Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries

and Its Implications for the Defense Sector

The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan
NIDS JOINT RESEARCH SERIES No.7
I'ublished by:
The National Institute for Dcfcn-,c Studies
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Cont
Preface .
Eiichi Kuru/wru
CHAPTER I ..
Indonesia's Security Outlook and Dete
Ri;u/ SUKMA
Introduction ..
lndoncsia's Security Challenges ..
Developments in Defence Sector: Impro
External Cooperation and Initiatives.......
CHAPTER 2 .
Malaysia's Perspectives and Responses
lANG Sirw Mun
Malaysia's Strategic OutlOOK ..
South China Sea: Dangerous Undercurrei
The Strategic Implications of US's "Pivot
Contending with China's Increasing Milit
Concluxion .
CHAPTER 3 .
The Philippine Security Situation in 20]
in external defense while continuing to I
Hermon Joseph S. Kraft
External Security .
Internal Securitv .
Defense OutlOOK for .20 1.2 .
CHAPTER 4 .
Singapore in 2011: Security Enhanceme
Lam Peng Er
Security outluok: the realist paradigm of "
Singapore's relations with Malaysia: railw,
(Jell-strategic ullL'tTtainties: Singapore's S!l
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation: dipI
Epilogue: pmt-Lee Kuan Yewera and "har
Printed by Urban Councction-,
dies
I 153-8648. Japan
ilion are solely of the authors. and do not
itutions or governments of the authors.
ute for Defense Studies
ilication may be reproduced. stored in retrieval
111 or by any means (electronic. mechanical.
se) without the written permission from the
Contents
Preface ..
Eiichi Katahara
CHAPTER I .
Indonesia's Security Outlook and Defence Policy 2012
Rit.al SUKMA
,
Inuoduction .....................................................'
Indonesia's Security Challenges . . -I
Developments in Defence Sector: lrnprovcnu-nt Continue.'
, ~
External Cooperation and Initiative, .. I ~
CHAPTER 2................. . . 21
Malaysia's Perspectives and Responses to Strategic Challenges
TANG Siew MUI1
Malaysia's Strategic Outlook.
South China Sea: Dangerous Lndcrcurrcru-, ..
The Strategic Implications of US', "Pivot" Strategy
Contending with China's Increasing Military Powcr.
Conclusion ........
.
. .
.
~ I
~ . ~
~ h
.... 2
l
)
CHAPTER 3 . ~ I
The Philippine Security Situation in 20 II: Plugging the (\cry big) holes
in external defense while continuing to face internal vulnerabilities
Herman Joseph S. Kmj!
External Security ..
Internal Security . . 37
Defense Outlook for 2012 .
. -II)
CHAPTER 4 .
Singapore in 2011: Security Enhancement Amidst Uncertainty
Lam Peng Er
Security outlook: the realist paradigm of "hard truth-," . -f('
Singapore's relations with Malaysia: railway land aIlL I w.ucr. . -1
')
Gee-strategic uncertainties: Singapore', .'trategic rc-pon-cv. . :'iO
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation: diplomncv and security. .. '1.1
Epilogue: post-Lee Kuan Yew era and "h.ud rruthx'". .. :i-l
CHAPTER 5 57
Thailand's Security Outlook: Next-Door, Indoor, Non-Traditional and
(; eo- Regi 0 naI
Till I ill II II POlIgs/I(/himk
Introduction . 57
Next-Door: Cumbodiu . . 5X
:\ext-Door: Mvamuur... .. 61
Indoor: Southern Insurgency 64
Non-Truditionul: Flood 65
Gco-rcgional: Between the Inucd States and China 66
Implications for the Defence Sector 67
CHAPTER 6 .. . 69
Vietnam's Security Outlook
Curtv! ,\. 11/(/li'I'
lntroducuon . ......................... .. 69
Security Challenge.s Facing Vietnam . .. 70
lruplic.uion-, for the Defence Sector. . X2
Prospect-, for Regional Coopcr.uion . .. X6
CHAPTER 7 X9
Myanrnars Security Outlook and the Myanmar Defence Services
Jill MOLllIg MUlIlIg ThOll
Introduction: Elected civilian government and the military in politics ....... ........ X9
Leadership transition in the military .. 92
Myanmar Defence Services and national xecunty .., .. 94
Internal security challenges: from war to peace" 96
f)rug traftickmg and narcotics issues... .. 99
International security Issues 100
Conclusion. . .. 102
CHAPTERS . 103
Mongolia's Immediate Security Challenges: Implication to Defense
Sector and The Regional Cooperation
Mushbat Otgonbuvur Sarluet:
Introduction .. . 103
I. Security Challeuuc', for Mongolia . 104
., lmplicarion to Its Defense ScL'lm.... .. . 109
.i , luturc Prospects I'm \lEA DC'fellSc' Cooperation .. 112
('()[Klus[( )[1. . . 11.1
Bibl iography
...............................
CHAPTER 9 ..
The United States and the Asia-Pacific
SO/liP Linuivc
Introduction ..
Identify and Discus the Top 3 to 5 lmpo
the United States ..
Implications for the Defense Sector ..
Prospects for Regional Cooperation ..
Concluxion, .
CHAPTERIO .
Chinese Security in 2011
Rw) AS{f//()
20 J I Highlights ..
Long-term Bad;gn1unu: The Rise of Chin
CHAPTER 11 ..
Japan's Security Outlook in 2011: Iowa
Posture
7iJlllOhiko Satak
Introduction .
Japan's Security Challenges in 2011.
Implications for the Defense of Japan .
Conclusion .
CONTRIBUTORS .
57
Door, Indoor, Non-Traditional and
..... 57
........... 5g
... 61
....
........ 65
.ates and China ..
.66
... 67
69
................ 69
........ 70
.................. . g2
.. gel
89
theMyanmar Defence Services
iment and the military in politics .. 89
.................................................... 92
ional security....... .... 94
ar to peace') . 96
s
.................... 100
........................... 102
10:)
nallenges: Implication to Defense
tion
.................................................................. 1m
a .
104
.......................................................... IM
se Cooperation .
112
113
Bibliography ...
I I
CHAPTER 9 I 17
The United States and the Asia-Pacific: Challenges and Opportunities
Satu P. Limav
lntroducuon . I 17
Identify and Di,clJSS the Top -' to 5 Important Security Challengcs Facing
the United Statex.. .... I 17
Implications for the Defense Sector.
I
Prospects for Regional Cooperation ..

Conclusions

CHAPTER 10 .
Chinese Security in 2011
Rvo ASl//lO

I I Highlights.
Long-term Buckuround: The Rise of China.
I
1.\.\
CHAPTERII..................................... . 1,7
Japan's Security Outlook in 2011: Toward a More "Dynamic" Defense
Posture
TOl11ohiko Sl/tl/ke
lntroducuon ,
1.\7
Jap.ms Security Challenges in 2011.
1.11'
Implications for the Defense of Japan ..
Conclusion .....
1:'.1
CONTRIBUTORS
147
and Its Implications tor the Defense Seclor
text-door security concerns and internal
iblernatic and depend on vicissitudes of
Ire. But on the non-traditional security
ess, especially regional cooperation on
as non-traditional issues offer the Thai
.itirnacy.
r
CHAPTER 6
Vietnam's Security Outlook
Carlyle A. Thayer
. .
Introduction
During the lirst hall' of 20 I I tensions flared between Vietnam and China a, a result
of the aggressiveness of Chinese civilian maritime patrol boats in a"erting Chinese
jurisdiction in disputed water, in the South China Sea lying within Vietnam's
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Chinese state vcxxe! reportedly cut the cahlc-,
of two oil exploration vessels. the Binh Minh 02 and Viking II. while they were
conducting seismic surveys under commercial contracts with Vietnamx state
petroleum authority. China claims jurisdiction over these waters based on historic
rights depicted on a map containing nine-dash lines forming a u-xhape around the
rim of the South China Sea.
Chinese assertiveness in thc South China Sea provoked a seriex of eleven anti
China demonstrations in Vietnam over a twelve week period from June to August.
Victnurncsc leaders responded to domestic pressure hy making unusually strong
public statements defending Vietnam' territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
More significantly. Vietnam conducted a live-firing exercise to demonstrate it,
resolve.
Vietnam also responded to China's actions hy dixpatching a special diplomatic
envoy to Beijing in mid-year. Shortly after. China and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted Guidelines to Implement the DOC (Declaration on
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea). South China Sea tcnsiorr- abated in thc
second half of the year. Nguyen Phu Trong. the Secretary General of the Vietnam
Communist Party. visited Beijing in October, China's Vice President Xi Jinping, heir
apparent to President and party leader Hu Jintuo. paid an ollicial visit to Hanoi In
December,
With one possible exception. Vietnam faced no serious internal security challenges
in 20 II. In May. the Center for Public Policy Analysis an advocacy group, based
.,
--------
L

711 Seellrlt\ Outlook orthe Asi" Pacific Courtric-, and Its lmplicutiou-, for the Defense Sector
In Washington, D.C., reported that a public protest by several thousand Hmong
ethnic minority people in Dien Bien province adjacent to Laos resulted in a major
crackdown by Vietnamese and Lao <ccurity forces u,ing armed helicopter gunxhip.'
The Center for Puhlic Policy Analysi, alleged that at le:tst sixty-three Hmong were
killed. Ry year's end no corroborating evidence was forthcoming.
DUring 201 I. Vicmumc-,c security personnel reportedly continued to repress Dcgar
Christiun-, in the Central Highland.' Vietnam also intensified its repression of
hloggcrs and political actiVist-;: thirty-three activists were tried and xentcnced to
imprisonment during the year. In addition, a further twenty-seven religious freedom
and pro-democracy activists were arrested.
'
Police also intervened on several
occasion, to break up anti-China protests in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Security Challenges Facing Vietnam
Vietnam xharc-, land bordcr-, with three countries: China I km). Laos (2,130 km)
and Cambodiu km I. Vietnam is mainly concerned 10 control the challenges
of Iransnational security ihrc.us such as smuggling: trafficking in drugs. women and
children. and weapons; infectious diseases: and cross border political activities hy
.uui-rcgimc ucuvi.sls.
Vietnam's total land border of -1.6.\') km compares with a coastline or 3.444 kill.
Vietnam is aho concerned wuh smuggling by sea, piracy and maritime security.
Vicm.uu currently occupies nearly thirty islands and rocks in thc South China Sea.
China claims xovcrcigruy over these islands and features. Thrc.us to Vietnam's
territorial integrity and national sovcreiuntv rank high on its list of security
challenges.
Center 1"(lr Publir \1\. PrL'...," Rclcu-,c. "Vietnam. Lao" Llprising: 2:\ Prore-ror-,
Killed hy VPA." \la\ '1.211 II "1lL1 C'L'IIILT 101 Puhlir Policy Analv-i-, Pre" Release. "Vietnam: 14 OiL'
a" Troup" 011 \Ia; l). 2UI [.
