then holding a pair of pants. Inside the pockets were 3 marijuana sticks. The buy-bust operation led to the arrest and conviction of Arriesgado and Tabar. HELD Search valid. The SC held that when Tabar was asked to spread it out, which she voluntarily did, the marijuana sticks were exposed to the plain view of the officers. Thus, a crime was committed in the presence of police officers. Pursuant to the Rules of Court, she could be lawfully arrested and searched for anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without corresponding arrest and search warrants. Even assuming that the search and seizure was done without a warrant, Tabar had voluntarily waived her constitutional right thereto by voluntarily submitting to the search and seizure.

Passing through a checkpoint set up at the Batasan Complex, a search was conducted by the PNP wherein firearms were found neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag on the truck of the car. The COMELEC ordered the filing of criminal charges for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner argued that the search was illegal. HELD The search was illegal. An extensive search without a warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. There was nothing in the behavior of the driver that would raise the suspicion of the police officers. A warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. VERONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 47J VS ACTON No. 94-590 June 26, 1995 FACTS Motivated by the discovery that athletes were leaders in the student drug culture and concern that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury, Veronia adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of students who participate in athletics programs. Acton was denied participation when he refused to consent to the testing. The Court took in account the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative obtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the search and concludes that Veronias policy is reasonable, and hence constitutional.. The policy was undertaken in furtherance of the governments responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care. Just as when the government conducts a search in its capacity as employer, he relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. Note that the primary guardians of Veronias schoolchildren appear to agree. The record shows no objection to this district-wide program by any parents other than the respondents. 37

HELD

ANIAG, JR. VS COMELEC 237 SCRA 424 FACTS In preparation for the 1992 elections, COMELEC prohibited persons from carrying firearms. Pursuant to that prohibition, the sergeant-at-arms of the House of Representatives wrote petitioner, a Congressman, to return the firearms issued to him by the House. Petitioner then sent his driver to return the firearms.

Searches and Seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose What could be referred to by the phrase searches and seizures of whatever nature and for whatever purpose? It extends the search and seizure clause to at least two penumbral areas: 1. Subpoena duces tecum under Rule 27 of the Rules of Court. 2. Building inspection by administrative officers. This is yet untouched by Philippine Jurisprudence. MATERIAL DISTRIBUTORS VS NATIVIDAD 84 Phil 127 FACTS Under authority of Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, the respondent judge had granted the motion for the production and inspection of: 1)books and papers of Material Distributors, Inc. comprising of journals, ledgers, letters, and cable grams; 2) books and papers belonging to Harry Lyons; 3) the originals of the two annexes to the complaint containing lists of names. Complainants alleged that it was a violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures, self-incrimination, and violation of the privacy of communication: W/N there was a violation of the above-enumerated rights. 1. Self- Incrimination: The court found nothing in the allegations to believe that bu inspection of the annexes, the petitioner may incriminate themselves. 2. Violation of the search and seizure clause: it was opined tha the orders in question pertain to a civil procedure clause that cannot be confused with unreasonable search and seizures prohibited in the constitution. There was no question that upon pleading in this case, Sarreal (the party who asked for the order) has an interest in the books and documents in question , that they are material and important to the issues between him and the petitioners. That justice will be better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the court. 3. The constitutional guarantee on the privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated because the trial court has the power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in

question in virtue of the constitutional guaranteemaking in express exception in favor of the disclosure of communication upon lawful order of the court. OKLAHOMA PRESS VS WALLING 327 US 186 FACTS The Wage-Hour Division Administrator issued a subpoena duces tecum to Oklahoma Press in the course of investigating whether the company is covered by and violating the Fair Labor Standards Act. The petitioner sought total immunity from the provisions of the Act requiring them to submit their pertinent records for the Administrators inspection. They claimed that the Act was violative of the 1st Amendment (expression), the 4th Amendment (Searches and Seizures), and 5th Amendment (selfincrimination). It contends that the enforcement of the Act would permit the Administrator to conduct general fishing expeditions into the companys records in order to secure evidence that they have violated the Act, without a prior charge or complaint. 1. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. This power was delegated to the Administrator by Congress.

HELD

ISSUE HELD

2.

The 5th Amendment seems to afford no protection by virtue of the self-incrimination clause, to the corporation or its officers in an instance where the production of records and papers is in response to a subpoena or order authorized by law and safeguarded by judicial sanction. The 4th Amendment guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breath in things required to be particularly described, if the inquiry is one of the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified by law are relevant. 3. The gist of the protection of the protection is in the requirement that the disclosure shall not be unreasonable. CAMARA VS MUNICIPAL COURT 387 US 523 38

FACTS

An inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the Citys Housing Code. The buildings manager informed the inspector that the appellant, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Claiming that the buildings occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the groundfloor, the inspector confronted the appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant. A complaint was filed charging him with refusing a permit a lawful inspection in violation of a provision of the Housing Code. HELD 1. A suggested justification for warrantless administrative searches is that public interest demands such a rule: it is vigoriously argued that the health and safety of the entire urban population is dependent upon the enforcement of minimum fire, housing and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of enforcing such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physical structures.

FACTS

THIS

IS A CONSOLIDATION OF

8 HABEAS CORPUS

CASES QUESTIONING THE

VALIDITY OF THEIR DETENTION SINCE THEIR ARRESTS WERE MADE WITHOUT WARRANT AND PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.

NPA SPARROW UNIT. WHILE QC HE WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF 2 CAPCOM SOLDIERS THE DAY BEFORE. AS SUCH HE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE REGIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES OF CAPCOM WHERE HE WAS DETAINED. THE FISCAL THEN FILED AN INFORMATION IN THE RTC FOR VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-SUBVERSION ACT.
IS A MEMBER OF THE BEING TREATED WITH GUNSHOT WOUNDS IN

DURAL

HELD THE SC

HELD THAT THE CRIMES OF REBELLION, SUBVERSION, CONSPIRACY OR

PROPOSAL TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMES, AND CRIMES OR OFFENCES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF OR IN CONNECTION THEREWITH CONSTITUTE DIRECT ASSAULTS AGAINST THE AND ARE IN THE NATURE OF CONTINUING OFFENSES. WITHOUT WARRANT IS JUSTIFIED.

AS

SUCH THE ARREST OF

STATE DURAL

PEOPLE VS DE LA CRUZ FACTS CRUZ

AND SIGNAL, ARREST.

BECAUSE

OF

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT

BY

AN

INFORMANT,

THE

POLICE

CONDUCTED A BUY-BUST OPERATION IN ORDER TO CATCH DRUG PUSHERS.

2.

In the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property, without a warrant. Thus, a practical matter and in the light of the 4th Amendments requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is another satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. In the case at bar, there was no emergency demanding immediate access. The inspectors even had time and opportunity to procure a warrant.

BELTRAN GAVE THE POSEUR-BUYER 1 FOIL OF MJ. WITH NARCOM AGENTS CONVERGED, IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AND

FOR P10, DE LA THE PRE-ARRANGED

EFFECTED THE

HELD SC

HELD THAT A BUY-BUST OPERATION IS A FORM OF ENTRAPMENT WHICH IS

EMPLOYED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CAPTURING A LAWBREAKER FROM WHOSE MIND THE CRIMINAL INTENT ORIGINATED. VIOLATORS OF THE

IT IS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE THAT IN THE ARREST OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT (DDA) IN A BUY-BUST OPERATION, THE MALEFACTORS WERE INVARIABLY CAUGHT RED-HANDED. THUS THE CASE AT BAR FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTION AS FOUND IN RULE 113 SEC. 5 (B). PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN 163 SCRA 402 FACTS Police officers had received a tip that accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo and was carrying marijuana (mj). Based on this, they waited for him and arrested him as he was disembarking from the ship. They also inspected his bag and found 3 kilos of mj. ISSUE He claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and searched without warrant.

Warrantless Arrests IN RE UMIL VS RAMOS 187 SCRA 311

39

HELD In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. The accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante delicto nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the RoC. Even expediency could not be invoked since no such urgency exists. From the conflicting declarations of witnesses, the police officers had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Amminudin. His name was known. The vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they received, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. Dissenting Opinion: J. Aquino dissents and holds that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying mj leaves at the moment of his arrest thus, he was not innocently disembarking from the vessel. HARVEY VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO 162 SCRA 840 FACTS Petitioners (2 Americans & Dutch nationals) were apprehended in February by virtue of mission orders issued by Commissioner Defensor-Santiago of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photos and negatives of suspected child prostitutes in salacious poses and sexual acts. Also living-in with them were young children, 2 of whom were found naked. In March, deportation proceedings were instituted against them for being undesirable aliens. They were charged for deportation. Such that arrest warrants were issued for violation of specific sections of the Immigration Act. The petitioners filed a petition for bail for medical reasons which were denied considering the certification of their good health. Such that they now petition the court for habeas corpus. ISSUE Whether or not their detention was valid considering that they were detained pending determination of the existence of probable cause.

HELD The SC said that the right granted by Art III 2 is available to all persons including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provides exemptions to arrest even without any warrant. In this case, the arrest was based on probable cause (PC) determined after close surveillance for three months. The existence of PC justified the arrest and the seizure of the articles even without warrant. Even if the arrest was not valid at inception, it has become valid since formal charges has been filed and hearing has been conducted. Moreover, the filing of petition to be released on bail must be considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them questioning its validity. Note: Atty. Candelaria pointed out that a warrant of arrest can only be issued upon final order of deportation. PEOPLE VS SUCRO 195 SCRA 388 FACTS THE POLICE WERE INFORMED OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES BEING CONDUCTED BY THE ACCUSED. SUCH THAT 2 DAYS LATER, THEY MONITORED THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ACCUSED FROM A HOUSE 2 METERS AWAY FROM WHERE THE BUYING AND SELLING OF MJ OCCURRED. AFTER THE TRANSACTION, THEY ARRESTED SUCRO. ISSUE WON THE ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT IS LAWFUL. HELD THE ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT WAS LAWFUL SINCE IT CAME UNDER RULE 1135 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. AN OFFENSE IS COMMITTED IN THE PRESENCE OR WITHIN THE VIEW OF AN OFFICER, WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE RULE AUTHORIZING AN ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT, WHEN THE OFFICER SEES THE OFFENSE, ALTHOUGH AT A DISTANCE, OR
HEARS THE DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE AT THE SCENE THEREOF.

ALSO,

THERE IS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTUAL COMMISSION OF THE CRIME

SINCE THEY HAVE CONDUCTED SURVEILLANCE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ACCUSED.

PEOPLE VS RODRIGUEZA GR 95902 February 4, 1992 FACTS After receiving a confidential information form one of its informant , the Narcotics regional Unit formed a team to conduct a buy-bust 40

operation. CIC Taduran acted as the poseur-buyer. After the transaction wherein he allegedly obtained Marijuana for P200, he went back to the headquarters and made a report about it. And on the basis of that report, the appellants were arrested without warrant and brought to the headquarters for investigation. HELD A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by police officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. In case at bar, CIC tTadurans procedure was highly irregular as he did not immediately arrest the appellant. Sworn statements and other evidences seized are inadmissible. PEOPLE VS BAGISTA FACTS NARCOM of Baguio City received reports that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair and with a height of 52 or 53, would be transporting marijuana from up north. Sgt. Fider and a civilian agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet & established a check point. The agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus and noticed a woman with curly hair at the last seat of the bus. The agents inspected her things and discovered marijuana. Bagista claimed that the bag was not hers and she was a victim of frame-up. HELD Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search has been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have a reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. The NARCOM agents had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant. They also have probable cause to search Bagistas belongings since she fits the description given by the informant.

