SCFI 2010

Albert Qaeda

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Index
Index .............................................................................................................................................................. 1 Hegemony Procurement 1NC .......................................................................................................................................... 2 Procurement Solvency................................................................................................................................... 3 Procurement Solvency................................................................................................................................... 4 Procurement Solvency................................................................................................................................... 5 Procurement Solvency Terrorism ............................................................................................................... 6 Procurement I/L Overstretch ....................................................................................................................... 7 Procurement A2: Cut Spending .................................................................................................................. 8 Officer Training 1NC ...................................................................................................................................... 9 Officer Training Solvency............................................................................................................................. 10 Proliferation Israel 1NC.................................................................................................................................................... 11 Israel Solvency ............................................................................................................................................ 12 Israel Solvency Iran .................................................................................................................................. 13 Israel Solvency Saudi Arabia .................................................................................................................... 14 Israel Uniqueness ..................................................................................................................................... 16 Fuel Bank 1NC ............................................................................................................................................ 17 Fuel Bank Solvency ..................................................................................................................................... 18 Fuel Bank Solvency ..................................................................................................................................... 19 Fuel Bank Solvency Russia ...................................................................................................................... 20 Fuel Bank Solvency Russia ...................................................................................................................... 21 A2: Fuel Bank CP ........................................................................................................................................ 22 Iran Sanctions 1NC...................................................................................................................................... 23 NPT Fails ..................................................................................................................................................... 24 NPT Fails ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 NPT Fails ..................................................................................................................................................... 26

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

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Procurement 1NC
The United States federal government should fully fund modernization of Department of Defense equipment and weapon systems purchased from private contractors. Solves hegemony were nearing the tipping point when our military becomes obsolete

Holmes and Eaglen in 2007(Kim, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, and Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies and Mackenzie, Research Fellow for National Security Studies, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, Military chiefs sound warnings of a hollow force JR) Why else would both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chief of staff of the Air Force call for spending at least 4 percent of our gross domestic product on defense, and two members of Congress introduce a joint resolution saying basically the same thing? Because they understand that,

unless we invest at least that much each year for five to 10 years in state-of-the-art technologies and platforms, our military will lose its fighting edge. The warning signs are there. Today,when the Army goes to war, it does so with a force designed to fight the Soviets in Europe, not asymmetric warfare in the desert. The U.S. Air Force has some 2,500 fewer aircraft today than in the late 1980s, and the U.S. Navy fleet has less than one-half the number of ships it did then. Many of our weapons and systems are worn out or, worse, obsolete. We are rapidly approaching the tipping point. A military ill-equipped for battle will suffer needless deaths. It's happened to our troops before, and it could happen again.
In 1950, some 400 young U.S. soldiers - many teenagers - watched a column of North Korean T-34 tanks advance. Only days before, these men had been on occupation duty in Japan.

Wet weather knocked out their World War II-era radios and soaked their sneakers(there hadn't been enough combat boots at the supply depot to go around).Each soldier carried only 120 rounds of rifle ammunition and a dozen were armed with Howitzers and "bazooka" rocket launchers. These weapons were effective during World War II, but they were no match for the heavily armored T-34s.
Nevertheless, they were ordered to engage the enemy. Gen. Douglas MacArthur said an "arrogant display of strength" was all it would take to drive back the "barefoot Asian army" of North Korea. Not quite. The men suffered 181 casualties. This disaster was a failure of Washington leadership after World War II. Congress

drastically slashed defense spending and, as a consequence, the military was simply unable to prepare for the next war.This is not an isolated incident.Today, our military faces similar obstacles. The number, size and duration of deployments have increased dramatically since the Cold War, yet defense spending remains historically low. Take the procurement budget: During the Reagan buildup (fiscal years 1981
through 1985), we an average of $131 billion a year. During the post-Cold War procurement holiday, mean defense spending was $71 billion between 1990 and 1997, and in the war on terrorism, the mean has been $93 billion for 2002 through 2011.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

Adv CPs
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Procurement Solvency
Defense spending key to econ and hegemony
The reality is that there

Talent 7 (Jim Talent is a distinguished fellow in military affairs at the Heritage Foundation. He served in the U.S. House of Representatives,
March 5, 2007, National Review, More: The crying need for a bigger U.S. Military. JR)

is no huge pot of money currently in the defense budget from which the necessary increase can be funded. It cannot come from reducing the number of service personnel because the military is already too small. Precisely because of budget pressures in the past, the service chiefs have already reduced force structure to dangerous levels. That is why the Navy is "cross-decking" sailors -- helicoptering them from a ship returning home to one that is steaming out to sea -- in order to man all its vessels. Nor can the money come from reducing the compensation we pay our servicemen and women. Apart from the fact that Congress would and should never reduce
compensation in the middle of a war, the services must hire and retain high-quality people. The more modern the military becomes, the more skills it demands, and skilled people cost money. There

is no such thing as a "grunt" in today's military. The truth is that spending on personnel benefits is much more likely to increase than decrease. Total spending on defense health care, for example, increased from $17.5 billion in 2000 to $37 billion in 2006. WE CAN DO IT The good news is that robust and consistent funding of the military is fully within America's capability. Currently the U.S. spends only 3.8 percent of its GDP on the core
defense budget, including the non-Department of Defense expenditures for national security. That is far lower than during the Cold War, and almost a full percentage point less than was spent even during the Carter years. America's

economy is so powerful that even after years of underfunding military procurement, the U.S. could still recapitalize and sustain its military strength by enacting the $34 billion increase I mentioned earlier, and maintaining defense spending at no less than 4 percent of GDP thereafter. This program -- called the "4% for Freedom Solution" by the Heritage Foundation -- would send the clearest possible message to America's friends and enemies that, whatever happens in Iraq, America will remain a force to be reckoned with. For some purposes, defense policy is foreign policy. Imagine the impact on China and North Korea,
for example, of realizing that the U.S., by using only a small fraction of its economic resources, can guarantee an increased and highly capable naval presence in the Western Pacific for years to come. The 4% for Freedom Solution would also have a positive impact on our long-term fiscal position. First, it would focus debate about the deficit squarely where it belongs: on the entitlement programs. Even

a glance at the government's budget shows that growth in entitlement programs, not in defense or other discretionary spending, poses the real long-term threat to solvency. If Congress reforms entitlement spending, there will be more than enough money for defense; if Congress fails to get entitlements under control, then funding defense on the cheap will not save the country from bankruptcy. Second, assuring sufficient funding for defense would promote more efficient use of defense dollars. Capital would flow back into the defense industrial base, and the service chiefs could attempt what in Washington has heretofore been unthinkable: long-term planning. They could budget in a way that reduces costs over the life of new systems, instead of fighting each other for money every year, or maneuvering each budget cycle just to keep vital programs aliv e. President Bush's
proposed double-digit increase is welcome news; but large swings in defense funding always cost the taxpayer more than solid, consistent funding over time.Finally, American power is an important stabilizing force in the world ;

by reassuring the financial markets about American strength, the 4% for Freedom Solution would help reduce risk within the international economy and promote economic growth at home and abroad. Even a small positive impact on the economy would more than pay for the additional investment in military capability . How much would it be worth
economically, for example, to reduce the risk that China invades Taiwan, or Kim Jong Il is tempted to use his nuclear capability? The peace and prosperity of the 1990s, remember, were due at least in part to the Reagan defense buildup of the 1980s. The Reagan precedent is also the answer to those who are concerned about the short-term impact of the 4% for Freedom Solution on the deficit. It is true that military strength has its price, but as Jimmy Carter found out, there is a price to be paid for weakness, too.President Bush's recent defense-budget submission is the best news for American security in 15 years. The Democratic leaders should fully fund it, and the administration deserves credit for proposing it. But it would not have been necessary if the Clinton administration had not cut defense spending in the 1990s, or if the first George W. Bush administration had more robustly funded the needs that were clearly apparent even in 2001. By adopting the "4% for Freedom Solution," our leaders can show that for once they have learned the lessons of the past. There never will be a war that ends all wars; history has shown that, even in years where threats do not seem immediate, the dangers remain -- and only the reality and perception of American power can deter them from breaking out.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

Adv CPs
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Procurement Solvency
Buying weapons from private contractors solves quality and costs
Today's American military is stronger and covers ground more quickly than ever before. But, because

Spencer in 2005(Jack, Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy, Heritage Foundation, Keeping our military strong JR) of globalization, fewer and fewer products are actually "Made in USA."The president's helicopter fleet is made by a foreign manufacturer, for example, whilethe Army and Marine Corps lease Australian catamarans . So it's no surprise that the Department of Defense is often looking outside of America's borders to meet our defense needs. This raises some logical questions:
Is globalization good for the military? Are we truly safe when so many critical systems and components are manufactured overseas? To get the answers, The Heritage Foundation spent more than a year studying the military industrial base. We interviewed experts in military affairs and manufacturing and held forums with members of government and academia. We found that the

best way to preserve our military

advantage over potential foes is to take advantage of the free market. That may seem surprising at first blush. After all, the country might appear to be safer if the government controlled all the facilities involved in the military supply chain. But the fact is,Congress has tried repeatedly over the years to steer defense contracts in directions that would supposedly shore up or expand America's military-industrial capacity. Yet these efforts have nearly always interrupted the natural tides of the market and led to unintended consequences, including inefficient practices, high prices and limited choices for the military. America's war-fighting institutions have consistently achieved better results when they have relied on the free market to decide where and how products should be made. As proof, consider what happens when the government owns a defense-related manufacturing facility and guarantees the income of its employees. While the military can count on a steady stream of products, the plant's employees have no incentive to consider their global competition. The plant will continue to receive appropriated funding as long as it produces articles that meet government specifications. In the same way, when a government subsidizes or guarantees the existence of a manufacturing facility and -- in some cases, the income of its workers -- the Department of Defense has no incentive to make further investments in the plant's facility or people. The plant continues to receive funding as long as it produces articles that meet government specifications. But there's never an incentive to make better products or ones that cost less.In both cases, innovation and competition are sacrificed to maintain guaranteed supply. Rather than fear supply competition, the military needs to encourage it, to ensure our troops always have the best equipment available. One way to encourage competition would be to create contests that reward those who develop critical technology.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

Adv CPs
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Procurement Solvency
Now is the key time modernization requires a quick and sustained increase
http://www.heritage.org/About/Staff/T/Jim-Talent, February 20, 2007.

