Moderate Republicans in the Conservative Rise

The Ripon Society, 1962-1982

By Andrew G.I. Kilberg

A Senior Thesis Submitted to the History Department of Princeton University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

Princeton, New Jersey April 6, 2010

This thesis represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For me, the senior thesis has been a culmination of not only my time at Princeton, but also my fourteen years at the Potomac School and countless experiences both in the classroom and out. For as long as I can remember, I have been fascinated by both history and politics, and I am grateful for the opportunity the Department of History has given me to pursue the convergence of these two disciplines. Professor Sean Wilentz has advised me for a year and a half now, first on my quixotic quest to prove the importance of the private rooms of the United States Senate, and more recently on my harebrained endeavor to reveal the important contributions moderates made to the conservative Republican ascendancy. Without his guidance, this thesis would have been sorely wanting of effective argument. His humor, wit, and patience kept me levelheaded throughout the process. The scholar and author Geoffrey Kabaservice has been an indispensable help. His willingness to discuss my ideas and point me in the direction of important sources was vital to the timely completion of this thesis. To the Riponers, both those with whom I spoke and those I did not, thank you for inspiring me. Your example is one I can only hope to equal. My parents, Riponers both, have been incredibly patient in reading my drafts and talking through my ideas. Their support, love, and unflagging patience have carried me through not only the last seven months, but also the last twenty-two years. Though I wrote much of this thesis in my carrel on the B Floor of Firestone Library, it was 13 Prospect Avenue, the Princeton Tower Club, that kept me sane. Jims sandwiches and late night Haven runs; formals and Wednesday nights; deckparties and lawnparties; twobounce games on the basketball court and terrible on-demand horror movies; political kids and theater kidsPTC is indescribably more. Three years of PTC residents and regulars have left me with a formidable arsenal of memories. To my eleven comrades: thank you for the best year of my life. Zach, Kolt, Allie, Cyrus, Daniel, and Trevor: thank you for listening to me rant and rave about my thesis, even though you werent here. Sam, you inspire me more than you know with your dedication to your friends and with your sense of duty and service. And, Julia, thank you for coming into my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction..... Chapter One: The Early Years, 1962-1966... Pre-1964: Defining Ripons Liberalism 1964 Election. The Aftermath of 1964: Election 64 and the Black Voter.... Third Force: the Republican Governors Association.... Filling the Research Gap.... Federal Tax Revenue Sharing.... Ray Bliss and the RNC.. John Lindsay and the Cornerstone Project China and the Draft.... Expansion, Reorganization, and an Institutional Role... Chapter Two: Maturity and Middle Age, 1967-1974. 1968 Primaries... The Urban Papers... 1968 General Election... Into the Nixon Administration... Early Ambivalence Towards Nixon.. Domestic Policy Successes.... Instead of Revolution. Gilders Daycare Editorial. A Ripon President? ... 1972 Election. Watergate... Ripons Decline Through the Ford Administration... Chapter Three: Old Age and Rebirth, 1975-1982... 1976 Election. 3

5 14 15 20 27 30 36 39 42 44 45 47 49 50 58 60 62 65 79 71 72 75 77 83 86 89 89

Organizational Decline.. Supply-Side and the 1978 Capital Gains Tax Cut. Jack Kemp and Empowerment.. 1980 Election. Supply-Side and the 1981 Tax Cuts.. Rick Kessler and Ripons Transformation. Epilogue.. Bibliography... Primary Sources. Secondary Sources.

96 99 103 104 110 112 117 127 127 140

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, Republican Christopher Shays lost his bid to continue representing Connecticuts 4th District in the United States House of Representatives. Shays was the last Republican member of the House from New England, the last vestige of moderate Republicanism left in the lower chamber.1 His defeat was the culmination of the decadeslong reshuffling of geographical alignment and the strengthening of ideological difference between the two great American political parties, what the journalist Ronald Brownstein has termed the Great Sorting Out of politicians into two highly polarized factions.2 By most accounts, the Republican reformation dates back to the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater in 1964. The strident conservative Goldwater lost overwhelmingly to the liberal incumbent President Lyndon Johnson, but the Arizonan proved that a true conservative could win the Republican nomination, a feat which had not been accomplished since Herbert Hoovers run for reelection in 1932. An invigorated conservative movement arose, building an ideological platform off of the foundations of William F. Buckleys National Review, which started publication in 1953, and Russell Kirks influential book The Conservative Mind, which also came out in that year.3 Embracing the white backlash against civil rights and the breakdown of social order in the 1960s, the wellfunded movement created an institutional structure through which it would catapult the former actor and Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, to the presidency in 1980. Young think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, and revived old
Raymond Hernandez, Northeast Republicans Lose Precious Ground in Washington, New York Times, 5 November 2008, 15. 2 Ronald Brownstein, The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America (New York: Penguin, 2007), 175. 3 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953).
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stalwarts, such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Hoover Institute, helped to popularize innovative, conservative ideas and provided the movement with intellectual heft. Upset by Richard Nixon and Gerald Fords policy of dtente with the Soviet Union and flabbergasted by the feminist demands of the 1970s, Reagan led the conservative ascendancy in the 1980s, redefining the Republican Party, and indeed the whole country, in the process.4 But its not that simple. In hindsight, it is easy to see the conservative movement marching from the National Review in 1953 to Goldwater in 1964 to the reaction against Roe v. Wade in 1973 to Reagans election in 1980. Yet, Lyndon Johnson beat Goldwater with over 60% of the popular vote in 1964. Yes, AEIs William Baroody advised the Goldwater campaign, but the think tank remained small through the rest of the 1960s and into the 1970s.5 Heritage, the most successful of the conservative think tanks, did not even come into existence until 1973, and Cato did not appear until 1977.6 The New Right did not get going until the later part of the 1970s.7 Furthermore, a close look at Nixons presidency reveals that moderate Republicanism was not dead or defeated after Goldwaters candidacy. In fact, it was reinvigorated and emboldened in many ways. Thus, Nixons presidency successfully blended a southern strategy with appeals to moderate Republicans. While he made law-and-order a calling card of his administration and opposed busing as a means to desegregate schools, Nixon actually was a progressive president in his domestic

The journalist and sometime-political adviser Sidney Blumenthal wrote an excellent book, originally published in 1986, on the rise of a conservative elite (xix). The Rise of the Counter-Establishment: The Conservative Ascent to Political Power (New York: Union Press, 1986. 5 Blumenthal, Counter-Establishment, 35 and 97. 6 Heritage Foundation, About, http://www.heritage.org/About; Cato Institute, About Cato, http://www.cato.org/about.php. 7 Julian E. Zelizer, Seizing Power: Conservatives and Congress Since the 1970s, in The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism, ed. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 111.

policy initiatives. His domestic agenda included forcing the integration of construction unions, creating the Environmental Protection Agency, and setting new regulatory workplace standards, among other things. While he expanded American military operations in Vietnam into neighboring Laos and Cambodia, he pursued dtente with the Soviet Union and took the first step toward normalizing relations with communist China. Conservative Republicanism did eventually triumph, but the moderates played a significant role in shaping what it was to become. An influential and often forgotten fixture of the GOPs moderate wing was the Ripon Society. The founders of the society first met casually and almost accidentally. During his senior year at Wesleyan University in 1960-61, Emil Frankel took a trip to Cambridge, Massachusetts to meet Bruce Chapman, an undergraduate at Harvard University and co-founder with George Gilder, another undergraduate, of Advance, a moderate Republican political magazine. Frankel was interested in moderate Republicanism in the tradition of Teddy Roosevelt, and ended up writing an article for Advance in 1961. But for him the more important part of that trip was whom he met. Through Chapman, Frankel met Jack Saloma, Tim Petri, and Gene Marans. These four, along with Lee Huebner, Ned Cabot, John Price, and a few others, would form the core of a new group they were to name the Ripon Society after Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the Republican Party.8 After graduating from Wesleyan in 1961, Frankel studied at Manchester University in England as a Fulbright Scholar. While in England, he learned about the Bow Group.9 Founded in 1951, Bow was a collection of young, university educated Conservatives, who sought to promote fresh and innovative ideas from within the British Conservative Party.

8 9

Emil Frankel, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 23 June 2007. Ibid.

They founded the Bow Group to counter the Tories image as the stupid party, James Barr wrote in his 2001 history of the group. Barr continued: Nowhere was that image stronger than in the universities, from which they had only recently graduated. The Left was intellectual, exciting and eclectic; the Right was hobbled by constant reference to an image of pre-war Conservative Government as a paradise for profiteers and hell for everyone else.10 Bow aimed to reinvigorate the Conservative Party by putting a premium on new, innovative policy ideas. Frankel found Bow intriguing and saw parallels between the Tories and the Republicans. Both were outmatched in the realm of policy creativity by the opposing party and had a tendency to fight yesterdays battles. When he returned to the United States to attend Harvard Law School, he and Saloma, who was a junior professor of political science at MIT, decided to pursue the creation of an American Bow Group at Harvard to counteract that image of the GOP as the stupid party.11 Frankel and Saloma invited a select group of Harvard graduate students to a dinner meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club on Wednesday, December 12, 1962, with Professor Morton Halperin as host.12 The new groups objectives were to influence Republican party policy through research and publication to redefine the range of political debate to favor the expression of a progressive or constructive Republican point of view to activate and mobilise [sic] young professional and business people of liberal Republican persuasion to change the image of the Republican party from one of reaction to one of action, to that of a party capable of providing mature and responsible leadership in solving the problems of the twentieth century.13 The first two research projects proposed were on American policy regarding China and The Negro, the Southern voter, and the Republican Party. Finding commonality in their
James Barr, The Bow Group: A History (London: Politicos, 2001), 3. Frankel interview with Kabaservice. 12 Ripon Society, Agenda, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club, 12 December 1962, Ripon Society Papers, Box 1, Folder 28, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University. 13 Ripon Society, Summary Minutes, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club, 12 December 1962, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 28.
11 10

vigorous support of civil rights and their distrust of Goldwaters brinksmanship towards the Soviet Union, these young Republicans set out to oppose conservatism and promote fresh ideas within the GOP. Despite a chronic lack of money, the new society quickly carved an institutional role for itself as a sort of think tank for hire, working for moderate Republican politicians. Through its newsletter / magazine, the Ripon Forum, the society published policy papers on domestic and foreign issues, encouraged the Republican Party to actively court black voters, and warned the party not to pursue a southern strategy. The societys research groups worked closely with the Republican Governors Association, individual governors, senators, representatives, and mayors. The group developed several in-depth policy proposals, including articulate calls for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and local governments and for a negative income tax to help the poor. The proposals tended to support the use of decentralization, the free market, and well-placed tweaks of the tax code to accomplish liberal societal goals. Richard Nixons election in 1968 gave the Ripon Society its first taste of power in the executive branch. As part of his strategy of coalescing the GOP around himself, Nixon brought at least fifteen Riponers into his first administration.14 Once there, they significantly influenced and impacted Nixons domestic agenda, helping to bring many moderate policy proposals, such as revenue sharing, to fruition. While its members influenced the Nixon Administration from within, the Ripon Society itself began to decline. As the original generation of Riponers moved into government or on to other pursuits, the society lost its dynamism and entered a long period

14

Geoffrey Kabaservice, Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), Unpublished Manuscript, 1-2; John Topping, Interview with author, 6 November 2009.

of irregular leadership. Drastic changes in domestic political and cultural issues beyond civil rights for blacks, embodied above all in the rise of the second wave feminist movement, divided the once cohesive society by exposing latent differences between members over policy. Nixon himself, as truly neither a moderate nor a conservative, split the society, which as a whole viewed the President with ambivalence. Plagued by financial difficulties, lacking strong leadership or a clear vision, and waging a war on the way the Republican National Committee apportioned delegates to the national conventions, the society drifted through the Ford and Carter years. Some of Ripons members, however, were busy promoting a new idea: supply-side economics. Two Riponers, Richard Rahn and Mark Bloomfield, were integral to the early promotion of the theory, and a former editor of the Forum, George Gilder codified supplysides philosophical underpinnings in an influential book, Wealth and Poverty. At the same time, empowerment ideas, such as Jack Kemps plan for enterprise zones, made their way into the conservative Republican agenda. By the time of Reagans inauguration in 1981, the Ripon Society was in shambles. Conservatism had triumphed and the society was barely functioning. A Washington insider named Rick Kessler took over the organization and successfully rebuilt it, but as a vehicle for connecting society members with Congressmen. The policy orientation was gone. The Riponers of the 1960s and 1970s went on to occupy positions all across the political spectrum. Where they landed seems to depend on which group of issues has most animated them. Some embraced social conservatism; many others did not. Many today are active Republicans, while some are independents or Democrats. Considering this diaspora,

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what significant impact, if any, did the Ripon Society have on the resurgence of the Republican Party? None of Ripons major domestic policy initiatives became sustained laws; the Republican National Committee rebuffed Ripons battle to reform the process of allocating delegates to the national conventions; the party succeeded with the very strategy of appealing to the conservative South that Ripon was formed to oppose; and overall, despite the Goldwater debacle in 1964, the party moved decisively to the right in the 1970s and after. Yet, Ripon still had an important impact. By championing civil rights and arguing against a southern strategy, they helped to weaken the relatively new formulation of the GOP as the anti-black party and keep a significant number of moderate Republicans loyal to the party through the end of the twentieth century. By articulately developing and promoting domestic policies which advocated decentralization and self-empowermentpolicies which, in the 1960s, were consonant with the moderate and even liberal wings of the partyRipon ironically helped lay the foundation for a host of conservative policies on housing (enterprise zones) and welfare (incentivizing employment) along with supply-side economics. And, by insisting on serious discussion of government and policiesboth goals and meansthey helped turn the right into an intellectual force that recast the Democrats as the party of no ideas. We must remember that conservatism was defeated in 1964. Unwelcome in the mainstream media, [conservatives] could easily have retreated into an alternative universe and limited their conversation to preachments aimed at the like-minded few, the journalist Sam Tanenhaus has written. They rejected that course, electing instead to seize whatever openings they could to join the larger quarrels, adapting their voices to the idioms and

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vocabulary of the day. They rejected extremism for centrism, purism for pragmatism, revanchism for realism.15 Or, as Bruce Chapman described it, William F. Buckley and his circle eventually understood that the extremism on the right was embarrassing to conservatism. And, they appreciated that all sorts of extremism more or less resemble each other.16 Conservative Republican thinking was aided by a host of early Riponers who contributed ideas, many distilled from early Ripon writings, and who generally participated in the debates of the time. Debate between the two competing wings of the party fostered the production of innovative ideas, which, when brought before the electorate, contributed to the GOPs electoral success. It was the moderate wing that began this policy revival. Ripon was writing policy papers in the mid-1960s, long before the major conservative think tanks gained serious national political influence. During the late 1960s and 1970s, it was moderates like the Ripon Society which updated the policy lexicon of the Republican Party. Without them, the conservative Republican ascendancy may never have happened. *** The Ripon Society between 1962 and 1982 is best understood in three stages: the early years, 1962-66; maturity and middle age, 1967-74; and old age and rebirth, 1975-82. Chapter One explores Ripons early stages with an emphasis on the groups support for civil rights, policy and political work, and organizational growth. Chapter Two follows the society during the Nixon and Ford Administrations with an eye on how Ripon and Riponers influenced domestic policies, how the rising feminist movement began to divide the society, and how Nixon himself impacted the group. Chapter Three narrates Ripons organizational floundering in the late 1970s, the societys relationship with the new supply-side movement,

15 16

Sam Tanenhaus, The Death of Conservatism (New York: Random House, 2009), 13. Bruce Chapman, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 8 December 2009.

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the adoption of empowerment policies by the conservative wing of the GOP, and Ripons revitalization under Rick Kessler. The Epilogue draws conclusions about Ripons impact on the conservative Republican ascendancy between 1962 and 1982.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Early Years, 1962-1966 Civil Rights, Federalism, and an Institutional Role
After its founding in December 1962, the Ripon Society spent most of 1963 holding meetings and researching position papers. Beginning in the fall of 1963, however, many Ripon members campaigned on behalf of Nelson Rockefeller in the Republican primaries against Barry Goldwater. Civil rights was the primary motivating issue for these graduate students. It was 10 years after the landmark ruling Brown v. Board of Education declared segregated schools unconstitutional, yet the countryand the federal governmenthad been excruciatingly slow to enforce desegregation. Attracted by the Republican Partys rhetoric of individualism and self-empowerment and the partys anti-slavery history, these young men believed that the GOP was the proper vehicle for progressive change. After Goldwaters nomination in July 1964 in San Francisco, the society decided to research and write a report repudiating an electoral strategy that relied upon the southern white backlash to desegregation. Published in 1965, Election 64 united the Ripon Societyunderscoring civil rights as the both the societys catalyst and glue. In 1965 and 1966, however, the society enlarged its focus beyond the issue of civil rights, and began to establish itself as a mini-think tank. Beginning in 1965, the society started publishing a newsletter, the Ripon Forum. Working with moderate Republican politicians, Ripon became a paid research group, attracting the attention of the media and gaining influence disproportionate to its small size. As 1966 ended and the kickoff to the next presidential campaign loomed, the Ripon Society had managed to carve out a small institutional role for itself within the Republican Party. 14

Pre-1964: Defining Ripons Liberalism

For the Ripon Society, liberal and progressive meant actively supporting federal action on civil rights. To Ripon, the word conservative brought with it segregationist implications. And it was Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater who did more than arguably any other Republican to push the conservative label in a pro-segregationistand anti-civil rightsdirection. Yet, Goldwaters broad definition of conservatism did not conflict with the guiding principles of the Ripon Society. Goldwater believed not only that the Constitution protects and enables governance by the states on many if not most issues, but also that essentially local problems are best dealt with by the people most directly concerned, as he wrote in Conscience of a Conservative in 1960.1 A conservative, Goldwater claimed, is one who understands that each member of the [human] species is a unique creature. Only a philosophy that takes into account the essential differences between men, and, accordingly, makes provision for developing the different potentialities of each man can claim to be in accord with Nature.2 Conservatives believe above all else in the primacy of individualsa primacy that is best protected and developed by the decentralization of power. Yet, Goldwater saw no legal problem with the segregationist South. I deny, he wrote, that there can be a conflict between States Rights, properly definedand civil rights, properly defined.3 He argued that the 14th Amendment does not require the States to maintain racially mixed schools and that the Constitution does not permit any
1 2

Barry Goldwater, Conscience of a Conservative (Sheperdsville: Victor, 1960), 29. Ibid., 11-2. 3 Ibid., 31.

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interference whatsoever by the federal government in the field of education.4 Ripon, on the other hand, saw the 14th Amendment, together with the other Reconstruction Amendments, as explicit federal bulwarks against racial discrimination. Goldwater took an extreme conservative legalistic view not only of civil rights, but of federal programs that coerced state action through promises of federal monies. His zeal to protect the states overwhelmed any argument of the need for the federal government to step in to protect legally and constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, which he interpreted as human rights that were not incorporated in the law and thus not enforceable by the instruments of civil law.5 Ripon believed in the primacy of the individual just as Goldwater did. But, the society also believed that civil rights for blacks were protected by the federal Constitution and therefore demanded active federal protection. Under that reading, the Ripon Society was a conservative institution. But, as considered within the conservative party, they endorsed a relatively liberal interpretation of legal limits and the implications of the civil rights debate. It is important to remember that the Ripon brand of liberal or progressive Republicanism in the mid-1960s was not a repudiation of Republican principles, but rather, in the eyes of Riponers, a validation. The passion of Riponers for civil rights was in part a result of the times. The youth of the 1960s, of which they were a part, were overwhelmingly more concerned about the rights and welfare of minorities and the poor than were their parents.6 The Ripon generation was much more likely to become activists for a cause, and the social activist
Ibid., 34. Ibid., 32 and 33. 6 According to Ripon, Nearly half of the parents interviewed in an earlier poll said they would object to Negroes living next door but only just over a quarter of their children had similar objections. William E. Wessels, The Young Americans: A Message for the Grand Old Party, in The Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, ed. Lee W. Huebner and Thomas E. Petri (Washington: National Press, 1968), 16.
5 4

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movement of the 1960s was itself intrinsically related to the fight for civil rights. If the activists of the 60s have traceable roots, they are in the Civil Rights movement, Riponer William E. Wessels wrote in 1966. Since Martin Luther Kings successful boycott of the segregated buses in Montgomery, Alabama, and the first sit-in at a Greensboro, North Carolina, lunch counter, thousands of students have joined organizations which usually have only two things in common: a refusal to accept their parents excuses for the world as it is, and an almost evangelistic sense of their mission to reform society.7 Riponers were predominantly from the Northeast and Midwest, traditional bastions of reformist Republicanism. They were young law school students, academics, and professionals, whose sense of the importance of social action was inculcated not only in the community, but also in elite educational institutions. And while the Democratic Party was broadly seen as the locus of active social change, these young people were uncomfortable with that partys emphasis on progress through direct federal programs. They were more at home in the Republican Partys traditional emphasis on the individualfree soil and free men.8 As such, Ripon did not oppose governmental solutions to domestic problems; rather, the society supported policies that harnessed the free market and decentralization as solutions which empowered individuals and localities and pushed people in the right direction. Ripon was not a liberal group in the Democratic sense, but neither did they belong to the conservative side of the spectrum. Ripon should be properly identified as a moderate group. We began meeting, because we tired of apologizing to the world of ideas for being Republicans, a Riponer remembered, and to fellow Republicans for being interested in

7 8

Young Americans, The Ripon Papers, 16. A Declaration of Conscience, The Ripon Papers, 11.

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ideas.9 As youths, Riponers had a distinct sense of how the civil rights issue was defining their generationand how the Republican Party needed to actively address the issue if they were to appeal to the youth generation, which the Democrat President John F. Kennedy had so energized. The Riponers in the mid-1960s, however, were all male graduate students. Though Harvard had a formal relationship with Radcliffe College, university life was not truly coeducational. For instance, Yale University, which hosted one of the first Ripon chapters, did not accept women undergraduates until 1969.10 Women would join the group as the decade progresseda change that impacted Ripon just as the feminist movement changed the whole of American politics. It was a talented, dynamic group. Emil Frankel, who brought the idea for the Ripon Society back with him from his time as a Fulbright Scholar in England, was from Connecticut.11 Jack Saloma was born in New York City but grew up in Weymouth, Massachusetts. A graduate of MIT, he attended graduate school at the London School of Economics as a Fulbright scholar before receiving his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. He was working as a junior professor at MIT when Ripon was founded.12 Gene Marans grew up in a Jewish household in Montana before attending Harvard College and then Harvard University.13 John Price spent his early years on Long Island before it became a land of commuters. His mother grew up on a farm in Iowa and his father came from the West Virginia coal-mining region. The moderate Republican temperament of his parents rubbed off on himhis father led Eisenhowers Office of Defense Mobilization from 1959-

Thomas E. Petri and J. Eugene Marans, Ripon at Twenty-Five, Ripon Forum, 24:1 (February 1988), 21. Yale University, History, http://www.yale.edu/about/history.html. 11 Frankel interview with Kabaservice. 12 J. Eugene Marans, Interview with author, 16 March and 3 April 2010; Lindsey Gruson, John S. Saloma, 48; Specialist in Politics Started Ripon Group, New York Times, 8 July 1983, B7. 13 Marans interview with author.
10

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60. Price attended the small Grinnell College in Iowa before Harvard Law School.14 Lee Huebners parents both taught high school in Sheboygan, Wisconsin, a town on the shores of Lake Michigan and north of Milwaukee. While in college at Northwestern University in Chicago, Huebner noticed that among college Republicans, [t]here was a real sense that with Eisenhower leaving office perceived as the rather tired leader of a rather tired group, the energy was all with the Republican right. Huebner had met Tim Petri when they were young at the Wisconsin Boys State summer program at Ripon College, and they ran into each other at Harvard in the fall of 1962 when Huebner was a graduate student in history and Petri was at the law school. It was Petri who summoned their shared Wisconsin roots and suggested to name the fledgling group the Ripon Society.15 Doug Bailey grew up in a Republican-voting family in Cleveland before he matriculated at Colgate University. After spending a few years of the 1950s stationed in Germany while in the Army, he went to Boston to attend Tufts Universitys Fletcher School, eventually moving to Harvard to assist Henry Kissinger.16 Peter Wallison grew up in Queens, the son of Jewish, New Deal Democrat teachers. After paging in the overwhelmingly Democratic House of Representatives in high school, Wallison decided he was a Republican. While a Harvard undergraduate, he met Petri and Marans and became president of the Harvard Young Republicans, though he did not join Ripon until he was at Harvard Law School.17 Bill Kilberg, the father of the author of this thesis, grew up in Bath Beach, Brooklyn, just a few blocks from Gravesend Bay and a few houses from Funzi Tieri, the infamous mob boss of the 1970s. Kilbergs father worked for the New York Port Authority as an electrical

14 15

John Price, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 20 July 2007. Lee Huebner, Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 11 April 2007 and 24 November 2009. 16 Douglas Bailey, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 22 March 2007. 17 Peter Wallison, e-mail to author, 2 April 2010.

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engineer, while his mother worked for a fuel company and managed several commercial development projects. After attending the Industrial and Labor Relations School at Cornell University, Kilberg began Harvard Law School in the fall of 1966. Later in the decade, a few women joined the group. Bobbie Kilberg (ne Greene), the authors mother, grew up in the Forest Hills neighborhood of Queens, the daughter of an accountant and an office manager for an accounting firm. Both her parents were Jewish; her father was a Republican, while her mother was an Independent.18 After attending Vassar College, she went to Yale Law School, where she became involved in Ripons New Haven chapter. She married Bill Kilberg in the fall of 1970. Tanya Melichs father was an enterprising Republican politician in Utah, who ingrained his immense respect for Abraham Lincoln in his daughter. Tanya attended the University of Colorado before graduate school at Columbia University. Melich was active in Republican politics from a young ageshe was a page at the 1956 national conventionand her experience in New York introduced her to the northeastern wing of the GOP.19 It was as diverse a group as could possibly be found at Ivy League graduate schools in the 1960s. The Riponers moderate Republicanism came from different roots, but in 1964 their energies converged on opposing the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater.

1964 Election
Kennedys assassination in November 1963 hit the nation hard, and Ripon was no exception. The Presidents death prompted the societys first public statement, A Call to Excellence in Leadership, which was released on January 3, 1964. Establishing publicly that
18 19

Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 1 April 2010. Tanya Melich, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 13 February 2007.