PEOPLE VS MENGOTE 210 SCRA 174 FACTS WPD RECEIVED A CALL THAT THERE WERE 3 SUSPICIOUS-LOOKING PERSONS LUNA AND NORTH BAY BLVD. IN TONDO. THE POLICE OFFICERS WERE DISPATCHED AND UPON ARRIVAL AT THE PLACE, THEY SAW 2 MEN LOOKING FROM SIDE TO SIDE, ONE OF WHOM HOLDING HIS STOMACH. THE POLICE OFFICERS INTRODUCED THEMSELVES BUT THE TWO MEN TRIED TO RUN AWAY. UPON CATCHING THEM, THEY WERE SEARCHED. THE SEARCH REVEALED A REVOLVER WITH LIVE BULLETS AND A FAN KNIFE. AS SUCH THEY WERE ARRESTED.
AT THE CORNER OF

ISSUE WON ARREST MADE WAS LAWFUL. HELD IN BY

NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION COULD IT HAVE BEEN INFERRED FROM THESE ACTS THAT AN OFFENSE HAD JUST BEEN COMMITTED, OR WAS ACTUALLY BEING COMMITTED, OR WAS AT LEAST BEING ATTEMPTED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICE OFFICERS. SHORT, THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT WILL ALLOW THE DISPENSATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF A WARRANT. KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS INDICATING THAT HAD WAS HEARSAY INFORMATION.

ALSO

THE OFFICERS HAD NO PERSONAL

MENGOTE

HAD COMMITTED AN OFFENSE.

ALL

THEY

GO VS COURT OF APPEALS 206 SCRA 138 FACTS Six days after the shooting of Maguan, Rolito Go presented himself , together with his 2 lawyers, before the Police Station to verify reports that he was being hunted down by the police. The police, nevertheless, detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting incident positively identified Go as the gunman. That same day, the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide. But since Maguan died, the information was amended to a murder charge. HELD The arrest was unlawful since (1) Go went to the station not to surrender himself but only to verify reports; (2) the crime committed does not fall within the Umil doctrine of a valid warrantless arrest due to a continuing crime; (3) the arrest took place 6 days after the incident which is not within just has been committed; and (4) none of the officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that Go was the gunman. 41

PEOPLE VS MANLULU 231 SCRA 700 FACTS DURING

A DRINKING SPREE, A WITH HIS SERVICE PISTOL BY ACCUSSED-APPELLANTS. CLOCK IN THE MORNING.

NARCOM AGENT WAS STABBED THE KILLING TOOK PLACE

AND SHOT AT ONE O

THE

ARREST AND THE CONSEQUENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAME AT

FACTS PNP Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. They immediately proceeded to the area and found several men fishing within the seven kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the ship and inspected the boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain. They took samples of the live lapu-lapu from the fish cage for laboratory examination, which when tested yielded positive of sodium cyanide. HELD The warrantless search is valid as it was suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure. PEOPLE VS ARUTA GR No. 120915 April 3, 1998 FACTS There was a tip on Dec. 13, 1988 of the arrival of appellant from Baguio City on board a Victory Liner Bus with Marijuana on the 14 th. They deployed themselves near PNB where the bus stops. Two ladies alighted and the informer pointed to appellant. While crossing the street, she was approached and asked to see the bag, which she gave. They saw marijuana and she was charged and convicted. HELD The search was invalid as a search warrant could have been procured as there was 24 hours to spare, they had a name, the thing to be seized and the bus company. There was no waiver as the act of giving the bag is not voluntary submission nor a waiver, as to have a valid waiver, the right must exist, has knowledge of said right, intention to relinquish said right. The supposed implied acquiescence, more of passive conformity to intimidating and coercive circumstance. PEOPLE VS SOLAYAO FACTS Nilo Solayao was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. SPO3 Jose Nio conducted an intelligence patrol to verify reports of the presence of armed persons roaming around Caibiran. The team met Solayaos group. Nio became 42

AROUND SEVEN OCLOCK THAT EVENING, SOME

19 HOURS LATER.

ISSUE WON THIS INSTANCE COME WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST. HELD THIS INSTANCE CANNOT COME WITHIN RULE 113 5(B) OF RULES ON CRIM. PROCEDURE SINCE IT REQUIRES THAT THE ARRESTING OFFICER MUST HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFENSE WHICH HAS IN FACT JUST BEEN COMMITTED. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE WAS PERSONAL GATHERING OF INFORMATION BUT NOT PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. ALSO, THE ARREST WAS NOT EFFECT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. EXTRA CASES: Warrantless Searches MALACAT VS COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 123595 December 12, 1997 FACTS As a response to report of bomb threats, policemen in uniform went on a foot patrol. They saw two groups of men posted at opposite sides of a corner near the Mercury Drug Store. They were acting suspiciously, with their eyes moving very fast. As a policeman was approaching group they fled, and were only able to catch appellant. A search was made and a fragmentation grenade was found tucked inside appellants from waist line. HELD As probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in the light of the police experience and surrounding conditions to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. HIZON VS COURT OF APPEALS 265 SCRA 517

suspicious because he noticed that the group was drunk and Solayao was wearing a camouflage uniform. Upon seeing Nios group, Solayaos companions fled. Nio identified himself and seized the dried coconut leaves that Solayao was carrying. He unwrapped it and found a latong. Solayao claimed that his companion, Cenining, gave it to him wrapped in coconut leaves. Thus, he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed inside. Further, it cannot be used as evidence against him since Nio didnt have a valid warrant . HELD Solayao and his companions drunken actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nios group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a camouflage uniform and that his companions fled after seeing the peace officers. This case constituted an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was a justifiable cause to stop and frisk Solayao when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. However, the Court ruled that while the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to carry such firearm. The prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that Solayao admitted before Nio at the time that he was accosted that he did not have any authority to carry the firearm. Solayao is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. a. Arrests PEOPLE VS SALVATIERRA 276 SCRA 55 FACTS Charlie Fernandez, a palamig vendor, was met by three persons. One of them was accused David Salvatierra, who lunged a pointed instrument at Fernandez. Fernandez was hit at the left breast. Thereafter, the three scampered away. Charlie Fernandez died a few days after the incident. The assault was witnessed by Milagros Martinez, a vendor. Martinez did not immediately report the incident to the police authorities because she was afraid. Three months later, Salvatierra was taken into custody for creating a commotion. It was later found out that Salvatierra was a suspect in the killing of Fernandez. Milagros Martinez learned of the apprehension of Salvatierra. She went to the WPD station and there, executed a sworn statement implicating accused to the crime. In a police line-up

Milagros pinpointed Salvatierra as the person who stabbed Fernandez. Accused was charged with murder. Salvatierra pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. The trial court found him guilty. Hence, he appealed. ISSUE Whether or not the warrantless arrest was illegal? HELD The Supreme Court held that a warrantless arrest effected three months after the commission of the crime is unconstitutional and illegal -- there must be compliance with the element of immediacy between the time of the commission of the offense and the time of the arrest. However, Salvatierra is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest where he never raised it before entering his plea. Any irregularity attendant to his arrest, had been cured by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea and participated during the trial. The SC affirmed the conviction of Salvatierra. PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ 282 SCRA 387 FACTS Sharleen Tan, a prep student at ICA, was kidnapped on January 21, 1992. The accused Jose Lorenzo, the family driver, together with Sharleens nanny Eva Sta. Cruz picked up Sharleen from school. Upon boarding the car, several men also boarded the car. Eva Sta.Cruz was allowed to alight to inform the parents for Sharleens ransom. The kidnappers initially demanded P10 million but settled with P 409 thousand. The money was dropped at the designated place. Several weeks later Sharleen was released. An intensive manhunt was conducted. The first to be apprehended was Efren Hernandez who was arrested in connection with another crime. He waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Hernandez voluntarily admitted his participation. The other members of the kidnap group were subsequently arrested. The other suspects (Tumanneg, Lorenzo, Jacob and Famondulan) each executed an extra-judicial confession which became the basis of the criminal charge against them. The accused were convicted. They appealed to the SC. 43

ISSUE Whether or not the warrantless arrests were illegal? Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions are admissible? HELD Although the accused were arrested without the benefit of a warrant and under the circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest. Clearly, their warrantless arrests violated the Constitution. However, they are estopped from assailing the illegality of their arrest when they failed to move for the quashing of the Information against them before their arraignment. By entering a plea of not guilty, and participating in the trial, appellants waived their right to challenge the legality of their warrantless arrests. The SC also held the admissibility of the confessions. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary. The burden is on the accused to prove the involuntariness of his confession. PEOPLE VS JAYSON 282 SCRA 167 FACTS Wenceslao Jayson was a bouncer of the Ihaw-Ihaw nightclub in Davao City. On March 16, 1991, Patrolmen Camotes and Racolas received a radio message directing them to proceed to the IhawIhaw nightclub where there had been a shooting. They saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to Jayson as the one who shot Jordan. They then arrested Jayson. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver. The firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt issued by Deputy Commander of CAFGU, Maj. Arquillano. Jayson was initially charged with murder but after plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. The trial court sentenced him. He was also charged with illegal possession of firearms. The trial court found him guilty of illegal possession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals increased the penalty. Accused appealed to the SC. ISSUE Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid? HELD The facts of the case show the warrantless arrest and search were valid. Rule 113, Sec. 5(B) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: ....(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. The arresting officers

acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts that Jayson was the assailant. PEOPLE VS CABILES FACTS Marites Atienza, her daughter and housemaid (Luzviminda Aquino) were sleeping when a man suddenly barged into the house by destroying the kitchen door. The man ordered Marites to take out her jewelry and raped Luzviminda. Marites was able to escape by saying that she had to prepare milk for the baby. Marites asked help from her neighbor, Arnel Cericos. However, when Arnel came to Luzvimindas aid, the man stabbed Arnel 4 times and ran away. Later, Romeo Nas (Marites brother), with some policemen went to a sash factory warehouse where they saw Cabiles. Romeo recognized Cabiles bracelet as the one taken form Marites. Upon being awakened, Cabiles told them that the other things he took from Marites were inside a plastic bag at the factory building. Cabiles admitted his guilt. Later, Cabiles changed his mind and denied committing the crime. He relied on denial and alibi. He also claimed that he was arrested without warrant. HELD The Court has consistently held that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Also, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgement rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free form error such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused. Cabiles confession to the policemen cannot be admitted in evidence. Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. However, Cabiles verbal confession before Marites is admissible. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.

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SECTION 3. (1) THE

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

SHALL BE INVIOLABLE EXCEPT UPON LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT, OR WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY OR ORDER REQUIRES OTHERWISE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW.

Property Code. The Rules of Court on Privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. EXCLUSIONARY RULE: any evidence obtained shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings. (this is a purely personal defense.) PEOPLE VS MARTI 193 SCRA 57 FACTS Appellant Marti wanted to send 4 packages to Switzerland. Before delivering them to the Bureau of Posts, the owner of the forwarding company, as company practice, inspected the packages and discovered that they contain marijuana leaves. He immediately notified the NBI and in their lab test, they confirmed that it was indeed marijuana. Agents of the NBI went to the office of the forwarder and the forwarder took out the marijuana leaves and turned them over to the agents of the NBI. Appellant was charged under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Appellant argued that the marijuana leaves should not have been admitted in evidence, as they have been illegally seized. ISSUE Should the Marijuana not be included as evidence?

