Physica A 390 (2011) 42274235

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Physica A
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/physa

The coevolutionary ultimatum game on different network topologies

Lili Deng, Wansheng Tang , Jianxiong Zhang
Institute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China

article

info

abstract
In this paper, a model of ultimatum game is discussed from the coevolutionary perspective, where strategy dynamics and structure dynamics coexist. The interplay between structure dynamics and strategy dynamics leads to overwhelmingly interesting evolved topology and fairness behaviors. It is found that fair division emerges for specific ratios of structure updating probability to strategy updating probability. Furthermore, it is shown that the initial structures have no essentially different effect on the coevolutionary results. In particular, the results for strategy are almost similar whenever the initial structure is set to be the nearest-neighbor coupled network, the ER random network or the scalefree network. Besides, the effects of other spatial factors are also investigated, e.g. the population size has a positive influence on the offer, while the average degree has a negative effect. In addition, one extrinsic factor, the background payoff, is also of great importance in promoting fair divisions. Apart from above, we study the properties of the evolved networks, which have the small-world effect and positive assortative behaviors. 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Article history: Received 23 March 2011 Received in revised form 8 June 2011 Available online 7 July 2011 Keywords: Ultimatum game Coevolutionary dynamics Small-world effect Complex networks

1. Introduction In practice, activities such as hunting, defending territory, cooperative supply chain, etc., are more efficient and profitable when people collaborate than they do alone [1]. It is well known that such cooperative activities can be promoted by fair divisions of the earnings or the excess resources. Such phenomena are studied as an ultimatum game in an evolutionary context [24]. In an ultimatum game, two players are required to divide a sum of the excess resources. They are designated the role of either proposer or responder. The proposer suggests how to divide the resources, and the responder can then accept or reject the offer. If the proposers offer is accepted, the resources will be shared as proposed. Otherwise, the rejection of the division leaves both sides nothing [5]. The rational strategy claimed by the classical game theory is for the proposer to offer the smallest possible positive resources and for the responder to accept. However, in real-life circumstances, people do not behave so rationally, and instead the majority of proposers offer 40 to 50% of the total sum, and about half of all responders reject offers below 30% [24]. A question has arisen naturally: why and how do these differences between rational behavior and the observed human behaviors happen? One possible explanation is on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The emergences of fairness behaviors have been investigated in terms of evolutionary ultimatum games. One of the prime works was proposed by Page and Nowak [6], where a generalized adaptive dynamics framework was adopted to describe the evolutionary ultimatum game, and in different cases it deduced rational solutions and fairness mathematically. Page and Nowak [7] provided an empathy adaptive dynamics which could lead to the evolution of fairness, and further gave the ways to empathy. With a payoff-oriented adaptive mechanism, Duan and Stanley [8] also revealed the emergence of fairness even for the zero-intelligence agents. In order to achieve fair division, costly punishments are of great importance. Li and Cao [9] asserted that the emergence of costly punishment in the evolutionary ultimatum game is determined by the corresponding largest Laplacian eigenvalue

Corresponding author. E-mail address: tang@tju.edu.cn (W. Tang).

0378-4371/$ see front matter 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.06.076

