Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

Quantum Mechanics AC
Quantum Mechanics 1AC .............................................................................................................................................. 2 1AR Cross X Check Shell ................................................................................................................................................ 8 AT CX Checks Bad ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 1AR Theory Abuse Shell .............................................................................................................................................. 10 Skep Bad Shell ................................................................................................................................................................ 11 AT Util ................................................................................................................................................................................ 12 AT Deont ........................................................................................................................................................................... 13 AT Skep ............................................................................................................................................................................. 14 Definitions ....................................................................................................................................................................... 15

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

Quantum Mechanics 1AC

I affirm Resolved: Rehabilitation ought to be valued above retribution in the US Criminal Justice System. Part 1 is Framework. Ought is defined as indicating moral rightness, so the value is morality. I reserve the right to clarify. Moral arguments are placed within a meta-ethical framework. Meta-ethics conditions what words we can use to meaningfully describe moral claims. Meta-ethical debate functions on a higher level than debates about particular ethical theories, because metaethics literally determines what counts as a warrant for an ethical theory. Our ethical theories must exist under the condition of naturalism: All facts must be reducible to scientific facts. This is because the world is causally closed under natural facts. This means that moral considerations must be based in physical facts. Papineau writes,
In the middle of the nineteenth century the conservation of kinetic plus potential energy came to be accepted as a basic principle of physics (Elkana 1974). In itself this does not rule out distinct mental or vital forces, for there is no reason why such forces should not be conservative, operating in such a way as to compensate losses of kinetic energy by gains in potential energy and vice versa. (The term nervous energy is a relic of the widespread late nineteenth-century assumption that mental processes store up a species of potential

the conservation of energy does imply that any such special forces must be governed by strict deterministic laws: if mental or vital forces arose spontaneously, then there would be nothing to ensure that they never led to energy increases. During the course of the twentieth century received scientific opinion became even more restrictive about possible causes of physical effects, and came to reject sui generis mental or vital causes, even of a law-governed and predictable kind. Detailed physiological research, especially into nerve cells, gave no indication of any physical effects that cannot be explained in terms of basic physical forces that also occur outside living bodies . Thus, for example, consider J.J.C.
energy that is then released in action.) However

Smart's (1958) thought that we should identify mental states with brain states, for otherwise those mental states would be "nomological danglers" which play no role in the explanation of behaviour. Or take David Lewis's (1966) and David Armstrong's (1968) argument

since the only laws governing behaviour are those connecting behaviour with physical antecedents, mental events can only be causes of behaviour if they are identical with those physical antecedents.1
that, since mental states are picked out by their causal roles, and since we know that physical states play these roles, mental states must be identical with those physical states. Again, consider Donald Davidson's (1970) argument that,

Causal closure demands that our mental states, and hence moral beliefs, must be rooted in physical facts about us. Only physical facts exist, and only physical facts are truth-functional. Further, Any ethical claims have to be grounded in concrete examinations rather than abstract principles. Ryn2
The reasons why a new understanding of universality is needed are many and varied. In epistemology, abstract universalist reifications and rigidities stand in the way of a faithful account of the dynamics of actual human knowing. In aesthetics, static, mimetic notions of beauty are not sufficiently sensitive to what is contributed by human creativity and the distinctiveness of artistic

In ethics, abstract moral absolutism generates a blueprint approach to the moral life and a weak sense of the actual moral opportunities of human existence. As in the case of the French Jacobins and their descendants, such an approach easily turns putative moral principles into moralistic tyranny. More generally, abstract moral universalism creates a gulf between philosophical propositions and concrete human experience. It does not well prepare the individual for embodying universality in particular actions. This kind of universalism tends to lose the substance of morality in merely abstract considerations of "virtue," "good," "justice" and "rights." Conducting intricate discussion to find just the right formulations or to come up with just the right casuistic application of "universal principles" comes to seem more significant than actually improving self or undertaking concrete good actions. A useful first step in
visions. rethinking the relationship between universality and particularity may be to consider the conflict in the modern world between two broad streams of thought concerning that subject. Briefly

universality should be looked for, not in abstract theoretical "principles" or other a historical judgment or vision, but in concrete
reviewing these seemingly irreconcilable orientations will help focus attention on the crux of the philosophical matter. The stage will be set for arguing a thesis: that