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. When is the intrustion into the privacy of communication an correspondence allowed? 1. Upon lawful order of the court.(requirement of probably cause in the preceding section should still be followed.) 2. Prescribed by law. Is there any implementing statute covering this subject? Yes. RA 4200 known as the Anti-Wiretapping Law provides penalties for specific violations of private communication. Note that Section 3 of the Act allows court-authorized taps, under specific conditions, for the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping. Where can you find the recognition of the Right to Privacy? A ccording to Ople vs. Torres, the right to privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in Section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights, in Section 1(Due Process Clause), section 2 (Rt. To be secure in ones houses, papers, and unreasonable search and seizures), section 6 (liberty of abode), section 8 (right to form unions associations and societies), section 17 (against self-incrimination) Other zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The RPC makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the AntiWiretapping law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual

HELD It is a valid evidence. 1. The evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person acting in a private capacity and without intervention of the authorities. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was intended to be a restrain upon the government and its agents and not upon private individuals. 2. Since the marijuana came into the possession of the government without its violation of the right of the appellant against unreasonable search and seizure they were inadmissible in evidence. The mere presence of the agents of the NBI did not convert the search effected by the forwarder into a warrantless search in violation of the constitution. To observe and look at what is in plain view sought is not a search. Doctrine: This comes into conflict with the Supreme Courts decision in Zulueta. Both evidences are committed by a private person yet the former was admissible while the latter is not.

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RAMIREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS 248 SCRA 590 FACTS Ramirez taped a telephone confrontation between him and the private respondent. Thereafter, a civil case was filed by Ramirez in the RTC against Garcia for alleged vexation, insult and humiliation. She presented as evidence the taped conversation. Garcia on the otherhand prays that the taped conversation shall not be admitted as evidence since it violated RA 4200. ISSUE Is the taped conversation admissible?

ISSUE

WON the evidence should be admitted.

HELD It is inadmissible. The search was illegal. There was no waiver. 1. The right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or by one expressly authorized to do so in his behalf. 2. The accused was not in the house when his alleged helper authorized the police authorities to enter. There is no evidence that the accused had authorized his helper to open his house in his absence. The search of the dwelling is illegal. VEROY VS LAYAGUE 210 SCRA 97 FACTS Spouses Veroy used to reside in Catalunan Grande, Cavao City before they transferred to Quezon City. The Davao residence was leftin care of two houseboys. Capt. Obrero received a report on Apr. 12, 1990 that the house(Davao) was being used as a safehouse for rebel soldiers. They were not able to enter the hosue a the one was not present and they did not have a search warrant. They called Mrs. Veroy and asked permission if they could search the house. She agreed on the condition that Maj. Macasaet would be there when the search would be conducted. They were able to enter the house thru the kitchen. They hired a locksmith to open the padlock to the door leading to the childrens room. They entered and recovered a .45 caliber, a half-full jute sacks contain printed materials of RAM-SFP. They made an inventory and receipt of the article seized. An information was filed charging spouses Veroy for illegal possession of firearms. ISSUE WON the guns should be admissible in the line that there is a waiver made by Mrs. Veroy. HELD The warrantless search is illegal and the objects seized are inadmissible in evidence. 1. The permission given to the police was merely to ascertain the presence of soldiers in the house and did not include an authority to conduct a room-toroom search inside the house. 2. EVEN IF CAPT. OBRERO RECOGNIZED THE FACT THAT HE NEEDED A SEARCH WARRANT AS HE DID NOT PERSIST IN ENTERING THE HOUSE BUT RATHER ASKED PERMISSION, IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A VALID WAIVER. 46

HELD The act of taping a private conversation by one of the party without the consent of the other is considered as a violation of RA 4200. 1. Legislature made no distinction whether the party sought to be penalized is part of the conversation or not. Without the consent of the both parties, it is considered penalized. 2. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation statute. 3. The definition of communication is any process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols. Such definition is broad enough to include private conversation WAIVER OF RIGHTS UNDER SEC. 2 AND 3 PEOPLE VS DAMASO 212 SCRA 547 FACTS Lt. Quijardo and some companions sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA at a certain brgy. In Dagupan City. They were able to apprehend a number of NPAs which they revealed that there was an underground safehouse in Pangasinan. They were able to get subversive documents, radio, and a .45 caliber firearm. They proceeded to a rented apartment of Rosalinda Aritumba. They sought the help of Tanciango, an alleged helper, to help them locate the house. They were allowed to enter the house by the latter. Inside, they saw radio sets, pamphlets, xerox machines and a computer. The military asked if they could look around and the helper consented. They found books, radios, ammunitions, maps, and an M-16 rifle. They made an inventory. The accused assailed the validity of the evidence confiscated since they were illegally seized.

PEOPLE VS EVARISTO FACTS Police officers came upon someone who was firing a gun. The person ran to a nearby house. As the police officers were chasing him and approaching the house, they saw the accused. The accused told them that the one who fired the fun escaped through a window. One of the police officers observed a bulge around the waist of the accused. Upon being frisked, the accused admitted it was a revolver. The co-accused, who owned the house, permitted the police officers to enter the house to look for the one who fired the gun. They saw several firearms inside the house. The coaccused was charged of illegal possession of firearms. They claimed that the seizure of the firearms were illegal. ISSUE WON the firearms were illegally seized.

protest. Peaceful picketing has also been included within the meaning of speech. What are the prohibitions of this article? The first prohibition is prior restraint. Prior restraint means official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. However, the mere prohibition of government interference before words are spoken or published would be an inadequate protection of the freedom of expression if the government could punish without restraint after publication. Hence, the guarantee of freedom of expression also means a limitation of the power of the state to impose subsequent punishment. 2. PRIOR RESTRAINT What is the exception to the prohibition against prior restraint? 1. When the nation is at war, prior restraint may be availed of in order to prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports and number and location of troops; 2. When the security of the community life will be protected against incitements to acts of violence and overthrow by force of orderly government; 3. The primary rights of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. Is the preferential treatment in the matter of prior restraint that has been given to the press also extend to motion pictures? No. Although motion pictures also come under the constitutional protection given to expression, the government, through the exercise of police power may require that the films be submitted and viewed by a board of censors prior to public exhibition. Is symbolic speech included in this guarantee? Yes. Symbolic speech such as wearing of black bands and burning of the flag is included in freedom of speech. and NEAR v. MINNESOTA 238 U.S. 697 (1931)

HELD 1. The arrest of the accused without a warrant is valid, as he committed an offense in the presence of the police officers. The observance of the bulge on his waist, the earlier report of gunfire, and the professional instincts of the arresting officers are more than sufficient to justify the arrest. 2. The taking of the firearms was incidental to a lawful arrest. The purpose of the officer in entering the house of the co-accused was to apprehend the person who fired the gun. 3. The discovery of the firearms was inadvertent. Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant. Section 4. NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION, OR OF THE PRESS, OR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES. 1. FREEDOM OF SPEECH subsequent punishment AND PRESS: Prior restraint

What does speech, expression and press include? They include every form of expression, whether oral, written, tape or disc recorder. It also includes movies as well as what is referred to as symbolic speech such as the wearing of an armband as a symbolic 47

FACTS. A Minnesota law declares as public nuisance a malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper, magazine, or other periodical. It provides for the abatement of public nuisances and further states that any person engaged in the business of producing, publishing, or giving away of such periodicals shall be enjoined from further engaging in such business. It therefore prohibits any further issues of the periodical declares as public nuisance. Near, a publisher of a newspaper which was declared as a public nuisance assailed the constitutionality of the said law. ISSUE. Whether the law violated freedom of speech. HELD. Yes. A consequence of publishing malicious of defamatory article is to put the publisher under effective censorship and the renewal of the publication would constitute a contempt and that the judgment would lay a permanent restraint upon the publisher. By suppressing publication and punishing as contempt further publication, this is censorship or prior restraint. The chief purpose of this liberty is to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The liberty is especially cherished for the immunity it afforded from prior restraints of the publication censured of public officers and charges of official misconduct. In effect, what the publisher would do is to play safe and make sure that the article is not of character that will subject it to contempt. NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. US 403 US 713 (1971) FACTS. The US seeks to enjoin the NY Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled History of US Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy ISSUE. Whether enjoining such publishment is constitutional HELD. No. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries the burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. In this case, the Government had not met that burden. Concurring Opinions: Justice Black & Douglas: The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Governments power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. To argue that the President has inherent power to halt

the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the 1st Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make secure. Justice Brennan: The 1st Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an even kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. In no event may mere conclusions be sufficient: for if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in preventing publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. Unless and until the Government has clearly made out its case, the 1st Amendment commands that no injunction may issue. Justice Stewart & White: It is the constitutional duty of the Executive as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know lawthrough the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense. DissentingJustice Harlan, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger: The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy. Also, the judiciary may not properly redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security. The very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. FREEDMAN v. MARYLAND 380 US 51 (1965)

48

FACTS. Freedman exhibited the film Revenge at Daybreak at his Baltimore theatre without first submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors as required by Sec. 2 of the Maryland motion picture censorship statute. Appellant argues that the statute constitutes an invalid prior restraint because it presents a danger of unduly suppressing protected expression. The state concedes that the picture does not violate the statutory standards and would have received a license if properly submitted. Appellant was consequently convicted for violating Sec. 2 of said statute. ISSUE. Whether the statute in its entirety unconstitutionally impair freedom of expression. HELD. Yes. Noncriminal process which requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor. Second, while the State may require advance submission of all films, in order to proceed effectively to bar all showings of unprotected films, the requirement cannot be administered in a manner which would lend an effect of finality to the censors determination whether a film constitutes a protected expression because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expressiononly a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. Third, the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. Since the Maryland scheme fails to provide adequate safeguards against undue inhibition of protected expression, it is tantamount to an invalid previous restraint. AYER PROD PTY. LTD v. JUDGE CAPULONG 160 SCRA 865 (1988)

FACTS. Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. envisioned the filming for commercial viewing the historic EDSA revolution. The proposed motion picture would essentially be a reenactment of the events that made possible the revolution; it is designed to be viewed in a 6-hour mini-series television play, presented in a docu-drama style, creating 4 fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. In a letter dated 16 Dec 1987, Hal McElroy informed Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture. Enrile replied that he would not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema, film, or other medium of commercial exploitation. Enrile further advised McElroy that in the production, showing, or distribution of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should be made to him or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to him. McElroy acceded to this demand, deleted Enriles name from the movie script, and proceeded with the project. On 23 Feb 1988, Enrile filed a Complaint alleging that the production of the mini-series film without his consent and over his objection constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy. The RTC ruled for Enrile and ordered the Ayer Prod to cease and desist from producing and filming The Four Day Revolution. ISSUE. Whether Ayer Prod., in filming The Four Day Revolution, is validly exercising its freedom of speech and of expression protected under the Constitution. HELD. Yes. The right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in he heirarchy of civil liberties (Phil Blooming Mills). It is not, however, without limitations. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. Here, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by Enrile and the right of freedom of expression invoked by Ayer Prod. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, the SC holds that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by Ayer Prod., the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of 49

expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. Whether the balancing-of-interests test or the clear and present danger test be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that the production and filming by Ayer Prod. of the projected motion picture does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon Enriles right to privacy. Note: The Court also put into consideration that the portrayal of Enrile in the movie was as a public figure. Public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a public personage. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent, their right of privacy for 3 reasons: 1. they had sought publicity and consented to it 2. their personalities and their affairs had already become public 3. the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interests. What is the clear and present danger rule? This standard emphasizes the importance of speech to a free society without sacrificing other freedoms essential to a democracy. The test is: whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. Clear means that the danger must be serious, e.g., overthrowing of the Government. Present means that the danger must be imminent or near at hand, i.e., there is a strong probability that it will happen. What is the balancing-of-interest rule? This test is applied where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and where the effect of speech and assembly in terms of the probability of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation. It applies to non-political affairs. The factors to be considered in applying this test are: 1. the value and importance of the particular freedom involved; 2. its extent such as the number of the people to be affected; 3. the necessity of the means used; 4. the availability of other means or remedies that may be used to achieve the same goal.