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of the network, and the analytical findings were supported by numerical simulations. From reputation perspective, Nowak et al. [10] pointed out that some information on the co-players past actions can lead to the prevalence of fair divisions. Another explanation is based on the idea that a substantial proportion of agents maximize a subjective fitness function different from the payoff [1113]. From this viewpoint, the fitness is postulated as: fitness = payoff in the game + background payoff outside the game. The background payoff reflects the original payoff values of players before they join into the game system. McNamara et al. [14] first introduced the background fitness contribution in evolutionary model and highlighted its importance in the evolution of cooperation. Motivated by these findings, in this paper we also take the background payoff into consideration and find that the background payoff can promote fair offers. Thirdly, there are many studies trying to explain the emergence of fairness from the topology perspective. The effects of topologies on the evolutionary ultimatum game have been explored in the last decade. Page et al. [5] first compared the strategy of ultimate game in random encounters with that of the spatial cases, and presented that the spatial structure could promote the emergence of fairness. Kuperman and Gusman [15] considered the effect of complex network structure, especially the clustering coefficient, on the evolutionary ultimatum game. Sinatra et al. [16] and Bo and Yang [17] also discussed the emergence of fairness in the different settings and network topologies. Studies above focused considerable attentions on the fixed networks. In our simulations, the three different topologies are taken as the initial structures for comparisons. Last but not least, recent advances of coevolutionary rules and adaptive networks, for details see Reviews [18,19], offer new ways of understanding cooperative behaviors in realistic situations. Actually, the interaction networks evolve in time as well as the strategies, and indeed many other factors in turn affect back the outcome of the evolution of strategies. The observation above triggered studies where the network structure may coevolve with the evolutionary game dynamics [2023]. Interestingly, as pointed out in Refs. [1921], it is the interplay of both the individual strategy and network structure evolution that facilitates the promotion of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. Therefore, to well understand the emergence of fairness (cooperative-like) behaviors in the ultimatum game, it is a sound idea to combine strategy evolution with topological evolution. In the light of above considerations, this paper presents the results of ultimatum games and structures under the coevolutionary environments where strategy dynamics and structure dynamics simultaneously interplay with each other. The introduction of coevolutionary dynamics to evolutionary games implies that, besides the evolution of strategies, the topology where players locate is also subject to evolution, i.e., players can replace their old neighbors with new ones under specific rules. In this case, we explore the coevolutionary ultimatum games by simulation and our experimental study produces some interesting findings. It is quite plausible that the combination of structure updating and strategy updating shows the great fostering of fairness behaviors. In particular, the ratio of structure updating probability and strategy updating probability has a prime influence on the strategy. Furthermore, it is found that the initial topology has no essential influence on the coevolutionary results. Subsequently, the effects of the population size, the average degree and the background payoff are investigated by extensive numerical simulations. In addition, the evolved networks are also studied, which show many features of real social ones, such as the small-world effect and positive assortative behaviors. The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a detailed model for ultimatum game with coevolutionary dynamics. Section 3 provides the simulation results and discussions. Finally our conclusions are drawn in Section 4. 2. The model description and simulation setting In the standard version of the ultimatum game aforementioned, the total sum of the excess resources divided by the two players is set to be 1. Consider the strategy S = (p, q), where p is the offer given to the other player when acting as the proposer and q represents the minimum acceptance level as the responder. Suppose player i with strategy Si = (pi , qi ) interacts with player j with strategy Sj = (pj , qj ). The corresponding payoff for the player i in the interaction (two rounds are included, both as a proposer and a responder once), denoted by U (Si , Sj ), is as follows

1 pi + pj , 1 pi , U (Si , Sj ) = pj , 0,
which is also described as

pi pi pi pi

qj , pj qj , pj < qj , pj < qj , pj

qi < qi qi < qi ,
(1)

U (Si , Sj ) = (1 pi )I(pi qj ) + pj I(pj qi )

where I() is the indicator function, taking value 1 if its argument is true and 0 if it is false. Our model begins with a network with N nodes, where each node represents a player and the link represents the interaction between the two players. Initially, players strategy parameters p and q are set to be distributed uniformly in the range [0, 0.5]. The coevolutionary dynamics proceed as follows. (1) Payoff update: in every generation, player i plays with his each neighbor j (j Ni , which represents the set of player is entire neighbors) with equal probability as the proposer or responder, and the payoff for player i in this interaction can be obtained from Eq. (1). Then the corresponding payoff for player i in all the interactions in generation t, denoted by Ui (t ),