I
"\"L'ln;ltlll'\l' St.'clInt) FI)rL'I'S /\UaL')... Chri.\tiall \\"oL\hippcr ..... :' AllgU..... ! 15.
2() I I.
I
"Vietnam." l lum.m W'tlch. \\,,,M He/Jorl p. 4(1] and Ron Corbcn, "liS Step' L'p
PrL'-.,-.,lll'l' on vicuuun Ovc: Hum.u: Rq;hh_" \fJicc o(.\J/rcric(/ Ncw. I.muarv .22. 201.2.
I
J
J
Vietnam is the world's fourteenth largest C'
This makes it roughly comparable to a mi
ranks forty-second in the wOI'ld in terms c
power parity) at U.5. $277 bi Ilion (July 201
used, Vietnam has a GOP of U.5. sI06 bill
2.Y1c of GOP on defence. This would equ:
When these ligures are compan:u to simi
Vietnam is in a highly asymmetric relations
The Vietnam People's Armed Forces com
forces. The former come under the direcri:
and the latter come under the control of the
Vietnam People's Army comprises the Arm
Defence Force (see Tahle I ). These regular t(
Border Defence Force and local forces. th,
Force (urban areas). The local forces are est
Table 1: Vietnam People's
Military Service
ArlllY
Navy
__NavalJllfantry_
Air-Air Defence Force
sub-total
Border Defence Command
Total
Source Internatlonallns(l(ute for Strategic Studies, TI
Vietnam's most recent Defence White Par
the appraisal that Southeast Asia's security,
potential risks of conflicts still remain.":' Th
Nuoc ('()ng Hoa Xu HDi Chu I\:ghi<t Viet \'arn. Bo (
Xu"t Ban The Gioi. 2(1(1\)1. 1'1.
I public protest by several thousand Hmong
province adjacent to Laos resulted in a major
:urity forces usinc armed helicopter gunships.'
; alleged that at least sixty-three Hmong were
evidence was forthcoming,
-sonnel reportedly continued to repress Degar
! Vietnam also intensified its repression of
I-three activists were tried and sentenced to
tion. a further twenty-seven religious freedom
nested.' Police also intervened on several
:"ts in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
etnam
countries: China (1.::'81 kill). Laos (2.130 krn )
, mainly concerned to control the challenges
s smuggling: trafficking in drugs. women and
eases: and cross border political activities hy
km compares with a coastline of kill.
?gling by sea, piracy and maritime security.
rty islands and rocks in the South China Sea.
islands and features. Threats to Vietnam's
ereignty rank high on its list of security
-lease, "Vietnam. Laos Upri"ing: 2X Hmong Protestors
ublic PolicyAnulvxix. Press Release, "Vietnam: 1-+ Die
irity Forces Auack Christian Worshippers," August 15.
Repon 20/2. p. -+01 and Ron Corbcn, "LIS Steps Lip
ce ufAI/It'rica New, January 2012.
r
Vietnam is the world's lourtecnth largest country with a population or l)0 million.
This makes it roughly comparable to a middlesized province in China. Vietnam
ranks forty-second in the world in terms 01' Gross Domestic Product (purchasing
power parity) at U.S. S277 billion (July 20 II estimate). If official exchange rates arc
used, Vietnam has a GDP of U.S. SI06 billion. Vietnam ollicially claims it spcnds
2.S';{ of GDP on defence. This would equate to approximately C.S. S2.65 billion.
When these hgures arc compared to similar hgures 1'01' China it is obvious thai
Vietnam is in a highly asymmetric relationship with Its northern neighholtr
The Vietnam People's Armed Forces comprise both military and public sccunr,
forces. The former come under the direction of the Ministry of National Defence
and the latter come under the control of the Ministry of Public Security. The regular
Vietnam Pcoplcx Army comprises the Army. Navy and Na\ al Infantry, and Air-Air
Defence Force (see Table I). These regular forces arc supplemented hy a puramilitur-,
Border Defence Force and local forces. the Mi litia (rural areas) and Sell-Defence
Forre t urban areas). The local forces arc estimated to number 5 million.
Table 1: Vietnam People's Army Force Estimates
Military Service Size
_Armv
412,000
Navy 13,000
_Naval Infantry 27,000
Air-Air Defence Force 30,000
sub-total 482,000
Border Defence Command 40,000
Total 522,000
Soi.rco lnter national Institute for Strategic Stud es, The Mi .t., F)"lan,:e 2009. .i 15- 417
Vietnam's most recent Defence White Paper. released in December 2()()l). oflcr-,
the appraisal that Southeast Asi<l's security environment is "buvicully stable ... [but]
potential risks of conflicts still remain.":' These risks arc identified as Iollow:
I Nuoc Cong Ho.r Xn Hoi Chu Nghi<l Viet ;\bm, Bo QUOl' (j1((J("/JI/o/l,t:. \'i'f ...\i(/JJ] (Hanoi:
Xu.u Ran The Giol. 200')). I'i.
SecUril\ Ourl.io], o!' the '\'ia Pacillc Counuic-, and II' Implicauon-, lor Ilw Defense Sector
Dcstubilixinu impact ul' !!Iubal economic recession 011 domestic stability "ill
<orne countric-."
Territorial disputes over land and SGI
Natural floods and tsunamis
Tcrrorixm and piracy
Climate dlange
Epidemics
Transnutioual crime
With respect lu Vietnam, the Defence White Paper identities four ruajor security
challcng.: (I) impact of the glubal financial crisis on Vietnam's economy and the
danger of "further I'lgging behind" other regional states: (2) the threat by "hostile
I'orces", to incite violence and separatism" in order to undermine domestic stability:
I) ) disputes over s()\'ereignty, <ovcrciun rights and jurisdiction over the tcrriioric-, in
the East Sea ISuuth China Seal: and (--1-) nun-traditional security issues (specifically
illegal traflieking of weapuns and drug. piracy. organised transnauonul crimes.
tcrrorism. illegal migratiul1 and immigr.uion, environmental degradation, climate
change, and cpidcm ics 1.'
Vietnam's Defence White Paper is a public document whose intended audience is
the internationul community It therefore treads lightly on sensitive i,ssucs, When
development- sitlce the 200l) White Paper arc reviewed. the following emerging
security challenges may be identified alongside long-standing security concerns:
managing defence relations with the great powers: protecting national sovereignty ill
the South China Sea: naval modcruisntion: non-rraditioual security: and developing
forces for international pe,ll'ekeeping, Each 01' these challenges is discussed in turn
bclov, ,
Managing defence relations with the major powers
SII1l'C the cullap,e of the Soviet Union in Il)l) I. Vietnam became a country without a
lormal ally, A major ch,tIleilge 1'01' Vietnam is how io develop relations with former
I'oes and new mulril.ucral invtitution-, to huurcss national security, In 2011 managing
defence rclation- thl' major powers became' a major concern fur Vietnam,
Bn ()lH1L' (jll!l( \ 'I,',! ,\'1/111. ! 7 IX.
Vietnam's foreign and defence policyguide
cooperation and development with a forei
and diversification along Iwith I the princq
credible partner of all nations in the intern
Vietnam has been highly successful in i
Vietnam became a member of ASEAN
repaired relations with Japan and the Eurc
relations with the United States, Vietnam'
when. a, the unanimous choice of the Asi
the United Nations General Assembly a,
Nations Security Council (200R-U9),
Vietnam has sought to strengthen
Vietnam played a proactive role in 201(
establishment of the ASEAN Defence
Vietnam also used its role as ASEAN Chai
ISSUC,
Ncvcrthcle:. Vietnam's experience as A
centric multilateral security arrangements,
arrangements to rextrain Chinese assertiven
the ADMM Plus was in response to its fru
ASEAN Regional Forum, When Vietnamhe
many of the major external players raised tl
Expert Working Group OJ] Maritime Securit
was set up, But the ADMM Plus minister
years. thus scuttling the possibility of swif
China Sea and other maritime security issue
130Qunc Phonp, {}lIOC Phong viet Num, 21.
Japan and rh.- Elf cancelled development assistan
laic
l..
mtries and lh lmplic.uion-, I'or the Lietcn-,c Sccu
.onomrc recession on domestic stability "in
.ea
and tsunamis
White Paper identifies four major security
nancial crisis on Vietnam's economy and the
her regional states: (2) the threat by "hostile
ism" in order to undermine domestic stability:
n rights and jurisdiction over the territories in
4) non-traditional security issues (specifically
piracy. organised transnational crimes.
igration. em ironmental degradation. climate
public document whose intended audience is
fore treads lightly on sensitive issues. When
Paper are reviewed. the following emerging
i alongside long-standing security concerns:
reat powers: protecting national sovereignty in
ition: non-traditional security: and developing
Each of these challenges is discussed in turn
majorpowers
in 1991.Vietnam became a country without a
.tnam is how to develop relations with former
a buttress national security. In 20 I I managing
wers became a major concern for Vietnam.
Vietnam's foreign and defence pol icy guidel inc-, inc ludc "i ndcpcndcncc, sci I' rcIiancc.
cooperation and development with a foreign policy of openness. mulril.ucralixation
and diversification along Iwith I the principle that VIetnam vv I,hes to be a friend and
credible partner of all nations in the international comnlunity.""
Vietnam has been highly successful in implementing thc-.c guidelines. Ry Il)l):'i
Vietnam became a member of AS I::A1'\. the ;\SEAN Regional Forum (ARFI.
repaired relations with Japan and the European Union -. ami c-tublishcd diplomatic'
relations with the United States. Vietnam's foreign policy achieved further success
when. as the unanimous choice of the Asia bloc. it was overwhelmingly elected hy
the United Nations General Assembly as a non-permanent member on the United
Nations Security Council (200X-OY).
Vietnam has sought to strcnuthcn ASEAI'\ in ii, relation, vv ith the major pmver,
Vietnam played a proactive role in 20 I0 ,1' ASEAN Chair in shephc'rding the
estublishmcnt of the ASEAN Defence Milllstcrs Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus)
Vietnam also used its role as ASEAN Chair to internationalise the South China Sea
Nevertheless. Vietnam's experience as ASI:AN Chair confirmed that ;\SEA:'\
centric multilateral security arrangement', arc weak reed, to support robust security
arrangements to restrain Chinese asxcrtivcnc-c-. For cv.unplc. Vietnam", <upport for
the ADMM Plus was in response to its frustration mer the talk shop nature of the
ASEAN Regional Forum. When Vietnam hosted the ADMVI Plus inuugural mccune
many of the major external players raised their concern- over maritime security. An
Expert Working Group on Maritime Security. co-chaired by Malaysia and Australia.
was set up. But the ADMM Plus minisicr-, decided to convene once cverv three
years. thus scuttling the possibility of swift action on rising tcnxiou-, in the South
China Sea and other maritime security issues.