EASTERN BROADCASTING v. DANS, JR. 137 SCRA 628 (1985) FACTS. This is a petition to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. The charge of inciting people to commit acts of sedition arose from the petitioners shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. ISSUE. Whether closing the radio station because it covers public events and public affairs and allegedly incites people to commit sedition violates the freedom of speech and expression HELD. Yes. All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rulethat words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must bot bee too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE 50

G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994 FACTS. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. The Philippine press Institute (PPI) is a nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS) is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their rights under Sec 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law. PPI contends that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, RA 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. On the other hand, PBS alleges that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. ISSUE. Whether RA 7716 imposes censorship HELD. No. The RA does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification. The registration requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. Therefore RA 7716 does not offend free speech, press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution. ALEXANDER v. US 113 S. Ct 2776, 125 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1993)

FACTS. Ferris J. Alexander, owner of more than a dozen stores and theaters dealing in sexually explicit materials, was convicted on 17 obscenity counts and 3 counts of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The District Court then found that petitioner had acquired a variety of assets as a result of his racketeering activities. The court ultimately ordered petitioner to forfeit his wholesale and retail business and almost $9 million in moneys acquired through racketeering activity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Courts forfeiture order holding that the forfeiture here was a criminal penalty imposed following a conviction for conducting an enterprise engaged in racketeering activities, and not a prior restraint on speech. ISSUE. Whether the forfeiture (which effectively shut down petitioners adult entertainment business) constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech rather than a permissible criminal punishment. HELD. No. Petitioner contends that the forfeiture predicated solely upon previous obscenity violations, operates as a prior restraint because it prohibits future presumptively protected expression in retaliation for prior unprotected speech. Not so. The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. The RICO forfeiture order in this case does not forbid petitioner from engaging in any expressive activities in the future, nor does it require him to obtain prior approval for any expressive activities. It only deprives him of specific assets that were found to be related to his previous racketeering violations. The statute is oblivious to the expressive or nonexpressive nature of the assets forfeited. The forfeiture order in this case imposes no legal impediment to no prior restraint on petitioners ability to engage in any expressive activity he chooses. He is perfectly free to open an adult bookstore or otherwise engage in the production and distribution of erotic materials; he just cannot finance these enterprises with assets derived from his prior racketeering offenses. Dissenting Opinions Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter. The operation of RICOs forfeiture provisions is an exercise of government censorship and control over protected speech as condemned in our prior restraint cases. What is happening here is simple: books and films are condemned and destroyed not for their own content but for the content of their owners prior speech. What is at work in this case is not the power to punish an individual for his past transgressions but the authority to suppress a particular class of disfavored speech. The forfeiture provisions accomplish this in a direct way by seizing speech presumed to be protected along with 51

the instruments of its dissemination, and in an indirect way by threatening all who engage in the business of distributing adult or sexually explicit materials with the same disabling measures. 3. SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT GONZALES v. COMELEC G.R. No. 279835 March 13, 1968 FACTS. Petitioners challenge the validity of the Revised Election Code prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity. They claim that these provisions violate their right to freedom of speech and assembly. The COMELEC asserted that the assailed position is an exercise of police power of the state designed to insure a free, orderly, and honest election. ISSUE. Whether the provisions violate freedom of speech. HELD. No. The freedom of expression is not absolute. There are other social values that press for recognition. The test as a limitation of freedom of expression is justified by the danger or evil of a substantive character that the state has the right to prevent. Congress was called upon to seek remedial measures arising from the too early nomination of candidates and the necessarily prolonged political campaigns. The direful consequences and the harmful effects of the public interest with the vital affairs of the country sacrificed many a time to purely partisan pursuits were known to all. The violence did frequently occur because of the hate engendered by such political activities. Under the police power then the legislative body must have felt impelled to impose the foregoing restrictions. PEOPLE v. PEREZ 45 Phil. 599 (1923) FACTS. Isaac Perez, the Municipal Secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet at the presidencia of Pilar became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Woods head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence. Perez was charged for violation of Art 256 of RPC.

ISSUE. Whether Art 256 of the RPC and Act No. 292, as amended abridges the freedom of speech and the right of the people peacably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. HELD. No. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government. Criticisms, no matter how sever, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. When the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. In the case at bar, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes and tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety and order of the Government. These various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by Act no. 292 as amended. DENNIS v. US 341 US 494 (1951) FACTS. Petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act. The indictment charged the petitioners with willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the USA and were found guilty of the offense charged. ISSUE. Whether the Smith act may be constitutionally applied HELD. Yes. The statute may be applied where there is a clear and present danger of the substantive evil which the legislature had the right to prevent. Bearing, as it does, the marks of a question of law, the issue is properly one for the judge to decide. The mere fact that from the period 1945 to 1948 petitioners activities did not result in an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence is of course no answer to the fact that there was a group that was ready to make the attempt. The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch and go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically 52

attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score. And this analysis disposes of the contention that a conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from the advocacy itself, cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it compromises only the preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger. If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added. 4. SPEECH AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

SANIDAD v. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 (1990) FACTS. On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION was enacted into law. The Comelec then promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito Sanidad, a newpaper columnist assailed the constitutionality of Sec 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167, which provides that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or tv time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Sanidad maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, view and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. He believes that CR 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may violate it because it contains a penal provision. The Comelec maintained that the promulgation of such resolution was merely a valid implementation of its power to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as enunciated in Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution. Moreover, they contended that said resolution does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his views since there is the Comelec space and airtime. ISSUE. Whether Sec 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.

HELD. Yes. The evil sought to be prevented by Art IX-C of the Constitution is that a candidate for any elective office take advantage of advertising space or television time. It cannot be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves. Furthermore, plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The peoples right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restriction on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioners freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced to justify such abridgement and therefore this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of freedom of expression. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB v. COMELEC G.R no. 102653, March 5, 1992 FACTS. Petitioners are representatives of the mass media, 2 candidates for office, and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. They maintain that it amounts to censorship and asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of medias role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and opinion relevant to election issues. Further, they contend that it abridges the freedom of speech of candidates ISSUE. Whether Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 violates freedom of expression HELD. No. Sec 11(b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Firstly, it is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability: it is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Secondly, it is limited in its scope of application. It does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises; newspaper, radio broadcasting and television stations remain 53

quite free to carry out their regular and normal information and communication operations; it does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political adverticements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. What Sec 11(b) in fact does is to limit paid partisan political advertisement to fora other than modern mass media, and to Comelec time and Comelec space in such mass media. Sec 11(b) does limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Art IX-C and Art II 26 of the Constitutionwhich is to equalize as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign war chests. Concurring OpinionDavide, J.: Freedom of speech and of the press, or of expression is not an absolute right. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. What the Constitution contemplates is to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor in our societythat there be Social Justice. It neither constitutes proscribed abridgment of the freedom of expression nor prohibits free speech; it merely provides the rules as to the manner, time and place for its exercise during a very limited period. Dissenting Opinions Gutierrez, J. Sec 11(b) of RA 6646 is censorship pure and simple. It is particularly reprehensible because it is imposed during the limited period of the election campaign when information is most needed. Cruz, J. The announced purpose of the law is to prevent disparity between the rich and the poor candidates by denying both of them access to the mass media and thus preventing the former from enjoying an undue advantage over the latter. There is no question that this is a laudable goal. But in Constitutional law, the end does not justify the means. To pursue a lawful objective, only a lawful method may be employed even if it may not be the best among the suggested opinions. In my view, the method here applied falls short of the constitutional criterion. The provision is an undisguised attempt at censorship. It does not matter that the use of these facilities may involve financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove them from the protection of the Constitution. ADIONG VS. COMELEC

Relying on Section 11 of RA 6646, the Comelec prohibited the posting of decals and stickers of candidates on "mobile" places, public or private. The Supreme Court declared it invalid for infringing freedom of speech and for being an undue delegation of rule making authority. The prohibited acts were found to present no substantial danger to government interest. The prohibition therefore did not satisfy the requirements of the clear and present danger rule. Moreover, the prohibition was found to suffer from over breadth. It encompassed the use of privately owned property such as a vehicle. It therefore was an unreasonable restriction on the use of property. Finally, the constitutional objective to give rich and poor candidates equal opportunity was not seen as served by the prohibition of decals. 5. COMMERCIAL SPEECH RUBIN vs COORS BREWING CO. Sec. 5 of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935 prohibits beer labels from displaying alcohol content to prevent strength wars. The ban infringes on freedom of speech and there is no evidence of any relationship between publication of factual information regarding alcohol content and strength wars. For commercial speech to be lawful: a. must concern lawful activity b. not be misleading c. ask if government interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, determine whether the regulation directly advances govt'l interest asserted and if it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. CINCINNATI vs. DISCOVERY NETWORK Discovery Network Inc. is engaged in the business of providing adult educational, recreational and social programs to individuals in Cincinnati area. It includes items of general interests and 1/3 of which is distributed thru 38 newsracks that the city authorized Discovery to place on public property in 1989. Harmon Publishing publishes and distributes a free magazine that advertises real estate and had permission to install 24 newsracks. Cincinnati refused respondents to distribute their publications through the newsracks for aesthetic and safety reasons. SC held that this is unconstitutional. The very basis for regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech. There was no fit between the goals and means to achieve it. The city desires to limit the total number of newsracks is justified but it only limits the number of newsracks distributing commercial publication. Thus, it is unconstitutional 54

CITY OF LADUE vs GILLEO Prohibits homeowners from displaying any sign on property except residence identification sign for sale or safety hazards. The City says that the signs take up space and obstructs views, distract motorists and the alternative use of land. The Court held the ordinance invalid as a content based regulation because the City treated commercial speech more favorably than non commercial speech and favored some kinds of noncommercial speech over others. 6. LIBEL POLICARPIO vs MANILA TIMES Facts: Policarpio, an officer of UNESCO, filed charges against Reyes, a subordinate, and caused her to be separated from the service. Reyes filed charges against Policarpio in the office of the President. She also filed a complaint of malversation and estafa against Policarpio. A news article appeared claiming the case has already been filed. She claimed that the news item was defamatory, libelous, and false and had exposed her to ridicule and embarrassment. Issue: Was the news item libelous?

Issue: May the Chronicle be held liable? Held: Yes. An action for libel would lie against it even though the publisher already made a correction of the mistake upon discovery thereof. While a newspaper should not be held liable to account for honest mistakes owing to pressures of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet and no occasion to act with haste in a weekly magazine such as the Manila Chronicle. A retraction published to correct the mistake does not wipe away the responsibility arising from the publication of the libelous photograph or article, although it may be and should mitigate it. NEW YORK TIMES CO vs SULLIVAN The case is conditioned upon the status of the complainant, that is, that he be a public officer. It underscores the vitality of the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open." Needs "actual malice". If something is libelous per se, should prove it is true or else general damage will occur. Good motives and belief in truth is only mitigating. ROSENBLOOM vs METROMEDIA Broadcast in radio station is defamatory statement. If a matter is subject of public interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. " . . . constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous." GERTZ vs ROBERT WELCH INC Prohibits public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless proven it was done with actual malice. Rejected Rosenbloom doctrine and for all practical purposes the basis for diverse treatment is still the status of being a public official or a public figure. HUSTLER MAGAZINE vs FALWELL 55

Held: Yes. The inaccuracy in the news items were indeed derogatory to Poli. The amount of money allegedly misappropriated was only P 54 but the news failed to mention it nor the fact that the malversation imputed to her was for using the UNESCO stencils for personal use, numbering only 18 to 20. The articles omitted important details. As a result, the article had the effect of conveying the idea that the offense imputed to her was more serious. LOPEZ VS. CA Facts: Fidel Cruz sent distress signals to Manila that the people there were terrorized by killers since Christmas of 1955. The message turned out to be false. Cruz only wanted to avail of free transportation to Manila.The Chronilcle ran an article on said story and branded it as the "Hoax of the Year". It also published a picture of the alleged Fidel Cruz but it turned out to be a picture of a different Fidel Cruz, a former mayor of Bulacan. The Manila Chronicle was sued for damages for the defamatory character of the publication. It claimed it should not be held liable since it already made a correction.