Talent 2007 (Jim, Jim Talent is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, where he specializes in military readiness and welfare reform issues.)
America is now reaching a decision point similar to the one Reagan faced in 1981, and it is important to understand clearly what is at stake. America is the defender of freedom in the world and therefore always a prime target for those who hate freedom. The progress of the international order toward peace and democracy depends on American power; and while the basket of Western foreign policy contains many tools, what underpins them all is a U.S. military that the world knows is capable of defeating threats swiftly and effectively. Judged by this standard, the situation facing the U.S.
military is grave. America's armed forces are, in one respect, better off than in 1981. The volunteer force is a proven, mature, and successful model; America is protected by the finest servicemen and women in history. But because of

decisions over the last 15 years -- driven more by budgetary than by military considerations -- the Army is too small, the Navy and Marine Corps may well be too small, and much of the equipment in all the services is too old and increasingly unreliable. Without a substantial increase in procurement spending, beginning now and sustained over the next five to ten years -- an increase measured not in billions but in tens of billions of dollars per year above current estimates -- the U.S. will be unable to modernize its forces to the degree necessary to preserve its security with the necessary margin of safety.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

Adv CPs
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Procurement Solvency Terrorism

Modernization key to winning the War on Terror
Spring 08 (Baker SpringF.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, January 28, 2008,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/01/Laying-the-Groundwork-for-a-Military-Victory) George W. Bush is in the last year of his presidency. Yet the greater war against terrorism will continue long after he's out of office. So, as he prepares to deliver his final State of the Union address, he needs to address the requirements for national defense beyond Iraq. This isn't to say he shouldn't mention Iraq. Our progress there in the last year remains a vital issue, and the American people deserve to hear about it. What President Bush must do, though, is tie his explanation of the progress in Iraq to the broader requirements for military preparedness. First, Bush must remind us this isn't the time for a "peace dividend." Even if the U.S. achieves a swift military and political victory in Iraq, one that would allow tens of thousands of Americans to leave Iraq, the broader war will continue.

Our country can't afford to hollow out the military when we need it to win the war against Islamic extremists. Unfortunately, we're still rebuilding from the "procurement holiday" forced on the military in the 1990s. Because we didn't purchase enough weapons systems during that decade, we're forced to spend more today to buy the equipment the military needs. This increase must allow the military to recover from the shortfall and put it on the path to sustained investments for new weapons and equipment. That leaves less available for buying current weapons systems. For example, the Navy has been forced to reduce construction of Virginia-class submarines to one per year -- even though constructing two per year could have reduced the unit cost to $2 billion per boat. The Air Force has been forced to scale back dramatically its purchasing of F-22 Raptor tactical fighters. It's slated to obtain just 183 F-22s despite its requirement for 381. The Army has been forced to extend the production time for its Future Combat System by five years.
This president ought to leave a very different military to his successor than Bill Clinton left for him. That, of course, will cost money. For example, it

will cost $8 billion more than is currently planned per year for the Navy to buy the new ships it needs and $3 billion per year for the Marine Corps to recruit and train thousands of necessary new warriors.
How much will the total bill be? Well, military analysts at the American Legion suggest it would take a sustained investment of 5 percent of GDP each year. Experts at The Heritage Foundation think it can be done for 4 percent -- slightly more than the 3.9 percent appropriated this year. Bush should make it clear that our military spending is low compared to what it's been other times we've been at war. And he

should point out that we need to invest today to have the military we'll require in the years ahead. The president also needs to articulate a sound national security strategy. It ought to be called a "damage limitation" program. This would explain how he intends to protect the American people (as well as friends and allies around the world) from attack. Such a pro-active stance would be a welcome change from our Cold War policy of accepting vulnerability by relying on a strategy of retaliation (mutually assured destruction) in case of attack. A damage-limitation strategy would be designed to minimize the likelihood of a successful weapons of mass destruction attack on the U.S. and its friends and allies. After all, other nations are less likely to attempt to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons -- or attempt to use these weapons -- if their attack is likely to fail. Meanwhile, our military needs to field the correct mix of offensive and defensive forces. We must maintain the conventional forces necessary to go after Islamic extremists anywhere in the world, which is an essential component of the damage-limitation strategy's central goal of providing protection to the American people and allies. America's general purpose forces, however, cannot focus on the threat of Islamic extremists alone. There are two other broad requirements of the damagelimitation strategy that can be met only through modernized general purposes forces possessing broader capabilities. The first is to prevent a major power threat to Europe, eastern Asia or the Persian Gulf. This requires enough conventional military power to counter the organized armed forces of aggressive countries. The second requirement is to maintain access to vital resources and conduits for global trade. In this case, U.S. general purpose forces must be capable of projecting power to distant regions in order to defend access to those resources. America's military must also be capable of protecting vital trade routes, whether at sea, in the air, in space or in cyberspace. Our recent focus on Iraq is understandable. But it's time to broaden the nation's perspective regarding national defense. That's where the State of the Union speech comes in.

Iraq is a critical battle in a long war, just as Korea and Vietnam were important battles in the Cold War. Sustained investments in the military are urgent and necessary to achieve ultimate victory.

Most importantly, President Bush should use the speech to make a solemn pledge to the American people that the military investments he is advocating are necessary to protect them and their families.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

Adv CPs
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Procurement I/L Overstretch

The troops are exhausted expansion of the military key to prevent collapse
-AM

Brooks 07 (March 26, 2007, Peter Brookes, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2007/03/The-Next-Threats-Military-Able-But-Stretched)

The U.S. military has now made over 2 million individual deployments to Iraq and or Afghanistan. The preponderance, of course, has been our "ground-pounding" soldiers and Marines - many on multiple tours. This high ground-force operational tempo ("ops tempo") has led some to declare our military nearly broken, incapable of handling another major conflict - that is, lacking in what military planners call "strategic depth."
Legit concerns. But we're not at "mission impossible" - yet.

Yes, our active-duty and reserve ground forces are tired - and understandably so. So is their equipment after four years of wear and tear in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker has issued strong warnings to Congress about repeat deployments and their toll on the army's health and welfare. The Marines, ever reluctant to complain, concur. The Army/Marine ops tempo should give us pause. But that doesn't mean Uncle Sam can't handle another fight if necessary - thanks to the Navy and Air Force. Sure, it would be tough, but let me explain: Outside of Iraq/Afghanistan, the three conflicts most likely to involve America are a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, a China-Taiwan dust-up and another Korean-peninsula war. Not minor military matters, but with the arguable exception of Korea, they could all be fought using heavy doses of sea and air power, which, fortunately, aren't stretched as thin as our ground forces. Iran: An attack would likely be executed by U.S. air and sea strikes, not ground forces (but don't count out special ops). Air Force B-2 bombers and F-117, F-15 and F-16 strike fighters would drop GPS-guided JDAM and gravity bombs on Iranian air defenses, nuclear facilities and retaliatory forces such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Navy would chime in with carrier-based aviation and surface ships/submarines in the Persian Gulf and the North Arabian Sea, dropping bombs and firing cruise missiles at Iran's nuclear sites, air defenses and naval assets. China-Taiwan: While the chance of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait is remote, China's defense buildup and recent Taiwanese rhetoric about "independence" keeps this possibility at the front of war planners' minds. Fortunately, a Chinese attack on Taiwan must navigate the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait. China doesn't have the air- and sea-lift capability to support a full-scale invasion of Taiwan - so it would have to rely on ballistic missiles and sea and air power. The U.S. objective would be to protect the political status quo, using air and naval forces to break Chinese naval blockades, counter air or missile strikes and vanquish sea- or airborne invasion forces as they cross the strait. Korea: A Korean contingency would normally call for significant U.S. ground forces. But the 28,000 American and 650,000 South Korean troops now "in country" could fight a holding action until the U.S. cavalry - forces not deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan or the Persian Gulf - arrived. South Korea's ground forces alone are more than a match for the North Korean People's Army - which, while still dangerous, is a shell of what it was back in the days when Pyongyang was getting military aid from the Soviet Union. The United States would quickly add naval and air assets to throw the fight in our direction. Missile defenses are already deployed for dealing with North Korea's long-range missile and nuclear capability. These - and theater missile defenses - are constantly being developed and improved. But, while the Navy and Air Force can respond, we shouldn't feel comfortable "hollow force" if trends in defense spending and ops tempo for all services don't change.

