Iran Da

SCFI 2011 Silent Nihilists
Iran Disadvantage
Iran Disadvantage
Iran Disadvantage ............................................................................................................................ 1 1NC Iran Disadvantage 1/3 ...........................................................................................................................................2 2NC Impact Outweighs 1/4 ........................................................................................................................................... 5 ***UNIQUENESS*** .........................................................................................................................9 Uniqueness No Space Exploration Now ................................................................................................................. 10 Uniqueness No Iran Space Now .............................................................................................................................. 11 Uniqueness No Nuclear Missile Capability Now .................................................................................................... 12 A2: Recent Launches Prove Iran Space Capability 1/2 ............................................................................................. 13 ***LINKS AND INTERNALS*** ...................................................................................................... 15 Link Mars Exploration ............................................................................................................................................. 16 Link Debris ............................................................................................................................................................... 17 Link US Modeled 1/2 ............................................................................................................................................... 18 Link Perceived Military Threats ............................................................................................................................. 20 Link Space Exploration Collaboration ............................................................................................................... 21 A2: US Would Exclude Iran ....................................................................................................................................... 22 Link Espionage ........................................................................................................................................................ 23 Link Russia (Debris Module) 1/2 ........................................................................................................................... 24 Link Russia (Mars Module) 1/2 .............................................................................................................................. 26 Internal Link Duel-Use 1/4 ..................................................................................................................................... 28 ***IMPACTS***............................................................................................................................... 32 Brink Ballistic Missile Tech Improving ...................................................................................................................33 Iran Proliferation Bad Global Proliferation ........................................................................................................... 34 Iran Proliferation Bad Nuclear Terrorism 1/2 ........................................................................................................35 Iran Proliferation Bad Regional Instability ............................................................................................................ 37 Iran Proliferation Bad Europe NMD ...................................................................................................................... 38 Iran Proliferation Bad Turns Case (US Space Supremacy) .................................................................................. 39 A2: Ballistic Missile Capabilities Now ....................................................................................................................... 40 A2: Iran Cant Nuclearize ............................................................................................................................................ 41 A2: No Nuclear Material 1/2 ...................................................................................................................................... 42 A2: Iran Proliferation Inevitable ............................................................................................................................... 44 A2: Iran Proliferation Good (Waltz) 1/3 ....................................................................................................................45 A2: No Iran Threat Conventional Forces Fail ........................................................................................................ 48 Iran Space Expansion Bad EMP Attack 1/2 ........................................................................................................... 49 Iran Space Expansion Bad Regime Credibility 1/3 ................................................................................................ 51 Iran Space Expansion Bad Israel-Iran War ............................................................................................................54 Iran Space Expansion Bad Turns Case (US Space Supremacy) ............................................................................ 55 A2: Other Measures Prevent Iranian Space Expansion ............................................................................................56 ***AFF*** ....................................................................................................................................... 57 No Internal Link No Duel-Use Intentions ............................................................................................................. 58 No Impact No Nuclearization (Technology) 1/3 ....................................................................................................59 No Impact No Nuclearization (Desire) .................................................................................................................. 62 No Impact No Space Threat.................................................................................................................................... 63 No Impact No Timeframe ....................................................................................................................................... 64 Impact Non-unique Ballistic Missile Capabilities Now .........................................................................................65 Impact Non-unique Iran Nuclearization Inevitable .............................................................................................. 66
1
Carols baby hates Iran as much as any of us
Iran Disadvantage
1NC Iran Disadvantage 1/3

The global space age has ended countries are curtailing their space exploration The Economist, 11 (Jun 30th 2011, The end of the Space Age,
http://www.economist.com/node/18897425)
But the shuttle is now over. The ISS is due to be de-orbited, in the inelegant jargon of the field, in 2020. Once that happens, the game will be up. There is no appetite to return to the moon, let alone push on to Mars, El Dorado of space exploration. The technology could be there, but the passion has goneat least in the traditional spacefaring powers, America and Russia. The space cadets other hope, China, might pick up the baton. Certainly it claims it wishes, like President John Kennedy 50 years ago, to send people to the surface of the moon and return them safely to Earth. But the date for doing so seems elastic. There is none of Kennedys by the end of the decade bravura about the announcements from Beijing. Moreover, even if China succeeds in matching Americas distant triumph, it still faces the question, what next? The chances are that the Chinese government, like Richard Nixons in 1972, will say job done and pull the plug on the whole shebang. Iran will model US progress in space exploration plan causes them to accelerate their space program Cordesman, CSIS, 3/6, (Anthony H., CSIS, US Strategic Competition With Iran: Energy,
Economics, Sanctions, And The Nuclear Issue, http://csis.org/publication/us-strategiccompetition-iran-energy-economics-sanctions-and-nuclear-issue, DOA: 7/15/11)
Over the past several decades, a pattern has developed in this aspect of US and Iranian competition. As Iran moves forward in areas that could give it nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, the United States reacts with diplomacy, sanctions, and efforts to strengthen US and Southern Gulf forces and deterrent capabilities. Tehran frequently acknowledges Washingtons diplomatic efforts and
appears to respond to them, but delays ensue and even if promises are made, progress is not. Iran continues to pursue its nuclear program without full compliance with IAEA safeguards, without negotiating tangible agreements with either the US or other members of the P5+1, and with little practical regard to UN sanctions. Moreover, Iran has sought to counter American and UN sanctions by leveraging its international economic position through its energy exports. This, in turn, helps Iran undermine multilateral support for sanctions. Tehran can offer economic opportunities to nations which skirt or weaken sanctions because other countries voluntarily suspend ties with the Islamic Republic. This effort has had an important impact on China, Russia, and other states who support the sanctions process. It has delayed and weakened UN efforts, limited the impact of the P5+1 negotiating process, and had a wider impact on other states, including key players like Turkey.
Irans tactics of delay, denial, and move forward have forced American policymakers to either take a more confrontational approach to nations outside its sanctions regimesometimes pushing them further towards cooperation with Iranor to accept a weakening of sanction and pressures on Iran. At the same time, they have led the US to repeatedly make it clear that while it prefers a negotiated solution, it is
keeping military options on the table. They also have led the US to increase pressure on other states, to use the UN sanctions process, and to limit all major arms sales and all nuclear and missile-related technology transfers to Iran. Iran has responded by steadily building up its conventionally armed long-range missile capabilities, its capabilities to conduct asymmetric warfare in the Gulf, and its capabilities to respond to any US (or Israeli) attack on Iran; by expanding its ties with Syria and with hostile states as far away as Venezuela; and by using its ties to non-state actors as a potential threat.
The end result is that there are no clear boundaries to this aspect of US and Iranian competition: they affect a broad range of diplomacy, competition within the UN framework, sanctions and related economic and arms transfer efforts, energy exports and investment opportunities in Iran, and a wide range of competition in military options. The interaction between Irans nuclear programs and US sanctions efforts is the most direct and visible aspect of this competition and as the US continues to employ both carrots and sticks to try to alter Iranian behavior, the pattern continues. Tehrans gradual progress, however, calls into
question the efficacy of the American approach. Sanctions and diplomacy have successfully slowed Irans nuclear development. US actions have not changed Tehrans strategic calculus or the shape of its nuclear and missile efforts.
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Iran Disadvantage

Expansion of Iranian space capabilities is the missing link for nuclear expansion NYT, 6 (William Broad and David Sanger, April 3, Iran keeps an eye on outer space
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/03/world/africa/03iht-rocket.html)
Iran has publicly rejected the goal of developing unconventional arms. It says its space and rocket efforts are either entirely peaceful, aimed at improving the state's telecommunications and monitoring natural disasters - strong earthquakes shook Iran on Friday - or are military efforts meant to boost its defenses with conventional weapons. But some Western analysts note that such technologies can also have atomic roles and that a crucial element of a credible nuclear arsenal is the ability to launch a missile accurately and guide a warhead to its target. While Iran
now depends on Russia to launch its satellites into orbit, it has vowed to do so itself, and is developing a family of increasingly large rockets. In
the biggest could hurl not only satellites into space but warheads between continents. "The real issue is that they have a very large booster under development," said Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington who wrote a recent report on Iran's nuclear effort. He said Tehran's bid to develop new rocket and space technologies might be nothing more at this point than its exploring of technological options , at times quite modestly, as in its recent effort to loft experimental satellites. "That doesn't mean the potential should be minimized,"
theory, Cordesman said. "We know these states can achieve technical surprise." On Sunday, Iran said it had test-fired a fast underwater missile that could evade sonar, and on Friday announced that it had launched a new rocket that can carry multiple warheads and elude radar. The military actions, accompanied by film clips on state television during a week of naval maneuvers, seemed calculated to defy growing pressure on Tehran. So far, U.S. officials say they have not protested Iran's space program. Intelligence agencies reviewed information about the satellite launching last fall, but concluded that it warranted no action. Nor has the United States urged Russia - a key player in the current negotiations with Iran over its efforts to enrich uranium - to halt the launchings. But a senior American official who spoke anonymously because he was unauthorized to address the topic publicly said the United States was "taking another look" at pressing Moscow to end the space assistance as a
Analysts across the political spectrum seem to agree that the Iranian missile and satellite programs bear watching, even if judged as presenting no current threat to the United States. "It's clearly interesting to see what direction they're going," said David Wright, a space analyst at the
way of pressuring Iran to stop the enrichment of nuclear material.
Union of Concerned Scientists, a policy research group in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The UN Security Council is now debating possible sanctions against Iran because many states worry that Tehran's atomic push conceals a clandestine effort to acquire an atom bomb.
American intelligence agencies estimate that Iran is 5 to 10 years away from having enough material for a nuclear weapon. John Negroponte, director of national intelligence, recently called the danger that Tehran "will acquire a nuclear weapon and the ability to integrate it with ballistic missiles Iran already possesses" a cause "for immediate concern." Iran has missiles that can reach about 1,000 miles, or 1,600 kilometers, which is as far away as Israel and, as Negroponte put it, has "the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East." American intelligence officials estimate that it might field an intercontinental missile by 2015 , but such forecasts are always rough approximations.
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Iran Disadvantage

Iranian proliferation causes global hyper-proliferation impact is extinction Krauthammer, Commonwealth Scholar at Oxford, 6 (Charles, March 26, Today
Tehran, Tomorrow the World http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1176995,00.html) Depending on your own beliefs, Ahmadinejad is either mystical or deranged. In either case, he is exceedingly dangerous. And Iran is just the first. With infinitely accelerated exchanges of information helping
develop whole new generations of scientists, extremist countries led by similarly extreme men will be in a position to acquire nuclear weaponry. If nothing is done, we face not proliferation but hyperproliferation . Not just one but many radical states will get weapons of mass extinction, and then so will the fanatical and suicidal terrorists who are their brothers and clients. That will present the world with two futures. The first is Feynman's vision of human destruction on a scale never seen . The second, perhaps after one or two cities are lost with millions killed in a single day , is a radical abolition of liberal democracy as the species tries to maintain itself by reverting to strict authoritarianism--a self-imposed expulsion from the Eden of post-Enlightenment freedom. Can there be a third future? That will depend on whether we succeed in holding proliferation at bay. Iran is the test case. It is the most dangerous political entity on the planet, and yet the world response has been catastrophically slow and reluctant. Years of knowingly useless negotiations, followed by hesitant international resolutions, have brought us to only the most tentative of steps--referral to a Security Council that lacks unity and resolve. Iran knows this and therefore defiantly and openly resumes its headlong march to nuclear status. If we fail to prevent an Iranian regime run by apocalyptic fanatics from going nuclear, we will have reached a point of no return . It is not just that Iran might be the source of a great conflagration but that we will have demonstrated to the world that for those similarly inclined there is no serious impediment.
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Iran Disadvantage
2NC Impact Outweighs 1/4

Warhead capability is likely in 2 years Iran nuclear capability causes Middle East nuclear arms race, nuclear terrorism and blockade of the Strait of Hormuz Heritage Foundation, 4-5-11 (Special Report on National Security and Defense, A Strong
National Defense: The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/04/a-strong-national-defense-the-armed-forcesamerica-needs-and-what-they-will-cost) The regime in Iran poses the most significant threat to U.S. interests. It sponsors terrorism as part of its foreign policy, repeatedly threatens the existence of both Israel and the United States, and is
actively seeking to establish a regional hegemony and undermine U.S. influence in the region. Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons. Its leaders are deeply committed to building nuclear and ballistic missiles in defiance of U.N. Security Council restrictions . While estimates vary, the intelligence community estimated in 2010 that Iran could have a nuclear weapon within one or two years . The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran has increased the number of uranium-enriching centrifuges at its Natanz facility from about 3,000 in late 2007 to more than 8,000. In 2010, Iran unveiled even faster centrifuges to speed up enrichment, and it has stockpiled more than 3,000 kilograms of low-enriched uraniumenough to produce at
least two nuclear weapons if the uranium is further enriched.
Tehran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it continues to increase their range, scale, and payload capabilities. Its new two-stage solid-propellant missile could soon be capable of reaching Eastern Europefar beyond Israel. According to a recent National Intelligence Estimate, many of Irans ballistic missiles are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload. Iran could have a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015, enabling it to hold governments around the world hostage simply by threatening to launch its missiles. Iran poses a threat to shipping and oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, it continues to support foreign terrorist elements, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Taliban. If Iran achieves a nuclear capability, it could provide nuclear weapons to terrorists to carry out its ambitions. Likely influenced by Iran, in the past four years, at least 14 countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced intentions to pursue civilian nuclear programs, which are viewed by many as a hedge against the possibility of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran will multiply this phenomenon, resulting in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Furthermore, the United States should be wary of cooperation between anti-American regimes, such as Irans cooperation with Venezuelas Hugo Chvez in Venezuela. Finally, Iran has sought to undermine the coalition in Iraq and U.S. relations with longtime U.S. allies in the region, including Turkey and the Gulf states.
5
Iran Disadvantage

Even a low level nuclear conflict in the Middle East risks extinction Hoffman, 6 (Ian, Nuclear winter looms Inside Bay Area, lexis) Researchers at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting warned Monday that even a small regional nuclear war could burn enough cities to shroud the globe in black smoky shadow and usher in the manmade equivalent of the Little Ice Age. Nuclear weapons represent the greatest single human threat to the planet, much more so than global warming," said Rutgers University atmospheric scientist Alan Robock. By dropping
imaginary Hiroshima-sized bombs into some of the world's biggest cities, now swelled to tens of millions in population, University of Colorado researcher O. Brian Toon and colleagues found they could generate 100 times the fatalities and 100 times the climate-chilling smoke per kiloton of explosive power as all-out nuclear war between the United States and former Soviet Union. For most modern nuclear-war scenarios,
the global impact isn't nuclear winter, the notion of smoke from incinerated cities blotting out the sun for years and starving most of the Earth's people. It's not even nuclear autumn, but rather an instant nuclear chill over most of the planet, accompanied by massive ozone loss and warming at the poles. That's what scientists' computer simulations suggest would happen if nuclear war broke out in a hot spot such as the Middle East, the North Korean peninsula or, the most modeled case, in Southeast Asia. Unlike in the Cold War, when the United States and Russia mostly targeted each other's nuclear, military and strategic industrial sites, young nuclear -armed nations have fewer weapons and might go for maximum effect by using them on cities, as the United States did
in 1945. "We're at a perilous crossroads," Toon said. The spread of nuclear weapons worldwide combined with global migration into dense megacities form what he called "perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of society since the dawn of humanity." More than 20 years ago, researchers imagined a U.S.-Soviet nuclear holocaust would wreak havoc on the planet's climate. They showed the problem was potentially worse than feared: Massive urban fires would flush hundreds of millions of tons of black soot skyward, where -- heated by sunlight - it would soar higher into the stratosphere and begin cooking off the protective ozone layer around the Earth. Huge losses of ozone would open the planet and its inhabitants to damaging radiation, while the warm soot would spread a pall sufficient to plunge the Earth into freezing year-round. The hundreds of millions who would starve exceeded those who would die in the initial blasts and radiation.
6
Iran Disadvantage

Iranian attack on the Strait of Hormuz causes skyrocketing oil prices and collapses the global economy Khan, Institute of Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, 10 (Sabahat, January,
Iranian Mining of the Strait of Hormuz Plausibility and Key Considerations INEGMA Special Report No 4)
Unless it was militarily prevented from doing so, the
extensive inventory of mines possessed by Iran and its ability to means that it possesses a credible capability to rapidly mine the Strait of Hormuz and enforce a blockade in one of the worlds most critical maritime traffic passage with relative ease. Massively critical questions such as whether Iran begins its minelaying operations in preutilize conventional and improvised minelaying platforms
emption to a U.S. (or Israeli) attack or in retaliation to an attack (when its capability to do so would have been weakened), how early it is detected, and if an open conflict between Iran and the U.S. ensues or not, and if it would be limited in nature or not will all determine the likelihood of success in Iran being able to close the Strait. The first three hours of any Iranian mine-laying operations will be the most critical if it is unable to accomplish key mission objectives within this time-period then it is likely to be intercepted and prevented from achieving strategic objectives beyond this timeframe.
The psychological impact of Iranian claims to have mined the Strait will however suffice in disrupting global energy supplies . Approximately fifteen supertankers transit the Strait on a daily basis. Commercial shipment firms would be generally unlikely to take the risk of transiting through hostile spaces: Even if (as some experts suggest) the likelihood of large tankers being sunk by naval mines was low (apparently because of their ability to absorb the energy), it is unlikely that many companies in the short-term would be willing to risk potentially millions of dollars in damage to their vessels which would still be exposed to attack from Iranian anti-ship missile ranges. During the Tanker War, both Iraqi and
Iranian forces targeted merchant vessels and damaged, by one estimate, a total of 546 vessels. Today, Iranian mines are ten times as powerful as those it deployed during the Tanker War and its anti-ship missiles are much more lethal. In most cases, the potential costs of transiting through the Strait would vastly outweigh the potential benefits.
The price of oil will shoot up exponentially simply because of the way in which commodity trade markets today react to impending geopolitical uncertainties and conflict scenarios. The economic impact will be felt not just with Arab Gulf states some ninety percent of their hydrocarbon and other oil-derived products exports cross the Strait but around the world from Venezuela to Japan. Iran will
stand at the center of international public attention.
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Iran Disadvantage

Oil spike causes nuclear great power war McKillop, Founder of International Association of Energy Economists, 4 (October
10, Energy Transition And Final Energy Crisis Oil and Gas Journal, http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=23067) Geopolitical risk: In the mid-term and long-term there is recognized need to cut oil and gas burning to limit climate change. More importantly in the short-term there is an increasingly urgent need to limit and head off oil and gas price explosions able to trigger great power rivalry , that is armed conflict for remaining reserves of oil and natural gas between the worlds economic superpowers, motivated by national economic survival. World regions most exposed to this risk are evidently the Middle East and Central Asia, and to a lesser extent Africa. We can note that threats of using military invasion, or actual invasion -- of Iraq in 2003 -did not in any way facilitate and improve oil supplies to the large consumer countries and groups of countries. In fact the exact opposite: the US-UK invasion of Iraq has effectively sabotaged or neutralized Iraqs oil export capacity for many years. Any international plan and program for energy transition, perhaps modeled on or incorporating the Kyoto Treaty, must ensure that oil producers are not exposed to military invasion, nor catastrophic falls in the oil price and their export revenues, when or if they choose to husband or conserve their non-renewable resources, and cap their oil or gas production before reducing it, instead of waiting for resource depletion and exhaustion to do the same job. No obligation to supply a depleting, non-renewable resource exists. The risk of great power rivalry for remaining oil and gas reserves is high . Even the most unconditional believers in unlimited oil and gas reserves accept that covering depletion loss, and adding net production capacity takes time and is increasingly costly to develop. The risk, or threat of large nations or groups of nations jumping the queue and taking oil and gas production capacity wherever it already exists -- leading inevitably to armed resistance, as in Iraq -- is real. Certainly since 1973, political deciders in the US have considered that any embargo or unreasonable reduction in supplies of oil, by exporters, is hostile to US vital interests -- opening the way to retortion or revenge by military invasion, to restore the free flow of reasonable priced oil ... as it was called by George Bush-1 at the time of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. A ny other large oilimporter nation, or group of oil-importer nations with nuclear weapons capability can adopt the same oil supply security doctrine. Participation in faster development and construction of non-oil, non-gas renewable energy alternatives to fossil fuels, and especially substitutes for oil, will therefore reduce invasion risks for oil and gas exporter countries. The same effort will also reduce threats to economic security of the large oil importer nations and groups of nations. As noted above, current and future oil and gas supply gaps, causing undersupply to markets, will become structural. This will raise the risks from failed attempts at obtaining oil reserves or production capacity through military invasion, as in Iraq.
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Iran Disadvantage
***UNIQUENESS***
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Iran Disadvantage
Uniqueness No Space Exploration Now