Jerry Falwell is nationally known minister and he was caricatured in a Campari Liquer ad. But actual malice is necessary for "parody" of an advertisement. Public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing, in addition, that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with "actual malice" i.e. with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true or not. MILLER vs CALIFORNIA The case is about the mass mailing of "adult" material. And to avoid unconsenting adults and juveniles from receiving such mail. It is ruled that : obscene materials are utterly without redeeming social value, such material can be regulated by States subject to specific safeguards and hold that obscenity is to be determined by applying "contemporary community standards" and not that of National Standards. Utterly without redeeming social value test is amended by the test of: a. whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest b. whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law and c. whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. May the State Prohibit the Publication of Obscene Materials? Yes. As an exception to the freedom of expression rule the State, through the exercise of its police power, may regulate or prevent the publication of obscene materials. What are the Factors to Determine whether a Publication is Obscene? 1. Its purpose or predominant appeal is to prurient interest; 2. the work must not have any serious redeeming social value; 3. the work must be considered as a whole; 4. must consider normal and present standards (in determining contemporary normal standards, one should consider the standard of the given community since standards vary from one community to another; it must be gauged using an average adult as a basis, e.g. Rommel) "when you see it and it turns you on, it's obscene".

GONZALEZ VS. KATIGBAK Facts: Gonzales questioned the "For adults Only" classification of "Kapit sa Patalim" given by the Board of Review headed by Maria Kalaw Katigbak. He claims that the classification was without basis. Issue: Was the act of the board proper? Held: Yes. The power of the board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other constitutional objections , determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what require parental guidance or limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restriction is the exception. The power to exercise prior restraint. Rather, the presumption is against its validity. However, the law frowns on obscenity. All ideas have the protection of the guarantee, unless excluded they enroach upon the limited area of more important interests. Obscenity is one form of expression that does not fully enjoy the protection of the guarantee. The Court upheld the Board's classification of the movie. Pita vs. Court of Appeals Facts: Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, with some police officers, seized and confiscated magazines and publications believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent. Pinoy Playboy (owned by Pita) was own of the publications seized and burned. Pita filed for injunction claiming that the magazine was decent, artistic and educational and was protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. The trial court denied the motion for injunction. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals. Pita seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals and invokes the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution as well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due process. Issue: Whether the seizure of Pinoy Playboy without warrant (but based on the determination that they are obscene) was illegal Held: The search was illegal and Pitas petition is granted. Immoral lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. The SC has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a clear and present danger that would warrant State interference and action. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present 56

danger. The burden is on the State to demonstrate existence of clear and present danger to justify State action to stop the speech. The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction has been sought below. There were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. Barnes vs. Glen Theater Facts: The Kitty Kat Lounge desires to present totally nude dancing. Indiana statutes require that dancers wear pasties and a g-string. The dancers also wishes to dance nude because they believe they would make more money. Glen Theater, Inc. supplies adult entertainment through written and printed materials, movie showings, and live entertainment at an enclosed bookstore. The dancers in the bookstore dance nude or semi-nude. The 2 companies sued to enjoin the enforcement of the Indiana public indecency statute. They claim that the statute violated the First Amendment because nude dancing was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Issue: Whether nude dancing is a form of expression protected by the First Amendment Held: The Indiana statutory requirement that the dancers in the establishments involved must wear pasties and a g-string does not violate the First Amendment. This Court has held that when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. The Court used the OBrien test: a government regulation is sufficiently justified if (a) it is within the constitutional power of the Government, (b) furthers an important or substantial government interest, (c) governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and (d) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The Court found that Indianas public indecency statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity. Applying OBrien: The traditional police power of the State is defined as the authority to provide for the public health, safety and morals. The statute reflected moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places. The public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality What Indiana prohibited was not dancing as a communicative element but simply its being done in the nude.

Indianas requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a Gstring is modest and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the States purpose. F.C.C. vs. Pacifica Foundation Facts: Pacifica Foundations radio station broadcasted Filthy Words, a monologue about dirty words, at 2 oclock in the afternoon. Before the broadcast, Pacifica advised its listeners about sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some. A man complained saying that he heard the broadcast while he was driving, with his young son. FCC issued an order declaring that Pacifica can be subject to administrative sanctions. The Commission characterized the language used in the monologue as patently offensive, though not obscene. It also concluded that certain words depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner and the broadcast was done at a time when children were in the audience. Issue: Whether the Commissions order was a form of censorship and violated the First Amendment Held: Although the words of the monologue are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment, there is no absolute rule that the First Amendment prohibits all government regulation that depends on the content of speech. The question is every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The content of Pacificas broadcast was vulgar, offensive and shocking. Because the content is not entitled to absolute protection, the context must be considered to determine the constitutional permissibility of the Commissions action. Of all forms of communications, broadcasting has received the most limited First Amendment protection. Broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the public. Offensive material presented over airwaves confronts citizens in public and private life. Because they tune in and off, prior warnings cannot protect them from unexpected program content. Broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even to those too young to read. The governments interest in the well-being of its youth and supporting parents claim to authority in their own household, justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. Fr. B: Pacifica can broadcast the monologue during night to prevent the Commissions interference. Renton vs. Playtime Theaters Facts: The Mayor of Renton suggested to the City Council that it consider the advisability of enacting zoning regulation dealing with adult entertainment uses. The Council referred the matter to the citys Planning and Development Committee who reviewed the experiences of Seattle and other 57

cities. The Council adopted Res.No. 2368, which imposed a moratorium on the licensing of any business which has as its primary purpose the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit materials. Acting on the Committees recommendation, the Council enacted Ordinance No. 3626. The ordinance prohibited any adult motion picture theater from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school. Respondents acquired 2 theaters with the intention of exhibiting adult films and challenged the ordinance on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Issue: Whether the Renton ordinance is violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendment Held: No it is not. The Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community. The Renton ordinance is completely consistent with the definition of content-neutral speech regulations as those that are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations. The ordinance meets such a standard. Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities and in particular on the detailed findings summarized in the Washington SCs Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance. There is no constitutional defect in the method chosen by Renton to further its interest. The ciry must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to serious problems. The Renton ordinance represents a valid governmental response to the admittedly serious problems created by adult theaters. Bethel School District vs. Fraser Facts: Matthew Fraser, a student at Bethel High School, delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for student elective office, During the entire speech, Fraser referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic and explicit sexual metaphor. A disciplinary rule in the school prohibited the use of obscene language in school. The principal told Fraser that he violated this rule and was suspended. Frasers name was removed from the list of candidates of graduation speaker at the schools commencement exercises. However, because of the ruling of the District and Appellate Court, Fraser was still elected as the graduation speaker. Issue: Whether the schools sanctions violated Frasers right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment Whether the schools disruptive conduct rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad

Held: The SC ruled that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. It is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in the public discourse. The inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system is the work of the schools. The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct. The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech would undermine the schools basic educational mission. Finally, the schools disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposed criminal sanction. Hazelwood School District vs. Kuhlmeier No. 86-836 Facts: One of stories to be included in Spectrum (school newspaper) was about students experience with pregnancy and divorce. Principal Reynolds believed that the articles references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at schools. He also believed that in the article about divorce, the students parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the accusatory remarks made or to give their consent to the its publication. He decided not to print the stories instead. Held: The First Amendment rights of students in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission. The schools is not considered a public forum unless school authorities have, by policy or practice, opened the school from indiscriminate use by the general public. The school publication was developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implication sin regular classroom activities. Therefore, schools officials were allowed to regulate the contents of the Spectrum in any reasonable manner. The First Amendment is implicated only when the decision to censor a schoolsponsored publication, theatrical production or other vehicle of student expression has no valid education purpose. Principal Reynolds acted reasonably. 7. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION Navarro vs. Villegas Facts: Held: The Mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assemble in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. The Mayor has expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful 58

assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the community. The civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an ordered society. Navarro has failed to show a clear specific legal duty of the part of the Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally. PBM Employees vs. PBM Facts: Employees of PBM decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. They informed their employer PBM, who refused to allow them. PBM told the employees (through the union) that any employee who will miss his shift will be subject to dismissal. The employees attended rally. They were charged with violation of the CBA and some were terminated. Held: The employees exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from what they believed were police excesses. It was the duty of PBM to protect their employees from harassment of local officers. Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers vis--vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have been emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees to further indignities. The pretension of PBM that is would suffer loss and damage beyond reason because of its employees absence is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The primacy of human rights (freedom of expression, peaceful assemble and petition for redress of grievances) over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a potent means of inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well a mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. JBL Reyes vs. Bagatsing Facts: Reyes applied for a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. So many days passed without petitioner being informed of any action taken on his request. Later, the Mayor denied his application citing persistent reports of subversive plans of rebels to infiltrate the assembly. Issue: Was the refusal to grant the permit justified? Held: No. Absent the existence of a clear and present danger of substantive evil, no prior restraint on the right of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly may be imposed. The mere assertion that the subversive elements may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not sufficient.

Streets and parks have immemorially been used for the purposes of assembly and the choice of Luneta as the venue for the rally was proper. Malabanan vs. Ramento Facts: Officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta University sought and was granted a permit by school authorities to hold a meeting from 8AM- 12PM on august 27, 1982 at the basketball court. However, the Council held their meeting at the second floor lobby. They manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. They marched toward an area not covered by their permit and continued their demonstration, thus disturbing classes. The leaders were failed to explain the holding of the illegal assembly and were placed under preventive suspension for 1 academic year. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that although the student leaders were liable for illegal assembly, the punishment was excessive. The assembly was held in private premises, the property of Gregorio Araneta University. Hence, they only needed the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession, which was granted to them. The authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students is recognized but it cannot go so far as to be violative of these rights and constitutional safeguards. The students are entitled to peaceable assembly and free speech. Their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state has a right to present. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is held in school premises, permit must be sought from school authorities. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportioned to the offense. SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. What is religion? 59

It refers to ones belief regarding the following questions: (1). existence of a supreme being (2). nature of this supreme being (3). obligations on the believer imposed by such religion What are the 2 principal parts of section 5? (1). the non-establishment clause (2). the free exercise clause The first prohibits the establishment of any religion and the second guarantees the free exercise of religion. What is the non-establishment clause? The State cannot set-up a Church. The State cannot pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. In essence, it is government neutrality. The State cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group and vice versa. It calls for the separation of Church and State, not just treating all religious sect equally. Rather, it should be equal non-treatment. What is the purpose of the non-establishment clause? It seeks to protect voluntarism and insulation of the political process from interfaith discussion. Who determines the existence of a religious purpose? It rests in the courts. Is there hostility between the Church and State? No. The State recognizes the beneficial influence of religion. What other provisions in the Constitution express the nonestablishment clause? (1). Art VI, Section 29 (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employed directly or indirectly for the use, benefic, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, system or religion, or any priest . . . except priests assigned to the AFP, penal institution, government orphanage, or leprosarium (2). Art. II, Section 6 The separation of Church and State (3). Art. IX-C, Section 2 (5) Prohibition on religious denominations and sects from being registered as political parties or organizations