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the new group believed that a moderate course of progressive Republicanism would give the Republican party the best chance to build a durable majority position in American politics, the society argued that Kennedys death means that the center is once again contestable.20 To the early Ripon members, the Democratic Party was the party of cumbersome, centralized federal solutions and was heavily dependent on the South. On the other hand, the Republican Party was the party of Lincoln and individual empowerment. Kennedys death opened the door for a new generation of Republicans to take back the center of the political spectrum, protect civil rights, and lead the country progressively into the future. The Call to Excellence gained the attention of some prominent leaders in the party, including former President Dwight Eisenhower and Michigan Governor George Romney.21 When President Kennedy was shot in November 1963, a group of Riponers, including Emil Frankel, Ned Cabot, John Price, and Gene Marans, were gathered with other graduate students at Harvard University planning a trip to New Hampshire to campaign for New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller, whom many Riponers favored in the 1964 presidential election, was a manifestation of moderate northeastern Republicanism: progressive and with an elite air about him. Furthermore, as a member of the wealthy Rockefeller clan, he had the money with which to campaign against the rising Goldwater movement within the GOP. Though they postponed their trip because of Kennedys death, most of the group that met that day in November did go to New Hampshire later and

20 21

A Call to Excellence in Leadership, Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 5-6. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Walter Thayer, 23 January 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 177; George Romney,Statement by Governor Romney for Use in Ripon Society Brochure, Undated, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 177.

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campaign door-to-door for the Rockefeller.22 Moreover, in January and February 1964, a group of Harvard Law School students, including Ned Cabot, followed Goldwater while he campaigned in New Hampshire, asking him pointed questions on China, Social Security, and the Soviet Union. They called themselves the Truth Squad.23 While civil rights was Ripons prime motivating issue, the groups opposition to Goldwater was not completely based on his support for states rights. Goldwaters brinksmanship unsettled Riponers, as did his baiting over Chinas probable admission into the United Nations. Ripon was certainly anti-communist, but like many Americans in 1964, the society believed Goldwaters inflammatory rhetoric was dangerous. Ripons activism during the primaries was limited and was certainly not intended to be a formal Ripon activity, Frankel said, and most of Ripons work did come, in fact, after the nomination.24 Kennedys assassination also had an unintended consequence: it put Ripons biggest competitor in the moderate Republican market out of business. Founded at Harvard in 1960 by undergraduates Bruce Chapman and George Gilder, Advance was a moderate Republican magazine with significant financial backing. The magazine moved to D.C. in 1962.25 Chapman and Gilder, however, had bet their success on the November 1963 issue, which was a feature on how the GOP could beat Kennedy in the 1964 presidential election. The Kennedy assassination made mass distribution of the issue politically impossible. Out of money, Advance closed up shop. If that hadnt happened, I dont think there would have been a Ripon Society, said Lee Auspitz, who would later become Ripon president.26 Of course, Ripon had been founded in 1962, but Advances demise cleared the playing field.
22 23

Frankel interview with Kabaservice. Robert J. Samuelson, Truth Squad of 10 Law Students Trails Goldwater in N.H. Primary, Harvard Crimson, 5 February 1964. 24 Frankel interview with Kabaservice. 25 Chapman interview with Kabaservice. 26 J. Lee Auspitz, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 21 October 2006.

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It is questionable whether two moderate Republican organizations started at Harvard within a few years of each other could have both survived. Ripon member Lee Huebner also took on a research project for the primary campaign of Representative Charles McCurdy Mac Mathias, who was running for reelection in Marylands 6th District. Mathias had a primary challenger in L. Brent Bozell, brother-in-law of the young conservative Ivy League firebrand William F. Buckley, Jr., an editor for Buckleys conservative magazine National Review, a former speechwriter for controversial Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, and co-founder of the conservative Young Americans for Freedom.27 Bozell also used his speechwriting skills to ghostwrite Barry Goldwaters Conscience of a Conservative in 1960.28 Huebner holed up in Harvards Widener Library, read all of Bozells old writings, and passed on what he found to the Mathias campaign.29 It was an early example of effective opposition researcha tactic that has become central to modern American political campaigns. And Mathias won. Marred by his divorce two years earlier and remarriage, Rockefellers campaign faltered as the Goldwater machine painted the New Yorker as an elitist womanizer.30 Despite the attempt by moderate Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton to step up and head off Goldwater, it was clear as the summer unfolded that the Republican National Convention in San Francisco in the middle of July would nominate the strident Senator from Arizona.31 Ripon was shocked that the party of Lincoln would nominate an implicitly prosegregationist candidate. On July 4, 1964, Independence Day and nearly 100 years after
27 28

David Stout, L. Brent Bozell, 71, a Champion of Conservatism, New York Times, 19 April 1997, 48. Lee Edwards, A modern Don Quixote fought the good fight, Insight on the News, 9 June 1997, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_n21_v13/ai_19469428/. 29 Huebner interview Kabaservice. 30 Lewis L. Gould, Grand Old Party (New York: Random House, 2003), 360. 31 Ibid., 360-1.

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Lincolns renomination for the presidency in 1864, the society issued A Declaration of Conscience from Ripon, Wisconsin. Harkening back to the GOPs roots, Ripon proclaimed that [t]oday America stands at another point of great moral and physical crisis. Comparing the bloody conflict over the spread of slavery into Kansas in 1854 to the brutal suppression of peaceful demonstrators in the South, Ripon asserted that [o]nce again the conscience of America and especially young America has been struck.32 A Declaration of Conscience was a direct challenge to Goldwater, who had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 just days before. In the Riponers opinion, Goldwater had disqualified himself to be the leader of the party of Lincoln.33 A Declaration of Conscience was one of the most scathing and eloquent repudiations of Goldwater by fellow Republicans. Many Republicans thought it went too far in its criticism of the partys probable presidential nominee. For instance, Representative Bob Michel, who would later be the Republican Leader in the House for fourteen years (1981-1994), sent a particularly snippy letter to Jack Saloma on July 7.34 On the other hand, Michels letter was a sign that party leaders were noticing Ripon, even if they did not agree with the society. Goldwater did not run an explicitly anti-black or anti-civil rights campaign. Yet, while he voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he was concerned that the act breached constitutional protections of federalism, Goldwater did nothing to assuage the justified fears of moderates and liberals within the Republican Party, many of whom ended

32 33

A Declaration of Conscience, 10 and 12. Ibid., 12. 34 Highlights in the Career of Robert H. Michel, Dirksen Congressional Center, 2006, http://www.dirksencenter.org/print_michel_bio.htm; Robert H. Michel to John S. Saloma, 7 July 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2.

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up voting for President Johnson.35 Goldwaters acceptance speech at the San Francisco convention on July 16 underscores his failure to mellow his image. Balance, diversity, creativity - these are the elements of Republican equation, he claimed as a throw-out line to the moderates and liberals. But the paragraph before was an implicit defense of his vote against civil rights. Our towns and our cities, then our counties, then our states, then our regional contacts - and only then, the national government, he said. That, let me remind you, is the ladder of liberty, built by decentralized power.36 Ripon would later argue strongly in favor of decentralization in several different areas of domestic policy, but when it came to civil rights the group held strongly to a belief in federal action. At least one Riponer, Doug Bailey, heard Goldwaters acceptance speech in person in the Cow Palace arena. Bailey, who had been at the meeting which founded the society, had been in effect the number two person on the foreign policy side in the Rockefeller research operation, and it was through this job that he met John Deardourff, with whom he would later start the political consulting firm Bailey, Deardourff & Associates. Bailey and Deardourff traveled to San Francisco with the Rockefeller team. Bailey vividly recalled the crowds reaction when Rockefeller took the stage to give his scheduled speech to the delegates: The venom of the booing and the hatred in peoples eyes really was quite stunning.37 Judging that Goldwaters defeat was as close as possible to a sure thing, Ripon began what would be called Project Election 64a detailed report repudiating the election strategy and electability of conservative Republicans and Goldwater in particular.38 The society was prepared to capitalize upon Goldwaters upcoming defeat in order to try to
Bart Barnes, Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies, Washington Post, 30 May 1998, A1. Barry Goldwater, Goldwaters 1964 Acceptance Speech, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm. 37 Bailey interview with Kabaservice. 38 Ripon Society, Summary Minutes, Dinner, Business, and Discussion Meeting, 7 December 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 28.
36 35

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reverse some of the elections most negative connotationsmost notably the relationships between the GOP and black voters and the GOP and the Deep South. Ripons work on this project resulted in two major publications in two years: Election 64: A New Mandate (published in 1965) and Southern Republicanism and the New South (published 1966). The society also distributed several statements soon after the election of 1964 and again after the election of 1965. As a whole, these publications and public statements argued strenuously for moderation both on local and national tickets, especially when it came to civil rights and what they saw as a nefarious southern strategy. During the time between Goldwaters nomination and election day in November, Ripon steered clear of official negative comments on Goldwater, and instead focused on the campaigns of those whom they supported. On October 28, 1964, the society released to newspapers its list of 75 endorsements. All the men who received Ripons support supposedly were competent, responsible, and experienced candidates; but more than this they are outstanding representatives of the best traditions and ideals of the Republican Party. They all helped affirm Ripons belief that the Republican party is potentially a more flexible instrument [than the Democratic Party] for governing this great nation in the decades ahead. Civil rights clearly was the vital issue in deciding whom to endorse. Tellingly, only two candidates in the South received an endorsement: Winthrop Rockefeller, who was running for governor of Arkansas; and John J. Duncan, who was running for Congress out of the 2nd District of Tennessee. All in all, the list resembled a whos-who list of moderate Republicans in 1964: Senators Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania), Kenneth Keating (New York), and Hiram Fong (Hawaii); Congressmen John Lindsay (New York), Alphonzo Bell, Jr. (California), Fred Schwengel (Iowa), and Charles Mathias (Maryland); and

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Governors George Romney (Michigan), John Chafee (Rhode Island), and John Volpe (Massachusetts). Many others made the listthose were just the notables at the time.39 Lee Huebner did head out on the campaign trailas an aide to Richard Nixon. The former Vice President flew around the country, campaigning for Goldwater and the Republicans. Even though I opposed Goldwater, I was in a sense campaigning for him by being aboard that airplane, Huebner recalled. This was the first round of [Nixons] 68 presidential campaign. Nixon, having lost narrowly to Kennedy four years earlier, was rebuilding his image and earning support within the party by campaigning hard for Republicans regardless of ideology.40 On November 3, 1964, President Johnson trounced Barry Goldwater, winning over 60% of the popular vote and taking 486 electoral votes to Goldwaters 52. While Goldwater carried all five states of the Deep South (South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana), Johnson won the rest of the Southindeed, Johnson won the rest of the country except Arizona, Goldwaters home state.41 In 1956, Eisenhower carried Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. Goldwater lost all of those except Louisiana.42 And, the South was where Goldwater did best.

The Aftermath of 1964: Election 64 and the Black Voter

After the election, Ripon issued a preliminary report followed by the full Election 64 analysis in January 1965. In preparing Election 64, Ripon targeted its analytical eye on the black vote and the South. The report includes a great amount of data based on VEP
39

Ripon Society, Ripon Society Issues National Endorsement of Republican Candidates, 28 October 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 185. 40 Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 41 James R. Whitson, 1964, President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1964.html. 42 James R. Whitson, 1956, President Elect, and http://presidentelect.org/e1956.html.

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statistics, Gene Marans wrote in a letter on January 11, 1965. VEP, the Voter Education Project, was a subsidiary of the Southern Regional Council, a black activist group in the South. Presumably the statistics about black voting on which Ripon focused were pulled from VEPs report Southern Negro Voting Statistics.43 The drafting of the report was a collective effort. The minutes from a meeting of the society on December 7, 1964, note that [n]early all members of Ripon have worked and are working on this project.44 In its pro-civil rights, anti-Goldwater activism, Ripon was united. Election 64 pointed to the implicit racist appeal, the consummation of the Republican National Committees Southern strategy as the most tragic flaw of the Goldwater campaign.45 That strategy failed. The big Republican winners in 1964 were those whom Ripon had endorsed precisely because they represented the opposite of Goldwater within the GOP: Governors Romney and Chafee and Congressman Mathias. Romney especially ran an explicitly anti-Goldwater campaign.46 Are you supporting Goldwater or arent you, a man asked Romney on the campaign trail. You know darn well Im not! was his response.47 The Republicans who won in 1964 were those who actively distanced themselves from Goldwater. In the rest of the country, Republicans saw a reverse coat-tail effect. Maine, for instance, saw its state legislature flip from a Republican majority of 29 to 5 to a Democratic

Wiley A. Branton to J. Eugene Marans, 18 December 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2; J. Eugene Marans to Wiley A. Branton, 11 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2. 44 Summary Minutes, 7 December 1964. 45 Ripon Society, Election 64: A Ripon Society Report, ed. Thomas P. Petri (Cambridge: Ripon Society, 1965), 19. 46 Ripon Society, A New Republican Mandate: A Ripon Society Report and Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections, 5 November 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 185. 47 Robert Ajemian, A Trio of G.O.P. Stars Fighting Hard Not to be Buried with Barry, Life, 30 October 1964, 35.

43

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majority of the exact same margin. The GOPs Congressional strength in the suburbs fell from a majority of 29 to 17 to a minority of 24 to 22. The Republican percentage of the black vote also fell tremendously. In Atlanta, Richard Nixon won 58% of the black vote in 1960; Goldwater won 3%. The other cities of both the South and the North saw a similar backlash.48 These results were particularly upsetting for Ripon considering that a higher percentage of Republican Congressmen voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 than did Democrats.49 Now that [m]oderate Republican congressmen were traded for segregationists, Ripons plea for leaders with a commitment to the future instead of the past was even more urgent.50 Election 64 revealed the practical side to Ripons focus on civil rights, an angle that Ripon would continue to pursue in the future. While Riponers described themselves as moderates, they were very Republican [and] partisan, as Lee Huebner put it.51 The Presidential election of 1964 and its aftermath have obscured one central fact: America stands on the verge of an exciting new era of politics, the society argued in From Disaster to Distinction, its first full-length book. A new order is coming in American politics based upon a new generation and continued growth and concentration of population.52 The growth areas that Republicans must tap are not obscure, Ripon argued. Geographically they are in the expanding urban centers and suburbs of the North and West and among the Negroes of the deep South.53 There were certain groups on the

48 49

Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections. R.D. Davis, Debunking the Big Lie: The Truth About the 1964 Civil Rights Act, National Minority Politics 7:11 (November 1995), 37. 50 Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections; Ripon Society Issues National Endorsement of Republican Candidates, 28 October 1964. 51 Lee Huebner, Interview with author, 8 September 2009. 52 Ripon Society, From Disaster to Distinction: the Rebirth of the Republican Party (New York: Pocket Books, 1966), 95. Emphasis in original. 53 Ibid., 112.

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way upthe GOP must fight for the interest of the Negroes, of the youth, of the middleclass suburbanite, and of the new sophisticated technician, because [w]ithout them the Republican party has no future.54 Fighting for civil rights for blacks was not only a moral concern, but a well-reasoned and calculated political one as well. These dual concerns did not contradict each other, but rather were mutually reinforcing. To follow Ripons thinking, vigorously supporting civil rights and affiliated federal programs, which was the morally right thing to do, would attract black and other minority voters as well as moderate Democrats to the Republican Party, and give the party greater political power and a mandate to further efforts in the civil rights area.

Third Force: the Republican Governors Association

From the outset, Riponers understood that their organization was going to be a small one. While Jack Saloma and Emil Frankel argued that [i]f [Ripon] succeeds on a scale comparable to its British model [the Bow Group] it can play a crucial role in reshaping the Republican Party and its image, they knew that Ripon itself was no substitute for larger party structures.55 They sought to magnify their impact through influential lenses: mayors, representatives, senators, governors, and the like. But these political relationships, while undoubtedly important for the groups influence and financial solvency, lacked the compounded multiplying power of the Goldwater-controlled RNC and private organizations such as the American Conservative Union and John Birch Society. Ripons solution was to promote the new Republican Governors Association as a third force within the party, as a check on Congressional Republicans and the RNC. (It
54 55

Ibid., 113. Agenda, 12 December 1962.

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might have been more accurate to call it a fourth force, since the combination of conservative groups like the ACU and Birch Society had significant power and influence.) Ripon presented a research paperThe Republican Governors Association: The Case for a Third Forceto Republican governors at their meeting in Denver on December 4 and 5, 1964. Ripons targeting of GOP governors made complete sense; as a group, they were much more moderate than the Congressional and RNC leadership. Nelson Rockefeller of New York, the national leader of the partys moderate wing, was the most prominent of the sixteen members, though Robert Smylie (ID), Mark Hatfield (OR), George Romney (MI), and William Scranton (PA) were no lightweights. Notably, not a single southern statenot even a border statewas represented by a Republican governor in December 1964.56 By virtue of the Democratic stranglehold of the South, GOP governors came from generally more liberal regions. As a group, they were highly palatable to Ripon. But before we get to the specifics of the Third Force paper, we must understand how the RGA got its start. Since 1908, the countrys governors have met annually under the banner of the National Governors Association (NGA).57 In the early 1960s, the vastly outnumbered Republicans became more and more frustrated by the Democrats grip on the NGA. Not only did the Democrats move repeatedlyand successfullyto issue statements supporting President Kennedys agenda, but they also stymied Republican efforts to support civil rights. At the NGAs Honolulu meeting in June 1961, a strong Republican civil rights proposal was disposed of with a vacuous substitute resolution by

56 57

Ibid. About the National Governors Association, National Governors Association, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.cdd492add7dd9cf9e8ebb856a11010a0/.

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[Democratic] Governors Ernest Vandiver of Georgia and Price Daniel of Texas.58 At Hershey, Pennsylvania in July 1962, A republican civil rights resolution, calling for a pledge by every Governor to make best efforts to advance civil rights in his state, was filibustered to death by the Southern Democrats, and all civil rights resolutions finally had to be withdrawn.59 At Miami in July 1963, Governor Smylie led the Republicans in a maneuver that not only forced the Democrats into a position of opposition to civil rights, but also boxed them into a situation of favoring a gag on all issues coming before the Conference.60 The Democrats then got rid of the Resolutions Committee to prevent any proclamations on civil rights. At all these meetings, the Democrats had strong support from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) as well as the White HouseVice President Johnson attended the Honolulu meeting and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara represented the President at the Hershey conference.61 The Republicans, on the other hand, had no organizational support. At the end of the Miami conference in 1963, the GOP governors formed the RGA, albeit without a formal structure. According to Ripon, [c]ivil rights was the immediate catalyst in 1963the Democrat-dominated NGA was stifling GOP attempts to address the issue, essentially muzzling Republican governors from making a group statement on the subject.62 The Republican governors also wanted to establish concerted action with the House and Senate party leadership and saw the need for more direct contact with the Republican National Committee.63 By coordinating with federal and national party
58

Ripon Society, The Republican Governors Association: The Case for a Third Force, 4 December 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, 3. 59 Ibid., 4. 60 Ibid., 5. 61 Ibid., 3-4. 62 Ibid., 6. 63 Ibid., 6-7.

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leadership, they hoped to fight against the Democrats machine-like control of the NGA and make their voices heard on the national level. The GOP governors agreed to meet in Denver in September 1963 in order to work out the organizational details.64 The RNC, under the direction of Chairman William Miller, whom Goldwater would pick as his running mate in 1964, was wary of the incipient RGA, filled as it was with moderates. The RNC was heavily pro-Goldwater and feared a vocally pro-civil rights RGA would harm Goldwaters southern strategy.65 Miller first successfully stopped GOP Congressmen from sending representatives to Denver, then got his version of the new organizations by-laws passed, thereby consolidating the RNCs control of the RGA. Under the RGAs Articles of Association, [t]he executive committee will constitute an advisory and liaison group between the Republican Governors and the National Chairman and through him to the House and Senate Campaign Committees and the Republican State Chairmans Association.66 All formal communication between the RGA and other party organizations had to go through Miller and then his successor Dean Burch, a Goldwaterite from Arizona. Furthermore, the Treasurer of the RNC was given the added job of Treasurer of the RGAMiller held the purse strings as well.67 The RGA, thus, was wholly subsumed within the RNC. At the annual NGA meeting in Cleveland in June 1964, the RGA suffered from poor organization, dissension, and discouragement.68 With Eisenhower, Nixon, and Goldwater all in attendance at the conference, some of the GOP governors hoped to stage a
64 65

Ibid., 8. Ibid., 9. 66 Republican Governors Association Articles of Association of September 14, 1963, reproduced in The Republican Governors Association: The Case for a Third Force, 4 December 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, 20. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid., 12.

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confrontation with Goldwater on civil rights. Goldwater, however, had no intention of attending a summit meeting with Eisenhower and Nixon, and the RGAs handling of the press was abysmal. During a meeting Governor Smylie was holding with the press, Governor Paul Fannin of Arizona announced that Goldwater would not have time to meet with the former President and Vice President.69 Ripon saw Cleveland as a crucial missed opportunity: If the Republican governors had been able to use Cleveland as a dramatic display of coordinated and creative leadership instead of defeatism and incompetence, they might have had more success in the San Francisco platform fight and in moderating the nominees acceptance speech. With national attention riveted on Cleveland in the midst of a heated political battle, it would have been advantageous to use the Conference as a sounding board for lucid, reasoned proposals on civil rights, extremism, medicare, social security, and similar problems.70 The RGAs problems were organizational. The Association had plenty of talent, but forces within the party were suffocating it. Ripons straightforward proposals for revamping the RGA, presented a month after Johnsons trouncing of Goldwater, engaged the Associations structural problems. The RGA needed dedicated professional staff, financial independence from the RNC, and the ability to communicate directly with Republican Senators and Congressmen. Research and adequate preparation were key. Republican Governors should collectively speak out on federal-state problems through policy statements and position papers, the paper argued. The Ripon Society is prepared to assist in the preparation of research papers for the Governors.71 Nearly two years later in July 1966, Ripon representatives spoke to the Republican governors in Los Angeles. The conservative Goldwater menace was still strong, they argued,
69 70

Ibid., 14. Ibid., 15. 71 Ibid., iv.

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and possibly stronger than it was in 1964. Looking forward to 1968, Ripon despaired at the RGAs failure to follow through with transforming the governors into a potent national political force. We want you to make the Republican Governors Association a political reality, Ripon told the governors. Today the country doesnt sense any team feeling among the Republican Governors. More than position papers or campaign schools, as important as these may be, we would like to see you develop political muscle.72 The election of Ray Bliss as Chairman of the RNC in 1965 (replacing Burch) had taken some pressure off of GOP governorsBliss was not a Goldwater lackey and he was instituting organizational reforms to enhance the RNCs operations. One of the effects of this, however, was that there was less of an immediate catalyst for the strengthening of the RGA. In fact, the RGA stayed submerged within the RNC until 2002, when Congress passed the McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill. That legislation tightened rules governing so-called soft money contributions from corporations and individuals to the national parties for the purpose of aiding federal elections. The laws in most states, however, continued to be much looser in their campaign financing regulations, prompting the RGA to separate itself from the RNC and form its own distinct legal entity. Before 2002, the RGA was a subset of the RNC [and] raised money to the RNSEC (Republican National State Elections Committee). The Association was really the redheaded step child of the national party, an RGA official told the author.73 Ripons desire for a strong RGA was politicalthe governors tended to be more liberal, and therefore provided somewhat of a bulwark against the conservative movement but it was pragmatic as well. Ripon, like the majority of the Republican Party, wanted a new
72

Ripon Society, Statement of the Ripon Society to the Republican Governors Association Meeting in Los Angeles July 3-7, 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 178, 3. 73 Mike Adams, Interview with author, 22 February 2010.

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federalism, a revitalization of the countrys traditional decentralized approach to governance, as opposed to the Democratic trend, begun by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, towards centralization under the federal bureaucracy in Washington. Empowering the RGA as the partys third force would significantly enhance the political power of a new federalism by introducing Republican governors as a potent player on the national political scene.

Filling the Research Gap

The Ripon Societys public endorsement of candidates in the 1964 elections and its repudiation of Goldwater caught the attention of high-profile politicians. By January 1965, however, the society was verging on insolvency. We are overextended, not in ability or intellectual resources, but in our increasing inability to run a growing organization without infrastructure, society President Jack Saloma wrote to Walter Thayer, the President of the Whitney Communications Corporation, which owned and operated the New York Herald Tribune, the premier moderate Republican voice in the press. The momentum of the Ripon Society cannot be maintained unless the Society acquires a sound financial basis now. Uncertainty in the future of party institutions such as the RNC and RGA and the continued rise of private conservative organizations such as the American Conservative Union and John Birch Society convinced Saloma that an expansion of Ripons resources was vitally important. Saloma argued that the society could serve two possible functions: either as a component part of a coordinated Republican structure or, failing such a coordinated structure, as an autonomous research unit to help fill the Republican research gap.74 The so-called research gap was a reference to the lack of new, innovative policy ideas within

74

John S. Saloma to Walter N. Thayer, 28 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26.

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the GOP. With Thayers help, Ripon raised enough money in 1965 to expand its operations and fill the role of autonomous research unit. John Price referred to Thayer as the secretary-general of the Eastern Republican Establishment, because of his role in connecting and managing the different groups and personalities of moderate Republicans.75 Using his connections, Thayer solicited donations from businessmen and politicians, including New Yorks Senator Jacob Javits and Governor Nelson Rockefeller, though Rockefellers brothers John and Laurance declined to give.76 Other donors included: Representative Donald Rumsfeld of Illinois; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., former Senator from Massachusetts, Ambassador to the United Nations under Eisenhower, and Nixons running mate in the 1960 presidential election; Governor George Romney of Michigan, who would run for the Republican nomination for president in 1968; Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania; and Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Elliot Richardson.77 Jock Whitney, Thayers boss at the WCC, and his family donated and continued to be Ripon patrons into the 1970s. In January 1965, Ripon began to publish a newsletter /magazine, the Ripon Forum.78 Through the Forum, which the society has continued to publish to this day, the society disseminated policy papers, commentary, and Ripon-related news. In July 1965, Ripon expanded its subscriber base by sending solicitation letters to former subscribers of the
75 76

Price interview with Kabaservice. Jacob K. Javits to Walter N. Thayer, 9 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Walter N. Thayer to Christopher T. Bayley, 9 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Laurance Rockefellers secretary to Christopher T. Bayley, 30 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Sarah [Winner?] to Christopher T. Bayley, 5 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26. 77 Donald Rumsfeld to the Ripon Society, 9 August 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7; Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. to Christopher T. Bayley, 11 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Christopher T. Bayley to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 15 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; George Romney to Christopher T. Bayley, 22 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Hugh Scott to the Ripon Society, 3 June 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26; Christopher T. Bayley to Elliot L. Richardson, 6 April 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 26. 78 Ripon Forum, 1:1 (January 1965).