David Papineau, Naturalism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. Ryn Claes G. Ryn1992. Universality and History:The Concrete as Normative From HUMANITAS, Volume VI, No. 1, Fall 1992/Winter 1993 National Humanities Institute, Washington, DC USA. TC
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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson 3 Quantum Mechanics AC experience; that normative authority, in so far as it exists for man, resides in historical particularity. That such a thesis will strike many as strange and even as a contradiction in terms
shows the pressing need for rethinking the subject. Widespread and deeply rooted habits of dealing with the problem of universality and particularity are stifling philosophical renewal.

Side-constraint theories of ethics try to locate moral truths in the a priori deductions of practical reason. However, since all facts are scientific facts, and all scientific facts are known only by experience, there are no a priori side constraints in nature. Since there are multiple contradictory interpretations of the topic and I have to adopt one of them in my case, then interpretative issues would be reasons why we adopt a different interpretation rather than punish me with a loss. Voting me down would outweigh any other abuse insofar as it would be impossible for me to not violate theory and lose every round under that interpretation. The standard for the round is maintaining consistency with an understanding of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics is a prerequisite to scientific fact because regular physics cant explain the double slit experiment that proves that photons act as waves and particles, and behave differently based on whether or not they are observed. Cartlidge3 light waves passing through two parallel slits create a characteristic pattern of light and dark patches on a screen positioned behind the slits. The patches correspond to the points on the screen where the peaks and troughs of the waves diffracting out from the two slits combine with one another either constructively or destructively. In the early twentieth century, physicists showed that this interference pattern was evident even when the intensity of the light was so low that photons pass through the apparatus one at a time. In other words, individual photons seem to interfere with themselves, so light exhibits both particle-like and wave-like properties. However, placing detectors at the slits to determine which [slit] one a particle is passing through destroys the interference pattern on the screen behind. This is a manifestation of Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which states that it is not possible to precisely measure both the
In the classic double-slit experiment, first done more than 200 years ago, position (which of the two slits has been traversed) and the momentum (represented by the interference pattern) of a photon.

Which should be impossible, so an explanation is required. Quantum mechanics proposes an interpretation to solve this dilemma, which will be presented in the next part of the case. And the only way we can derive an understanding of the microscopic and its applications to the macroscopic is through quantum mechanics. Vaidman4 defines quantum mechanics Quantum mechanics is, at least at first glance and at least in part, a mathematical machine for predicting the behaviors of microscopic particles or, at least, of the measuring instruments we use to explore those behaviors and in that capacity, it is spectacularly successful: in terms of power
and precision, head and shoulders above any theory we have ever had. Mathematically, the theory is well understood; we know what its parts are, how they are put together, and why, in the mechanical sense (i.e., in a sense that can be answered by describing the internal grinding of gear against gear), the whole thing performs the way it does, how the information that gets fed in at one end is converted into what comes out the other. The question of what kind of a world it describes, however, is controversial; there is very little agreement, among physicists and among

the theory describes a set of facts about the way the microscopic world impinges on the macroscopic one, how it affects our measuring instruments, described in everyday language or the language of classical mechanics. Disagreement centers on the question of what a microscopic world, which affects our apparatuses in the prescribed manner, is,
philosophers, about what the world is like according to quantum mechanics. Minimally interpreted, or even could be, like intrinsically; or how those apparatuses could themselves be built out of microscopic parts of the sort the theory describes.[1]