The Space Shuttle Programs end will bring about a chill amongst the private sector and international space travel
The Sydney Morning Herald July 10, 2011 Up, up and away http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/up-up-and-away-201107091h7ze.html#ixzz1SC4Az3jy
From here on, US astronauts will travel to Kazakhstan or South America for their ticket to the International Space Station aboard an ageing Soyuz, akin to trading down their business class seats for economy, as NASA's view of the heavens tilts towards new priorities. Low-earth travel is being farmed out to the private sector, which is not expected to be ready to fill the void for at least five years, while a new heavy-lift rocket becomes a focus of NASA's drawing board
and the conduit to its deep space ambitions. There's vague talk of landing on a near-earth asteroid sometime after 2020 and, beyond that, of sending humans to Mars.
US space program ending

Lovitt Travel writer 10/6/2009, Rob A clown, a crisis and the future of space travel With NASA a no-go, can the private sector fill the space gap? Filling the vacuum Theres certainly nothing funny about the current state of the U.S. space program . Last month, a White House panel released a preliminary report questioning NASAs ability to pursue manned
space flight in the years ahead. Among the findings: the proposed retirement of the space shuttle next year would lead to a seven-year gap in the countrys human-launch capability. US ending space exploration plans now Davis, Foreign Policy Association, 7-7-11 (Joel, Twilight for U.S. Space Program?
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/07/07/twilight-u-s-space-program/) As you may have heard, the space shuttle Atlantis will launch tomorrow
for the last time. This launch will conclude the shuttle program and quite possibly, the U.S. manned space program , at least in the way we have come to think about it. If NASA is ending the shuttle program you would think that a new program with a new space vehicle would be ready to begin, sadly though, thats not the case, as John Glenn points out in his recent criticism of NASA. Up until last year, NASA did have
a plan for continuing the American advance into space, it was called the Constellation Program, and it envisioned a fleet of new launch and crew vehicles that would not only send astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also to the Moon to establish a small outpost. This was part of a comprehensive Vision for Space Exploration that would have replaced our halting and stumbling expansion into the solar
system with a methodical step-by-step plan to move humans permanently into space. Unfortunately, this plan did not mesh well with new political and budget realities and was ended by President Obama.
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Iran Disadvantage
Uniqueness No Iran Space Now

Iran has failed numerous times in efforts to conquer space Shapir 5 , Yiftah (Irans Efforts to Conquer Space, Strategic Assessment, November 2005, Vol.
8, No. 3, http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=160) Nevertheless, a close examination of the projects that Iran has been engaged in indicates its great difficulty in attaining these capabilities. Iran has failed to reach even the basic stages in these grandiose projects after many years of effort, stages that other states attained a long time ago . The reasons for this failure are not clear but they seem to be linked to the governments inherent inability to coordinate government agencies, resolve conflicting demands, and mobilize the required resources for the projects. In other words, Iran is motivated to achieve far-reaching goals. Iran also has a significant technological infrastructure. Nevertheless, the engine is stalled and important projects are being delayed. If this assessment is correct and the Iranian
failure is a deep systemic failure, this could point to questions on Iran's capability to materialize other ambitious programs, such as in the realms of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Death of Iranian chief engineer will further cause setbacks in developmental programs. Vick 10 (Charles P. Pirard, Theo, "Iran in Space", Spaceflight, Vol. 42, Aug. 2000, p. 319. Iran
approves funds for a domestic satellite, Space News, 1999. Iran's deadly missile potential, Kenneth Timmerman, The Washington Times, July 16, 1999, pp. A15. Iran to launch three birds in two years, Space Business News, Vol. 17, No. 17 Aug. 18, 1999, pp. 7. Iran plans joint satellite project with China, Tehran, voice of IRIFPN 00:20:30 GMT, January 25, 2000. Tehran, Iran (Reuters) 4:43, May 6, 2000, "Russia prepared to build Iranian satellite, Space News, p. 2. O'Sullivan, Arieh, "Key Iranian missile man dies mysteriously", Jerusalem Post, 12, July, 2001. Covault, Craig, "China, Iran Pursue Imaging Spacecraft", Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct 1, 2001 p. 45., http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/iris.htm) It was reported in the Jerusalem Post on July 12, 2001 which was, quoting the Saudi Arabian newspaper Ashark al-Awsat, that Ali Mahmudi Mimand the Chief engineer in the Iranian Ministries Satellites and Aeronautics Industry had passed away under mysterious circumstances that have not been explained. He was called the "father of Iran's Missiles". This is paramount to the loss of the Designer General of
Iran's missile program which, inevitable, will cause some setbacks in the program which is already delayed due to development problems. Chief Engineer Mimand headed the Zelzal (earthquake),
Shahid Hemat Industrial group at its facilities south of Teheran, Iran. His position was such that he was the head of many different rocket projects that came under his authority including the Shahab-1 through 6, Kosar, IRIS series and the other tactical missiles such as the (ASM) Air to Surface Missile system for Iranian helicopters. He was the recipient of the "Ayatollah Khomeni" citation among others.
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Iran Disadvantage
Uniqueness No Nuclear Missile Capability Now

Current missiles dont have nuclear payload space expansion key Arms Control Association, 7-12-11 (Iranian Missile Messages: Reading Between the Lines
of "Great Prophet 6" http://www.armscontrol.org/print/4965) Reading Between the Lines There are, however, other conclusions to be drawn from Irans flexing of missile muscles. For those seeking to prevent or dissuade Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, the
most important question is how much progress the exercises demonstrate toward Iran developing and deploying the missiles, which would carry nuclear warheads . Realistically,
medium-term delivery boils down to two existing systems: the liquid fuel, single stage Ghadr 1 MRBM, an advanced derivative of the Shahab 3, and the solid fuel Sejjil 2 MRBM, a two-stage system with sufficient range to target Israel from launch sites throughout Iran, but not yet operational. Neither missile was flown during Great Prophet 6. The only MRBM launched was announced to be a Shahab 3, an unlikely candidate for fulfilling Irans likely nuclear delivery capability aspirations. It is possible that the Iranians foresee using the Ghadr 1 as a nuclear weapons platform, in spite of the disadvantages inherent to liquid fuel mobile missiles in terms of their limited mobility and greater vulnerability to attack. It is more likely that the Iranians see the Sejjil 2 as the preferred carrier for a possible future nuclear warhead. Iran is
apparently feeling no need to exercise its only operational missile suited for the nuclear mission and the missile best suited for the nuclear mission has not yet reached an operational status appropriate for exercising. Thus, if the U.S. Government is correct in assessing
that Tehran has not yet made a decision to build nuclear weapons, there would appear to be time for dissuading it from doing so. A Long-Range Missile Threat Not Yet in Sight In a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate, the U.S. intelligence community projected that Iran could test an ICBM within a few years. Most analysts predicted back then either even odds or a likely chance that Iran would test an ICBM by 2010. However, in 2009, senior military and defense officials testified to Congress that shifting from deployment of strategic interceptors to Europe in a third site to a program for deploying theater interceptors in a Phased Adaptive Approach was appropriate since the Iranian ICBM threat was evolving more slowly than previously thought. The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis reported to Congress in 2011 that Iran was fielding increased
numbers of SRBMs and MRBMs, continuing to work on producing more capable MRBMs, and developing space launch vehicles, which incorporate technology directly applicable to longer-range missile systems . [2] The still unofficial Report on Sanctions of the UN Panel of
Experts completed in May 2011 revealed that the Iranians had conducted two unannounced tests of the Sejjil 2 MRBM (in October 2010 and February 2011) [3] in addition to the five flight tests it had conducted since 2007. (A senior Iranian Republican Guard Corps Commander recently confirmed two previously unannounced 1,900 kmrange missile flights tests in February.) The Iranians launched their second satellite in May 2011, using the Safir Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) and predicted that it would be followed by another satellite launch in the summer. Unlike the larger Samorgh SLV that had been displayed as a mockup in February, conversion of
the Safir SLV to a ballistic missile would still only deliver a nuclear-sized payload about 2,100 km, according to the IISS Strategic Dossier, [4] roughly the same as the Sejjil 2 MRBM. This summers Great Prophet 6 exercise provides more evidence that, while Tehran makes steady progress on augmenting its stocks of enriched uranium and while R&D work continues on its most likely MRBM candidate for being able to deliver a future nuclear weapon within the region, Tehrans present military focus is on demonstrating and enhancing its conventional capability to deter and defeat a preventive attack on the Islamic Republic itself. It has not flight-tested, or indeed even asserted a need for, an IRBM or ICBM the missile categories most relevant to threatening the territories of NATO Europe and the United States.
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Iran Disadvantage
A2: Recent Launches Prove Iran Space Capability 1/2

Current launches havent been enough Iran has to test more satellites launches for it to be a threat Rawnsley, Danger Room, 6-16-11 (Adam, Iran Claims Launch of Second Homebrew Before you cancel that European vacation or start building a bomb shelter, its worth taking Irans boasts with a grain of salt. While Iran has cooked up some indigenous weaponry over the years, its desire to puff out its chest and pronounce immunity from the effects of international sanctions has led to some absurd exaggerations and outright lies. Iran has used Photoshop to make its missile launches look more fearsome, welded oil drums together to look like advanced air defense systems
and talked up its the allegedly homemade S-300 air defense missile.
Satellite http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/iran-claims-launch-of-second-homebrewsatellite/)
Even if Rasad actually made it to space, it probably had a bumpy ride. Globalsecurity.orgs Charles Vick tells the New York Times that the launch has taken the Iranians far longer than they advertised because of sanctions and management issues. Current Iranian capabilities are only rhetoric Kass, Defense Contractor, 6 (Lee, September, Irans Space Program: The Next Genie In A
Bottle? Middle East Review of http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a2.html) International Affairs,
Irans space program and its efforts to develop long-range missiles have yet to generate sufficient global concern. Richard Speier, an arms control expert at the National Defense University, surmises that the international community remains unconcerned, because the space program remains relatively low-profile.[40] In addition to concurring with this assessment, Patrick Clawson, an Iranian expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, points out that Tehran has a history of making grandiose statements about possessing a certain technological feat long before it is operational.[41] For instance, in July 1999, Irans government-run radio announced that the country would launch three satellites within
two years.[42] That has yet to happen, which reinforces the perception that an operational Iranian space capability is mere rhetoric. Clawson surmises that
the world also believes Tehran lacks the requisite infrastructure to develop an independent satellite production program.[43] Perhaps that explains why the press departments in the White House and
Ahmadinejads speech the previous day about his plan to wipe Israel off the map overshadowed the event.[44]
U.S. State and Defense departments did not issue official statements or comments the week after Russia launched Irans first satellite.
aside, the Iranian space endeavor is a growing threat.
Political rhetoric
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A2: Recent Launches Prove Iran Space Capability 2/2

Past satellites launches have not been threatening but Iranian progress in space will be Broad, NYT, 6-15-11 (William, After Delay, Iranians Launch a Satellite
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/middleeast/16iran.html?_r=1)
Iran said it launched a satellite into orbit on Wednesday that Western aerospace experts said could be used for limited military reconnaissance and also to monitor crops and track damage from earthquakes, flooding and other natural disasters. It was the second time that an Iranian rocket had carried a satellite into orbit and took place more than two years after Iran joined the international space club by launching its first satellite. Iran released few details about the satellite, which it calls Rasad-1, or Observation-1. Western experts said it weighed about 100 pounds meaning that the light payload and the modest rocket carrying it bore little resemblance to an intercontinental missile and its heavy warhead. Still, aerospace experts said the successful launching demonstrated Iranian engineers growing skill and contrasted with the repeated failures endured by North Korea in trying to place payloads into orbit. Its a significant step forward for the Iranians, said Charles P. Vick, an expert on Iranian rockets at GlobalSecurity.org, a private research group in Alexandria, Va. Still, it did
not come as a surprise to those who monitor Irans efforts. Everybodys been expecting this, said Marcia S. Smith, founder of SpacePolicyOnline.com, a news blog in Arlington, Va. Mr. Vick noted that the Iranians had announced that Rasad-1 would be lofted last
Its taken them far longer than they advertised, Mr. Vick said in an interview. The reason, he added, appeared to be managerial failures and sanctions that have been having a significant
summer, but the mission then was delayed.
impact on their getting foreign technology and hardware. He described the Iranian satellite as an experimental craft designed mainly for tracking the Earths resources from space. But the spacecraft, he said, could also be used for low-resolution reconnaissance. Iranian news reports said that the Rasad-1 was built by the Malek-Ashtar University. Analysts in the American intelligence community view the university as having close ties to the Revolutionary Guard, the Islamic Republics main enforcers. Iranian scientists have long hailed the benefits of Earthobservation satellites for tracking floods, fighting fires, gauging earthquake damage, finding evacuation routes and identifying high-risk areas. In February, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced plans to launch several Iranian-built satellites this year, including at least one for reconnaissance. He also repeated a claim that Tehran would send an Iranian astronaut into space by 2020. Iran placed its first satellite into orbit in February 2009. The nations 5,000 rial banknote, the equivalent of 50 cents, bears the satellites image. The Iranians called it a rudimentary communications craft. The announcement of the launching on Wednesday came on the countrys Arabic-language television channel, Al-Alam. The channel said a rocket known as Safir, or messenger, fired the satellite into an orbit with a maximum height of 162 miles. It is capable of photographing the Earth, the report said of the satellite. The channel said Rasad-1 would circle the Earth 15 times a day and should operate for two months. Iranian media reports have said the Safir rocket can carry a satellite weighing 110 pounds into elliptical orbits
Western nations fear that Iran is trying to develop a missile capability under cover of its space program that could also threaten to deliver nuclear warheads. Iran denies that it has any ambition to develop an atom bomb and asserts that both its space and nuclear programs are peaceful. But it is openly developing a group of increasingly large rockets . In theory, the biggest might eventually be powerful enough to hurl not only satellites into space, but also warheads between continents.
as high as 280 miles.
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Iran Disadvantage
***LINKS AND INTERNALS***
15
Iran Disadvantage
Link Mars Exploration

Mars exploration boosts international space capabilities through cooperation and information sharing Dordain, Director-General of European Space Agency, 10 (Jean-Jacques, October 24,
Space Exploration in the 21st Century: Global Opportunities and Challenges http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oce/appel/ask/issues/38/38i_space.html) Develop Robotic Exploration Plans Last year, ESA and NASA made a significant step by taking a
joint initiative for a systematic robotic exploration of Mars; we have decided to use every opportunity to go to Mars together, and we have already defined joint missions that will be launched in 2016 and 2018. The ultimate goal is a joint Mars sample return in the mid-2020s. There, also, the partnership is not closed and must be open to other partners . Beyond this Mars robotic exploration plan, other robotic missions should be planned as precursors to human exploration, around or on the surface of other destinations such as the moon or
asteroids. Such missions should provide detailed information on the topography and geochemical properties of the surface of these destinations, and allow the testing of possibilities and techniques for "living off the land." A major interest of robotic investigation is to involve industrial expertise outside the traditional space industry and, therefore, to widen the base of stakeholders and increase the synergy between space-bound and Earth-bound interests. Define a Human Space Exploration Scenario As Administrator Bolden has noted, there is no common vision
among international partners about a human space-exploration scenario beyond the exploitation of the ISS. The U.S. Constellation program is being terminated, though the United States
remains committed to explore beyond low-Earth orbit. In Europe we are currently reflecting on our future human exploration plans. Other partners may have plans, but they are individual plans rather than a contribution to a global scenario.
A global exploration strategy has been developed by fourteen space agencies, including ESA.
But this global exploration strategy has not been addressed at a political level and does not represent a political strategy shared by an enlarged community of international partners.
A high-level political forum, including current partners as well as potential new partners of the ISS, should be set up with the objectives of developing a common vision for exploration. At the space-agency level, we can develop a common architecture for human space exploration . But we can't develop the political vision. We are waiting for someone to take the initiative. Which partner in the world has the willingness and credibility to propose such a political forum? I am convinced that the United States is the best suited to take such an initiative but
when? As the French author and aviator Saint-Exupry said, " the question about the future is not to predict it, but to make it possible." So let us work together to make it possible.
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Link Debris
Every country would be involved in any US space debris activity
(AFP) Oct 26, 2010 (Staff Writers,International Space Station to manoeuvre to dodge debris Moscow http://www.spacetravel.com/reports/International_Space_Station_to_manoeuvre_to_dodge_debris_999.html) In addition to the complex issues of engineering and physics , actively removing space debris raises a number of legal and policy issues as well. "The 2010 Beijing Space Debris Mitigation Workshop
underscored the importance of international dialog and cooperation on space debris among all spacefaring nations, because the problem cannot be solved by one country acting alone," said Brian Weeden, SWF Technical Advisor and one of the meeting's organizers. "It is just too expensive
and too difficult to go it alone." Existing international law reinforces this need for international cooperation, Weeden said. According to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, countries that place objects in space retain jurisdiction over those objects in perpetuity.
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Link US Modeled 1/2

US space leadership spurs international efforts to model US action Schaffer, Space Policy Institute, 7 (Audrey, March 31, Design of a Mechanism to Organize
International Collaboration on http://www.cspo.org/igscdocs/Audrey%20Schaffer.pdf) Space Exploration
Many interviewees raised the question of leadership. Who will be the leader of the mechanism? Will there be formal leader? How will a leader or leaders affect the functioning of the mechanism? First, many space agencies expressed interest, or at least acceptance, of U.S. leadership of exploration . Given that the United States currently has the most resources invested in exploration, it seems natural that other space agencies would plan their activities around those of the United States . This
An additional point that does not fit with the mechanism criteria nor the preconditions is worth discussion nonetheless. situation, however, may change over time. If other space agencies begin investing more resources, especially to develop parallel space transportation capabilities, other leaders may emerge. In order to deal with the rise and fall of dominant players, multilateral structures are necessary because they engage all players.
Iran models the US

Kass 6, (Lee, Volume 10, No. 3, Article 2/10 - September 2006, Defense Contractor in McLean, Virginia. His focus areas are arms control, missile defense, nuclear strategy, conflict resolution, and the Middle East. His publications include Syria after Lebanon: The Growing Syrian Missile Threat, which appeared in the fall 2005 edition of Middle East Quarterly, and he co-authored the cover article Observation From Orbit, which appeared in the December 2003 edition of Janes International Defense Review. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a2.html)
arena.
Iranian efforts to exploit space started over thirty years ago, which demonstrates that the country put a premium on further understanding this
Iran built a facility to obtain photographs soon after the United States launched the first system designed to capture imagery of the Earth. The Iranian Remote Sensing Center (IRSC) is responsible for
gathering, processing, and distributing relevant material to users throughout the country for resource planning and management. The IRSC helps officials determine suitable areas to develop, and its personnel maintained operations while the country experienced a revolution and a devastating conflict with neighboring Iraq.[2]
The US has always been the leader in space