" Ro Quoc Phong, QIIO!' Phong Vie! /1/(//11.21.
7 Japan and the ELJ cancelled development alter Vrcrn.uu. uucrvcruion 111 Cnmbodi.. 111
late 1'J7X.
r
1
L
74 Security Ouilo., olrhc A'ia Paciti Counuics and It, lmplic.nions lor the Defense Sector
In 2011 Vietnam xupportcd Indonesia in its role as ASEAN Chair in pursuing the
South China Sea ix-uc including Guidelines to Implement the D O C . ~ Vietnam puts
lillie faith in the current ASEAN Chair, Cambodia, to be proactive regarding South
China Sea i,.sues. Cambodia ami Myanmar, for example, were the only two members
of the East Asia Summit th.u did not raise maritime security issuex at the informal
leaders' retreat. Cambodia will be followed by Brunei (20J3l, Myanmar (2014), and
Lam (2015).
In 20 I I, Vietnam hosted the Fi fth ASEAN Navy Chids Meeting (ANCM 5) and was
aghast when the chiefs quibbled over a number of issues including the formal name
of the meeting, how often it should meet. the conduct ofjoint patrols. and a proposal
by Vietnam for an ASEAN communications protocol when navy ships from ASEAN
members pa" each other at sea.
Vietnam views working within the ASEAN-centric multilateral security framework
as a necessary but not sufficient condition to maximise its national security. Vietnam
has therefore s()llght to develop defence and security tics with all the major powers.
China's rise and challenge to U.S. primacy present a pressing security challenge for
Vietnam.
Vietnam's interactions with China and the United States represent a distinctly
different set of relations from the other great powers because they arc triangular
in nature. Analysts often describe Vietnam's policy as a form of "soft balancing"
or hedging. Neither term accurately captures Vietnam's self-perceived role as pivot
between Beijing and Washington. Vietnam prefers a situation where there is a certain
amount of tension. rivalry and competition between China and the United States.
Victnamstunds to benefit from this state of affairs because as pivot it can maximise
it., utility to Beijing and Washington as an independent actor. Vietnam does not wish
to -ce tcnsrons between China and the United States deteriorate to open hostility
as Vietnam would suffer from the fallout. Vietnam also rears that if Beijing and
Washington develop amicable relations they will collude at Vietnam's expense. A
review of defence intcraction between Vietnam with China and Vietnam and the
Declaration Oil Conduc: of Paruc ill till' South China Sea adopted hy ASEAN member Statl" and
China in !\()\L'l1lhL'r 2()()2.
j
United States in 20 II bears this out.
In mid-20 I I, despite rising tension over SOL
conducted their eleventh joint naval patrol i
conducted search and rescue exercises. At 1
navy ships made their second port cull to Cl
On August 28th. China and Vietnam helc
Dialogue at deputy minister level in Beij
Chairman of the People's Liheration Army (P
counterpart, Lt. General Nguyen Chi Vinh,
The two deputy ministers agreed to step ul
open a hot line between the two defence mir
General Ma noted that the sovereignty dispui
difficult and sensitive ixsur;" in hilateral relan
Vietnam's readiness "to cooperate for rnut
disputed area":' in accord with internatioru
sides. General Vinh also stressed that there v
East Sea issue: "the declaration of sovereigm:
related to the tics between Vietnam and Ct
forums:' II The following month China host
the head of the Vietnam People's Army (V
member of the Central Military Party Comm
In October. Nguyen Phu Trong, Secretary Ge
visited Beijing for discussions with his count
issued after their discussions included a paragi
that read:
The People', Libcr.uion Arm. N,\\y made three po
year.': November ~ O O ~ . December 20lN and October 21
In China anet Vietnam initiated their hrst annual defe
were upgraded to deputy minister level and first Stra
Hanoi in November 20 IO.
II All quotations in thi-, purugraph are taken from '"
dialot!uC'''' V{('!IIWJI Neves Agl'l,l t \ ". August 31. 20ll.
.l
ntries and Its Implications lor the Deren", Sector
in its role as ASEAN Chair in pursuing the
elines to Implement the DOCs Vietnam puts
" Cambodia, to be proactive regarding South
mar, for example, were the only two members
aise maritime security issues at the informal
wed by Brunei (2013), Myanmar (2014). and
\N NavyChiefs Meeting (ANCM 5) and was
number of issues including the formal name
the conduct ofjoint patrols, and a proposal
tionsprotocol when navy ships from ASEAN
:AN-centric multi lateral security framework
on to maximise its national security. Vietnam
and security ties with all the major powers.
lacy present a pressing security challenge for
id the United States represent a distinctly
er great powers because they are triangular
tnam's policy as a form of "soft balancing"
ptures Vietnam's self-perceived role as pivot
am prefers a situation where there is a certain
.ition between China and the United States.
:eof affairs because as pivot it can maximise
an independent actor. Vietnam does not wish
United States deteriorate to open hostility
out. Vietnam also fears that if Beijing and
s they will collude at Vietnam's expense. A
I Vietnam with China and Vietnam and the
uth China Sea adopted by ASEAN member slales and
Vicuiams Security Outlook 7",
United States in 2011 bears this out.
In mid-2011, despite rising tension over South China Sea issues. China and Vietnam
conducted their eleventh joint naval patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both navies have
conducted search and rescue exercises. At the conclusion of this patrol, Vietnam's
navy ships made their second port call to China (the first took place in June 2(09)."
On August 2Rth, China and Vietnam held their 2nd Defence-Security Strategic
Dialogue at deputy minister level in Beijinp.!" Lt. General Ma Xiaotian. Vice
Chairman of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff hosted his Vietnamese
counterpart, Lt. General Nguyen Chi Vinh. Deputy Minister of National Defence.
The two deputy ministers agreed to step up the exchange of military delegations,
open a hot line between the two defence ministries, and expand military training.
General Mu noted that the sovereignty dispute in the South China Sca was the "most
difficult and sensitive issue" in bilateral relations. General Vinh responded by stating
Vietnam's readiness "to cooperate for mutual development with China in rcal ly
disputed areas," in accord with international law and the mutual interest of both
sides. General Vinh also stressed that there were three closely related aspects to till'
East Sea issue: "the declaration of sovereignty by concerned countries, soh'ing issue\
related to the ties between Vietnam and China, and solving issues at mululatcrut
forums." II The following month China hosted a Visit hy General Ngo Xuan Lich.
the head of the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) General Political Department and
member of the Central Military Party Committee.
In October, Nguycn Phu Troug, Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist Party.
visited Beijing for discussions with his counter-part Hu Jintao. The Joint Statement
issued after their discussions included a paragraph on stepped up defence cooperation
that read:
lJ The Pcoplcs Libcr.uion /\["[11)-' Nay)-' made three pori \ i .... ii-, It) Vicui.un after ,I huuu-, or \c\cnIL'l'Jl
vc.ns: November 200X, December 200'i and October 20 I0
](\ China and Vietnam initiated their first annual defence I...'\lll\tdtatJon\ ill April 2()()),
were upgraded to deputy" minister level and rirst Dctcncc Sccuritv Diulouuc \\a\ held in
Hanoi ill November 20 16. -
II All quotations in ihi- paragraph arc tukcu from "Vietnam. China hold :-..l'l...ond defence.
Jial(lt!uc." Vietnam News Agency, Augu,,' J 1,20 II,
---------------_d
7(, Sl'lUrtl.' Ourloo], "I IIll' ,\",1 I'dlilll Counnic-, .uul lh hupfic.uiou-, for the I)l'kll'" Sector
lourthly. to promote in-depth cooperation between the two armies, increase
contuct bet \\ ccn high-rank inj; "I'm) leaders of the two countries: continue to
at deputy ministerial level: accelerate the
cstahlishmcnt 01 a direct telephone line between the two defence ministries:
incrcaxc cooperation in personnel training and exchanges between junior
olliccr: conduct trial Joint patrols along the land border at a convenient time:
conunuc to holdjoiut nava] patrols in the GulfofTonkin: increase cooperation
in such ticld-, a, mutual li,its by the two countries' naval ships,"
Finally. in December. Vice Prcvidcnt Xi linping made an official visit to Hanoi and
met with all 01 Vietnam', top party and state leaders. Xi's visit was primarily "a get
to know you" I isit a, he i, widely viewed as Hu Jintao heir apparent. It was later
reI calcd that Xi warned each 01 the senior Vicmamc-,c leaders whom he met "to keep
Ithcir] di-tancc Irom the Unucd States on the sensitive issue 01 territorial disputes in
the South China Sea." I ,.
In 20 I I. the l.initcd States and Vietnam entered into discussions to raise their
hil.ucral rcl.uinnship to a "strategic partnership." a classification used by Vietnam
to describe couutric-, with which it has particularly close bilateral relations, r..
In April. the President of the National Defense University (NDU). Vice Admiral
Ann Rondrcau, visited Hanoi and offered scholarships for Vietnamese officers to
undertake profc-c-ionul militury education at the NDU.
Vietnam and the Initcd States held their Political. Security and Defence
Dialogue in Waxhington in June where they discussed peacekeeping operations and
training. humanitarian assistancl' and disaster relief. counter-terrorism and counter
narcotics, non-prolifcr.uion and maritime security, The following month the U.S.
and Vietnam their lirst tormul military agreement. a Statement of Intent on
Military Medical Cooperation (August I): the Commander or the U.S. 7th Fleet
\ i-itcd Hanoi :') I: and the USS George Wushillgloll returned to South China
"Tuvcn ho hal TlUOl' Vil'[ \:alll \ a Trung (JUDC," Vh'!IWII I New: Agency, October IS. 20 I I,
[1Ulllt-l (1\ I.
K)..()do. "Chilld 1,.\,lI"Ih Vicru.un not !U l'U/Y LIp to U,S. on S, China Sea i:-.. -,uc: <ources." Mainichi.
J,1I111"r\ 21.21112.
vrcui.un and China l'hclral'!l'ri/l' their hrlutcral relation-, as a comprehensive strategil' partner.-,hip.
Sea waters on August 13, Once again Vietr
operations.
U,S.-Vietnam defence relations were adva
held in Washington on September 19, Dep
Scher and Vice Minister 01 National Defe.
first formal Memorandum or Understand
MOU included live priority areas: the estal
between defence ministries: maritime se
exchanging experiences on United Natior
assistance and disaster relief.
With respect to other major powers. Vietr
long-standing. Vietnam and India have d
partnership. In September 2011 they held
deputy minister level in Hanoi. This rneeti
air force, air defence and defence industry
arms and equipment sales to Vietnam,
In October 20 I I the Defence Ministers of 1
of Understanding on the enhancement of (
provisions for regular defence talks at deput
and exchanges between the Japan Sclf-D
Army, According to Japanese officials.
involving China's obstruction of maritime
part "to keep in check China's growing as
East China Sea." I) In November 2011. Vie
cooperation with France and the United Kir
In sum. Vietnam has not aligned itself with
tilted towards the United States to contain
I':; Kvodo, "Japan, Vietnam ..... ign memo Of) defense
25.21111.