Cartlidge, Edwin. June 3, 2011. "New 'Double Slit' Experiment Skirts Uncertainty Principle." 4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics."
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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson 4 Quantum Mechanics AC That is what an interpretation of the theory would provide: a proper account of what the world is like according to quantum mechanics, intrinsically and from the bottom up. The problems with giving an interpretation (not just a comforting, homey sort of interpretation, i.e., not just an
interpretation according to which the world isn't too different from the familiar world of common sense, but any interpretation at all) are dealt with in other sections of this encyclopedia. Here, we are concerned only with the mathematical heart of the theory, the theory in its capacity as a mathematical machine, and whatever is true of the rest of it

this part of the

theory makes exquisitely good sense. Part 2 is the Many Worlds Interp Maintaining consistency with quantum mechanics requires an interpretation. Jones5 defines MWI In this interpretation, every time a[n] "random" event takes place, the universe splits between the various options available. Each separate version of the universe contains a different outcome of that event. Instead of one continuous timeline, the universe under the many worlds interpretation looks more like a series of branches splitting off of a tree limb.

I contend that the only plausible interpretation is the Many Worlds Interpretation, for 2 reasons. First, MWI is the only interpretation that avoids quantum collapse. Vaidman 26 The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave. (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions of the
Universe prior to the experiment: only the probabilities are governed by the initial state. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make

We need not assume that Nature plays dice. The The MWI exhibits some kind of nonlocality: "world" is a nonlocal concept, but it avoids action at a distance and, therefore, it is not in conflict with the relativistic quantum mechanics; see discussions of nonlocality in Vaidman 1994, Tipler 2000, Bacciagaluppi 2002, and Hemmo and Pitowsky 2001.
deterministic predictions. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI. MWI is a deterministic theory for a physical Universe and it explains why a world appears to be indeterministic for human observers.

Quantum Collapse is the manifestation of randomness within a deterministic system, which throws ethics up to chance, which triggers skepticism, and Quantum collapse is impossible. Price7 wavefunctions appear to collapse (See "Does the EPR experiment prohibit locality?"), when measurementlike interactions (See "What is a measurement?") and processes occur via a process called decoherence (See "What is decoherence?"), but claims that the wavefunction does
Many-worlds predicts/retrodicts that not actually collapse but continues to evolve according to the usual wave-equation. If a mechanism for collapse could be found then there would be no need for many-worlds. The reason why we doubt that collapse takes place is because no one has ever been able to devise a physical mechanism that could trigger it. The Copenhagen interpretation posits that observers collapse wavefunctions, but is unable to define "observer". (See "What is the Copenhagen interpretation?" and "Is there any alternative theory?") Without a definition of observer there can be no mechanism triggered by their presence. Another popular view is that irreversible processes trigger collapse. Certainly wavefunctions appear to collapse whenever irreversible processes are involved. And most macroscopic, day-today events are irreversible. The problem is, as with positing observers as a cause of collapse, that any irreversible process is composed of a large number of sub-processes that are each individually reversible. To invoke irreversibility as a mechanism for collapse we would have to show that new fundamental physics comes into play for complex systems, which is quite absent at the reversible atom/molecular level. Atoms and molecules are empirically observed to obey some type of wave equation. We have no evidence for an extra mechanism operating on more complex systems. As far as we can determine complex systems are described by the quantum-operation of their simpler components interacting together. (Note: chaos, complexity theory, etc., do not introduce new fundamental physics. They still operate within the reductionistic paradigm - despite what many popularisers say.)

Jones, Andrew. What is the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics? http://physics.about.com/od/quantumphysics/f/manyworldsinterpretation.htm 6 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics." 7 Everett FAQ http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#wavefunctions Price, Michael
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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

Other people have attempted to construct non-linear theories so that microscopic systems are approximately linear and obey the wave equation, whilst macroscopic systems are grossly nonlinear and generates collapse. Unfortunately all these efforts have made additional predictions which, when tested, have failed. (See "Is physics linear?")