Roger Handber 2010 (The future of American human space exploration and the Critical Path http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1543/1, January 11) The pattern has been clear: the US leads and others follow . This unipolar posture, however, assumes that the United States is willing to lead in terms of paying the major portion of the costs of any international space project. The likelihood of the Obama Administration dropping or ending the US human spaceflight program is low given the prestige and other considerations that have undergirded US human space exploration since its inception during the Eisenhower administration. Whether the Obama Administration will push forward aggressively or, more likely, seek alternatives is unimportant except that the United States will continue in whatever configuration is agreed upon.
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Iran Disadvantage
Link US Modeled 2/2

Iran seeks space program in response to the US
Kass 6,(Lee, Volume 10, No. 3, Article 2/10 - September 2006, Defense Contractor in McLean, Virginia. His focus areas are arms control, missile defense, nuclear strategy, conflict resolution, and the Middle East. His publications include Syria after Lebanon: The Growing Syrian Missile Threat, which appeared in the fall 2005 edition of Middle East Quarterly, and he co-authored the cover article Observation From Orbit, which appeared in the December 2003 edition of Janes International Defense Review. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a2.html)
Iran seeks to accomplish these and other broad objectives in order to become more technologically advanced. Possessing imagery and other types of material from space will assist Tehran to identify areas suitable
manufacturing satellites. On January 5, 2003, Rear within eighteen months,
for development and those to be avoided because of their susceptibility to earthquakes and floods.[4] Iran attempted partially to do that by
Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the countrys former defense minister, stated that Iran will be the first Islamic country to penetrate the stratosphere with its own satellite and with its own launch system. According to Shamkhani, the satellite launch would be in response to American actions: The Persian Gulf was once a place from which constant threats against the Islamic Republic emanated. But now, with the resources that we are gaining, this region cannot be used against us by any outside force. When he made this announcement, Tehran figured it was the next target after coalition forces met their objectives in Iraq. That has yet to occur, but Iran still seeks a space capability partly because of Americas growing regional presence.
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Iran Disadvantage
Link Perceived Military Threats

Iran worries about US space advancements theyd advance their own programs in the event of military threat
Kotsev 5/4/10 Victor Kotsev, research and writtingAsian Times, 2010, US militarys robotic shuttle spooks Iran, Asian times, Mayr, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LE04Ak05.htmll, DOA: 7/15/11 United States government officials promptly denied the claims. " The X-37B is a risk reduction vehicle for
space experimentation and to explore concepts of operation for a long duration, reusable space vehicle," said a spokesperson for the project. The robotic shuttle, if it passes its tests successfully, would add important new capabilities for the US Air Force. At the very least, it would help service expensive US military satellites; it is not hard, however, to
imagine much more active military roles. "Regardless of its original intent, the most obvious and formidable is in service as a space fighter - a remotely piloted craft capable of disabling multiple satellites in orbit on a single mission and staying on orbit for months to engage newly orbited platforms," said Everett Dolman, professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base. Some go even further in their speculation. "Ultimately, weapons could be delivered from a space plane in low Earth orbit," commented William Scott, a former bureau chief for the Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine. Perched on top of a giant Atlas V rocket ready to take it into space, the X-37B looks diminutive and unimpressive. Its length is just 8.8 meters and its height is less than three meters. The wingspan is 4.25 meters, bringing the total weight to about five tons. However, this small size, in addition to the ability to adjust orbit, makes it an ideal reconnaissance and anti-satellite platform. It is especially well-adapted to enter and leave polar-type orbit, favored by most espionage satellites, without being detected. "A shuttle [is] able to lift off from Vandenberg [US Air Force base in California]," writes Lewis Page for The Register, "orbit at a high angle from the Equator once - during which time it could deploy something or pick something up - and then re-enter, using its wings to bend its re-entry track east and so put down again in California, never having overflown any nation of concern". This information might help explain Iran's worries about the project. The Islamic Republic's space program is already fairly advanced, and the country has two satellites in orbit: Sinah-1, launched by Russia in 2005, and Omid, launched by a domestically-built rocket last year. Several other satellites and space missions are in the works.
Since the X-37B is still in the early stages of being tested, it is unlikely that it poses any real danger to Iranian (or any other) satellites. Due to its small payload, speculations that it might be used for orbital bombardment also appear unrealistic. Ultimately, however, there is an intimate connection to the Iranian nuclear program that provides context to the Iranian fears. It rests in the changing role of nuclear weapons for military strategy with the advance of science and technological capacity.
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Iran Disadvantage
Link Space Exploration Collaboration

US space exploration spurs international space exploration by other countries Obama for America, 8 (Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration
http://www.aiaa.org/pdf/public/Obama%20Space%20Policy%20FINAL.pdf)
Historically, the U.S. space program has inspired people the world over with its feats on behalf of all humankind. This leadership can continue; indeed, the Bush administration set an ambitious agenda for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), but has since failed to provide adequate funding or leadership to move forward with that agenda. As a result, key programs have suffered. Poor planning and inadequate funding are leading to at least a five-year gap after the retirement of the Space Shuttle. During those years, the United States will have to depend on foreign rockets
and spacecraft to send Americans to orbit. NASA has had to slash its research budget, including its aeronautical research, its programs to study climate change, microgravity research that can yield new technologies, and even the robotic exploration of the outer solar system and the universe beyond. Many other countries are moving forward in space; the United States cannot afford to fall behind.
Space exploration causes international collaboration on space activities Obama for America, 8 (Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration
http://www.aiaa.org/pdf/public/Obama%20Space%20Policy%20FINAL.pdf) Collaborating with the International Community Space exploration must be a global effort. Barack Obama will use space as a strategic tool of U.S. diplomacy to strengthen relations with allies, reduce future conflicts, and engage members of the developing world . Collaborating on Exploration: The United
States needs to fully involve international partners in future exploration plans to help reduce costs and to continue close ties with our ISS partners. NASA has been working with 13 other space agencies to develop a globally coordinated approach to space exploration ; Barack Obama will not only continue but intensify this effort . Human exploration beyond low-earth orbit should be a
long-term goal and investment for all space faring countries, with America in the lead.
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Iran Disadvantage
A2: US Would Exclude Iran

Cant exclude Iran international collaboration in space is open to all countries Schaffer, Space Policy Institute, 7 (Audrey, March 31, Design of a Mechanism to Organize
International Collaboration on http://www.cspo.org/igscdocs/Audrey%20Schaffer.pdf) Space Exploration
The mechanism must be open to all space agencies that want to participate in exploration . Every interviewee who commented on the subject of membership said that any nation should be welcome to participate in the international collaboration mechanism, given that the nation has at least some small budget invested in exploration programs. Many interviewees described space exploration as a way to foster international stability and bring developing space agencies into a common international system. Space agencies do not want to treat space exploration as an area for competition. This criterion runs contrary to one of the criteria of the United States. The United States wants the ability to control which space agencies join the mechanism, whether or not they meet the objective
membership criteria (such as investment levels and technical capability, as described in #4 of the U.S. criteria). The United States is not comfortable collaborating with every nation and is not likely to agree to the everyone is welcome principle. Resolving this issue will be critical in developing the initial terms of reference of the mechanism and will require NASA (the likely representative for the United States) to consult heavily with the White House and Department of State.
22
Iran Disadvantage
Link Espionage
Modanlo leak shows how Iranian technology is based off US
Associated Press, June 27, 2011 (http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/06/27/us-spaceentrepreneur-accused-aiding-iran/) A federal grand jury indicted the Potomac, Md., resident last year on charges he secretly brokered the launch from Russia of the first Iranian-owned satellite in 2005, in violation of the U.S. sanctions against Iran. If convicted on all counts, he could be sentenced to 65 years in prison and ordered to pay $10 million. Five Iranian nationals were also indicted, but none are in custody. Iran went on to launch its first satellite aboard an Iranian-built rocket in 2009 and its second earlier this month. Jonathan McDowell of the HarvardSmithsonian Center for Astrophysics said the June 15 launch of the tiny Rashad-1 satellite, a 34-pound orbiter, shows the country is well on its way to mastering the multi-stage rocket technology that would be needed for longrange nuclear missiles. McDowell called it an impressive record for a country in the early stages of its space program. "They might have a couple of more failures in the next couple of launches," he said. "But after that, they will basically have the capability to know what they're doin g." Modanlo, 50, denies that he violated U.S. sanctions and is free on $250,000 bond. He declined through his lawyers to be interviewed, and officials from the Justice Department and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement likewise declined to discuss the case. But experts, court documents and other public records describe how his ambitions might have led him into trouble. The trial is expected to begin in October 2012. The 2005 launch from Russia of the Sina-1 satellite came one day after newly-elected Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Israel must be "wiped off the map." To many, the launch seemed to back up this threat. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security, an expert on nuclear proliferation, said Iran is focused on the military applications of space science. " One of the goals of the program, and it appears to
be an ongoing program, is to develop a missile that can carry a nuclear warhead if Iran decides to build one," he said. Iranian officials insist that they are pursuing nuclear technology strictly for peaceful
purposes. But their refusal to disclose all their nuclear activities has raised international suspicions, and has led to four rounds of United Nations sanctions since 2006. A recent International Atomic Energy Agency report said there was evidence Iranian scientists were studying ways to build nuclear warheads compact enough to be carried by a missile. Ahmadinejad recently announced Iran was expanding its uranium enrichment program, bringing the country another step closer to the capacity to build weapons. The Justice Department said Modanlo's case is just one of more than 150 filed by prosecutors in the past four years against arms traders and middlemen suspected of helping Tehran illegally acquire U.S. technology. Defendants have been accused of using shell
companies, offshore bank accounts and faked end-user certificates to supply Tehran with everything from U.S.-made component parts for missile guidance systems to the ultra-highstrength steel needed to build centrifuges that enrich uranium.Yet Modanlo's case stands out. Unlike most of those prosecuted under the act, he isn't charged with shipping U.S. technology to Iran. Instead, he is suspected of using his business contacts and aerospace engineering experience to help launch Iran's space program.
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Iran Disadvantage
Link Russia (Debris Module) 1/2

Russia part of IADC Will cooperate with U.S. on Debris
ESA 2008 (ESOC: Focal point for ESA space debris activities, http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ESOC/SEMU2CW4QWD_0.html)
Te Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)
is one of the world's leading technical organisations with space debris is. ESA is a founding member of IADC, together with NASA, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency, ROSA VIAKOSMOS, and Japan. Subsequent members include ASI (Italy), BNSC
(UK), CNES (France), the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA), DLR (Germany), ISRO (India) and the National Space Agency of the Ukraine (NSAU).
IADC's primary purpose is to exchange information on space debris research activities, to facilitate opportunities for cooperation in space debris research, to review the progress of ongoing cooperative activities and to identify debris mitigation options. Irans space program is based on and aided by Russia
CIA 11/16/2011 (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iran-space.pdf, date accessed, 7/15/11)
An OSW review of open source material indicates that there has been a consensus for several years among prominent Russian space experts that Iran is seeking to develop space launch technology to develop an ICBM capability but there is disagreement about how quickly that goal can be achieved. In contrast, most statements over the past year Moscow appears to have become more worried about the security implications of assisting Tehran with the further development of its space capability. Irans Ambassador to Russia, for example, complained publicly about a slowdown in space-related cooperation. Most Russian military and scientific space experts judge that recent Iranian space launches demonstrate that Iran is moving forward in developing multistage separation and propulsion technology and is increasingly capable of developing a space launch vehicle with an advanced payload capacity. Viktor Mizin, deputy head of the Moscow State University of International Relations Institute of International Studies, in September 2009 said that over the past five to seven years, Iran has mastered technology to develop both liquid-fueled and solid-propelled rocket engines, as well as multistage launch vehicles. Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, first vice president of the Russian Academy of Security, Defense and Law and a former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Troops, in March 2009 said that, in addition to work to develop rocket staging, the Iranians appear to have acquired a more sophisticated rocket propulsion capability -2 rocket last year,
calling them groundless in some cases. Nonetheless, noted that It is quite extraordinary to use a two-stage rocket of such a small launch mass (up to 25 ton) for a spacecraft launch mission. In order for the upper stage to gain the required velocity to deliver even a small satellite into orbit, it should have a rather sophisticated design. Vladimir Yevseev, a senior research fellow with the Moscow-based Center for International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told the state-controlled RIA Novosti news agency in February 2009 that,
from Russian officials and legislators have tended to downplay both Irans technical capabilities as well as its intentions to develop ICBMs,
since 2005, Iran has been developing space launch vehicles (SLVs) rumored to have an improved range of up to 10,000 km and featuring a three-stage design, with the first and second stages being propelled by liquid fuel, and the upper stageby solid fuel.
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Iran Disadvantage
Link Russia (Debris Module) 2/2

Russia aid with the Iranian Space Program has lead to ICBMs that could hit Moscow.
Bloomberg 2/3/2011(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/russian-scientists-worriediran-uses-their-know-how-for-missiles.html, date accessed 7/15/11)
Russian scientists are increasingly concerned that years of cooperation with Iran on its civilian space program has provided the technology for Iranian development of missiles that would be capable of reaching Tel Aviv or Moscow, according to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency review of Russian press accounts and statements. Russian military and space experts have concluded that Iran has mastered technology for both liquid-fueled and solid- propelled rocket engines, as well as multistage launch vehicles. Russian officials and legislators, in contrast, are playing down Irans capability and intentions to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), according to the unreleased Nov. 12 assessment
prepared by the CIAs Open Source Office. The report, based on unclassified sources of information from Russia, doesnt represent the coordinated views of the CIA, it says. Still, the documents a timely distillation as the United States attempts to win Russias backing for a regional missile defense program to protect against the potential of Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles. The report points to Russias state news, RIA Novosti, which in July 2010 noted Irans orbiting of the Rasad-1, an Iranian-developed weather and navigation satellite, and reported that
Iran may be developing a ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 km
(2,485 miles) to 5,000 km (3,106 miles). That would have potentially the range to hit as far as London, 4,408 km (2,740 miles) away. Viktor Mizin, the deputy head of the Moscow State University of International Relations Institute of International Studies, said in September 2009 he expected Iran within the decade to develop reliable medium-range missile systems with a range of about 3,000 km (1,864 miles). Missiles at that range could reach Tel Aviv, which is 1,598 km (993 miles) from Tehran, and Moscow, which is 2461 km (1,529 miles) from Irans capital. Mizin also saw a move toward testing of Irans first ICBM with a range of 3,500 km (2,174 miles) to 5,000 km (3,106 miles). A
variety of Russian experts over the past few years have said Tehran intends to use Space Launch Vehicle technology to develop ICBM systems that could reach targets throughout most of the Middle East, said the CIA report. There is less consensus among Russian experts regarding the pace at which Iran will be able to develop ICBMs,
it said. While Russian officials and politicians downplayed Iranian capabilities and intentions to develop ICBMs, their actions showed concern growing over Russian assistance to the Iranian space programs, according the report said.
Russia appears reluctant to help Iran with the development of the Zoreh telecommunications satellite with a lifespan of 15 years, the report said, citing the head of Russian Federal Space Agency who, during the 2009 Paris Air Show, said that no work is currently being done on a second Iranian satellite.
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Iran Disadvantage
Link Russia (Mars Module) 1/2

US will cooperate with Russia on a Mars mission
Cox The West Australian (Perth) July 2, 2011 Saturday (Sally, First Edition Into the next frontier; The last US shuttle to go to the space station blasts off in a week. So what do the superpowers have planned for space travel after that. SECTION: MAI; Pg. 54)
A manned mission to Mars is the next big adventure on the space agenda and there are three major players: the US, Russia and China. It has been estimated the mission will cost at least $20 billion and will take a minimum of 18 months for the return flight. Staggering under the weight of a growing national debt after the global financial crisis and two major conflicts, the US can ill afford the billions it costs for manned space flights, but it has already invested in the technology and has plans to send a car-sized robot called Curiosity to the red planet in the northern winter. The Russians have a simulated mission to Mars under way called Mars 500. At an aircraft hangar outside
So what now for the exploration of space?
Moscow, six volunteers have sealed themselves into a 550sqm module built to re-create the conditions of a spacecraft hurtling into deep space. The volunteers, three Russians, a Chinese, a Frenchman and an Italian, entered the module in June last year and will emerge 520 days later in November, having performed flight tasks and experiments with the highlight a simulated spacewalk on Mars in a big sandpit. The Russians predict there will be a manned flight to Mars by 2030. In 2003, China became the third country after Russia and the US to launch a manned space mission and was snubbed by the Bush administration when it expressed an interest in joining the International Space Station program. It is behind in technology, but China has a flourishing economy that may put a manned mission to Mars within reach. Back in 1969 when Armstrong took that one small step for man, it would have been unthinkable that Russia and the US, still at each other's throats during the
An international co-operation between the US, Russia and the Chinese would make it far more likely for a manned mission to Mars to succeed. It would be an achievement as inspiring to the human spirit of adventure as was that first Moon walk. Truly a marriage made on Mars. We're really not too far from going to the stars.' Astronaut John Young in 1981 after the first shuttle
Cold War, would join forces to further mankind's knowledge of space. But it came to pass. returned safely.
Irans space program is based on and aided by Russia

CIA 11/16/2011 (http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iran-space.pdf, date accessed, 7/15/11)
An OSW review of open source material indicates that there has been a consensus for several years among prominent Russian space experts that Iran is seeking to develop space launch technology to develop an ICBM capability but there is disagreement about how quickly that goal can be achieved. In contrast, most statements
from Russian officials and legislators have tended to downplay both Irans technical capabilities as well as its intentions to develop ICBMs, calling them groundless in some cases. Nonetheless,
over the past year Moscow appears to have become more worried about the security implications of assisting Tehran with the further development of its space capability. Irans Ambassador to Russia, for example, complained publicly about a slowdown in space-related cooperation. Most Russian military and scientific space experts judge that recent Iranian space launches demonstrate that Iran is moving forward in developing multistage separation and propulsion technology and is increasingly capable of developing a space launch vehicle with an advanced payload capacity. Viktor Mizin, deputy head of the Moscow State University of International Relations Institute of International Studies, in September 2009 said that over the past five to seven years, Iran has mastered technology to develop both liquid-fueled and solid-propelled rocket engines, as well as multistage launch vehicles. Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, first vice president of the Russian Academy of Security, Defense and Law and a former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Troops, in March 2009 said that, in addition to work to develop rocket staging, the Iranians appear to have acquired a more sophisticated rocket propulsion capability -2 rocket last year,
noted that It is quite extraordinary to use a two-stage rocket of such a small launch mass (up to 25 ton) for a spacecraft launch mission. In order for the upper stage to gain the required velocity to deliver even a small satellite into orbit, it should have a rather sophisticated design. Vladimir Yevseev, a senior research fellow with the Moscow-based Center for International Security of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told the state-controlled RIA Novosti news agency in February 2009 that,
since 2005, Iran has been developing space launch vehicles (SLVs) rumored to have an improved range of up to 10,000 km and featuring a three-stage design, with the first and second stages being propelled by liquid fuel, and the upper stageby solid fuel.
26
Iran Disadvantage
Link Russia (Mars Module) 2/2