with the way things stand. We're looking down the barrel of a

The Army and Marines are finally adding troops after 1990s cutbacks. But at the same time, the

Navy and Air Force are cutting personnel in a "rob Peter to pay Paul" strategy to finance needed weapons systems. It's hard to believe, but U.S. defense spending remains at historic lows as a percentage of gross domestic product, despite the large budgets since 9/11. This isn't good for our national security - or fair to our fighting men and women. It's encouraging to adversaries. There's plenty of blame to go around. Finger-pointing makes for good political sport, but fixing the problem instead of assigning blame is what counts. Congress needs to act quickly. Raising and maintaining our armed forces is its constitutional duty. Anything less than giving our military the wherewithal to take on the challenges to our national security is unacceptable - anddangerous.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

Adv CPs
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Procurement A2: Cut Spending

Cutting programs doesnt solve long term the military needs comprehensive reform
U.S. Defense Spending: The Mismatch Between Plans and Resources, The Heritage Foundation, JR)

Eaglen in 2010 (Mackenzie, Research Fellow for National Security Studies, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, June 7, Closing the gap between the Defense Departments modernization requirements and the funding allocated by Congress will require honestly assessing the underlying causes and repudiating failed solutions. Congress should specifically reject defense program cuts masked as acquisition reform. In March, Deputy Defense
Secretary William Lynn touted the cancellation of seven major programs, including the C-17 cargo aircraft and the alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, as major acquisition reform successes.[43] Killing

programs is a simple way to show immediate dollar savings, but it will not change how the military actually buys equipment or address underlying problems. Furthermore, cutting current investment in next-generation systems will simply balloon future bills. It will also expose servicemembers to greater risks on the battlefield and further reduce the militarys capabilities. Instead of temporary measures to reduce todays outlays, Members should pursue true reforms that will restructure troubled programs and restore long-term efficiencies. Congress should take steps designed to alleviate each of the budget pressures identified, taking into account competing demands for the marginal defense dollar and prioritizing the maintenance and improvement of core defense capabilities. To ensure that resources are allocated wisely, Congress should: Smooth the defense budget peaks and valleys through more predictable outlays. Through its annual budget resolutions, Congress should sustain a defense topline that outpaces inflation for at least three years after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan subside. Members should pursue this even though it will likely require adding funding to the Presidents annual
budget request. This is particularly important given that a flat defense budget is really a declining defense budget because the cost growth of personnel and O&M typically outpaces inflation by 3 percent to 8 percent annually. Furthermore, when

current operations wind down, Congress will likely be pressured to cut defense spending, but reducing the budget at that time will prevent the armed forces from resetting and recapitalizing effectively. The Pentagon will also need to broaden military training and modernize aging systems with next-generation programs. Relieving the strains of wartime deployments will give the Pentagon greater flexibility in a stable, predictable defense budget to improve overall readiness levels and develop coherent programming plans.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

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Officer Training 1NC

The United States federal government should require and fund graduate school attendance for the senior officer corps of its armed forces. Solves hegemony
Professional-Military-Education) -AM

Carafano 08 (July 31, 2008, James Carafano, Ph.D., http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/07/On-Teaching-War-The-Future-ofOn the one hand, American professional military education has never been under greater stress. The war tax, the Pentagon's annual ritual of raiding institutional budgets to pay for military operations until supplemental appropriation are approved; plucking staff out of stateside schools for staff jobs overseas; a relentless operational tempo that leaves little time to send the right people to schools at the right time; and outsourcing teaching and thinking to private sector companies are undermining the world's finest military education system. On the other hand, the military schools in all the services from basic training to the war college's have preformed yeoman's services trying to reorient education courses to give warriors the skills, knowledge, and attributes they need to fight the Long War. At the same time, they have experimented with distributed learning and other techniques and technologies to deliver education to the field. The armed forces have also tried hard, despite the demands to field a combat force, to get more leaders to civilian graduate schools to learn the non-military technical and critical thinking skills required to complement warfighting knowledge. Compounding the ambiguous state of teaching the military craft is a long list of lessons learned from the first years of the Long War. The service's Cold War practice of linking promotion and education proved a tragic mistake. Post-Cold War military operations have been highly decentralized, requiring men and women at all levels and throughout the force to exercise complex leadership and management tasks. It turns out in the new world disorder, everybody, not just the best and the brightest destined for generalship, requires a very high-degree of professional military competence. Neglecting the professional education of the reserves, particularly in regard to joint education, was a painful lesson as well. Reserve soldiers serve in staffs at every level on every battlefield and they need to be educated to the exact same standards as their active duty counterparts. Perhaps the most difficult lesson learned was what the real scope of professional military education should be. The military's role in warfighting was always unquestioned, but its responsibilities in peace operations are both controversial and poorly understood. This reflected the military's traditional approach to post-conflict missions, homeland security, and other interagency operations (where soldiers have to work hand-in-hand with a variety of civilian agencies), which have always been ad hoc and haphazard. The old adage that the military's job is to "win the nation's war" was just stupid. Nations, all the parts of the nation that contribute the war effort, win wars. And, "winning the peace" is part of winning the war as well, and many parts of the nation, including the military, have a role here as well. When American forces prepare to undertake postconflict missions, they try, as much as possible, to make them mirror traditional military activities. Such an approach can result in the misapplication of resources, inappropriate tasks and goals, and ineffective operations. In addition, the armed forces largely eschew integrated joint, interagency, and coalition operations, as well as ignoring the role of non-governmental agencies. The result is that most operations lack cohesion, flexibility, and responsiveness.

Saving professional military education from the relentless budgetary pressures to fund other military priorities is continuing challenge. Folding the lessons learned from the Long War into the professional military education system is another. Sustaining the education
system is largely a question of maintaining adequate defense budgets--a major battle that will have to be fought in the years ahead. Institutionalizing the lessons of the Long War, however, will require both money and change.

The obstacles to making the military learn more effectively are largely cultural in origin. Therefore, changing military culture could well require a set of initiatives that cut across the services' education, career professional development patterns, and organization. To start with, the skills needed to conduct effective post-conflict tasks require "soft power," not only the capacity to understand other nations and cultures, but also the ability to work in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. These are sophisticated leader and staff proficiencies, required at many levels of command. In the present military education system, however, much of the edification relevant to building these attributes is provided at the war colleges to a relatively elite group being groomed for senior leader and joint duty positions. This model is wrong on two counts. First, I think these skills are needed by most leaders and staffs in both the active and reserve components, not just an elite group within the profession. Second, this education comes too late in an officer or NCO's career. Virtually every other career field provides "graduate level" education to members in their mid-20s to 30s. Only the military delays advanced education until its leaders are in their mid-40s. That has to change.
Each armed service also need special schools specifically designed to teach the operational concepts and practices relevant to post-conflict missions, homeland security and other critical national security tasks. The services already have advanced schools (such as the Marine Corps School for Advanced Warfighting) for instructing in the operational arts at their staff colleges. These courses train the military's finest planners. The curriculum in these courses should be expanded to include post-conflict missions. In the

future, the attribute most needed by military officers is the critical thinking skills that come from a graduate education program. Thinking skills are the best preparation for ambiguity and uncertainty. Virtually any graduate program would suffice. In fact, the military should seek as broad a range of graduate experiences as possible as a hedge against unexpected operational and strategic requirements. To build a well-educated, diverse officer and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps, the military should use the free market. A requirement for educating a large pool of military officers will create a vast new demand. Officers and NCOs
should have a wide variety of options and opportunities. The primary goal of military education is to teach officers how to think. What or where officers are learning is less important than the types of skills that they are developing--skills that will serve them well in a wide spectrum of situations and conflicts. An officer, for example, can gain the same critical analysis skills from a political science course as from an advanced engineering course.

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

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Officer Training Solvency

American Military Officers undertrained-military education reform key.
James Karafano&AlaneKochems, 2005.(Ph.D. Deputy Director, The Kathryn andShelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director, Heritage Expert) http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2005/10/Military-Education-Needs-Reform, October 11, 2005

Increasingly, like our enemies, our on-the-ground leadership will be bound together by shared ideals and objectives, but little else. Our leaders, in essence, will direct self-sufficient "cells" of soldiers as they pursue their independent tasks. Critical thinking will be, well, critical. Quick judgments to counter rapidly changing circumstances will be essential. Encounters with uncommon and unexpected threats -- from weapons of mass destruction, unexpected capabilities or surprise attacks from insurgents and terrorists -- will be unavoidable. Yet, the training these officers now receive has changed little since the end of the Cold War, when enemies were known, battles were planned and capabilities were fully anticipated. We continue to train and promote officers on the basis of their ability to meet challenges they almost certainly never will encounter on a battlefield. For example, despite the fact that the U.S. military has conducted an average of one peacekeeping, peacemaking or post-conflict operation
every two years since the end of the Cold War, military education and training programs offered scant preparation for the postwar challenges in Iraq.