Another reason for doubting that any collapse actually takes place is that the collapse would have to propagate instantaneously, or in some space-like fashion, otherwise the same particle could be observed more than once at different locations. Not fatal, but unpleasant and difficult to reconcile with special relativity and some conservation laws.)
(

The simplest conclusion, which is to be preferred by Ockham's razor, is that wavefunctions just don't collapse and that all branches of the wavefunction exist. Second, Price 2 gives four warrants why MWIs applications arent just interpretative, as opposed to different interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.
No, for four reasons:

First, many-worlds makes predictions that differ from the other so- called interpretations of quantum theory. Interpretations do not make predictions that differ. (See "What unique predictions does many-worlds make?") In addition manyworlds retrodicts a lot of data that has no other easy interpretation. (See "What retrodictions does many-worlds make?")

Second, the mathematical structure of many-worlds is not isomorphic to other formulations of quantum mechanics like the Copenhagen interpretation or Bohm's hidden variables. The
Copenhagen interpretation does not contain those elements of the wavefunction that correspond to the other worlds. Bohm's hidden variables contain particles, in addition to the wavefunction. Neither theory is isomorphic to each other or many-worlds and are not, therefore, merely rival "interpretations".

there is no scientific, reductionist alternative to many- worlds. All the other theories fail for logical reasons. (See "Is there any alternative theory?") Fourth, [Third], the interpretative side of many-worlds, like the subjective probabilistic elements, are derived from within the theory, rather than added to it by assumption, as in the conventional approach. (See "How do
Third, probabilities emerge within many-worlds?")

[Fourth] rMany-worlds should really be described as a theory or, more precisely, a metatheory, since it makes statements that are applicable about a range of theories. Many-worlds is the unavoidable implication of any quantum theory which obeys some type of linear wave equation. (See "Is physics linear?") So the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics for the round is the MWI. Part 3 is the implications of the many worlds interp. A. The Many Worlds Interp undermines the notion of personal identity. Vaidman 38 "I" am an object, such as Earth, cat, etc. "I" is defined at a particular time by a complete (classical) description of the state of my body and of my brain. "I" and "Lev" [Nick] do not name the same things (even though my name is Lev). At the present moment there are many different "Lev"s [Nicks] in different worlds (not more than one in each world), but it is meaningless to say that now there is another "I". I have a particular, well defined past: I correspond to a particular "Lev" in 2002, but I do not have a
well defined future: I correspond to a multitude of "Lev"s in 2010. In the framework of the MWI it is meaningless to ask: Which Lev in 2010 will I be? I will correspond to them all.

Every time I perform a quantum experiment (with several possible results) it only seems to me that I obtain a single definite result. Indeed, Lev who obtains this particular result thinks this way. However, this Lev [Nick] cannot be identified as the only Lev [Nick] after the experiment. Lev [Nick] before the experiment corresponds to all "Lev"s [Nicks] obtaining all possible results. Although this approach to the concept of personal identity seems somewhat unusual, it is plausible in the light of the critique of personal identity by Parfit 1986. Parfit considers some artificial situations in which a person splits into several copies, and argues that there is no good answer to the question: Which copy is me? He concludes that personal identity is not what matters when I divide. Moreover, lack of personal identity undermines desert-based theories of morality. Dresser9
8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2002. "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics." 9 [10] Shoemaker, David (Dept of Philosophy, U Memphis). Utilitarianism and Personal Identity. The Journal of Value Inquiry 33: 183199, 1999. http://www.csun.edu/~ds56723/jvipaper.pdf

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC personal identity seems a necessary underpinning to desert; the state can justifiably hold a person responsible for past criminal acts only if that person committed the acts. The nonto individuals. An all-or-nothing, determinate view of reductionist may argue, then, that desert is incompatible with reductionism because without the existence of a separate, persistent self, desert lacks a metaphysical and moral base. If the

The provocative implications of Parfit's theory for criminal law emerge in his discussion of the moral principle of desert. Desert is a principle governing the distribution of burdens and benefits

if personal identity can be indeterminate and a matter of degree, then no one can deserve punishment for past criminal acts. Parfit labels this the "Extreme Claim."
reductionist view is true,