Russia aid with the Iranian Space Program has lead to ICBMs that could hit Moscow.
Bloomberg 2/3/2011(http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/russian-scientists-worriediran-uses-their-know-how-for-missiles.html, date accessed 7/15/11)
Russian scientists are increasingly concerned that years of cooperation with Iran on its civilian space program has provided the technology for Iranian development of missiles that would be capable of reaching Tel Aviv or Moscow, according to a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency review of Russian press accounts and statements. Russian military and space experts have concluded that Iran has mastered technology for both liquid-fueled and solid- propelled rocket engines, as well as multistage launch vehicles. Russian officials and legislators, in contrast, are playing down Irans capability and intentions to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), according to the unreleased Nov. 12 assessment
prepared by the CIAs Open Source Office. The report, based on unclassified sources of information from Russia, doesnt represent the coordinated views of the CIA, it says. Still, the documents a timely distillation as the United States attempts to win Russias backing for a regional missile defense program to protect against the potential of Iranian nuclear-tipped missiles. The report points to Russias state news, RIA Novosti, which in July 2010 noted Irans orbiting of the Rasad-1, an Iranian-developed weather and navigation satellite, and reported that
Iran may be developing a ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 km
(2,485 miles) to 5,000 km (3,106 miles). That would have potentially the range to hit as far as London, 4,408 km (2,740 miles) away. Viktor Mizin, the deputy head of the Moscow State University of International Relations Institute of International Studies, said in September 2009 he expected Iran within the decade to develop reliable medium-range missile systems with a range of about 3,000 km (1,864 miles). Missiles at that range could reach Tel Aviv, which is 1,598 km (993 miles) from Tehran, and Moscow, which is 2461 km (1,529 miles) from Irans capital. Mizin also saw a move toward testing of Irans first ICBM with a range of 3,500 km (2,174 miles) to 5,000 km (3,106 miles). A
variety of Russian experts over the past few years have said Tehran intends to use Space Launch Vehicle technology to develop ICBM systems that could reach targets throughout most of the Middle East, said the CIA report. There is less consensus among Russian experts regarding the pace at which Iran will be able to develop ICBMs,
it said. While Russian officials and politicians downplayed Iranian capabilities and intentions to develop ICBMs, their actions showed concern growing over Russian assistance to the Iranian space programs, according the report said.
Russia appears reluctant to help Iran with the development of the Zoreh telecommunications satellite with a lifespan of 15 years, the report said, citing the head of Russian Federal Space Agency who, during the 2009 Paris Air Show, said that no work is currently being done on a second Iranian satellite.
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Iran Disadvantage
Internal Link Duel-Use 1/4

Irans satellite technology is dual-use provides significant nuclear advancements (causes US ballistic missile defense) Rawnsley, Danger Room, 6-16-11 (Adam, Iran Claims Launch of Second Homebrew
Satellite http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/iran-claims-launch-of-second-homebrewsatellite/)
The significance of the satellite launch doesnt so much lie in the demonstration of Irans satellite technology, but in showing off the countrys apparent missile prowess. The technology that can launch a satellite into space is also useful for building longer range missiles. Its that kind of dual-use potential that gets American defense planners attention. Fears of an emerging Iranian missile capability have motivated the U.S. to push for a missile shield that could intercept Iranian or North Korean ballistic missiles headed towards Europe .In the past, Iran had to rely on Russia to put its spy satellite, Sina-1, into space. But in 2009, the Islamic Republic managed to launch the Omid (meaning hope) satellite all by itself, forming a milestone in the countrys space program. To get Omid into orbit Iran used the Safir-2 rocket, a two-stage, 72-foot-long, 26ton tricked out version of Irans Shahab-3 missile. Space expansion provides impetus for ICBM missile capabilities threatens the US homeland Mazol, George Marshall Institute, 9 (James, February, Persia in Space: Implications for
U.S. National Security Marshall http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/626.pdf)
skeptical:
Institute
Policy
Analysis,
The Iranian government said promoting the national space industry4 remains the main objective of its indigenous space program. Iranian President Ahmadinejad told state television, We need [space-related] science for friendship, brotherhood, and justice.5 America should be
Iran can and probably is using space-related science to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear payloads. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) expressed similar concerns after confirming Irans claims. A spokesman said: The mere fact that this launch involves dual-purpose capabilities is what causes concern to us in this government. The technology thats used topropel this satellite into space is one that could also be used to propel long-range ballistic missiles.6 A newly space-faring Iran only provides further impetus for constructing the comprehensive, multi-layered missile defense
(ICBMs) system America has begun building in Europe and at home.
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Iran Disadvantage

Iran can use peaceful space technology for delivery systems for ICBMs.
Rubin March 20, 2009 (Uzi Rubin is an Israeli defense engineer and analyst, SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES America's new space rivals; Iran, North Korea swoop to conquer, lexis)
Iran's recent breakthrough in placing its own satellite in orbit by a homemade multistage rocket earned it the distinction of being the first radical regime that reaches space. Worse, the tepid reaction in the United States and the West to this watershed event served as a powerful inducement for Iran, North Korea and other potential nuclear wannabees to camouflage their offensive missile programs in the guise of peaceful space activities . The truth must
be said: Iran's space program is no more peaceful than its nuclear program. Self-delusion will not help here. Ever since the dawn of the space age, ballistic missiles and space launchers existed in close symbiosis. The first two satellites in human history, the Soviet Union's Sputnik and the U.S. Explorer 1 were lofted to Earth orbits aboard slightly modified ballistic missiles. The alarm in the United States at the Soviet achievement did not come from the rudimentary 80 kilogram ball of metal that beeped its way in space but from the rocket that
Any rocket that can propel a satellite into Earth orbit can be easily modified and upscaled to drop a significant bomb anywhere on Earth. Ballistic missiles and space launchers are so intertwined
launched it.
that the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the only international instrument that governs the sale of missiles and their technologies, does not distinguish between the two. The MTCR, subscribed today by 34 industrialized nations (Russia included) defines space launchers as missiles for every practical purpose, and bans the sale of their key technologies except to responsible governments and under strict assurances of end use. The appearance in 1998 of the North Korean Paektusan 1 that failed to orbit a satellite, and the Iranian Safir that succeeded to do so in 2009, made a mockery of the MTCR. By rights, every key technology utilized in those launchers - the rocket motors, the stage separation systems, their guidance and control instrumentation - should have been denied to the two missile-brandishing countries. Yet the fact is that someone, somewhere was greedy enough - or politically motivated enough - to contravene international norms and regulations
In practical terms, proficiency in space launching is synonymous with a proficiency in missile engineering. Even if the Paektusan and Safir
to supply the two with all their space and missile needs. Let's make no mistake about it.
are too puny by themselves to send meaningful payloads across oceans, the teams (or the team?) that designed them can use the accredited know-how and accumulated experience to design capable intercontinental ballistic missiles. Or the other way around: The same teams that designed the long-range rocketry of these two radical players, can modify them into space launchers - and clothe their military program in the peaceful guise of space activity.
While this interchangeability between missiles and space launchers was always obvious to experts, it was less so to political and military leaderships. Hence, one can only imagine the pleasant surprise of the Iranian leadership, castigated internationally after each of its provocative Shahab and Sajeel ballistic missile tests, when the success of the Safir space launcher was received with indifference in the United States and elsewhere. It probably dawned on those leaders that there was no better way to flex Iran's missile muscles than by disguising it as peaceful space "research." Take your theater ballistic missile and call it "Kavoshgar Sounding Rocket." take your embryonic ICBM and call it "Safir Space Launcher." Chances are that Western gullibility will buy the hoax.
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Iran Disadvantage

An Iranian space program leads to satellite-guided Iranian Ballistic Missiles. Kass, 9/7/2006 (Lee Kass is a defense contractor in McLean VA, Iran's space program: The next
genie in a bottle? Lexis)
Teheran is advancing its space program to satisfy numerous civil and military objectives including manufacturing satellites to accurately guide its Shahab ballistic missiles. The United States and Israel remain gravely concerned about Iranian efforts to gain more military power. The Iranian space endeavor mimics a disturbing pattern other countries use clandestinely to advance their long- range missile programs. Iran might reengineer the Shahab to carry future satellites and try to obtain significant political rewards from future satellite launches. Exploiting this event would unite Iran politically complicating Washington's
External support continues to help advance Iran's space effort.
regional objective and further destabilizing the region.In slightly different ways and to varying degrees of success China North Korea and Pakistan use a civil space program clandestinely to manufacture longer-range missiles to further safeguard national security. Iran seeks to become a space power for similar reasons. Unlike other Islamic countries with satellites the Iranian defense ministry plays a prominent role in
This military component manages the Shahab ballistic missile program which Iran might modify into a space launch vehicle (SLV) with foreign support. Enhancing the Shahab to become satellite-guided would allow Iran to strike Israel and United States military forces stationed throughout the region precisely. Statements from Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who declared his intention to "wipe Israel off the map" and dismissed
shaping the space effort with possible contributions from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC). the United States as a "hollow superpower heighten the level of tension. Iran might seek to develop a space program to improve national pride. Successfully testing a launch vehicle would allow Iran to boast that it is a space power. The propaganda Teheran espouses following this event might unite the country.
This would further legitimize Ahmadinejad's policies and rhetoric and generate greater regional and international fear regarding the regime's intentions . Iranian efforts to
exploit space began under the Shah who tried to improve his country's scientific standing. In 1959 Teheran became a founding member of the United Nations' Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS). The United Nations' General Assembly requested that UNCOPUOS review international collaborative programs to exploit space for civil purposes serve as a forum for information exchanges and encourage the development and facilitate the advancement of national programs to study outer space.
Irans space program can easily be used as a cover to develop ballistic missiles.
Elleman 1/21/2011(Michael Elleman is co-author of Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment., http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/jan/21/could-iran-deliver-bomb-four-basicsabout-iran%E2%80%99s-ballistic-missiles)
Iran has an ambitious space program, to be sure, and is making steady progress toward its officially stated goal of launching a man into space within a decade. In early 2008, Iran placed a small satellite into earth orbit using the domestically developed, two-stage Safir spacelauncher. Last year, with great fanfare, Tehran unveiled a much larger satellite carrier rocket, the Simorgh, whose maiden voyage of is
larger launchers are almost certainly on the drawing boards of Irans space agency. The technologies used to launch satellites can also be used to develop ballistic missiles, so there is good reason to be concerned about Irans space activities. The Simorgh, for example, could in theory be converted into an intermediate-range missile capable of 4reaching most of Europe from Iranian territory. Space launcher and ballistic missiles are founded on similar technologies, but
scheduled for February or March 2011. Still
there are many fundamental differences between the two systems. For starters, space launchers are normally prepared for flight over a period of many weeks, components and sub-systems can be checked and verified before launch, and the mission commander can wait for ideal weather before initiating the countdown. And if during the countdown an anomaly is encountered, the launch can be delayed, the problem fixed and the process restarted. Think of how many times a Space Shuttle launches been delayed for one reason or another?. Ballistic missiles, on the other hand, must perform reliably under a variety of operational conditions, and with little advanced notification, like any other military system. These operational requirements must be validated through an extensive test program before a missile can be declared combat ready. And while some of the validation can be achieved within a civilian space program, not all of them can be addressed adequately when
once the Simorgh is proven as a satellite carrier, another two to five years of testing in the ballistic missile mode would be required. Nonetheless, Irans space activities must be closely monitored to avoid future surprises.
operating the system as a launcher. All told,
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Iran Disadvantage

Irans space program can be used to manufacture ballistic missiles UPI 6/20/2011 (http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/06/20/Iransatellite-launch-signals-missile-push/UPI-99551308591084/, accessed 7/14/11)
BEIRUT, Lebanon, June 20 (UPI) -put into orbit in two years,
The real importance of Iran's recent launch of its Rasad-1 satellite, the second it's is the Safir booster rocket used to loft the 34-pound, data-gathering craft into space. That technology produces intercontinental ballistic missiles. Iran's state television reported that the June 16 launch
thrust Rasad, which means "Observation" in Farsi, went into orbit 163 miles above the Earth. The satellite had been scheduled for launch in August 2010 and there was no explanation for the delay at a time when U.N. experts are reported to have concluded Iran has accelerated its efforts to develop long-range missiles. These include the Shehab-3b and Sejjil-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable to hitting the Persian Gulf Arab states and Israel, by passing tough sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council in June 2010 over Iran's contentious nuclear program.
Tehran is reported to have increased the military budget by more than 40 percent ,
from $7 billion to $10 billion a year, apparently to fund the construction of more ballistic missiles. This was possible because of rising oil prices.Rasad-1 was built at the Malek Ashtar University, founded and run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the
the military aspect of the Rasad launch and indeed Iran's entire space program, which is seen by the West and by Israel as an integral part of the drive to develop a long-range ballistic missile capability. According to Western specialists, the multistage Safir-2 used in the Rasad launch is much smaller than a weapon capable of
elite military organization that's in charge of Iran's ballistic missile program and the strategic missile command. This underlines carrying conventional or nuclear warheads. But the 72-foot, 26-ton Safir is a version of the Shehab-3 intermediate-range missile that currently forms the backbone of Iran's operational missile force. The Rasad launch presumably took place at the Semnan launch site in the Great Salt Desert south of Tehran. It was there on Feb. 3, 2009, Iran sent aloft its first indigenously launched satellite, a research and communications craft called Omid-1 atop a Safir rocket. The Islamic Republic thus joined the fewer than a dozen other countries capable of launching satellites into space. "Tehran now has established its status as having the most advanced space, missile and nuclear programs in the Muslim Middle East, confirming its technical superiority over its Arab rivals," Jane's Intelligence Digest reported at the time. The
successful launch "confirms that the Iranians have overcome the technological obstacles to launching a multistage missile, a process than can increase flight range considerably," Jane's said. In 2010, Iran
announced plans to start sending research animals into space in 2011, initially using modified Shehab ballistic missiles as the booster rockets.On Feb. 3 that year, Tehran announced it sent a rocket carrying a mouse, two turtles and a dozen worms into space aboard a 10-foot Kavoshgar-3 research rocket. At that time, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has made the space program one of his government's priorities, unveiled a capsule for a monkey, along with four prototype Iranian-built satellites Tehran plan to launch before March 2012. Hamid Fazeli, director of Iran's Space Organization, which oversaw the Rasad launch, said a 625-pound capsule carrying a monkey would be launched aboard a Kavoshgar-5 rocket between July 23 and Aug. 23 this year to an altitude of 74 miles. Communications Minister Reza Taqipour says these launches will be followed by orbital missions as a prelude to an Islamic manned space program, by around 2021.
Many of the technological building blocks involved in the booster rockets like the Safir-2 are the same as those needed to develop long-range ballistic missiles. This was the pattern of early U.S. and Russian development in the 1950s and 1960s of the Atlas, Titan and R-7 ballistic missiles. One U.S. analysis of the recent advances in Iran's missile technology said a successful Safir-2 mission "could raise concerns in the U.S. Congress among Republicans who claim U.S. President Barack Obama acted wrongly by reducing Missile Defense Agency
facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic against Iranian Safir-type missiles that could eventually have the capability to strike the United States directly." In 2010, Iran unveiled plans for a four-engine, liquid-fuel Simorgh rocket to carry a 220-pound satellite into orbit at an altitude of 310 miles.
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Iran Disadvantage
***IMPACTS***
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Iran Disadvantage
Brink Ballistic Missile Tech Improving

Iran is improving Ballistic Missile technology Carafano and Graham 5/23/2011 (James Jay Carafano is director of The Heritage
Foundations Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, where Owen Graham is research coordinator for national security and foreign policy. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2011/05/While-North-Korea-and-Irancollaborate-China-Covers-Up)
Iranian delegations have visited North Korea in the past to observe missile tests and exchange technology. This newest UN report, buried by China, affirms U.S. concerns about Chinese willingness to look the other way when it
Beijing to bar North Korean shipments through China, yet China has taken no action.
comes to North Korean nuclear activities. Diplomatic cables published through WikiLeaks show that the U.S. has repeatedly importuned
North Korea and Iran have a long history of military, economic and intelligence cooperation. Their collaboration on missile technology goes back to the Iran-Iraq war. In fact, Tehrans ballistic missile inventory, the largest in the Middle East, is largely based on North Korean missile designs. In testimony earlier this year, James Clapper, director of national intelligence,
highlighted North Koreas ballistic missile proliferation activities regarding Iran and hinted that this cooperation is bearing dangerous fruit.
Tehran continues to expand the scale, reach and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload, Clapper said. Iran is investing heavily in ballistic missile, nuclear, and space programs all run by the military. Unfortunately, it is making impressive strides on all fronts. Tehrans new two-stage solid-propellant missile may Iran is doing ballistic missile tests now Stringer, 6/29/2011 (David Stringer is
LONDON
soon be able to reach Eastern Europe and U.S./NATO bases, enabling it to hold governments hostage simply by threatening to launch its missiles.
a writer for the Associated Press, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43575181/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/, date accessed, 7/14/11)
Iran has conducted covert tests of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in addition to a 10-day program of public military maneuvers, Britain alleged on Wednesday. Foreign Secretary William Hague
told the House of Commons that there had been secret experiments with nuclear-capable missiles, but did not specify precisely when the tests had taken place.
Iran has "been carrying out covert ballistic missiles tests and rocket launches, including testing missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload," Hague said. Britain believes Tehran has
Iran conducted secret ballistic missile tests in October and February. During the tests, the report said,
conducted at least three secret tests of medium-range ballistic missiles since October, amid an apparent escalation of its nuclear program and increased scrutiny from the International Atomic Energy Agency A U.N. Panel of Experts report leaked to the media last month reported that
Iran launched a liquidfueled Shahab 3 missile, with a range of 560 miles (900 kilometers), and one or two solid-fueled Sejil 2 missiles, with a range of 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers).Both missiles are believed to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, the U.N. experts said. They did not say if the tests were successful, or provide other details. The Washington-based Institute for
Science and International Security, an arms control group, raised concerns about the secret tests in a posting on its website. The group pointed out that a 2010 U.N. Security Council resolution prohibits Iran from "any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches..." Iran is currently displaying its military hardware in a series of war games in an apparent show of openness, and on Tuesday fired 14 missiles in public tests. However, the U.K. believes that the covert missile tests show Iran's leaders are seeking to avoid scrutiny over the real extent of their weapons programs. "On the back of the recent IAEA report and the unanswered questions about its nuclear program, they only serve to undermine further Iran's claims that its nuclear program is entirely for civilian use," said a Foreign Office spokesman, on customary condition of anonymity in line with policy. An IAEA report last month listed "high-voltage firing and instrumentation for explosives testing over long distances and possibly underground" as one of seven "areas of concern" that Iran may be
concerned over Tehran's decision to increase its capacity to enrich uranium to a higher level at the Fordo site near the holy city of Qom in central Iran. "It has announced that it intends to triple its capacity to produce 20 percent enriched uranium. These are enrichment levels far greater that is needed for peaceful nuclear energy, " Hague said. Low-enriched
conducting clandestine nuclear weapons work. Hague also said Britain was
uranium at around 3.5 percent can be used to fuel a reactor to generate electricity, while uranium enriched to around 90 percent purity can be used to develop a nuclear warhead.
Enriching to 90 percent can be done much more easily from material enriched to 20 percent purity than from low-enriched material. Some Western officials claim Iran
is accelerating its attempts to produce a nuclear weapon, partly because leaders have been shaken by protests against authoritarian regimes across the Middle East. Iran and the West remain in dispute over its nuclear program. The U.S. and its allies insist it is aimed at developing atomic weapons a charge Iran rejects."We will maintain and continue to increase pressure on Iran to negotiate an agreement on their nuclear program," Hague said. Hague also condemned Tehran over its support of the violent crackdown on anti-regime demonstrations in Syria. "Iran continues to connive in the suppression of legitimate protest in Syria and to suppress protests at home," he said.
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Proliferation Bad Global Proliferation