1(, "Vietnam. France agree to boosr defense cooper
'Vr\', UK -,ign \1oL' Oil uercllcc cooper.uion," Tuoi T,
l
ntries and !I.S Implic.ui.m 1(\1' ihl' lkkll'l' Sector
.ooperation between the two armies. increase
tony leaders 01 the two countries: continue to
res at deputy ministerial level: accelerate the
lone line between the two defence ministries:
mel training and exchanges between junior
ols along the land border at a convenient time:
ols in the Gulf olTonkin: increase cooperation
Iythe two countries" naval xhipx.!"
Ci Jinping made an official visit to Hanoi and
i state leaders, Xi's visit was primarily '"a get
ved as Hu Jintaos heir apparent. It was later
ior Vietnamese leaders whom he met "to keep
on the sensitive issue o! territorial dispute in
nam entered into discussions to raise their
artnership," a classiticurion used by Vietnam
has particularly close bilateral relauons.':'
11 Defense University (NOU J. Vice Admiral
ered scholarships for Vietnamese officers to
ion at the NOU,
I their 4th Political. Security and Defence
they discussed peacekeeping operations and
Iisaster relief. counter-terrorism and counter
ime security, The following month the U,S,
military agreement. a Statement of Intent on
st I): the Commander of the U,S, 7th Fleet
i GeorgeWashing/on returned to South China
rung Quoc." Viel!"'"1 Nnl',l Agel/fl. October 15, 20 I I.
'up toU,S, Oil S, China Sea ""Ie: sources." Mainichi.
.rat relations JS a comprehensive stratcgil' partner.... hip.
Sea waters on August 13, Once again Vietnamese Ilflicials wcrc 111111 n out til obxcrv
operations,
Ll.Sr-Vietnurn defence relations were advanced at the 2nd IkIL'nL'L' 1'1l11L':- Diaillgu,'
held in Washington on September 19, Dcpury Assisl;lllI Sccrcuuy III Defence Robert
Scher and Vice Minister of National Defence LI. Gen. r\gulen Chi Vinh signed the
first formal Mcmorundum 01 Understanding (MOL', on defence coopcnuiun. TIlL'
MOU included live priority areas: the cstnbli-Juncn: III a regular high-lcvcl dlaloguL'
between defence ministries: maritime security: ,carch and rescue: studyin!:, and
exchanging experiences on United Nations (Ll N I peacekL'cpin!:,: and humnnu.u'i.m
assistance and disaster relief.
With respect to other major powers, Vietnam's dctcuc,. rL'I;lll\)ns II ith India arc 01
long-standing, Vietnam and India have declared their rrl.u ionxhip to he strate!:'ic
partnership, In September 20 I I they held their 6th Strate!:'IL' Defence I)ialo!:,ue at
deputy minister level in Hanoi. This meetin!:, discussed. among other thinu-. na, ul.
air force, air defence and defence industry training coopcrauon and possihk Indian
arms and equipment sales tu Vietnam,
In October 20 I I the Defence Ministers of Japan an(1 Vietnam signed a Mrmcuauduru
01" Understanding on the enhancement of defence coopcr.uion. The MOl' incluclc-,
provisions for regular defence talks at deputy minister level. mutu.rf ministcrial vixit-.
and exchanges between the Japan Self-Defense l-or.c and the Vicm.uu Pcoplc
Army, According to Japanese olticiul. the 111'0 ministers discussed incidcnt-,
involving China's obstruction of maritime uctivitics. The MOll was dcvigncd in
part "to keep in check China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and
East China Sea:' l'i In November 20 I I. Vietnam signed separate MOI\ on defence
cooperation with France ami the United Kingdom, [(,
In sum. Vietnam has not aligned itself with any of the major powers nor has Vietnam
tilted towards the United States to contain China. Ruther, Vietnam has attempted
I Kyodo, "Japan, Vietnam "ign memo Oil Lkrcn'L' III ,'\10/11[( III. (kll lhl'l
25. 20! r.
II, "Vietnam, France agree to hOD:'} defense coopcrauon." Tu.ri li'(' November 2()11 :111l1
"VN, UK MoLJ Oil defence 7I/IJi lJc /\,'('1\ v. Nu\ ember 2-". 20 I J. h J
7X Security Outlook. of the Asia Paciric Countries and Its lmplicution-, tor the Defense Sector
to develop defence relations with all major powers in general and develop defence
relations in parallel between China and the United States in particular. Vietnam
prefers to play the role of pivot to preserve its autonomy for independent action.
Protecting national sovereignty in the South China Sea
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, especially with China, constitute
Vietnam's main security challenge. In Hanoi's view thc issue is one of territorial
integrity and national sovereignty. Vietnam has stationed small military gan'isons on
the major islands and rocks that It occupies.
There arc four components to the South China Sea dispute: sovereignty claims over
islands and Icaturcs (rocb) including the western Paracels: maritime delimitation of
Vietnam', EEZ; sovereign riglus to oil. gas and minerals within Vietnam's EEZ; and
fj,hing In the South China Sca.
China claims indisputable sovereignty over all the islands and rocks in the Paruccl
Ixland-, and Spratly archipelago. China claims an estimated eighty percent of the
South China Sea on the baxi-, of historical right, as illustrated in a map containing
nine dash lines forming a u-shape line that cut-, deeply into Vietnam's EEZ. China
also claims sovereign rights to oil. gas and minerals in the South China Sea and
views Vietnamese exploitation of these resources as plundering. China imposes an
annual li,hing ban lrom May to August in the South China Sea.
The waters of the South China Sea were roi led by Chinese assertiveness in 2007
2010 in imposing a unilateral fishing ban in waters north or twelve degrees north
latitude. In 20 II China adopted particularly aggressive tactics involving cutting the
cables of two commercial oi I exploration vessels operating within Vietnam's EEZ.
Vietnam responded by conducting a live-tire naval exercise on June 13 in the waters
ncar Hon Ong lsland.!" Hon Ong Island is located approximately forty kilometres
off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam roughly opposite the Puraccl Islands
and removed from the area where the two cable-cutting incidents occurred. The first
Bao flam An Toan Hang Hai vhcn l3ac I Northern Maritime Sarcty Corporation], "Vc vice ban
dan that trcn lung hu-n ()uang ;\aIl1." So IIl7/TBIlII-CTBDATIlIlMB. June 9. 2011. hllp://www.
\ mv-north. \ 11.
S
phase of the exercise involved coastal artill
involved missile corvettes firing their deck
also fired from Sukhoi jet aircraft. IX
Naval modernisation
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in IS
Vietnam's military equipment deteriorated
Russian Federation stabilised arms and miJit
1990s Vietnam embarked on a modest prog
has picked up in recent years. In 2009. in a I
that it would procure six conventional dies.
Russia. These are scheduled to be delivered
at facilities to be constructed by Russia at Ca
are likely to be equipped with sea-skimrnin:
range of 300 kilometres. I'!
In 20 I I Vietnam stepped up its naval me
delivery of four additional Su-30MK2 mul
to be equipped with the Kh-59MK anti-ship
Vietnam currently has on order sixteen more
took delivery of two Gepard-elass guided m
shi p missiles with a range of 130 km and two
addition, Vietnam launched its first indigenoi
carrier;" In October. while on a tour of the NI
Dung gave his approval for the purchase offc
are slated for construction in Vietnam." Thes
IX Reported by a confidential Vietnamese military SOL
I') The author would like to thank Robert Karniol 1'0
Challenge:' The Straits Times (forthcoming).
C(, "Russia to supply Vietnam six submarines in 2014,
" "Russia exports aircraft to Vietnam." The V!';ceof R
tau chien Nga." BHe. August 24. 20 II. "Russia deli"
Interfax-Av'N Military News Agenc\'. October II. 2011
VN:' October 25. 20 I I.
" "Viet Narn tu dong tau chien." fiRe. October 3,201
raising: eyebrows in region:" South China Morninv Post
"VN dam phan mua 4 tau r"i':n ella Ha Lan," BBe.
mtries and Its Implications 1'01' the Defense Sector
najor powers in general and develop defence
md the United States in particular. Vietnam
erve its autonomy for independent action.
South China Sea
tina Sea, especially with China, constitute
1 Hanoi's view the issue is one of territorial
.nam has stationed small military garrisons on
rpies,
.h China Sea dispute: sovereignty claims over
l.e western Paraccls: maritime delimitation of
, gas and minerals within Vietnam's EEZ: and
, over all the islands and rocks in the Paracel
ra claims an estimated eighty percent of the
ricaI rights as illustrated in a map containing
: that cuts deeply into Vietnam's EEZ. China
1S and minerals in the South China Sea and
e resources as plundering. China imposes an
,t in the South China Sea.
ere roiled by Chinese assertiveness in 2007
ban in waters north of twelve degrees north
ularly aggressive tactics involving cutting the
ion vessels operating within Vietnam's EEZ.
.e-fire naval exercise on June 13 in the waters
nd is located upproximatcly forty kilometres
'ietnam roughly opposite the Paraccl Islands
wo cable-cutting incidents occurred. The first
Northern Maritime Safety Corporation], "Ve viec han
7!fBHH-CT.BDATHHMB. June 0. 2011, http://www.
Viem.un', SL'Curity OutlOOK 79
phase of the exercise involved coastal artillery, while the second part of the exercise
involved missile corvettes tiring their deck guns. Reportedly, anti-ship missiles were
also tired from Sukhoi jet aircraft."
Naval modernisation
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Vietnam lost its major arms supplier.
Vietnam's military equipment deteriorated sharply in the following years. Once the
Russian Federation stabilised arms and military technology sales resumed. In the late
1990s Vietnam embarked on a modest program to modernise its armed forces. This
has picked up in recent years. In 2009, in a major development. Vietnam announced
that it would procure six conventional diesel powered Kilo-class submarines from
Russia. These are scheduled to be delivered in 2014. They are expected to be based
at facilities to be constructed by Russia at Cam Ranh Bay. The Kilo-class submarines
are likely to be equipped with sea-skimming 3M-54 Klub anti-ship missiles with a
range of 300 kilornetrcs.!"
In 2011 Vietnam stepped up its naval modernisation programme when it took
delivery of four additional Su-30MK2 multi-role jet righters. These are expected
to be equipped with the Kh-59M K anti-ship cruise missile with a range of I 15 km.
