Nietzsche K

DDI 12 SS Nietzsche K
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Notes
Existential/Suffering A few things you'll need to set up in round You have to win that the affirmative is simply a speech act with no real world solvency. The only effect of the speech is what it means about our (the people in the room's) identity/ethical outlook if we vote for the argument (Thats turanli, also more of those cards are in the framework block). In this type of framework, even a critical disabilities aff links and does not solve. Their speech may "resist the hegemonic nature of" whatever, but it won't actual solve it. When you have an in round existential focus, that gives you a leg up in terms of impacts. When you argue that suffering is inevitable, don't just say it is inevitable. Sure, that is part of the argument, but the real argument is that suffering is inevitable and necessary for life. So, once you have that argued, the round stands like this - aff is simply a speech act that can't solve it's advantages in the real world. However, endorsing the aff speech act means endorsing an ideology that we should seek to always minimize suffering in our lives. Keep the link, impact, alternative, everything, specific to the people in the room Extinction The inevitability stuff we talked about in lab death/extinction are inevitable, the aff is obsessed with finding the perfect solution which negates our relationship with life The alternative in both cases is da squo For the extinction version, a lot of aff answers overlap with security, so get answers from the security neg file (e.g. realism, security good, etc.). A lot of value to life stuff is in there too. Der Derian cards should answer all those pretty thoroughly though
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***1NCs***
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Everything ends, no one is immortal the affirmatives resentment of insecurity drives them to attempt and order a safer world Der Derrian 98 [James, Watson Institute research professor of international studies at Brown University, The Values of Security:
Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, JSTOR] Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of selfpreservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37 The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols The causal instinct is thus conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear. The "why?" shall, if at all possible, not give the cause for its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause --a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving. . . . That which is new and strange and has not been experienced before, is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanation--that which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility--recycling the desire for security. The "influence of timidity," as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the "necessities" of security: "they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences." 39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. "Trust," the "good," and other common values come to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling of security such as the Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god." 40 For Nietzsche, of course, only a false sense of security can come from false gods:
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"Morality and religion belong altogether to the psychology of error : in every single case, cause and effect are confused; or truth is confused with the effects of believing something to be true; or a state of consciousness is confused with its causes." 41
Chaos is an intrinsic part of life the affirmative denies this as it lashes out against the inevitable suffering inherent in existence Saurette 1996 [Paul, I mistrust all systemizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in
International Relations Theory, Journal of International Studies vol. 25 No. 1 ] According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give it meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organization of a particular community. Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic an d natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, to understand the development of our modern conception society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justifications of life on heroic myths which honored tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) Aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence. However this incarnation of the will to power as a tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. 'Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people but five steps from excess: the monstrum in animo was a universal danger. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life. While still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates Saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of denigration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end. And Socrates understood that the world had no need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realized that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearnings for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An Alternative will to power. An Alternate Foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating /escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[r]ationality was divined as a savior... it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency : one was peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or be absurdly rational... Thus Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterized by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealized Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possibly by creating a 'Real World' of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World' of transitory physical existence. Suffering and Contingency is contained within the apparent world, disparaged, devalued and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the real world. Essential to the Socratic will to truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the apparent world and the idealized order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomized model lead to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern' understanding of life in which one could only view suffering as the result of an imperfection of the apparent world. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically induced condition ressentiment. And argues that it signaled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, acetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomization by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the apparent world, precisely because they did not live up to god, the Truth and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, 'I suffer: someone must be to blame for it' thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: 'quite easy so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it but you yourself are this someone, you are alone are to blame for yourself. You are alone are to blame for yourself this is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered. Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospects of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one
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had only one choice: either to perish or be absurdly rational... the genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic will to power as the Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the Socratic division through this reduction. The real world was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escapes into a model towards which the apparent world actively aspired always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomized worlds creates the Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for the 'hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering'. According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possibly only when the apparent world perfectly duplicates the Real World. The will to Order then is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent world in line with the precepts of the moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the will to order therefore generates two interrelated reactions. First, the ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal, Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however, the acetic ideal also asserts that a truer more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established, creating an ever-increasing will to truth. This selfperpetuating movement creates an interpretive structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic truth of the real world as Nietzsche suggests.