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defunct magazine Advance.79 Bruce Chapman, the cofounder of Advance, had given Ripon his mailing list, thereby allowing for the relatively quick formation of the Forum.80 Many members of the society also worked directly for senators and representatives in their offices in D.C. Jay Kriegel worked for John Lindsay when he was a Congressman.81 In 1965, Jack Saloma held a position in the office of Representative Tom Curtis of Missouri.82 Emil Frankel served as a Legislative Assistant to Senator Jacob Javits of New York in the late 60s, later becoming his Legislative Director.83 Doug Bailey was hired by Representative Brad Morse of Massachusetts in December 1964 to coordinate the Wednesday Group, a small society of moderate Republican congressmen including Lindsay, Mathias, Ellsworth, [and] Tupper.84 Through positions like these, Ripon kept up to date on the politics in the capital, gained experience handling legislation, and pushed the societys services. Ripons primary activity was the development of policy papers. For instance, in a five-page document titled A Republican Civil Rights Platform for 1965, the society enumerated 35 policy proposals to strengthen civil rights. Our civil rights program stresses action, they wrote. Affirmative action must be taken in all parts of the country, on all levels of private and public activity, to help realize for all persons the promise of the American dream.85 Their proposals stressed federal legislation and action in order to prevent discrimination on the state and local level. The GOPs principled belief in the importance of individualism necessitated federal protection. To Ripon, invoking federalism

79 80

Christopher T. Bayley to James Carpenter, 4 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 160. Auspitz interview with Kabaservice. 81 Marans interview with author. 82 Jack Saloma to Helen [Linsky?], 12 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81; Jack Saloma to Marianne Magocsi, 13 August 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81. 83 Emil Frankel, e-mail message to author, 22 March 2010. 84 Bailey interview with Kabaservice. 85 Ripon Society, A Republican Civil Rights Platform for 1965, 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, 1 and 5.

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was a thin excuse for a vote against the protection of civil rights. [W]e recognize that civil rights is a responsibility not of states and localities alone, they wrote, it is a national problem and a national responsibility.86 With 35 policy proposals spread over 8 categories (voting; public schools; employment; public accommodations; administration of justice; housing; public facilities and services; and legislative procedures), the paper was a comprehensive index of progressive Republican policy ideas on civil rights. Politicians also began to hire Ripon to help them with policy research. In the spring of 1965, Ripon wrote a research paper on poverty for Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey.87 Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Elliot Richardson petitioned Ripon for help on legislative research in April.88 The biggest project of 1965, however, was not for an individual politician, but rather was for the RGA.

Federal Tax Revenue Sharing

The RGA did not only endorse Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and local governmentsthe Association also helped to write and edit it. Lee Huebner, who would later become Ripon President, headed the Ripon research group, which wrote the initial draft before working closely with Dr. Carl McMurray of the RGA staff and Robert McCall, Smylies assistant.89 The RGA gave Ripon $150 to cover the RGAs share of this expense.90 First printed in July 1965, the Ripon /RGA report revived national awareness of the policy proposal, which
Ibid., 5. John Price to Al Abrahams, 27 March 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 79. 88 Elliot L. Richardson to J. Eugene Marans, 14 April 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2; Unsigned to Elliot L. Richardson, 4 June 1964, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 2. 89 Ripon Society, Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and local governments, 6 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, foreword; John S. Saloma to Robert E. Smylie, 23 May 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81. 90 Robert E. Smylie to John S. Saloma, 25 October 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81.
87 86

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had first been brought into the spotlight by Dr. Walter Heller, who was President Johnsons chief economic advisor.91 Bipartisan support had grown for the proposal after it gained public attention in 1964, and a special Presidential task force approved the plan. Both Johnson and Goldwater had endorsed the idea in the closing days of the 1964 campaign, but Johnson changed his mind in December, and it seemed that the so-called Heller Plan would die without congressional action.92 Ripon and the RGA stepped in to give new life to the Heller Plan. State and local governments have vast responsibilities, the report noted, and because of rising costs, [o]fficials are constantly preoccupied with fiscal crises.93 Of all revenues, only the income tax expands quickly with the growing economy, the paper explained. Yet only 12% of state and local monies are drawn from this source.94 Instead of wasteful, conditional federal grant programs, unconditional sharing of federal tax revenuesgrowing as a result of economic prosperitywould supplement the finances of state and local governments and allow for the continued distribution of essential government services.95 The Ripon / RGA proposal displayed great belief in federalism and the virtues of state and local government. A decision is made more rationally when those who make it must live directly with its consequence, they wrote. Decentralization permits a variety of values, protecting legitimate minority and regional interests.96 Furthermore, decentralization creates a pseudo-market in policy ideaseach government essentially competes for residents, and thus novel, workable policies gain credence more quickly than in
91

Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and local governments, Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 71. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., 73. 94 Ibid., 75. 95 Ibid., 77-81. 96 Ibid, 73.

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a rigid top-down hierarchy of government.97 The dominating ideology in the paper, if it can be called an ideology, was federalism, as opposed to states rights. More a philosophy than an interpretation of the Constitution, this policy manifestation of federalism recognized the importance of government shared between national and local authorities. The proposal received bipartisan support. Republican Representatives William Brock (TN) and F. Bradford Morse (MA) sponsored legislation, which would have codified the proposal, in the House, while Republican Senator Jacob Javits (NY) agitated in the Senate. Representative Donald Rumsfeld (IL) also expressed interest, as did Republican Representatives Robert Ellsworth (KS), Tom Curtis (MO), and Al Quie (MN).98 Robert Taft, Jr. of the formidable Taft political family, requested and received a draft copy of the report in May 1965.99 The RNC received at least 25 copies of the report.100 But despite the bills Republican patronage, the Senatorial Kennedy brothers, Robert and Teddy, got behind the plan.101 The Kennedys could support the plan because it gave the federal government a role in financing important programs that were best run by state governments, such as education. When their brother was President, he had fought for federal education grants and loans for three years with the support of moderate Republican Senators Javits and Clifford Case (NJ), finally succeeding in getting Congress to pass his program in 1963.102

Ibid., 73-4. Donald Rumsfeld to John S. Saloma, 15 December 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7; Bill [?] to John S. Saloma, 29 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 81; and John S. Saloma to Marianne Magocsi, 11 August 1965, Box 2: Folder 81. 99 Lee Huebner to Robert Taft, Jr., 21 May 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7; Robert Taft, Jr. to Lee Huebner, 25 May 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 7. 100 Saloma to Magocsi, 11 August 1965; John S. Saloma to Ray C. Bliss, 13 July 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 72. 101 Government for Tomorrow, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, foreword. 102 Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedys New Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 230 and 243.
98

97

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Revenue sharing would solidify federal aid to the states, allowing for greater spending on education, among other things. The newspapers also jumped on the revenue-sharing bandwagon. Writing in the New York Herald Tribune, Raymond Price argued that the tax-sharing plan offers the GOP a convincing argument to take to the voters.103 The Republican Governors Association has come to life with an admirable project, Roscoe Drummond of the Washington Post wrote. It isnt being scared away just because President Johnson once supported the idea.104 The New York Times also covered the release of the report.105 The revenue sharing report brought the Ripon Society recognition as a group with serious research capacity and potential. The report also demonstrated Ripons dual commitment to conservative federalism and progressive causes. It is progressive in that it seeks to equip state and local government to deal effectively with massive problems of urbanizationtransportation, education, health, technologynot neglect them, Drummond wrote in the Post. It is conservative in that one of its results would be to arrest the flow of political power to Washington.106 And its proposal had reached the halls of the Capitol Building. Ripon was still headquartered in Cambridge, but the tiny group was being heard in Washington.

Ray Bliss and the RNC

One of the people who heard Ripon was RNC Chairman Ray Bliss. After

Goldwaters defeat, the party was in shambles. Governor Smylie and other moderate

103 104

Government for Tomorrow, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187, foreword. Roscoe Drummond, Sharing Tax Money, Washington Post, 18 July 1965, E7. 105 Tax-Sharing Plan Pressed by G.O.P., New York Times, 13 July 1965, 14. 106 Drummond, Sharing Tax Money.

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governors took the lead on calling for the replacement of the current RNC Chairman, Dean Burch, who was a Goldwater ally. Burch had taken over from Representative William Miller, when Goldwater named Miller as his running mate in the 1964 election. With the help of Donald Ross, a committeeman from Nebraska, Bliss was elected at the RNC meeting in January 1965.107 Primarily focused on organization, Bliss managed to hold both conservatives and moderates within the party. As part of this effort to keep the party together, Bliss and a senior RNC staffer named Ray Humphreys courted Ripon, and the society was happy to be told that it was a valued member of the GOP.108 Humphreys visited the society in Cambridge, and Saloma met the RNC Research Director and Bliss himself, on separate occasions.109 Bliss was immensely important to Ripon, because he represented a first step in taking back the party from the Goldwater conservatives.110 Bliss was not an ideologue. [W]e must first determine and then act upon pertinent issuesissues that are of deepest concern to most people, issues around which our fellow citizens organize their political responses, Bliss told the 13th Annual Republican Womans Conference on April 1, 1965. There must be a perceptive presentation of these issues based upon a realistic consideration of wants and needs rather than as abstract reference to ideological terms.111 Bliss

John F. Bibby, Party Leadership, the Bliss Model, and the Development of the Republican National Committee, Politics, Professionalism, and Power, ed. John C. Green (New York: University Press of America, 1994), 21. 108 Ripon Society Executive Committee to Members of the RNC, 15 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 73; Charles M. Lichenstein to Thomas E. Petri, 25 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 73. 109 John S. Saloma, Memorandum on Luncheon with Dr. Arthur Peterson, 21 April [1965?], Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 73; John S. Saloma to Ray C. Bliss, 26 August 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 72; Ray C. Bliss to John S. Saloma, 23 September 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 72. 110 The Republican Response to Defeat, From Disaster to Distinction, 86. 111 Ray C. Bliss, The Chairman Speaks: Address by the Honorable Ray C. Bliss Before the 13th Annual Republican Womans Conference, April 1, 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 72.

107

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measured, pragmatic approach to party organization and policies ensured that Ripon would be supported by the national party as part of the expansive coalition.

John Lindsay and the Cornerstone Project

The few elections held in 1965 gave enough fodder for Ripon to release a ten-page follow-up to Election 64 titled A Second Mandate to Republicans: A Ripon Society Report and Analysis of the 1965 Elections. Focusing on the few races that happened in that year, Ripon found some encouraging signs of the success of those who followed the strategy of moderation the organization preached. John Lindsays victory in the New York City mayoral race was a particularly important race to Ripon. Lindsay defeated his Democratic opponent as well as a Conservative Party candidate, National Review founder and stalwart conservative William F. Buckley, in a city with a 7 to 2 Democratic registration edge. Lindsay was able to draw significant black and Puerto Rican support, thereby highlighting the conclusions drawn by Ripon in Election 64.112 Lindsay proved to be an important Ripon ally during the organizations early years. After Lindsays mayoral election, he worked with Ripon on an ombudsman project for New York City, as arranged by a staff assistant to the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress.113 The mayor also gave his backing to an ambitious undertaking called the Cornerstone Project. In April 1965, the Chairman of the University of Michigan Young Republican Club, Lyle B. Stewart, initiated a correspondence with Ripon about the YR clubs work on civil
Ripon Society, A Second Mandate to Republicans: A Ripon Society Report and Analysis of the 1965 Elections, Undated, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 187. 113 Mary McInnis to Robert Behn, 16 December 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 9; John V. Lindsay to Mary McInnis, 1 December 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 9; Robert Behn to Marry McInnis, 13 December 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 9.
112

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rights. Ripon gave them preparatory documentation and advice, and in the fall of that year, the YRs hosted the Young Republican Leadership and Civil Rights Conferences, at which Governor Romney spoke.114 This working partnership between the group of law students from the University of Michigan and Ripon resulted in the Cornerstone Project in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn.115 Over four sessions in June and July 1966, the project took about 100 young men, both Republicans and Democrats, and put them in the heart of the ghetto for two weeks. They worked with organizations which did social work during the day and at night had panel discussions on various topics dealing with poverty. Ripon sought not only to do a little good in a bad neighborhood, but also to help educate their members on what they were fighting for.116

China and the Draft

Nineteen-sixty-six also saw the production of major Ripon policy papers on communist China and conscription. In May, the society released its China paper, arguing that both military containment and diplomatic accommodation were required in dealing with China.117 While Ripon deplored Chinas outward militarism, the society cautioned against seeing Vietnam as a test of Chinese will and power. To be bogged down in Vietnamese jungles will not necessarily strengthen our capacity to contain Communism in Asia.118 Rather, the United States should pursue a full normalization of relations, including an exchange of ambassadors and admission to the United Nations.119 Ripons

114 115

David Miller, Jr. to Marianne Magocsi, 29 January 1965, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 93. Robert Behn, Memorandum: The Cornerstone Project, 23 May 1966, Ripon papers, Box 2: Folder 93. 116 Cornerstone Project brochure, Ripon Papers, Box 2: Folder 93. 117 China Today Containment and Contact, Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 177. 118 Ibid., 178. 119 Ibid., 179.

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promotion of the shield and the olive branch120 remarkably foreshadowed the route pursued by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger towards China in the early 1970s. In December, the society called for the Federal Government to eliminate the draft, to improve the salary, incentives, fringe benefits, and prestige of the military, and to establish a 2.7 million man volunteer army.121 An all-volunteer army was not only possible, but also preferred over both a lottery and mandatory national service. According to the report, which was written by Bruce Chapman, the founder of Advance,122 a volunteer force would have a smaller turnover rate, thereby saving the military the money and time required to train new classes of draftees, not to mention the expertise developed by career soldiers. Furthermore, voluntarism represented an essentially libertarian principle, which attracted so many immigrants to our shores in the first placevoluntarism was a quintessentially American idea.123 And, as it unquestionably has been a Democratic Congress that has stymied reform in recent years and a Democratic President who has manipulated the issue in ways apparently calculated to prevent thorough debate, the stage was set for Republicans to take the lead on the issue.124 Like its paper on China, Ripons proposal for an all-volunteer army foreshadowed the ending of the draft under Nixon in 1973.125 Voluntarism became a Republican issue. Ripon allies Donald Rumsfeld and Tom Curtis pushed voluntarism in the House of

120 121

Ibid., 181. Politics and Conscription: a Ripon proposal to replace the draft, Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 93. 122 Petri and Marans, Ripon at Twenty-Five, 22. 123 Ibid., 105. 124 Ibid. 125 Julian Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National SecurityFrom World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 234-5.

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Representatives in 1967, and Nixon added it as a campaign plank in both 1968 and 1972.126 On two major foreign policy issues, Ripon was ahead of the game.

Expansion, Reorganization, and an Institutional Role

Nineteen-sixty-six was a year of growth for the Ripon Society. The society started the year with chapters in Cambridge, New Haven (Yale) and Southern California. In July, a New York City chapter joined the rolls, and by October there were the seeds of chapters in D.C., Chicago, and San Francisco. The growth in Ripon necessitated a new organizational structure. In October, Ripon became a representative corporation with a National Governing Board. Jack Saloma was elected the first President and Lee Huebner the first Vice President.127 Though Ripon was growing, it remained a relatively small organization. Yet, it enjoyed influence disproportionate to its size. The American Conservative Union felt threatened enough by Ripon that it issued a 31-page analysis of the society. While the Ripon Society is small in numbers, its influence is felt at some of the major American universities, the ACU found. The conservative organization believed that Ripons influence extended beyond the ivory tower, arguing that Ripon, as progressive Republicanisms intellectual elite, will play an important role in narrowing down the field of liberal candidates for the 1968 GOP presidential nomination.128 While the ACU report probably overstated Ripons influence within the party, it is clear evidence that Ripon had carved out a small institutional role for itself in the GOP.

Ibid., 209, 217, and 232-3. News from Ripon Society, Ripon Forum, 2:5 (July 1966), 5; Ripon News, Ripon Forum, 2:7 (October 1966), 6. 128 American Conservative Union, The Ripon Society, 1966, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 52, 29.
127

126

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Between December 1962 and December 1966, Riponers turned their society into a sort of small-scale political research firm, selling their services to moderate Republicans for whom they produced papers that they could use in backing up their positions.129 The Forum gave the society a vehicle, through which they commented on elections and the future of the GOP, praised and criticized politicians, and presented important policy papers. As 1967 dawned and the next presidential election loomed, the Ripon Society was counted as a successful and growing voice within the moderate wing of the Republican Party.

129

Marans interview with author.

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CHAPTER TWO

Maturity and Middle Age, 1967-1974 Nixon, Ford, and the Move to D.C.

The 1968 presidential election was something of a rite of passage for the Ripon Society. That year, in a way, marked the organizations graduation. Before 1968, Ripon managed to ally itself with various Republican politicians, campaigns, and institutions, produce statements of principle, write position papers under paid contract, and build political relationships. After Richard Nixons election as President of the United States, the Republican Party had finally retaken the seat of executive power, and several Riponers received positions in the new administration. But greater influence within Washington and the White House helped to cause a crisis of leadership within Ripon by taking away so many of its active members and former officers. Furthermore, the elevation of the GOP as a whole to a position of power made Ripons criticisms of the party now seem disloyal. Finally, although Nixon supported and helped to bring to fruition certain Ripon proposals, his election hastened the societys decline by redirecting the societys energies toward Washington and confusing the societys mission with his own indistinct identification as neither a moderate nor a conservative. Still, Ripons ideas and members had great influence during the Nixon years. The White House staff dominated the policy discussion, thereby giving the young Ripon staffers in the Administration significant influence over domestic policy proposals. Furthermore, Nixon adopted key Ripon suggestions, such as the negative income tax and federal revenue sharing, as his own. Finally, Nixons domestic agenda was, overall, progressive and reflected much of the general thinking and posturing that Ripon had espoused since its founding. 49

1968 Primaries
Speculation about who the Republican presidential nominee would be in 1968 started as early as 1966. Three candidates in particular caught Ripons eye as well as that of the Republican Party as a whole: Richard Nixon, George Romney, and Ronald Reagan. Romney, the moderate Governor of Michigan, who had run an explicitly anti-Goldwater gubernatorial campaign in 1964, appealed more to Ripon than either Nixon or the conservative Reagan, who had campaigned for Goldwater in 1964. Nixon was seen as the safe unity candidate, who had the potential to bring together both wings of the party, while Reagan was a real threat.1 A solid Reagan victory in the most populous state in the nation would place him in immediate contention for the nomination with Romney and Nixon, the Forum predicted in July 1966, when Reagan was campaigning hard to become governor of California. He would be a new face, a winner who had overcome the liberalconservative Republican split in his state.2 While Nixon impressed the GOP faithful with his tireless campaigning on behalf of Republican candidates in 1964 and 1966, Romney attracted the attention of influential voices inside the press corps. The Washington Posts David Broder even wrote an article in October 1966 comparing Romney to the late President Kennedy.3 For most of 1967, however, the society focused most of its energy on producing policy papers, including two impressive works proposing a negative income tax and a new strategy for Vietnam. First proposed by the British economist Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams and seconded by Milton Friedman in his 1962 tract Capitalism and Freedom, the negative income tax would have supplemented the incomes of families below a certain level through
1 2

John S. Saloma, The Dilemmas of Three Factions, Ripon Forum, 3:1 (January 1967), 5. The View From Los Angeles: Lengthening shadows on 1968, Ripon Forum, 2:5 (July 1966), 2. 3 David S. Broder, Can Rommey Do a JFK? Washington Post, 9 October 1966, E1.

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direct federal payments.4 The proposed system would have provided incentives for poor families to move up the income scale until they can begin to pay positive taxes, according to the Ripon research paper on the topic, which the society released in April 1967. For example, suppose the standard income for a family of four is $5,500, and the tax rate is 50%, the papers authors John Topping and Duncan Foley explained. If the family earns nothing, it gets $2,750 (50% of $5,500). If it earns $1,000, it gets $2,250 from the Negative Income tax, and has a total income of $3,250, $500 more than before.5 The essential idea was that while the government actually would provide more to the poor, it would also use market forces to encourage the poorest to climb the economic ladder. The negative income tax was a self-empowerment idea that highlighted the power of individuals as a refreshing contrast to the Democratic welfare bureaucracy. In essence, the negative income tax proposal was an early variation of welfare reform. Ripon was also concerned about the Vietnam War, which was an issue of growing national and electoral importance. Building upon their opposition to the draft, in October Ripon released The Realities of Vietnam, a report by Christopher Beal and Lee Auspitz that repudiated President Johnsons Americanization of the war. The proposal sought an end to escalation and the implementation of a so-called confederal strategy, which would give power to local leaders loyal to South Vietnam and the United States and included financial and material aid to areas not under direct American military control.6 The confederal strategy aimed to minimize American military presence and increase aid, thereby

Specifically, in Friedmans book see chapter 12, The Alleviation of Poverty, 190-5. Rhys-Williams wrote a book entirely devoted to domestic goals, taxation, and incentives. Milton Friedman, Wealth and Poverty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Lady Rhys-Williams, Taxation and Incentive (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). 5 John R. Topping, Jr. and Duncan K. Foley, The Negative Income Tax, Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 127. 6 Christopher Beal and Josiah Lee Auspitz, Realities of Vietnam, Ripon Papers, 1963-1968, 196.

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creating a confederation of localities that did not feel threatened by the American military, yet stayed loyal to the United States because they received tangible benefits. In turning against the President on Vietnam, Ripon charged that President Johnson has had little vision to spare for the real constituency of his Vietnam policy: the generation of men who are expected to fight the war and live with the results.7 Most Riponers were young enough to be drafted. Looking forward to the next years presidential election, they concluded that [i]t remains for a new administration, undeluded and free to act, to adopt a confederal strategy.8 Republican leaders publicized the report as the basis for a new Republican strategy on Vietnam. Romney said the paper was highly perceptive. General James Gavin, a critic of the Johnson Administrations prosecution of the war, called it a brilliant analysis.9 Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania commended the paper on the Senate floor: The Ripon research paper [on Vietnam] is an excellent and thoughtful proposal. Senator Clifford Case told the Senate that I have made reference to the Ripon Society paper because I hope to make that the basis of a good many discussions about what goes on in Vietnam.10 The war would be a major issue in 1968, and Ripon placed itself in the camp calling for a general withdrawal of American forces from combat zones. Ripon also continued to produce policy papers for politicians. For instance, between August and December 1967, Ripon produced five detailed, substantial research memos for Massachusetts Governor John Volpe on Automation and Technology, Senior Citizens,

7 8

Ibid., 183. Ibid., 202. 9 David Broder, GOP Group Asks New Vietnam Policy, Washington Post, 4 October 1967, A12. 10 Clifford Case and Hugh Scott, Congressional Record, 9 October 1967, S14407.

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Increasing Job Opportunities for the Urban Poor, Crime, and Housing.11 Volpes use of Ripons research services most likely was a result of Ripons relationship with Elliot Richardson, who had been Volpes Lieutenant Governor from 1965-66 and was the states Attorney General in 1967. The paper on job opportunities supported the implementation of a federal tax credit for vocational education [and] training expenses. Such a tweak of the tax system would utilize private enterprise in an attempt to implement societys broad goals.12 On housing, Ripon suggested that home ownership was a central concern as it had psychological value and encouraged respect for property [and] community responsibility. Citing the need to involve private enterprise in an initiative rather than [as a] subsidiary (to government) capacity, the housing report suggested that the federal government should institute a program that helped local organizations renovate houses.13 Furthermore, a Home Ownership Loan Fund, financed by debentures sold on the open market, but guaranteed by the Federal Government, would finance the sale of the [renovated] houses.14 These proposals pre-dated and foreshadowed conservative Republican appeals to tax credits, vocational training, and the value of home ownership, policies which are even today central to Republican domestic initiatives. The implosion of Romneys fledgling campaign in the fall of 1967 brought the upcoming election into the spotlight. George Gilder was sending reports to Ripon from within the Romney camp, and things did not look good for a man touted a year earlier as the second coming of JFK. In late October 1967, Gilder told Bruce Chapman that Romneys
Ripon Society, Automation and Technology, August 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; Ripon Society, Senior Citizens, September 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; Ripon Society, Increasing Job Opportunities for the Urban Poor, October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; Ripon Society, Crime, October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189; and Ripon Society, Housing, December 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 189. 12 Increasing Job Opportunities, 7. 13 Housing, 10. 14 Ibid., 11.
11

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budget had just been halved, and this was before he even declared himself a candidate.15 Much like his son, Mitt, 40 years later, Romney had a tendency to make verbal gaffes, which resulted in bad media coverage. In September 1967, he told the press that the military and Johnson Administration diplomats had given him the greatest brainwashing that anybody can get during a 1965 trip to Vietnam.16 The comment turned into a media fracas. Another governor, who was with Romney on the trip, told the Washington Posts David Broder that he noticed no evidence of any brainwashing.17 Romney never fully recovered from that gaffe, and withdrew early from the contest in February 1968.18 Romneys decline created an opening for other potential moderate Republican candidates. I am personally more convinced than ever, Chapman wrote to Tim Petri after Gilder reported Romneys financial troubles, that the only hope of the moderates is to get Romney out of the Race and NAR [Nelson Rockefeller] or someone into it before New Hampshire. We cant afford to wait until after a Nixon win in N.H.19 That month, Bob Behn and Timothy Brown discussed the possible dark horse candidacy of moderate Republican Pete McCloskey, a first-term anti-Vietnam War representative from California.20 I could not agree with you more when you suggest that Mr. McNamara [Johnsons Secretary of Defense, a Republican] would make an excellent president, Tim Petri wrote to a friend in February 1968. So would John Lindsay or [Johnsons Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare] John Gardner or [civil rights activist] J. Irwin Miller or General

15 16

Bruce Chapman to Thomas E. Petri, 29 October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 11: Folder 5. Gould, Grand Old Party, 373. 17 David Broder, Romney Charges LBJ Brainwashes the People, Washington Post, 7 September 1967, A1. 18 Gould, Grand Old Party, 373. 19 Chapman to Petri, 29 October 1967. 20 Robert Behn to Timothy Brown, 20 October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 7: Behn Correspondence; Timothy Brown to Robert Behn, 25 October 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 7: Behn Correspondence.