10

SCFI 2010
Albert Qaeda

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Israel 1NC
Israel should substantially reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal and sign the Non Proliferation Treaty. Solves prolif and a new Middle East arms race
<http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51300>. CJ As the only Middle Eastern country armed with nuclear weapons, Israel

Deen, Thalif10, UN Bureau Chief & IPS Regional Director. "Israel, Iran Targeted at Nuke Non-Proliferation Meet." ISP (2010): n. pag. Web. 16 Jul 2010.
has been treated as a political sacred cow, one whose weapons programmes have not been publicly challenged either by the United States or Western powers. But on Monday an overwhelming majority of U.N. member states - 118 out of 192 - wanted the defiant Jewish state to come clean with its nuclear weapons programme and sign the NPT, which is aimed at halting the spread of these devastating armaments. Speaking on behalf of the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said the fact that Israel has refused to sign and ratify the NPT has resulted in the continued exposure of non-nuclear weapon states of the region to nuclear threats by the only country possessing these weapons of mass destruction. Israel, he warned, has also unleashed risks associated with the operation of "unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and activities of unknown safety standards". Worse still, Israel has also implicitly triggered the threat of a nuclear arms race of "a catastrophic regional and international potential" thereby jeopardising the NPT regime in its entirety, said Natalegawa, echoing the views of the largest single political coalition at the United Nations. "This situation is unsustainable," as it also jeopardises the implementation of the 1995 resolution calling for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, Natalegawa warned. The month-long

conference, which runs through May 28, will take stock of the successes and failures of an international treaty aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons and perhaps ultimately eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world's military arsenals. The treaty, which was opened for signature back in July 1968, has come under review every five years. Today, 189 countries have acceded to the treaty, including the five declared nuclear powers, which are also the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council: the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia. The three undeclared nuclear powers are India, Pakistan and Israel, which are not parties to the NPT. North Korea acceded to the treaty, violated it, and later withdrew. The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the necessity of Israel's accession to the NPT, and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But so far, Israel has refused to accede to that request. Speaking at the opening session Monday, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki- moon, who declared that disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are among his "top priorities", singled out only two countries by name: Iran and North Korea. He urged Tehran "to comply fully with Security Council resolutions and cooperate fully with the IAEA" and called upon North Korea to help achieve a "verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula". But he stopped short of making any references to Israel, India or Pakistan. Still, he said, "I urge those countries that are currently outside the treaty regime to accede to it as soon as possible," without identifying the three countries by name. Taking a

righteous stand on nuclear weapons, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the only head of state at the conference, said the sole function of the nuclear weapon is to annihilate all living beings and destroy the environment. The resulting radiation, he pointed out, would affect the coming generations and its negative impacts would continue for centuries. "The nuclear bomb is a fire against humanity rather than a weapon for defence," he said. "The possession of nuclear bombs is not a source of pride;
it is rather disgusting and shameful," said Ahmadinejad, whose country is accused of trying to develop nuclear weapons: a charge he has flatly denied. "And even more shameful is the threat to use or to use such weapons, which is not even comparable to any crime committed throughout the history," he declared. Ahmadinejad did not spare Israel, accusing it of stockpiling hundreds of nuclear warheads. He accused the Jewish state of having waged

many wars in the region and continuing to threaten the people and nations of the region "with terror and invasion".But he also pointed out that Israel "enjoys the unconditional support of the U.S. government and its allies, and receives, as well, the necessary assistance to develop its nuclear weapons programme".

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CP gets to the heart of Middle East nuclear politics sanctions do nothing
Solomont, E.B., and Herb Keinon10, New York correspondent for The Jerusalem Post - Diplomatic Correspondent for the Jerusalem Post. "Israel:
Iran sanctions a good start ."Jerusalem Post (2010): n. pag. Web. 16 Jul 2010. <http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=177983>. CJ

Today, the Security Council has responded decisively to the grave threat to international peace and security posed by Irans failure to live up to its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Rice said. We are at this point because the government of Iran has chosen clearly and willfully to violate its commitments to the IAEA and the resolutions of this council. Despite consistent and longstanding demands by the international community, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment and other proliferation-related activities. Israel expects energy-sector sanctions by WestStill, the sanctions fell short of some expectations, with modest increases from previous measures, and the resolution did not garner a unanimous vote in the Security Council. Israel, which for months has been calling for crippling sanctions targeting Irans energy sector, issued a statement welcoming the new UN sanctions as an important step, but saying that additional steps were needed. This is the sixth resolution demanding that Iran suspend its enrichments and cooperate with the IAEA, a carefully
clear this

worded statement issued by the Foreign Ministry read. Iran blatantly violated all the previous resolutions, and demonstrates blatant disregard for the international community and its institutions. There is great importance in the full and immediate implementation of this resolution. The statement said that it was

UN resolution by itself was not enough, and that what was necessary now was for additional significant steps to be taken by various countries and international groupings. In an obvious reference to the need to hit the Islamic Republics energy sector, the statement read that only such sanctions that focus on a variety of sectors in Iran are liable to impact on the Iranian decision-making process. Broad and determined international action was necessary to make clear to Teheran the price of continuing to

ignore the international communitys demands, the Foreign Ministry statement said. The ramifications of a marriage between Irans extremist ideology and nuclear weapons would be catastrophic, it warned. Brazil, Turkey remain opposed to sanctions Ahead of the vote, representatives of Brazil, Turkey and Lebanon criticized the Security Council decision to embrace sanctions. Last month, Brazil and Turkey brokered a deal with Iran to swap low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. We do not see sanctions as an effective institution in this case, said the Brazilian envoy, Maria LuizaRibeiroViotti. Sanctions would lead to the suffering of the people of Iran, she said, and they run counter to efforts of Brazil and Turkey to engage Iran. On Wednesday morning, hours ahead of the sanctions vote, the United States, Russia and France rejected the nuclear deal. The facts are clear, the French UN envoy, Grard Araud, said following the Security Council vote. The council was forced to react firmly, or else send a message to Iran and its allies to go ahead and pursue nuclear weapons. Iran has spared no effort to avoid the substance of an agreement, Araud said, accusing Iran of using the agreement as an alibi to avoid discussion of its nuclear program. Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon, currently in New York, issued a statement characterizing the decision as historic and took a veiled jab at Turkey. History will judge the nations according to their vote, and whether they chose narrow, cynical interests, or the interests of peace and stability, he said. What was important now was to supervise the implementation of the sanctions, Ayalon said. Obama: Iran only NPT signatory IAEA unconvinced is peaceful US President Barack

Obama called the sanctions the toughest and most comprehensive sanctions ever passed against the Islamic Republic. This resolution will put in place the toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government, and it sends an unmistakable message about the international communitys commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, he said. Indeed, Iran is the only NPT signatory in the world the only one that cannot convince the IAEA that its nuclear program is intended
for peaceful purposes, he said. Thats why the international community was compelled to impose these serious consequences. The Iranian envoy to the UN, however, accused Security Council members of a politically motivated vote. Citing many false accusations against Iran, Ambassador Muhammad Khazaee said, No amount of pressure and mischief will be able to break our nations determination to pursue and defend its legal and inalienable rights. During the vote, only Lebanon mentioned Israel. Israel

is the only country in the region who holds nuclear weapons, the Lebanese representative said. Israel should sign onto the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-weapon state, and submit its facilities to IAEA inspection.

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Israel Solvency Iran

CP is a prerequisite to solving Iran prolif
Tisdall, Simon 10,chief foreign affairs leader writer for the Guardian. "Israel's nuclear weapons: the end to nods, winks and blind eyes." Guardia (2010): n.
pag. Web. 16 Jul 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/23/israel-nuclear-weapons>. CJ

Israel has long been assumed to possess nuclear weapons. The fact Israel's leaders routinely refused to discuss it did not diminish the certainty with which this conviction was held by the country's Arab neighbours, nor their strong objections to it. But continuing official ambiguity served a useful purpose in that neither side was forced to confront the issue full on. Now the veil has been torn aside. Proof that Israelis, without any doubt, a nuclear weapons state, means an end to nods, winks and blind eyes. It confirms Israel as the Middle East's premier armed power. And it challenges all the countries of the region, including Iran, to address, separately or jointly, the threat inherent in the resulting, now undeniable military imbalance. Iran appears to have already made its choice. It is widely believed to be working hard to catch up with Israel, developing nuclear expertise and enriching uranium to levels inconsistent with purely civilian uses.
Tehran will interpret the latest disclosures as proof of a double standard maintained by the US and some western countries and a vindication of its assertion of its "nuclear rights". It may become even harder to obtain international support for implementing proposed new nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. Many

Arab states worry more about Iran than Israel. In a sort of nuclear chain reaction, states such as Qatar have begun their own civilian nuclear programmes with US backing and know-how, which could have military applications down the road. Others, such as Saudi Arabia, are said to be looking at the options. Syria is suspected of having co-operated with North Korea on obtaining nuclear capabilities, a claim denied. But all Arab countries face strong US pressure to eschew a dangerous and expensive Middle East nuclear arms race a spectre long portrayed as a prelude to Armageddon. Many, notably the largest, Egypt, appear to be sincere in voluntarily forgoing them. What they want are concrete results arising principally from Barack Obama's effort to make nuclear counter-proliferation a top global priority. From their perspective, this means first and foremost dealing with Israel and thereby potentially defusing the Iran problem. In his
Prague speech last year, Obama held out the prospect of a nuclear weapons-free world and then agreed significant warhead stockpile reductions with Russia. At this month's nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) review conference in New York, the US supports, in theory at least, Egyptian-and Turkish-led efforts to create a Middle Eastern nuclear weapons-free zone. But diplomats warned last week that the conference could collapse under the weight of its own contradictions unless there was a concrete agreement on the issue including from Israel. The pressure

on Israel from Obama, and on Obama from the Arab countries, to end perceived double standards and take substantive steps to advance counter-proliferation goals is likely to increase. It doesn't help that the relationship between the US president and the Israeli prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, is adversarial, soured by Jewish settlement activity in the occupied territories and an impasse in the peace process. It doesn't help that Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his regime cronies continue to threaten Israel's existence. In such a hostile environment Israel is unlikely to make
concessions that could impair its security. This has been at the heart of the problem since the Jewish state was founded.