The affirmatives obsession with perfection is life-negating the eternal struggle against entropy reduces life to mere empty existence Kain, professor of philosophy at Santa Clara, 2007 [Philip J., Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence, Journal
of Nietzsche Studies 33 (2007), 49-63] Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human beings is to suffer. Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem. As Nietzsche tells us in On the Genealogy of Morals, human beings can live with suffering. What they cannot live with is meaningless sufferingsuffering for no reason at all (GM III:28). In Nietzsche's view we are "surrounded by a fearful void . . ." (GM III:28; cf. WP 55). We live in an empty, meaningless cosmos. We cannot look into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish . . ." (BGE 39; cf. WP 822). And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of existence. He lived it himself.2 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes: "Around 1876 my health grew worse. . . . There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain. . . . My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain . . . with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus."3 In Nietzsche contra Wagner, he tells us how significant this suffering was for him: I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest years of my life than to any others. . . . And as to my prolonged illness, [End P0age 49] do I not owe much more to it than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which grows stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!To it, I owe even my philosophy. . . . Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit. . . . Only great suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the suffering that takes its timeforces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths. . . . (NCW "Epilogue") Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, overlooked by most scholars.4 I hope to show that it had a profound effect on his thought, indeed, that he cannot be adequately understood without seeing the centrality of this concept. To begin to understand its importance, let us consider three different visions of the human condition. The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos. It is as if it were purposively planned for us and we for it. We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos. We are confirmed and reinforced by it. Our natural response is a desire to know it and thus to appreciate our fit into it. Let us call this the designed cosmos. Roughly speaking, this is the traditional view held by most philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through the medievals. And for the most part it has disappeared in the modern worldfew really believe in it anymore. The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first. This view started with Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most moderns. Here the cosmos is neither alien nor designed for us. It is neither terrifying nor benign. The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, malleable. Human beings must come to understand the cosmos through science and control it through technology. We must make it fit us. It does not fit us by design. We must work on it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home. We must create our own place. For these modern thinkers, we end up with more than the ancients and medievals had. We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the added satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, accomplishing it through our own endeavor, individuality, and freedom. Let us call this the perfectible cosmos. The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no
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reason at all. It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills actionwhich requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78). One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubtnot at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless sufferingsuffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changedit can only be concealed.
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The alternative is to embrace the tragedy of the status quo only by embracing the inevitability of extinction can we affirm the vibrancy of life Joanne Faulkner, University of New South Wales, 2008 [The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Spring/Autumn]
We could envisage a style of subjectivity responsive to the innocence of becoming in terms of Nietzsches remarks regarding Dionysus. In BT Nietzsche poses the question of why Greek tragedy came into existence (along with the equally significant question of why it eventually went out of favor). Dionysus figures in Nietzsches analysis of tragedy as its progenitor (BT Attempt at Self-Criticism 1)tragedy incarnating the Dionysian state or affect (BT 8)and as its hero.20 The Dionysian attitude, culminating in tragedy, refers to the ability (or art) of regarding ones own suffering from the heights (the gods perspective, for Nietzsche, but theater parlance also gives the gods to refer to the highest viewing areas, such as the balconies).21 The adoption of such a lofty perspective can be regarded as a means of sublimation, wherein the most unbearable aspects of ones life are transmuted and refined to become most beautiful (GM II:7). Greek tragedy is thus unconcerned with such moral affairs as sin and the punishment of sinners (GS 135). Rather, tragedy is a transfiguring celebration of lifes difficulty, pain, and necessity: for if nothing else, at least our tribulations entertain the immortals (GM II:7). And in this manner the gods also performed the curious function of absorbing the Greeks guilt (rather than sin) and warding off bad conscience (GM II:23). By taking Dionysus as ones godhead rather than Jehovah, by Nietzsches lights, one would then evaluate life more positively, in all its immanence, transience, and suffering. He writes in BT: So my instinct at that time turned itself against morality with this questionable book, as an instinct speaking on behalf of life, and invented for itself a fundamental counter-doctrine and counterevaluation of life, a purely artistic, an anti-Christian one. What should it be called? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without taking a certain libertyfor who knows the true name of the Antichrist?with the name of a Greek god: I called it the Dionysian (BT Attempt at SelfCriticism 5). To understand agency according to this instinctual affirmation of life we would have to take into account the dual creative and destructive dynamics of life. To the extent that it is aligned with a Dionysian affect, agency would thus involve an embrace of death, drunkenness, and dissolutionbut, importantly, according to deaths own inevitability and within a context that sees the body becoming an active participant in the causes that determine it. It is clear, even putting aside his rather romantic framing of the problem here, that for Nietzsche what is at issue is a willingness to be aware of ones possibilitiesand moreover, ones limits. Since life demands of each of us that we must die, we would be most empowered by taking an active part in this process at its most advantageous moment: We should recognize how everything which comes into being [End Page 77] must be prepared for a painful demise, we are forced to peer into the terrors of individual existencewithout turning to stone. . . . [T]he struggle, the agony, the annihilation of phenomena now seem necessary to us, in the context of the excess of countless forms of existence which crowd and push their way into life, of the overwhelming fertility of the world-will (BT 17). In this respect, and somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes the most life-affirming path (and the moment of optimal agency) would be to end life.22 It might assist our understanding of this very specific account of agency at this point to consider its connection to the philosophy of Nietzsches forerunner, Baruch Spinoza. Spinozas influence on Nietzsches thought is already well established.23 The aspects of Spinozas work that particularly appealed to Nietzsche were his denial of free will, of teleology, and of the moral world orderall of which circumscribe, for Spinoza, a kind of freedom embedded within his determinism and an understanding of agency and ethical capacity that remains unpolluted by conventional morality.24 Yet at first glance this would seem a rather impoverished sense of freedom, especially if we take seriously the conviction each of these philosophers holds to, that all events are already determined. This determinism emerges from a thoroughgoing materialism, after the death of God: a commitment that, as embodied subjectsor subjected bodies (GM II)we occupy a place in a physical ecosystem, as does any other animal. Continuous with our environment, we humans are not invulnerable to external events that act on us; nor are we selfcaused. Rather, insofar as we are free, we participate in a complex web of interactions through which our agency is bounded and context dependent.