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Gavin or a number of others.21 But the most obvious moderate candidate was Nelson Rockefeller, who had run in 1964 and had the money to challenge Nixon. And, Rockefeller did indeed receive the most support from Riponers. John Price, Tanya Melich, Peter Wallison, and Mike Brewer, who had joined Ripon while at Harvard Law in the mid-1960s,22 worked in his delegate operation, while Bobbie Greene (who would later become Bobbie Kilberg after she married Bill Kilberg in 1970) worked in the domestic policy research group. Bruce Rabb, Jonathan Moore, and Howard Gillette also worked on the Rockefeller campaign.23 Rabb had been part of the Advance team.24 Gillette got involved with Ripon while he was a graduate student at Yale in late 1966.25 Nixon, however, did not give up on the moderate vote and purposefully courted Ripon. In preparation for his 1968 presidential race, Nixons aides sought Ripons research services. As Ripon Research Director Bob Behn described to Raymond Price, for $2000 the society could supply research memos, which puts a premium on hard facts, dramatic illustrations, new ideas and useful concepts. Behn also assured Price that they can do major, in-depth research projects. We can write speeches. We can do very short quick fact sheets.26 Nixons aide and speechwriter Pat Buchanan went on to solicit at least two projects: one on labor-management relations and a request to select brief and colorful anecdotal stories for use in speeches, short quotations which make a specific point with regard to an issue, and phrases that by themselves can sum up an issue and make it one

Thomas E. Petri to John F. Ahearne, 20 February 1968, Ripon Papers, Box 9: Folder 1. Michael Brewer, Interview with author, 10 October 2009. 23 Price interview with Kabaservice; Melich interview Kabaservice; Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail messages to author, 24 and 26 March 2010. 24 Auspitz interview with Kabaservice. 25 Howard Gillette, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 2 November 2006. 26 Robert Behn to Raymond K. Price, 16 May 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 16.
22

21

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that people will remember.27 Buchanan liked the piece on labor-management relations so much that he summoned the author, Bill Kilberg, to New York and offered him a job on the Nixon campaign, a position that Kilberg accepted. Lee Huebner would also later join the Nixon team during the general election.28 Waiting in the shadows behind the preferred Rockefeller, generally acceptable Nixon, and defunct Romney was Ronald Reagan. In the fall of 1967, Ripon sent Mike Smith, the societys former Executive Secretary, to California to investigate Governor Reagan up close and write a report on him. At the time, Ripon was very unnerved by the chatter that was going around that Reagan would be a comely vice presidential candidate under either Nixon or Romney or Rockefeller in 1968, Smith recalled.29 Reminding himself not to be a hatchet man, Smith spent October and November 1967 researching, resulting in a 24-page profile that was eventually published in June 1968.30 Smith noted Reagans skill in communication and the similarity of his stances on foreign policy to Goldwaters. Reagan, Smith wrote, wins his audience with a masterful arsenal of well-turned phrases and humorous quips that simultaneously make his point as well as any amount of lecturing could. His beliefs in foreign policy were bold, simplistic, straight-forward, and expressing a dangerous faith in military solutions and in the wisdom of military leadership. All in all, Smith painted a picture of a formidable politician who could appeal to both conservatives and moderates.31 Around that time, Reagan spoke at Yale University and met with the New Haven Ripon chapter while he was there. We had prepared a series of fairly hostile
27

Patrick J. Buchanan to Thomas E. Petri, 13 December 1967, Ripon Papers, Box 1: Folder 16; Thomas E. Petri to Patrick J. Buchanan, 20 November 1967, Ripon Papers, 7: Behn Correspondence. 28 Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 29 Mike Smith, Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 12 February 2007. 30 Ibid. 31 Michael C. Smith, Here is the Rest of Him: A Report on Ronald Reagan as Governor of California, June 1968, Ripon Papers, Box 3: Folder 190.

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questions for Reagan and, to the surprise of most of us, he hit each of them out of the park, Bobbie Kilberg remembered. We may not have agreed with many of his answers but he was articulate, specific, and thoughtful.32 Reagan was a threat precisely because he was so good, and Ripon was the first moderate group to identify the danger he represented. In the end, neither Rockefeller nor Reagan could defeat Nixon. There was a kind of game of chicken going on between Reagan and Rockefeller, Riponer Lee Auspitz remembered, in that both of them felt they could individually stop Nixon, but neither wanted to have their fingerprints on the knife in Nixons back; each wanted to inherit Nixons support.33 Even though Romney had withdrawn from the race in February, Rockefeller did not jump in. In fact, 9 days after he won 10.8% of the vote in New Hampshire primary to Nixons 77.6%, Rockefeller announced that he would not run.34 But on April 30, on the day he won the Massachusetts primary, Rockefeller proclaimed himself a candidate.35 But Rockefeller never recovered from his initial announcement that he was not running, and Reagans entrance at the convention was too little, too late. Of the 13 primaries that pledged delegates, Nixon won 9. Rockefeller only won Massachusetts; Reagan only won California; Governor John Rhodes claimed his home state of Ohio; and a NixonRockefeller unity ticket triumphed in D.C.36 Rockefellers back-and-forth on whether to run paralleled the 1964 primaries, when George Romney led people to believe that he would make the jump, but then decided against it. It also reflected the perennial failure of Republican moderates and liberals to organize sufficiently and to pursue the presidency with
32 33

Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 29 March 2010. Auspitz interview with Kabaservice. 34 Rhodes Cook, United States Presidential Primary Elections, 1968-1996 (Washington: CQ Press, 2000), 464; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962-1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 145-6. 35 Ambrose, Nixon, 153. 36 Cook, Presidential Primary, 14-5.

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anywhere near the zeal needed. Rockefeller did not have his heart in it; Nixon had been preparing for four years. And, Nixon rolled through the primaries. The Republican National Convention in Miami in August awarded Nixon the nomination on the first ballot.37 Huebner was there as the official Ripon representative, but he was not the only Riponer in attendance.38 John Price, Tanya Melich, Bobbie Greene, and Howard Gillette were there as part of the Rockefeller operation.39 Greene was in the hotel suite where Rockefeller watched the roll call vote.40 But not all of Ripon was wholly consumed by the convention. In that same month, the society released two influential essays, which it called the Urban Papers.41

The Urban Papers

Building upon the papers Ripon produced for Massachusetts Governor Volpe the previous year, the society released papers on social services and jobs in August 1968. The social services paper suggested the creation of a national network of neighborhood information centers, which would serve as an information clearinghouse for virtually all public and private social services.42 The idea was to streamline service distribution, while taking power from urban political machines, which controlled the availability of information, and encouraging the utilization of private companies by placing their services on the same level and availability of those provided by the government.43

37 38

Ambrose, Nixon, 170. Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 39 Gillette interview with Kabaservice; Price interview with Kabaservice; Melich interview with Kabaservice; Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 26 March 2010. 40 Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 26 March 2010. 41 The Conditions for Self-Help, Ripon Papers, 144. 42 Ibid., 145. 43 Ibid., 148.

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The jobs paper promoted the use of tax credits and governmentally reinforced investment in development. Ripon suggested that the federal government provide tax credits to companies which opened or updated facilities in poor urban areas and to companies that hire the hardcore unemployed (the long-term unemployed).44 The society also supported Senator Jacob Javits proposal for a Domestic Development Bank, which would provide loans to businesses in poor urban areas, thereby rectify[ing] the fundamental lack of commercial credit for the black business community.45 The paper also recommended that federal efforts give special attention to promoting the formation of joint ventures between major corporations and poverty area businessmen.46 The Urban Papers expanded upon the recommendations laid out in the Volpe papers, holding strong to the central idea of empowerment and the utilization of market forces to help underprivileged people and areas, what Ripon referred to as the conditions for self-help.47 Fundamentally, Ripon saw these proposals as a coherent and viable alternative to Democratic solutions. In their eyes, the Democrats wanted to keep the status quo or establish cumbersome new bureaucracies to distribute aid. Republicans could offer new solutions, which encouraged the development of private industry within poorer communities through tweaks of free market forces, backed up by the power of the federal government in conjunction with small and large private businesses. Though Ripon presented and promoted these ideas as moderate, they were very similar to the

44 45

Ibid., 150-1. Ibid., 151. 46 Ibid., 153. 47 Ibid., 144.

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conservative Republican policy proposals of later decades. New York Representative Jack Kemp, in particular, later became a prime supporter of closely analogous policies.48

1968 General Election

After the Republican National Convention, some of the Rockefeller Riponers moved to the Nixon campaign. Walter Thayer, a strong Rockefeller supporter who switched his allegiance to Nixon after the convention, recruited Price to the Nixon team as well.49 John McClaughry, who was part of the Advance team in D.C., worked on black empowerment out of the campaigns New York City headquarters.50 Lee Huebner, who had worked for Nixon in 1964, but stayed out of the primary campaign, joined up.51 Still, many Riponer were wary of Nixon. McClaughry said that he detested Nixon, even though he toiled on the campaign.52 Doug Bailey, cofounder of the political consulting firm Bailey-Deardourff, had worked on the foreign policy research team in Rockefellers 1964 run. When the Nixon campaign called in 1968, he emphatically turned them down. Richard Nixon was a bad person, Bailey said. Id had the chance to vote for him in 1956 and I didnt. I didnt vote for him in 1960 either. Why would I work for him in 1968?53 (In 1956, Bailey was stationed in Germany as part of the Army and did not vote. In 1960, he voted for Kennedy.)54 Despite Nixons overtures to the society, Ripon generally remained ambivalent towards him up until the Watergate scandal in 1974. His courting of the group
48

Kemp was a strong proponent of what he called enterprise zones. In fact, the New York Times claimed he was the first lawmaker to popularize the idea. David E. Rosenbaum, A Passion for Ideas: Jack French Kemp, New York Times, 11 August 1996, 1. 49 Price interview with Kabaservice. 50 John McClaughry, Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 15 and 29 November 2009. 51 Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 52 Ibid. 53 Bailey interview with Kabaservice. 54 Douglas Bailey, e-mail message to author, 29 March 2010.

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was appealing, but it was transparently part of a coalition strategy, and the conservative influence on Nixon was worrisome to Ripon. Nixon barely defeated Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who had received the nomination after Johnson withdrew and Robert Kennedy was assassinated during the primaries. On the day of the election, both the Washington Post and New York Times ran stories depicting the race as a toss-up. Total Uncertainty Marks Eve of Voting, the Post announced; Lack of an electoral Victory for Anyone Held Possible, the Times claimed.55 Nixons margin in the popular vote was smallhe had 43.4% of the total to Humphreys 42.3%, a difference of fewer than a million votesbut he won 301 electoral votes to Humphreys 191 and the segregationist Alabama Governor George Wallaces 46.56 After the election, Ripon produced Lessons of Victory, in which Bob Behn, the principal author, dissected the 1968 election, restating and expanding upon the societys argument about election strategy and the future of the Republican Party. In short, a southern-dominated strategy that ignored blacks, other minorities, and youths might prevail in the short-term, but was a death wish in the long run. Nixon and his campaign led by John Mitchell, Behn argued, so feared the anti-war activists and southern reactionaries, that he did not really campaign on anything at all. The noncommunicative nature of the slogan [Nixons the One] was, of course, the fundamental reason for its selection, Behn wrote, for it said nothing that could offend any voter, took no position with which anyone could disagree.57 Nixons secret plan to relieve the nation of its commitment in Vietnam is emblematic of the noncampaign as Ripon termed it. While Nixon did not go so far as to
55

David Broder, Humphrey Surge Clouds Nixon Bid In Election Today, Washington Post, 5 November 1968, A1; Tom Wicker, Nation Will Vote Today; Close Presidential Race Predicted in Late Polls, New York Times, 5 November 1968, 1. 56 James R. Whitson, 1968, President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1968.html. 57 Ripon Society, The Lessons of Victory (New York: Dial Press, 1969), 5.

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oppose desegregation, he did make law-and-order a central part of his campaign, appealing to voters who feared the race riots and college uprisings of the last few years. Ripon viewed this as a negative campaign. The tragedy of 1968 was that it was the perfect time for a wise and experienced man to seize the imagination of an American public hungry for strong leadership, Behn deplored. It was clear then that a bold campaign and sweeping mandate would establish him in unarguable terms as President of all of the people. But those who planned Nixons campaign sold him short. They underrated his potential.58 Lessons of Victory was emblematic of Ripons overall ambivalence towards Nixon: he had the potential to be a truly national, moderate leader, but his electoral fears, cemented in his presidential defeat in 1960, haunted him. Kevin Phillips famous (or infamous) The Emerging Republican Majority, published the same year, served as a counterweight to Lessons of Victory and added to Ripons wariness when it came to Nixon.59 But despite this caution, more than a few Riponers wound up working in the Nixon Administration.

Into the Nixon Administration

After eight years, the Republican Party was back in the White House, though the Democrats still controlled the Senate with 57 seats to the Republicans 43 and dominated the House with a 51-vote margin, 243 to 192.60 At least 15 Ripon members worked in the Nixon Administration, and Nixon appointed Ripon allies George Romney as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, John Volpe as Secretary of Transportation, Donald

58 59

Ibid., 33. Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969). 60 Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm; Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), United States House of Representatives, Office of the Clerk, http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html.

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Rumsfeld to lead the Office of Economic Opportunity, and Elliot Richardson as Under Secretary of State.61 (Richardson would ultimately serve as Secretary in four different Cabinet level departments under Nixon and Ford.) Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan, whom Nixon brought it to head his Urban Affairs Council, hired four Riponers, including John Price, who in December 1969 would take over from Moynihan; the Council on Executive Organization took three; Lee Huebner was appointed a speechwriter with the title of White House Staff Assistant to the President; Nixon aide John Ehrlichman hired Jamie Humes as an aide; Bobbie Greene, a White House Fellow, was assigned to the Office of the Staff Secretary and then later moved to the Domestic Policy Council; Bill Kilberg, also a White House Fellow, went into the Department of Labor, where he would eventually be appointed Solicitor of Labor in 1973 at the age of 26, at the time the youngest person ever to hold a subcabinet position. (The Solicitor ranks only behind the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.) Attorney General John Mitchell hired David C. Miller as an assistant, while Frank Shakespeare, the director of the United States Information Agency, hired William
Matuszeski; Steve Herbits served on the Presidential Commission on an All-Volunteer Force

(the Gates Commission); and John Topping worked for the Office of Minority Business Enterprise.62 For such a young and small organization, Ripon managed to secure quite a large collection of conspicuous junior positions. Nixon consciously sought to bring moderates into the administration, especially in the domestic sphere, as part of his strategy of unifying the Republican Party around himself.

61 62

Kabaservice, Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), 31-2. Kabaservice, Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), 1-2; Bobbie Kilberg, email to author, 24 March 2010; William J. Kilberg P.C., Gibson Dunn, http://www.gibsondunn.com/Lawyers/wkilberg; Topping interview with author; 14a Eliot Street, Ripon Forum, 5:12 (December 1969), 27.

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With some of Ripons top talent and officers going into the administration and other longtime officers resigning to build careers and families, a new group took over the major positions within the society. Auspitz replaced Huebner as president; Huebner had taken the job after Saloma resigned in 1967. Peter Wallison became the Chairman of the National Governing Board, Christopher Bayley became Chairman of the Executive Committee, and Howard Gillette took over as Vice President.63 By 1968, Ripon was a small, but growing organization with semi-autonomous chapters in Cambridge, New York, New Haven, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, and Dallas. New chapters in New Jersey and Pittsburgh formed during Nixons first term. Most significantly, the society opened a chapter in D.C., an early sign of the societys eventual descent into the capitals quagmire-like political scene.64 However, growth was making the organization financially unstable. The groups budget more than doubled between 1967 and 1968 from $46,000 to $115,000, and while the societys magazine, the Ripon Forum, saw a 50% increase in paid circulation, the overall financial situation was ominous.65 With an enlarged organization and connections in the administration, the Forums new editor A. Douglas Matthews was confident that the societys discussions of policy proposals will be increasingly influential with a Republican in the White House. Signs are that our magazine has become an important bridge between the world of ideas and the world of power.66 Jack Saloma, however, issued a warning from his new home in San Francisco: If the Nixon Administration absorbs the best Ripon talent and the Society becomes in effect an arm of the Administration, weve lost our most important function

63 64

Kabaservice, Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), 2-3. Ibid., 6. 65 Ibid., 7. 66 A. Douglas Matthews to J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 8 September 1969, Ripon Papers, Box 13.

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independent thought and criticism.67 The Nixon Administration soon earned both the Ripon Societys praise and ire.

Early Ambivalence Towards Nixon

Nixon encouraged Ripon by adopting two of their key domestic policy proposals as part of his New Federalism program. In an August 8, 1969, speech to the country outlining his domestic agenda, Nixon announced that he sought to replace welfare with a negative income tax, which he termed the Family Assistance Program. What I am proposing is that the Federal Government build a foundation under the income of every American family with dependent children that cannot care for itself, Nixon said.68 Riponer Chris DeMuth worked on the negative income tax proposal as a staffer on Moynihans Urban Affairs Council.69 Nixon also endorsed the sharing of federal tax revenues, for which Ripon had proclaimed its support back in July 1965. We can no longer have effective government at any level unless we have it at all levels, the President declared. There is too much to be done for the cities to do it alone, for Washington to do it alone, or for the States to do it alone.70 Lee Huebner, who had led the Ripon research group on revenue sharing, took responsibility for most of the administrations statements on the proposal.71 Ripons two major domestic policy proposals had made it into the heart of Nixons domestic agenda. The height of Ripon influence with Nixon came on December 16, 1969, when six Riponers met with Nixon in the Oval Office to discuss youth issues for an hour. The report
67 68

Howard L. Reiter, Ripon: Left Spur to the GOP, Nation, 17 February 1969. Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 8 August 1969, Nixon Library Foundation, http://www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/clientuploads/directory/archive/1969_pdf_files/1969_0324.pdf, 4. 69 Chris DeMuth, Interview with author, 11 October 2009. 70 Nixon, Domestic Programs, 7. 71 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.

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combined a number of policy proposals relating to youth, including abolishing the draft and changing the voting age to 18. Overall, the report reflected the societys JFK-inspired belief in the contributions young people could make to the nation. The discussion was heartening for the society, as the President assigned an aide to coordinate Ripon activities and research with the Administration.72 Yet, all was not rosy between Ripon and the administration. On the same day in January 1970 that the President congratulated the society on its seventh birthday (Huebner actually drafted the statement),73 Attorney General Mitchell called the society a group of little juvenile delinquents on the CBS Evening News. In the Forum, the society had accused Mitchell of politicizing law enforcement, and suggested that he should resign as Attorney General or assume the more traditional political position of Postmaster General.74 Ripon also opposed Nixons anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program, Safeguard,75 and implicitly criticized his approach to Vietnam by supporting the Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam, a large nationwide demonstration on October 15, 1969, as well as antiwar bills written by moderate Republicans Senator Charles Goodell of New York and Representative Pete McCloskey of California.76 Ripons most effective mobilization of anti-administration activity came while the Senate considered the Presidents nomination of Judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court. When Associate Justice Abe Fortas resigned in 1969 as a result of a scandal, Nixon first nominated Judge Clement F. Haynsworth to replace him. After the tireless campaigning

72 73

Kabaservice, Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), 65-70. Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 74 Mitchell Depicts Ripon Society as Little Juvenile Delinquents, New York Times, 18 January 1970, 24; Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 75 Beyond the First 100 Days, Ripon Forum, 5:5 (May 1969), 21. 76 Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), 53.

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of Democrat Indiana Senator Birch Bayh among others, the Senate rejected Haynsworth.77 On January 19, 1970, Nixon nominated Carswell, a conservative Floridian whose positions on race were judged much worse than Haynsworths by many.78 Riponer John Topping, who was then Counsel to the Office of Minority Business Enterprise, believed Nixon saw the Haynsworth rejection as a direct challenge to him. Nixon thought I need to stick it to them, Topping surmised. I cant lose twice in a row.79 Topping was suspicious of Carswells record on race issues, and, as a lawyer, believed that his judgeship was mediocre at best. Even though he was a Nixon Administration official, he quietly organized for the Ripon Society a resistance effort.80 John Adler, a New York lawyer and friend of Ripon founder Gene Marans, connected Ripon with a group of Columbia Law School students, who were researching Carswells record.81 We were trying to establish that he was one of the least cited judges by the [Supreme] Court, his opinions were shortera lot of different reasonsto the extent you could establish that he was subpar, independent of the civil rights issue, Topping remembered.82 The Ripon-Columbia effort aimed at showing that Carswell was simply mediocre, and it succeeded. Ripon took the lead on releasing the findings to the media. At a press conference in D.C. on March 5, they announced that of Carswells eighty-four published decisions nearly sixty per cent had been reversed, or more than twice the average rate of the other judges in the Fifth Circuit District Courts.83 Carswell lacks either the intellectual stature or the judicial impartiality to qualify for a place on our nations highest court, the Ripon press
77 78

Richard Harris, Decision (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1971), 10-11. Carroll Kilpatrick, Floridian Picked for High Court, Washington Post, 20 January 1970, A1. 79 Topping interview with author. 80 Ibid. 81 Topping interview with author; Harris, Decision, 101. 82 Topping interview with author. 83 Harris, Decision, 101.

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release charged.84 Toppings handwritten notes from the time suggest that he coordinated with Ripon in order to convince enough Republican senators to vote against Carswell.85 While Ripon was crucial to Carswells downfall, it was conservative Republican Senator Roman Hruska from Nebraska, who accidentally put the last nail in the coffin. Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers, Hruska said to a reporter just outside the Senate chamber on March 16, the first day of debate on the nomination. They are entitled to a little representation, arent they, and a little chance? We cant have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like that there.86 All three justices to whom he referredBrandeis, Frankfurter, and Cardozowere Jews. Carswells nomination was defeated by a vote of 45 to 51 on April 8, 1970.87 Nixons next nominee for the Fortas seat was Harry Blackmun, who would author the Courts majority opinion in Roe v. Wade. To the conservative movement, which adopted a severe anti-abortion stand as the decade progressed, the Carswell defeat was emblematic of the problems moderates created. In this case, giving an inch on Carswells nomination resulted in losing a mile on the question of abortion. In later decades, conservative Republicans weeded moderates out of the party, because they saw them as a real threat. Ripons role in the Carswell defeat, therefore, arguably heightened intra-party partisanship between moderates and conservatives.

84 85

Ripon Society, The Case Against Carswell, March 1970, Ripon Papers, Box 17: Folder 15. John Topping, Personal papers, 1970. 86 Harris, Decision, 110. 87 Congressional Record, 8 April 1970, S10769.

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Domestic Policy Successes

In the latter months of 1969 and in 1970, Nixon followed through on several progressive domestic policies, on which Riponers within the administration worked. As a whole, these initiatives displayed Nixons tendency to deal with real issues not by opposing federal solutions but by incorporating Republican principles, as Bill Kilberg put it.88 And, this was the pragmatic approach to governance the Ripon Society had promoted since its founding. In late 1969, Nixon outmaneuvered union leader George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, in desegregating construction unions under the Philadelphia Plan, on which Bill Kilberg, a Riponer who was a White House Fellow in the Labor Department, had worked. The proposal hurt whatever support Nixon had from union membersa constituency he admired as the character of this countrybut he went ahead with lobbying Congress on the measure.89 After the House of Representatives voted to uphold the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon sent a message of congratulations to Congress, saying, There is no civil right more central to the American system than the right of equal opportunity.90 In 1970, Nixon sent his Indian Message to Congress and signed the Occupational Safety and Health Act. On July 8, Nixon announced that the federal government would continue to extend the native tribes of the United States the right to self-determination without the termination of federal aid. The idea was to balance the two in order to maintain tribal sovereignty and provide badly needed assistance, while helping to build tribal infrastructure in order to reject the suffocating pattern of paternalism. The message also
88 89

Bill Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 27 March 2010. Ambrose, Nixon, 474. 90 Richard Nixon, Statement About Congressional Action on the Philadelphia Plan, 23 December 1969, American Presidency Project, University of California at Santa Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2382.

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included support for a bill pending before Congress that returned the sacred Blue Lake and its surrounding lands to the Taos Pueblo Indians in New Mexico.91 The message was originally going to be released as a fact sheet, until a congressional relations staffer stopped Riponer Bobbie Greene, who was the project manager on Indian issues, outside the press office, her arms full with copies of the fact sheet. Democratic Senator Clint Anderson of New Mexico had called and threatened to oppose the ABM Treaty if the provision on the Taos Pueblo was included, the staffer said. The sheet could not be released to the press. Nixon rebuffed Anderson and elevated the fact sheet to the level of a special message to Congress. Greene and Lee Huebner drafted the Indian Message over the July 4th weekend. And on July 8, Nixon met with tribal leaders in the Cabinet Room in the White House along with Vice President Agnew and several Cabinet secretaries and top policy officials.92 Nixons gambit paid off: the New York Times ran a story on the Cabinet Room meeting on the front page, and the Taos Pueblo got their land back.93 An increase in public attention paid to job-related injuries pushed Nixon to support the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), also known as the WilliamsSteiger Act after the bills bipartisan cosponsors Democratic Senator Harrison Williams and Republican Representative Bill Steiger, who would be a main participant in two subsequent Ripon-related initiatives. OSHA, which Nixon signed into law in December 1970, created a new agency in the Department of Labor, whose responsibility was to set and enforce

91

Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 8 July 1970, American Presidency Project, University of California at Santa Barbara, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2573. 92 Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 27 March 2010. 93 James M. Naugton, President Urges Wider Indian Role in Aid for Tribes, New York Times, 9 July 1970, 1.

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workplace safety and health standards.94 To counteract the obvious expansion of federal power which OSHA represented, the bill included a provision which allowed individual states to set and enforce their own standards.95 Bill Kilberg worked on OSHA as well.96 These three policy successes are not often remembered, but they illustrate the Riponesque approach to domestic policies that Nixon took during his first term. On civil rights, he supported federal action in order to ensure equal opportunity. On Indian policy, he laid out a plan to integrate native tribes into the federal system without forcing assimilation. On work safety standards, he saw the practical need for federal action, yet allowed states to voluntarily set their own standards. On these smaller issues, Nixons New Federalism mirrored Ripons own philosophy.

Instead of Revolution
In 1971, Ripon published its second to last book, Instead of Revolution, a collection of thirteen essays focusing on Americas youth and youth policy. The book was an outgrowth and adaptation of the youth paper, which Ripon had presented to President Nixon in December 1969.97 The books title by itself clearly conveys Ripons message: we are young and idealistic with a transformative view of America, yet we are not radicalswe want to work with the system and through the system, especially the free market, to break down the barriers surrounding economic and social improvement. Yet, by 1971, most Riponers were not as young or as idealistic as they used to be. Nineteen-sixty-four, even 1968, was a long time ago in political terms. The civil rights issue had morphed into
94

Susan Hall Fleming, OSHA at 30: Three Decades of Progress in Occupational Safety and Health, Job Safety & Health Quarterly, 12:3 (Spring 2001), 24. 95 Bill Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 27 March 2010. 96 Ibid. 97 Ripon Society, Instead of Revolution (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971), v.

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arguments over busing and affirmative action, and in so doing started to lose its power as a unifying issue. Expansion, drift, and the loss of key people to government and other jobs was taking its toll on the society. The society began to falter administratively in 1969 when its representatives met with Nixon over the youth paper: Auspitz, the societys third president, was on a leave of absence to work in the administration, and Howard Gillette had yet to take over officially; finances were a never-ending issue; and there was a general lack of participation from those outside of the societys headquarters in Cambridge.98 And, as 1971 came to a close, the editor of the Forum was about to expose a rift within the Ripon Society and the Republican Party as a whole.