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is jNi U (Si (t ), Sj (t )), where Si (t ) = (pi (t ), qi (t )) and Sj (t ) = (pj (t ), qj (t )) denote the strategies adopted by players i and j in t-th generation respectively. At the end of each generation, payoff is updated. (2) Strategy dynamics: during the simulation process, the players modify their strategies independently of each other and with the same strategy updating rate. The number of offsprings left by an individual is proportional to the individuals total fitness, consisting of the payoff in the game and a positive constant W , where W is defined as the background payoff and represents the contribution to fitness that obtained outside the game [14]. In other words, player i will adopt the strategy of its randomly selecting one h (h (Ni {i})) with probability

Pr(Si Sh ) =

Uh (t ) + W Ui (t ) + W +

jNi

(Uj (t ) + W )

(2)

Here it is assumed that players can observe their own payoffs as well as their neighbors payoffs and strategies. Players are postulated to use one strategy with respect to their entire neighborhood. Further we suppose that strategy updating is subject to some mutation, that is, with a small probability , the offsprings adopt the strategy of their parents plus or minus some small random error within an interval size . It has been indicted in Ref. [5] that a larger mutation error leads to larger p and q. To focus on studying the effects of other factors, in our simulation, the mutation rate is set to be 0.1 with an interval size = 0.001. (3) Link adaptation: like the strategy dynamics, the structure updating is also adopted, but the probability of structure updating is r (r > 0) times of the strategy updating rate. For fixed 0 < r < 1, the strategy updating rate is determined in the range [0.1, 0.5], and when r 1, the structure updating rate is chosen from the range [0.1, 0.5], then the other is also determined in the simulation. A higher r implies relatively more chances for the players to change their linking partners compared with the updating of strategy. Each player updates his neighbors in accordance with the payoff he gains from them in the present generation. Players always try to terminate a relationship before attempting to create a new one. In particular, a player will break his link with the neighbor from whom he obtains the least payoff, then the broken link is reconnected to any one of the non-neighbors in random. Furthermore, if the average payoff gained by a player is approximately equal to that of his neighbors, in particular, the strategy adopted by every one is almost the same, no links will be rewired. During this process, we impose that the number of the total links is fixed, i.e., in a constrained resource environment, there are limited possibilities of network configurations instead of the globally coupled networks. 3. Simulation results and discussions In our simulation, the interplay between network structure dynamics and game strategy updating is implemented as follows:

Step 1: Strategy revision opportunities arrive asynchronously for the players. Each player plays the ultimatum game with
its current neighbors and updates the payoff obtained. Players stochastically update their strategies according to Eq. (2) with probability pg at the end of each generation. Step 2: The evolution of structure also uses asynchronous updating mechanism. At the end of each generation, players stochastically rewire their neighbors as aforementioned with probability rpg . Step 3: Repeat the above two steps until the population with almost the same strategy, or stop repeating the above two steps 2000 generations. We have performed the simulations starting from the three different network topologies, the nearest-neighbor coupled network, the ER random network and the scale-free network, with various population size N and average neighborhood size d (average degree). In our current simulations, the nearest-neighbor coupled network consists of N nodes on a ring, joined to their first d/2 neighbors to each side. The adopted ErdsRnyi random graph model [24] is G(N , pr ) model, which is constructed by connecting nodes randomly. Each edge is included in the graph with probability pr independent from every other edge. The third topology is the scale-free networks of Barabsi and Albert (BA) [25], starting from a globally coupled network with m0 = d/2 + 1 nodes, and at every time step a new node is added with m = d/2 edges that link the new node to the different nodes already present in the system. We carry out 30 independent simulations for specific parameters N , d, r and W . Each value presented in the following figures is obtained by averaging over these 30 different simulations. 3.1. Results for the evolution of strategy Firstly, we consider the impact of the ratio r onto the results of evolutionary ultimatum game. Since the parameter r characterizes the ratio of structure updating to strategy updating, a larger r implies that agents will have more chances to adaptively adjust their linking partners. The role of the parameter r in determining the fairness behaviors at steady state is first examined. From Fig. 1(a), it can be seen that the values of average offer p are increasing dramatically when r grows from 0.1 to about 3, but p slightly decreases when r still grows from 3 until 10. It is concluded that, at least for a certain range of r, the ratios of structure updating to strategy updating have obviously positive effects on the offer.