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Israel Solvency Saudi Arabia

Only the CP prevents Saudi prolif spills over to the region
<http://www.debka.com/weekly/452/>. CJ Saudi King Gets Set to Enrich Weapons-Grade Uranium with French Assistance: Saudi

DEBKA 10. "Saudi King Gets Set to Enrich Weapons-Grade Uranium with French Assistance." DEBKA 10.452 (2010): n. pag. Web. 17 Jul 2010.
King Abdullah made up his mind to press ahead on uranium enrichment in defiance of repeated US requests after his June 29 conversation with US President Barack Obama at the White House ended in discord on nuclear questions. The king was not satisfied with US efforts to prevent Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon and decided to take matter in his own hands. Shortly after he returned
from Washington, a Saudi cabinet meeting chaired by Crown Prince Sultan, deputy premier and minister of defense and aviation was called for July 6 and resolved to expedite the signing of a nuclear cooperation pact with France. The ruling council rarely makes its decisions public, but, according to DEBKA-NetWeeklys intelligence and Gulf sources, the

projected pact with France, defined as cooperation for building and operating the atomic and renewable energy city near Riyadh as announced by King Abdullah in April, had a more far-reaching function. It was designed in fact to expedite the concentration of all the kingdoms nuclear facilities in one place, using the structures standing ready for two years at the new nuclear city. The core component was to be the secret uranium
enrichment facility currently housed in the southern military town of Khamis Mushayt near the Yemeni border. Abdullah brings Jordan aboard: Jumping the gun on the pact, French nuclear engineers and technicians have been working on the project since early this year, the first Western experts to see at first hand what is going on in the Saudi nuclear city. Our sources quote the Saudis and French officials

involved in the project as predicting that the enrichment facilities will start working at full tempo within four to five months after their reinstallation in the nuclear city. Abdullah came away from his conversation with Obama angered rather than persuaded by Obamas proposal for Saudi Arabia to adopt as its model the United Arab Emirates-United States nuclear cooperation plan, under which the UAE would receive nuclear reactors and other equipment from America. This proposal put King Abdullahs back up for two reasons: The Saudi royal family is on bad terms with the UAEs ruling Al- Nahyans. Furthermore, Washington proposed bringing forward its year-old nuclear proposition to the UAE provided the Emirates consented to join American sanctions against Iran. This would be a powerful sanctions tool, since
the UAE has long served Iran as its main financial, trading, aviation and transport hub and export and import lifeline to the outside world. And indeed, the UAE carried out its side of the bargain in the last two weeks. By denying fuel to Iranian airliners, the Gulf federation awarded the US a major strategic breakthrough and dealt Iran a grave setback. However,

seen from Riyadh, the US-UAE transaction looked like an American attempt to cut Saudi Arabia out of its dealings over Iran and a mark of its mistrust of the Saudi throne. When they met last week, King Abdullah rebuked the US president for failing to run his transaction with the UAE past his government first.
Riyadh places orders for French military satellites: Following another confidential cabinet decision against Washington, the king decided to couple the oil kingdoms nuclear partnership with France with expanded military acquisitions, DEBKA-Net-Weeklys military sources reveal. Billions of petrodollars were earmarked to buy off-the-shelf French military satellite systems which France will launch for Saudi Arabia in the next two years. France will also be commissioned to build Saudi ground stations to receive the data gathered by the satellites and operate the stations until Saudi teams are trained. Like the nuclear pact, this contract too is still unsigned but already in the initial stages of implementation. A Saudi delegation last month visited the French military intelligence imagery center at the French Air Force base in Creil, north of Paris, to get coordination procedures started. DEBKA-Net-Weeklys intelligence sources report that just

as Iran used North Koreas services to try and establish in Syria a nuclear infrastructure to feed Tehrans program with plutonium, Saudi Arabia is taking steps with French help to make Jordan its logistical nuclear fuel backup for supplying the Saudi nuclear program with fuel for a nuclear weapon. On returning from Washington, the Saudi King got in touch with
Jordans King Abdullah II and gave him a green light to expedite negotiations with concessionaires for mining Jordanian uranium deposits and building enrichment facilities and nuclear reactors. These reactors will produce electricity and also nuclear fuel rods.

Abdullah encourages Jordan to tap uranium bonanza, build reactors: The two kings Abdullah decided to go fast forward, although well aware of extreme Obama administration objections to both their plans. After talking to the Saudi monarch, Abdullah II ordered the Jordanian Atomic Energy Commission to kickstart negotiations with the several firms vying to sell the kingdom the technology for its first nuclear power plant. Experts estimate that Jordan has at least 65,000 tons of uranium under the desert outside Amman and possibly an additional 100,000 in southern, central and eastern Jordan, making its deposits the 11th largest in the world. This bonanza of high-quality ore relatively close to the surface may be enough to revolutionize Jordans economy which is heavily dependent on outside assistance. French and Chinese geologists are carrying out intensive explorations in search of more finds. Earlier this year, Jordan signed a joint venture with Frances Areva to mine uranium in central Jordan under a 25-year concession. In May, the French nuclear giant Areva, Canadas AECL and Russias Atomstroyexport were shortlisted to compete for designing the kingdoms first 1,000 megawatt nuclear power plant. The Jordan French Uranium Mining Company (JFUMC), a joint venture between AREVA and Jordan Energy Resources Inc., has been operating within a 1,400-square-kilometre concession area in the central region, including the Swaqa, Khan Azzabib, Wadi Maghar and Attarat areas. Amman has presented to Washington an ambitious program for developing its uranium wealth and in parallel building enrichment plants that would make the kingdom the Middle East hub for distributing nuclear fuel to Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf States, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. It has met with US disapproval. Washington fears Jordan too unstable to keep nuclear facilities secure : Washingtons

refusal to let Jordan exploit its own uranium deposits to make nuclear fuel has held up their nuclear cooperation talks. The American side insists on guarantees

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from Jordan that would oblige it to buy reactor fuel from the international market a safeguard against its potential diversion for military uses (after the Iranian precedent). Washington proposes an accord permitting Jordan to mine the ore but not convert it into fuel.
civilian nuclear program for generating 30 percent of its energy needs by 2030. The

This would spike Jordans plans, backed now by Saudi Arabia, to become a regional centre for uranium enrichment. In return, the US would help Jordan launch a

Jordanian side stands by the right to produce its own nuclear fuel as a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are three major considerations behind the Obama
as Syria, Iran and even possibly Iraq or Islamic extremists. - Given a free hand, Jordan or its

administrations alarm over its close Middle East allys nuclear plans: - Another nuclear power would be introduced to the Middle East, flying in the face of Barack Obamas ambition for worldwide denuclearization, starting with this volatile region. - The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its king are not powerful or stable enough to keep their fuel enrichment installations secure. - A high-tech nuclear industry would make Jordan an irresistible target for its covetous neighbors, such

pose the same threat to the world as Iran.

conquerors may seek nuclear weapons and

US grants Israel nuclear perks to maintain its military edge: Powered by full Saudi backing and a French vested interest, the Hashemite king feels he can overlook Obamas objections and move forward with his nuclear plans. Cairo is watching these events with interest. Monday, July 5, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak took advantage of his visit to Paris for a discussion with French president Nicolas Sarkozy on the integration of his own nuclear plans in the burgeoning Saudi-French-Jordanian program. This was before he went into the Percy military hospital for medical check-ups (see HOT POINTS of July 7) The acute acceleration of a nuclear race on the moderate Arab side of the Middle East figured large in President Obamas talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the White House Tuesday, July 6. It resulted in a presidential pledge, leaked later by US and Israeli sources, to sell Israel materials for the production of electricity, advanced nuclear technology and other items, without requiring Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This pledge was in keeping with Obamas public commitment to guarantee Israels military edge.

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Israel Uniqueness
Israel has refused to cooperate on non-prolif agreements
online.com/english/?id=39261>. CJ

Middle East Online 10, "Israel denounces, but Iran hails NPT accord." (2010): n. pag. Web. 16 Jul 2010. <http://www.middle-eastIsrael Saturday denounced a United Nations resolution adopted on Friday by the Non-Proliferation Treaty's 189 nations and said it would refuse to take part in a conference on a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East. "This resolution is
Toronto by the Israeli government, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Canada. "It

deeply flawed and hypocritical. It ignores the realities of the Middle East and the real threats facing the region and the entire world," said a statement released in

singles out Israel, the Middle East's only true democracy and the only country threatened with annihilation," said the statement from Israel, believed to be the region's sole if undeclared
nuclear power. "Israel will not be able to take part in its implementation," it said. Iran welcomed the document from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories that proposed new steps towards disarmament. The agreement reached Friday at the 2010 NPT review conference called for a regional conference in 2012 to advance the goal of a nuclear-free Middle East. The accord specifically mentions "the importance of Israel's accession to

the treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards." But it failed to make similar reference to other nations including India and Pakistan that, like Israel, are non-members of the treaty and are either known or believed to possess nuclear weapons.

