G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983 SIERRA MADRE TRUST, petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents. Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner. Fortunato de Leon for respondents. ABAD SANTOS, J.: This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8, 1970, in DANR Cases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The decision affirmed a decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969. The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137, as amended) which provides: "... Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review wherein only questions of law may be raised." The factual background is given in the brief of the petitionerappellant which has not been contradicted by the respondentsappellees and is as follows: On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2) Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5) Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered on December 11, 1964 with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.

The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of the herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12, (3) JC11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9, (9) N-9, (10) W-8, and (11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on May 14, 1965. The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned six (6) lode mineral claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company, null, void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises. This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502. Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 and amended August 5, 1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya. The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode mineral claim covered by LLA No. V9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3) A-13, (4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9)
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F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11) F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio Taduan, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered with the office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965. The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned six (6) claims of respondent J & S Partnership, null void, and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-9028 over the said claims. Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises. This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A. These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-404 were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director of Mines reads: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds that the respondents have the preferential right over their "Finland-2", "Finland3", "Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-25", "A-29" and "A30" mining claims. Accordingly, the protests (adverse claims) filed by protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby they are, DISMISSED. And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reads: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by the appellant, Sierra Madre Trust is

hereby dismissed and the decision of the Director of Mines dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. " The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan Trust Mining Company and J and S Partnership were based on the allegation that the lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter "encroached and overlapped" the former's mineral claims, However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained to believe that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the protestant's and respondents' mining claims. " And this finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office finds that the Director of Mines did not err when he found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has been incotrovertibly proven by the records appertaining to the case." It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in his decision, "during the intervening period from the 31st day after the discovery [by the respondents] to the date of location nobody else located the area covered thereby. ... the protestant [petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening right as it is our findings that their mining claims do not overlap respondents' mining claims." After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had affirmed the factual findings of the Director of Mines to the effect that there was no overlapping of claims and which findings were final and conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should have kept its peace for obviously it suffered no material injury and had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was obstinate and raised this legal question before Us: "May there be a valid location of mining claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, in contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New Mining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions. We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in this petition considering that there is no justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither
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encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered." Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/or partnership registered with the Mining Recorder of a province, but not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, be vested with juridical personality to enable it to locate and then lease mining claims from the government?" Suffice it to state that this question was not raised before the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. There is also nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the appellees are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For these reasons, even assuming that there is a justiciable issue between the parties, this question cannot be passed upon. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur. Aquino, J., is on leave. G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987 ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.: By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads: Clause 17. SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the SELLER hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with: a) Concrete curbs and gutters b) Underground drainage system c) Asphalt paved roads d) Independent water system e) Electrical installation with concrete posts. f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall

g) Developed park or amphi-theatre h) 24-hour security guard service. These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that such improvements shall have been completed. 1 On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976. Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent

NHA through a letter-complaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September 1977. Antipolo Realty, without presenting any evidence, moved for the consolidation of Case No. 2123 with several other cases filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued on 7 February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the following conditions: l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of account for the monthly amortizations from November 1976 to the present; m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November 1976 to the date of the statement of account; and n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears shown in the statement of account. 2 Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell. The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant.
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On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of the NHA was assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter. 4 This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29 January 1979. Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through public respondent Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave. 6 In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the complaint of private respondent Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not only acted on a matter beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of judicial or quasijudicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform. We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, 7 basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:

In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution of labor management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sensemaking and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil, 932, 941 [1954]). In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to the former, "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents). The Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to
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award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . . had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim." In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that: There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular courts. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasijudicial authority must be determined by referring to the terms of

Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11Section 3 of this statute provides as follows: National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied) The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide: WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems lighting systems and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers; WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value . (emphasis supplied) Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms: SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
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shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real estate business practices: B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.(emphasis supplied.) The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads: Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied.) Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments

made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the contract and receive reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest) made for the purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner. Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed. We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process. This assertion lacks substance. The record shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that such service had been effected. 14 But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner, nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion for reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must hence sound even more hollow. 16 We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had accrued during the period from September 1972 to October 1976, when private respondent had suspended payment of his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot.
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The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 October 1976 period: [R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his monthly installments until the improvements in the subdivision shall have been completed. Respondent informed complainant on November 1976 that the improvements have been completed. Monthly installments during the period of suspension of payment did not become due and demandable Neither did they accrue Such must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments. If the suspension is lifted the debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur any arrears. Such being the case, the demand of respondent for complainant to pay the arrears due during the period of suspension of payment is null and void. Consequently, the notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s that were not due and demandable is also null and void. 17 The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and amplification. The NHA correctly held that no installment payments should be considered as having accrued during the period of suspension of payments. Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments which would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no default on the part of the petitioner intervened. To our mind, the NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing that the original period of payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time equal to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which extended time (tacked on to the original contract period) private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. We think that such is the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor shall resume payments" and that such is the most equitable and just reading that may be given to the NHA resolution. To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount in a lump

sum after it had defaulted on its obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957,supra) to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. As the NHA resolution pointed out, [s]uch must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments." Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an expressively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had already fulfilled, albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer should not be regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest. The suspension of installment payments was attributable to the petitioner, not the private respondent. The tacking on of the period of suspension to the end of the original period precisely prevents default on the part of the lot buyer. In the words of the NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears." WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the original contract period for payment of installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which extended time private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 161811 April 12, 2006

THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, and ORLANDO GENOVE, Petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO NIO, JOSEFINA NIO, EMMANUEL NIO, and EURLIE OCAMPO, Respondents.
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DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A. Placino (Narcisa) a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio City. Francisco Nio (Nio), one of the herein respondents, who has been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of November 11, 1976. Nio appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed. The decision of the Director of Lands dated November 11, 1976 having become final and executory,1 the then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution dated February 1, 1993 directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Nio and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto."2 Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC dismissed Narcisas complaint, however, by Order3of August 7, 1996. Narcisas counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall (Atty. Claravall), later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Nio. The DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the

City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government. The DENR-CAR also invoked Section 14 (now Section 10 (d)) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.4 Atty. Claravall thereupon moved to have the Order of Execution previously issued by the DENR-CAR amended, which was granted. As amended, the Order of Execution addressed to the CENRO Officer read: WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1844 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3077, you are hereby enjoined to enforce the aforementioned order, with the assistance upon request of the City Sheriff of Baguio City, the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City Police Station, by Ordering Petitioner Nio and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto. xxxx SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The DENR-CENRO, together with the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City police, desisted, however, in their earlier attempt to enforce the Amended Order of Execution.6 On July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian, started demolishing the houses of Nio and his herein corespondents.7 The demolition was, however, temporarily stopped upon the instructions of DENR-CENR Officer Guillermo Fianza, who later advised Nio that the DENR-CENRO would implement the Amended Order of Execution on August 4, 1997.8 Nio and his wife Josefina Nio thereupon filed a Petition9 for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City against Guillermo Fianza, Teofilo Olimpo of the DENR-CENRO, Mayor
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Mauricio Domogan (hereafter petitioner), Atty. Claravall, Engr. Orlando Genove (hereafter petitioner), Rolando Angara, and Police Officer Donato Bacquian challenging the Amended Order of Execution issued by the DENR-CENRO.1avvphil.net The Nio spouses later filed an Amended Petition10 by impleading Emmanuel Nio and Eurlie Ocampo as therein co-petitioners and the City of Baguio (hereafter petitioner) and Narcisa as therein additional respondents, and further praying for damages. Branch 6 of the Baguio RTC dismissed the petition of Nio et al. (hereafter respondents) for lack of merit.11Respondents Motion for Reconsideration12 having been denied, they filed a Petition for Review13 under Rule 42 of the Rules before the Court of Appeals. By Decision14 of December 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Review, holding that Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules reading: SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. xxxx (d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. (Underscoring supplied) applies. Thus disposed the appellate court: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Orders dated September 24, 1997 and November 23, 1998 are hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent City Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineers Office are hereby ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended

order of executionissued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper court.1avvphil.net SO ORDERED.15 (Underscoring supplied) Respondents filed before the appellate court an Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration16 on January 9, 2003, alleging that some of the reliefs they prayed for in their petition were left unacted upon.17 Petitioners too filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 on January 28, 2003, raising the following grounds: 1. THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE CITY MAYOR HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THE DEMOLITION OF ILLEGALLY-BUILT STRUCTURES; 2. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW; 3. THE HONORABLE COURT MISAPPLIED SEC. 10 (d), RULE 39 of the RULES OF COURT.19(Underscoring supplied) In support of the first ground, petitioners raised before the appellate court, in their Motion for Reconsideration, for the first time, the power of the City Mayor to validly order the demolition of a structure constructed without a building permit pursuant to Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to the National Building Code of the Philippines. Alleging that respondents built their house without the required entry and building permits, petitioners argued that the City Mayor may order the demolition of a house without a special court order.20 The Court of Appeals denied both parties motions for reconsideration by Resolution21 of December 17, 2003.

10

Hence, the present petition of the City of Baguio, Mayor Domogan (now a Congressman), and Orlando Genove, faulting the appellate court: 1. . . . IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL COURT ORDER IS NEEDED FOR THE DEMOLITION OF RESPONDENTS STRUCTURES; 2. . . . IN APPLYING SEC. 10(d) RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN THIS CASE; 3. . . . IN ENTERTAINING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REVIEW.22 The petition fails. While it is noted that respondents appeal to the Court of Appeals was erroneously brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of under Rule 41, the RTC having rendered the questioned decision in the exercise of its original, not appellate, jurisdiction, this Court overlooks the error in view of the merits of respondents case.23 Petitioners contention that the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution does not need a hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires does not lie. That an administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution is of no moment, since the requirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes the constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."24 Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority teaches: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.25(Underscoring supplied)