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Fig. 1. The average outcomes of p and q in the ultimatum games affected by the population size N and relative ratio r with initial nearest-neighbor coupled network and specific average degree 10.

Table 1 Results without structure evolving for fixed N = 1000 and d = 10. Structure NN ES p 0.427292 0.132651 q 0.418158 0.118789

As shown in Fig. 1(b), the value of average acceptance level q shows a stochastic feature, but compared with Fig. 1(a), it is obviously lower than the offer p, which itself reveals that almost all acceptances occur in the ultimatum game. It seems that it is the structure updating that exerts fairness behaviors in terms of offer, which is the essential determinant in the game. In the sequel, we aim to examine and explain the effect of structure evolution on the evolution of strategy, i.e., the effect of parameter r. For comparison, we now present results in Table 1 for fixed r = 0, i.e., with the static structure topologies: NN (nearestneighbor coupled network) and ES (evolved structure in our simulation). As shown in Table 1, both p and q on the static nearest-neighbor coupled network are quite higher than those on the evolved network. It is interesting that while the network structures are changing, higher levels of offer are attained, but the same evolved network structure alone does not promote fairness behavior as a static network. However with the aid of structure updating, i.e., when r > 0, offers in Fig. 1 in our paper are higher than those in Table 2 in Ref. [5] even with respect to the case of nearest-neighbor coupled network, under the same population size N and degree d. Albeit if the evolved networks are taken to be static, the results of strategy, especially the offer, have no advantages over the static nearest-neighbor coupled networks. The coevolutionary structures provide quite better results than the static nearest-neighbor coupled networks. It is thus implied that the combination of structure updating and strategy updating facilitates fairness behaviors. To explain the effect of r, we first recall that in the so-called minigame [10] with only two possible offers h and l (high and low), with 0 l < h 1/2, there are four different strategies S1 = (l, l), S2 = (h, l), S3 = (h, h), and S4 = (l, h). By employing the replicator equation [26], one knows that evolution will always lead to a population that consists entirely of S1 players. However, after introducing the chances of link adaptations, i.e., r > 0, one can break the interaction with whom he obtains the least payoff. Thus strategies S1 and S4 are easily subject to elimination, in respect that their offers l are lower than others minimum acceptance level h. At the same time, if one adopts the strategy S2 = (h, l) or S3 = (h, h), his initial neighbors will not break the interaction with him, and others who have the right to rewire interactions, may be willing to create a connection with him. Therefore, the player with this strategy is more likely to have more neighbors, at least locally, and with strategy updating, this person can bring more people to adopt such a popular strategy. On the other

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Fig. 2. The average results of p and q in the ultimatum games for varied degrees with fixed N = 1000 and r = 1.

hand, in consideration of the payoff of his/her own in such coevolutionary dynamics, a player with strategy S2 = (h, l) can receive more than S3 (h, h), since others offer may be l. Furthermore, consider the best response to a population whose strategies are randomly distributed. According to payoff (1), we can give the expected payoff for a player using strategy S = (p, q) against with other players whose strategies S = (x, y) are uniformly distributed in [0, 1/2] [0, 1/2] as E [U (S , S )] =

1/2

1/2

[(1 p)I(py) + xI(xq) ]f (x, y)dxdy (1 p)I(py) dxdy + 4

0 1/2

=4
0

1/2 0 1/2

1/2

1/2

1/2

xI(xq) dxdy

=2
0

(1 p)I(py) dy + 2
1

xI(xq) dx (3)