Iran proliferation cascades and goes global McCoy, President of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 1-29-11 (Ronald, Irans nuclear aspirations: A poisoned chalice
http://www.kafkapizechust.com/irans-nuclear-aspirations-a-poisoned-chalice/2247/) Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has warned that
another 20 or 30 virtual nuclear weapon states have the capacity to develop nuclear weapons in a very short time. The stimulus may come from a threat made by an existing nuclear weapon state, a change
in leadership, a desire for national power and prestige, a misguided scientist, or sudden access to nuclear weapons technology. The Iranian case is a selective challenge to the legitimate rights of developing countries to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It represents another serious blow to the quid pro quo bargain embedded in the NPT regime. If
developing countries perceive the Iranian crisis as a new form of nuclear apartheid, some may decide that the NPT is too discriminatory and does not confer sufficient benefits and withdraw from it, as North Korea has done. Should Iran opt to withdraw, the nuclear non-proliferation regime may be irretrievably damaged. This could lead to a nuclear free-for-all and a cascade of proliferation. Iranian prolif causes a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, destroys the nonproliferation regime, and give terrorists WMD with which to attack the U.S. Cohen, Former Secretary of Defense, 9 (William, December 17, What to expect from a
nuclear Iran Washington Times, http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/dec/17/cohen-whatto-expect-from-a-nuclear-iran/?feat=home_headlines)
A nuclear Iran would be emboldened in its efforts to destabilize the Middle East and export its revolutionary ideology. Armed with nuclear weapons, Iranian leaders would enjoy a sense of invincibility. This could lead to bolder interference in Iraq and Afghanistan, greater mischief in Lebanon and more aggressive support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Tehran also could incite Shia populations in the Gulf States, thus threatening the survival of moderate Arab governments. Iran's possession of a nuclear bomb would likely start a nuclear cascade across the Middle East , as nations threatened by Iran question U.S. security guarantees and seek their own deterrent capability. Within a decade, we could see the number of nuclear states grow dramatically, as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and others seek nuclear weapons to protect against Iranian aggression. This would spell the end of nonproliferation . As more nations develop their own nuclear deterrent, our ability to control nuclear stockpiles and prevent the spread of nuclear materials to dangerous actors could collapse. A nuclear Iran would itself pose an unprecedented proliferation risk. Tehran already supplies dangerous weapons to Hezbollah and Hamas, and might share nuclear materials with radical extremists. The result would be a growing risk that nuclear or radiological weapons will get in the hands of terrorists, who would not hesitate to use them against the U.S., Israel and other allies.
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Proliferation Bad Nuclear Terrorism 1/2

Iran cannot be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons, already support multiple terrorist organizations. Talent 2/14/2011 (Jim Talent is a Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2011/02/Leaks-Illustrate-Magnitude-of-IransThreatening-Ways)
The WikiLeaks release of U.S. diplomatic cables was despicable. But it did, at least, demonstrate that even Muslim leaders believe Iran is an aggressive and ongoing sponsor of terrorism, must not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons capability and cannot be trusted. Those who have been skeptical of similar Western claims should heed the warnings of Arab leaders on Iran's sponsorship of terrorism. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak tells us that the Iranians are "sponsors of terrorism." And Kuwait's military intelligence chief told U.S. General David Petraeus that Iran was supporting extremist groups in Yemen. We also now know that Jordanian officials have called for the Iranian nuclear program to be stopped by any means necessary to reduce the threat of a weapons program. And officials in the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have referred to the Iranian regime as "evil," and an "existential threat." Crown Prince bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi warned the U.S. and the world against appeasing the Iranian regime, even declaring, "Ahmadinejad is Hitler." According to one cable, King Abdullah "frequently exhorted the U.S. to attack Iran to put an end to its nuclear weapons program." The
fat liars" Saudi
Saudi ambassador to Washington, reporting on a 2008 meeting between King Abdullah and Petraeus, revealed that King Abdullah "told you to cut off the head of the snake." Egypt's Mubarak cautioned the U.S. to be wary of Iranian leaders as negotiating partners, because "they are big,
King Abdullah told a U.S. diplomat: "The bottom line is that they (the Iranians) cannot be trusted." It is possible to build a bipartisan, international strategy to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. American leaders
must discard their preconceptions and develop and implement a strategy that confronts reality: 1. The vast majority of Americans want a world where political and economic freedom, human rights and cultural and social tolerance are the norm. 2. Most nations can and should be viewed as partners in advancing these goals -- provided they see consistent, common-sense and bipartisan leadership from the United States. 3. However, there are movements and governments actively opposing enlightened international relations. Their goal is to oppress other people, and they understand that achieving that vision puts them in direct conflict with United States. 4. These
forces are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction because they understand that such weapons empower them to accomplish their goals. They will not give up those attempts unless they believe the costs of pursuing them outweigh the substantial leverage gained by acquiring weapons . As North
Korea demonstrates, rogue regimes become more aggressive when they acquire nuclear weapons. Iran will be much worse than North Korea if it acquires such weapons. Iran
is the world's chief sponsor of terrorism. The leaked cables show it is not trusted by any of its neighbors, regardless of their religion or government structure. The threat can still be deterred, but the world is running out of time, and nothing will be accomplished by wishful thinking about the nature of the Iranian regime.
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Proliferation Bad Nuclear Terrorism 2/2

Nuclear terrorism causes global nuclear escalation national retaliation goes global Morgan, Foreign Studies Prof at Hankuk University, 9 (Dennis Ray, December, World
on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race Futures, Vol 41 Issue 10, p 683-693, ScienceDirect)
what most terrorists obviously already In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question "Is Nuclear War Inevitable??" [10].4 In Section 1, Moore points out
know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they've figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange . As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian "dead hand" system, "where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed," it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States " [10]. Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal "Samson option" against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even "anti-Semitic" European cities [10]. In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the
environment and fragile ecosphere as well.
36
Iran Disadvantage
Iran Proliferation Bad Regional Instability

Status quo missile capabilities are not threatening nuclearizing long-race missiles causes regional instability and pre-emptive war Arms Control Association, 7-12-11 (Iranian Missile Messages: Reading Between the Lines
of "Great Prophet 6" http://www.armscontrol.org/print/4965) Missiles Are the Measure Missiles are the premier weapon of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Irans ballistic missiles, in particular, occupy an iconic place in the power pantheon they are fast to
employ, hard for an enemy to locate and attack prior to launch, difficult to intercept in flight, and can potentially serve as a vehicle for delivering nuclear weapons to targets far from the countrys
border. Iran already has medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in its arsenal, which can reach targets not only in neighboring states, but also in Israel. Moreover, given the heavy concentrations of U.S. troops in the region, even Irans shorter-range missiles can easily and quickly put the lives of U.S. soldiers at risk. Anti-shipping cruise missiles along with mines provide one of Irans most credible deterrent threats, because they enable Tehran to effectively exploit its geographical position by threatening to interrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries a third of all the world's seaborne traded oil. Such a disruption, even short-term, would have incalculable effects on the international economy. Iranian missile forces loom large in relative significance because of inadequacies in Irans air and ground forces. These forces are sufficient to deter or defend against conventional threats from Irans weaker neighborsbut lack the air power and logistical ability to project power much beyond Irans borders or to confront regional powers such as Turkey or Israel, according to a recent official U.S. assessment. [1] U .S. domination of the seas and
skies in any military confrontation drives Iran into a disproportionate reliance on threatening to use missiles to level the odds. Even so, the practical utility of Iranian missiles is primarily limited at present to being an instrument of intimidation or terror when targeted against cities, given that Irans ballistic missiles lack accuracy against point targets and Irans cruise missiles are not
suited to land-attack.
By acquiring nuclear warheads for its medium-range ballistic missiles, Iran could gain the ability to destroy specific targets. The deployments of missile defenses in Israel and the Persian Gulf are unlikely to give the defenders confidence that nuclear devastation would be averted in the event of an actual Iranian nuclear missile attack. Moreover, missile defenses are likely to spur rather than retard Iranian efforts to improve their missiles. Fortunately, Tehran would also be aware that its use of nuclear weapons would provoke retaliation that could result in its annihilation as a nation a risk disproportionate to any conceivable gain.
37
Iran Disadvantage
Iran Proliferation Bad Europe NMD

Iranian ballistic missile threat causes US missile defense system in Europe Hodge, Danger Room, 9 (Nathan, September 18, What a Revamped U.S. Missile Shield
Might Look Like http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/09/what-a-revamped-us-missileshield-might-look-like/)
Details are now emerging on the Obama administrations plans to revamp missile defense to better counter the emerging Iranian missile threat. President Barack Obama yesterday announced that he would scrap George
W. Bushs plan to park missile-defense interceptors in Poland and place an X-band radar in the Czech Republic. Speaking yesterday to reporters, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates offered the new rationale. Over the last few years, we have made great strides with missile defense, particularly in our ability to counter short-and-medium-range missiles, he said. We now have proven capabilities to intercept these ballistic missiles with land-and-sea-based interceptors supported by much-improved sensors. These capabilities offer a variety of options to detect, track and shoot down enemy missiles. This allows us to deploy a distributive sensor network rather than a single fixed site, like the kind slated for the Czech Republic, enabling greater survivability and adaptability. In addition, Gates noted the Navys considerable test success with the missile-shooting Standard Missile-3 (pictured here), which has seen eight successful flight tests since 2007. Sea-based interceptors,
the new plan might include deploying an Xband radar to the Caucasus the region sandwiched between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea to keep an eye out for missile launches from Iran. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright said stationing a radar in the
he said, offer a much more flexible option than a fixed site. Intriguingly, Caucasus might reassure Russia, which was vehemently opposed to the Bush administrations plan to place assets in Eastern Europe. The Xband radar is a single directional, he said. In other words, when you put it down, it points in a single direction. And it will be very clear that it is pointing south towards Iran.
Its easy to speculate about which countries in the region could potentially host an X-band radar. The United States has close military ties with Georgia . And
neighboring Azerbaijan, which shares a border with Iran, has received U.S. funding for the construction of radar installations. The idea of stationing an X-band radar in the Caucasus, however, is not new. Back in 2006, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) published a fact sheet that said mobile sensors for ballistic missile defense might be placed in an unnamed country in the Caucasus. The agency subsequently scrubbed the fact sheet to remove any mention of possible locales, although MDA spokesman Rick Lehner told me at the time that
the region would be a good location for a small X-band radar to provide tracking and discrimination of missiles launched from Iran. Iranian missile advancements through space prompt US missile defense in Europe Kass, Defense Contractor, 6 (Lee, September, Irans Space Program: The Next Genie In A
Bottle? Middle East Review of http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a2.html) In contrast, the Iranian space effort is a growing source of International Affairs,
international unease. The defense ministry and possibly the IRGC play a more prominent role in the countrys space program. Their involvement, Iranian motivations for becoming a space power, behavior, and cooperation with countries that cloak their long-range ballistic missile efforts behind a civil space project, raises disturbing questions about this nations intentions in space. The international community will likely react to a future Iranian SLV launch in a similar manner to North Koreas August 1998 failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit using a reengineered ballistic missile. North Koreas Taepo-dong 1 launch was a key factor that reinvigorated efforts within the United States to develop a ballistic missile defense shield. Irans SLV launch will generate greater European support for the U.S. ballistic missile defense program . The event will also
increase pressure on the European Union states of United Kingdom, Germany, and France to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue before the IRGC can threaten Europe with a miniaturized nuclear warhead onboard a modified missile.
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Proliferation Bad Turns Case (US Space Supremacy)

Iranian nuclearization turns US space supremacy Space War, 4 (November 19, Analysis: Can Iran
http://www.spacewar.com/news/milspace-04zd.html)
Secretary of State Colin
Alter
US
Space
Strategy?
Powell's blockbuster allegation that Iran's mullahs were on the verge of fielding nuclear missiles was a grave warning sign that the days of the United States' military's virtual monopoly on outer space could be numbered. The American military's technical prowess has given it a dominance in space-based systems, which leads to the logical likelihood that its enemies could look for ways to attack and destroy the satellites that U.S. troops routinely use to monitor enemy forces on the ground and handle the steady flow of communications between units in the field and commanders who are sometimes thousands of miles away. We are getting so dependent on them (satellites) that we are creating a target, said Thomas Moorman, a retired Air force general and current vice president of the defense consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton. We have to worry about protecting those satellites; we have to take away those tempting targets. The United States has made great strides in establishing a virtual military monopoly on the final frontier You can't go to war and win without (utilizing) space, said Gen. Lance Lord, the rightfully proud head of Space Command. And if you take space away from us, people will
the role the dominance of space has played in the current conflict in Iraq.
since the Air Force Space Command was established 50 years ago in the heyday of the Cold War. Other countries have military and intelligence-gathering satellites in orbit; however the United States has seemingly been in a league of its own in its utilization of space for tactical purposes. Moorman and other speakers attending an Air Force Association conference on space in Beverly Hills Friday were bullish on
die. The audience of Air Force personnel and representatives of the big defense contractors that produce the futuristic birds were regaled with war stories from battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan that generally involved the military's various eyes in the sky bringing Pentagon tacticians and far-off command-and-control into the action in real time. The advantage of good intelligence allows U.S. forces to escape ambushes and locate massing enemy forces that can be struck by air or artillery before they reach their intended target. And if the need should arise, satellites would likely provide the first warning that an enemy missile was about to be launched. Losing the advantage in space, Lord and other speakers
Our greatest threat is complacency and taking for granted our place in space, Lord said. We need to make sure that we maintain our advantage.... We don't want to assume the environment where we operate is benign. The planners and analysts who look at space from the military point of view don't have to make much of a leap to conclude that an enemy planning a nuclear first strike - or even a conventional attack - against the United States or an ally would likely take some steps to blind the constellation of satellites that serve as the United States' watchful eyes and ears . While it currently might not be possible to physically shoot down a satellite in orbit far above Earth, it is considered within the realm of possibility to detonate a missile in the general area of a crucial satellite and either disable it or push it out of position so that the only thing the controllers on the ground see is a nice view of deep space. The same theory of a shove in space is one of the earliest ideas behind the concept of missile defense - an explosion
agreed, would result in the United States losing an advantage on the ground.
knocking an incoming missile off course. Waging war against satellites has been a point of contention in recent years among some scientists and policymakers who cringe at the thought of militarizing space and others who don't see anything wrong with defending the satellites that have become a cornerstone of U.S. military capabilities. At the same time, the development of defensive measures for satellites would boost the cost of the military's space program, possibly at the expense of other weapons programs or even the fledgling missile defense system that was spawned by President Reagan's much-maligned Star Wars program and given new life by the current Bush administration.
The
possibility that a Muslim theocracy such as Iran could soon join North Korea as the second of President Bush's Axis of Evil nations to crash the once-exclusive nuclear club doesn't necessarily mean that the world is a step closer to doomsday. It does, however, raise the urgency of protecting the satellites that are the best of the United States' limited means of preventing a surprise attack that could pale Pearl Harbor and Sept. 11.
39
Iran Disadvantage
A2: Ballistic Missile Capabilities Now

Iran doesnt have ICBM capabilities now Zarif, Iran Leader at AEI Critical Threats, 9 (Maseh, April 9, Potential Delivery Systems
for Iran's Nuclear Program http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear-program/potential-deliverysystems-irans-nuclear-program) Long-range ballistic missiles, or intercontinental ballistic missiles ( ICBMs), possess a range of at least 3,400 miles.[17] Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director Lowell Jacoby assessed in 2005 that Iran will have the technical capability to develop an ICBM by 2015 .[18] If it chooses to develop an ICBM missile capability, Iran would need to overcome various technical limitations. In particular, Iran needs to
develop or acquire: multi-stage missile technology, a more powerful propulsion system, a reentry vehicle able to withstand higher velocities and temperatures, and advanced missile guidance systems.[19] Iran could expedite the development of an ICBM if it chose to acquire technologies
such as a multi-stage capabilityfrom foreign suppliers like Russia, China, or a network similar to A.Q. Khans.[20] In a February 2009 report, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) illustrated Irans capability to do just that speed up the development of increasingly sophisticated missile technology.[21] IISS explains that between May 2005 and November 2007, Iran appeared to make the transition from producing a two-ton missile motor to a ten-ton missile motor. Irans relatively quick upgrade from a small motor to a larger one is significant because the process typically has a steep learning curve and requires hardware on export-control lists. Therefore, IISS argues that the upgrade suggests that Iran received technical assistance and export-controlled hardware from foreign sources. Speculative reports regarding Irans pursuit of longer range IRBMs and ICBMs have drawn attention in recent years. In 2008, U.S. deputy national intelligence director Thomas Fingar noted Irans display of a 1100 mile range missile (Ghadr-1) during a military parade and Iranian claims of a new 1250 mile range missile (Ashura).[22] In November of 2008, the Iranian defense minister declared that Iran tested a new 1,200 mile-range missile the Sejjil. Weapons expert Duncan Lennox questioned the claim that the missile was new, pointing out the Sejjils likeness to the Ashura.[23] Supposedly, the dual-engine, multi-stage Sejjil missile uses solid fuel, unlike the liquid-fueled Shahab.[24] The significance of that distinction lies in that solid fuel missiles launch quicker than liquid fuel missiles and, therefore, are less susceptible to missile defense intercept.[25]
Speculation periodically surfaces regarding an Iranian ICBM, commonly referring to a Shahab6. Recent reports claim that the 3500 mile range Shahab-6, based on North Koreas Taepodong, is under development.[26] Iran denies it has plans to pursue an ICBM capability, however, it is
unclear if Iran actively pursues, previously abandoned or even created the design for a Shahab-6 ICBM.[27] As Stephen Hildreth of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes, non-official public sources reflect little technical or program consensus regarding an Iranian ICBM program.[28]
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Iran Disadvantage
A2: Iran Cant Nuclearize

Even the perception of an Iranian bomb vastly increases the risk of a regional nuclear war Cirincione, NonProlif Director at Carnegie, 7 (Joseph, August 21, The Middle Easts
Nuclear Surge http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/08/nuclear_surge.html)
Iran is still probably five to 10 years away from gaining the ability to make nuclear fuel or nuclear bombs. But its program is already sending nuclear ripples through the Middle East. The race to match Iran's capabilities has begun.Almost a dozen Muslim nations have declared their interest in nuclear energy programs in the past year. This unprecedented demand for nuclear programs is all the more disturbing paired with the unseemly rush of nuclear salesman eager to supply the coveted technology . While U.S. officials were reaching a new nuclear
agreement with India last month, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Libya and agreed to help the United Arab Emirates launch its own civilian nuclear program. Indicating that this could be just the beginning of a major sale and supply effort, Sarkozy declared that the West should trust Arab states with nuclear technology. Sarkozy has a point: No one can deny Arab states access to nuclear technology, especially as they are acquiring it under existing international rules and agreeing to the inspection of International Atomic Energy Agency officials. But is this really about meeting demands for electric power and desalinization plants? There
is only one nuclear power reactor in the entire Middle East the one under construction in Busher, Iran. In all of Africa there are only two, both in South Africa. (Israel has a research reactor near Dimona, as do several other states.) Suddenly, after multiple energy crises over the 60 years of the nuclear age, these countries that control over one-fourth of the world's oil supplies are investing in nuclear power programs. This is not about energy; it is a nuclear hedge against Iran. King Adbdullah of Jordan admitted as much in a January 2007 interview when he said: "The rules have changed on the nuclear subject throughout the whole region. . . . After this
summer everybody's going for nuclear programs." He was referring to the war in Lebanon last year between Israel and Hezbollah, perceived in the region as evidence of Iran's growing clout.
Other leaders are not as frank in public, but confide similar sentiments in private conversations. Here is where the nuclear surge currently stands. Egypt and Turkey, two of Iran's main rivals, are in the lead. Both
have flirted with nuclear weapons programs in the past and both have announced ambitious plans for the construction of new power reactors. Gamal Mubarak, son of the current Egyptian president and his likely successor, says the country will build four power reactors, with the first to be completed within the next 10 years. Turkey will build three new reactors, with the first beginning later this year. Not to be outdone, Saudi Arabia and the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) at the end of 2006 "commissioned a joint study on the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." Algeria and Russia quickly signed an agreement on nuclear development in January 2007, with France, South Korea, China, and the United States also jockeying for nuclear sales to this oil state. Jordan announced that it, too, wants nuclear power. King Abdullah met Canada's prime minister in July and discussed the purchase of heavy water Candu reactors. Morocco wants assistance from the atomic energy agency to acquire nuclear technology and in March sponsored an international conference on Physics and Technology of Nuclear Reactors. Finally, the Arab League has provided an overall umbrella for these initiatives when, at the end of its summit meeting in March, it "called on the Arab states to expand the use of peaceful nuclear technology in all domains serving continuous development." Perhaps these states are truly motivated to join the "nuclear renaissance" promoted by the
the main message to the West from these moderate Arab and Muslim leaders is political, not industrial. "We can't trust you," they are saying, "You are failing to contain Iran and we need to prepare." It is not too late to prove them wrong. Instead of seeing this nuclear surge as a new market, the countries with nuclear technology to sell have a moral and strategic obligation to ensure that their business does not result in the Middle East going from a region with one nuclear weapon state - Israel - to one with three, four, or five nuclear nations. If the existing territorial, ethnic, and political disputes continue unresolved, this is a recipe for nuclear war. This means that nuclear technology states must be just as energetic in promoting the resolution of these conflicts as they are in promoting their products. It means building the unity of the United States, Europe, Russia and the regional states to effectively contain the Iranian program. Finally, it means that engaging with Tehran is even more crucial to halt not only the Iranian nuclear program, but those that will soon start to materialize around it.
nuclear power industry and a desire to counter global warming. But
41
Iran Disadvantage
A2: No Nuclear Material 1/2