Is total separation between Church and State possible? No. It is not possible. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable (read the cases). What are the requisites to prove the validity of the governments support to sects? (1). The law has a secular purpose (2). Primary or principal effects does not advance or inhibit religion (3). There is no excessive entanglement between Government and religion How does one determine if government entanglement with religion is excessive? (1). The character and purpose of the institution benefited (2). The nature of the aid the State provides (3). The resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority What are the Constitutional exceptions to the non-establishment clause? (1). Art VI, Section 28 (3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents, mosques, nonprofit cemeteries, and all land, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes are exempt from tax. (2). Art. XIV, Section 3 (3) At the option in writing of the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children . . . in public elementary and high schools . . . without additional cost to the government. CASES A. Non-establishment of religion

AGLIPAY VS RUIZ 64 PHIL 201 FACTS On May 1936, the respondent, Director of Post, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, ordered the issuance and selling of postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. The event was organized by the Roman Catholic Church. 60

Initially, the design of the postage stamps was a chalice in the center, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps were blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange. Subsequently, it contained a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: Seat of the XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3 7, 1937. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seek the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prevent the issuance and sale of such postage stamps. He alleged that the action of the respondent was violative of the provisions of Sec. 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution which prohibits the appropriation of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of any religion. ISSUE Whether or not the issuance of the postage stamps by the Director of Post to commemorate the International Eucharistic Congress is unconstitutional. HELD The issuance and sale of the postage stamps is valid. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, and not mere religious toleration. It does not deny its influence in human affairs. In the case at bar, it appears the respondent issued the questioned postage stamps under the provisions of Act No. 4052. The Act authorizes the Director of Post, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of appropriated funds for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps. They can do so as often as they deemed advantageous to the Government. The Act contemplates no religious purpose in view. And, in the present case, the respondent was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The only purpose was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists o this country. The officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although the issuance of the postage stamps may be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the promotion of the Roman Catholic Church was not the aim nor the purpose of the Government. Thus, there is no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. GARCES VS ESTENZO 104 SCRA 510 FACTS The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolutions 5 and 6. The resolutions revived the celebration of the feast day

of their patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer. They provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer, and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. The image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration but, for the rest of the year, the hermano mayor shall be the caretaker of the image and the image will remain in his residence. The resolutions were ratified by 272 voters. A controversy arose when the parish priest, Fr. Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return the image on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. Because of the controversy, Resolution 10 and 12 were passed by the council. The resolutions provided for the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Fr. Osmea for the recovery of the image and the appointment of the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, as its representative in the case. In his answer, Fr. Osmea assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. Later, he and three others prayed for the annulment of the said resolutions. The lower court dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed. ISSUE Whether or not the four resolutions of the barangay council are unconstitutional because: a. the barangay council was not duly constituted because the chairman of the kabataang barangay was not present; b. they contravened the constitutional provisions that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion and no funds shall be appropriated or used for the benefit, use or support of any religion. HELD The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court and declared the resolutions valid and constitutional because: a. Managos absence from the sessions of the barangay counsil did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolution was passed. b. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge any religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergymen. The image was purchased using private funds and not taxpayers money. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion. As to the construction of the waiting shed, it was an entirely secular matter. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saints image and could have been resolved amicably. The image in question is owned by 61

the barangay council and, therefore, has the right to determine the custody of the image. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitution. SCHOOL DISTRICT VS SCHEMPP 374 US 203 FACTS In both Cases No. 142 and 119, the States, by law, required the reading of verses from the Holy Bible, without comment, and the recitation of the Lords Prayer at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any of the child can be excused from such Bible reading and recitation of the Lords Prayer upon written request of his parent or guardian. On each school day, while the students were attending home rooms or advisory sections, opening exercises were conducted in pursuant of these statutes. The exercises were either broadcast through an intercommunications system or, if not available, by the homeroom teacher or students by rotation or by volunteers. The exercises were closed with the flag salute and such pertinent announcements as were of interest to the students. The verses may be selected from any version of the Bible. In Case 142, the Schempp family brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the statute. They are members of the Unitarian Church were they regularly attended services. Mr. Schempp testified of specific religious doctrines that were contrary to their religious beliefs. He further testified that he considered excusing his children but decided against it since it may adversely affect his childrens relationship with fellow students and teachers. In Case No. 119, the petitioners, professed atheists, attempted to rescind the rule to no avail, thus, this petition for mandamus. They claimed that it threatened their religious liberty since it put a premium on belief against non-belief. ISSUE Whether or not the establishment clause of the First Amendment was violated by a Pennsylvania statute, or a rule of the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City which required the reading, without comment, at the opening of each school day of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lords Prayer by the students in unison.

HELD The statute and rule violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The reading possessed a devotional and religious character and in effect constituted a religious observance. Such character became more apparent by the recitation of the Lords Prayer. The fact that students may be excused does not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony. The States recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony was evident from the rules specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay and the amendment permitting nonattendance at the exercises. Although it is true that religion had been closely identified with the United States history and government, religious freedom is likewise as strongly imbedded in our public and private lives. BOARD OF EDUCATION VS ALLEN 392 US 236 FACTS A law of the State of New York required local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades 7 through 12 and students attending private schools were included. The law also authorized the loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools. The Education Law of New York authorized public school boards to designate textbooks for use in the public schools, and to purchase such books with public funds, and to rent or sell the books to public school students. The appellant Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 brought suit and alleged that the provisions violated the Constitution and that their failure to lend books to parochial school students should not be a ground for their removal from office. The trial court held the statute to be unconstitutional but the appellate court reversed the decision. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE Whether or not Section 701 of the Education Law of New York which lends books free of charge to sectarian school students violated the Constitution provisions against the establishment and free exercise of religion. HELD the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that the statute did not violate the Constitution provisions against the establishment and free exercise of religion since: a. the statute merely made available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend schoolbooks free of charge, 62

b. books were furnished at the request of the pupil, and ownership remained, at least technically, in the State, c. no funds or books were furnished to parochial schools and the financial benefit was to the parents and children, not the schools, d. only secular books, not religious books, could receive approval for loans, and e. the statute was not alleged in any way to have coerced the plaintiffs as individuals in the practice of their religion. LEMON VS KURTZMAN 403 US 602 FACTS Both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania adopted statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. Rhode Islands 1969 Salary Supplement Act provided for a 15% salary supplement to be paid to teachers in non-public schools at which the average per pupil expenditure on secular education was below the average in public schools. Eligible teachers must teach only courses offered in the public school, using only materials in the public schools, and must agree not to teach courses in religion. 25% of the State's elementary students attended non-public schools, about 95% of whom attended Roman Catholic affiliated schools, and that to that date about 250 teachers at Roman Catholic schools were the sole beneficiaries under the Act. Pennsylvanias Non-public Elementary and Secondary Education Act authorized the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to purchase certain secular educational services from non-public schools, reimbursing those schools solely for teachers salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. Reimbursement was restricted to courses in specific secular subjects, the textbooks and materials must be approved by the Superintendent, and no payment was to be made for any course containing any subject matter expressing religious teaching or the morals or forms of worship of any sect. Contracts were made with schools that had more than 20% of all the students in the State, most of which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. The plaintiffs were citizens and taxpayers of the States. They assailed the constitutionality of the statutes and alleged that they violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment because the church-affiliated schools were controlled by religious organizations which had the purpose of propagating and promoting a particular religious faith. These schools conducted their operations to fulfill this purpose. The District Court in the Rhode Islands case declared the statute unconstitutional while, in the Pennsylvania case, it was held to be valid.

ISSUE Whether or not the Rhode Islands Salary Supplement Act and Pennsylvanias Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act violated the Constitution provisions against the establishment and free exercise of religion. HELD Both statutes are unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Religion Clauses did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state religion but it commanded that there should be no law respecting an establishment of religion. The three main evils that the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection were sponsorship, financial support and active involvement. To determine if a statute violated the Establishment Clause, three tests were to be applied. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion; and, finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Although the statutes passed the two tests, the Court concluded that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship involved excessive entanglement between government and religion. This was determined based on the character and purposes of the institutions that benefited, nature of the aid provided, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. The following factors determined that there would be and there were such excessive entanglement. These were: a. the schools were near parish churches which permitted convenient access to religious exercises. 2/3 of the teachers were also nuns. The process of inculcating religious doctrine was enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils; b. The teachers had a substantially different ideological character from books. A textbooks content was ascertainable while a teachers handling of a subject was not. There was a potential if not actual danger in this form of state aid; and c. The program required the government to examine the school records in order to determine how much of the total expenditure is attributable to secular education. This was fraught with the kind of entanglement the Constitution forbade. Such created an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state. TILTON VS RICHARDSON 403 US 672

63

FACTS The Higher Education Facilities Act was passed in 1963 in response to a strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university facilities to meet the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education. It provided federal construction grants and loans for college and university facilities, excluding any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or . . . primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity. The Act is administered by the US Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner required applicants to provide assurances that these restrictions will be respected. The US retained a 20-year interest in any facility constructed. Any violation would entitle the US to recover an amount equal to the proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to the original cause. Restrictions were enforced primarily by way of onsite inspections. Appellants were citizens and taxpayers of the United States and residents of Connecticut. 4 church-related colleges and universities which received federal grants were named defendants. Appellants attempted to show that the four recipient institutions were sectarian. The District Court ruled that Title I authorized grants to church-related universities and colleges. ISSUE Whether or not the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 was unconstitutional because it promoted religion. HELD The Court was satisfied that Congress intended the Act to include all colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation. The Act expressly prohibited use of the facilities for religious purposes but it makes no reference to religious affiliation or nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances, it must be taken to include church-related colleges and universities. As noted in Lemon v Kurtzman, we can only dimly perceived the boundaries of permissible government activity in this area of constitutional adjudication. We consider four questions: Firstly, did the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? Secondary, was the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Thirdly, did the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement with religion? Fourthly, did the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion? The stated legislative purpose appeared in the preamble which declared that the youth be assured of ample opportunity for the fullest development of their intellectual capabilities. This expressed a legitimate secular objective. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrued to a religious institution, but whether its primary effect advanced religion. The question of excessive entanglement, 3 factors substantially diminished the extent and potential danger. These were:

a. College students were less impressionable and susceptible to religious indoctrination. Courses tended to limit the opportunities for sectarian influence by virtue of their own internal disciplines. Such colleges and universities were characterized by a high degree of academic freedom. This reduced the risk that government aid will support religious activities; b. Correspondingly, the necessity for intensive government surveillance was diminished and entanglement between government and religion lessened; c. Facilities provided were themselves religiously neutral and aid here was a one-time, single-purpose construction grant. There was no continuing financial relationships and inspection as to use was a minimal contact. The government was permitted to recover an amount when a recipient violated any statutory restrictions. This remedy, however was only available if the conditions were violated within 20 years after completion of construction. Such limitation obviously opened the facility for any purpose after the period. In effect, the original federal grant would in part advance religion. This would make it incompatible with the Religion Clauses. This, however, would not invalidate the Act. Thus, except for the 20 year period the law is valid. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY VS AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 57 LW 504 FACTS The County Courthouse was owned by the Allegheny County and was its seat of government. The main, most beautiful and most public of the courthouse is its Grand Staircase. Since 1981, the County had permitted the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, to display a creche in the County Courthouse during th Christmas holiday season. It was a visual representation of the manger scene in Bethlehem it included figures of the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, farm animals, shepherds and wise men which has at its crest an angel bearing a banner that proclaims Gloria in Excelsis Deo! The creche was on display on the Grand Staircase from November 26 to January 9. This was used as the setting for its annual Christmas-carol program. The City-county Building had also been the location of a large Christmas tree which was located under the middle arch outside the Grand Street entrance. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayors name and entitled Salute to Liberty. The city had expanded the display to include a symbolic representation of the Chanukah, an 8-day Jewish holiday. The central ritual of this holiday was the lighting of lamps. The Chanukah was symbolized by a menorah. Some nonreligious American Jews celebrate 64