Gilders Daycare Editorial

George Gilder had been an editor even before Ripon existed. David Rockefeller, brother of Nelson and Gilders fathers roommate in college, became a kind of surrogate father to George after his father died during World War II. Rockefeller mentored Gilder, who essentially grew up within the walls of the Liberal Republican Establishment.99 While at Harvard University in 1960, Gilder co-founded Advance, a magazine on politics, with Bruce Chapman. After the magazine folded in 1964, Chapman joined the Ripon Society. Gilder joined Evelyn F. Ellis as co-editor of the Forum on the July 1971 issue, and Gilder produced a minor stir with that very same issue. H.L. Mencken once described Presidential politics as the quest of boobs for boobissimus the superlative boob, Gilder wrote in his first editorial. And in all partisan candor, we must admit that the Democratic array excells [sic]

98 99

Kabaservice, Ripon and the First Year of the Nixon Administration (1969), 63-4. Larissa MacFarquhar, The Gilder Effect, in The New Gilded Age, ed. David Remnick (New York: Random House, 2000), 116.

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in boobissimus potential any Republican offering since 1964. 100 Referring to a whole slate of potential Democratic nominees as boobs angered some readers, causing at least one man to disaffiliate from Ripon. In replying to the disgruntled reader, Ellis, Gilders coeditor, assured him that Gilder did not receive approval for the piece from either Ripons National Governing Board or National Executive Committee, and that everyone was disappointed in the editorial.101 Then, in January 1972, Gilder dropped a bomb-shell with an editorial applauding Nixons veto of a federal daycare bill. The bill, according to Time, was a good deal more ambitious than a federal babysitting service. Under the Democrat-sponsored program, poorer families would receive the service for free, while families above a set income level would have to pay. Furthermore, the child-care centers would be run by local prime sponsorscities, towns, counties or even such groups as Indian tribal councils.102 On the surface, the bill seemed to be a Ripon-like ideaprogressive, but also promoting decentralized government. Gilder disagreed. President Nixons veto was eminently justified, Gilder argued, on fiscal and moral grounds. Nixons alternative plan would provide such services for poor mothers, who are most likely to have an urgent need to work. According to Gilder, it is quite possible that the new federal program, by making families less dependent on a male provider, would contribute to the familial disintegration already promoted for years under federal welfare laws.103 Gilders editorial shocked many within the society by implicitly arguing that a womans proper place was in the home. Promoting working mothers, Gilder suggested,
100 101

Editorial: The Lightweight Brigade, Ripon Forum, 8:7 (July 1971), 3. Evelyn Ellis to Joseph P. Wells, 8 July 1971, Ripon Papers, Box 23: Folder 6. 102 The Nation: Child Care Veto, Time, 20 December 1971, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,878957,00.html. 103 Editorial: The Daycare Veto, Ripon Forum, 8:1 (January 1972), 3-4.

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would lead to the breakdown of the family unit. That blew everybodys minds, said Howard Gillette, who was then president of the society. We were just at the point where we were finally adapting to the modern era and having women officers, and here Gilder came out with his war on women.104 Huebner called it a real sort of scandal.105 The Forums next issue later that month included a piece describing opposition to the editorial, including much from within the organization itself. A significant proportion of the Ripon National Governing Board under the leadership of Executive Committee Chairman Patricia Goldman on January 5 dissented, the magazine noted. Several active Ripon members, including Goldman, Pamela Curtis and Bobbi Greene Kilberg [sic] had lobbied for the bill. Goldman worked for the Wednesday Group on Capitol Hill, and was instrumental in the back-and-forth between the society and members of Congress.106 And those four were not the only ones: Several members of the Ripon chapter in Pittsburgh, led by National Executive Committee member Leah Thayer, were said to be incensed by the FORUM stance, since the chapter had worked hard in 1970 for Jo Anne Evans Gardner, a daycare supporter. Also opposing sections of the editorial were members of the leadership of the New York Chapter, including Ripon Finance Chairman Peter Wallison, and Minneapolis City Council and Ripon Chapter President John Cairns.107 The February issue contained a lengthy point-counterpoint between Virginia Kerr, a daycare activist, and Gilder, as well as a letter of protest from Ripons New York chapter, which Tanya Melich, a self-styled Republican feminist had a role in drafting.108 By 1972, Ripon was no longer a boys club; in fact, it had only been so for a few years. As coeducation spread through the nations universities in the late 1960s and early
104 105

Gillette interview with Kabaservice. Huebner interview with Kabaservice. 106 Patricia Goldman, Interview with author, 9 October 2009. 107 Daycare Edit Stirs Dispute, Ripon Forum, 8:2 (15 January 1972), 4. 108 Tanya Melich, The Republican War Against Women (New York: Bantam, 1996), 27-8.

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1970s, Ripon also experienced an influx of women members, many of whom were active in the feminist movement and strongly supported feminist issues. The increase in female influence was not limited to Ripon. Fourteen women served in the House of Representatives during the 93rd Congress (1973-75). Furthermore, 13 blacks were in the House and Ed Brooke served in the Senate.109 These two statistics reflect the changing nature of the domestic policy debate: segregation was less of a concern, while feminist issues were rising in importance. Gilder continued as Forum editor through September, and Dick Behn (brother of Robert Behn) took over for the October issue. Bruce Chapman has said that George didnt get fired.110 Whether he was fired or left of his own volition, Gilder played a crucial role in Ripons development by exposing nascent divisions within Ripon and the moderate Republican movement as a whole over developing womens rights issues such as abortion. As the daycare brouhaha was erupting, the Supreme Courts decision nationally legalizing abortion was still a full year away. That year, however, Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, and conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly launched her STOP ERA campaign, which successfully stopped the ratification of the amendment.111 Feminist issues were on the rise, and Ripon was not prepared to adapt.

A Ripon President?
As Richard Nixons first term came to a close, the President looked more and more like a Riponer on many issues. In February 1972, Nixon visited China, an important first

109

Julian E. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its Consequences, 1948-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97 110 Chapman interview with Kabaservice. 111 Sean Wilentz, Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 93-5.

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step in the recognition of the communist country, which Ripon had endorsed back in 1966.112 In May 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks resulted in Nixons declaration that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed on a treaty curtailing ABMsRipon had spoken out against the development of the Safeguard ABM system earlier in the term.113 And in October 1972, Nixon signed the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 outside of Independence Hall in Philadelphiafederal tax revenue sharing with the states was now the law of the land.114 In addition to these breakthroughs and the Philadelphia Plan, the Indian Message, and OSHA, Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, on which Riponer Chris DeMuth worked, and ordered the full enforcement of President Johnsons Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, which outlawed discrimination by federal contractors and compelled them to take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed without regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.115 Through both the New Federalism and dtente, much of Ripons agenda was adopted by the President. Furthermore, the more conservative high-ranking officials had come to accept the presence of Riponers and other moderates in the administration. At first, H.R. Haldeman, Nixons Chief of Staff, and Pat Buchanan, Nixons chief speechwriter, were suspicious of the moderates on the White House staff. After Ripon went public with its criticism of Carswell, Nixons nominee to the Supreme Court, Buchanan demanded that the Riponers in the administration denounce our former group, in the words of Lee Huebner. The Riponers countered by arguing that all the staffers who belonged to conservative groups,
Ambrose, Nixon, 512. Ibid., 441-2. 114 Revenue Sharing Becomes Law, Revenue Sharing Bulletin, 1:1 (November 1972), 1. 115 DeMuth interview with author; National Archives, Executive Order 11246--Equal employment opportunity, Federal Register, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executiveorder/11246.html.
113 112

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which heavily criticized many of the administrations domestic proposals, should have to do the same. Haldeman called off the hunt.116 Riponers had unusual influence on the formation on domestic policy, because of the administrations organizational focus on the White House, according to Bobbie Kilberg (ne Greene). Riponers who worked on domestic policysuch as those at the Urban Affairs Council, Domestic Policy Council, Office of Minority Business Enterprise, etc.worked directly on policy proposals and speeches, and therefore had influence disproportionate to their youth. Ehrlichman, especially, looked out for Greene and others on his Domestic Policy Council staff.117 Yet, despite all the President did to elevate their agenda to the national stage, Ripon as a whole still viewed Nixon with ambivalence. He supported many of their policies, but he seemed to do so for purely political reasons. There was a general sense, not uncommon to Ripon, that they did not know the true Richard Nixon.

1972 Election
For the Ripon Society, the 1972 election cycle was as much about a lawsuit as it was about candidates and issues. In November 1971, Ripon filed a suit in the federal D.C. Circuit Court challenging the Republican Partys convention delegate apportionment formula. The problem, as the society saw it, was that too few young people, women, and minorities had been represented at previous conventions. Their solution was to even out the delegate representation among the states; for the 1972 convention, the eight most populous

116 117

Huebner interview with Kabaservice. Bobbie Kilberg, e-mail to author, 27 March 2010.

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states, with 48.7 per cent of the population, only [received] 37 per cent of the delegates.118 Though the suit would only affect the 1976 convention and beyond, it quickly became an important issue heading towards the 1972 convention in Miami. The society won a victory in the District Court in April 1972; the court declared unconstitutional a provision that provided bonus delegates to each state which elected Republican candidate or candidates for President, governor, senator or a majority of the U.S. House seats without regard to the population of Republican voting strength in the state.119 At the convention, a resolution was passed which call[ed] for a new committee to study the party rules with the goal of further opening the selection process to greater participation by women, youth, racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly.120 The convention also told Republican state parties to endeavor to obtain equal representation for men and women to the 1976 national convention, an action that many of the women active in party affairs regard as a mandate, according to Lou Cannon of the Washington Post.121 Despite the court ruling, however, the convention voted against repealing the delegate bonuses.122 The delegate fight, which would continue through the 1976 election cycle, rebranded the Ripon Society in the eyes of many Republicans. Since the groups inception, conservatives had viewed the society with a wary eye. The American Conservative Union, in particular, perceived Ripon as a threat, as shown by its critical report on the society.123 Yet, while Ripon had a strong record of criticizing the Republican Party for its policy proposals,

Philip A. McCombs, Ripon Societys Suit Seeks Reform for 76, Washington Post, 7 December 1971, A3. 119 Ripon Wins Suits on Delegate Formula, Ripon Forum, 8:9 (May 1972), 3. 120 Robert J. Huckshorn and John F. Bibby, National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republican Party, American Political Science Association, 16:4 (Autumn 1983), 658. 121 Lou Cannon, Delegate Fight Stirs Old Animosities, Hints New Ones, Washington Post, 20 August 1972, A4. 122 Lou Cannon, Reformers to be Back, Washington Post, 28 August 1972, A21. 123 American Conservative Union, The Ripon Society.

118

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electoral strategy, and even its hierarchy (the report on the RGA), the group had never before attempted to attack directly the party infrastructure. There was a strong reform coalition, as the political historian Julian Zelizer has called it, dating back to the late 1950s, but that coalition was primarily Democratic in makeup.124 Republicans tended to see intraGOP reforms as efforts to strengthen the northeastern establishments hold on the party. The lawsuit and the fight at the convention, therefore, looked to many like, at best, an attempt by the moderate wing of the party to, through the courts, usurp the conventional process, retake the party machinery, and reverse the hard-earned gains of grassroots conservatives, and at worst, an act of outright sabotage intended to help the Democrats. Though there was some truth to the former suspicion, the latter was completely false. Nevertheless, the continuing fight over delegates did much to discredit the Ripon Society as a constructive partner within the Republican Party. As in previous elections, Ripon did not endorse anyone until after the conventions. The society, however, promoted the long-shot attempt by anti-Vietnam Representative Pete McCloskey of California to unseat Nixon as the partys presidential nominee and advocated the replacement of Vice President Spiro Agnew on Nixons ticket. An unofficial poll of Forum subscribers taken between January and February 1972 showed that 94% of those who voted for Nixon in 1968 (Group A) believed he would be renominated, while 95% of those who did not vote for him in 1968 (Group B) also believed he would be renominated. In Group A, 17.5% viewed Nixon as the person most worthy of your enthusiasm and support, with 9% going to McCloskey and Rockefeller each. Of Group B, 18.5% checked McCloskey for that question, while Nixon was tied with Democratic presidential hopeful Senator Ed Muskie with 4%. In Group A, 66% approved
124

Zelizer, Seizing Power, 108-9.

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of Nixons Vietnam policy and 70% of those approvers liked his implementation. In Group B, only 35% approved of Nixons Vietnam policy and 63% of those approvers liked his implementation. In Group A, 49% wanted black Massachusetts Senator Ed Brooke to be the vice presidential candidate, 17% preferred Rockefeller, and only 4% supported the current Vice President, Spiro Agnew (who tied with Reagan and Treasury Secretary John Connally, then a registered Democrat). In Group B, 59% wanted Brooke and 18% favored Rockefeller; no other figure garnered more than 2% support.125 This poll showed three things: (1) Nixon was going to cruise to the nomination; (2) those who were adamantly against the war disliked Nixon and were attracted to McCloskey; and (3) moderates overwhelmingly wanted Agnew replaced, and Brooke was the most favored replacement. McCloskeys short-lived presidential campaign in New Hampshirethe first state to vote in the primary processreceived favorable attention from Ripon. At least one Ripon officer, Mike Brewer, the Chairman of the National Governing Board, resigned from Ripon in order to go work on McCloskeys campaign in June 1971.126 Congressman Pete McCloskeys Presidential primary campaign and Republican youth drive has overcome its immediate financial crisis, the Forum reported enthusiastically in October 1971, plowed through the blizzard of its own unfortunate press releases, and laid the groundwork for a breakthrough in New Hampshire when the real snow falls this winter.127 In March 1971, the Forum regret[ted] Congressman McCloskeys decision to drop out of active contention in the presidential primaries after losing New Hampshire to Nixon by nearly 50 points.

125 126

Ripon Poll Results, Ripon Forum, 8:9 (May 1972), 18-9. Michael F. Brewer to Charles Percy, 14 June 1971, Ripon Papers: Box 14. 127 McCloskey Focuses on New Hampshire, Ripon Forum, 7:14 (15 October 1971), 1.

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The article offered him praise for his stances on Vietnam and truth in government.128 Ripon never endorsed McCloskey outright and did not believe he would or could win, but it was clear that the society viewed his campaign favorably for the light it shined on Vietnam. Despite Ripons efforts, a campaign to draft Brooke as a replacement for Agnew on the ticket went nowhere. Auspitz, a former president of the society, helped put together a write-in campaign for Brooke in New Hampshire, while Brooke maintained he only wanted to run for reelection to the Senate and asked the write-in campaign, according to the Forum, to cease and desist in their efforts in his behalf.129 John Mitchell, who resigned his position as Attorney General to run Nixons reelection campaign, ran a write-in campaign for Agnew in order to head off the efforts for Brooke. It worked: Agnew received 47,000 votes to Brookes 8,000.130 With Brookes non-candidacy effectively defeated, Riponers began to speculate loudly about John Connally, who had stepped down as Treasury Secretary in June to run the Democrats for Nixon effort. Writing in the July issue of the Forum, Tim Petri argued that Connally would be a greater asset than any other, would be a more effective Vice President, and was of Presidential calibre [sic].131 George Gilder noted, however, that Connally would function chiefly as a dramatic symbol of an ascendant strategy of Southern realignment, and in the northern industrial states and California a Nixon-Connally tandem might be successfully depicted as a ticket of big money Protestant hawks. Gilder warned that [i]n the atmosphere of ITT [Nixon political fundraising scandal] and the Bay of

128

McCloskeys Challenge, Ripon Forum, 8:6 (15 March 1972), 1; Past New Hampshire Primary Election Results, Primary: New Hampshire, http://www.primarynewhampshire.com/new-hampshireprimary-past-results.php. 129 Brooke V.P. Write-in Announced, Ripon Forum, 8:4 (15 February 1972), 4. 130 Agnew, Peabody Score in VP Races, Ripon Forum, 8:6 (15 March 1972), 3. 131 Thomas E. Petri, The Case for Connally, Ripon Forum, 8:13 (July 1972), 3.

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Pigs at the Watergate, such charges might even give McGovern some momentum.132 This argument was superfluous; Nixon chose to keep Agnew. Nixon was nominated on August 23, 1972, and Ripon duly endorsed him in their September issue of the Forum. Differences between the Ripon Society and the Nixon Administration during its first term of office have been frequent and severe, the editorial acknowledged. Nevertheless, the society still chose to endorse him: There is no doubt in our minds that the Nixon Administration could have fashioned a more positive record over the last four years particularly in the domestic sphere. But there is no doubt in our minds, either, that the Presidents statesmanship abroad and his goals for the new American Revolution can provide the foundations for a truly progressive second term. We therefore urge progressive Republicans to put aside their past differences with the Administration and to work for the Presidents re-election.133 In particular, the Ripon organization outside of the Administration deplored the perpetuation of the divisive war policy in Vietnam, the southern strategy, the conservative Supreme Court nominations, and the stance against busing to realize school integration.134 The endorsement, therefore, was controversial. At least one National Governing Board member, Ken Kaiserman, resigned from the society over the decision. In general, Riponers within the Nixon Administration believed the President accomplished a lot during his first term, while those outside the Administration were more wary of his record. But given the choice between the Democratic nominee, George McGovern, and Nixon, most of the society stuck with the President.

132 133

George Gilder, Connallys Phase III, Ripon Forum, 8:13 (July 1972), 7. Progressives and the President, Ripon Forum, 8:18 (September 1972), 3. 134 Ibid.

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Nixon destroyed McGovern, winning over 60% of the popular vote and 520 electoral votes to McGoverns 17 and the Libertarian candidates 1.135 As the Watergate scandal unraveled in 1973, however, Ripon found itself repudiating the President.

Watergate
In October 1973, the Ripon Society released its final book, Jaws of Victory: The Game-Plan Politics of 1972, the Crisis of the Republican Party, and the Future of the Constitution. The 357-page study of the 1972 election was written by Clifford W. Brown, Jr. in conjunction with several other academics and Ripon members. (Brown was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany.)136 It contained a whole chapter devoted to Watergate. On the surface it should not be surprising that anyone who looks at politics primarily in strategic terms should behave as the Watergate conspirators did, the chapter authors, Gregg Rushford and Brown, wrote. After all, if winning is the supreme strategic objective, then why should any tactic that contributes to winning not be desirable and permissible? The Watergate scandal was just one of the more spectacular examples of the new politics, of the new patterns of strategic politics that are beginning to prevail in modern America.137 The adversary process, which Brown, Bob Behn, and Lee Auspitz praised as the foundation of our constitutional order, fostered these excesses of strategic thinking.138 They argued that the answer to the problem was not to weaken the presidency, but rather to strengthen it, and Congress as well, in addition to clearly defining the separation of powers.

135 136

James R. Whitson, 1972, President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1972.html. Ripon Society and Clifford W. Brown, Jr., Jaws of Victory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), jacket flap. 137 Brown, Jaws of Victory, 90. 138 Ibid., 351.

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Brown, Behn, and Auspitz argued for a step backward, away from the inter- and intrainstitutional tensions created by the sharing of powers, and towards a more defined government with increased weight given to state and local governments, which would have to be improved upon to work effectively.139 The failure, according to Jaws of Victory, was a systemic one that did not just fall on the shoulders of Ehrlichman or Haldeman or Nixon himself, but on the type of politics Ripon had been arguing against for years. Since its founding, the Ripon Society had pleaded for leaders, who would lead the Republican Party and society as a whole forward based on intelligent, progressive ideas. Yes, they also sought to avoid the adoption by the GOP of an electoral strategy that exploited the anti-civil rights backlash in the South. But, Ripon wanted ideas to shape electoral politics, not politics to shape ideas. The Watergate scandal seemed to confirm that, despite their best efforts, politics had become all-consuming. Furthermore, it confirmed the suspicions of many within the society that Nixon could not be trusted. Ripon had called upon Nixon and his administration to tell the truth about Watergate as early as November 1, 1972. In an editorial note titled For an Open Presidency, the Forum argued that [p]ublic confidence in the President, in the federal government, and in the Republican Party demands that President Nixon personally direct his staff to disclose their involvement in the secret campaign activities.140 In April 1973, the Forum charged that it was not the Republican Party that was responsible for Watergate, but the New Majority Party, led by Nixon and Haldeman, that sought to place the President above either party and was responsible for the indifference to integrity that pervades

139 140

Ibid., 352-3. For an Open Presidency, Ripon Forum, 8:21 (1 November 1972), 4.

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official statements from the White House.141 The Forums critique continued throughout the year, with critical editorials or articles in June, July, August, and November.142 In the November article, Ripon President Ronald Speed suggested that [i]mpeachment proceedings may provide the only avenue by which President Nixon and the Congress can negotiate a working agreement to conduct the affairs of government in the coming months.143 Watergate hovered in the background throughout 1974, coloring Ripons coverage and commentary of nearly everything. The FORUM has deliberately not taken an editorial stand on the impeachment to urge Congress to decide once way or another, Dick Behn wrote in an August issue that was released six days after Nixons resignation. We have believed that it is inappropriate to tell representatives and senators how to vote.144 Watergate had the unfortunate consequence of overshadowing Nixons true achievements in both domestic and foreign policy, some of which occurred in his aborted second term. For instance, Nixon finally followed through on his 1968 and 1972 campaign pledge to end the draft by colluding with Congress to let it expire in 1973.145 None of these accomplishments, however, could save Nixon. On August 8, 1974, five years to the day after he announced his support for a negative income tax and revenue sharing before Congress, President Richard Nixon resigned.146

Editorial, Ripon Forum, 9:8 (15 April 1973), 2. Editorial, Ripon Forum, 9:11 (June 1973), 4; Tanya Melich, National Security, Ripon Forum, 9:14 (15 July 1973), 1; Robert G. Stewart, To Resign, Ripon Forum, 9:14 (15 July 1973), 4; Robert Donaldson, Or Not To, Ripon Forum, 9:14 (15 July 1973), 5; Robert Behn, White House and the Way of the Whigs, Ripon Forum, 9:15 (15 August 1973), 1-2; Ronald Speed, Impeachment, Ripon Forum, 9:20 (November 1973), 5. 143 Speed, Impeachment, Forum, 5. 144 Dick Behn, Law and Order, Ripon Forum, 10:16 (15 August 1974), 5. 145 Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, 234-5. 146 Richard Nixon, Resignation Address to the Nation, 8 August 1974, American Rhetoric, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixonresignationspeech.html.
142

141

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Ripons Decline Through the Ford Administration

For the Ripon Society, the Watergate period was one of organizational decline. Jaws of Victory was the last book that Ripon would publisha symbol of the end of Ripons institutional role as a moderate quasi-think tank. The society moved its headquarters to Washington in time for the September 1973 issue of the Forum, though their publishing arm did not come down to the nations capital until later that year.147 The move to D.C.first taken in spirit in 1969was now complete. Ripons officers were still diverse. In the May 1974 Ripon elections, John Cairns, who had signed the New York chapters repudiation of Gilders daycare editorial, was elected President, while Tanya Melich was elected Chairperson of the National Governing Board. Richard Rahn, who had been national Executive Director, D.C. chapter President, and national Managing Director and would be influential in promoting supply-side economics, was the new Finance Chair.148 More than a decade old, however, Ripon lacked the vigor of its youthful beginning and was integrated into the D.C. culture which it had pointedly spurned for so long. Riponers and Ripon allies were still represented in the Ford Administration, and the society as a whole viewed him as a true moderate; the society, which had viewed Nixon with such ambivalence, wholeheartedly embraced Ford. Nixon had appointed Bill Kilberg as Solicitor of the Department of Labor in 1973, and he remained there through the Ford Administration. Bobbie Kilberg, who had left the Nixon White House in 1971 after serving in the Office of the Staff Secretary and the Domestic Policy Council, returned as Associate
The September issue is the first to locate the society headquarters in D.C. and issues later in the year switch back and forth between locating the Forum in Cambridge and D.C. 148 Ripon Society, Ripon Election Announcements, May 1974, Tanya Melich Papers, University Libraries, University at Albany, State University of New York, Series V: Box 6: Folder 2; Steve Livengood, Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice, 1 and 29 March 2009.
147

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Counsel to President Ford.149 Peter Wallison, who had served on the Council on Executive Organization, became Counsel to the new Vice President, Nelson Rockefeller.150 Ford appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, eventually making him Chief of Staff and then Secretary of Defense. Yet, many had left. Elliot Richardson resigned as Attorney General when Nixon ordered him to fire the prosecutor who was investigating Watergate (Ford would bring him back as Commerce Secretary in 1976). George Romney left the Cabinet at the beginning of Nixons second term and John Volpe left his post as Transportation Secretary in 1973 to become Ambassador to Italy. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Democratic ally of Ripon, had also taken an ambassadorship, this one in India, in 1973. John Price took over the Urban Affairs Council after Moynihan left. Chris DeMuth had left the UAC to attend law school in 1970; Tim Petri also departed the same year from his position as the Director of Crime Studies on the Council on Effective Organization.151 Lee Huebner, who had risen to second in command on the speechwriting staff, left in January 1974.152 The Ripon Society was in a state of decline and drift. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 brought some Riponers into power, but it also made Ripons criticism of Nixon and the party look disloyal. Expansion combined with a new generation of officers crippled the ad hoc system of governance and production which had worked so well during the societys first five years. The apparent solution to this problemmoving Ripon headquarters to D.C.only exacerbated Ripons problems by placing the organization within the community it had always criticized. Changing times and changing issues exposed Ripons
149 150

William J. Kilberg P.C., Gibson Dunn. Peter Wallison, Interview with University of Virginias Miller Center of Public Affairs, 28-9 October 2003, Ronald Reagan Oral History Project, 5. 151 American Enterprise Institute, Chris DeMuth, Scholars & Fellows, http://www.aei.org/scholar/11. 152 Huebner interview with Kabaservice.

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fragile unity, and a president who was neither conservative nor moderate, Richard Nixon, trapped Ripon in a state of inertia with no movement leader to support and no outright villain to oppose.

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CHAPTER THREE

Old Age and Rebirth, 1975-1982 Organizational Drift, Reagan, and Supply Side Economics
In the latter half of the 1970s, the Ripon Society drifted along, a shell of the organization it was in 1969, until a man named Rick Kessler came along in 1981 and began to transform the society. The societys continued decline was a result of chronic problems: clipped, ineffective leadership; lack of an operating vision and institutional role; and the divisions exposed by the rise of feminist politics and issues. The support of many Riponers for John Andersons unrealistic independent campaign in 1980 was, in retrospect, a fitting coda. At the same time, however, the new movement championing supply-side economics had captured the imagination and talents of a few Riponers and indirectly extended the societys influence. Furthermore, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, New York Representative Jack Kemp promoted self-empowerment proposals, which closely reflected Ripon ideas from the 1960s. After Rick Kessler took over the societys presidency and Representative Jim Leach was elected Chairman, Ripon moved decisively in a new direction, appealing to lobbyists for financial support in exchange for a new program of conferences and networking events. By the end of 1982, it was clear that the Ripon Society had entered a new phase.