Iran expanding weapons-capable uranium production Hendersen, Director of Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington Institute, 3-2-11
(Simon, New Evidence of Iran's Nuclear Ambitions http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3317) The February 25 report noted the following: Contrary to Security Council resolutions, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities at several facilities, which are under IAEA safeguards. Indeed, enrichment activities have been expanded at both a pilot plant and the main plant at Natanz, and at an enrichment plant called Fordow, near the holy city of Qom. Tehran admitted the existence of the latter facility in 2009, days before it was revealed by U.S. and European surveillance. Indeed, Iran is enriching with more than 5,000 centrifuges, 1,000 more than three months ago. (A rare optimistic note is that Iran's total of 8,000 centrifuges is slightly less than the total at the time of the last report, suggesting breakdowns remain a problem.)
Iran has now produced more than 3,600 kilograms of low-enriched uranium; if processed into higher proportions of the fissile isotope U-235, this amount could theoretically be enough for several atomic bombs. In addition, Iran continues to enrich some of this to a higher (20 percent) proportion of U-235, a cause for concern because anything beyond is defined as highly enriched uranium (HEU). Iran is also working on two new centrifuge designs that might be more efficient than its problematic IR-1 centrifuge. Iran is not responding to information requests about the Fordow plant and has yet to tell the IAEA anything about ten new centrifuge plants. Sites for five of these plants have already been chosen,
and construction will begin on one of them before the Iranian new year (March 20) or shortly afterward. Iran has provided no further information regarding its claim last year that it possessed laser enrichment technology, nor on its later announcement that it was developing a new type of centrifuge. The regime has also ignored IAEA requests about additional locations related to the manufacture of centrifuges and research and development on enrichment. Although Iran has stated that it is not working on reprocessing -- which the IAEA confirmed, but only in the facilities it was permitted to inspect --the regime continues to work on heavy-water projects in violation of Security Council resolutions. Some activities at the Isfahan uranium conversion and fuel manufacturing facilities contravene Iran's international obligations. Under a section titled "Possible Military Dimensions," the IAEA report refers to "new information
recently received "as well as concerns "about the possible existence in Iran...of activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." This disturbing conclusion reinforces previous evidence that Iran is working hard to design a nuclear weapon small enough to fit on top of a missile less than three feet in diameter. It also suggests that Iran intends to design an implosion-type device, which is more challenging than the gun-type design used in the Hiroshima bomb and later developed by apartheid-era South Africa. Nuclear devices for missiles must also be
more durable than those dropped from aircraft because they need to cope with the huge acceleration and high reentry temperatures associated with rocket launches.
42
Iran Disadvantage
A2: No Nuclear Material 2/2

Iran proliferation will be successful now causes cascading Middle East arms race and terrorism Bolton, Senior Fellow AEI, 4-15-11 (John, Iranian Winter Could Chill the Arab Spring
Wall Street Journal)
Inside Iran, we now have confirmationthanks to disclosures this month by an Iranian opposition group, which have been confirmed by Iranian officialsthat the regime has the capability to mass-produce critical components for centrifuges used to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. That news proves again the inefficacy of U.N. Security Council resolutions and sanctions against a determined adversary. Thus Irans weapons program proceeds full steam ahead, which only emphasizes to would-be proliferators that persistence pays. Moammar Gadhafi surrendered his nuclear weapons program in 2003-04 because he feared becoming the next Saddam Hussein, but he is now undoubtedly cursing his timidity. Had he made seven years of progress toward deliverable nuclear weapons, there would surely be no NATO bombing of his military today. An Iranian nuclear capability would undoubtedly cause Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others to seek their own deliverable nuclear weapons. We would therefore see a region substantially more in Irans thrall and far more unstable and dangerous for Washington and its allies. Moreover, Americas failure to stop Irans nuclear ambitionswhich is certainly how it would be perceived worldwidewould be a substantial blow to U.S. influence in general. Terrorists and their state sponsors would see Irans unchallenged role as terrorisms leading state sponsor and central banker, and would wonder what they have to lose. Iran has enough uranium to begin enrichment Capaccio, Bloomberg, 3-10-11 (Tony, Iran Continues its `Drive to Enrich Uranium,' Defense
Agency's Chief Says http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-09/un-sanctions-aren-tstopping-iran-s-nuclear-enrichment-dia-says.html)
Iran has produced more than enough low-enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon if it were to further enrich and process the material for bomb use, according to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. United Nations sanctions are not stopping Irans drive to enrich uranium for potential nuclear weapons, says Army Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, director of the DIA. Sanctions havent slowed operation of Irans heavy water nuclear reactor or the installation at its Natanz facility of more centrifuges that could enrich uranium to weaponsgrade levels, Burgess says in a statement prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee. Iran has installed nearly 9,000 centrifuges at Natanz and accumulated more than enough 3.5 percent enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, if it further enriches and processes the material to higher levels, Burgess says. Fissile material for nuclear warheads requires 90 percent enriched uranium. The number of centrifuges is up from 3,000 in late 2007, according to U.S. intelligence estimates. Centrifuges are machines that can enrich uranium for use in
nuclear power plants or to fuel nuclear weapons.
Even if Iran doesnt have the nuclear know-how theyll get it from North Korea Hendersen, Director of Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington Institute, 3-2-11
(Simon, New Evidence of Iran's http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3317) Nuclear Ambitions
Much of the confidence that Iran remains unable to make a nuclear device rests on the knowledge that its IR-1 centrifuge has never been successfully used to make the required 90 percent HEU needed for a deliverable atomic bomb. Iran's attempts to develop two new centrifuge types, known as IR-4 and IR-2M, could be beyond the regime's technical skills. Given Tehran's relations with Pyongyang, however, Iran could obtain access to advanced P-2 centrifuges, which were revealed to be operating in North Korea last year. Pakistan has used this type of centrifuge to develop enough HEU for as many as a hundred atomic bombs.
43
Iran Disadvantage
A2: Iran Proliferation Inevitable

A nuclear Iran is not inevitable
Benjamin Kerstein 06/08/10 (Kerstein is Senior Writer http://newledger.com/2010/06/the-inevitable-nuclear-iran/) for The New Ledger)(
The point of all this is not to engage in hypothetical scenarios or wishful fantasies. It is simply to emphasize that the emergence of a nuclear Iran is not inevitable. That is, the basic concept behind Obamas foreign policy on Iran that there is nothing we can do about it and we might as well resign ourselves to the inevitable and make the best of it is not merely a self-fulfilling prophecy but also simply untrue. It is simply defeatism dressed up as realpolitik. The truth is that even a cursory look at the big picture reveals a strong majority of nations whose interests stand to be damaged by the emergence of a hegemonic Iranian theocracy. And the possible negative
repercussions of attempting to exploit this confluence of interests appear to pale in comparison to those that will follow Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. With a little creative diplomacy, this fact can be turned
to the advantage of all these nations, but only if they are prepared to move beyond the idea that the United States must take the lead in all such crises. And this is perhaps the saddest aspect of the entire situation. If the Iranian nuclear program is successfully stopped, it will only be because Barack Obama should have been more careful in wishing for a post-American world. He will have
gotten it, but not in the way he would have liked. The tragedy of Obamaism is painfully obvious when one considers that, as long as Obama is president, a nuclear Iran is avoidable only if concerted
opposition to it is undertaken without the United States.
44
Iran Disadvantage
A2: Iran Proliferation Good (Waltz) 1/3

Waltz is wrong Sagan, PolSci Prof at Stanford, 7 (Scott, A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting
Disaster Journal of International Affairs, Vol 60 No 2, Proquest) Thank you for this invitation. Nuclear weapons are horribly destructive. And, in theory, any statesmen in any state should be strongly influenced by the fear that his or her cities could be destroyed by an adversary. But in reality, as opposed to theory, nuclear weapons are not controlled by states.
They are not controlled by statesmen. They are managed by imperfect, normal human beings inside imperfect, normal organizations. To understand in which situations nuclear weapons are likely to produce successful deterrence and in which situations they are less likely to, we need to open the black box of decisionmaking inside states to look at who controls and manages the actual nuclear weapons or devices that are being built. We fail currently to do that in our thinking about Iran.
There is a creeping fatalism occurring in the American debate about this subject. Many policymakers and scholars are fatalists in thinking that there is nothing we can do, short of using military force, to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons. And that fatalism is often coupled with deterrence optimism, best exemplified by Kenneth Waltz's thinking. Proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism interact in a particularly diabolical manner; the more we think it inevitable that Iran is going to acquire nuclear weapons, the more we are tempted-through wishful thinking-to say, "Well, maybe it won't matter." And the more we bolster our belief that it won't matter, the less we are willing to take the necessary diplomatic and strategic steps that could potentially stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons. I think diplomacy could still work in Iran and a military attack would not be a wise move today. But, for now, I'd like to focus my brief remarks on why we should really worry about nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian regime. Let me start by noting that today, as in the past, Kenneth Waltz refers back to the Cold War, saying that the United States didn't want the Soviet Union to acquire nuclear weapons, and, when it did, Moscow still didn't use them against us. Deterrence worked. He refers to the People's Republic of China, saying we didn't want them to get nuclear weapons-we even thought of preventive war-but the result wasn't so bad. Deterrence worked.
And yet, these two states, China and the Soviet Union, were monolithic governments through most of the Cold War. Indeed, the rare moments when they were not monolithic were some of the most dangerous periods in recent history. At the end of the Cold War when the Soviet Union collapsed and during China's Red Guard Cultural Revolution, there were serious threats to the safety and control over their respective nuclear weapons.
Instead of looking at the Cold War with nostalgia and projecting its legacy to assess the meaning of potential nuclear weapons in Iran, let us look instead at the more recent history of a state in Iran's neighborhood: Pakistan. Three of the dangers that can occur in theory when a new nuclear state emerges really did occur, and in spades, in Pakistan. First is the danger of nuclear weapons promoting aggression of the state which holds them-that is, acquiring the protection of a nuclear shield which will enable the state to be more aggressive in a conventional manner. Second, there is the problem of terrorist theft. And third, the problem of potential loose controls and sales of nuclear weapons to terrorists. All three of these problems occurred when Pakistan got nuclear weapons. The first is often called the stability-instability paradox: a situation of stability between two countries who both have nuclear weapons that can lead one country to think that it can be more aggressive conventionally because it is protected from a nuclear retaliation by its nuclear shield. In Pakistan decisionmaking is not centrally controlled, as it was in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. When Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons there were many inside its military who said, "This our chance to do something about Kashmir," so they misled then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif into approving an operation which sent Pakistani soldiers disguised as Mujahedeen guerrillas into Indian controlled Kashmir near the town of Kargil in the winter of 1998.
45
Iran Disadvantage
When the Indians threatened to retaliate, the Pakistani military reportedly began to ready its missiles for nuclear strikes. It took a brave (and one of the last) act of Pakistani civilian Prime Minister Sharif
to order the disguised Pakistani forces in Indian-held Kashmir to pull back.
Nuclear weapons created that particular problem and sparked the Kargil war. The second problem is the vulnerability-invulnerability paradox: For nuclear weapons to have a deterrent effect, they must be invulnerable to a first strike from an adversary to allow for the possibility of retaliation. During times of peace, Pakistan creates this invulnerability by putting its nuclear weapons under
lock and key in Pakistani military bases, so terrorists are unable to seize them. But in
a crisis or a conventional war they have every incentive to take those nuclear weapons to the countryside, where they can be hidden and would be less vulnerable to an attack. And yet the countryside is exactly where they are more vulnerable to terrorist seizure. This problem can be best illustrated by an incident during the 1999 Kargil crisis. According to the Washington Post, officers within Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, proposed the following idea to address the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons to an Indian attack: " Let's hide them in Afghanistan-the Indians will never be able to attack them there."1 Such an operation would reduce the vulnerability of an Indian attack but would certainly increase the likelihood that AlQaeda, the Taliban or another jihadi group could seize the weapons.
The third problem is the loss of control and the potential that someone inside a nuclear state could give nuclear weapons to another non-nuclear state. Professor Waltz argues that we do not need to wonder whether new nuclear states will take good care
of the nuclear weapons-they have every incentive to do so. "They," an abstract entity called the state, may have the incentive to do so. But other actors inside these states may not have similar incentives. Look at the history of the A.Q. Kahn nuclear network in Pakistan. With help from others, a senior scientist, acting in his own interest and greed, began to sell bomb design and centrifuge technology. He sold the actual centrifuges and bomb design to Libya, and he offered them to Iraq in 1991, though Saddam Hussein turned down the offer, thinking it was a CIA ploy. A.Q. Khan helped initiate the Iranian nuclear program in 1987, selling them centrifuges and other technologies. He sold similar items to North Korea. Using the Pakistan analogy instead of the Cold War analogy, the effects of a nuclear Iran are correctly seen as very dangerous.
First, the stability-instability paradox-that is, the possibility that individual countries would be more aggressive with nuclear capability. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, will it behave more aggressively in the Middle East? On the one hand, we have a good insight from Professor Waltz: The United States would be more reluctant to attack Iran if it had nuclear weapons, and indeed I do believe that's why Iran is so interested. On the other hand, however, we have the possibility that various Iranians-especially those in the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-may feel that it is safer for them to probe-to attack Americans in Iraq, to attack military bases in the region, to support terrorist attacks elsewhere. Therefore it is not at
all clear what might be the final outcome. More probing attacks? More provocation? Indeed, this is the worry with regard to the Iran crisis today. I don't believe the Bush administration wants to attack. But I do think there are some factions in Iran who wouldn't mind a potential attack from the United States because it would increase support for the regime. It's possible that these factions in Iran will actually increase rather than decrease attacks by Iranian agents in Iraq against American forces to force our hand. The second problem-terrorist theft. The Iranians, in trying to reduce the likelihood of an attack against their nuclear development sites, are dispersing those sites in the countryside . But such
measures will increase the likelihood that there won't be central control over their nuclear program, and increase the likelihood that, if they do develop nuclear weapons, insiders and terrorist groups could potentially seize them.
Finally, the question of ambiguous control. Here we must ask: Who controls the weapons and materials? Carols baby hates Iran as much as any of us
46
SCFI 2011 Iran Disadvantage Silent Nihilists They don't yet have weapons in Iran, but they are working to get them. And it is not the professional Iranian military but the Revolutionary Guard Corps guarding the development sites whose own financial units have often been those used to purchase different parts of the program . These are the same individuals running the arms supply operations to terrorist organizations that Iran supports. To have your nuclear guardians and your terrorist supporter organizations be one and the same is a recipe for disaster. It is very useful to have this debate, because Kenneth Waltz says loudly and often what Jacques Chirac was only willing to say briefly and in what he claimed afterward was an off-the-record moment of rare French candor. We should be worried about President Chirac. As reported by the New York Times, Chirac said, "I would say what is dangerous about this situation is not the fact of having a nuclear bomb. One, maybe a second one a little later, well, that's not very dangerous. But what is very dangerous is the effects on proliferation."2 Well, proliferation is a problem, but saying that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is dangerous becuase it produces a problem of proliferation elsewhere is like telling your kid, "Don't take heroin, because it could lead to stronger drugs." Iran getting nuclear weapons will be dangerous enough. The government may become
emboldened, and organizations that purport to manage nuclear weapons in Iran will be weak, and the weapons will be in danger of being stolen or sold to others. In short, we will face a very different kind of nuclear dynamic and danger than we ever faced during the Cold War.
Richard Betts: All perfectly clear! Ken, since Scott emphasized the lessons that can be drawn from the case of Pakistan, how do you see those parallels or lessons differently? What happened in Kargil was a game of chicken, a slippery slope upon which it isn't clear which side has the incentive to be the first to stop. How can you be sure we weren't simply lucky in that case and that in another Kargil instance that slippery slope would go to the lengths you're confident won't happen? Kenneth Waltz: In a world in which countries had only conventional weapons, that slippery slope would indeed lead to a conventional war. A number of Indians and Pakistanis think that what prevented the Kargil conflict from becoming the fourth war between the two countries was that each had nuclear weapons and knew the other had them as well. They each knew there was a limit to how far they could go. As one Indian military officer said, "We found, as we expected, that the trigger for war does not lie on the Kashmir frontier." It lies where there are vital interests at stake. Of course skirmishes take place, and of course conflicts can and will occur. But they will be contained as they always were. Nuclear optimists, like me, deal with the world as it has been for more than fifty years. Pessimists deal with hypothetical disasters that have never occurred. It seems to me that the optimists are the realists and the pessimists are the ones who are off in some ill-defined hypothesized world. Richard Betts: Yes, but Ken, all disasters are things that have never occurred until the first time they occur. Your
precedent from the Cold War-the stability of the U.S.-Soviet competition-involved fairly stable, secular regimes, oriented toward their material interests. Is it really a flight of fancy to worry about those regimes that possess nuclear weapons and are not governed by material interests and physical survival, but instead by religious zealots for whom physical survival is not the prime goal?
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Iran Disadvantage
A2: No Iran Threat Conventional Forces Fail

Spaced based kinetic-energy weapons are ideal for countries that seek global power projection without the need for earth forces. Edwards et al, Preston, Johnson, Gross, and Miller, 2002 (Sean, Bob, Dana, Jennifer, Michael,
Rand, Space Weapons Earth Wars, Chapter 3: Space Weapons Kinds and Capabilities)
Space-based kinetic-energy weapons for surface targets also destroy targets by using their own mass moving at very high velocities. Unlike weapons that engage targets outside the earths atmosphere, these must be large enough to survive reentry through the earths atmosphere with a speed high enough to be destructive. To preserve accuracy and energy through reentry, they have to attack targets at steep, nearly vertical trajectories. This would mean having either a great many weapons in low
orbits to have one within reach of a target whenever needed or a smaller number at higher orbits with longer times to reach targets. A reasonable high-altitude constellation would place about six weapons in orbit for each target to achieve response times or two to three hours from initiation of the attack to destruction of the target.
The effort required to deliver one of these weapons to orbit and then to a target would be similar to that required for a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Such weapons could be effective against stationary (or slowly moving) surface targets that are vulnerable to vertical penetration of a few meters, such as large ships, missile silos, hardened aircraft shelters, tall buildings, fuel tanks, and munitions storage bunkers. Because of their meteoroidlike speed entering the atmosphere, these weapons would be very difficult to defend against. Although they would be of
little interest to the United States because it already has weapons that are effective against this class of targets,
kinetic-energy weapons could be desirable for countries that seek global power projection without having to duplicate the U.S. investment in terrestrial forces.
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Space Expansion Bad EMP Attack 1/2