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The affirmative is fixated on ending suffering but in the process it negates the very things making life worth living. We must embrace the nature of existence as chaotic and painful in order to truly live. Kain 07, professor of philosophy at Santa Clara [Philip J., Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 33 (2007), 49-63] Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human beings is to suffer. Yet, still, this is not precisely the problem. As Nietzsche tells us in On the Genealogy of Morals, human beings can live with suffering. What they cannot live with is meaningless sufferingsuffering for no reason at all (GM III:28). In Nietzsche's view we are "surrounded by a fearful void . . ." (GM III:28; cf. WP 55). We live in an empty, meaningless cosmos. We cannot look into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish . . ." (BGE 39; cf. WP 822). And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of existence. He lived it himself.2 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes: "Around 1876 my health grew worse. . . . There were extremely painful and obstinate headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred days of pain. . . . My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain . . . with complete lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus."3 In Nietzsche contra Wagner, he tells us how significant this suffering was for him: I have often asked myself whether I am not much more deeply indebted to the hardest years of my life than to any others. . . . And as to my prolonged illness, [End P0age 49] do I not owe much more to it than I owe to my health? To it I owe a higher kind of health, a sort of health which grows stronger under everything that does not actually kill it!To it, I owe even my philosophy. . . . Only great suffering is the ultimate emancipator of the spirit. . . . Only great suffering; that great suffering, under which we seem to be over a fire of greenwood, the suffering that takes its timeforces us philosophers to descend into our nethermost depths. . . . (NCW "Epilogue") Nietzsche's belief in the horror of existence is largely, if not completely, overlooked by most scholars.4 I hope to show that it had a profound effect on his thought, indeed, that he cannot be adequately understood without seeing the centrality of this concept. To begin to understand its importance, let us consider three different visions of the human condition. The first holds that we live in a benign cosmos. It is as if it were purposively planned for us and we for it. We fit, we belong, we are at home in this cosmos. We are confirmed and reinforced by it. Our natural response is a desire to know it and thus to appreciate our fit into it. Let us call this the designed cosmos. Roughly speaking, this is the traditional view held by most philosophers from Plato and Aristotle through the medievals. And for the most part it has disappeared in the modern worldfew really believe in it anymore. The second vision backs off from the assumptions required by the first. This view started with Francis Bacon, if not before, and it is the view of most moderns. Here the cosmos is neither alien nor designed for us. It is neither terrifying nor benign. The cosmos is neutral and, most importantly, malleable. Human beings must come to understand the cosmos through science and control it through technology. We must make it fit us. It does not fit us by design. We must work on it, transform it, and mold it into a place where we can be at home. We must create our own place. For these modern thinkers, we end up with more than the ancients and medievals had. We end up with a fit like they had, but we get the added satisfaction of bringing it about ourselves, accomplishing it through our own endeavor, individuality, and freedom. Let us call this the perfectible cosmos. The third vision takes the cosmos to be alien. It was not designed for human beings at all; nor were they designed for it. We just do not fit. We do not belong. And we never will. The cosmos is horrible, terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact. It is a place where human beings suffer for no reason at all. It is best never to have been born. Let us call this the horrific cosmos. This is Nietzsche's view. Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us. Instead, we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves. We need more suffering, not less. It has "created all enhancements of man so far . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates:
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the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills actionwhich requires distance and illusion. The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for
whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78). One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't
it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubtnot at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely
that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world
but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce
suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means
meaningless sufferingsuffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changedit can only be concealed.
The affs focus on the transformation into a world without suffering resents the only world we have this hatred of the status quo destroys capacity for the affirmation of life Turanli 2003 (Aydan, Prof of Humanities and Soc Sciences @ Istanbul Technical Institute, Nietzsche and the Later Wittgenstein:
An Offense to the Quest for Another World Journal of Nietzsche Studies 26) The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an
DDI 12 SS Nietzsche K account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to
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imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. [End Page 61] Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect
world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create"
(WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already
there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI 309).
Embrace the status quo. We must first affirm the horror of all existence to in order to affirm the beauty of life Sadegh Kabeer, doctoral candidate in Middle Eastern politics and previously worked as a journalist based in the United Arab Emirates, 2008
[http://www.eterazonline.com/2008_03_01_archive.html] Salom argues that after his conception of the eternal recurrence Nietzsche became transfigured. His contradictions were not only heightened to an unbearable degree but he became irreparably torn between an unbridled loathing and an equally powerful desire to embrace the eternal recurrence of the same.[lxviii] Salom concludes that madness was the only logical possibility for such a fractured and tormented soul. But these ad hominem remarks miss the point. Nietzsches credo that Pain does not count as an objection to life flies in the face of Saloms diagnosis.[lxix] Rather than circumventing or merely resigning oneself to suffer existence interminably la Schopenhauer, the task is to assimilate this very pain and suffering that has destroyed and crippled so many; the free spirit is to adopt a childs attitude towards what used to constitute the seriousness of existence.[lxx] The most solemn concepts of God and sin will seem no more important to us than a childs toy and a childs pain seem to an old man, and perhaps the old man will then need another toy and another pain, still enough of a child, an eternal child![lxxi] This new existential comportment of the self evinces what is most essential in Nietzsches conception of the tragic. Nietzsches distinct and profound understanding of the tragedy of existence is perhaps the deepest of the chasms separating him from his predecessor Arthur Schopenhauer, and is visible as early as his first published work, The Birth of Tragedy (1872). For Nietzsche it is a matter not of reconciliation or resignation, but as we have seen, of redemption immanently procured. The type of a spirit that takes into itself and redeems the contradictions and questionable aspects of existenceDionysus versus the Crucified: there you have the antithesis. It is not a difference in regard to their martyrdom it is a difference in the meaning of it.[7] Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence,
creates torment, destruction, the will to annihilationOne will see that the problem is that of the meaning of suffering:[8] whether a Christian meaning or a tragic meaning. In the former case, it is supposed to be the
path to a holy existence; in the latter case, being is counted as holy enough to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering.