Vietnam currently has on order sixteen more Su-30M K2 jet fighters." Vietnam also
took delivery of two Gepard-cuis guided missile frigates armed with Kh-.15E anti
ship missiles with a range of 130 km and two S\'erlmk-class missile Patrol Boatx.:" In
addition, Vietnam launched its first indigenously built gUllship and multi-deck troop
carrier." In October. while on a tour of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
Dung gave his approval for the purchase of four Sigilli/-class corvettes, two or which
are slated for construction in Vietnam." These too are expected to be equipped with
IX Reported by a confidential Vicmamc-,e military .... ourcc to Ihe author.
l'J The author would like to thank Robert Karniol for an a,hanL'L' L'OpY of his "Vietnam's
Challenge," The Straits Times (Iorthcoming).
'" "Russia to supply Vietnam six suhmarines in 201-1." Thanh Nicn /\in1.l, Julv .1.2011.
" "Russia exports aircraft to Vietnam:' The V"i,.,. ,,(RI/llill. June 22. 20 II . "Hai qu,m Viet Nam nhun
tau chien Nga." BHC. August 24. 2011. "Russia deliver-, \l'cond cO<l;-.,lal 1ll1\\11c \y .... 1CIll to Vietnam.
Inler(lx-AVN Militarv Nell'S October I L 2011. and HHe. "Nga giao tiel' hai tau tuan tra cho
VN:' October 25, 2011.
" "Viet Nam tu dong tall chien:'nnc. OcrobcrJ, 2011 and Torodc. "Vrcm.unc militarv
raising eyebrows in region." SOl/til ChiI/O Mornins; Poet. Januar-, 2012.
" "V"l dam phan mua -I tall chien ella Iia Lan." HHe (klohL'r l x. 20 I I
b
,II Sentr;tl Outluo], Ill' till' ,.\"" P"L'iliL' Counuic-, ,,"d II' lmplx.uion. I'm till' DdL'Il"L' SCL'IIlr
lcth.t] .uui-xhip mivsilc',
In :-'() II, Vietnam beefed Ul1 its l.md-b.r-cd ulastal defences by acquiring il.s second
B;lsti()n l.uul-ba-cd anti-shill h;t1llstic mi,ssiiL' system, Vietnam also .uquircd Vera
11assi\C r.ulio loc.uor-, 1'1'<)\11 tilL' Czech Republic, Vietnam also reportedly acquired
Israeli Lvtcndcd Rangl' .vrtillcr, :Y1uniti()n,s--a ballisti,. mi-o.ilc effccuvc beyond
I5() I-.In, In Ol'tllbel:-'() II, during President Truong Tan S;lIlg's visit to New Delhi, the
local mcdi.. rcportccl th.u lndiu \\as prepared to sell Vietnam ilS Hrahlvlo-, xuperxonic
crui: Prcvidcut Sang requested Indian assisl;lIlL'e In four areas: submarine
training, convcr-ron training lor pilots to Ily Sul-.boi-.\()s, tran-.lcr 01 medium sited
p.uro] bo.ux. and modcrui-uuou ()I port lucilitic-; at Nhu Trang,C'
VOIl-traditiollal security
Vietnam I'ace's a coni inuint: chaliL'nge in maintaining control mer lis land
hmllc'rs \\ ith Chi I];\. l.ao-, am.l CllllhllLlla, Vll'111;1111lns .utcmptcd to secure it-, borders
hy LTl';lting twent\ -Iwr : economic-defence lones tkliu l.inh tc-qucu: SII) in which
['egular I'orcl's all' gilcn rl'sponsihilily Ior security and -ocio-cconomic development.
In .uldiuon. the Hordl'!' l)ekncl' Command, formerly under the Ministry of Public
Se'curil\, Ins resp()nsihilit\ for maintaining border ,sl'l'urity,
Vietnam ami China have .tcm.uc.ucd thcu lund border and are currently putting in
pial'''' mcchanivm-, t() l'cs()ln: I()l'al di-putc-. There i,s on-going cooperation between
vlilit.u. /ones adjal'l'tll t() th,- border .uid bcrwccu their respective border guards,
Vicrn.un. bordcr-, \\ ith Laos and Cumbodi., are porous and the main security
l'il;llknges arc transnational. Thl'sl' include trafficking in drugs, wcapon-, and
pcr-on-: illcual migration: gu;,rdlng again,st infectious diseases (avian nul: criminal
al'lj\ it\ .uul thv .ictivitic-, \11' anti-regime political acti\islS, In 2()()I, and ,suhsequently,
ethnic minorit. unrc-t ill the Ce'ntral Highland, has spilled over into neighbouring
Cambodiu. In :-'t)\ I, ;111 uuidcnt ill\()hing dcmonstr.uiun-; hy disaffected Hmoug
ethnic miuoru, broke our in Dicn Bien province and <pillcd over into Laos, nne
I"\111.-' 1"[ .I(11l11"(lIL '!ndld II., Tu Sl'll B;th\ld" Supcr-oni,: Crui-,c Mi .... ...,ik,,, til Vietnam."
NII,iIlCi lnsi.tr. Sl'pll'lllhl'l" 2(). 2() I I
S:ilHke'[1 1l1',IlI\. "\ le'lmlll', pk" 1)111 SIluIIl Illlle" ill " prcdic.nncnt." file l lnulu. N"IL'I1lhc'r 'J,
.:'1111
J
overseas advocacy group alleged that Vieu
and armed helicopter gunship, to suppress 1
evidence indicnrc-, that these allegations are
Cambodia continually protests mer the
smugglers along their border. The politic,
Vietnam has illegally encroached on the bOI
opposition leader Sam Rainsy and :J grouj
removed several border marker poles, In
a Memorandum of Under.swnding on dcm
boundarv before the end Ill' 2011 (a deadli
Carnbodin .md Viet nan] are in the proccs:
border.
Vietnam also cxpcricncc-, security challe:
neighbouring states, These include pirac
conducts joint naval p.urols \\ ilh Thailand, r
Issue,s,
De velopingforces for international peacek.
For the past decade and a half Vietnam ha
intcrnationu] peacekccpuu; operations unde
Vietnam has deterred Illal-.ing a comrnitrnen
for pcncckecpi ng. did not have sufficient
opinion opposed posting Vit'lnamese forces
officials raise conccrn-, that involvement in i
Vietnam the target 1'01' attack,
In 2() I I. Vietnam finally decided to prep,
peacekeeping, Special lucilitie-; have been s
currently undergoing langu:\ge and other rei
Australia arc assisting Vietnam.
'r, Carlyk;\, Th"ILT \ lc'tnam Hmons Demonsn
H(/dgm/l/ltl {iri"{;lIg, SLI'IL'lllh.'" ,0, .:'011, Available at
ntriesand It, Implic.uion-, [or the Dctcn-,c Sl'Llllt
sed coastal defences hy acquiring its second
missile syvrem. Vietnam also acquired Vera
Republic. Vietnam also reportedly acquired
itions-a ballistic missi lc effective beyond
entTruong Tan Sang's visu to New Delhi. the
iared 10 sell Vietnam its Brahlvlr, supersonic
edIndian assistance in I'our areas: xubmuriuc
to fly Sukhoi-.'Os. transfer of medium si/ed
facilities at Nha Trang."
allenge in maintaining control over its land
. Vietnam has attempted to secure its borders
nee Lones U!JII kiuh t c-quun .111) in which
r securitv and socio-economic development.
land. formcrlv under the Ministry of Public
ing border security.
eir land border and arc currently pun inu in
ties. There is on-going cooper.uion oct ween
10 between their respective border guards.
nbodia are porous and the main security
iclude trafficking in drugs. weapons and
inst infectious diseases (avian tlu): criminal
oolitical activists. In 200 I. and <ubscqueru ly,
ighlands has spilled (ncr into neighbouring
ing dcmonstrntion-; by disaffected Hmong
I province and spilled over into Laos. One
I Block in a predicament," T!/(' Hindu. Nnvcmbcr 9.
overseas udvocucy group ,t1kged that Vietnam ,llld 1.'1(1, nlllhJii,ell miliuu, 1'(I['cL"
and armed helicopter gunships to ,upprl'" unrest.:\ ['e\ iL'" (l1'thl' puhllcl\ a\ail"hk
evidence indiL'ates [hat these ,lileg'ltion, .uc Il\L'['sIalL'd II n(l[ m.ucur.nc. '"
Cambodia continually pr<llests over [he ,Iui\ itll" Ill' \ il'[n'lnll.',e <qu.ut cr ,Ulli
smugglers along their horeh-r. The p(llitic,t1 "!lpl>siti(ln In Camh(ldia ,tIlcge' t!1;I[
Vicuuun has illegally encroached (In the border. 1[1 one high-Ilrollk Incid,'nt in .:'I)()l)
opposition leader Sam Rainsv and a gr(lull "I 'UPP"rll'I's Ilh\ 'ILally upr(l(lted ,11111
removed several border marker poles, In April .:'0I I. Cumbodi.: .uul ViL'lnal1\'lgned
a Memorandum of Undcr-tandi ng (Ill dcmarc.u iIlg the rcma I Illng area \II' the 1;lIld
boundarv before the end Ill' .:'011 (a deadline -incc L'v\L'mled to the end 01' .:'01.:'1.
Cambodia and Vietnam are in the prOI'L'" 01' IllaL'lng granitc m.ukcr-, ,tlllllg the
border.
Vietnam al,o experiences secmity challen:,'L" ,lion!, ii' m.uituuc bordcr-, \\ uh
ncighbouriup states. The-e include piraL'y, pO;IL'hlll:,' alld ,nlll),'gling. Vil.'tn;1111
conductsjoint nuval patrols \\ irh Thailand, i\lala\'I,1 and Ctilihotiiaill ,llldrL'" ihc-
ISSUCS,
Developing forces for internatiottal peacekeeping
For the past dec;lde and a hall' Vietnam ha' been mullinv \\ hcthcr Ill' no: [Il i()11I
international peacckccpuu; operations under th,' aUlhll['il\ 01 the \ nucd '>aIIOlls.
Vietnam has deterred making a couuniuucnt arguing ih.u It, Illrl'C' \\ere untr.uuc.l
Ior peacekeeping, did not h;l\ c <ulticicnt l'(lreig[l langu,lgL' lluenL'y. ,11ll1 puhl il
opinion opposed posting Vietnamese I'mces abro.ul. In private ViL'tn,1I11L'SL' ddenL'"
officials raise cuuccru-, th,lt involvement ill intcru.uiou.tl [11Ighl 111akl'
Vietnam the target I'm attack.
In 2011. Vietnam hnally decided to prepare a <mull IllrLe earmarked lor I\;
pc.icckccpiug. Special Iucilitic-, have been ,el lip .uu l armed forl'L" pcr-onncl ,I[C
currently undergoing language and other relevant Ir'llnln),'. The Lnu cd St,ltes and
Australia arc assisting Vietnam.