1976 Election
For the second presidential election in a row, Ripon found itself fighting a battle of procedures with the Republican Party. At the 1972 Republican convention in Miami, a resolution was passed to explore ways to increase the number of youth, women, and 89

minority delegates at future conventions. The Rule 29 Committee, named after the resolution (Rule 29(b)) was chaired by Representative Bill Steiger of Wisconsin, who was important for the passage of OSHA and would be integral to the reduction of the capital gains tax in 1978. Meeting from 1973-4, the committee encouraged states to actively seek more representation in their delegations of women, minorities, ethnic groups, young people, and senior citizens, but there was to be no quota system and proposals were not to be binding on state parties.1 The Rule 29 Committee was more a fight over women in the party than minorities, reflecting a general change in focus in the 1970s from civil rights to feminist issues. Tanya Melich lobbied RNC members to vote for the committees proposals.2 When the RNC nixed the part of the committees report that would have obliged the state parties to file reports outlining their positive actions and called upon the RNC to review and comment on them, Ripon women reacted angrily.3 Bobbie Kilberg, a member of the National Womens Political Caucus, said at the time that the RNC managed to emasculate whatever little was left of compromise in the proposal.4 In his 1973 book Sexual Suicide, George Gilder charged that the feminist movement, which had found a partial home in Ripon, was a betrayal of the civil rights movement.5 But Gilders view of betrayal was atypical, and it is clear that Ripon largely embraced Republican feminist politics. Meanwhile, the society was still suing the RNC, claiming the allocation of bonus delegates was unconstitutional. Ripon claimed that the 1976 Formula overweights the West and South at the expense of the North, calling the allocation plan a form of invidious

1 2

Huckshorn and Bibby, National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republican Party, 659. Tanya Melich to Richard Rosenbaum, 25 February 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series V: Box 6: Folder 3. 3 Huckshorn and Bibby, National Party Rules and Delegate Selection in the Republican Party, 659; 4 Lou Cannon, GOP Right Dilutes Minority Appeal Program, Washington Post, 7 March 1975, A5. 5 George F. Gilder, Sexual Suicide (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), v.

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discrimination against millions of Republicans to preserve their power to dictate the result of the 1976 Convention. Therefore, judicial intervention [is] essential.6 In hearings on the Rule 29 Committee proposals, former Ripon president Lee Auspitz testified on Democratic attempts to force voters to register as either a Democrat or Republican, which would have been a boon for the Democrats in the post-Watergate era. In response to a comment Auspitz made about fears of state party leadership that an increase in Republican strength will upset control of party machinery, former RNC Chairman Ray Bliss, who had gotten along well with the society in the 1960s, replied that such bad publicity statements had always irritated him about Ripon.7 Even ostensible Ripon sympathizers had had enough of Ripons crusade against the party. It is one thing to criticize party policies and electoral strategy; it is another to challenge the infrastructure itself. My feeling was that it was a mistake to have committed so much of Ripons energies toward the delegate suit, said Steve Livengood, who was Ripon Executive Director from 1976 to 1980. Livengood continued: The delegate suit was the wrong tactic, because it offended everybody. It was an assertion of judicial power. It offended the whole Republican establishment and gave us a bad name. We had no power base. And that was the whole problem all the way along: these were people from Harvard looking down on America.8 Livengood was from Kansas and when he was a graduate student in history at Emory University in Atlanta, he wrote for the Forum, before coming to D.C.9 Ripon was now part of the D.C. scene, but the GOP establishment still viewed the group as a collection of outsiders. No longer were they the successful little juvenile delinquents of early 1970; now they were a dysfunctional and disorganized thorn in the side of the Republican Party.
6 7

The Ripon Suit, Ripon Forum, 9:21 (15 November 1973), 1. Rule 29, Ripon Forum, 10:11 (1 June 1974), 2. 8 Livengood interview with Kabaservice. 9 Ibid.

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Throughout 1975, the Forum, under the editorship of Dick Behn, was obsessed with the threat of a primary challenge against President Ford by Ronald Reagan. Behn dismissed Reagan as wishy washy, characterizing him as reluctant to take responsibility for conservatives criticisms of President Ford, yet still eager for attention.10 In August 1975, Behn claimed that Hurricane Ronnie is being quickly downgraded in its storm status.11 Yet, the Forum followed Reagan and his supporters with avid attention throughout the year, suggesting that he might run on a third-party ticket with segregationist George Wallace of Alabama, and taking every opportunity to argue that Ford, as the sitting president, was a stronger candidate.12 In a meek admission that a Reagan primary challenge might be more than a pipedream, Behn suggested that perhaps the challenge of a vigorous primary campaign is what the emaciated GOP needs.13 The Republican Party got a primary campaign whether or not it needed one. Reagan joined the race, and despite the natural advantage Ford enjoyed as the incumbent, Reagans candidacy was not a fantasy. Reagan should have won New Hampshire, the first primary in the nation, according to the historian Sean Wilentz. It was the most conservative of the New England states, and its elections often turned on intensely personal, small-town campaigning.14 Dick Behn agreed, writing in the October 1975 Forum that New Hampshire is a snake pit for President Ford.15 But Reagan had slipped up in the fall, when he revealed a plan to cut federal spending by $90 billion, balance the budget, and cut personal income taxes to an average of 23 percentall by transferring authority from the

10 11

Dick Behn, Wheres Ronald Reagans Horse, Ripon Forum, 11:6 (15 March 1975), 1. Dick Behn, The Callaway Connection, Ripon Forum, 11:16 (15 August 1975), 1. 12 Duly Noted: Reagan, Ripon Forum, 11:1 (1 January 1975), 3. 13 Dick Behn, Ford Versus Reagan: See Them in New Hampshire, Ripon Forum, 11:8 (15 April 1975), 2. 14 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 65. 15 Dick Behn, Campaign Strategy in the Snake Pit, Ripon Forum, 11:20 (15 October 1975), 1.

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federal government to the states.16 In December 1975, Behn predicted that Reagans proposal was bound to spark endless controversy.17 In fact, Reagans plan was repudiated by both the president of the New Hampshire state Senate and the speaker of the state House of RepresentativesNew Hampshires citizens enjoyed no state income tax, something which was certain to change if a proposal like Reagans was ever enacted.18 On January 27, Ford won New Hampshire, but barely. Ripon described the result as the absence of disaster, not the presence of victory for both campaignsno one won, but no one lost either. Despite the technical victory for Ford, the Forum sounded a despondent notethe Supreme Court had just rejected the societys petition to hear an appeal on the delegate apportionment suit, which earlier had been rebuffed by the Court of Appeals for D.C. They saw the approaching primariesweighted so that smaller, more conservative states received more delegates than if the allocation was based purely on populationas a stacked deck for Reagan.19 Throughout the campaign, the President found himself trying to appease the partys conservative winga strategy of accommodation according to Ripon.20 President Fords theology these days sounds unrefreshingly like Reagans, Dick Behn wrote in January 1976. His comments on government spending, abortion, school prayer, busing, and economic policy seem to place Ford and Reagan uncomfortably in the same pew.21 And by March, Ford was backpedaling on foreign policy as well, announcing on the stump that We are going to forget the use of the word dtente.22
16 17

Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 65. Dick Behn, Will Peking Play in Peoria? Ripon Forum, 11:23 (1 December 1975), 1. 18 Dick Behn, The $90 Billion Man Story, Ripon Forum, 12:2 (15 January 1976), 1. 19 New Hampshire and the Constitution, Ripon Forum, 12:5 (1 March 1976), 1. 20 Politics: The Presidency, Ripon Forum, 11:21 (1 September 1975), 5. 21 Dick Behn, The Presidential Pulpit, Ripon Forum, 12:4 (15 January 1976), 4. 22 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 64.

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But the next big contest, the March 9th Florida primary, showed that Fords strategy of positioning himself to the right might have been a wrong move, at least on domestic policy. Reagan campaigned in the Sunshine State on overhauling Social Security, a position that did not resonate at all with Floridas numerous elderly voters. Ford, who condemned Reagans plan as foolish and risky, won.23 The Forum argued that this demonstrated the bankruptcy of Howard Bo Callaways strategy of preempting the nomination by undermining Reagans conservative support.24 The magnitude of Reagans defeat in New Hampshire and Florida, as well as Massachusetts and Vermont on March 2 and Illinois on March 16, was large. Pundits speculated that he would have to drop out, the historian Julian Zelizer has noted. By March, most of Reagans staff was working without pay.25 Reagan was losing primaries in which the focus was on domestic issues. The moderate tack of Nixon and Fords domestic policies was not enough of a sticking point with the Republican electorate. In North Carolina, however, Reagan ran on the Panama Canal. President Ford was negotiating a treaty with the Panamanians to give the American-financed canal to the country in which it resided. Reagan famously told campaign crowds that We bought it. We paid for it, and General Torrijos should be told we are going to keep it.26 Reagan went on to win North Carolina on March 23, and started a comeback that led all the way to the convention in Kansas City. Along the way, Ford continued his shift to the right on foreign policy issues, and managed to win the nomination, but only by 117 votes out of 2,257.

23 24

Ibid., 66. Politics: The Presidency, Ripon Forum, 12:6 (15 March 1976), 3. 25 Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, 267. 26 Ibid., 268.

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Reagans announcement of moderate Pennsylvania Senator Richard Schweiker as his running mate upset many conservatives and contributed to Fords victory.27 Ford was able to mollify some conservatives by naming a former Congressman from Kansas and RNC Chairman, Bob Dole, as his running mate. Dole did not fit Ripons call for a progressive republican who can attract northern Democratic and independent voters. Ironically, the Forum said that Schweiker fit the mold perfectly, but he had signed on to Reagan before the convention.28 Throughout the summer, some within the GOP suggested that Ford pick former Texas Governor and Nixon Treasury Secretary John Connally. The Forum argued against Connally, saying he was too conservative and too close to the publicly despised Richard Nixon.29 The officers of the D.C. chapter of the society, however, wrote to President Ford in support of Connally.30 The society was split on the idea of a conservative Vice President. Where was Nelson Rockefeller through all of this? After withdrawing himself from the reelection race on Fords behest in November 1975, he essentially played no part in the campaign. After the announcement of his withdrawal, the Forum praised him and expressed disappointment that he would not serve in President Fords potential second term.31 Yet, Dick Behn criticized Rockefeller two months later. For too long, Rockefeller has held tenaciously onto his position as pastor emeritus of the progressive flock, preventing more committed, less divisive politicians from rallying progressive enthusiasm, Behn wrote. For a decade and a half, Rockefeller has told the progressive congregation that they needed him, while doing little to organize the congregation, preach new homilies, or attract new
27 28

Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy, 267-70; Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 66-8. Ford, Si; Connally, No, Ripon Forum, 12:15 (1 August 1976), 2. 29 Ibid, 1. 30 Waring Patridge, Steven Saunders, and Kathleen McDonald to Gerald Ford, 11 August 1976, White House Central Files Name File, Box 2665, Ripon Society, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 31 Editorial Points: The Administration and the City, Ripon Forum, 11:22 (15 November 1975), 1.

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converts.32 The Ripon Society and the moderate Republican movement were experiencing similar dilemmas: without strong, focused, and determined leadership, they were floundering in the wilderness without direction, identified purpose, or organizational means. Yet, the society did not think that the greater progressive Republican movement was dead. And, as Reagan discovered in the New Hampshire and Florida primaries, Republicans had yet to move decisively in favor of conservative domestic policies. It was on foreign issues that Reagan did well. Ripon, however, was overconfident in moderate Republicanisms prospects. The nomination of Ronald Reagan was the conservatives improbable dream for 1976, the Forum claimed after the Kansas City convention. Looking backward in 1980, conservatives may wonder how they came so close.33 But, Reagans victory over President Carter in 1980 would make this analysis look silly.

Organizational Decline
From the mid-1970s until the early 1980s, the Ripon Society was an organizational muddle. The last significant Ripon publication was The Jaws of Victory in 1973, and in September 1974 the society stopped publishing the Forum in typeset, presumably for financial reasons. Ripon never had solid financial footing, but the mid-70s saw the disappearance of any steady funding. Even the Whitney family of the Whitney Communications Corporation, which owned the New York Herald Tribune before it folded and the International Herald Tribune, gave less (though Jock Whitney did give $4000 to the New York chapter in 1975).34 The Whitneys group of donors also was not giving like they

32 33

Dick Behn, The Presidential Pulpit, Forum, 4. Where Do Conservatives Go From Here? Ripon Forum, 12:17 (1 September 1976), 1. 34 Lewis Bart Stone to John Hay Whitney, 21 February 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series 5: Box 6: Folder 9.

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used to. In January 1975, the society had to take out a $17,000 loan to pay its debts, and by March, the societys budget had been reduced by 40%.35 It appears that at least three times in the 1970s, Ripon held auctions in order to raise money. The auction items included a drawing by Elliot Richardson and a pen signed by President Ford.36 In order to alleviate their money problems and help to redefine the societys mission, charter member Gene Marans had the idea to establish a Political Action Committee (called the New Leadership Fund) and an educational operation that would qualify for tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status (called the Ripon Educational Fund), thus enabling the organization to accept double donations and also support moderate candidates in a visible way. But the fundraising was a disaster. You know, moderates give moderately, Livengood explained. A fundraising firm run by Democrats and hired by the society did not come through. I think their lists were wrong, the message was wrong, it was utterly uncoordinated, Livengood said, and as far as I was concerned they were utterly incompetent.37 The Ripon office at 1609 Connecticut Avenue in D.C. was across the hall from an outcall service, according to Livengood, who was one of the societys Executive Directors in the late 1970s. They would sometimes use it as an incall service and put the mattresses in the hallway, Livengood recalled.38 (It just so happens that the author actually spent last summer working at 1609 Connecticut Ave. There was no outcall service by 2009.) The society lacked sustained, coherent leadership, as numerous officers and directors came and went, some of them incompetent. No one knew what they were doing, and the office
35

Josie Cuevas to National Executive Committee, 30 January 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series 5: Box 6: Folder 3; Richard W. Rahn to William A. M. Burden, 6 March 1975, Ripon Papers, Box 23. 36 Jeannette Smyth, A Famous Doodle and Some Guffaws, Washington Post, 25 October 1973, E1; Ripon Reception and political auction at the home of Teresa and John Heinz III, 12 May 1975, Ford Papers; Gwen A. Anderson to Susan Whitten, 27 May 1976, Ford Papers. 37 Livengood interview with Kabaservice. 38 Ibid.

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operations were completely inefficient, so the whole thing was coming apart, Livengood recalled.39 When John Topping took over as President in 1978 (he left early in 1980), the society turned around somewhat. Topping moved Ripon into his law office, which had much nicer accommodations, and restored the Forum to a typeset format, even adding color covers and black-and-white photographs.40 But, Ripon had changed permanently. A New York Times article on the New Leadership Fund in the spring of 1977 ended with an apt summary: The program represents a new departure for the society, the 2,500 members of which, in 14 chapters, have been largely devoted in the past to research and issue analysis from the progressive Republican point of view but are now venturing into more direct political action.41 The number of members was greatly inflated and in fact probably corresponded to the number of subscribers to the Forum. The society was almost completely D.C.-based by the time of Jimmy Carters inauguration. In April 1975, the Los Angeles and Seattle Ripon chapters were defunct, and four more were decaying.42 With a greater emphasis on the inside-thebeltway political scene, Ripon chapters were less and less needed or relevant to the organization. The D.C. chapter and the national organization were almost synonymous, Steve Livengood remembered.43 Since 1973, Ripon had been floundering. The New Leadership Fund and the Ripon Educational Fund, though lacking in money, at least gave the organization some direction during the Carter years. Overall, Ripons problems reflected the general state of moderate Republicanism: down, but not defeated.
39 40

Ibid. Livengood interview with Kabaservice; Ripon Forum, 15 (1979). 41 Warren Weaver, Jr., G.O.P. Liberal Group Opens a Fund Drive, New York Times, 1 April 1977, 13. 42 Ripon Society, Minutes of National Executive Committee Meeting, 18 April 1975, Tanya Melich Papers, Series 5: Box 6: Folder 4. 43 Livengood interview with Kabaservice.

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Supply-Side and the 1978 Capital Gains Tax Cut

One of the most interesting accomplishments associated with Riponers was not directly connected to the society itself. The Investment Incentive Act of 1978 was championed on Capitol Hill by Congressman Bill Steiger of Wisconsinso much so, in fact, that it became known as the Steiger Amendment. Steiger, who had come into close contact with Ripon through his chairmanship of the Rule 29 Committee, argued that the capital gains tax should be halved in order to encourage greater business investment and thereby boost the economy. His pushing, along with significant lobbying from extra-governmental groups, resulted in a reduction from 49% to 28% in the capital gains tax as part of the Revenue Act of 1978.44 A Ripon favorite, Steiger died suddenly from a heart attack in December 1978, a month after the bill passed. Tim Petri, a founding Riponer and the societys first Executive Director, succeeded Steiger and still holds his seat today.45 (Petri represents Wisconsins 6th District, which includes the town of Ripon.)46 In the January 1979 Forum, Ripon saluted Steiger, saying he did the seemingly impossible, he routed the Carter Administration to achieve changes in the tax law to encourage investment and entrepreneurship.47 The capital gains tax reduction is often cited as the first victory for proponents of supply-side economics. Although Arthur Laffer claims that the theory has roots in the works of earlier economic theorists as far back as the 14th century Ibn Khaldun, the supplyside movement can safely be said to date to when Laffer drew his famous curve for then44

Geoffrey Kabaservice, William Steiger: Supply-Side and Conscience, FrumForum, 17 March 2009, http://www.frumforum.com/william-steiger-supply-side-and-conscience. 45 Citizens for Petri to Dear Friends, 16 January 1979, Walter Thayer Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Series 2: Box 4: Folder 9; Walter Thayer to ?, 18 January 1979, Thayer Papers, Series 2: Box 4: Folder 9; Petri Survives Labor Blitz to Hold Steiger Seat, Ripon Forum, 15:4 (May 1979), 15. 46 Thomas E. Petri, Interview with author, 19 November 2009. 47 William A. Steiger, Ripon Forum, 15:1 (January 1979), 2.

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Deputy Chief of Staff Dick Cheney (and not Donald Rumsfeld as was inaccurately reported for decades).48 Laffer was the ideological father of supply-side. After receiving his undergraduate degree in economics from Yale, Laffer got his MBA from Stanford. Then the Dean of the Faculty at the University of Chicago, George Shultz, brought Laffer to Chicago to teach economics in the shadow of conservative economist Milton Friedman. When President Nixon appointed Shultz the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Shultz brought Laffer along as the offices chief economist.49 In 1974, when Laffer met with Cheney, supply-side was still in its infancy. Laffer apparently liked to draw his curve on napkinsa former Riponer named Richard Rahn has a napkin on which Laffer drew a copy of his curve in 1976.50 Rahn had been President of the Ripon chapter in D.C. and was the societys Finance Chair and Executive Director in the early 1970s. In 1978, Rahn, who had a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University, was the Executive Director of the American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF).51 He and his deputy, Mark Bloomfield, another Riponer, worked closely with Ed Zschau of the American Electronics Association (AEA) in lobbying Congress for the reduction in capital gains tax.52 (Zschau is currently a Professor at Princeton University). In 1973, Rahn met Congressman Jack Kemp, who would become a prime supporter of supply-side in Congress. Through ACCF, Rahn met Laffer and the two split dutiesLaffer formulated a supply-side theoretical model and Rahn handled

48

Arthur Laffer, The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future, Heritage Foundation, 1 June 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/06/The-Laffer-Curve-Past-Present-and-Future; Jude Wanniski, Yorktown Patriot, 14 June 2005, http://www.yorktownpatriot.com/printer_78.shtml. 49 Blumenthal, Counter-Establishment, 160-1. 50 Richard Rahn, e-mail message to author, 18 March 2010. 51 Richard Rahn, Interview with author, 8 September 2009. 52 Ed Zschau, Interview with author, 23 February 2010.

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fundraising for the lobbying organization.53 Steve Livengood accurately characterized Rahn as Mr. Supply-Side.54 A 1980 study by Henry C. Kenski of the University of Arizona showed that the Revenue Act of 1978 was supported by a broad coalition of moderate and conservative Democrats uniting with Republicans.55 Nevertheless, Rahn argued that the capital gains tax cut probably would never have happened if it hadnt been for the existence of Ripon.56 Not only was there a confluence of Ripon talent that helped elevate supply-side theory and lobby for its implementation (George Gilder, in addition to Rahn and Bloomfield, played a big role after 1978), but there was arguably a connection between supply-side and Ripons earlier support of a negative income tax and other proposals, which were based on incentives. Chris DeMuth, who worked for Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Nixon White House and had a hand in drafting Nixons negative income tax proposal, said that the negative income tax led us to think a lot about incentives, and incentives at the margin. DeMuth conceded that there was a distinctly political component to supply side economics that had nothing to do with any Ripon heritage, and it was a little bit different from just the marginal effects on supply and demand. So I can imagine people saying, Oh, God, 78, you know, Ripon didnt have anything to do with it, but it actually did. There was a core idea there that grew off in some other directions in response to the [economic conditions] of the time [1978].57 Since 1973, the country had endured stagflation, the painful combination of a stagnant economy and high inflation.58 In November 1978, when Congress passed the Revenue Act,

53 54

Rahn interview with author. Livengood interview with Kabaservice. 55 Henry C. Kenski, Partisanship and Ideology in the Revenue Act of 1978, Policy Studies Journal, 9:1 (Autumn 1980), 80. 56 Rahn interview with author. 57 DeMuth interview with author. 58 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 35.

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the one-month inflation rate was 7.82%.59 Support for a new approach that highlighted incentives was higher as a result of the economy. Not all Riponers agree with DeMuths assessment of supply-sides genetic relationship to the negative income tax and other Ripon proposals, and it would be presumptive without further inquiry to claim that most agreed. Patricia Goldman said that she did not see a real connection between Ripons policy work in the late 1960s and early 1970s and supply-side. I think that came out of Richard [Rahn], she said.60 Mike Brewer said that supply-side was not inconsistent with Ripons policies, because it goes back to how you structure your incentives. Yet he saw a difference between the micro incentivizing approach of a negative income tax and the macro approach of supply-side: The micro side of it is, if you have a choice between a government program with a top-down bureaucracy in Washington and all that, or can you use the tax code to incentivize people to behave in a certain way. And theres ultimately a war between the supply-side and that because the supply-siders would say no, dont micro manage the tax code. The supply side people would say you have to minimize the adverse consequences of taxes by having the broadest possible base and the lowest possible rates.61 A broad comparison of the negative income tax and supply-side results in many similarities, but a more in-depth investigation reveals conceptual differences. They share a focus on incentives, but do so at different levels of the economy. It is consistent, therefore, for some Riponers to have supported both a negative income tax and supply-side, while others embraced only the former. The Ripon Society was not directly associated with the capital gains tax cut; it did not have an official role in developing the legislation or pushing it through. But at this point in

59

Federal Reserve Bank of Dalls, Trimmed Mean PCE Inflation Rates, http://www.dallasfed.org/data/data/pcetrim.tab.htm. 60 Goldman interview with author. 61 Brewer interview with author.

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Ripons history, the society was not contributing much real substance to the policy debate. Riponers Richard Rahn and Mark Bloomfield and Ripon ally Bill Steiger took an idea that was well within the confines of what the Ripon of the late 1960s would have supported and vigorously lobbied for it. In February 1979, the Forum praised Rahn and Bloomfield, claiming that Bloomfield co-wrote the Steiger Amendment with Steiger himself and that Ripon again defied the political oddsmakers by helping secure a rollback of capital gains taxes.62 Whether the tax cut would have happened without Ripon is eminently debatable. What is not is that some Riponers were closely involved with the cut and that it was wholly consistent and justifiable for Rahn and Bloomfield, as Riponers, to support the cut, at least in their own eyes.

Jack Kemp and Empowerment

One of the earliest Congressional supporters of supply-side was New York Representative and former professional football star, Jack Kemp. But, Kemp did not limit himself to arguing for a broad-based cut in income taxes. Concerned by urban poverty, he sought to target the power of incentives on revitalizing the nations cities. The public sector can help by providing a tax and regulatory climate that is more favorable to business creation and expansion in the citiesa climate that eases investors fears and somewhat smooths [sic] the federal, state, and local regulatory obstacle course, Kemp wrote in 1979. It also requires efforts to ease the tax burden on income from job-creating investments.63 Kemp did not want to get rid of the social safety net, but instead incentivize people to rise out of it. [W]e must draw people out of the net by expanding attractive opportunities in the
62 63

Ripon Annual Report for 1978, Ripon Forum, 15:2 (February 1979), 5. Jack Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 94.

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private sector, Kemp argued. A vibrant economy can afford to leave the safety net in place and at the same time ensure that the net is as empty as possible.64 In the early 1980s, Kemp ran with the idea, cosponsoring the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act with Democratic Representative Robert Garcia, also from New York. The bill would allow federal and state governments to designate a city or area as an enterprise zone, with the citys permission, if it was significantly poorer than the national average on appropriate indexes (unemployment, etc.). Businesses and employees in the zone would receive tax credits in some instances and lower tax rates in others.65 Kemps enterprise zone idea closely resembles Ripons contract work for Governor Volpe in 1967 and the Urban Papers of 1968. In both of those instances, the society argued for tax credits, among other things, as a means of creating the conditions for self-help in poverty-stricken urban areas. Now, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, selfidentified conservative Republicans picked up the empowerment idea and combined it with supply-side, creating a formidable and coherent economic program for the nation. These domestic policy proposals had clear roots in moderate Republicanism and the Ripon Society in particular.

1980 Election
Supply-side economics, nourished with the help of Riponers, found a home in the 1980 presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan. Arthur Laffer and Jack Kemp, along with Laffer associate Jude Wanniski, convinced Reagan of the theorys merits.66 Yet, despite his acceptance of a theory that the contemporary Ripon Society seemed to endorse, the society
64 65

Ibid., 79. Main Provisions of the Kemp-Garcia Bill, Congressional Digest, 1 March 1982, 72-75 and 96. 66 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 121.