Chanukah as an expression of ethnic identity and rather than a religious event. The menorah was owned by Chabad, a Jewish group. The plaintiffs questioned the displays alleging that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it had the effect of endorsing religion. ISSUE Whether or not the menorah and creche displays viplated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by endorsing religion. HELD The Court declared the creche display unconstitutional because the creche itself was capable of communicating a religious message. Nothing in the context of the display detracted from the creches religious message. It stood alone and was the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase. The floral frame served only to draw ones attention to the message. Furthermore, the creche sat on the main and most beautiful part of the building that is the seat of government sending an unmistakable message that the county supported and promoted the religious message. Disclosure of ownership by a Roman Catholic organization did not alter this conclusion. On the contrary, the sign demonstrated that the government endorsed the religious message of the organization. On the other hand, the menorah display was declared constitutional because its message was not exclusively religious. Moreover, the menorah stood next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. The necessary result created an overall holiday setting that represented both Christmas and Chanukah. The simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and Christianity was no less constitutionally infirm. However, the Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a religious symbol. That date, the Christmas tree typified the secular celebration of Christmas. Numerous Americans placed Christmas trees in their home without subscribing to the Christian religious belief. The tree was also clearly the predominant element in the display and the Mayors sign linked the theme with the Nations legacy of freedom. Given all these considerations, it was not sufficiently likely that the residents would perceive the combined display of the tree, sign and menorah as an endorsement or disapproval of their individual religious choices. ZOBREST VS CATALINA 509 US 1 FACTS Petitioner, James Zobrest, who had been deaf since birth, asked respondent school district to provide a sign-language interpreter to

accompany him to classes at a Roman Catholic high school pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). James attended grades 15 in a school for the deaf and grades 6-8 in a public school. For religious reasons, James parents enrolled him for the ninth grade in Salpointe Catholic High School. When petitioners requested that respondent supply James with an interpreter, respondent declined to provide the interpreter since the county attorney concluded that it would violate the Constitution. The petitioners filed a complaint for relief but the District Court ruled that the interpreter would act as conduit for the religious inculcation of James thereby, promoting James religious development at government expense. ISSUE Whether or not the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment barred the school district from providing an interpreter to James. HELD The Court held that the Establishment Clause did not prevent respondent from furnishing a disabled child enrolled in a sectarian school with a sign-language interpreter. Religious institutions were not disabled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs. Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens without reference to religion were not really subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions receive financial benefits. Here, the child was the primary beneficiary, and the school only received an incidental benefit. In addition, an interpreter, unlike a teacher or guidance counselor, neither added to nor subtracted from the sectarian schools environment. He merely interpreted whatever material was presented to the class as a whole. CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW BOARD VS PINETTE & KU KLUX KLAN US NO. 94-780, JUNE 29, 1995 FACTS Capitol Square is a 10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the Statehouse. For over a century, the square had been used for public speeches, gatherings and festivals advocating and celebrating a variety of causes, both religious and secular. Ohio Administrative Code gave the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board responsibility for regulating public access. To use the square, a group must simply fill out an official application form and meet several criteria, which concern primarily safety, sanitation, and non-interference with other uses of the square, and which were neutral as to the speech content of the proposed event. The Board had also permitted a variety of unattended displays. 65

On November 1993, the Board received an application from respondent Donnie Carr, an officer of the Ohio Ku Klux Klan (KKK), to place a cross on the square. The Board denied the application. After having unsuccessful in its effort to obtain administrative relief from the Boards decision, the KKK filed the present suit seeking an injunction requiring the Bo0ard to issue the requested permit. The Board defended on the ground that the permit would violate the Establishment Clause. The District Court determined that Capitol Square was a traditional public forum open to all without any policy against free-standing displays; that the Klans cross was entirely private expression entitled to full first Amendment protection; and that the Board had failed to show that the display of the cross would reasonably be construed as endorsement of Christianity by the State. ISSUE Whether or not: the Boards decision to deny the display of the cross at the Capitol Square was: a. a violation of the petitioners freedom of expression under the First Amendment; or b. justified because issuance of the permit would violate the Establishment Clause under the First Amendment. HELD The Court held that: a. the KKKs religious display was a private expression. The right to use government property for ones private expression depended upon whether the property had by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum or reserved for specific official uses. Thus, it was a violation of the respondents private expression because the expression was to be made on government property which was open to the public for speech, and permission was requested through the same application process and on the same terms required of other private groups; b. issuance of the permit would not violate the Establishment Clause because there was no endorsement test of any sort. Endorsement connoted an expression or demonstration of approval or support. We consistently held that there was no violation for government to enact neutral policies that happened to benefit religion. Religious expression could not violate the Establishment Clause where it was purely private, and occurred in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms. MANOSCA VS COURT OF APPEALS 252 SCRA 412 FACTS Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, with an area of 492 square meters. The National Historical

Institute then ascertained that the parcel had been the birthsite of Felix Manalo, the founder of the Iglesia ni Kristo. It passed Resolution 1 declaring the land to be a national historical landmark, thus, should be for public use for which the power of eminent domain nay be authorized Accordingly, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the RTC an, at the same time, filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. The trial court fixed the provisional market and assessed value of the propertyat Ps54,120.00 and Ps16,236.00, respectively. It authorized the take over of the property upon deposit of the required sum with the Municipal Treasurer. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. ISSUE Whether or not: a. the expropriation was for a public purpose; and b. the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit or support of Iglesia ni Kristo, a religious entity, contrary to the Constitution. HELD The Court held that: a. the validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain should not restrict the definition of public use to traditional uses. Public use was defined as one which conferred some benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by the public. That only few would actually benefit did not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. b. it was not contrary to the Constitution. Not only members of the Iglesia ni Kristo would be benefited. What should be significant was the principal objective of, and not the casual consequences from, the exercise of the power. The purpose essentially was to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines. Any greater benefit to the Iglesia ni Kristo remained to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.

LEE VS WEISMAN 505 US 577 FACTS Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public school in Providence. For many years, it had been the policy of the school committee and the Superintendent of Schools to permit principals to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and 66

benedictions at middle school and high school graduations. In Deborahs school, a rabbi was invited. He was given a pamphlet containing guidelines for composition of public prayers and advised him that the prayers should be non-sectarian. The Weismans objected to such a practice and sought a permanent injunction to prevent petitioners from inviting clergy. ISSUE Whether or not the practice of inviting clergy to give invocations and benedictions was a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. HELD Including clergy who offered prayers as part of an official public school graduation ceremony was forbidden by the Establishment Clause: a. State officials directed the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies. Lees action were choices attributable to the State. Moreover, he directed and controlled the prayers content. The good-faith attempt to make the prayers acceptable did not resolve the dilemma of the schools involvement; b. Prayer exercises carried a particular risk of indirect coercion. The school districts supervision and control placed subtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending students. The State may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use direct means. c. Option not to attend did not excuse any inducement or coercion. High school graduation was one of lifes significant occasions and a student was not free to absent herself. B. Free exercise of religion

Council. Jesse was also convicted of the offense of inciting a breach of the peace. The facts which supported the conviction on Jesse were that he stopped 2 men in the street, asked permission and was granted to play a record. The record Enemies was played and it incensed the men, who were Catholics, that they threatened to hit him if he did not leave. On being told so, he left their presence. ISSUES Whether or not: a. their activities was within the statute; b. as applied to the appellants, it offended the due process clause because it denied religious freedom and liberty of speech and press; and c. Jesse was guilty of inciting to breach the peace. HELD The Court held that: a. their activities was within the purview of the statute since the trial court found that in addition to the sale of the books and the distribution of the pamphlets, the defendants were also soliciting contributions or donations of money for alleged religious cause; b. as applied to the appellants, the statute deprived them of their liberty without due process of law. The constitutional limitations on the subject of religion had two aspects: freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first was absolute but the second may be regulated for the protection of society. However, the appellants were right in their insistence that the statute in question was not such a regulation. It required an application to the secretary of public welfare council who determined if the cause was religious or not. The right to solicit depended upon him. Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive was a denial of liberty. The State may regulate the manner and time for solicitation in the interest of the public. But to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religion upon a license was to burden the exercise of that liberty; c. the conviction of Jesse should also be set aside. The Court noted that Jesse was in a public street where he had the right to be and impart his views. There was no showing that he was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive. It was not claimed that he intended to insult the 2 men. Thus, he had not invaded the interest or rights of the public nor of the men accosted. UNITED STATES VS BALLARD 322 US 78 FACTS Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud. The charge was that certain 67

CANTWELL VS CONNECTICUT 310 US 296 FACTS Newton Cantwell and his 2 sons, Jesse and Russell, members of a group known as Jehovahs Witnesses, and claiming to be ordained ministers, were engaged in going singly from house to house in Cassius Street, New Haven when they were arrected. They were individually equipped with a bag containing books and pamphlets on religious subjects, a portable phonograph and a set of records which, when played, introduced and was a description of the books. Each appellant asked permission to play one of the records and, when permission was granted, tried to sell the books or solicited contribution towards publication. Cassius Street was a thickly populated neighborhood where 90% of the residents were Roman Catholic. A phonograph record describing a book entitled Enemies included an attack on the Catholic religion. They were convicted of soliciting money, services or any valuable thing without the approval of the Secretary of Public Welfare

designated corporations were formed, literature distributed and sold, funds solicited, and membership in the I Am movement sought by means of false and fraudulent representations, pretenses and promises. They alleged that, by reason of supernatural attainments, the three designated persons had the power to heal persons of ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted. They further represented that they, in fact, had already cured hundreds of people. ISSUE Whether or not the conviction of the defendants should be determined based on the jurys determination whether the teachings were false or not. HELD The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals because the issue should not be the falsity of the teachings or not. Rather the issue should be whether or not the defendants honestly and in good faith believe their teachings. Religion could not come into the case because little would be left of religious freedom if the determination of the guilt of a person was based on the jurys determination of the falsity of the teachings. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS CITY OF MANILA 101 PHIL 386 FACTS Plaintiff-appellant was a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation. In the course of the ministry, the Philippine agency had been distributing and selling Bibles and/or gospel portions thereof. On May 1953, the City Treasurer informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandiser without the necessary Mayors permit and municipal license. He required the plaintiff to secure such permit and license and to pay the amount of Ps5,821.45 covering the period 1945 to 1953. The plaintiff paid under protest and filed a case for refund. In the hearing, the plaintiff proved that it was exempt from real estate taxes, and that it was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war. It testified that it made no profit from the sale of the bibles and maintained its operations by obtaining substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary contributions from various churches. ISSUE Whether or not: a. the ordinances of the City of Manila (Nos. 3000, 2529, 3028 and 3364) were constitutional and valid; and b. the provisions of said ordinances were applicable in the case at bar.