= 2p(1 p) q2 + ,
4

where f (x, y) denotes the joint probability density function of the offer and the minimum acceptance level. It follows from Eq. (3) that the average payoff is thus maximized by (p, q) = (1/2, 0). And our simulation results in Fig. 1 to some extent confirm this. Typically, one is interested in the effect of different population size. Fig. 1 displays that the average level of strategy as a function of r for different population sizes with initial nearest-neighbor coupled networks whose average neighborhood size d = 10. When the population size is small (N = 100), the average value of p is quite small, but the average offer p rises obviously when the population size N grows until around N = 1000. Thus, the choice of N = 1000 seems sufficiently high to capture the behavior of large populations [22]. Therefore, we can conclude that the values of average offer in very large evolving networks appears to be higher with respect to the population size; that is, high levels of fairness behaviors actually appear to be benefited from increasing population size. In the remainder of this paper, we only use N = 1000 during our simulations unless explicitly stated herein Fig. 1. Fig. 2 illustrates the influence of the average degree d on the final steady strategy with fixed N = 1000 and the relative ratio r = 1. The three different initial structures set to be ER random network, nearest-neighbor coupled network and scale-free network (ER, NN and SF are the abbreviations of ER random network, nearest-neighbor coupled network and scale-free network, respectively) generate almost the same results. Although it is known that both p and q on the static nearest-neighbor coupled network are quite higher than those on other topologies including the evolved network. But with the aid of structure updating, results on initial ER random networks and scale-free networks have almost the same results with the case of the nearest-neighbor coupled network. That is to say, the nearest-neighbor coupled network has no advantage with coevolutionary dynamics. It turns out that with structure updating, the influence of the initial network structures on the strategy results is relatively weak. As shown in Figs. 1 and 2, the value of average offer p increases with population size N and decreases generally with average degree d, which is also highlighted in Ref. [5,15] in the case of the traditional models of ultimatum game (i.e., in the absence of network evolution). With the nearest-neighbor coupled network, evolution leads to players offering and demanding an almost fair split with increasing population size and decreasing neighborhood size, for the details please refer to Table 2 in Ref. [5]. And Kuperman and Gusman [15] also supported that with the regular random graph and ordered network, a small increase in the number of neighbors leads to strategies much closer to the rational prediction. But with

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Fig. 3. The average offer p and the acceptance level q as a function of the background payoff W with different values of r, fixed N = 1000 and d = 10.

coevolutionary dynamics, fairness behaviors emerge, that is, the results of offer in the case of initial nearest-neighbor coupled networks here are slightly higher than those obtained in Ref. [5,15]. The impact of the background payoff W on promoting fairness behaviors is explored as follows. Fig. 3 exhibits the result of strategy as a function of the background payoff W for different values of r = 0.1 and 0.5 with fixed average degree d = 10. From Fig. 3, it is easy to see a great positive effect of background payoff. For fixed W with structure updating, the three different initial topologies generally have quite the same effects on the results. The influence of background payoff can be explained in terms of the constitution of fitness. Since an agents fitness is made up of the background payoff and the payoff obtained in ultimatum game, the latter will play a less important role in determining an individuals lifetime fitness when W becomes larger. And the corresponding higher offer with larger W implies a greater taste for fairness. 3.2. The evolved structure As mentioned before, we take the network of size N = 1000 to capture the features of the evolved networks. Fig. 4(a) and (b) show the degree distribution graph and cumulative degree distribution graph of the final structures with different initial topologies (N = 1000, d = 10) respectively. The degree distribution function pd of a network represents the probability that a randomly chosen node has degree d, while the cumulative degree distribution function Pd is the probability that the degree is greater than or equal to d [27]. As shown in Fig. 4, the degree distributions tend to be approximately Poisson, almost all the same for the different initial structure and background payoff values. But from the curve of cumulative degree distribution function, we can clearly see that the initial scale-free network has a quite longer right tail of values that are far above the mean than other two cases. In general, the evolved networks can be treated as approximately homogeneous except for a few nodes with high degrees. Let L denote the average path length between node pairs in a network: L = N (N2+1) ij dij , where dij is the shortest path length from node i to node j [28]. Provided that the average degree d = 10, the average path length L is about 3.21 when N = 100 for all the three initial topologies, and the values of the average path length are all close to 3.25 when N = 1000 in all cases, much smaller than the number N of vertices. Therefore, networks involved show the small-world effect because the value of L scales slower with network size N for fixed mean degree. Another important structural feature used for measuring the correlation among nodes of a network is the assortative mixing coefficient A, or degreedegree correlation [29,30], which is defined as follows
1 M M i =1