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was not sold on Reagan, who had been a symbol of the conservative wing of the party for too long and was Fords rival for the nomination in 1976. Throughout 1979, the Forum focused its attention on three Republican candidates: Reagan, John Connally, and John Anderson, a Congressman from Illinois. Three feature articles in the October, November, and December issues of the Forum reflect how Ripon viewed the primary election. In October, an article explored the nascent stage of Reagans candidacy.67 In November, the Forum featured Connally and his focus on Middle Eastern policy.68 Decembers issue included an article titled John Anderson: A Dark Horse Who Could Pull Off The Upset of The Century. The article, which was given more prominence than the other two with its earlier page placement, was unsigned, giving it the stamp of the Ripon as a whole, while the others had named authors.69 By December 1979, Anderson was the favorite candidate of the Ripon Society. Earlier in the year, it appeared to Ripon that the fight would be between Reagan and Connally, but the emergence of Anderson as a possible candidate grabbed the societys attention. In the spring of 1979, the Forum reported that [i]n the last two months the star of the Republican presidential stage has been Texan John Connally, whom they described as a spicy blend of constitutional radicalism, macho politics and chutzpah.70 In the same issue, the society argued that Reagan was losing conservative support to Congressman Philip Crane of Illinois, just one of multiple increasing signs of vulnerability.71 Connally and Reagan were the two standouts. Yet, as early as February 1979, the society had its eye on
67

Bumper Gammon and E. Scott Royce, Ronald Reagan: Leading Man or Final Act? Ripon Forum, 15:7 (October 1979), 13-4. 68 John C. Topping, Jr., John Connallys Big Political Gamble: A New U.S. Policy for the Middle East, Ripon Forum, 15:8 (November 1979), 6-7. 69 John B. Anderson: A Dark Horse Who Could Pull Off The Upset of The Century, Ripon Forum, 15:9 (December 1979), 4-5. 70 Washington, Lincoln, FDR and Connally? Ripon Forum, 15:3 (March/April 1979), 4. 71 Reagan Lead Dwindling, Ripon Forum, 15:3 (March/April 1979), 7.

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Anderson, a moderate as opposed to the movement conservative Reagan and the quixotic Connally. In that months issue of the Forum, Anderson wrote an article that extolled the type of pragmatic, moderate Republicanism that Ripon had advocated since its founding. Proclaiming the patent inadequacy of traditional Democratic remedies, he called for Republicans to present forward-looking approaches in education, health, civil rights, rebuilding our cities, reforming civil service and welfare, and streamlining our defense budget.72 Although the Forum covered other candidates, Anderson received most of its attention over the summer. The lead editorial in the July/August issue argued that only three men had the potential to head off what looked like a formidable candidacy by Ted Kennedy, who was well-positioned to challenge President Carter for the Democratic nomination the next year: Anderson, Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh, and Illinois Governor James Thompson. And, the society noted, only Anderson seems determined to press his candidacy.73 In that same issue, three Riponers wrote articles promoting the primary candidacies of Anderson, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee, and George Bush, who had held a plethora of governmental positions.74 Yet, the article supporting Anderson was written by John Topping, then the national President of Ripon. The Ripon leadership was already leaning towards Anderson. As 1980 began, Riponers were spread out among the various Republican contenders campaigns. Bill Weld was chairman of Cranes Massachusetts campaign; Ted Vlamis was working for the Dole effort in Iowa; founding member Doug Bailey was high up in the
72 73

John B. Anderson, The Future of the GOP, Ripon Forum, 15:2 (February 1979), 24. The Kennedy Factor, Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August 1979), 6. 74 John C. Topping, John B. Anderson for President, Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August 1979), 11-2; William Ehrig, Howard Baker for President, Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August 1979), 12-3; and Kathleen McDonald, George Bush for President, Ripon Forum, 15:6 (July/August), 14.

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Baker camp; August Fromuth led Connallys New Hampshire campaign; John McClaughry was a speechwriter on the Reagan campaign; Bush had the services of Dick Salvatierra, the national Vice President, and Sandy Thompson, who had been a Managing Director.75 Bill and Bobbie Kilberg also served on Bushs finance committee.76 But Anderson employed the most Riponers, at least twenty in some capacity or another, including Topping and former Ripon President Howard Gillette, as well as other former officers.77 In general, the society thought Reagan was not very substantive while Anderson was very cerebral and very issue oriented, according to Peter Baugher, who was chair of the New Haven Ripon chapter while at Yale Law School in the early 1970s and chairman of the National Governing Board in the latter part of the decade. Baugher and his wife were closely involved in Andersons Illinois effort.78 Topping even resigned his position as Ripon president in order to concentrate on the Anderson campaign.79 Topping, however, left the campaign in April and returned to Ripon as editor of the Forum. Soon after Topping departed the Anderson campaign, it became clear that Reagan would be the GOP nominee, and Anderson decided to run an independent campaign.80 Several Riponers, including Topping, Livengood, and Tanya Melich, went to the GOP convention in Detroit in July, where Livengood and a few others helped a dismal effort, which failed, to rally support for Anderson despite his status as an independent candidate actively campaigning against the Republican ticket.81 After flirting

75 76

Ripon RoundUp, Ripon Forum, 16:1 (January 1980), 6; McClaughry interview with Kabaservice. Bill Kilberg, e-mail message to author, 23 March 2010. 77 Ripon RoundUp, Ripon Forum, 16:1 (January 1980), 6. 78 Peter Baugher, Interview with author, 1 April 2010. 79 Ripon RoundUp, Ripon Forum, 16:3 (March/April 1980), 11; John C. Topping, Jr., A Word from the Editor, Ripon Forum, 16:4 (May/June/July 1980), 2. 80 Frank Smallwood, The Other Candidates: Third Parties in Presidential Elections (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983), 226. 81 Livengood interview with Kabaservice.

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with the idea of a co-presidency with Gerald Ford, Reagan chose George Bush, who had been the favorite of the GOP establishment, as his running mate.82 Under Toppings editorship, the Forum predicted that Carter would finish third behind Reagan and Anderson. An editorial even suggested that Carter should not be invited to presidential debates because his inclusion could deflect voters attention from the more serious candidates.83 This was a bold statementCarter may have been doing badly in the polls, but he was still the incumbent President. Reagan wanted to include Anderson in the presidential debates, but Carter would not agree to that arrangement, and Reagan and Anderson debated once before Reagan succumbed to debating Carter without the independent candidate.84 The final election results looked nothing like Toppings predictions. Barring some international crisis that redounds to his benefit, Topping had written during the summer, Jimmy Carter, even if he wins his partys Presidential nomination, is likely to finish third in the popular vote and a very poor third in the electoral college, perhaps carrying only two or three Southern states.85 But the prediction proved ridiculous. Reagan won with 50.8% of the popular vote to Carters 41% and Andersons 6.6%. Reagan won 44 states; Carter won 6 states and the District of Columbia; Anderson did not win a single state.86 A study done in the aftermath of the election found that Andersons appeal remained largely restricted to the young, liberal, well-educated, white and affluentin other words, Riponers and those like them.87 Reagan, on the other hand,

82 83

Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 120. Should Jimmy Carter Be Included in the Presidential Debates? Ripon Forum, 16:4 (May/June/July), 2. 84 Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 123. 85 John C. Topping, Jr., 1980 Presidential Outlook, Ripon Forum, 16:4 (May/June/July 1980), 15. 86 James R. Whitson, 1980, President Elect, http://presidentelect.org/e1980.html. 87 Gerald M. Pomper, The Presidential Election, The Election of 1980: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Marlene Michels Pomper (Chatham: Chatham House), 84.

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won with fairly similar margins almost everywhere, suggesting a broad appeal across traditional geographical and demographic barriers.88 Toppings misjudgment of the political landscape in the summer is understandable though Andersons poll numbers would steadily decline, they hit 20% at one point. Yet, Toppings analysis still was a manifestation of how out of touch the Ripon Society had become with the direction of American politics in 1980. As is now fairly clear in hindsight, Reagans election ushered in an era of conservative dominance, in which Democratic politicians had to package themselves as centrists to be successful nationally and the Republican Party as a whole shifted to the right. Ripons championing of John Anderson, who left the GOP, was a sign that moderate Republicanism was fading as a national power. In a way, the deaths of Bill Steiger in December 1978 and Nelson Rockefeller in January 1979 symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another. Steigers death turned him into a symbol, almost a martyr, for supply-siders. Columnist George Will praised Steiger for his work on liberating the nations productive energies, including energy in the form of capital and, where possible, supplanting coercion with incentives.89 The Washington Posts news coverage also made the capital gains tax cut central to his obituary.90 The passing of these two figures marked the end of moderate dominance of the Republican establishment and the realization that conservatives were in control of the GOP. The moderates were out, and the conservatives were in. Yet, its not that simple. As we have seen (and will see again), a few Riponers were closely involved with promoting supply-side, and many more supported or were intrigued by the theory. Also, empowerment policy proposals were gaining credence in the GOP.
88 89

Pomper, 67. George F. Will, PoliticsAs Steiger Practiced It, Washington Post, 7 December 1978, A23. 90 J. Y. Smith, Rep. W.A. Steiger Dies; Backed Tax Cuts, Washington Post, 5 December 1978, C8.

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Furthermore, some Riponers served in the Reagan Administration. Peter Wallison was the General Counsel of the Treasury Department and then became Counsel to the President.91 John McClaughry, who was a speechwriter on the campaign and managed liaison efforts with governors, state legislatures, and mayors during the transition, was appointed Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of Policy Development and headed the Cabinet Council on Food and Agriculture in the administration.92 John Topping volunteered for the transition, helping the Office of Presidential Personnel.93 Richard Rahn became Vice President and Chief Economist at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.94 Bruce Chapman led the Census Bureau from 1981-83 and then was a Deputy Assistant to President Reagan while serving as Director of the Office of Planning and Evaluation.95 It is not so much that these Riponers were converted as issues and politics changed. In the 1960s, civil rights unified Ripon; in the 1970s, feminist politics began to divide them; in the late 1970s and early 1980s, supplyside took over the economic policy debate. As the times changed, so did Riponers.

Supply-Side and the 1981 Tax Cuts

The second major accomplishment of the supply-side movement was the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, also known as Kemp-Roth after its chief proponents, Representative Jack Kemp of New York and Senator William Roth of Delaware. Kemp and Roth had sponsored a similar proposal in 1978, which they put forward as an amendment to the Revenue Act. It failed in both the House and Senate, at least partially because in a

91 92

Wallison interview with Miller Center. McClaughry interview with Kabaservice; Ethan Allen Institute, Staff and Directors of the Institute, http://www.ethanallen.org/aboutus/dir.html. 93 John Topping, e-mail message to author, 17 March 2010. 94 Cato Institute, Richard W. Rahn, http://www.cato.org/people/richard-rahn. 95 Discovery Institute, Bruce Chapman, President, http://www.discovery.org/p/7.

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period of high inflation it enabled Democratic politicians and an overwhelming majority of economists to declare it highly inflationary and unable to generate the tax revenues expected by its supporters, according to a study by Henry C. Kenski.96 The 1981 bill cut income taxes by 25% phased in over three years and capital gains taxes by 40%.97 While Reagans advisers were not all in support of the cuts, he himself was certain,98 and the Revenue Act of 1978 provided a legislative foundation on which to build the new reductions. Supply-siders were able to argue that the cut in the capital gains tax, which was relatively modest compared to the scope of the 1981 bill, had significantly increased federal revenues from capital gainssomething about which they themselves were surprised. I had greatly underestimated the amount of increase they had, and that the 78 capital gains tax cut set the stage for the 81 through 83 Reagan tax cuts, Richard Rahn said. As Vice President and Chief Economist at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Rahn was an important public voice in favor of the bill. George Gilder, who left Ripon after the daycare editorial in 1972 raised the ire of many within the society, became a prime intellectual supporter and promoter of supply-side. Gilders 1981 book, Wealth and Poverty, is sort of a Bible of Reaganomics, as Rahn described it. Gilderwho thanked Riponers Mike Brewer, Chris DeMuth, Lee Auspitz, Bruce Chapman, John Topping, Richard Rahn, and Mark Bloomfield in his preface for their helpargued eloquently that the source of the gifts of capitalism is the supply side of the economy.99 Drawing not only from economics, but also from sociology, political science, and philosophy, Gilder crafted a coherent argument that in time has come to be seen as one

96 97

Kenski, Partisanship and Ideology in the Revenue Act of 1978, 76. Wilentz, Age of Reagan, 143. 98 Ibid., 140. 99 George F. Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic Books, 1981), xi and 28.

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of, if not the, defining works in support of supply-side. The books impact on the passage of the 1981 tax cut is unknowable.100 David Stockman, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, liked the book and gave it out to many people, according to John McClaughry.101 Writing in the Forum in August 1981, John Topping said that Wealth and Poverty provides a devastating critique of the prevailing economic wisdom and social philosophy of the past generation and that a true test of supply side economics would require far more radical cuts in tax rates than what the 1981 bill would in fact deliver.102 Steve Livengood recalled being skeptical of the concept before reading Gilders book; after perusing it, we all supported him. Overall, the Ripon Society was heavily in support of the concept of supply side economics.103 What is undeniable is that Gilders book had great influence in proceeding years.

Rick Kessler and Ripons Transformation

The election of 1980 had taken a heavy toll on an already teetering Ripon organization. John Toppings resignation in April of that year after less than two years at the helm accentuated the leadership difficulties the society was experiencing, especially since both the organizations Vice President, Dick Salvatierra, and Executive Director, Steve Livengood, were active in primary campaigns. Ripon did not even produce the Forum regularly in 1980, because the election distracted its officers and the society was practically

Wealth and Poverty came out in early 1981news articles mention it by February of that yearso it conceivably could have convinced some Representatives and Senators to vote for the tax cuts. An example of a newspaper article on the book: Henry Allen, George Gilder and the Capitalists Creed, Washington Post, 18 February 1981, B1. 101 McClaughry interview with Kabaservice. 102 John C. Topping, The First Six Months, Ripon Forum, 12:2 (August 1981), 6 and 7. 103 Livengood interview with Kabaservice.

100

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broke.104 I was leaving my paycheck in the Ripon account so that the other checks didnt bounce, Livengood recalled.105 And even when the society did publish the Forum, it was not on a monthly basis and it always came out late, a trend that started before the election. For instance, the Princeton University library received the January 1979 Forum on February 23, 1979, over a month late.106 And, with an admitted lack of money, the New Leadership Fund and the Ripon Educational Fund must also have been struggling. In 1981, Rick Kessler, a veteran of the Anderson campaign, took over as Ripon Executive Director, and Representative Jim Leach of Iowa was elected Chairman.107 Kessler, who served on the Reagan Inaugural Committee, reinvigorated the organizations fundraising, while Leach pushed the society to have a greater focus on foreign policy issues, especially support for a ban on the testing of, and an overall freeze on construction of, nuclear weapons.108 In 1982, Ripon teamed up with the Bow Group, the conceptual father of Ripon, in putting on a transatlantic conference in D.C. By chance taking place during the height of Britains Falklands crisis in April, the conference featured speeches by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Senators and Representatives, such as Leach, Tim Petri, and Jack Kemp. A self-professed Anglophile, Leach informed the group that British policy on the Falklands was more popular in the United States than American policy towards El Salvador.109 The conference was an important step in building American public and

John C. Topping, Jr., A Word from the Editor, Forum, 2. Livengood interview with Kabaservice. 106 Cover, Ripon Forum, 15:1 (January 1979), 1. The library stamped the date of reception on the front cover. 107 419 New Jersey Avenue, Ripon Forum, 17:2 (August 1981), 10; Jim Leach, A Moderate Manifesto, Ripon Forum, 17:3 (October/November 1981), 11; and 419 New Jersey Avenue, 17:3 (October/November 1981), 14. 108 419 New Jersey Avenue, Ripon Forum, 17:2 (August 1981), 10; Jim Leach, Interview with author, 15 March 2010. 109 Leach interview with author; Barr, The Bow Group, 180.
105

104

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Congressional support for the British over the Argentineans.110 That conference was followed by others throughout the decade with both the British and Germans. These conferences were conspicuous examples of Ripons new direction under Kessler, who stayed with the organization until 2009. Today, the Ripon Society primarily hosts breakfasts and lunches with Senators and Representatives so that the societys members can interact with lawmakers in an intimate and unofficial setting. The Forum is still published, though on a bimonthly or quarterly basis. The society has a small paid staff of five with an office in downtown D.C.111 Without Kessler, it is questionable whether Ripon would have survived at all. He brought a distinct vision for the group, and rebuilt the society in that image using his contacts in D.C. A symbolic sign of the societys new focus was its move in 1981 to offices on New Jersey Avenue, just a block down from the Capitol.112 Jim Conzelman, the societys current President, described the organization Kessler built in favorable terms. They try to break down the barriers of Congress and get real conversations going between Ripon members and Senators and Representatives, Conzelman said. Conzelman also is beginning a concerted effort to recruit young Hill staffers to the society.113 Not everyone agrees with the more upbeat assessment of Kesslers impact. Gene Marans, a founding Riponer, said that, under Kesslers leadership, Ripon turned into a lobbyist trade association.114 Steve Livengood was more critical, accusing the society under Kessler in the 1980s of cross[ing] all kinds of lines. 80% of what they did was illegal. According to Livengood, on the way to one of the transatlantic conferences, Kessler
Barr, 180. Jim Conzelman, Interview with author, 16 March 2010; Lou Zickar, e-mail message to author, 19 March 2010. 112 419 New Jersey Avenue, Ripon Forum, 17:2 (August 1981), 11. 113 Conzelman interview with author. 114 Marans interview with author.
111 110

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gave first class tickets to his clients, and the other people were sitting in coach. However, it was not until they had to raise the price of attending that the conferences became events exclusively for lobbyists and their clients, Livengood recalled.115 Kessler himself is a lobbyist with his own firm, Kessler & Associates. In 2006, a group called Public Citizen accused Ripon of skirting congressional ethics rules that forbid lobbyists from paying for congressional travel. Public Citizen claimed that Ripon paid for senators and representatives to travel to events, where Ripon members, who are mostly lobbyists, would get unbridled access. The society, however, denied the accusation, saying that they dont allow any lobbying at their events.116 Both sides of this debate do agree, however, on one point. As Conzelman said, Rick [Kessler] was the catalyst for the group, because, for the most part, the Ripon Society had died.117 Whether the group which Kessler raised from the ashes of the old society is useful or not is a question beyond the scope of this thesis. What is readily apparent, however, is that Kesslers Ripon Society is diametrically different from the Ripon Society of the 1960s. Whereas the early society focused on policies first from the locus of Cambridge and then from within Washington, the society as it is today is much more a part of the inside-the-beltway culture and has not even come close to resembling a think tank for twenty years. In 1981, the Ripon Society received a new lease on life. But Ripon as it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s never returned.

115 116

Livengood interview with Kabaservice. Thomas B. Edsall, Lobbyists Help Fund Ripon Society Travel, Washington Post, 23 January 2006, A4. 117 Conzelman interview with author.

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In July 1983, Jack Saloma, Ripon founder and the societys first president, died from AIDS.118 In a way, his passing symbolized the end of the Ripon Society.

118

Elsa Dixler, Acknowledgments, in John S. Salomas Ominous Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984). Ominous Politics was published posthumously.

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EPILOGUE

At a panel discussion and dinner at the posh Metropolitan Club in D.C. in January 2010, I sat at a table with five early members of the Ripon Society: Emil Frankel, Gene Marans, Lee Huebner, Bill Kilberg, and Peter Wallison. The panels topic was the future of the Republican Partya fitting subject, considering the five men had spent much of the middle and latter part of the 1960s worrying, talking, and writing about the future of the party. After the dinner ended, I stood talking with Frankel, who had been across the table from me and out of conversation distance. It was Frankel who had spent time as a graduate student in England and came back with the idea to form a society based on the model of the Bow Group. The Ripon Society, he told me, was a failure. In many objective, measurable ways, Ripon did fail. Except for improved relations with China, for which President Nixon and Henry Kissinger deserve full credit, and the ending of the draft, none of Ripons major policy proposals ever became lasting law. Congress never passed bills codifying a negative income tax, though Nixon publicly supported the proposal. Nixon did sign a revenue sharing bill in 1972, but Reagan oversaw the end of the program in 1986.1 Neither President Johnson nor Nixon adopted the confederal strategy for Vietnam, and the war dragged on until 1973. The RNC firmly rebuffed Ripons efforts both to change the way the party allocated delegates to the national conventions and to encourage more minority and women delegates. The society argued until it was hoarse against the GOPs adoption of a southern strategy, claiming that the party could never challenge the Democrats for true national
1

PBS, Domestic Politics: Richard M. Nixon, 37th President, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/presidents/37_nixon/nixon_domestic.html.

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dominance without the support of minorities and southern moderates. As it happened, Nixon successfully blended the southern strategy with an appeal to the moderate northern wing of the GOP, and over the past 45 years, the party has seen its center of gravity move south. In the 40 years between 1969 and 2009, the country had a Republican president 70% of the time. Congress remained Democratic until the 1994 midterm elections flipped both houses to the GOP. Only after the 2006 elections did the Democrats regain both houses.2 It is clear that the southern strategy worked. Ripons electoral predictions were, for the most part, wrong. And as a whole, the Republican Party took a rightward turn. The demise of the northeast wing of the party, which Nelson Rockefeller had symbolized for so long, was a running story surrounding the 2006 and 2008 elections. In 2008, Christopher Shays of Connecticut, the last Republican member of the House of Representative from New England, traditionally a bastion of moderate Republicanism, was defeated.3 Id deluded myself, Riponer Tanya Melich wrote about the 1992 Republican National Convention in Houston. The tacit approval of the President of the United States was being used to shatter the nations tranquility, to tear away at its Constitution, to shackle women, and to stifle dissentall in the cause of winning elections. George Bush and the other leaders of the Republican party were to blame for giving respectability and power to this movement of hate, this sickness of the soul. And I too was to blame. Theyd encouraged this firestorm and Id gone along. Id let cleverness overwhelm good sense. Id not been willing to let go, to leave the party of my roots, my ambition, my lifes work, my dreams. Id been wrong, very wrong.4 The rise of the social conservative movementdominated by evangelicalism, opposition to abortion, and, more recently, a campaign to block states from legalizing gay marriagestill
2

Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present; Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present). 3 Hernandez, Northeast Republicans Lose Precious Ground in Washington. 4 Melich, Republican War Against Women, xi.

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angers Melich and many other Riponers, especially women, who see the conservative movement as an activist war on womens rights and, in some ways, a repudiation of small government federalism. Some others, despaired at the perceived militarism of Reagans administration and shocked by what they believed to be the negative implications of supplyside economics, were drawn to the center-left approach of Bill Clinton and the Democratic Leadership Council. The compassionate conservatism that George W. Bush proclaimed during the 2000 campaign pleased many Riponers, although his presidency turned just as many off. Still, some Riponers had a hand in forging the new politics of the right. George Gilder pioneered the backlash to the feminist movement with Sexual Suicide, and Wealth and Poverty established a philosophical foundation for the supply-side theory, which Richard Rahn had helped formulate. Even some of Ripons anti-conservative accomplishments helped move the party to the right. For instance, by assisting the effort to block Nixons nomination of G. Harrold Carswell, Ripon indirectly aided the emergence of the abortion debatethe seat Carswell would have occupied was then taken by Harry Blackmun, who authored the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade. Most Riponers are probably still registered Republicans, whether or not they have moved to the right ideologically. In fact, Riponers were represented in both the Bush 41 and Bush 43 administrations.5 Tim Petri still represents the Wisconsin district in which he was elected after Bill Steigers death. Bill and Bobbie Kilberg have become active party fundraisers. Bruce Chapman leads the Discovery Institute, which is at the forefront of those

Bobbie Kilberg headed the Office of Public Liaison in the Bush 41 Administration. Emil Frankel was Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy in the Department of Transportation from 2002 to 2005. Emil H. Frankel, Director of Transportation Policy, Bipartisan Policy Center, National Journal, http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/contributors/EFrankel.php.

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arguing in favor of intelligent design. Rahn, who was married to Reagan speechwriter Peggy Noonan and now is at the Cato Institute, continues to be influential among economic conservatives, and people still read Gilders Wealth and Poverty. Peter Wallison, who was Counsel to Vice President Rockefeller, has created an intellectual niche for himself at the American Enterprise Institute as a critic of certain financial regulations. The list goes on. What can we make of this? While Ripon did help, albeit indirectly, to formulate some of the new policy stances of the Reagan Revolution, it is important to remember that womens rights issues and supply-side came out of the 1970s. Ripons moderatism (or liberalism or progressivism) was formed in the crucible of the 1960s debate over civil rights for blacks. The new social issues and supply-side, on the other hand, gained public attention through the rise of the feminist movement and the terror of stagflation, respectively. When these issues came to the forefrontand the politics of segregation began to withdrawinherent differences of opinion within Ripon became visible. This is not to say that Riponers did not change their opinions about some things. Rather, it is entirely consistent for both Tanya Melich and Peter Wallison, for example, to start with Ripon and end up where they have. Part of the reason this diaspora is consistent with Riponism is that the society lost its vision, mission, and vitality after Richard Nixons election in 1968the society never established a clear set of principles in response to the new issues emerging out of the 1970s, and its defining features were, therefore, indelibly linked to the mid-1960s. As a practical matter, Ripon lost its dynamism when its founders wandered off into their professional lives, Gene Marans said. There was not a follow-up generation of activists who would

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advise Lindsay, Baker, Dirksen, and Scott, and take on Ripon initiative.6 After Nixons victory in 1968, many of the organizations early leaders went into the new administration; others, like Jack Saloma, had already left to pursue other things. The contract work Ripon did in the mid-1960s for moderate politicians ceased. Ripon had been united by its members support for civil rights. As the issue morphed into the realm of busing and affirmative action, Riponers began to disagree with each other as to the right policies. And, as the party increasingly embraced the conservative backlash, a viable moderate Republican position on these new issues looked bleaker and bleaker. As Nixon moved into the White Housethe first time the Republican Party held the reins of either the executive, Senate, or House of Representatives since Eisenhower left office in 1959a quandary arose: how did Ripon, often a critic of the party to which it professed loyalty, fit into the institutional structure? The groups whole purpose, beyond vigorous support for civil rights, was to restore the Republican Party as the party of pragmatic, goal-driven ideas. Before Nixons election, the society focused as much attention outside of Washington as critiquing the politicking within the capital. With Nixon in the White House, the focus understandably shifted to D.C. But that did not mean a place at the table. Many Riponers did come into the administration as part of Nixons attempt to fold the partys wings around himself. But a group of relatively young, idealistic outsiders coming to town with their Ivy League ideas and pretensions was not a resume for quick induction into the Washington fraternity. Thus, Nixon adopted the societys ideas on revenue sharing and the negative income tax, while Attorney General Mitchell felt free to deride the group as little juvenile delinquents. The societys suit against the RNC over delegate apportionment and its strenuous support of the Rule 29 Committees
6

Marans interview with author.