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Fuel Bank 1NC

The International Atomic Energy Agency should establish and fund a nuclear fuel bank accessible to nations who have been denied fuel for reasons not related to nonproliferation or commercial considerations. Solves prolif and strengthens the NPT
Brookings Energy Security Initiative, May 2010 (John P. Banks, Charles K. Ebinger, Michael M. Moodie, Lawrence Scheinman, Sharon
Squassoni, Non-Proliferation and the Nuclear renaissance: The Contribution and Responsibilities of the Nuclear Industry, Pg. 17-18 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/05_nuclear_renaissance_banks_ebinger/05_nuclear_renaissance_banks_ebinger.pdf)

Popular decades ago, proposals for a multinational nuclear fuel bank were never seriously discussed because of a lack of multilateral support. This concern may be changing, as highlighted by President Obamas explicit endorsement for the mechanism during his speech in Prague in April 2009. As highlighted earlier, different plans for fuel banks have been discussed for decades, and today there are more than a dozen fuel bank proposals including the Russian-backed International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) and the NTI-proposed, IAEA-NTI Nuclear Fuel Bank.25 The most important distinction of the current proposition for a multilateral fuel bank is that it will serve as a supply assurance to nations who have been denied access to fuel for reasons not related to non-proliferation or commercial considerations, and is not intended to replace the existing system. by offering assurance of LEU supply, nations interested in developing domestic nuclear power capacity will be less inclined to invest in domestic enrichment facilities. By limiting the number of enrichment facilities and consequently the diffusion of sensitive technologies and knowledge, the fuel bank proposal aims to prevent future abuse of Article X of the NPT, which gives a signatory nation the option to withdraw from the treaty should it ever
Proponents of the fuel bank system contend that jeopardize the supreme interests of the country. North Korea infamously invoked Article X and used the technologies and materials it acquired as a signatory state to develop its nuclear weaponsprogram once it withdrew from the Treaty.

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Fuel Bank Solvency

Securing loose nuclear materials is key solves Iran and North Korea
Serious About Nuclear Proliferation. http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2004/0303nuclearweapons_leverett.aspx)

Leverett, Visiting Fellow and Berger, ChairmanMarch 03, 2004 (Flynt L. and Samuel R., International Tribune, Brookings Institution, Let's Get
We are losing the fight to stop the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities to rogue states. In too many places, the approach to proliferation challenges is curiously complacentmarked by an inability to translate rhetoric into action.Recent events have underscored the risk of nuclear breakout. The deal brokered by three European foreign ministers with Tehran last autumn is not stopping Iran's development of an infrastructure that could ultimately produce weapons-grade fissile material for nuclear bombs. Worse, Iran's foreign minister said twice last week that Tehran intends to sell nuclear fuel abroad.The European approach is based on two premises: first, that Iran's nuclear program is motivated

primarily by nationalist ambitions to achieve world-class technological prowess; and second, that Tehran would ultimately relinquish the militarily applicable parts of its program in exchange for international assistance in developing the rest of its nuclear agenda. Unfortunately, this represents more wishful thinking than reality. Compelling evidence suggests Iran's nuclear program is intended to give Tehran a nuclear-weapons hedge

against what Iranians see as very real threats to their national security, and that Iran will not give up its nuclear aspirations until those concerns are addressed. Yet, the Bush administration stubbornly resists any suggestion of a "grand bargain" with Iran.As for North Korea, Kim Jong Il has clearly slipped the bonds of the nonproliferation regime. Analysts may debate the number of nuclear bombs North Korea has built, but it is virtually certain that Pyongyang possesses considerably more reprocessed plutonium today than a year ago, on its way to potentially becoming the first nuclear weapons WalMart for terror groups. Given this reality, the Bush administration's dithering on serious diplomatic engagement is inexplicable.Recent disclosures about
the activities of the Pakistani nuclear scientist and proliferation entrepreneur Abdul Qadeer Khan underscore additional risks. We know there are sophisticated clandestine procurement networks for nuclear fuels and technology. Yet the administration remains complacent in securing loose nuclear materials around the world and redirecting weapons scientists and assets to peaceful, constructive purposes.The Nunn-Lugar initiative is designed to dismantle or transform potentially dangerous nuclear activities in the former Soviet Union. At present funding levels, it will not complete the job for more than a decade. Meanwhile, as Senator Sam Nunn has said, right now, "tons of poorly secured plutonium and highly enriched uraniumthe raw materials of nuclear terrorismare spread around the world."What clear strategic choices for Iran and North Korea. Washington

would a serious strategy for containing the spread of nuclear weapons look like?First, it is time to define should publicly offer to normalize relations with Iranincluding a commitment not to change its government by forceand help it integrate into the global economy, provided that Iran gives up, definitively and verifiably, its weapons of mass destruction programs and ties to terrorist organizations .The United States also should lay out for North Korea the security guarantees and economic benefits it could expect for dismantling its nuclear weapons program and abandoning its nuclear ambitionsas well as make clear that further separation of plutonium will result in serious consequences, coercive if necessary. Only by defining North Korea's options in such stark terms, and demonstrating our willingness to get to Yes, can the United States marshal the regional and international support we will need if Pyongyang says No.Second, we must deal with the crisis of unsecured nuclear materials around the world. We must globalize Nunn-Lugar programs and fund them at the levels necessary to do the job, which will be much greater than the administration's current budget envisions. Third, it is time to close increasingly obvious gaps in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The president's proposals are fine as far as they go, but they do not go far enough. Tighter regulation of fuel cycle activities, keeping states under investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency off the agency's board of governors, and mandating implementation of the Additional Protocol as a condition for nuclear imports are all essential steps. But we also need to make sure that if states provide
assistance to others for peaceful nuclear energy, spent fuel rods are returned to international storage, under international supervision.Further, we need to make it illegal for a state to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty if its nuclear activities are under investigation. America should lead the UN Security Council in defining sanctions that would be imposed automatically on any state threatening to use the treaty as a springboard for nuclear weapons development.As Bush stated Feb. 11, the consensus among nations that proliferation is intolerable "means little unless it is translated into action." But translating counter

proliferation goals into action will take sustained American leadership and engagement, skillful diplomacy, and serious investments of political and financial capital. None of those have been forthcoming so far.

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Fuel Bank Solvency

As long as fissile material is available worldwide, weapons development is inevitable
Daadler, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Lodal, immediate past President of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a former senior Defense Department and White House official in the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Bill Clinton, 2008 (Ivo and Jan The Logic of
Zero; Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Affairs, Noevmber/December 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/11_nuclear_weapons_daalder/11_nuclear_weapons_daalder.pdf)

The fundamental weakness of the NPT is that it permits a country to produce enriched uranium and plutonium, the only two materials from which a nuclear weapon can be fashioned, as long as it does so as a declared part of its civilian nuclear program. For many years, this was thought to be acceptable because the technical challenges involved in moving from possessing the capacity to operate a power plant to being able to build a nuclear weapon were substantial (and kept largely secret by the established nuclear powers). But all this has changed. Centrifuge enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel produced by a nuclear power plant are technologies that are now widely understood and publicized. Once a few kilograms of the necessary material, whether enriched uranium or plutonium, are available, fashioning it into a device that could explode with catastrophic consequences is not beyond the capacity of any determined group of individuals with access to substantial resources.
Accounting for and controlling the fissile materials that are produced or otherwise available is therefore the only secure method of ensuring that new bombs will not be developedand this is about to become even more difficult. Increased

pollution, rising gas prices, depleted sources of oil supply, and global warming are fueling a growing demand for nuclear energy, including in many countries where antinuclear sentiment has long been very strong. The International Energy Agency has called for 1,400 new nuclear power reactors by 2050. As new reactors are built, more nations will insist on developing their own nuclear fuel cycle to enrich uranium for the sake of self-sufficiency. Facilities built to enrich uranium to the level needed to power a civilian reactor are essentially the same as those needed to produce weapons-grade uranium. Plutonium, the other bomb-making material, is a natural byproduct of producing nuclear energy, and it can be separated from power-plant waste (spent fuel) through reprocessing practice that is permitted under the NPT so long as it is done under IAEA safeguards. Once the facilities necessary to produce highly enriched uranium or separate plutonium are in place, only months are necessary to turn a permitted peaceful nuclear capability into a nuclear weapons capability.

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Russia supports the CP
Barnaby, consultant to the Oxford Research Group on nuclear issues, B.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D., D.Sc. (Hon.), 2009 (Frank,Scitizen.com, The Birth of an
International Nuclear Fuel Bank? May 26, 2009 http://scitizen.com/future-energies/the-birth-of-an-international-nuclear-fuel-bank-_a-14-2767.html)

The IAEA has been recommending for some time that a nuclear fuel bank should be set up in a way that would not disrupt the existing commercial market in nuclear fuels (3). IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei explains, " I want to make sure that every country that is a bona fide user of nuclear energy, and that is fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations, is getting fuel. It is not asking any State to give up its rights under the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty). The importance of this step is that, by providing reliable access to fuel at competitive market prices, we remove the need for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In so doing, we could go a long way towards addressing current concerns about the dissemination of sensitive fuel cycle technologies (4). The two most sensitive technologies, insofar as nuclear-weapon proliferation is
concerned, are uranium-enrichment and plutonium-reprocessing.