Iranian space supremacy causes EMP attack on the US Mazol, George Marshall Institute, 9 (James, February, Persia in Space: Implications for
U.S. National Security Marshall Institute Policy Analysis, http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/626.pdf) Also, Iran could punch Americas soft ribs by launching an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack in space. In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned that the United States could face a space Pearl Harbor.12 The consequences of a space Pearl Harbor would be particularly harmful to the United States given our dependence on space. As space defense analyst Robert Butterworth notes: Far more than any other country, the U.S. depends on space for national and tactical
intelligence, military operations, and civil and commercial benefits. A scorched space attackwould hurt the U.S. most of all.13 This option is particularly salient in light of Iranian reluctance to suspend its nuclear program. Iran could elect to detonate a nuclear weapon (or multiple weapons) in space, causing an EMP In this worst-case-scenario, the mere ability to wreak havoc on U.S. satellites in orbit affords the Iranians significant leverage . The Claremont Institutes Brian Kennedy reminds us, Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP 14 . A separate Commission, specifically designed to assess the EMP threat, concluded a space-based EMP detonation would probably produce widespread and long-lasting disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the fabric of U.S. society .15 The gamma rays from the explosion would obliterate most electronic devices and , more importantly, shut down the transformer stations distributing power throughout the country. Communication channels, lights, and water treatment stations would cease operation, among many other critical services reliant on electricity.16 Such an attack would have longterm catastrophic
consequences.17 Rather than exploding the nuclear warhead in space,
the Iranians could conceivably forgo space and fly an ICBM over the United States before detonating the warhead. The aforementioned EMP
Commission examined the consequences of a high-altitude, terrestrial EMP attack over the continental U.S. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, EMP Commission Chairman William Graham said such
an explosion would cause unprecedented cascading failures of major infrastructures .18 Systemic failures in interdependent infrastructure sectors (e.g., transportation, emergency services, finance and banking, and water delivery) might become mutually reinforcing until at some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the countrys ability to support its population.19 Chairman Graham also
discussed the Iranian EMP threat in his testimony before Congress: Iran has also tested high-altitude explosions of the Shahab-III, a test mode consistent with EMP attack, and described the tests as successful. Iranian military writings explicitly discuss a nuclear EMP attack that would gravely harm the United States. While the Commission does not know the intention of Iran in conducting these activities, we are disturbed by the capability that emerges when we connect the dots.20
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Space Expansion Bad EMP Attack 2/2

Extinction Joshpe, Harvard Law JD in 2005, 9 (Brett, July 1, Darkness at High Noon, Spectator,
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/07/01/darkness-at-high-noon) In recent weeks, I have attended two lectures that discussed what could be the greatest existential threat to the U.S: EMP , or electromagnetic pulse, attacks. Although an EMP attack would utilize
conventional nuclear weapons, it is an infrequently discussed aspect of our nuclear policy, and one for which we are woefully unprepared. Furthermore, the potential effects highlight the gravity and immediacy of the rogue nuclear threat. The way an EMP attack would work is as follows. An attacker would launch a nuclear weapon into orbit. However, rather than hitting American territory and obliterating a city with scorching flames, the weapon would detonate above the Earth's atmosphere. Instead of seeing a mushroom cloud upon impact, we would simply be left in the dark. Almost all forms of electricity, including cell phones and other battery-operated devices, would cease to work; airplanes would literally rain from the sky . Unlike past blackouts,
such as the one that occurred in the summer of 2003 and left much of the northeastern U.S. without electricity, the lights would not come back on for years potentially. The U.S. would be plunged into a
primitive state in which people scrounged for food and water to survive. Money would be worthless, our economy would revert to bartering, and one's most valuable assets would be guns and ammunition. So, how likely or plausible is this sort of attack? More so than we would like. In 2004, the Electromagnetic Pulse Commission, which Congress established, issued a Report of the
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack." It concluded that "EMP is one of a small number of threats that has the potential to hold our society seriously at risk and might result in defeat of our military forces ." The Commission issued another report in 2008 in which it concluded that "The electromagnetic pulse generated by a high altitude nuclear
explosion is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences ." On May 6, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States also issued a report in which it addressed EMP, saying, "We note also that the United States has done little to reduce its vulnerability to attack with electromagnetic pulse weapons and recommend that current
investments in modernizing the national power grid take account of this risk." The report also stated that "Prior commissions have investigated U.S. vulnerabilities and found little activity under way to address them," and "EMP vulnerabilities have not yet been addressed effectively by the Department of Homeland Security. Doing so could take several years." The 2008 Commission report recommended that "The Department of Homeland Security should add content to Web sites it maintains, such as www.Ready.gov." It appears, however, that the DHS has neglected to do so thus far. Instead, it has included a short description of potential EMP effects in its "Are you ready? An in-depth guide to citizen preparedness" report. In the report, it actually misleads citizens into thinking that EMP is virtually harmless, saying that "Although an EMP is unlikely to harm most people, it could harm those with pacemakers or other implanted electronic devices." If all of this is not enough to wake up members of Congress and a seemingly unaware public, then recent activity by American adversaries should. The Wall Street Journal reported in April that Russia, China, and other countries have "penetrated the U.S. electrical grid and left behind software programs that could be used to disrupt the system." Furthermore, Iran and North Korea recently conducted long-range missile tests, and North Korea may launch another missile soon in the direction of Hawaii. Military experts also believe that Iran is specifically simulating an EMP
strike, and an Iranian military journalist recently said that "If the world's industrial countries fail to devise effective ways to defend themselves against dangerous electronic assaults then they will disintegrate within a few years ."
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Space Expansion Bad Regime Credibility 1/3

Even if it doesnt provide missile capabilities Iranian space expansion causes nationalism and boosts the governments credibility ending public opposition Bayyenat, Foreign Policy in Focus, 7-6-11 (Abolghasem , July 6, The Politics of Iran's
Space Program http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_politics_of_irans_space_program) Irans National Self-image Political motivations are also a driving force behind Irans growing space program. Space activities along with nuclear power and stem cell research, in which Iran has made significant investments over the past few decades, possess symbolic value for Iran as vanguard
scientific fields. By developing its capacities in advanced scientific and technological fields, Iran aims to develop a new national self-image and improve its international prestige . Although Iran was one of the few countries in Asia and Africa which escaped direct colonization in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in large part as a result of great power rivalry between Tsarist Russia and Britain, it did experience indirect colonial domination. To Iranians, the experience of neo-colonial domination signified Irans absolute and relative decline in scientific, military, and economic power over the past several centuries. For a nation once at the forefront of world civilizations, this experience of decline provoked national soul-searching by both religious and secular intellectuals and spurred calls for a
national renaissance. Irans efforts at expediting its scientific and technological development over the past few decades demonstrate the countrys strong desire to break into the rank of the world's most technologically developed nations and bid farewell to its status as a Third World country. The statements of various top Iranian officials to the effect that Iran has now entered the space club and the nuclear club, or that it has become a pioneering country in stem cell research, all signify Irans struggle to acquire a new global status. Defense Minister General Ahmad Vahidi's statement that the successful launch of the Rasad satellite into orbit is good news for all those who think of Irans glory is meaningful in this regard. Iranian officials have set ambitious goals for their space program. The national goal of landing an Iranian astronaut on the moon by 2025 may not seem realistic to outside observers, but it has the effect of creating pride in the future for Iranian citizens and boosting their national self-image . The Iranian state can also benefit from enhanced political legitimacy at home. Scientific and technological achievements present the image of an efficient and competent government to the public. This increased stock of social capital can go a long way in helping the government survive other possible shortcomings and inefficiencies along the way. Understanding the politics of Iran's
technological development should serve as a check on the unwarranted paranoia that Irans scientific achievements have generated in the West.
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Iran Disadvantage

Aggressive Iranian foreign policy sparks slew of Middle Eastern conflicts Salem, Middle East Director at Carnegie, 7 (Paul, February 21, Dealing with Irans rapid
rise in regional influence Japan Times, lexis)
Iran's rise is causing alarm in the Arab Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Jordan , but also in Egypt. Though a Shiite country in an overwhelmingly Sunni region, Iran's radical Islamism resonates with the politicized Islamism that is energizing most Arab opposition movements, and its militant opposition to the U.S. and support for groups that engage Israel in battle is very popular on the Arab street and in the Arab media. At another level, Iran's rise, reinforced by its
suspected bid for nuclear weapons threatens to awaken historical hostilities, between Sunnis and Shiites and between Persians and Arabs. Both Iran and the Arab countries are struggling to come to terms with the consequences of Iran's newfound assertiveness. To be sure, Iran's long-standing support for regional Shiite groups is paying off. But its successes
in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine are creating great anxiety and even hostility, in some quarters. The rapid Shiite rise has already turned into a sectarian civil war in Iraq and recently has threatened to generate the same outcome in Lebanon. If Iran does not properly manage its growing power, it could unwittingly trigger a drawn out sectarian war throughout the region, a nuclear arms race with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and war with Israel, the U.S., or both. It could also draw in major Sunni powers, such as Egypt and Turkey, which have at times been dominant in the region, but lately have been disengaged. Too many Iranian successes, and too many Sunni debacles, could also lead to immense pressure in Syria, where a minority Alawi regime dominates a Sunni majority. The loss of Damascus would cost Iran its
influence in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in one fell swoop. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's administration is maintaining its radical rhetoric, perhaps looking ahead to a post-Bush era, when the U.S. has withdrawn from Iraq and Iran has developed nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Iran also feels the need for accommodation with its adversaries. For example, while Iran may not be happy with the American presence in Iraq, it realizes how close the country is to full-scale civil war. As a result, it has expressed a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on finding a soft landing for Iraq. Likewise, while Iran supports Hezbollah, it has also held Hezbollah back from outright rebellion , which might trigger a further Sunni backlash in the region. In the Persian Gulf, Iran has tried to
reassure its Arab neighbors that Iranian power is not aimed at them and can in fact be a pillar of gulf security. But the Arab world is divided about how to deal with the sudden rise in Iranian power. The tension is particularly acute in Saudi Arabia, which has warned the U.S. about the dangers of Iraq's possible collapse and now finds itself in an unequal face-off with Iran. Some in the kingdom argue that
Saudi Arabia must confront Iran, stand up for Sunni Arab interests and become a hands-on regional power. Other Saudis believe that confrontation will only lead to wider wars and are urging dialogue and accommodation. In this view, the U.S., not Iran, produced the region's current problems. Iran's regional foreign policy has not yet caught up with its new pre-eminence; it is making as many enemies as it is gaining friends and it might squander the windfall gains that it made in the past three years.
If Iran and the Arab countries - and alongside them the U.S. and the international community do not manage today's tensions wisely, the region could enter a period of protracted warfare. But there is a way forward, because all players in the region share an interest in security and stability. Leaders in Tehran, Riyadh, Washington and other key capitals must realize the costs of further mismanagement, step back from the brink and work toward cooperative solutions before it is too late.
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Iran Disadvantage

Nuclear war Ben-Meir, IR Prof at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, 2-7-7 (Alon, Ending Iran's
defiance, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3361650,00.html)
to the dismal failure of the Bush administrations policy toward it during the last six years. The fact that Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests
Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Irans reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability. By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The wars consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity. Thus, while the administration attempts to
Washington could deal with Irans nuclear program by itself, now
its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war
stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hizbullah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, and especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administrations resolve to inhibit Tehrans adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support US efforts. In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hizbullah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. Mr. Bush must realize that Damascuss strategic interests are not compatible with Tehrans and that the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States. President Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool, yet he is the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiations with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syrias real intentions, which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the Administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the Administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamics for the better throughout the region. Iran could plunge Mideast into nuclear conflagration Although ideally direct negotiation between the United States and Iran should be the first resort to resolve the nuclear issue, as
long as Tehran does not feel seriously threatened it seems unlikely that the clergy will at this stage end the nuclear program. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran will intimidate the larger Sunni Arab states in the region, bully smaller states into submission, threaten Israels very existence, use oil as a political weapon to blackmail the West, and instigate regional proliferation of nuclear weapons programs. In short, if unchecked, Iran could plunge the Middle East into a deliberate or inadvertent nuclear conflagration.
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Iran Disadvantage
Iran Space Expansion Bad Israel-Iran War

Iranian satellite technology allows them to challenge Israel Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 8 (Ajey, March 4, Iran: Looking
Towards Space! Society for the Study of Peace and http://www.sspconline.org/opinion/IranLookingTowardsSpace_AjeyLele_040308) Conflict,
With US forces sitting next door and bullish Israel in the neighborhood Iran needs continuous flow of intelligence inputs and clever investment in satellite technology could offer them a viable option. Iran also has plans to invest in small satellites. Particularly, at the backdrop of Chinese anti-satellite test they could even think of investing in satellite technology as a weapon of deterrence . Looking at their current progress it could be predicted that within half a decade Iran could enlighten Israel that they are capable of damaging their satellites by putting space mines in form of small satellites into the space.
54
Iran Disadvantage
Iran Space Expansion Bad Turns Case (US Space Supremacy)

Iranian space capability undermines US space supremacy and hegemony Mazol, George Marshall Institute, 9 (James, February, Persia in Space: Implications for
U.S. National Security Marshall http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/626.pdf) Institute Policy Analysis,
Iran could utilize its space-launch capability in other ways besides building long-range ballistic missiles to threaten the U.S. and its friends and allies. Tehran might mimic the Chinese and develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The ASAT presents a challenge to the American militarys Achilles heel: its space based assets and their related ground installations.10 On January 11,
2007, the Chinese military destroyed an aging weather satellite in LEO using an MRBM. The ballistic missiles kill vehicle collided with the satellite at an altitude of 864 kilometers. The Chinese realize both the importance and vulnerability of American military space assets . One Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) analyst concluded U.S. military space assets constitute its soft ribs and for countries
that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice .11 Iran may take the necessary steps, including developing a kinetic kill vehicle, to build up an ASAT program (perhaps, with Chinese assistance).
55
Iran Disadvantage
A2: Other Measures Prevent Iranian Space Expansion

US cant stop Iranian space efforts peaceful provision laws allow it Lele, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 8 (Ajey, March 4, Iran: Looking
Towards Space! Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, http://www.sspconline.org/opinion/IranLookingTowardsSpace_AjeyLele_040308) During last few years Iran is cautiously looking at its own satellite development programme. They understand that the biggest advantage of satellite technology lies in its dual-use nature. They know for sure that the way US is trying to corner them on a nuclear issue, would not be able to do so in respect of their space ambitions . They have Iranian National Committee (INCOPUOS) on Peaceful uses of outer space in place to handle issues related to their space dreams. Today, Iran knows that in the space arena they need to be self reliant. With their nuclear adventurism they may find it difficult to get international support. Even Russia and China could also become cautious to deal with them in the space arena.
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Iran Disadvantage
***AFF***
57
Iran Disadvantage
No Internal Link No Duel-Use Intentions

Satellites launches not a cover for ballistic missile capabilities Bayyenat, Foreign Policy in Focus, 7-6-11 (Abolghasem , July 6, The Politics of Iran's
Space Program http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_politics_of_irans_space_program)
The dominant narrative among Western politicians and in mainstream Western media is that Iran uses its satellite launches as a cover to develop long-range ballistic missile technology. The
same technology used to launch satellites into space can with some modifications deliver conventional and nonconventional warheads over a long distance to hit targets, for example, in Western Europe or even in the United States. This line of argument suffers from two main problems. First, Iran is already subject to
harsh economic sanctions imposed by Western powers, so it doesn't need a cover to develop long-range ballistic missile technology. Also, nothing prevents Iran from the perspective of international law from developing long-range ballistic missiles if they are only capable of delivering conventional warheads. Second, Iran does not define for itself a global military role that necessitates the development of long-range ballistic missile technology. Long-range ballistic missiles cannot significantly increase Irans deterrence against extra-regional powers given that these countries are already equipped with missile defense shield technology that enables them to destroy incoming missiles in the air, particularly from countries less advanced in the area of missile technology. Iran simply pursues military deterrence against regional adversaries, which are located within the striking distance of its various missiles, as well as against those extraregional powers which have military bases in the region. Irans modest military expenditures as compared to even some of its small neighboring countries and the overwhelmingly defensive nature of its military capabilities all point to the fact that Iran does not seek military roles beyond its means .
According to the Middle East Journal, the six Arab members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, with a combined population less than one-third of Iran, spent 7.5 times as much on their defense as Iran from 1997 to 2007. Similarly, they spent 15.6 times as much on arms procurement as Iran during the same period.
Iran is not a threat, they are committed to peaceful space activities

Brown, writer, 2009, (Peter J, Asian Times, Irans New Satellites Challenges China, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KB10Ak04.html, DOA: 7/16/11)
The ISA has been involved in various peaceful United Nations-sponsored joint space activities for decades, and Iran is a participant in another forum, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). China organized
ASPCO in 2005, and it now includes Iran along with Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand and Turkey. While there will be no attempt made here to somehow assert that China exerts any real influence over Iran's activities in space via APSCO, China stands to benefit enormously from anything that calls attention to, or otherwise underscores, China's efforts to foster the civilian and peaceful side of the global dual-use space technology agenda. As an established regional space forum in Asia, APSCO has served this purpose well. Besides having much to say about APSCO, Tarikhi's broader track record to date cannot be dismissed or overlooked. He has contributed years of service to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN-COPUOS). Among other things, he co-chaired the Action Team of UNISPACE-III which has tried to develop a comprehensive worldwide environmental monitoring strategy. He and other ISA personnel have worked closely with senior officials from countries like Nigeria and Indonesia, something that US President Barack Obama might ponder. In fact, as a senior member of the ISA team, Tarikhi's record embodies the ISA's commitment to developing assets in space both for peaceful purposes and for use as part of various multinational space projects. In an article published in "Position" magazine last June entitled, "Iran's
Tarikhi emphasized that "Iran has pursued a space program for many years. It first embraced the idea of using space and its technologies for peaceful purposes in 1958, when it joined 17 other countries to establish the UN ad hoc Committee for International Cooperation on Space (which later became UN-COPUOS)."
Ambitions in Space
58
Iran Disadvantage
No Impact No Nuclearization (Technology) 1/3