Carlyle A. Thayer. "Vicuuun: Hrnong cl Pll"l \I{1r1 .. 'I)L J//(/\('1" ("Oll\///flllli \
!hu'{gmllild Sl'I)Il'lllhl't [ I. Avuilublc . "",il"l.,o,,!.
l
~ 2 Security Outlook of the Asiu Pacific Countries and Its lmplicutions I'm the Defense Sector
Developing forces for international peacekeeping is a security challenge for Vietnam
because it extends the mission of the VPA from national defence to international
security. It is also a security challenge because the reputation of the VPA and its
military professionalism will be put on the line. If Vietnam makes a successful debut
it will have to contend with pressures to step up its contributions to international
security operations under the UN.
Implications for the Defence Sector
What arc the implications of the five security challenges outlined above for Vietnam's
defence sector'.' Ten implications are discussed below. It should be noted that many
of these implications are interrelated.
The first impl ication is funding. As Chart I indicates, real growth in defence spending
has not mirrored real growth in GDP since 2005. And as Chart 2 shows, defence
spending as a proportion of government expenditure has consistently declined
since 20 I I. There are signs. however. that Vietnam may be increasing its defence
expenditures." In November 2011. it was reported that Vietnam approved a defence
budget of U.S. 53.3 billion for 2012 of which U.S. $276 million was allocated for
the navy." The naval budget is projected to rise to U.S. $400 million by 2015.'" lt is
commonly estimated by analysts that Vietnam devotes one-fifth to one-quarter of its
defence budget to arms procurements.
vietn.un'< ()l'fcnl"C Minister. General Phung Quang Thanh. revealed that dclcnrc expenditure,
I'["()grammed [or 20 I0 rcprc-cntcd 2..';4 percent or GDP or fifty-two trillion dong (US. $2.(,6 billion).
lhi-, i"a hiuhcr ligurc than DIO c",tim<llc'I.
Trl'!or Mo". "Chme-- Aftershock.' fhe nil'/III""'. November 26. 2011.
/\gCllL'C l-runcc Pre--,c. "China u-n-ion.... \tdkl' Victn.uu naval .unbirion..... : The E('011011lic Times,
....uv cmbrr 14. 2()11
I
Chart 1: Growth in Defence Spending vs
o/e1
40
30
20
10
o
-10
-20
-30
-40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20C
Source' Australia. Defence Intelligence Organisation
Pacdlc (2010 261
Few analysts believe that Vietnam's officiallj
reality. Vietnam has not provided details on
Arms and equipment procurements with tl
involve counter trade in goods.
Military expenditure traditionally has been cl
has steadily declined as a percentage of GD
is how Vietnam will finance the procureme
the new military equipment, platforms and a
maintenance costs of the six Kilo-class subrr
l
1
nries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector
Vietnam's Security Outlook Xc'
.ekeeping is a security challenge for Vietnam
Chart 1: Growth in Defence Spending vs Growth in GOP (Annual % Change)
VPA from national defence to international
%
, because the reputation of the VPA and its
40
c::::::::J Real Grovvth.n DEfr;'lce ~ ~ f l e l , d l ' H l
the line. If Vietnam makes a successful debut
30
_ Real Growth .r- G[)p
to step up its contributions to international
20
10
ctor
o
rritychallenges outlined above for Vietnam's
scussed below. It should be noted that many
-10
-20
t I indicates, real growth in defence spending
-30
.ince 2005. And as Chart 2 shows. defence
lent expenditure has consistently declined
-40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
that Vietnam may be increasing its defence
as reported that Vietnam approved a defence
Source Australia,
Pacific 12010 26)
Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIOI, Defence Economic Trencfs In the ASIc/
which U.S. $276 million was allocated for
i to rise to U.S. $400 million by 2015."') It is
Few analysts believe that Vietnam's officially released defence budget reflects actual
etnam devotes one-fifth to one-quarter of its
reality. Vietnam has not provided details on what is included in its defence budget.
Arms and equipment procurements with the Russian Federation are reported to
involve counter trade in goods.
Military expenditure traditionally has been closely linked with economic growth and
has steadily declined as a percentage of GDP over the past decade. A key qucxtion
is how Vietnam will finance the procurement. maintenance and repair costs of all
the new military equipment. platforms and armaments it has acquired recently. The
maintenance costs of the six Kilo-class submarines are expected 10 be quite high.
19Quang Thanh. revealed that defence expenditures
JfGOP or fifty-two trillion dong (U.S $2.66 billion).
plomat, November 26. 201 I.
ike Vietnam naval ambitions," The Economic Times.
,q Sl'l'lI""1 l)lIll""K "I" lill' ,\",1 I',,,ilil' Counuie-, "1lL11" lmplicuuon-, Ior the I Jelen", Sl'l'lor
One pO"lhlc new <ourcc o! Iundinj: ari,e, from the development of commercial ship
repair luciliti,: at Cam Ranu Hav. " In ,2()()l) Viernams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
l)un12 announced th.u thc-.c laetillie' would be open to all countric. in \hc world,
In !\u12u,t 2() II, the United Slate, bcc.unc the lir,t country to avail itself of these
I'al'ilitll", The l'Si\S Ridllllil F, IIYnl called in for minor rcpuirx. Another U.S.
\lililar;. Scali lt Command ,hip II,,, rcporicdlv repaired at Cam Ranh Ray in 2011
hut no puhlicu . '.la, ,"ill'ntll II' I i-it.
Chart 2: Percentage or Government Spending on Defence
lVIOU. lor example. in Iact codified ani
pri nuui Iy a transparency measure, If Vii
worded De leuce Cooperation Agreements
major partners it will have to devote more
The third implication is that Vietnam l11US
technology transfers to maintain and repa
<ysrem-;
TIll' fourth implication i, that Vietnam rn
military alTair, to integrate its various sys:
) ~ 1
The filth implication is that Vietnam has
force, to opcral\' ctfcrtivclv in its maritir
Vicmum \\ ill need to develop doctrine I
modcruiscdjoinr Iorccs.
I, ~ : )
;()
The xixth implic.uion i, that Vietnam ma
army to make sal In12s '0 it can increase
Iorccs.
()
2UOO
\1 i I, ~ 11')1I: UII leUUn,.,:/(' Tre!J!is /,1] lilt! ASh] Pdc'dIC,
The ,econd impl icutiou i-, that Vicin.uu must devore more human and financial
rl',llurce, to inll'rtlational dckncc cooperation. So far Vietnam has broadened
convidcr.rbl v it, uucru.u ional ddl'llce coopcr.uion network. This has resulted in a
number llf mainl v vvmholi,. \IOl' a12rl'l'mcnl'. The recent Vicuuun-l 'uitcd Statc,
COIllJ1ll'llC il \ ~ ill 2()()l), \'Il'lllcllll dgrl'l'd III l'P1H.llll'l \ I )yagc repair" on L:,S, \;1iIi uuv Sl'a Lin
Conuu.md <h111" , l hc [lr"l 1\'P;111" \\.1" l'(l11Lltll'lL'l1 Oil ll1c LSNS ,\tI!<',f.!,lwrd in Ihl' port or Saigoll ill
')l'pklllhl'r ,2()()() .uul Illl' "l'l'(lIHl fl'llclll \\.1" l'lllldUl'll'd \111 Illl' USNS Rirhurd L Bvn! at Vall Phong Bay
111 \hrdl 2(111)
The seventh implication is that in order t
VPA might have to divest itself of prima
rrunsnuuonul is-.ucs bv transferring the]
Mini-urv of Public Security.
The cighth implication is that Vietnam w
Maritime Police (C(/lIiI Slit Bien) for enfon
The ninth implication is that Vietnam must i
of commercial cntcrpri-:r that do not co
,20()7, the Vietnam Couuuunist Party Cent
Ministry divest itsclf of commercial enterp
of the glohal economic and financial crisis.
,
l
ses from the development of commercial ship
2009 Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan
would be open 10 all countries in the world,
.arne the first country to avail itself of these
1 called in for minor repairs. Another U,S,
'portedly repaired at Cam Runh Ba\ in 20 I I
ivernment Spending on Defence
2005 2006 2001 2008 2009
.ato-. Defence EconOIT1i(
2010
rn must devote more human and financial
operation. So lur Vietnam has broadened
cooperation network. Thi- has resulted in a
cements. The recent Vietnam-United States
, conduct ""age repair' on LIS. Milir.u, Sea Lilt
ed on the US\lS Sa/,'guard in IIlL' poll ,,( Saigon ill
uctedon the l'SNS Richard E. 8m! at Vall Phong Bay
MOl!. for example. in raet codified acri\ ity that \\ ,', .rlrc:ul , undcrw.r, and wn-,
primarily a transparency measure. If Vietnam procced' tll move bcvond vat'ue/\
worded Defence Cooperation At'reements into more praetical arr.mucmcnr-, with it-,
major partners it will have to devote more re"HHH', to thi-, elTon
The third implication i-, that Vietnam nur-t modcrni-c u-, dcIcncc indu-n. to ah,mh
technology transfer' to maintain .uul repair new cqurpmcnt. platform' and \\l',qWII'
'yslenh.
The fourth Implication i, that Vietnam mu-: 'tep up the laddl'r or the revolution In
military affairs to irucur.uc its variou-, ,v,[em, to uuprov c their ,y nl'rt'\.
The lilth implication i-, that Vietnam l1a, to pUI m.uor elTorh iruo de\L'!oplnt' joint
I'orce, to operate elleetively in its rnarunuc domain and all' 'pacc. In ihi-, rc-pcct.
Vietnam will need to de\ clop doctrine to accompany the dc\ clopmcut ()r more
modernised joint force"
The <ixrh implication I' that Vietnam m,IV have ill reduce the ,ill' or ih ,tanding
armv to muke ,:1\ ings '0 it c.m iucrca: the ,ill' Id' u-, na\CIL air and air-dell-ncc
force"
The seventh implication I' th.u in order to lund ,I more proll'"ion:11 mi lit.irv. thL'
VPA might have to divest it-elf or primary re,[wn,ibility "01' border ,el'urit\ and
uunvn.uiouul i,sue, by transferring the Border Dcfcmc Command bach. to thl'
Mini-u, Ill' Public Sel'llrity.
The eighth implication is that Vietnam \\ ill h,l\l' 10 cxp.uu] the capabililiL" or ii'
Maritime Police tCanh Sol Bien) for enfon:ing ,tate juri-dicuon in Victn.unx ITZ.
The ninth implication i, that Vietnam mu-t re-run rhc prlln:" llrdi\e\lint' ii' milit.u,
of conunercial cntcrpriscx that do not couuiburc d i I L ' L ' 1 1 ~ 10 n.uionul -ccuritv, In
2007, the Vietnam Communist Party Central Commiucc direl'lcd ih.u the Dcfcncr
Ministry divest itself of cormucrciul enrerprisc- Thi. prol'e" -rallcd \\ uh the OJhl't
of thc global economic and rinuncial nisi"
________........-...-..... J
86 Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector
The tenth implication concerns the requirement to upgrade Vietnam's system of
professional military education and training (PME) to create an officer corps that
is proficient in dealing with modern technology and logistics management systems.