Both America and Russia have stated that they are willing to make nuclear material available for a fuel bank administered by the IAEA. In the words of Tariq Rauf, Head of the IAEAs Verification and Security Policy Coordination Sections Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, the setting up of a nuclear fuel bank under international safeguards is an either/or situation, if we dont make it work, then we must prepare to live in a world where dozens of countries have the capability and key ingredients to make nuclear weapons." (5)

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Russia supports the Cp
The Brookings Institution, July 16, 2010 Thinking Big on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear, Nonproliferation, Russia, Arms Control, Defense
Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy ,Steven Pifer, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

First, Washington and Moscow should agree this year to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to no more than 1500 deployed warheads on each side. In anticipation of further deeper nuclear reductions, they should begin parallel discussions on how to address non-deployed strategic warheads and tactical nuclear weapons. (The United States should also ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an action already taken by Russia.)

Second, Washington and Moscow should offer an agenda to strengthen the NPT regime. This should include: a diplomatic plan to secure universal accession to the NPT and to the Additional Protocol, which strengthens safeguards against the misuse of civil nuclear technology, and launch of a negotiation to ban the production of new fissile material. Third, Washington and Moscow should reenergize their cooperation to ensure that highly enriched uranium (HEU) and other nuclear weapons-usable materials are securely stored. Where necessary and appropriate, they should work out arrangements to take back HEU from third countries. That could be blended down into low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel for
nuclear reactors, as the Russians have been doing for years.

Fourth, Washington and Moscow should develop a program to produce LEU fuel under international supervision and make it available at reasonable cost to any non-nuclear weapons state in full compliance with its NPT obligations. They should also formalize Russias offer to help counties dispose of spent nuclear fuel. Fifth, Washington and Moscow should spur the UN Permanent Five-plus-Germany effort to persuade Iran to forgo nuclear enrichment or, at the least, to place its entire nuclear program under international supervision. The Permanent Five and Germany should make the choice before Iran as stark as possible: incentives including the prospect of normalization of relations with the United States and the West if Tehran makes the right choice; real costs including Russian and Chinese support for stiffer sanctions if Iran continues its current course.

Key to relations

The Brookings Institution, July 16, 2010 Thinking Big on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear, Nonproliferation, Russia, Arms Control, Defense
Carlos Pascual, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy ,Steven Pifer, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe

This is a big initiative that builds on issues where U.S. and Russian interests converge. It will drive the U.S.-Russian relationship in a more positive direction. It has plenty to interest the Russians: deep mutual reductions in nuclear weapons, a global leadership role boosting Moscows political stature, and long-term commercial benefits from supplying LEU fuel. Washington could use this to press Moscow to adopt a tougher line against Irans nuclear program. This is a win-win play for the United States and Russia. And it would be a big win for a safer world. Despite the NPTs limitations, the picture is less
grim than President John Kennedys fear of 20 nuclear-armed states by 1970. Strengthening the firewalls now against proliferation could curtail a race to weaponization that would be destabilizing and potentially deadly.

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A2: Fuel Bank CP

Were already developing a fuel bank
Solash, reporter for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2010 (Richard, Russia, IAEA Agree To Establish World's First Nuclear Fuel Bank, March 30, 2010
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_IAEA_Agree_To_Establish_Worlds_First_Nuclear_Fuel_Bank/1997174.html)

Russia has signed a deal with the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to set up the world's first nuclear fuel bank of low-enriched uranium for countries that need fuel for civilian purposes, including nuclear power plants.
Russia's atomic energy chief, Sergei Kiriyenko, signed the deal with IAEA head Yukiya Amano in Vienna on March 29. The IAEA says the

eventually hold a stockpile of 120 tons of low-enriched uranium.

bank will

Kiriyenko, who heads Russia's state-owned nuclear company Rosatom, said the bank will be located in the southern Siberian city of Angarsk. Russia and Kazakhstan have had a uranium enrichment facility there since 2007. He predicted that nearly a third of the total uranium stockpile should be ready to sell by the end of the year. But he stressed that the bank's reserves are meant to be used only in cases of urgent need and to avoid interruptions in a country's supply. Non-Proliferation Effort

The Russian deal was approved by the IAEA last November and is the result of years of planning to establish a reliable source of low-enriched uranium for civilian nuclear programs in countries with a perfect non-proliferation record. Under the agreement, countries will formally request nuclear fuel from the IAEA, which will then transfer the request to Russia. Russia will cover the costs involved in setting up the bank.
Corey Hinderstein, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, took part in consultations with the IAEA on the fuel bank initiative and says most of the countries where civilian nuclear energy is expanding are "for economic, political, and technological reasons...not likely to want to rely on indigenous fuel cycle facilities to be able to supply their nuclear energy programs, and they'll want to rely on the international markets."

The creation of an international nuclear fuel bank, an idea strongly backed by the United States, was also meant to give Iran an opportunity to change its course. The international community suspects Iran is trying to build atomic weapons, a claim that Tehran denies.
But Richard Weitz, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, says the creation of the bank comes too late to influence Iran's nuclear program. "The hope was that the Russia or some other countries would develop this fuel bank and that, in particular, Iran would rely on it rather than develop its own enrichment capabilities," Weitz said. "But that's not going to happen. That was a few years ago. But it's still thought that this could prove useful, perhaps, in other cases -- for example, [regarding] some of Iran's neighbors that are looking at a nuclear program." The IAEA says the

bank is a way to meet demand from some 60 nations for technical help in launching peaceful atomic energy programs without increasing the risk of proliferation.
Russia has its own stake in hosting the fuel bank. Since becoming prime minister in May 2008, Vladimir Putin has made strengthening Russia's nuclear power sector a top economic priority. During a visit to India earlier this month, Putin signed multi-billion-dollar deals to build up to 16 nuclear reactors, and said Russia hopes to eventually control a quarter of the global nuclear power market.

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Iran Sanctions 1NC

The United States federal government should extent economic sanctions against Iran to the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Solves weapons development the IRGC is responsible for the current crisis
Institute for Public Policy Research (2010): n. pag. Web. 16 Jul 2010. <http://www.aei.org/article/102306>.

Alfoneh, Ali 10, Scholar Researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. "What Would Really Work to Stop Iran's March to Nukes ."American Enterprise
The IRGC has defended the regime in Tehran against internal "counter-revolutionaries" since 1979 and external enemies such as during the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 and the following eight years of war. Yet, thirty one years after the revolution, the IRGC now preys upon the society it was meant to protect, and their involvement in the nuclear issue has subjected Iran to sanctions.These sanctions are not going to work. The reason is quite simple: they fail to target the financial arm of the IRGC, the engine of Iran's nuclear program. The latest round of U.N. sanctions focuses on both the IRGC and Iran's major banks--an attempt to starve the mainstay of the Islamic Republic and force a cost-benefit analysis that favors negotiations--but [it] ignores the Guard's parallel banking sector, through which the IRGC manages its financial activities.In early June, the United Nations Security Council imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Iran designed to punish the IRGC and its affiliated companies for their nuclear proliferation activities. Later in the month, Congress [then] approved tough new unilateral sanctions aimed at squeezing Iran's energy and banking sectors while punishing companies from other countries for doing business with Tehran.The Iranian political leadership and the IRGC dismissed them both."These resolutions are not worth a nickel to the Iranian nation," said President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Hossein Salami, the IRGC's deputy commander, added that the "Guards are not concerned about the sanctions." By sanctioning all companies partly or

completely owned by the IRGC the international community can deny them spare parts and technology, cut off foreign investment and paralyze their assets abroad.Unfortunately, Ahmadinejad and Salami have it right. Increasingly, the Iranian economy has become dominated by the IRGC, which has had decades to figure a way around sanctions. Indeed, the Guards' ability to mask their activities behind front companies--an agile game of hide-and-seek at which the IRGC is clearly the better player--means that the international community is constantly playing catch up. And losing. Let's take Khatam al-Anbia Construction Base (GHORB), the engineering arm of the IRGC, which is now under sanction. Less than a week before last month's U.N. Security Council action, the Iranian Oil Ministry granted $5 billion to a newly established Khtam al-Owsia Consortium for development of the 13th and 14th phases of the South Pars gas and oil field--a project which will require substantial foreign expertise and technology. In fact, Khtam al-Owsia is a front for the IRGC's Khatam al-Anbia construction company, which is under U.N. sanctions. Changing the name Khatam al-Anbia to Khatam al-Owsia is just one example of how the IRGC hides its assets and circumvents sanctions. The Islamic Republic's serial reflagging and renaming of Iran Lines (ISRIL) is another.In addition, the

Guards need to be cut off from internal Iranian support. As foreign nations have become more leery of doing business with the Guards, the Iranian government has filled the gap.During
his first five years in office, Ahmadinejad "privatized" almost $60 billion worth of public assets, substantial amounts of which were purchased by front companies for the Guards.The