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The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering:[9] he is sufficiently strong, rich, and capable of deifying to do so. The
Christian denies even the happiest lot on earth: he is sufficiently weak, poor, disinherited to suffer from life in whatever form he meets it. The god on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek redemption from life;
Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be eternally reborn and return again from destruction.[lxxii] What separates the Christian[10] from the tragic man is what they take to be the meaning of their suffering and its significance within the greater scheme of things. For Nietzsche once again this is a matter of incorporation. The metabolism of the
Christian is unable to digest the contradictions and questionable aspects of existence so he strives to negate this world and to seek salvation in another residing in the beyond. For the tragic man adventure, danger and even painbecome a necessity.[lxxiii] The tragic hero, the exemplar being Sophocles
Oedipus, is defined by the free acceptance of his determination by fate. Heroically bearing the truth of ones finitude is an act of affirmation that allows him to achieve something like authenticity, or even better, sovereign empowerment. Conclusion For Nietzsche, the doctrine of eternal recurrence stands opposed to the Day of Judgment, when eternal bliss and damnation will be handed down from on high.[lxxiv] Have I been understood? Dionysus against the Crucified[lxxv] The Wiederkunft or Second Coming of the spirit of great health, the overhuman, redeems mankind from two millennia of enslavement under the yoke of vengefulness and bad conscience. With the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth, God was paying himself back. God was the only one able to redeem man from what, to znew affirmative praxis through his incorporation of the eternal recurrence of the same. Mans redemption ceases to be beyond his grasp and that is why Nietzsche holds the Dionysian ideal of the eternal recurrence to be antithetical to the Day of Judgement: when man emerges as truly sovereign he becomes entitled to judge for himself.[lxxvii] The Dionysian philosopher flatly repudiates the loathsome desire for times end. The eternal recurrence of the same becomes synonymous with the innocence of becoming.[lxxviii] Each time our life repeats itself just as it was a thousand times before. But with each repetition we are different; each time we have incorporated the lessons of the previous recurrence, but have forgotten it in our innocence. This in turn affects the repetition of the same. Everything is the same and yet we have changed, which provokes everything to thus be renewed and invested with a novelty which had been absent hitherto. Upon the arrival of the final figuration of the overhuman the condemnation of man and existence itself will be banished once and for all the overhuman will partake in his own redemption and thereby become the meaning of the earth.[lxxix] Only now does the final metamorphosis proclaimed by Zarathustra take hold: the lion becomes a child.[lxxx] The overman, guardian of the sacred Yes, wills his own will in the creation of new values so as to emerge a circulus vitiosus deus;[11] what Nietzsche calls elsewhere the Roman Caesar with Christs soul.[lxxxi] Error, falsehood, delusion, the passions etc are
not to be blindly swept aside they are the stuff of knowledge and the well-spring of human civilization. The efforts of instrumental reason to placate and deprive nature of its abundance and vivacity are a road to nowhere, a veritable cul-de-sac. Its advocacy of an anthropomorphic and lopsided vision acts as merely another mask for the insatiable striving of the human organism as it assimilates alien forces in the quest for stable and secure conditions for the production and reproduction of life. Human beings however are moving apace toward self-destruction as they continue to live in thraldom to resentiment and bad conscience. Nietzsche admonishes us to cultivate counterdispositions in order to undercut the
malign drives and habits responsible for the preponderance of those values which hasten and ensure the degeneration of the most vital and life-affirming instincts.[lxxxii] These cultural configurations must be defanged and set upon a new course. Nietzsche sees the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same as this possibility. It is to endow the earth with a
new centre of gravity, breaking it out of its aimless stupor and select the composition of future (over)humanity. This task is not for the faint of heart. He tells us that we must first deracinate from each one of our souls
every trace of compassion and pity before we will be able to proceed. It seems, almost despite himself Nietzsche has transposed an incarnation of the Day of Judgement into the immanent flow of time. Damnation is stripped of the eternal those not up to the challenge are instead assured their extinction while those free spirits who manage to incorporate the eternal recurrence will steer the course along which future generations will continue to develop and build: Future history: more and more this thought will be victorious and those who do not believe in it must ultimately die out in accordance with their nature! Only those who consider their existence to be capable of eternal repetition will remain: with such ones, though, a state is possible which no utopian has yet reached![lxxxiii]
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***Links***
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Link Extinction
The affirmatives drive for a perfect security renders life fear this negates everything making life worth living Der Derrian 98 [James, Watson Institute research professor of international studies at Brown University, The Values of Security:
Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard, JSTOR] Nietzsche's interpretation of the origins of religion can shed some light on this paradoxical origin and transvaluation of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche sees religion arising from a sense of fear and indebtedness to one's ancestors: The conviction reigns that it is only through the sacrifices and accomplishments of the ancestors that the tribe exists --and that one has to pay them back with sacrifices and accomplishments: one thus recognizes a debt that constantly grows greater, since these forebears never cease, in their continued existence as powerful spirits, to accord the tribe new advantages and new strength.4 Sacrifices, honors, obedience are given but it is never enough, for The ancestors of the most powerful tribes are bound eventually to grow to monstrous dimensions through the imagination of growing fear and to recede into the darkness of the divinely uncanny and unimaginable: in the end the ancestor must necessarily be transfigured into a god .43 As the ancestor's debt becomes embedded in institutions, the community takes on the role of creditor. Nietzsche mocks this originary, Hobbesian moment: to rely upon an "artificial strength": "the feeling One lives in a community, one enjoys the advantages of communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness, without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside , the "man without peace," is exposed . . . since one has bound and pledged oneself to the community precisely with a view to injury and hostile acts.44 The establishment of the community is dependent upon, indeed it feeds upon, this fear of being left outside. As the castle wall is replaced by written treaty, however, and distant gods by temporal sovereigns, the martial skills and spiritual virtues of the noble warrior are slowly debased and dissimulated. The subject of the individual will to power becomes the object of a collective resentment. The result? The fear of the external other is transvalued into the "love of the neighbor" quoted in the opening of this section, and the perpetuation of community is assured through the internalization and legitimation of a fear that lost its original source long ago. This powerful nexus of fear, of external and internal otherness, generates the values which uphold the security imperative. Indeed, Nietzsche locates the genealogy of even individual rights, such as freedom, in the calculus of maintaining security: - My rights - are that part of my power which others not merely conceded me, but which they wish me to preserve. How do these others arrive at that? First: through their prudence and fear and caution: whether in that they expect something similar from us in return (protection of their rights); or in that they consider that a struggle with us would be perilous or to no purpose; or in that they see in any diminution of our force a disadvantage to themselves, since we would then be unsuited to forming an alliance with them in opposition to a hostile third power. Then : by donation and cession.45 The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show that the perilous conditions that created the security imperative--and the western metaphysics that perpetuate it--have diminished if not disappeared; yet, the fear of life persists: "Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and On Security: Chapter 2 http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html (8 of 17) [8/11/2002 7:45:38 PM] evaluation."46 Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox--all that makes a free life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions: Of future virtues--How comes it that the more comprehensible the world has grown the more solemnities of every kind have decreased? Is it that fear was so much the basic element of that reverence which overcame us in the presence of everything unknown and mysterious and taught us to fall down before the incomprehensible and plead for mercy? And has the world not lost some of its charm for us because we have grown less fearful? With the diminution of our fearfulness has our own dignity and solemnity, our own fearsomeness , not also diminished?47 It is of course in Nietzsche's lament, in his deepest pessimism for the last man, that one finds the celebration of the overman as both symptom and harbinger of a more free-spirited yet fearsome age. Dismissive of utopian engineering, Nietzsche never suggests how he would restructure society; he looks forward only so far as to sight the emergence of "new philosophers" (such as himself?) who would restore a reverence for fear and reevaluate the security imperative. Nietzsche does, however, go back to a pre-Christian, pre-Socratic era to find the exemplars for a new kind of security. In The Genealogy of Morals , he holds up Pericles as an example, for lauding the Athenians for their "rhathymia "--a term that incorporates the notion of "indifference to and contempt for security."48 It is perhaps too much to expect Nietzsche's message to resonate in late modern times, to expect, at the very time when conditions seem most uncertain and unpredictable, that people would treat fear as a stimulus for improvement rather than cause for retrenchment. Yet Nietzsche would clearly see these as opportune
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times, when fear could be willfully asserted as a force for the affirmation of difference, rather than canalized into a cautious identity constructed from the calculation of risks and benefits.
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Link - Hegemony
Hegemony is predicated upon a violent will to order that seeks to elevate security to a transcendental ideal that can never be realized Der Derian 2003 (James, Prof. of IR @ Brown U, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
boundary 2 30.3, Duke UP, p. 19-27) From President Bush's opening lines of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), the gap between rhetoric and reality takes on Browningesque proportions: "Our Nation's cause has [End Page 19] always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peacea peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent'" (1). Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like latevery latenineteenth-century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions. In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a fullspectrum dominance of the battle space for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins with "The United States possesses unprecedentedand unequaledstrength and influence in the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, [End Page 20] become free-floating signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle deployed by the NSS to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenthcentury jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-italone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global suzerainty, and war is peace.