Vietnam': participation in overseas PME courses must be closely tailored to
Vietnam's needs.
Prospects for Regional Cooperation
Vietnam is a finn supporter of regional defence cooperation. It has initiated joint
patrols with neighbouring states to meet challenges to security in their maritime
domain. Vietnam joined with China and the Philippines in a Joint Maritime Seismic
Undertaking in the Spratly islands from 2005 until 2008 when the agreement lapsed.
Vietnam has also supported the development of multilateral approaches to regional
<ccurity through ASEAN-l'entric organisations.
East Asia's security architecture is in a state of Aux. There have been six major
developments that could facilitate regional defence cooperation in addressing
maritime security issues. These arc:
ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security
ADMM procevs
ADMM Plus process
ASEAN-China implementation of the Guidelines to Implement the DOC
Expansion of the East Asia Summit to include the United States and Russia
ASEAN Maritime Forum
In 200l) the ASEAN Regional Forum established the ISM on Maritime Security. The
..14th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting approved the Work Plan for the ISM on Maritime
Security in July 2011. \1 The Work Plan focuses mainly on information sharing,
capacity building. and training.
ASEAN lorum. "Dr,i11 Outline ol a Work Plan on Maritimc Security: A Template
lor Di-cu-vion." ARF ISM on vl.mtime Sccuruy, Auckland. March I. zoto. "Co-Chair,,"
S","m,,,) of the Third AR F lntcr-Scv.ional on Maritime Security. Tokvo. Japan. February 14
1:\ ,,,,d "-t-tlh A:\lIP:\lC1ISth ARF. lndone-iu Chair", Statement. IXth ASEAN Rcgiona!
l-orum. Juh 20[ J. B,t1I. Indtllk''-,1;L'' Pnllll-l-l.
In May 2006, ASEAN Defence Ministei
process of institutionalising defence coope
a subordinate ASEAN Defence Senior Of
in turn oversees a structure involving ASEJ
heads of intelligence. The ASEAN Defenc
Political Security Council established und
in 2011. it was agreed that ASEAN navies
boundaries. As noted above with respect
practical activities to address security chall
At the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plu
the establishment of five Expert Working
assistance and disaster relief. counter-te
military medicine. Each group is to be co
member. The terms of reference for these
in October 20 II. The Expert Working Grc
ADMM Plus Senior Officials Meeting. PI
likely to remain slow because the 2nd AD
2013. It is possible, however, that ADMN
basis thereafter. In the meantime,
expert working groups and make recornrner
In July 2011. China and ASEAN member,
the DOC. They set up the ASEAN-China JI
Guidelines. China held the first meeting ir
promise that confidence-building measures
adopted and implemented. In November 20]
Officials began discussions on what activiti
Conduct for the South China Sea. Once agre
presented to China "to determine what. whe
carried out." according to an Indonesian offi
i::' "ASEAN ready to di ..... cu-,-,continuation of doc wit
ntries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector
to upgrade Vietnam's system of
lining (PME) to create an officer corps that
.hnology and logistics management systems.
PME courses must be closely tailored to
ation
II defence cooperation. lt has initiated joint
eet challenges to security in their maritime
I the Philippines in a Joint Maritime Seismic
2005 until 200Rwhen the agreement lapsed.
pment of multilateral approaches to regional
isations.
a state of flux. There have been six major
gional defence cooperation in addressing
.ional Meeting (ISM) on Mar itirne Security
he Guidelines to Implement the DOC
to include the United States and Russia
tablishedthe ISM on Maritime Security. The
wed the Work Plan for the ISM on Maritime
an focuses mainly on information sharing.
of a Work Plan on Maritime Security: A Template
ecurity. Alickianu. March 29-31. 20 I0: "Co-Chairs'
ing on Maritime Security. Tokyo. Japan. February 14
iesia 20 II. Chair's Statement. I Rth ASEAN Regional
In May 2006, ASEAN Defence Ministers met for the Iirvt time and began the
process of institutionalising defence cooperation on a regional basis. They approved
a subordinate ASEAN Defence Senior Officials Meeting (ADSOM). The ADSOM
in turn oversees a structure involving ASEAN service chiefs (army, navy and air) and
heads of intelligence. The ASEAN Defence Ministers now form part of the ASEAN
Political Security Council established under ASEAN's Charter. At the 5th ADMM
in 20 II, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their manumc
boundaries. As noted above with respect to the ASEAI\ navy chiefs. progress on
practical activities to address security challenges is at a nascent stage.
At the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus in October 20 I0, the minister, appro\ cd
the establishment of five Expert Working Groups: maritime security, humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations. and
military medicine. Each group is to be co-chaired oy an ASEAN and non-ASEAI\
member. The terms of reference for these Expert Working Groups were approved
in October 2011. The Expert Working Groups will report their deliberations to the
ADMM Plus Senior Officials Meeting. Progress on addressing security issues is
likely to remain slow because the 2nd ADMM Plus meeting is not scheduled until
20[3. It is possible, however, that ADMM Plus ministers will meet on an annual
basis thereafter. In the meantime, ADSOM Plus may review proposals from the
expert working groups and make recommendations to the defence minister.
In July 20 [ l , China and ASEAN member states adopted Guidelines to Implement
the DOC. They set up the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group to Implement these
Guidelines. China held the first meeting in January 2012. This process holds the
promise that confidence-building measures included in the 20()2 DOC may nov, he
adopted and implemented. In November 20 II, in a separate prol'ess, ASEA!'si Senior
Officials began discussion on what nctivitic and projects to include ill a Code 01
Conduct for the South China Sea. Once is reached. the draft COC will be
presented to China "to determine what. when. where and how the project would be
carried out," according to an Indonesian official. ,0
" "ASEAN rcadv 10 disct", cominn.uion 01 doc with China." .1/11(//'(/. :\mclllhcr 1-1.
L
sx Sccuruv Outloo], 01 IhL' /\"a 1';IlIIIL ('oUIlIIIL" .uid [I, lmplic.uion-, lor the Dclcn-, SL'Clor
In 20 I0 ASEAf'; extnhlishcd the ;\SEAN Maritime Forum (AlVlF) under the terms of
the ,1.SI:AN Politico I Securitv Connnunitv (APSC) B//I('fIrint ," The second meeting
of the AMI-- was held in Thailand in August 20 II and proposed expanding it>
mcmhcrvhip to include dialogue partners in a separate meeting (or AMF Plus), The
A:V1I-- is focused Oil a comprehensive approach to maritime issues and has so far not
dealt with South China SL'a is-.uc-, in detail.':'
III 2011 the I:ast Asia Summit met with an expanded membership including the
l'nited States and the Russian Federation, At the EAS informal leaders' retreat
sixteen of the eighteen leaders r.uscd maritime security issue. China was the only
dissL'nting voice arguing that the EAS was nut an appropriate venue, Nevertheless
Indonesia, as ASEAN Chair. noted that maruime security had now been put on the
agenda,
Each of these six multilateral arrangements holds the promise of contrihuting to
regional security cooperation. There is an obvious overlap in their areas of concern
and rcxpon-ihi litv. A major step forward in regional cooperation could he made if
government leaders could agree that the EAS should he the peak body to oversee
regional security cooperation. The next step would he for government leaders to
instruct their defence and foreign ministers to propose ways to streamline the work
programs of these various subordinate bodie-, to maximise their effectiveness with
a view to ensuring the timclv !low of poliL'y advice to senior officials prior to the
convening 01 the East Asian Summit. Vietnam can he expected to playa proactive
role in all of these proccxsc-.
"HanOI 1'1,," 01 Action 10 lmplcrucnt II'e ASlA:\ Regioll,,1 Forum Vixion Suucmcnt." May 20,
21110, I'olnl ,\,
"CI"lir', SlalL'll1elllOllhL' 1'Jlh ,\SI;,\:" SuIl1Il1 it. Hali, November 17,201 I," Point, 1-l-171 Maruimc
('uupL'ratioll J.
J
CHAPTER 7
Myanmar's Security Outlook,
Services
Tin Maung Maung Thall
Introduction: Elected civilian govei
politics
There were expressions of disappoinrmem
the West and opposition groups that viewer
under the auspices of the ruling State Peat
as neither free nor fair as well as lacking in
manipulated in favour of the Union Solidari
was transformed from the military-sponsor,
Organization, led by former prime minister
boyc. ltt of National League for Democracy (I
election and whose leader Nobel laureate C
house arrest had refused to re-register for COl
unfair election laws tarnished the victory of I
By winning over 79 percent of the contestee
Assembly or lower house of parliament) al
Hluuaw (National Assemhly or upper house
substantially (majority party in all seven stat
level. the USDP was in a position to form
respective Region/State Governments, Thou
General Than Shwc and the Vice Chairman v
con test the elections there were persistent rum
in the USDP or that the new government that'
the first Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Assemb
comprising the Pyithu Hluttaw and the Amyo
Thi-, WJ,' bccnu-,e the President and Vice Presi
rcprescmauve, aL'nlfding to the 200S Constitution (CI
Union 0[' Mvunmari.
rntries and It> Implications for the Defense Sector
t gained greater confidence of its deterrence
nent. As the 3.11 earthquake and tsunami
ditional security issues. such as terrorism and
IS important security agenda items. It will be
ecurity outlook becomes even more complex
mestic elections and leadership changes will
uries.
'apanese defense should be more active and
Idthat Japan should become a great power in
ling up its defense forces and abandoning its
I" 9 of the Constitution. Rather. it is argued
lefense and regional and global security even
economic situations. In fact. the increased
rla has already provided greater momentum
s. which share common stakes in the stability
ational interests. By taking advantage of this
egional and global security issues with other
before. Doing so would not only improve
ntribute to thc regional and global security
CONTRIBUTQg(in chapter order)
Rizal Sukma (Chapter II is Executive Director at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS I, Jakarta. He is also Chairman of International Relations.
Muharnmudiyah Central Executive Board. He has worked cxtcnvivcly Oil Southeast
Asia's security issues. ASEAN. lndoncsias defense and foreign policy. military
reform. Islam and politics. and domestic political changes in lndoncxia. He received
a Ph. D. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSEl. London. in 1997. He has served as a member \)1 National
Committee on Strategic Defense Review at the Ministry of Defense. the Republic
of Indonesia. and a member of National Drafting Committee for National Defense
Bill (2000-2001) and the Armed Forces Bill (2002-200.'\). His publications include:
Sccuritv Operations in Acclr: Goals. Consequences. and Lessons (Washington. DC:
East-West Center. 2(04): 1.1'10111 in Indonesia's hilFign Polin' (London: Routledge.
200.'\): and lndoncsia OI/(l China: The Politics oro Troublrc! Nclationshiji (London:
Routledge. 1999).