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recommendation to encourage more women and minority delegates further strengthened the image among some of the party faithful of Ripon as, in todays parlance, Republicans in name only. Without their outsider status, the loss of which was cemented by the national societys move to Washington in 1973, and without a robust presence within the city, Ripon no longer was an effective vehicle for and producer of fresh, new ideas and approaches. Ripons foundation as a youth organization also cannot be discounted. [T]he Kennedy mystique helped define the group, because it was this idea of Republicans should appeal to young people, to intellectuals, to the campuses, Lee Huebner said.7 It is difficult to say how much President Kennedy meant to young people. The first young President since Theodore Roosevelt, he was certainly the first to make them feel like a part of the country, William Wessels wrote in the Forum in the spring of 1966. [Kennedy] gave them a chance to make something other than a military contribution to society, Wessels explained.8 But by the 1970s, even though Riponers were still relatively young in comparison to the political movers in Washington, youth was starting to slip away from most of the active members. They were starting careers and families, and thereby losing the dynamism, as Marans put it, that had characterized the societys first five or so years. This contributed to a major deficiency in Ripon, which Marans identifiednamely, that it did not have enough sustained leadership at the top.9 With the rise of new policy issues, the shift of focus to D.C., the loss of youth as a motivating and energizing factor, and the lack of strong, sustained leadership, the society drifted along. As neither a pure moderate nor a pure conservative, Nixon lacked the ability to reinvigorate the group either in support of or opposition to his presidency. Ford was an
7 8

Huebner interview with author. The Young Americans, The Ripon Papers, 15. 9 Marans interview with author.

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underwhelming personalitythe society was more caught up with worry over the enthusiasm surrounding Hurricane Ronnie. And during the Carter Administration, the societys financial situation finally caused an unsuccessful organizational reshuffling with the establishment of the New Leadership Fund and the Ripon Educational Fund. It was not until Rick Kessler took the reins that the society began to recover, though in a much different direction from the way it started. Kesslers vision and long leadership allowed him to reshape the organization. In some ways, Ripons drift and decline during the 1970s reflected the greater trend of moderate Republicanism. After 1968, the movement lacked a long-term national leader, since Rockefellers status was diminished. Similar to how Ripon experienced a revolving door of presidents and directors, moderate Republicans jumped from politician to politician, be he Ed Brooke, Pete McCloskey, Gerald Ford, or John Anderson. Just as Ripon chronically lacked money, moderate Republican politicians found it difficult to fundraise as well as their conservative counterparts, and conservative think tanks bathed in funds. Worst of all, the movement lacked the dynamism of the conservatives. Though the society as an entity supported the Revenue Act of 1978, it was Reagan that picked up the idea and ran with it at the national level; the conservatives adopted the ideas mantle. In the end, however, Ripon and the greater moderate Republican movement made two significant, if subtle, contributions to the Republican ascendancy, which Reagan and his two presidential elections symbolized. First, Ripons forceful support for civil rights paved the way for the conservatives appeal to middle-of-the-road voters by helping to remove the stigma of Goldwaters vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Reagans personal image, personality, and proposals should not be discounted, but neither should the fact that Reagan

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first came onto the political scene as a spokesman for Barry Goldwater in 1964. Important work was done to undo the damage Goldwater had on the Republican brand. Second, the Ripon Society paved the way for the conservative Republican ideas revolution through its strong work on domestic policies in the 1960s and from within the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s. The non-social domestic policies of the Republican Party under Reagan and since have heavily depended on the idea of personal responsibility. The idea of tweaking market forces in order to incentivize and motivate greater productivity goes back to Ripons proposals for a negative income tax and urban revitalization. Supply-side economics and Jack Kemps enterprise zone proposal depended heavily on themes espoused by Ripon. In fact, empowerment schemes cut across traditional liberal/conservative dividing lines as the bipartisan support for a negative income tax showed. But it was Ripon and Richard Nixon, who brought the idea back. In many ways, Ripon pre-dated the major conservative think tanks. Yes, AEI and the Hoover Institute existed long before Ripon was even a thought in Emil Frankels head. But the society was expounding, disseminating, and popularizing policies which stressed decentralization and empowerment before the conservative think tanks rose to prominence in the 1970s. One position paper seemed to inspire another, Tim Petri and Gene Marans wrote on the occasion of Ripons 25th anniversary, as scholars discovered there was a receptive Republican audience for their ideas and analysis and a group willing to help them organize and present their work simply and clearly.10 Through the 1960s and 1970s, Ripon stood for freedom and equality for all persons before the law [and] for economic development and for individual opportunity.11 The Ripon Forum was a great outlet for

10 11

Petri and Marans, Ripon at Twenty-Five, 22. Ibid., 21.

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policy papers and for conferences, Peter Baugher recalled. [And] these were all people who were committed to the Republican Party.12 In Ominous Politics, a book published in 1984 after his death, Jack Saloma wrote, Nixon hired several key Riponites for policy and speechwriting positions in the White House as a symbolic gesture to counterbalance his conservative appointments.13 Yet, what Saloma did not fully understand was that, by centralizing the Executive Branch around the Office of the President, Nixon gave his young staffers, many of them Riponers, significant influence over domestic policy. Other Riponers, who served in departments, also had a hand in crafting policy. Nixons domestic successes turned the Republican Party into an active, policy-oriented party, a mantle which conservative Republicans took up. And, even then, Riponers were sometimes closely involved with the formulation and promotion of innovative policies, such as supply-side. Ripon did not ascribe to Reagans argument that government is the problem, but it did undergird much of the policy framework of the Reagan era. The Republican ascendancy truly was conservative. But it is important to remember the role that moderate Republicans like the Ripon Society played in removing the stigma of Goldwaters vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, promoting policies of selfempowerment, and challenging the right wing to update its ideas for the current era. In his memoir, Reflections of a Radical Moderate, Elliot Richardson wrote, [W]hile Washingtons history has not been uneventful, its hardest-fought struggles have been over purposes and policies rather than power.14 For about a decade, between December 1962 and the end of Nixons first term in office, Ripon was deeply involved in those struggles.
12 13

Baugher interview with author. Saloma, Ominous Politics, 97-8. 14 Elliot Richardson, Reflections of a Radical Moderate (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 4.

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And, during the next decade, as conservatives decisively took control of the Republican Party, Ripons ideas found new life in the policy proposals of the conservative movement against which the society had fought for so long. As the GOP continues its rightward drift, we should recall the forgotten and remember how the Ripon Society, a group of young, moderate policy wonks, had a hand in the shaping of the modern Republican Party.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources
Books
Friedman, Milton. Wealth and Poverty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Gilder, George F. Sexual Suicide. New York: Quadrangle, 1973. Gilder, George F. Wealth and Poverty. New York: Basic Books, 1981. Goldwater, Barry. Conscience of a Conservative. Sheperdsville: Victor, 1960. Huebner, Lee W. and Thomas E. Petri, eds. The Ripon Papers, 1963-68. Washington: National Press, 1968. Kemp, Jack. An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980s. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953. Melich, Tanya. The Republican War Against Women. New York: Bantam, 1996. Phillips, Kevin. The Emerging Republican Majority. New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969. Rhys-Williams, Lady. Taxation and Incentive. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. Richardson, Elliot. Reflections of a Radical Moderate. New York: Pantheon, 1996. Ripon Society. Election 64: A Ripon Society Report. Edited by Thomas E. Petri. Cambridge: Ripon Society, 1965. Ripon Society. From Disaster to Distinction. Edited by Thomas E. Petri. New York: Pocket Books 1966. Ripon Society. Instead of Revolution. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971. Ripon Society. The Lessons of Victory. New York: Dial Press, 1969. Ripon Society and Clifford W. Brown, Jr. Jaws of Victory. Boston: Little, Brown, 1973.

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Interviews & E-Mails

Adams, Mike. Interview with author. 22 February 2010. Auspitz, J. Lee. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaserivce. 21 October 2006. Bailey, Douglas. E-mail message to author. 29 March 2010. Bailey, Douglas. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 22 March 2007. Baugher, Peter. Interview with author. 1 April 2010. Brewer, Michael. Interview with author. 10 October 2009. Chapman, Bruce. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 8 December 2009. Conzelman, Jim. Interview with author. 16 March 2010. DeMuth, Chris. Interview with author. 11 October 2009. Frankel, Emil. E-mail message to author. 22 March 2010. Frankel, Emil. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 23 June 2007. Gillette, Howard. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 2 November 2006. Goldman, Patricia. Interview with author. 9 October 2009. Huebner, Lee. Interview with author. 8 September 2009. Huebner, Lee. Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 11 April 2007 and 24 November 2009. Kilberg, Bill. E-mail messages to author. 23 and 27 March 2010. Kilberg, Bobbie. E-mail messages to author. 24, 26, 27 and 29 March 2010 and 1 April 2010. Leach, Jim. Interview with author. 15 March 2010. Livengood, Steve. Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 1 and 29 March 2009. Marans, J. Eugene. Interviews with author. 16 March and 3 April 2010. McClaughry, John. Interviews with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 15 and 29 November 2009. Melich, Tanya. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 13 February 2007. 128

Petri, Thomas E. Interview with author. 19 November 2009. Price, John. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 20 July 2007. Rahn, Richard. E-mail message to author. 18 March 2010. Rahn, Richard. Interview with author. 8 September 2009. Smith, Mike. Interview with Geoffrey Kabaservice. 12 February 2007. Topping, John. E-mail message to author. 17 March 2010. Topping, John. Interview with author. 6 November 2009. Wallison, Peter. E-mail to author. 2 April 2010. Wallison, Peter. Interview with University of Virginias Miller Center of Public Affairs. 28-9 October 2003. Ronald Reagan Oral History Project. Zickar, Lou. E-mail message to author. 19 March 2010. Zschau, Ed. Interview with author. 23 February 2010.

Manuscript Collections
Melich, Tanya M. Papers. University Libraries, University at Albany, State University of New York. Cuevas, Josie to National Executive Committee. 30 January 1975. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 3. Melich, Tanya to Richard Rosenbaum. 25 February 1975. Series V: Box 6: Folder 3. Ripon Society. Ripon Election Announcements. May 1974. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 2. Ripon Society. Minutes of National Executive Committee Meeting. 18 April 1975. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 4. Stone, Lewis Bart to John Hay Whitney. 21 February 1975. Series 5: Box 6: Folder 9. Ripon Society Papers, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University American Conservative Union. The Ripon Society. 1966. Box 1: Folder 52.

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Bayley, Christopher T. to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. 15 March 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Bayley, Christopher T. to Elliot L. Richardson. 6 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Bayley, Christopher T. to James Carpenter. 4 July 1965. Box 3: Folder 160 Bayley, Christopher T. to Richard M. Nixon. 16 July 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Behn, Robert. Memorandum: The Cornerstone Project. 23 May 1966. Box 2: Folder 93. Behn, Robert to Mary McInnis. 13 December 1965. Box 1: Folder 9. Behn, Robert to Raymond K. Price. 16 May 1967. Box 1: Folder 16. Behn, Robert to Timothy Brown. 20 October 1967. Box 7: Behn Correspondence. Bill [?] to John S. Saloma. 29 July 1965. Box 2: Folder 81. Bliss, Ray C.. The Chairman Speaks: Address by the Honorable Ray C. Bliss Before the 13th Annual Republican Womans Conference, April 1, 1965. Box 2: Folder 72. Bliss, Ray C. to John S. Saloma. 23 September 1965. Box 2: Folder 72. Branton, Wiley A. to J. Eugene Marans. 18 December 1964. Box 1: Folder 2. Brewer, Michael F. to Charles Percy. 14 June 1971. Box 14. Brown, Timothy to Robert Behn. 25 October 1967. Box 7: Behn Correspondence. Buchanan, Patrick J. to Thomas E. Petri. 13 December 1967. Box 1: Folder 16. Chapman, Bruce to J. Eugene Marans. 16 January 1963. Box 1: Folder 1. Chapman, Bruce to Thomas E. Petri. 29 October 1967. Box 11: Folder 5. Cornerstone Project brochure. Box 2: Folder 93. Ellis, Evelyn to Joseph P. Wells. 8 July 1971. Box 23: Folder 6. Eisenhower, Dwight D. to Walter Thayer. 23 January 1964. Box 3: Folder 177. Huebner, Lee to Robert Taft, Jr. 21 May 1965. Box 1: Folder 7. Javits, Jacob K. to Walter N. Thayer. 9 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Lichenstein, Charles M. to Thomas E. Petri. 25 January 1965. Box 2: Folder 73. 130

Lindsay, John V. to Mary McInnis. 1 December 1966. Box 1: Folder 9. Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr. to Christopher T. Bayley. 11 March 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Marans, J. Eugene to Wiley A. Branton. 11 January 1965. Box 1: Folder 2. Matthews, A. Douglas to J. Harvie Wilkinson III. 8 September 1969. Box 13. McInnis, Mary to Robert Behn. 16 December 1966. Box 1: Folder 9. Michel, Robert H. to John S. Saloma, 7 July 1964. Box 1: Folder 2. Miller, David Jr. to Marianne Magocsi. 29 January 1965. Box 2: Folder 93. Petri, Thomas E. to John F. Ahearne. 20 February 1968. Box 9: Folder 1. Petri, Thomas E. to Patrick J. Buchanan. 20 November 1967. 7: Behn Correspondence. Price, John R. to Al Abrahams. 27 March 1965. Box 2: Folder 79. Rahn, Richard W. to William A. M. Burden. 6 March 1975. Box 23. Republican Governors Association. Republican Governors Association Articles of Association of September 14, 1963. reproduced in The Republican Governors Association: The Case for a Third Force, p. 20, 4 December 1964, Box 3: Folder 187. Richardson, Elliot L. to J. Eugene Marans. 14 April 1964. Box 1: Folder 2. Ripon Society. Agenda, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club. 12 December 1962. Box 1: Folder 28. Ripon Society. Automation and Technology. August 1967. Box 3: Folder 189. Ripon Society. The Case Against Carswell. March 1970. Box 17: Folder 15. Ripon Society. Crime. October 1967. Box 3: Folder 189. Ripon Society. Government for Tomorrow: a proposal for the unconditional sharing of federal tax revenues with state and local governments. 6 July 1965. Box 3: Folder 187. Ripon Society. Housing. December 1967. Box 3: Folder 189. Ripon Society. Increasing Job Opportunities for the Urban Poor. October 1967. Box 3: Folder 189. 131

Ripon Society. A New Republican Mandate: A Ripon Society Report and Preliminary Analysis of the 1964 Elections. 5 November 1964. Box 3: Folder 185. Ripon Society. A Republican Civil Rights Platform for 1965. 1965. Box 3: Folder 187. Ripon Society. The Republican Governors Association: The Case for a Third Force. 4 December 1964. Box 3: Folder 187. Ripon Society. Ripon Society Issues National Endorsement of Republican Candidates. 28 October 1964. Box 3: Folder 185. Ripon Society. A Second Mandate to Republicans: A Ripon Society Report and Analysis of the 1965 Elections. 1965. Box 3: Folder 187. Ripon Society. Senior Citizens. September 1967. Box 3: Folder 189. Ripon Society. Statement of the Ripon Society to the Republican Governors Association Meeting in Los Angeles July 3-7, 1966. Box 3: Folder 178. Ripon Society. Summary Minutes, Dinner, Business, and Discussion Meeting. 7 December 1964. Box 1: Folder 28. Ripon Society. Summary Minutes, Dinner Meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club. 12 December 1962. Box 1: Folder 28. Ripon Society Executive Committee to Members of the RNC. 15 January 1965. Box 2: Folder 73. Romney, George. Statement by Governor Romney for Use in Ripon Society Brochure. Undated. Box 3: Folder 177. Romney, George to Christopher T. Bayley. 22 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Rumsfeld, Donald to John S. Saloma. 15 December 1965. Box 1: Folder 7. Rumsfeld, Donald to the Ripon Society. 9 August 1965. Box 1: Folder 7. Saloma, John S. Memorandum on Luncheon with Dr. Arthur Peterson. 21 April [1965?]. Box 2: Folder 73. Saloma, John S. to Helen [Linsky?]. 12 March 1965. Box 2: Folder 81. Saloma, John S. to Marianne Magocsi. 11 August 1965. Box 2: Folder 181. Saloma, John S. to Marianne Magocsi. 13 August 1965. Box 2: Folder 81.

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Saloma, John S. to Ray C. Bliss. 13 July 1965. Box 2: Folder 72. Saloma, John S. to Ray C. Bliss. 26 August 1965. Box 2: Folder 72. Saloma, John S. to Robert E. Smylie. 23 May 1965. Box 2: Folder 81. Saloma, John S. to Walter N. Thayer. 28 January 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Sarah [Winner?] to Christopher T. Bayley. 5 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Scott, Hugh to John R. Price. 19 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 7. Scott, Hugh to the Ripon Society. 3 June 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Secretary for Laurance Rockefeller to Christopher T. Bayley. 30 March 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Smith, Michael C. Here is the Rest of Him: A Report on Ronald Reagan as Governor of California. June 1968. Box 3: Folder 190. Smylie, Robert E. to John S. Saloma. 25 October 1966. Box 2: Folder 81. Taft, Robert Jr. to Lee Huebner. 25 May 1965. Box 1: Folder 7. Thayer, Walter N. to Christopher T. Bayley. 9 April 1965. Box 1: Folder 26. Unsigned to Elliot L. Richardson. 4 June 1964. Box 1: Folder 2. Thayer, Walter Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Citizens for Petri to Dear Friends. 16 January 1979. Series 2: Box 4: Folder 9. Walter Thayer to [?]. 18 January 1979. Series 2: Box 4: Folder 9; Topping, John. Personal Papers. Topping, John. Handwritten notes. 1970. White House Central Files Name File, Box 2665, Ripon Society. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Anderson, Gwen A. to Susan Whitten. 27 May 1976. Patridge, Waring, Steven Saunders, and Kathleen McDonald to Gerald Ford. 11 August 1976.

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Ripon Reception and political auction at the home of Teresa and John Heinz III. 12 May 1975.

Periodicals
Ripon Forum. 14a Eliot Street, 5:12 (December 1969). 419 New Jersey Avenue. 17:2 (August 1981). 419 New Jersey Avenue. 17:3 (October /November 1981). Agnew, Peabody Score in VP Races. 8:6 (15 March 1972). Anderson, John B. The Future of the GOP. 15:2 (February 1979). Behn, Dick. The $90 Billion Man Story. 12:2 (15 January 1976). Behn, Dick. The Callaway Connection. 11:16 (15 August 1975). Behn, Dick. Campaign Strategy in the Snake Pit. 11:20 (15 October 1975). Behn, Dick. Ford Versus Reagan: See Them in New Hampshire. 11:8 (15 April 1975). Behn, Dick. Law and Order. 10:16 (15 August 1974). Behn, Dick. The Presidential Pulpit. 12:4 (15 January 1976). Behn, Dick. Wheres Ronald Reagans Horse. 11:6 (15 March 1975). Behn, Dick. Will Peking Play in Peoria? 11:23 (1 December 1975). Behn, Robert. White House and the Way of the Whigs. 9:15 (15 August 1973). Beyond the First 100 Days. 5:5 (May 1969). Brooke V.P. Write-in Announced. 8:4 (15 February 1972). Cover. 15:1 (January 1979). Daycare Edit Stirs Dispute. 8:2 (15 January 1972). Donaldson, Robert. Or Not To. 9:14 (15 July 1973).

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Duly Noted: Reagan. 11:1 (1 January 1975). Editorial. 9:8 (15 April 1973). Editorial. 9:11 (June 1973). Editorial: The Daycare Veto. 8:1 (January 1972). Editorial: The Lightweight Brigade. 8:7 (July 1971). Editorial Points: The Administration and the City. 11:22 (15 November 1975). Ehrig, William. Howard Baker for President. 15:6 (July/August 1979). For an Open Presidency. 8:21 (1 November 1972). Ford, Si; Connally, No. 12:15 (1 August 1976). Gammon, Bumper and E. Scott Royce. Ronald Reagan: Leading Man or Final Act? 15:7 (October 1979). Gilder, George F. Connallys Phase III. 8:13 (July 1972). John B. Anderson: A Dark Horse Who Could Pull Off The Upset of The Century. 15:9 (December 1979). Kennedy Factor, The. 15:6 (July/August 1979). Leach, Jim. A Moderate Manifesto. 17:3 (October /November 1981). Massachusetts Political Cauldron 1966, The. 2:3 (February 1965). McCloskey Focuses on New Hampshire. 7:14 (15 October 1971). McCloskeys Challenge. 8:6 (15 March 1972). McDonald, Kathleen. George Bush for President. 15:6 (July/August). Melich, Tanya. National Security. 9:14 (15 July 1973). New Hampshire and the Constitution. 12:5 (1 March 1976). News from Ripon Society, 2:5 (July 1966). Petri Survives Labor Blitz to Hold Steiger Seat. 15:4 (May 1979).

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Petri, Thomas E. The Case for Connally. 8:13 (July 1972). Petri, Thomas E. and J. Eugene Marans. Ripon at Twenty-Five. 24:1 (February 1988). Progressives and the President. 8:18 (September 1972). Politics: The Presidency. 11:21 (1 September 1975). Politics: The Presidency. 12:6 (15 March 1976). Reagan Lead Dwindling. 15:3 (March /April 1979). Ripon Annual Report for 1978. 15:2 (February 1979). Ripon Poll Results. 8:9 (May 1972). Ripon RoundUp. 16:1 (January 1980). Ripon RoundUp. 16:3 (March /April 1980). Ripon Suit, The. 9:21 (15 November 1973). Ripon Wins Suits on Delegate Formula. 8:9 (May 1972). Rule 29. 10:11 (1 June 1974). Saloma, John S. The Dilemmas of Three Factions. 3:1 (January 1967). Should Jimmy Carter Be Included in the Presidential Debates? 16:4 (May/June/July). Speed, Ronald. Impeachment, 9:20 (November 1973). Stewart, Robert G. To Resign. 9:14 (15 July 1973). Topping, John C. 1980 Presidential Outlook. 16:4 (May/June /July 1980). Topping, John C. The First Six Months. 12:2 (August 1981). Topping, John C. John B. Anderson for President. 15:6 (July/August 1979). Topping, John C. John Connallys Big Political Gamble: A New U.S. Policy for the Middle East. 15:8 (November 1979). Topping, John C. A Word from the Editor. 16:4 (May/June/July 1980). View From Los Angeles, The: Lengthening shadows on 1968. 2:5 (July 1966). 136

Washington, Lincoln, FDR and Connally? 15:3 (March /April 1979). William A. Steiger. 15:1 (January 1979). Where Do Conservatives Go From Here? 12:17 (1 September 1976). Others Ajemian, Robert. A Trio of G.O.P. Stars Fighting Hard Not to be Buried with Barry. Life, 30 October 1964, 35. Allen, Henry. George Gilder and the Capitalists Creed. Washington Post, 18 February 1981, B1. Broder, David S. Can Rommey Do a JFK? Washington Post, 9 October 1966, E1. Broder, David S. GOP Group Asks New Vietnam Policy. Washington Post, 4 October 1967, A12. Broder, David S. Humphrey Surge Clouds Nixon Bid In Election Today. Washington Post, 5 November 1968, A1. Broder, David S. Romney Charges LBJ Brainwashes the People. Washington Post, 7 September 1967, A1. Cannon, Lou. Delegate Fight Stirs Old Animosities, Hints New Ones. Washington Post, 20 August 1972, A4. Cannon, Lou. GOP Right Dilutes Minority Appeal Program. Washington Post, 7 March 1975, A5. Cannon, Lou. Reformers to be Back. Washington Post, 28 August 1972, A21. Drummond, Roscoe. Sharing Tax Money. Washington Post, 18 July 1965, E7. Edsall, Thomas B. Lobbyists Help Fund Ripon Society Travel. Washington Post, 23 January 2006, A4. Gruson, Lindsey. John S. Saloma, 48; Specialist in Politics Started Ripon Group. New York Times, 8 July 1983, B7. Kilpatrick, Carroll. Floridian Picked for High Court. Washington Post, 20 January 1970, A1.

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Main Provisions of the Kemp-Garcia Bill. Congressional Digest, 1 March 1982, 72-75 and 96. McCombs, Philip A. Ripon Societys Suit Seeks Reform for 76. Washington Post, 7 December 1971, A3. Mitchell Depicts Ripon Society as Little Juvenile Delinquents. New York Times, 18 January 1970, 24. Nation: Child Care Veto, The. Time, 20 December 1971, http:/ /www.time.com/time /printout/0,8816,878957,00.html. Reiter, Howard L. Ripon: Left Spurt to the GOP. Nation, 17 February 1969. Revenue Sharing Becomes Law. Revenue Sharing Bulletin. 1:1 (November 1972), 1. Samuelson, Robert J. Truth Squad of 10 Law Students Trails Goldwater in N.H. Primary. Harvard Crimson, 5 February 1964. Smith, J.Y. Rep. W.A. Steiger Dies; Backed Tax Cuts. Washington Post, 5 December 1978, C8. Smyth, Jeannette. A Famous Doodle and Some Guffaws. Washington Post, 25 October 1973, E1. Tax-Sharing Plan Pressed by G.O.P. New York Times, 13 July 1965, 14. Weaver, Warren Jr. G.O.P. Liberal Group Opens a Fund Drive. New York Times, 1 April 1977, 13. Wicker, Tom. Nation Will Vote Today; Close Presidential Race Predicted in Late Polls. New York Times, 5 November 1968, 1. Will, George F. PoliticsAs Steiger Practiced It. Washington Post, 7 December 1978, A23.

Speeches & Government Documents

Case, Clifford and Hugh Scott. United States Congress. Congressional Record, 9 October 1967, S14407. Goldwater, Barry. Goldwaters 1964 Acceptance Speech. Washington Post. http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm.

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National Archives. Executive Order 11246--Equal employment opportunity. Federal Register. http:/ /www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executiveorder /11246.html. Nixon, Richard M. Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs. 8 August 1969. Nixon Library Foundation. http:/ /www.nixonlibraryfoundation.org/clientuploads/directory/archive/1969_pdf _files/1969_0324.pdf. Nixon, Richard M. Resignation Address to the Nation. 8 August 1974. American Rhetoric. http:/ /www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixonresignationspeech.html. Nixon, Richard M. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs. 8 July 1970. American Presidency Project. University of California at Santa Barbara. http:/ /www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws / index.php?pid=2573. Nixon, Richard M. Statement About Congressional Action on the Philadelphia Plan. 23 December 1969. American Presidency Project. University of California at Santa Barbara. http:/ /www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws /index.php?pid=2382.

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