B. MWI justifies determinism. Price 410 many-worlds is a deterministic theory, since the wavefunction obeys a deterministic wave equation at all times. All possible outcomes of a measurement or interaction (See"What is a measurement?") are embedded within the universal wavefunction although each observer, split by each observation, is only aware of single outcomes due to the linearity of the wave equation. The world appears indeterministic, with the usual probabilistic collapse of the wavefunction, but at the objective level, which includes all outcomes, determinism is restored.
Yes, Some people are under the impression that the only motivation for many- worlds is a desire to return to a deterministic theory of physics. This is not true. As Everett pointed out, the objection with the standard Copenhagen interpretation is not the indeterminism per se, but that indeterminism occurs only with the intervention of an observer, when the wavefunction collapses. (See "What is the Copenhagen interpretation?"

AND, Determinism makes retributive justice incoherent. Pereboom11 According to the retributivist position, punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that he deserves something bad to happen to him pain, deprivation or death, for example just because he has done wrong.1 Hence, a
wrongdoers deserving to be harmed is not reducible to a component of a scheme justified solely on the basis of its consequences. This claim is typically subjected to qualifications such as that

the retribution theory is that according to the retributivist, it is the desert attached to the criminals wrongful action alone that provides the justification for punishment. The retribution theory does not appeal to a good such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of the criminal in justifying punishment. Rather, the good to be achieved by punishment, by means of which retributivism justifies punishment, is that an agent receive what he deserves as a result of his having done wrong.
the agent had to have committed the wrong intentionally or knowingly. But we can set these niceties aside, for what is crucial to our discussion about

This position would be undermined if [determinism] hard incompatibilism were true, since if agents do not deserve to be blamed just because they have done wrong, neither do they deserve to be punished just because they have done wrong. Because retributivism justifies punishment solely on the grounds of a basic notion of desert, hard incompatibilism is incompatible with
retributivism for the reason that it rejects this notion of desert. Hard incompatibilists must therefore abandon the retributivist justification for punishment.

C. If determinism is true, than the only type of justice with value is Rehabilitation. Pereboom 212 Moreover, the [determinist] hard incompatibilist can endorse this type of therapeutic procedure. It requires that criminals be able to improve their behavior by changing the way they think, and for criminals themselves to recognize that improvement can be effected by this method, none of which [determinism] hard incompatibilism would imperil. This sort of procedure also demands that criminals recognize that their ways of thinking are causally efficacious in producing their criminal behavior, and that different ways of thinking would produce behavior that is not criminal. The hard incompatibilist [determinists] can agree to all of this.

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Everett FAQ http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm#wavefunctions Price, Michael Pereboom, Derk. Living without Free Will. Pereboom, Derk. Living without Free Will.

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson 7 Quantum Mechanics AC This means you affirm because if something has value than it would be valued above something that has no value, and insofar as retributive justice 1. has no moral standing and 2. If it has one it would be low because its inconsistent with any understanding moral or amoral of the world and Rehabilitative justice is.