Tang Siew MUll (Chapter 2) is Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies at
the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS). Malaysia. Prior to joining
ISIS. he was a Senior Lecturer at Universiti Kcbangsann Malavsia. His primary
research interest is East Asia security and Japan's Ioreign relations. He holds a Ph.D.
(2004) from Arizona State University in Political Science. He is a member 01 the
International Studies Association and the Malaysian SOCial Science Association
(PSSM). He also serves on the Executive Committee of the Malaysian .lupanc-:
Studies Association. Additionally. he is a regular guest speaker at the Institute of
Diplomacy and Foreign Relations. He has contributed to numerous book charters.
in addition to national and international journals.
Herman Joseph S. Kraft (Chapter .'\) is an Associate Professor at the Department
of Political Science at the University of the Philippines where he teaches courses in
International Relations and Comparative Politics. He has worked on and publi-hcd
articles and book chapters on regional security and security Issues involving the
Philippines and Southeast Asia. His recent publications include: "Human Security in
Southeast Asia: Changing Security Norms in ASEAN'r' in Chantana Banpusirichote.
Philippe Doneys, Mike Hayes. and Chandan Sengupta. eds. Mainstrcuming Human
Security: Asian Perspectives, Bangkok. Thailand: Chula Global Network. 2012.
pp, 16-29: and "Driving East Asian Regionalism: the Reconstruction of ASEAN's
I~ ( l Sccurity Outlook oj rhc :\\1<\ Pacific Coumric-, 'IIlJ Its Implications lor the Defense Sector
Identity." in Rail' Emmers. cd. ASt'AN (/1/(1 the tnstinuionaliiution of' East Asiu,
Boulder: Routledge. 2012. pp, 61-7-1,
Lam Peng Er (Chapter -I) is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute,
Nationul Univcr-.itv of Singapore, He was a Visiting Fellow at N[DS in December
200l) - March 2010, He obtained his PhD, from Columbia University. His latest
hook is titled .l11/hlll'\ Pccuc-buildins; Diplotnacv ill Asia: Seekillg (/ more cutivc
polincul tolc (New York and London: Routledge, 200l)).
Thitinau Pougsudhirak (Charter 5) is Director of the Institute of Security and
lntcrnationnl Studies IISIS I ami Associate Professor of lutcmational Political
Economy at the Faculty of Political Science. Chulalongkorn University, Ht' has
authored a host of articles. books and book chapters on Thai politics. political
economy. forl'ign policy, and media as well as ASEAN and East Asian security and
economic cooperation. His award-winning PhD was taken at the London School of
Economics. A frequent analyst in the international media, his recent publications
include: "Thailand's Uneasy Passage." Iournul otDemocrcu:v, April-June 2()12:
"Thai land" in Ann Capl ing and Patrick Low (cdx), Governments. Non-Stine
.srtor, atul Trude Policv-Muking, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2010 "Between Continuity and Change: Thailand's Topsy-Turvy Foreign Policy
Directions" in Globa! Asia, He serves on the editorial boards of several academic
journals and has held visiting positions at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies and Stanford University,
Carlyle A. Thayer (Chapter 6) is Emeritus Professor, The University of New South
Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA). Canberra, He holds
degrees from Brown, Yale and The Australian National University, Thayer first
taught at The Royal Mil irary Collcgc-Duntroon (1979-X5) before transferring to
ADFA, He has also held senior appointments at the Axia-Pacilic Center for Security
Studies, LJ ,S, Pacific Command ( Il)l)l)-O I): Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
at the Australian Defence College (2002-04): and the Australian Command and
Stall College (2006-07 and 20 I0), He was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished
Visiting Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University in 2005 and the Inaugural Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor
at Ohio University in 200X, He is the author of over 4S0 puhlicarions including:
Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Coop
Development and Modernization (2009), ,
Doi Moi ( 199-1),
Till Maung Maung Than (Chapter 7). a ~
lcllow at the Institute of Southeast Asian S
member of its Regional Strategic and Politi'
in nuclear physics from the Rangoon Art:
diploma in economic planning from the R
as a Ph,D, in politics from the School afar
London, Currently, he is a member of the In
(London) and the Association for Asian SI
Dominance ill M\'(/11II/a1': The Political Ec
ISEAS, 20(7) and "Mvanmars 20 10Eleetio
Asian Ajjilirs 20 II (Singapore: [SEAS, 20ll
economy of development. democratization,
countries, human security, nuclear prolifera
Mashbat Otgonbayar Sarlagtay (Chapter 8
of the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS).
National University of Mongolia in 1998, 2
in Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
fifteen year long service in the ISS, he has SI
Committee of National Security and For
in 19\)6-1l)98. Mr. Otgonhayar has specializ
has worked in different fields of national!
from PKO problems to Korean Peninsula
in drafting the current National Security
parliament in 20 IO.
Satu P. Limaye (Chapter 9) is Director, I
Senior Advisor at the Center for Naval All
member at the Institute for Defense Analy
director of research and publications at the,
(APCSS). a direct reporting unit to Unite'
intriesand Its Implicauons I'(\r the Defcn-c Sector
Vand the Institutionalircnion oj' East Asia,
Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute.
lias a Visiting Fellow at NIDS in December
lh,D, from Columbia University. His latest
Diploinacv in Asia: Seeking a tnor active
,outledge.2009).
s Director of the Institute of Security and
ociate Professor of International Political
icience. Chulalongkorn University, He has
i book chapters on Thai politics. political
well as ASEAN and East Asian security and
ing PhD was taken at the London School of
international media, his recent publications
, Journal of Democracy. April-June 20 I 2:
rick Low (eds), Governments. Non-State
ibridge. UK: Cambridge University Press,
:e: Thailand's Topsy-Turvy Foreign Policy
on the editorial boards of several academic
IS at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
ersity,
tus Professor. The University of New South
e Academy (ADFAl. Canberra. He holds
ustralian National University. Thayer first
Duntroon (1979-SS) before transferring to
nents at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
I): Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies
02-04): and the Australian Command and
liasappointed the C. V Starr Distinguished
needInternational Studies at Johns Hopkins
1 Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor
author of over 4S0 publications including:
Southeast Asiu: Patterns of Security Cooperation (20 IOJ. Vietnam People" s Armv:
Development and Modernization (2009). ami The Vietnam People's Army Undc:
Doi Moi ( 1994).
Till Maung Mauttg Than (Chapter 7). a Myanmar nuuonul. i-, a Senior Research
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Siudic-, (ISEAS) Singapore where he i"1
member or its Regional Strategic and Political Stud ic-, Programme. Ill' h.r-, a Masrcr-,
in nuclear physics from the Rangoon Arts & Scicncc Uni\crsity and a gruduat
diploma in economic planning from the Rangoon ln-rituu: (11' Economics. as well
as a Ph.D, in politics Irom the School 01' Oriental ami African Studic-, l:ni\L'I"sit: 01
London. Currently. he is a member of the International Institute for Stratcgic Siudic-,
(London) and the Association for Asian Studic-, It 'SAl. Hc is the author 0\' Stou
Dominance in MY(/IIl11ar: The Politic! CCOIIOIIl\ olLttclustrialit.ation
ISEAS. 2(07) and" Myanmar's 20 I0 Elect ions. Continui ty and Change." in Soutlu- II
AS;l/nA.tlilirs :'.011 (Siugaporc: ISEAS. 2(11). Hi- rcscurch intcrc-ts Include: politicu]
economy of development. dcmocruuzation and civiluriliuuv relation, in developing
countries. human security. nuclear proliferation. Myanmar p(llilic, and economics,
Mashbat Otgonbayar Sarlagtay (Chapter S) is Vice Director and Dean III Rc-carcl:
of the Institute for Strutcgic Studies (ISS), He has made his LL.M in Law School.
National University of Mongolia in 1995. and his MA in National Security Affuir-,
in Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. California. USA. in 2007, Prior to hi,
fifteen year long service in the ISS. he has served a, an Aid to Chairman of Standing
Committee of National Security and Foreign Affairs. Parliamcut of Mongolia
in19Y6-199S, Mr. Otgoubayar has specialized ill Tibetan Affair, in China although
has worked in different fields of national security concerns of Mongulia. ranging
from PKO problems to Korean Peninsula problems. He has taken an active part
in drafting the current National Security Concept of Mongolia adopted by the
parliament in 20 IO.
Satu P. Limaye (Chapter 9) is Director. EastWc-! Center in Washington and .1
Senior Advisor at the Center for Naval Analyses (C:--JA), He wa a research ,talT
member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), From 1995 to 200.'i he was
director of research and publications at the Asia-Pacific Center for Sel"lIrity Studic-,
(APCSS), a direct reporting unit to United States Pacific Command Dr. Limayc
I~ ~ Sccuritv Outlook 01" the A,ia Pacific Coumrics and Ib lmplicurion-, lor the Defense Sector
received hi, Ph.D, in international relations from Oxford Univerxity (Magdalen
College) where he was a Marshall Scholar. He graduated IIIUgllU CUIII laude and Phi
Beta Kapi. from Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. In addition
to hi-, Institutional leadership. management. programmatic and lundraiving duties,
Dr. Limayc regularly write, and edits hooks, chapters, and articles. A recent work is
"America' Rclatiou-, with Southeast Asia: Constraints and Promise," Contetnporarv
\011/1/1'(/11 Asia, Vol. 32, No. .'I, December 20 I0 the lead article of a special cover
is-.uc that he conceived and commissioned entitled Americu Re-engages Southenst
.\.1 ia.
Ryo A.I'al1o (Chapter 10) i, a Professor of Doshixha University, Japan. His research
interest> include China', security policy. foreign policy. and IR theory, Recent
publication-, of Prof. Asuno include: China '.1 Expanding Militarv Power (Tokyo:
Koyo-Shoho. 2(12), Chinu" Militarv Force (Tokyo: lwanami-Shoten. 20 II J. and
Cliinas Mil itarv P(!Her!Tokyo: Sodo-Sha, 2(09),
Tomohiko Satake (Chnpter II) IS a Fellow at the National Institute for Defense
Studies (N IOS) located In Tokyo. He specializes in alliance studies, Asia-Pacific
,ccurity, and Japanese securuy policies. He earned B.A. and M.A. from Kcio
Lnivcrvity, and PhD in international relations [rom the Australian National
Univervity. His publication includes: "Japan. Australia and International Security
Burden-sharing with the United States," in William Tow and Rikki Kersten (cds).
Bilateral l'crspcctivi: on Regional Sccuritv: Australia. Japan and the Asia-paci]i
Region (Palgruvc Macmillan, 2(12); 'The Origin of Trilatcralism? The US-Japan
Australia Security Relations during the 1990s," The tnternational Relations of the
,\.,ia-Pacific, Vol. II. No. I. 201\: and "Japan's Nuclear Policy: Between Non
nuclear Identity and US Extended Deterrence:' Austral Polin' Forum. 09 12-A (May
2(09).