[
ji ki k2 i

1 2M

]2 (ji + ki )
M i=1

A=
1 2M

i =1 1 2M

( +
j2 i

(ji + ki )

]2

(4)

i =1

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Fig. 4. (a) Degree distribution and (b) cumulative degree distribution graph of the final structures with different initial topologies for r = 1, N = 1000 and d = 10.

where ji and ki are the degrees of the two nodes at the end of the ith edge, with i = 1, 2, . . . , M (M is the total number of edges of the network). In the real world, there are two main classes of possible correlations: assortative behavior if A > 0, indicating that largedegree nodes are preferentially connected with other large-degree ones, and disassortative behavior if A < 0, denoting that links are more easily built between large-degree nodes and small-degree ones. As demonstrated in Ref. [29], almost all social networks show assortative behavior with positive values of A, while others, including technological and biological networks, show disassortative behavior with negative A. However, the mechanism that leads to the basic difference between these two classes remains unclear [31]. In the following, we calculate the assortative mixing coefficient A according to Eq. (4) to check whether the evolved networks by our model are suitable representations of social systems. Fig. 5(a) shows that A is a function of W for different initial topologies. One can see that when the initial topologies are different, values of the assortative mixing coefficient A are quite different, but all show the assortative behaviors with A > 0. Fig. 5(b) shows that A as a function of W for different values of ratios. More assortative behavior occurs as the ratio r increases. Fig. 5(c) shows that when r = 1 the assortative mixing coefficient A as a function of average degree d for different values of W . The smaller of d, the more assortative mixing coefficient A is. For fixed d, values of A show slight changes with different W . Our reported results illustrate that the networks evolved in our model can well capture the assortative structural features of the emerging social networks. In general, the assortative is enhanced by more structural updating chances, i.e., A is increasing with r. It is worthy to mention that, Fu et al. [21] first investigated the degreedegree correlation pattern of the emerging social network under coevolutionary dynamics, and obtained the network configuration during evolution. Their work clearly reflected the underlying mechanism facilitating the emergence of cooperation. Our model couples the dynamical process of the ultimatum game and the evolution of the network, which leads to the difference between our model and that of Fu et al. [21]. Interestingly, in our simulation, we also reveal the assortative structural features of the emerging social networks. 4. Conclusions In this paper, we first provide a model of coevolutionary ultimatum game, where strategy dynamics and structure dynamics coexist. It is found that the interplay between strategy dynamics and structure dynamics leads to fairness behaviors and interesting network structures. In particular, the ratio of structure updating rate to strategy updating rate primely influences the strategy, and fair offer emerges with some ranges of the ratio. The three different topologies, i.e., the nearest-neighbor coupled networks, the ER random networks and the scale-free networks, are set to be the initial structures respectively. And it is shown that the initial structures have no essentially

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Fig. 5. (a) A as a function of W for different initial topologies with d = 10. (b) A as a function of W for different r with d = 10. (c) A as a function of average degree d for different W with r = 1.

different effects on the coevolutionary results, in particular, the results for strategy are almost similar when other coefficients are specific. Other spatial factors, such as the population size and the average degree, have also been investigated. The population size shows a positive influence on the results, while average degree has a negative one. In addition, it is worth noting that the background payoff, an extrinsic factor, is also important in promoting fair divisions. As for the evolved networks, the small-world effect and assortative behaviors are found. In all, the coevolutionary game deserves widespread and profound study. Acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge the editors and the anonymous referees delightful suggestions. This work was supported by National Nature Science Foundation of China No. 61004015, Research Fund for the Doctor Program of Higher Education of China No. 20090032120034, and Program for Changjiang Scholars and Innovative Research Team in University No. IRT1028. References
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