Part 4 is the out of round implications. A. Accept the aff interpretation as long as it is reasonable because the negative can adapt in the next speech, whereas I would have to start over entirely in the 1AR. This also sets the brightline for whether an interpretation is reasonable. The abusiveness of the interpretation must outweigh the structural disadvantage of forcing a 1AR restart for it to be unreasonable. B. RVIs are uniquely justified for the aff because: a. The massive time-skew of the LD 1AR makes it impractical to fully cover theory and still have a fair chance at substance; and b. No risk theory would exacerbate neg bias by giving him a free source of no risk offense that comes prior to all AC offense. C. For the purpose of having a substantial and educational debate, Im willing to clarify in cross-ex. D. First, skepticism doesnt just negate or affirm the resolution; it makes not only our arguments incomprehensible, but the resolution as well. So, if skepticism is true, you go to presumption. Second, if the negative illustrates some unskeptical link to the ballot, Quantum mechanics outweighs because it examines how our world functions, so the link still remains. Third, skepticism fails because it requires the warrant to move away from common sense, which isnt a realistic argument because insofar as you understand the words Im saying right now you can illustrate some topical story to a negative ballot. Fourth, skepticism is an unfair argument because if skepticism is true it has only one side winning the round, meaning an unreciprocal debate, and it takes away almost all affirmative ground. E. Presume aff for 4 reasons. a. States have unique obligations to their citizens so they have to stay active rather than inactive because an inactive government is basically anarchy. Err towards the truth of the resolution to save them. b. If the government does nothing in crisis the people would try to overthrow the government, meaning action is a prerequisite to the resolution, and you presume towards action. c. Sooner is better than later, so you presume aff to entice government action towards action rather than passivity. d. Time skew: The negative has 13 minutes of rebuttal time and I have only 7, meaning if the round was close I did the better debating. e. Adaptability: The negative has the ability to adapt his negative case to my affirmative case so under my fixed advocacy you Thus I urge an affirmative ballot

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

1AR Cross X Check Shell

A is the Counter-interpretation: Aff can _______ unless he asks me not to during cross-examination or prior to the AC. B. I meet, he didnt ask. The Counter-interp solves 100% of his offense because either I say yes and theres no abuse or I say no and he can go for theory. C is the standards 1. Substantive education: theory trades off with substantive education because if we get stuck on the theory debate we cant critically think or learn about each others cases. Thats uniquely important on this topic because (A) we live in the United States, and (B) the main cause for incarceration is a lack of awareness of and participation in our society. That means there are unique out-of-round impacts to productive discussion of the US criminal justice system. 2. Philosophical Education: before we can even begin to discuss the topic or any philosophy surrounding it I have to address the theory that was run just so he could call out perceived abuse that he didnt even bother to clarify in cross-X. Education is a voter that precedes substance because without it, educational institutions would not sponsor the activity, meaning A. we would never be allowed to miss school. B. Schools wouldnt provide funding for debate. And C. Education is a pre-requisite to a debate itself. You cant debate if youre not educated. Err aff on theory to compensate for neg side bias. And extend that theory is an RVI (IF THEY USE A FAIRNESS VOTER) AND they also lose on fairness because if I cant clarify in cross-ex, neg has 100% guaranteed theory ground because he can prep out mutually exclusive theory violations. NC theory is uniquely unfair because (a) it moots all offense in the AC which is the only advantage that the aff has in the round, and (b) the blippy nature of theory means it causes a massive time tradeoff for the 1ar. 1ar time skew outweighs other theory standards because it is the cause of the massive neg side bias. (IF THEY USE A FAIRNESS VOTER) Education outweighs fairness: (_) Education is more easily quantifiable whereas fairness is contingent on subjective preferences of what better debating means and external constraints such as resource disparities and side-bias. (_) Its the only impact with long-term, out of round implications. Fairness only matters until you sign your ballot. (_) You can debate an unfair debate, if schools stop sponsoring debate we cant debate. So, education outweighs fairness at its base.

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

AT CX Checks Bad
(_) Cross X checks arent meant to deny abuse, rather theyre meant to clarify if abuse happened. My opponent is illustrating what they believe happened in this abuse story but they didnt even bother to make sure that their interp is actually legitimate. (_) They didnt bother to clarify, meaning this could very well be averted and we could be discussing the perks and failures of the justice system. (_) My abuse story is that he didnt care to clarify, and consequently averted the actual view of the round away from the substance and towards the theory debate, impacting into the education voter removing tat actual educational value of debate.

Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

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1AR Theory Abuse Shell

A is the interpretation: Interpretative issues would be reasons why we adopt different interpretations. B is the violation: My opponent is running theory on me and looking for the most part past the substantial debate and trying to win the round off of some rule in theory which he believes I violate and make the round unfair. Warranting voting me down outweighs any other abuse insofar as it would be impossible for me to not violate theory and lose every round under that interpretation. Under the Ryn card in my case I articulate this pretty clearly, and it goes completely dropped by my opponent. C is the standards: 1. Theory abuse: If having separate interpretations of the resolutions warrants a loss, then I could violate every round for the rest of the tournament, having absolutely no chance to win. Interpretative abuse is different from other abuse insofar as its more than easy to just accept other interpretations and continue the round. Theory abuse outweighs any other links into fairness because if any interpretation violates theory all preround prep and argumentation goes down the drain and all that remains is theory violations, and neither I, nor any other opponents have any ability to win the round. 2. Strategy Skew: If my interpretation violates every round and we cant just adopt another interpretation, I have no strategy before or during the round until I understand the negatives interpretation, which completely skews my strategy. This is key to fairness because both debaters need to be able to formulate strategic positions in order to win. D is the implications. 1. You vote them down before you vote me down on any theory voter insofar as they first didnt attack the answer I made in the beginning of my case. Their abuse by running theory in itself outweighs the abuse theyre addressing. Because they dropped the aforementioned preweighing they cant win the round dont let them do it in the next speech. 2. Debate is a matter of competing interpretations so you ought to vote on it even if s/he kicks the argument and no abuse takes place in this debate. If his/her interpretation justifies abuse, thats a reason to vote against it, just as we should reject ethical theories that justify genocide. 3. At the very least this cancels out this abuse and you vote on substance or presumption because their violation is just as heinous and they dont do any weighing between the interp I violated and them violating the theory in my own case.

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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

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Skep Bad Shell

A is the interpretation: When debating a resolution that questions obligation, debaters must advocate a moral system that when evaluating actions can result in obligations that prove the resolution either true or false. B is the violation: My opponent is running skeptical arguments as a way to win the round meaning that moral obligations are impossible C is the Standards: 1. Extend the two standards of reciprocity and ground out of the bottom of my case. This takes away all my ground and narrows down the debate to which way skepticism flows. Meaning only one debater can win the round, and that would be off of implications of skepticism. 2. Predictability I frame my preparation of cases, blocks, and turns around the expectation that neg advocacies will be to some degree specific to the topic; the neg advocacy precludes all of this prep by simply proving the impossibility of obligation, which kills quality aff ground. Im not arguing that philosophical education be excluded but rather that frameworks are followed by contentions that link to the topic in order to ensure predictability. Predictability is key to fairness because its necessary to engage the neg with quality refutation. D. Implication Vote them down. 1. Fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity designed to find the better debater. Adjudicating unfair debates only determines who is arbitrarily advantaged, not who gave the better performance. 2. Only the loss sends a meaningful message: debaters want to win and avoid losing, so vote against them to discourage empty procedural debate. Docking speaks or ignoring the unfair argument doesnt account for me being at a structural disadvantage. Rejecting the argument is not enough, because that creates an incentive for bad debate, since debaters know they can just kick abusive arguments and exploit the time trade-off.

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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

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AT Util
(_) MWI presupposes an infinite number of worlds and consequentialism fails: Bostrom13 Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena
(this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ( ). Call such a world canonically infinite.

Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive value and an infinite quantity of negative value. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good or bad. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to imply that if the world is canonically infinite then it is always ethically indifferent what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically
Aggregative indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any non-contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