Iran has demonstrated neither technological breakthroughs, or ICBM capability. It does not have the R&D or infrastructure to develop ICBMs.
FRSTRATEGIE.ORG 5/2009 (http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/dossiers/menace_balistique/doc/JTA.pdf, date accessed, 7/15/11, 3.11 On February 2, 2009, Iran used the liquid-propellant Safir space launch vehicle (SLV) to send the Omid earth satellite into low earth orbit. By launching an earth satellite , Iran has demonstrated that it can exploit
low thrust rocket motors to build a two-stage rocket, and that it has qualified engineers who are able to make good use of the technology that is available to them. It does not show, however, that Iran has made a fundamental technological breakthrough. 3.12 The first stage of the
Safir SLV is derived from the Shahab-3 motor and airframe, with fuel and oxidizer tanks extended beyond those of the Shahab-3. In other words, the first stage of the Safir SLV is still based on the North Korean Nodong missile. The Safir SLV upper stage placed a satellite weighing about 27 kg into low-earth orbit. The Safir SLV upper stage appears to be nearly optimally designed to launch a small satellite into orbit. 3.13 Fears have been expressed that the two-stage Safir SLV can serve as the prototype of a long-range Iranian ballistic missile. The Safir SLV upper stage placed a satellite weighing 27 kg into low earth orbit, but any
nuclear warhead will be much heavier than that. The Safir upper stage is not likely to be suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead of roughly 1,000 kg weight because the thrust of its rocket motor may be too low and because its structure may not be strong enough to support such a heavy payload during flight. 3.14 The launch of the Omid satellite provides new information about
the way in which Iranian rocket technology is developing. Iranian engineers have demonstrated a high level of competence and ingenuity in rocket design. The Safir SLV can be regarded as a step in the development of staging technology, which is critical for the construction of two- and three-stage ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The Soviet Union and the United States started their ballistic missile programs with artillery rockets, surface-to-air missiles, and simple ballistic missiles. Iran started its ballistic missile program in the same way. Unlike Russia and the United States, however, Iran does not have the infrastructure of
research institutions, industrial plants, or the scientists and engineers that are needed to make substantial improvements in the basic rocket components it has used from the start. 3.16 SCUD
missiles use relatively low-energy propellants, rocket motors with materials and designs that are very hard to upgrade to more energetic propellants, and primitive guidance systems. SCUD technologies impose important limitations on the expansion of range and payload. Reports about the development of new ballistic missiles the Shahab-4, Shahab-5, and even the Shahab-6 with a range of 5,000-6,000 km and more have not been supported by any information, much less video or photographic evidence. The various modifications of the Shahab-3 constitute the main missile threat from Iran today. 3.17 The path that Russia, China, and the United States followed in developing modern IRBMs and ICBMs required new technologies, advanced
materials, sophisticated technical solutions, large numbers of personnel with a high level of experience and skill, and a highly developed R&D and manufacturing infrastructure.13 Iran is trying to build up its own indigenous R&D and production base, but it lags very far behind the leading missile countries. It has made skillful use of rocket components imported from other countries, and it will continue to rely for a considerable time on outside help in extending the payload and range capabilities of its ballistic missiles. 3.18 The history of truly indigenous ballistic missile development programs shows that every new phase of development requires tremendous intellectual and material efforts and many years to achieve results. The development and production of modern ballistic missiles requires an advanced R&D and industrial infrastructure, which in turn depends directly on the general level of a countrys scientific, technological, and industrial resources. More specifically, it requires: access to the world market for high-tech equipment, materials, and components; a general, diverse, and specialized system of educational, research, and training institutions; a highly developed R&D and industrial base; and a sufficiently large force of highly qualified and skilled scientists,
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Iran Disadvantage
engineers, and industrial workers. 3.19 The leading missile countries have hundreds of research organizations and Industrial enterprises cooperating in the development and manufacture of ballistic missiles. In Russia, for example, hundreds of entities participate in production of the Topol ICBM. The total number of employees in the Chinese missile and space industry exceeds 200,000,
even though China has rather modest achievements in missile technologies compared with the United States and Russia. Iran does not have such an infrastructure; neither do North Korea or Pakistan. 3.20 The major
scientific, technological and production problems that have to be solved in building an IRBM or an ICBM are as follows: a. The development of powerful rocket motors; b. Flight control, guidance systems, and telemetry; c. Reentry vehicle heat protection; d. Construction materials; e. Flight testing. Each of these areas would pose major scientific, technological, and production problems for Iran. (These are discussed in the Technical Addendum, available at www.ewi.info.) Iranian
officials have claimed that Iran has missiles with a range of 2,000 km.14 Such missiles would be capable of striking targets in the Middle East, southern Russia, and southern Europe. Iran, however, does not now have a missile capable of delivering a 1,000 kg payload to a range of 2,000 km. Table 1 shows that with such a payload the longest range of an Iranian missile for which we have technical data (i.e., the Shahab-3M) is 1,100 km. Nevertheless, on the basis of the technologies available to it, Iran could develop a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead weighing 1,000 kg to a range of 2,000 km. The time it would take for
Iran to do this is determined primarily by the time it would take to build a nuclear warhead that is small enough and light enough for an Iranian missile to deliver that is, six to eight years. (This is based on the estimates of the time it would take Iran to produce a simple nuclear device and then to develop a nuclear warhead.) 3.22 With the components and technologies it now has, Iran could hypothetically build missiles with a range of 3,000 km or more. Such missiles would possibly need a first stage consisting of a cluster of rocket motors, along with the associated turbopumps, control systems, and airframe. (The United States and the Soviet Union used rocket motor
clusters in rocket development.) Along with the development of staging technology, Iran would have to learn to cluster rocket motors of limited thrust, since they are the only rocket motors currently available to it. These are
both serious challenges, requiring extensive research and development and testing to gain the proper results and experience. Iran would also have to make significunt advances in turbopump-related and
airframe manufacturing technologies, as well as in system integration and component reliability. It would also need to solve difficult problems in flight control and guidance technology, and it would face particular problems in controlling the thrust vectors of the motors in the various stages. The design of warheads able to
withstand the heat of reentry into the atmosphere would also present problems. Mastering the necessary technologies without external assistance would be a major undertaking, requiring perhaps ten years of concerted and visible effort. IRBMs and ICBMs built in this fashion would have a serious disadvantage from Irans point of view. They would be large, visible, and cumbersome, and they would have to be launched from above ground, not from silos. They would be anchored to their launch sites and would take days to prepare for launch and hours to fuel. The launch sites could be monitored from space, and launch preparations would be visible. Preparation for the launch of such missiles would be vulnerable to preemptive strikes. Because they would not be survivable, missiles of this kind would not provide effective deterrence of an attack on Iran indeed they might invite an attack while their use would inevitably elicit 10 a devastating response. If Iran decides to develop IRBMs or ICBMs, it would make sense for it to develop missiles that are mobile and thus hard to find, or based in silos and thus hard to destroy. That would require more advanced technologies than Iran now possesses and would take longer than the development of IRBMs or ICBMs on the basis of existing technology.
60
Iran Disadvantage
No Impact No Nuclearization (Technology) 3/3

Irans nuclear weapons program is just hype, no concrete evidence.
Hersh 6/6/2011 (Seymor Hersh is a writer for The New Yorker, Iran and the Bomb How real is the nuclear threat? http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/06/06/110606fa_fact_hersh, date accessed, 7/16/2011) ABSTRACT: ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY about whether Irans nuclear program is being exaggerated. Is
Iran actively trying to develop nuclear weapons? Members of the Obama Administration often talk as if this were a foregone conclusion, as did their predecessors under George W. Bush. Theres a large body of evidence, however, including some of Americas most highly classified intelligence assessments, suggesting that the U.S. could be in danger of repeating a mistake similar to the one made with Saddam Husseins Iraq eight years agoallowing anxieties about the policies of a tyrannical regime to distort our estimates of the states military capacities and intentions. The two most recent National Intelligence Estimates (N.I.E.s) on Iranian nuclear progress have stated that there is no conclusive evidence that Iran has made any effort to build the bomb since 2003 . Yet Iran is heavily invested in nuclear inspectors have expressed frustration with Irans level of coperation, but have been unable to find any evidence suggesting that enriched uranium has been diverted to an illicit weapons program. In mid-February, Lieutenant General James Clapper, the director of National Intelligence, provided the House and Senate intelligence committees with an updated N.I.E. on the Iranian nuclear-weapons program. A previous assessment, issued in 2007, created consternation and anger inside the Bush Administration and in Congress by concluding, with high confidence, that Iran had halted its nascent nuclear-weapons program in 2003. Mentions the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.), W.
Patrick Lang, and Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. Thomas E. Donilon, Obamas national-security adviser, said in a speech on May 12th that the U.S. would continue its aggressive sanction policy until Iran proves that its enrichment intentions are peaceful and meets all its obligations under the nonproliferation treaty.
technology. In the past four years, it has tripled the number of centrifuges in operation at its main enrichment facility at Natanz, which is buried deep underground. International Atomic Energy Agency ( I.A.E.A.)
Obama has been prudent in his public warnings about the consequences of an Iranian bomb, but he and others in his Administration have often overstated the available intelligence about Iranian intentions. Mentions Robert Einhorn. Israel views Iran as an existential threat. Nevertheless, most
Israeli experts on nonproliferation agree that Iran does not now have a nuclear weapon. A round of negotiations five months ago between Iran and the West, first in Geneva and then in Istanbul, yielded little progress. Mentions Benjamin Netanyahu. The unending political stress between Washington and Tehran has promoted some unconventional thinking. One approach, championed by retired ambassador Thomas Pickering and others, is to accept Irans nuclear-power program, but to try to internationalize it, and offer Iran various incentives. Pickering and his associates are convinced that the solution to the nuclear impasse is to turn Irans nuclear-enrichment programs into a multinational effort. Mentions a 2008 essay Pickering, Jim Walsh, and William Luers published in The New York Review of Books. Mohamed ElBaradei, a Nobel Peace Prize recipient who is now a candidate for the Presidency of Egypt, spent twelve years as the director-general of the I.A.E.A., retiring two years ago. In his recent interview, he said, I dont believe Iran is a clear and present
danger. All I see is the hype about the threat posed by Iran.
61
Iran Disadvantage
No Impact No Nuclearization (Desire)

Iran only wants a nuke for deterrence.
Pfaff 01/31/2006 (William Pfaff is the author of ten books on U.S. foreign policy, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article11731.htm, date accessed, 7/16/11) 01/31/06 "Asian Age" -- -- Paris: Why is all this pressure being mounted against Iran when both Washington and Jerusalem unofficially concede that there is nothing to be done to prevent Irans government from continuing along its present course of nuclear development? The contradictions in Western official and unofficial
discourse about Iran and its nuclear ambitions are so blatant that one might suspect disinformation, but it probably is simply the cacophony of single-minded bureaucracies working at cross
purposes, and the effect of the multiple lobbies involved and of US domestic political exploitation, and the paradox of the American policy itself, whose nonproliferation efforts actually provoke nuclear proliferation. The Washington official line seems meant to build pressure at the UN Security
Council to impose sanctions on Iran, even while conceding that nothing practical is expected to result, and that nothing can be done about Irans resumption of nuclear processing. Iran at present is doing no more than it has a right to do in international law.The crossfire of public pronouncements draws attention to the inherent criticism of the Western position: the US and the other Security Council members can have nuclear weapons, and Israel, Pakistan and India (non-Security Council members), can have them too, but Iran shouldnt proceed with its (currently) non-military programme. The US is even in discussion with India to supply nuclear materials (for strictly peaceful purposes, of course). All of this piles up in righteous Iranian eyes as evidence that Iran needs to go beyond its present programme and actually build nuclear weapons. National prestige and pride are involved, obviously and nationalism is probably the most powerful of all political
forces. Military strategy is also involved. So far as anyone in the non-Western world can see, Iraqs mistake in 2003 was not to have a nuclear bomb or two in working order. That would have kept the US at bay, just as uncertainty about North Koreas nuclear arms inhibits US policy in the Far East. Iran already possesses non-
nuclear deterrents to American attack, which Iraq did not, and they are probably strong enough to keep both the US and Israel away from Iranian nuclear sites. Iran can close down a major
part of Middle Eastern oil shipments by closing the Strait of Hormuz. It has combined Revolutionary Guard and ground forces three times the total of American forces now active in Iraq, where Tehran also has influence on the Shia clerical leadership, which holds the key to Iraqs future. Nuclear weapons proliferation in the non-Western world is an old American preoccupation, but it is directly linked to Third World perceptions of the threat of American military intervention. The main, if not the only, advantage that nuclear weapons provide a
country such as Iran is the deterrence of intervention by the US or Israel. The urge to possess these weapons is directly reciprocal to American non-proliferation pressures, and the threat of attack. (The India-Pakistan case is an exception to these generalisations, since there the perceived threats are
strictly bilateral, and the two countries have simply replicated for themselves, at great cost, the balance of terror that existed between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.) Possession of the bomb would also
bring comfort and prestige to Iran in dealing with its nuclear-armed neighbours, which include Pakistan and Russia, as well as Israel. In theory, a threat of aggressive use of nuclear weapons exists, but in the Middle East it is accompanied by certainty of overwhelming Israeli (or even American) retaliation. Warning by American politicians that "rogue states" might attack Israel, the US, British bases on Cyprus, or Western Europe, are manipulation or propaganda. Individual Muslims may welcome martyrdom, but nations, even Muslim nations, do not.
62
Iran Disadvantage
No Impact No Space Threat

Iran lack of space technology, makes them in unlikely opponent in space
Weston, Maj. USAF, 2009, (Scott, Air and Space Power Journal, Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications, http://www.airpower.macwell.af.mil/airchronicle s /apj/apj09/spr09/weston.html, DOA: 7/16/11) Iran, the least space-capable of our potential opponents, has no nuclear capability at present . Because that country lacks the advanced tracking and guidance systems necessary to intercept a satellite, its only
weapon capable of reaching spacea ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead would explode blindly, creating a dangerous debris field in valuable low Earth orbits. Irans most capable
missiles, the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4, could possibly reach direct-ascent altitudes of 650 and 1,100 km, respectively.33
After all the hype about space warfare and space weapons, an examination of currently fielded forces capable of direct counter space operations against satellites clearly shows that few countries can conduct this type of warfare. Most threats envisioned in the US militarys space doctrine simply do not exist in an operationally deployed form. Iranian ambitious spacepower goals, consistently fail on similar projects because of poor coordination
Shapir, head of the INSS Middle East Military Balance, 2005, (Yiftah, Strategic Assessment (JCSS), Irans Efforts to Conquer Space., http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1920/, Vol. 8, No. 3, DOA: 7/16/11) Iran is determined to attain an independent satellite capability for communications and research, and in the future, for military purposes. If the launches of the Zohreh communications satellites and the other research satellites are successful, Iran will probably seek to obtain additional capabilities, especially the independent construction and launching of its own satellites. It will also probably try to build a military image-collecting satellite for supplying photographs of military quality . Iran regards these projects beyond their
functional aspects, as contributing to the nation's strength and deterrence capability and bolstering its position as the region's leader. Today, at a time when almost every state can purchase
satellite products on the open market - from imagery for research to communications channels, and even military quality imagery (up to a resolution of one meter) - there is little cost effectiveness in investing enormous resources to attain an independent satellite capability. Nevertheless, a close examination of the projects that Iran has been engaged in indicates its great difficulty in attaining these capabilities. Iran has failed to reach even the
basic stages in these grandiose projects after many years of effort, stages that other states attained a long time ago. The reasons for this failure are not clear but they seem to be linked to the government's inherent inability to coordinate government agencies, resolve conflicting demands, and mobilize the required resources for the projects. In other words, Iran is motivated to achieve far-reaching goals. Iran also has a significant technological infrastructure. Nevertheless, the engine is stalled and important projects are being delayed. If this assessment is correct and the Iranian failure is a deep systemic failure, this could point to questions on Iran's capability to materialize other ambitious programs, such as in the realms of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
63
Iran Disadvantage
No Impact No Timeframe
Itll take at least five years for Iran to have a warhead that could fit on their rockets.
FRSTRATEGIE.ORG 5/2009 (http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/dossiers/menace_balistique/doc/JTA.pdf, date accessed, 7/15/11)
It could take Iran perhaps five years and additional nuclear tests to move from the first test of a simple nuclear device to the development of a nuclear bomb or warhead with a yield of several tens of kilotons capable of being fitted onto existing and future Iranian ballistic missiles . Such a warhead would most likely weigh more than 1,000 kg, unless substantial help were obtained from abroad in the design and development of the warhead.9 The technological challenges
lie not only in the design of the nuclear charge, but in the design and engineering of the warhead as well. 2.11 The possibility was raised in our discussions that Iran could opt to use HEU to make a lightweight gun-type warhead like the 203-mm artillery shell first deployed by the United States in 1957 with a mass of only 110 kg. Several
members of the group regard this as much more challenging than simpler but heavier designs, and believe that Iran would not be able to develop such weapons in the foreseeable future . 2.12 Neither the IAEA nor the U.S. intelligence community has published data proving that Iran is developing, manufacturing, or testing any nuclear devices (although U.S. intelligence has concluded
that Iran carried out exploratory weapons-related work in the past). There is no seismic or radiation-monitoring data to indicate that nuclear tests have taken place in Iran.
64
Iran Disadvantage
Impact Non-unique Ballistic Missile Capabilities Now

Iran already has ballistic missile capabilities Zarif, Iran Leader at AEI Critical Threats, 9 (Maseh, April 9, Potential Delivery Systems
for Iran's Nuclear Program http://www.irantracker.org/nuclear-program/potential-deliverysystems-irans-nuclear-program) Irans Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, with an estimated range between 800 and 1,300 miles, possess a nuclear weapons capability.[9] Iran could use the Shahab-3, for example, to deploy a nuclear warhead with only slight modifications.[10] Given its technical specifications, including a payload capacity of nearly one ton, Iran would consider the Shahab-3 as the preferred delivery vehicle for a potential nuclear weapon.[11] After initial tests in 1998, Iran more recently tested the Shahab-3 in the summer of 2008 during a naval war games exercise.[12] Although the exact size of the Shahab-3 missile arsenal remains opaque, an estimate from Janes Defence Weekly contends that after tripling its stock of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) during the course of 2008, Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC) possesses 100 Shahab-3 missiles.[13] Beyond the basic Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), Iran possesses extended range variants of the MRBM.[14] As noted in 2008 by U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) director Henry Obering,
Iran currently pursues newer and longer-range missile systems and advanced warhead designs.[15] Irans pursuit of missile systems could involve developing indigenous production capabilities or more simply, importing complete missile systems. In 2005, for example, officials
from Ukraine conceded that six medium-range, air-launched cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were sent from Ukraine to Iran in 2001.[16]
65
Iran Disadvantage
Impact Non-unique Iran Nuclearization Inevitable

Iranian nuclearization is inevitable
Jamsheed K. Choksy 03.19.10 )(Choksy is professor of Central Eurasian studies, professor of history and adjunct professor of religious studies.) (http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/19/irannuclear-sanctions-opinions-contributors-jamsheed-and-carol-choksy.html As Iranians begin a New Year (Nav Ruz) on March 21, their quest for regime change has stalled, and a nuclear state is foreseeable, even if atomic weapons may not be inevitable. As Iran's leaders have demonstrated for 31 years, decisions are all about staying in power on their own terms. Yes, U.S.-led sanctions have hurt Iran's economy. Nonetheless a U.S.-proposed new set of stiffer sanctions that would further deprive Iran's people but have limited impact on the leaders is running into opposition from foreign nations and corporations. The sanctions will likely lead to more totalitarianism from the Iranian government, but they will also affect international trade with Iran, which is another reason for much of the opposition to them.
Essentially the prospect of profit outweighs fears of totalitarianism and mushroom clouds. Simultaneously Iran's government is augmenting its economic and diplomatic presence on the world stage.
66

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SCFI 2011 Silent Nihilists

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1NC Iran Disadvantage 1/3

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1NC Iran Disadvantage 2/3

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1NC Iran Disadvantage 3/3

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2NC Impact Outweighs 1/4

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2NC Impact Outweighs 2/4

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2NC Impact Outweighs 3/4

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2NC Impact Outweighs 4/4

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Uniqueness No Space Exploration Now

US space program ending

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Uniqueness No Iran Space Now

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Uniqueness No Nuclear Missile Capability Now

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A2: Recent Launches Prove Iran Space Capability 1/2

aside, the Iranian space endeavor is a growing threat.

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A2: Recent Launches Prove Iran Space Capability 2/2

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***LINKS AND INTERNALS***

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Link Mars Exploration

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Link US Modeled 1/2

Iran models the US

The US has always been the leader in space

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Link US Modeled 2/2

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Link Perceived Military Threats

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Link Space Exploration Collaboration

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A2: US Would Exclude Iran

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Link Russia (Debris Module) 1/2

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Link Russia (Debris Module) 2/2

Iran may be developing a ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 km

SCFI 2011 Silent Nihilists

Link Russia (Mars Module) 1/2

Irans space program is based on and aided by Russia

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Link Russia (Mars Module) 2/2

Iran may be developing a ballistic missile with a range of 4,000 km

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Internal Link Duel-Use 1/4

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Internal Link Duel-Use 2/4

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Internal Link Duel-Use 3/4

LINKS AND INTERNALS