Hegemony is a lie it consumes value and life in its quest for a perfect world Der Derian 03 (Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts
http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/boundary/v030/30.3derian.html boundary 2 30.3 (2003) 19-27, Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, James). Ultimately, however, real-world transformations exceed the grasp of the NSS. The war in Iraq put on full display just how effective the military could be in attaining its planned goals. But what falls outside the engineering and imaginary of the plan, what Edmund Burke called the "empire of circumstance," is in the driver's seat and beyond the cybernetic machinations of the NSS, as we see in the "peace" that followed. Many scholars saw the end of the Cold War as an occasion to debate the merits of a unipolar future as well as to wax nostalgic over the stability of a bipolar past. These debates continued to be state-centric as well as materialist in their interpretation of how power works. By such criteria, there was little doubt that the United States would emerge as the dominant military, economic, and, indeed, civilizational power. Even in Paul Wolfowitz's worst-case nightmares, it was difficult to identify a potential "peer competitor" on the horizon. But then came 9/11, and blueprints for a steady-state hegemony were shredded. Asymmetrical power and fundamentalist resentment, force-multiplied by the mass media, prompted a permanent state of emergency. After the first responders came a semiotic fix with a kick, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. But from the tragedy of 9/11 to the farce of war in Iraq, after the multilateral hopes for a "safer and better world" were subverted by the unilateral nihilism of preventive war, the syntax of order and the code of the simulacrum began to break down. We caught a glimpse of a
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heteropolar matrix, in which actors radically different in identity and interests (states versus super-empowered individuals), using technologies in revolutionary ways (civilian airliners to create kamikaze weapons of mass destruction, the Internet to mobilize the largest antiwar demonstrations ever), were suddenly comparable in their capability to produce improbable global effects. It might be small solace, but out of this deeply nihilistic moment might yet come a real balance of power and truth, in which the Straussian reach of The National Security Strategy is foreshortened by a Nietzschean grasp of reality.
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Link Enviroment/Biodiversity
The project of constant ecological intervention fuels the growing problems. It is a declaration that nature is not enough for existence to be positive. This is a nihilistic framework for evaluating nature. Mcwhorter 92 [Ladelle, "guilt as management technology", pg. 1-4]
Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer, exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mindboggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further; doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of cycle of human activity, followed by a new ecological disaster followed by human intervention, followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution because it a part of the problem itself.
The affs drive for a stable environment ignores that really humans have no power over our surroundings thus it never truly exists Goodwin 7 (Kingsley Goodwin, University College Dublin ,Postmodernism, deep ecology and the idea of wildness: Some
problems with Drenthens formulations ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 14, no. 4 (2007): 501-512., ) Drenthens wildness is also much more abstract. For an example of nature that is truly other, he gives the project of Dutch conservationist van Slobbe, who put a circular hedge around a piece of land, hidden in a nature reserve (Drenthen 2005, 334). This land cannot be experienced, valued or made subject to human plans or endeavours. In fact, we cant even be sure if it exists at all. For Drenthen this functions in social discourse as a moral reminder of human finitude in a land dominated by culture (Drenthen 2005, 334). This is a firmly humanist model where the other is set beyond and against the human subject. Drenthens wildness is the purest of otherness untouched by the human subject but this runs the risk of what Val Plumwood has called normative hyperseperation (1999, 210); in effect, it reproduces the long and problematic gulf between humans and nature characteristic of the western tradition. Wolfe (2003) has comprehensively challenged this model for imagining a false separateness; rather he says the-other-than human resides at the very core of the human itself, not as the untouched ethical antidote to reason, but as part of reason itself (Wolfe 2003, 17). The human is embedded and entangled in all that used to be thought of as its opposite or others (Wolfe 2003, 193). This is a development of Everndens picture of self and other being constituted together. Wolfe has shown that the opposition cannot be clearly drawn and opens up a complexity that, at present, Drenthens model is unable to accommodate. Drenthen claims that we are interested in nature that is beyond our control and fascinated by the limitations of our power (Drenthen 2005, 334), but this can only make sense in the context of an actually experienced other that viscerally challenges our ability to describe and control and on a deeper level is co-constituted with our subjectivity itself. Instead of being a necessarily limited and flawed attempt to articulate a concrete content of experience, wildness or the other is never experienced and functions only as an abstraction within moral discourse. Thus, we can never be sure if van Slobbes enclosure exists or not; it is the idea of it that matters. We are not confronted and confounded by anything, making it difficult to see what kind of a claim such a nature can make on us. Naess makes a similar point (in response to an article by Peter Reed (1999)) in this way: If something is vast, inhuman and utterly different from anything familiar, this in itself does not elicit awe. Nor do I see that we are led to protect it, or even feel an obligation to protect it (Naess 1999, 203). In contrast, for Naess, the ability to identify with other life motivates us to want to protect it. Without an element of identification, we are just as likely to feel alienated and indifferent as to care more for nature. Using an example of a sacred
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Sherpa mountain, Naess argues that while there is awe for the mountain, it is its perception as a beautiful princess and mother that inspires the Sherpa resolve to protect it from western climbers (Naess 1999, 203). Drenthen describes morality broadly as that which enable[s] us to see nature as a meaningful place for us to dwell in, as a world that makes sense (Drenthen 2005, 318) but he does not seem to recognise the value of this impulse for effectively caring about nature.