Because of the nature of MWI we cant evaluate the number of worlds, and assuming infinite actions and reactions have occurred, its okay to assume that worlds are infinite. Even if the number of worlds arent infinite consequentialist theories collapse because of the nature of the inevaluable number of worlds, so extinction in one world is just the end of one strain of worlds and an innumerable number of others still continues on, so in reality being nice to someone could set off a chain reaction that kills billions and leaves the rest to suffer, having a worse end effect than just ending one strain of worlds. (_) MWI makes it impossible to evaluate end states because we cant know what leads to what in any world. Any consequentialist arguments presuppose one world and thus fail in the face of many. (_) We cant put value on worlds that I am not in. Separate nicks could put value on items and events in different words but I cannot, and neither can we. So MWI precludes end states because it removes our ability to evaluate them. (_) If one world occurs and my opponent links into 2 billion people dying that same world could easily also contain the same net good and it would cancel out, so because my opponent cant know and elaborate on every aspect of every world presented in an end state scenario he cant create a link to the ballot. (Extinction) (_) MWI requires that an action be physically possible, and insofar as the human extinction has never happened, in an observable world, we dont know if it can actually happen, so there is a burden on my opponent to prove that extinction is possible. Which is impossible. So you cant weigh that evidence.

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Bostrom, Infinitarian Paralysis

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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

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AT Deont
(_) The notion of personal identity is removed under the MWI, so consequently there is no rational identity that belongs to human beings, and the very base by which deontology stands upon is gone. (_) Within Quantum mechanics the many worlds interp removes direct causality, insofar as anything can cause anything, everything does cause everything. Every action leads to every action, so doing an action that respects human worth could very well cause another action that leads to human worth being disrespected. This also means that all ends are means to another end, so because of this cause effect relationship deontology loses its footing. (_) This is a state specific resolution, meaning that both debaters have to articulate a link within their cases to the state or to the actual moral uses of retribution or rehabilitation.

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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

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AT Skep
(_) Extend the first point on skep out of my case stating that if skepticism is true than you go to presumption because not only are my arguments incomprehensible but his are as well and accordingly the resolution is too. Insofar as this is true all you as a judge can do is disregard the argument or go to presumption, which Im winning. (_) Extend the second point on skep coming out of my case that says that assuming my opponent illustrates some skeptical link to the ballot, quantum mechanics outweighs because its a study of how our world functions, and considering the link presented by my opponent should be slurred anyways quantum mechanics provides universally true links to the ballot. (_) Extend the third point on skep coming out of my case that says that my opponent has to articulate the movement away from common sense and considering were within a value based debate and Im articulating a value based approach taken from terms of common sense, you cant accept their skeptical arguments.

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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

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Definitions
Definitions: desert |dizrt| noun (usu. deserts) a person's worthiness or entitlement to reward or punishment: the penal system fails to punish offenders in accordance with their deserts. Ought [awt] Show IPA Auxiliary verb 1. (Used to express duty or moral obligation): Every citizen ought to help. 2. (Used to express justice, moral rightness, or the like): 3. (Used to express propriety, appropriateness, etc.): You ought to be home early. We ought to bring her some flowers. 4. (Used to express probability or natural consequence): That ought to be our train now. Noun 5.duty or obligation. Dictionary.com Restorative Justice:

What is restorative justice?

Restorative justice is a theory of justice that emphasizes repairing the harm caused or revealed by criminal behaviour. It is best accomplished through cooperative processes that include all stakeholders. Practices and programs reflecting restorative purposes will respond to crime by: 1. identifying and taking steps to repair harm, 2. involving all stakeholders, and 3. transforming the traditional relationship between communities and their governments in responding to crime. Some of the programmes and outcomes typically identified with restorativejustice include: Victim offender mediation Conferencing Circles Victim assistance Ex-offender assistance Restitution Community service

Three principles form the foundation for restorative justice:

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Christopher Columbus HS NAnderson Quantum Mechanics AC

1. Justice requires that we work to restore those who have been injured.

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2. Those most directly involved and affected by crime should have the opportunity to participate fully in the response if they wish. 3. Government's role is to preserve a just public order, and the community's is to build and maintain a just peace. Restorative programmes are characterized by four key values: 1. Encounter: Create opportunities for victims, offenders and community members who want to do so to meet to discuss the crime and its aftermath 2. Amends: Expect offenders to take steps to repair the harm they have caused 3. Reintegration: Seek to restore victims and offenders to whole, contributing members of society 4. Inclusion: Provide opportunities for parties with a stake in a specific crime to participate in its resolution

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