There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of demolition26 which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is. Indeed, [w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.27 (Emphasis added) Consequently, this Court held:28 x x x the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the possession of the land to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of Lands.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to remove improvements introduced by respondents on, and turn over possession of, the lot to Narcisa. Petitioners invocation of the City Mayors authority under Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code to order the demolition or removal of an illegally constructed house, building, or structure within the period prescribed by law or ordinance and their
11

allegation that respondents structures were constructed without building permits30were not raised before the trial court. Petitioners having, for the first time, invoked said section of the Local Government Code and respondents lack of building entry permits in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, it was correctly denied of merit,31 it being settled that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.32 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS SUTTON 153 SCRA 399 PUNO, J.: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution. The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR,[2] this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.[3] On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner ignored their request. On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.[6] On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order[7] partially granting the application of
12

respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR.[10] It ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such issue. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 is hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.[11]

Hence, this petition.

The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising. Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body concerned.
13

The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.[13] The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.[14] In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented

by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.[15] Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands. A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly does not apply in this
14

case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines.[18] Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for nonagricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents. Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one.[19] In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. [21] With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice

JESUS

CABARRUS, JR., complainant, BERNAS, respondents. DECISION

vs.

JOSE

ANTONIO

TORRES, JR., J.: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility. In his complaintaffidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996, complainant alleged as follows:

15

A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court in National Capital Region, RTC, which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6; B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A6, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping which states: Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states: He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of which are true to his personal knowledge and that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. Underscoring supplied. C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by forgery as gleaned from paragraph 15, 16, and 22; D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annex B.

D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646; D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI standard specimen signitures dated October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto attached and marked as Annexes (sic) C. E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that: He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-certification was placed under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis (sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping. F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired and confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and deliberate violation of Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states: Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.- The penalty of prison correctional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon: 1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial documents; and
16

2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage , shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article, or any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree. G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated abetted and facilitated the perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the code of Professional responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E; CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS. Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. In his Comment, [2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in the civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora. In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI the he assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular. The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping. After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and should be dismissed. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort to forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances, xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, [4] In this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and forgery committed by
17

Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating the circulars on forum shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[6] Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 provides, viz:
[7]

(f)

To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city and municipal peace officers at the request of their respective superiors along effective methods of crime investigation and detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their duties; To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation; To perform such other related function as the secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.

(g)

(h)

, specifically section 1 hereof

Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which shall have the following functions: (a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its initiative and as public interest may require; To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and other offenses; To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other infromations for the benefit and use of the prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the Philippines, identification records of all person without criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics, and ownership or possession of all firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom; To give technical aid to all prosecuting and lawenforcement officers and entities of the Government as well as the courts that may request its services; To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the investigation of cases of administrative or civil nature in which the Government is interested;

Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client. The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur. Mendoza, J., on leave.

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

18

G.R. No. 148579

February 5, 2007

"noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the now assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was affirmed in toto. Hence, this recourse. The pivotal issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television and (2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner. First, Section 3 of PD 19865 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads: SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture, television program or related publicity material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture, television program or publicity material. The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7,6 such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the movie, "Muro Ami." In adopting this finding, we hold that "Muro Ami: The Making," did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power of review of MTRCB.

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, Respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the June 18, 2001 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the January 7, 2000 order2 of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) which read: In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned, hereby imposes the administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM AIRING/BROADCASTING any program on EMC Channel 27 for a period of seven (7) days which period shall commence immediately upon receipt of this Order. Your failure to comply with this ORDER shall be construed by the BOARD as defiance on your part of a lawful order of the BOARD. The facts follow. Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986.3 The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 9817 dated December 15, 19984 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely

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On the other hand, petitioner claims that "Muro Ami: The Making" was a public affairs program.7 Even if that were so, our resolution of this issue would not change. This Court has already ruled that a public affairs program -- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within the MTRCBs power of review.8 Clearly, "Muro Ami: The Making" (which petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was well within the purview of MTRCBs power of prior review.1awphi1.net However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.9 Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000.10 Hence, the same is yet to be effective.11 It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR.12 Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Boards jurisdiction over "Muro Ami: The Making," is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued against petitioner GMA Network, Inc. pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby declared null and void. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246,
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1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847. b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,11801278. c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 15901595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 16301649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 17311734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 18021804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 18431844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 19862028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 21632244. e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 1122, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123. g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439. The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

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The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error' No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we

have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character. The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case. Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ... The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
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even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ... The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales

ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5 The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6 It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about
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the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified." From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. InPesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. SO ORDERED. Relova, J., concurs. Aquino, J., took no part. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave. Separate Opinions
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FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification): There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. I shall explain why. 1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity. 2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires

notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2 3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes. 4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
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is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule. 5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement. I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official

repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights. PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification): The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
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process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazetterequired by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role. In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.

However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette. DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

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