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Link The State

The affirmative is a cession to cold statism it reaffirms the state as the values-decider, allowing endless violence and removing the individual capacity for affirmation of life Miller 10 (Matthew Allen Miller, Philosophical writer, Nietzschean Critique of the State: Part 2 of 2, 5/3/10)
Much more can be said about Nietzsches critique of morality, but enough has been said in order to use it as the model for a Nietzschean evaluation of the state. What I will argue is that, just as Nietzsche believes modern moral values to be dangerous in the way described above, the same can be said of the state. The state is a danger, for Nietzsche, in the following interrelated ways. First, it lures the higher types into its service and ranks. In doing so, it redirects their energies from higher (creative) work to lower (political, stately) purposes. Even further, it imposes values upon those it governs, thus undermining the important task of creating values, which is a supremely important (and perhaps even essential) function for the individual human being. Most of the following discussion will be based the section from Zarathustra (I. 11) discussed above. There Nietzsche describes the state as a great enticer of those with the potential to flourish as higher men: Oh, even to you, you great souls, it whispers its dark lies! Unfortunately it detects the rich hearts who gladly squander themselves! Yes, it also detects you, you vanquishers of the old God!...It wants to gather heroes and honorable men around itself, this new idol! Gladly it suns itself in the sunshine of your good consciences the cold monster! Just as morality entices these higher types into the service of its ideals, so does the state. What the state does is stealthe works of the inventors and the treasures of the wise. It needs them and their energies for its own legitimacy; and perhaps also in order simply to survive and function. These great souls and heroes those with enough life and energy even to squander are redirected from creative pursuits. The state, then, recruits them for its own stately, collectivist endeavors, which might be nationalistic, or totalitarian, or egalitarian in nature A more specific danger of the state, Nietzsche suggests, is that it can turn great men into politicians. Watch them scramble, these swift monkeys! They scramble all over each other and thus drag one another down into the mud and depths. They all want to get to the throne, it is their madness as if happiness sat on the throne! Often mud sits on the throne and often too the throne on mud. The state, and the politics associated with it, provides great men with an arena for competition. But this is unlike athletic or intellectual competition. In these contexts, competitors (and even enemies!) can come together in a kind of reverence or respect, and they push each other to new excellences. But political competition is nothing more than a race to the bottom; for sitting in political office is akin to sitting in mud. Politics is simply monkey business a degrading, less-than-human activity. The state also undermines the development of those who do not become part of its apparatus. It does so by assuming the role of value arbiter. At the very beginning of the section of On the New Idol, Nietzsche describes his discussion of the state as his words about the deaths of peoples. Value creation (esteeming), for Nietzsche, should not be performed by the state, but is best left to individuals or to peoples. Indeed, it is that which Nietzsche holds to be among the highest (if not the highest) human purpose or ideal. In a later section, On a Thousand and One Goals, Zarathustra makes the following comments: No greater market place on earth did Zarathustra find than good and evil. No people could live that did not first esteem. A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings; observe, it is the voice of their will to power. Humans first placed value into things, in order to preserve themselves...That is why they call themselves human, that is: the esteemer. Esteeming is creating: hear me, you creators! Esteeming itself is the treasure and jewel of all esteemed things. (Z I. 15) Value creation, Nietzsche is suggesting, is an intrinsically valuable human activity. The valuing itself is more important than the specific values that result. Esteeming is even explained as an activity essential to humans for it is this activity after which they are named. Even further, it is also suggested that value creation has a kind of instrumental value. That is, it is a necessary condition for a group of individuals to achieve an identity as a people. But this activity is undermined by the state, which makes value creation unnecessary by imposing from above its own values upon individuals and peoples. The state says: On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordaining finger of God am I (Z I. 11) It is not simply a value creator, but the value creator. In other words, the state universalizes values, and seeks to close the door on the possible alternatives. In doing so, it undermines the development of higher types in two important ways. First, it removes the need for these individuals to create their own values. As Hunt (1991) describes it, the state provides us with a very attractive opportunity to commit this fatal evasion. In doing so, the state becomes a source of selfalientation, of estrangement from our true nature." [1] In other words, human nature as esteemer becomes unnecessary, as the state takes on this task for us. One might say that it "crowds out" the private enterprise of value creation. Second, the universalized values that the state imposes from above will not be conducive to the flourishing of higher types. That is, these state-imposed values are not at all likely to promote things like individualism or severe self-discipline. Rather, they are most-likely to be democratic-egalitarian or nationalist-collectivist in nature, the types of values that would reduce great men to the level of the herd or direct their energies to the goals of the collective. Nietzsche ends On the New Idol by entreating the great souls simply to run away: My brothers, do you want to choke in the reek of their snouts and cravings?
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Smash the windows instead and leap into the open! Get out of the way of the bad smell! Their best bet perhaps their only bet for flourishing is to get away from the state: There, where the state ends, only there begins the human being who is not superfluousThere, where the state endsthe rainbow and the bridges of the overman? (Z I. 11). When we hold the state to Nietzsches standard of value namely, his brand of consequentialism about the flourishing of higher types we see that, at the very least, the state is a great danger. It entices potential higher types of men, puts them into the service of its stately ideals, and thus undermines their flourishing in the pursuit of higher, more creative, endeavors.