HELD The Ordinance 3000 were of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the plaintiff. Nor does it contain any provisions prescribing religious censorship nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff was not particularly mentioned however the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax. On the other hand, Ordinances 2779, 2821 and 3028 were not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in any of the business or occupations enumerated. Thus, the question was whether the ordinances were applicable or valid if applied to the alleged business of the plaintiff. The constitutional guarantee carried with it the right to disseminate information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified on the grounds that there was a clear and present danger of any substantial evil which the State had the right to prevent. A license tax and permit were taxes on the exercise of a privilege. Thus, it tend to suppress the constitutional liberties if it was collected as a condition to the pursuit of such activity. Therefore, the license tax and Mayors permit was not applicable to the plaintiff because it would impair the plaintiffs right to free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession. EBRALINAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT 219 SCRA 256 FACTS In the two cases, the petitioners, members of Jehovahs Witnesses, were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265. Jehovahs Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believed that those were acts of worship or religious devotion which they cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. They feel bound by the Bibles command to guard ourselves from idols. They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. After complaints were received by the DECs Regional Office about the refusal of teachers and students belonging to Jehovahs Witnesses to actively participate in the flag ceremony, the Division Superintendent issued Memorandum 108 authorizing expulsion of the teachers and students who continue to refuse. Subsequently, the teachers and students were expelled.

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ISSUE Whether or not students who were members of a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school for refusing, on account of their beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony. HELD Religious freedom was a fundamental right which was entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among the human rights for it involves mans relationship with his Creator. The right to religion had a twofold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first was absolute as long as it was confined to the realm of thought. The second was subject to regulation where the belief was translated into external acts that affect public welfare. However, the sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of religious freedom was the existence of a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, morals, health or any other legitimate public interest that the State had the right to prevent. Absent such a threat, the expulsion of the students was not justified. Exempting the Jehovahs Witnesses, a group which only comprised a small portion of the school population, from the flag ceremony would not suddenly produce a nation untaught an uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism and love of country. They would still study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, learn Philippine history and culture and also receive training as a citizen. Expulsion would bring about the situation feared in Gerona (the first case dealing with this issue where the Court upheld the expulsion). Moreover, the expulsion would violate their right as citizens to receive free education since the Constitution provided that it was the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all. WISCONSIN VS YODER 406 US 205 FACTS Respondents were members of the Amish religion. They were all residents of Green County, Wisconsin. Wisconsins compulsory schoolattendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching the age of 16. The respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 to 16, to public school after they completed the eighth grade. On complaint of the school district, the respondents were charged and convicted of violating the compulsory-attendance law. Respondents defended on the ground that the law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments since they believed that their childrens attendance in high school was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.

Amish objection to formal education was grounded on the view that exposure to worldly influence was in conflict to their beliefs. ISSUE Whether or not the compulsory-attendance law violated the respondents right to religion as guaranteed by the Constitution. HELD The Court held that the law violated the respondents right to religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The bases for its decision were: a. that high school, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to sincere religious beliefs, and substantially interfering with the childs religious development, contravened the basic religious tenets and practices; b. foregoing at most 2 additional years of compulsory education would not impair the physical or mental health of the child, nor result in an ability to be self-supporting, or discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship; c. it was the parents who were subject to prosecution and since there was no showing that it was against the childs expressed desire, it was the parents right of the exercise of their religion, not the childrens rights, which would determine Wisconsins power to penalize the parents. PAMIL VS TELERON 86 SCRA 413 FACTS Private respondent, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, was elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. He was duly proclaimed. A quo warranto suit was then filed by petitioner, an aspirant for the office, for the respondents disqualification based on the 1917 Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service x x x. The suit did not prosper and respondent Judge sustained Fr. Gonzagas right to office. He ruled that the statute was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to the Supreme Court by the petitioner. ISSUE Whether or not: a. the Administrative Code of 1917 was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971; and b. the law violated the respondents right to free exercise of religion.

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HELD The Court was divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court were of the view that the judgement should be affirmed as the challenged provision was no longer operative. It was either superseded by the 1935 Constitution which declared that No religious test shall be required for the exercises of civil or political rights or repealed. Although the seven comprised the majority, it was not suffice to render the provision ineffective. The presumption of validity called for its application. Thus, Fr. Gonzaga was declared ineligible for the office of municipal mayor. Majority, however, believed that the provision was unconstitutional because the Constitution prohibited a religious test. The exclusion of the respondent imposed a religious test since his religion prevented him from being eligible for office. Moreover, individuals had, by ignorance or neglect, failed to claim their fundamental rights. This should not prevent a person, alert to his rights and their proper enforcement, from asserting them. It was never too late to re-establish constitutional rights. MCDANIEL VS PATY 435 US 618 FACTS In its first Constitution, Tennessee disqualified ministers from serving as legislators. The state legislature applied this provision to candidates for delegates to the constitutional convention. McDaniel, an ordained minister of the Baptist Church, filed as a candidate. An opposing candidate sued for a declaratory judgement that McDaniel was disqualified and to strike his name from the ballots. ISSUE Whether or not the exclusion of ministers of the Gospel as such violated a fundamental principle of liberty by punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil rights. HELD The Court held that the exclusion of McDaniel is a violation of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The clergy-disqualification provision barred McDaniel from exercising both his civil and religious rights simultaneously. Thus, the State is punishing a religious profession with privation of a civil right. Thus, the Court ruled that the provision was ineffective and the selection or rejection of clergymen for public office could be safely left to the good sense and desires of the people. GOLDMAN VS WEINBERGER 475 US 503

FACTS Petitioner Goldman was an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi. In 1973, he was accepted into the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program and placed on inactive reserve status in the Air Force while he studied clinical psychology at Loyola University of Chicago. After completing his Ph.D. in psychology, petitioner entered active service in the US Air Force as a commissioned officer. He served as a clinical psychologist at the mental health clinic on the base. Petitioner avoided controversy by remaining close to his duty station and by wearing his service cap over the yarmulke when out of doors. But in April 1981, after he testified as a defense witness at a courtmartial wearing his yarmulke but not his service cap, opposing counsel lodged a complaint arguing that petitioners practice of wearing hi yarmulke was a violation of Air Force regulation. This regulation stated in pertinent part that headgear will not be worn . . . while indoors except by the armed security police in the performance of their duties. Colonel Gregory informed him that the wearing of the yarmulke was a violation of the regulation and to refrain from using it except in the hospital. Petitioner refused. He then brought an action in Federal District Court claiming that the application of the regulation infringed on his First Amendment freedom to exercise his religious beliefs. The District Court enjoined the Air Force from enforcing the regulation against petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed. ISSUE Whether or not an application of the regulation to prevent the petitioner from wearing his yarmulke infringed on his First Amendment freedom to exercise his religious beliefs. HELD The Courts review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds would be more deferential than those designed for civilian society. The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest since to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment and esprit de corps. Thus, the First Amendment did not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner even though its effect was to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs. That Amendment did not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations. The Air Force drew the line essentially between religious apparel that was visible and that which was not. The challenged provision reasonably and evenhandedly regulated dress in the interest of the militarys perceived need for uniformity. Religious freedom was a fundamental right which was entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among the human rights for it involves mans relationship 70

with his Creator. The right to religion had a two-fold aspect: freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first was absolute as long as it was confined to the realm of thought. The second was subject to regulation where the belief was translated into external acts that affect public welfare. However, the sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of religious freedom was the existence of a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, morals, health or any other legitimate public interest that the State had the right to prevent. Absent such a threat, the expulsion of the students was not justified. GERMAN VS BARANGAN 135 SCRA 514 FACTS Petitioners composed of about 50 businessman, students and office employees converged at J P Laurel Street, Manila, for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoined the Malacaang grounds. Wearing the now familiar inscribed yellow t-shirts, they started to march down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, they were however barred by respondent Mayor Isabelo Lariosa from proceeding any further on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located. Because of the Mayors alleged warning that any similar attempt would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this recourse. Petitioners alleged purpose in converging was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude Chapel ISSUE Whether or not the petitioners constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion was violated when respondents prevented them to enter and pray in St. Jude Chapel. HELD The Court held that there was no violation because: a. based on the actions of plaintiffs, it cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and locomotion. The exercise of all fundamental rights must be done in good faith; b. assuming the claim to the free exercise of religion was valid and genuine, respondents reaction to such mass action was not violative of the freedom of religion because there was a real threat to the safety of the President, his family and government employees. c. the restrictions imposed was necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the government which petitioners mass action would certainly disrupt;

d. petitioners were not denied or restrained from their freedom of beliefs, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same to action. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE 249 SCRA 628 FACTS These were motions seeking to reconsideration of the Courts decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of RA No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The law provided for the imposition of a 10% tax on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. ISSUE religion. Whether or not RA No. 7716 violated the freedom of press and

HELD The Court had held that the press and the religious profession were not exempt from the taxing power of the State and what the Constitution guaranteed was that no law would single out the press or the religious for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against them. RA No. 7716 was none of this. The Court also stated that the VAT was not a license tax or a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. CENTENO VS VILLALON-PORNILLOS 236 SCRA 197

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FACTS Last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purposes of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covered solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. Trial on the merits ensued. The trial court found the accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to each pay a fine of P200.00. But, nevertheless, the accused was pardoned on the basis of its finding that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally liable. ISSUE Whether or not the Presidential Decree No. 1564 was applicable to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, (2) penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused; and (3) right to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution. HELD The Court held that: a. legislators never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage because in other enactments religious and charitable were enumerated while PD No. 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes. b. the constitutional inhibition of legistation on the subject of religion has a double aspect: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act on this belief. The second can be regulated and the State also has the power to determine whether or not there should be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. CHURCH OF LUKUMI VS CITY OF HIALEACH 508 US 520

FACTS Petitioner church and its congregants practice the Santera religion, which employed animal sacrifice as one of its principal forms of devotion. The animals were killed by cutting their carotid arteries, and were cooked and eaten following all the Santera rituals except healing and death rites. After the church leased land in respondent city and announced plans to establish a house of worship and other facilities there, the city council held an emergency public session and passed among others Resolution 87-66, which noted residents concern over religious practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety, and declared the citys commitment to prohibiting such practices. Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated the Florida animal cruelty laws, broadly punished whoever . . . unnecessarily or cruelly . . . killed animals. It has been interpreted to reach killings for religious reasons. More ordinances were passed defining sacrifice, prohibiting animal sacrifices and limiting slaughter of animals to slaughterhouses. ISSUE Whether or not the ordinances violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. HELD The Court held that: a. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdened religious practice need not be justified by compelling government interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, if such a law was not neutral or not of general applications, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. b. The ordinances texts and operation demonstrate that they were not neutral but had as their objective the suppression of the Santerias central element, animal sacrifice. c. Each of the Ordinance pursued the citys interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief and thereby violated the requirement that laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. LAMBS CHAPEL VS SCHOOL DISTRICT 508 US 385 FACTS New York law authorized local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations permitting the after-hours use of school property for 10 specified purposes, not including meetings for religious purposes. Respondent school board (District) issued rules and regulations allowing, inter alia, social, civic, and recreational uses of its schools, but prohibiting use by any group for religious purposes. After refusing two requests by the petitioner church to use the school facilities for a religious-oriented film series on family values and childrearing on the ground that it was church-related, the church filed this suit. 72

ISSUE Whether or not the Districts actions violated the First Amendments Freedom of Speech Clause. HELD There was no question that the District may legally preserve the property under its control. Rule 7 stated that access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter or speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. It also stated that all religions and religious purposes alike did not make its application in this case viewpoint-neutral. Permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film series would not have been an establishment of religion. Since the film series would not have been shown during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, there would be no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed.

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