IRGC's expansion into Iran's private sector has earned some attention but its move into banking and financial services has gone unnoticed. The Revolutionary Guards' financial institutions--like the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, the Mehr Finance &
Credit Institution, and the Ansar Financial and Credit Institute--operate without fear of sanctions, their reserves brimming with profits and, allegedly, ill-gotten gains from vast smuggling enterprises.This cash has enabled the IRGC to dominate the Iranian economy and to purchase state

enterprises and businesses through the Tehran Stock Exchange. Yet most of these businesses--ranging from mining and car companies

to telecommunications ones--are dependent on outside suppliers, technology and expertise. Remember: Iran is not North Korea. Its economy subsists on exports and imports, and very little is produced at home except crude oil and carpets.Up to now, Ahmadinejad has had a counterpunch for every American, European, or United Nations blow to the IRGC.Following the Treasury Department's February designation of Khatam al-Anbia as "proliferators of weapons of mass destruction," Ahmadinejad promised to compensate the IRGC for sanctions-related losses.Indeed, in March, the Oil Ministry gave Khatam al-Anbia a contract for an $850 million pipeline project. The following month, after Turkish companies announced their withdrawal from the development of the third phase of the South Pars oil and gas field, Khatam al-Anbia was granted the $7 billion project to make up for the gap.By all means, let's target the IRGC. Let's exact

a price for their adventurism, their support for terrorism, their role in oppression inside Iran and their role in proliferation. But let's do it effectively.By sanctioning all companies partly or completely owned by the IRGC the international community can deny them spare parts and technology, cut off foreign investment and paralyze their assets abroad. This in turn would affect negatively the value of these companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange, and increase transaction and business costs for IRGC owned businesses.Strangling the IRGC's access to funding would make it much more difficult for the Guard to establish political patronage through its business enterprises in Iran.The Iranian people increasingly understand that IRGC commanders are a source of corruption and repression, and not the war heroes they pretend to be.The Iranian public also recognizes that international sanctions are not designed to harm Iran and Iranians but to change the Iranian regime and the IRGC's nuclear calculations. But let's hit them effectively.

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NPT Fails
NPT is ineffective- loophole allows for the production of enriched uranium and plutonium
Zero; Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Foreign Affairs, Noevmber/December 2008, pg. 87 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2008/11_nuclear_weapons_daalder/11_nuclear_weapons_daalder.pdf) KM

Daadler, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Lodal, immediate past President of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a former senior Defense Department and White House official in the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Bill Clinton, 2008 (Ivo and Jan The Logic of
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to serve this role, but it has proved inadequate in a number of respects. India, Israel, and Pakistan never accepted the treaty, and they were therefore able to sidestep the worlds nuclearcontrol system with relative ease. North Korea and Iran signed the treaty but then used their safeguarded nuclear power and research programs to
develop the wherewithal to make the bomb. Pyongyang withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and then made the remaining short leap to testing a nuclear device. Tehran has been caught working on a weapons program and is enriching uranium, defying the demands of the IAEA and the UN Security Council to suspend these activities. There is no doubt that Iran has the capability to develop a nuclear weapon within the next few years.

The fundamental weakness of the NPT is that it permits a country to produce enriched uranium and plutonium, the only two materials from which a nuclear weapon can be fashioned, as long as it does so as a declared part of its civilian nuclear program. For many years, this was thought to be acceptable because the technical challenges involved in moving from possessing the capacity to operate a power plant to being able to build a nuclear weapon were substantial (and kept largely secret by the established nuclear powers). But all this has changed. Centrifuge enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel produced by a nuclear power plant are technologies that are now widely understood and publicized. Once a few kilograms of the necessary material, whether enriched uranium or plutonium, are available, fashioning it into a device that could explode with catastrophic consequences is not beyond the capacity of any determined group of individuals with access to substantial resources.

NPT is Flawed- Civilian Nuclear Proliferation

http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14467) KM

RHLE, Deputy Head, Policy Planning Section, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, June 04, 2007 (Michael, World Security Network,
The most worrisome structural weakness of the NPT from todays vantage point, however, might well be its energy dimension. Crafted

in a period of euphoria about the blessings of nuclear energy, the NPT sought to prevent military proliferation by fostering civilian nuclear proliferation. However, since civil and military nuclear technologies are almost indistinguishable, the Treaty in effect allows a country to develop its civilian nuclear programme right to the threshold of having military applications. Only the final steps to produce nuclear weapons are prohibited steps that a determined regime could take promptly after its withdrawal from the Treaty.4 This very scenario now appears to be coming true in Iran.

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NPT Fails
NPT leaves wide gaps for regimes that are determined to proliferate
Kittrie, Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day OConnor College of Law, Arizona State University, 11- years of service for the United States Department of State, including for three years as a senior attorney specializing in nuclear nonproliferation, 2007 (Orde F., AVERTING CATASTROPHE: WHY THE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY IS LOSING ITS DETERRENCE CAPACITY AND HOW TO RESTORE IT, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 28, pp. 337-430, 2007, students.law.umich.edu/mjil/article-pdfs/v28n2-kittrie.pdf) Civilian nuclear power technology and the nuclear technology needed to develop weapons-grade fissile material overlap considerably. Any nuclear power program that operates fully independently (with a full fuel cycle) includes technology readily adaptable to the production of weapons-grade fissile material. The fuel cycle stages most readily adaptable to producing such material are the enrichment and reprocessing stages.69 Yet, under

NPT Article IV as currently interpreted, state parties (including NNWSs) are not prohibited from possessing enrichment or reprocessing technology, or even weapons-grade nuclear material, so long as the technology and material are for peaceful purposes and in conformity with articles I and II of the NPT. As IAEA Director General El Baradei puts it: [u]nder the current regime . . . there is nothing illicit in a non-nuclear-weapon state having enrichment or reprocessing technology, or possessing weapon-grade nuclear material.70 The overlap between civilian and military nuclear technologies poses perhaps the most significant challenge facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime: the ease with which a statein the guise of conducting a peaceful nuclear weapons programcan acquire either weapons-grade fissile material or the technologies necessary for its production. Article X provides each state party the right to withdraw from the NPT at its own discretion. Therefore, once a state bent on developing nuclear weapons has acquired the requisite material or technologies, it can withdraw from the NPT and quickly proceed to construct a nuclear bomb.71 Alternatively, a state progressing towards developing nuclear weapons might
decide to remain within the NPT in order to further advance its weapons program clandestinely.72

NPT Cant Solve- Three Reasons

RHLE, Deputy Head, Policy Planning Section, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, June 04, 2007 (Michael, World Security Network,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14467) KM This school has many adherents, yet it fails to capture the true causes of the weakening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The

crisis of the NPT is due to many causes, with the failure of the NWS to adhere to their Article VI commitments being just one, and not the most important one. If the NPT is in jeopardy, it is mainly due to three major factors: First, structural weaknesses that burdened the NPT from its very beginning have progressively gained in salience and are now undermining some of the key tenets of the regime. Second, new developments in international security tend to invalidate many of the traditional assumptions underlying the NPT, and are pushing other nonproliferation strategies to the fore. Finally, the increasing demand for fossil energy tends to override the non- p-proliferation norm and paralyses the UN Security Council in maintaining the integrity of the nonproliferation regime. Each of these three factors is examined in more detail below.3

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NPT Fails
NPT fails- Iraq, North Korea, and India/Pakistan prove
RHLE, Deputy Head, Policy Planning Section, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, June 04, 2007 (Michael, World Security Network,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14467) KM

The discovery of Iraqs secret nuclear programme immediately after the 1990-1991 Gulf War revealed a massive verification failure. The resulting lack of trust in the NPTs verification clauses in general and the IAEAs abilities in particular could never be overcome. Neither in North Korea nor in Iran could the IAEA demonstrate convincingly that it was abreast of the situation,
and able to take effective action.

In 1993, North Koreas nuclear ambitions could only be contained through massive US political and military pressure, yet with little international support. In 1998, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan raised questions of how to discourage non-NPT members from seeking nuclear weapons, but also how to bring wayward outsiders into the NPT. That same year, the withdrawal of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) from Iraq and North Koreas missile tests further underscored the limits of
traditional multilateral approaches to nonproliferation.

The terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 gave the non-proliferation question a new sense of urgency and dramatically decreased US tolerance vis--vis proliferating states (axis of evil). The attacks also raised the spectre of terrorist non-state actors armed with WMD, thereby creating a new challenge for the inter-state nature of the NPT-regime and invalidating many assumptions of rationality and restraint that were considered central to dealing with the nuclear reality. Finally, the debate on a possible Talibanisation of Pakistan raised the spectre of a fundamentalist nuclear power emerging literally overnight.

NPT not credible- double standard

RHLE, Deputy Head, Policy Planning Section, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, June 04, 2007 (Michael, World Security Network,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14467) KM *Note: UNSC= UN Security Council

The NPTs structural problems and new security challenges make it clear that mere tinkering with the wording of some of the NPTs provisions will not suffice to restore the integrity of the damaged regime. That task will rather fall to the
standards. This

UNSC as the ultimate arbiter of the NPT. However, the five permanent UNSC members are nuclear-weapon states and thus vulnerable to charges of double

is particularly clear with respect to the United States the de facto trustee of the NPT regime which has clearly suffered from a loss of moral authority, notably because of the Iraq war. The major problem for the UNSC, however, is a phenomenon that one may term the economisation of security policy. Simply put, if a proliferator also happens to be a major energy supplier or is valuable for other reasons, the non-proliferation norm may be superseded by energy or geopolitical considerations. The case of Iran is most instructive in this regard. What can be observed here is a reversal of the NPTs original energy bargain. Instead of helping a NNWS to cope with its nuclear energy needs, it appears that some UNSC members own fossil energy needs may lead them to accept a countrys nuclear-weapon status in order to retain access to that countrys fossil fuel.

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