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Link Disabilities
The affirmative only exacerbates ableism embracing disability is the only way to dissolve the affirmatives life-negating dichotomies Overboe 1999 (James Overboe, PhD candidate at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, Difference in Itself:
Validating Disabled Peoples Lived Experience, Body and Society Vol. 5 No. 4http://a.parsons.edu/~nesrin/thesis/research/differenceinitself.pdf ) The rhetoric of equality of rights is a cornerstone of identity politics movements with its liberal individualistic embodiment. By arguing that disabled people must demand equality of rights for themselves, supporters of equality of rights deny the lived experience of disabled people. For example, Bickenbach (1993: 163) argues that disabled people may have the equal right to enter government offices, but if these offices are not accessible then many of us cannot exercise our equal rights. The obtaining of equal rights that maintains the systemic discrimination against disabled people does not resolve problems for us. It only exacerbates them. In respect of identity in concept Deleuze (1994: 266) writes, To restore difference in thought is to untie this first knot which consists of representing difference through the identity of the concept and the thinking subject. Applying Deleuzes insights to disability I believe that by untying this knot that garrottes our lived experience and imposes an identity on us, we can begin to rid ourselves of the twin concepts of ableism and extreme liberal individualism that often lead others to see us as an abomination. Rather than an equality of rights based on identity politics, I call for an equality of condition that validates both a disabled embodiment and sensibility. Our physical, mental and emotional manifestations of disability as well as the social, political, moral and physical environment will continue to have an impact upon us. But shifting the notion of an identity which is devalued to a lived experience that is validated causes a change in approach. No longer would we be done to, and done for, or even done with as so often Difference in Itself n 23 within non-disabled and extreme liberal individualism parameters and with the restrictions of an ableist sensibility. The shedding of the illusion of identity allows for our lived experience to come to the forefront. Thus our lived experience would be an integral part of the atmosphere and tone for any change within our lives and our interaction with others, whether they be disabled or non-disabled.
The affirmative delegates the condition of disability upon the population this categorization precludes the ability for the individual to come into its own individual identity by vilifying and accommodating their existence Overboe 1999 (James Overboe, PhD candidate at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, Difference in Itself:
Validating Disabled Peoples Lived Experience, Body and Society Vol. 5 No. 4http://a.parsons.edu/~nesrin/thesis/research/differenceinitself.pdf ) Fourth, according to Deleuze (1994), difference has been relegated to the separation of this from that according to the need to categorize. There is a distribution of difference that is entirely dependent on representation. For example, most disabled people would be primarily classified as disabled persons, which separates them from others with the exception of other disabled people. Although they would also be cross-referenced under the terms sex, race, age, education, employment and familial position the category of disability overshadows all other categories that are indexed. Yet sometimes disabled people do not fit neatly into these categories. For example, initially I was judged to be abnormal in comparison to the ablebodied population (Foucault, 1980). In some ways I could accept this designation because I was classified (albeit negatively) as having cerebral palsy which gave me a sense of identity (albeit devalued) and place (albeit marginal). However, an incident in my life began my questioning the classification of people. While undergoing a physical examination the head orthopaedic surgeon told the observing medical students that I failed to reach the recovery levels expected of cerebral palsy patients. I was shattered because not only was I not normal but now I was also judged to be a freak among people who experience cerebral palsy. In terms of cerebral palsy or able-bodied embodiment there was no prior template from which I came. It could be argued that I was born into a family that through genetics and socialization left me with some sort of blueprint to follow. But, as I have argued, the representation of disability often negated my lived experience that includes my genetic background as well as my familial influence. Moreover, it is not a given that a family will provide a supportive environment for 26 n Body and Society Vol. 5 No. 4 disabled people as the Latimer case illustrates. The difference between my upbringing and that of Tracy Latimer stems from my familys willingness to validate my lived experience. The classification of disability and, more specifically, cerebral palsy derived from the desire of society to impose a category upon me. After I overcame the uncertainty and the fear of being different for itself (to use Deleuzes term) with no category with which to anchor my existence or no place to belong, I felt a sense of freedom
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because I was released from the restrictions of the ability/disability categories. It was only then that I was able to validate my experience of cerebral palsy (I realize that the term cerebral palsy is a restrictive category itself, but presently I do not have a language that adequately describes my experience). But no matter how detrimental the devaluation of a disabled sensibility, the temptation to be safe and fall back on the familiar ability/disability continuum and its understandings is seductive. Thus for me there is an on-going struggle to escape these understandings that to some extent are embedded in my lived experience. I feel the risk in applying difference in itself will be beneficial to myself and others in my interaction with them. Hopefully, both myself and others will be able to shed our preconceived notions about ableism. Perhaps Nietzsche was right. Speaking of the notion of Eternal Recurrence, Philip Kain (1996: 1389) argues that the new heaven is not an escape from the suffering of this world. You must see and interpret the world in a different way. Based on his own experience, Nietzsche believes that we need to embrace illness and have it no other way. Through illness Nietzsche hopes to create new meaning. While I do not necessarily associate disability with illness I realize that both physical manifestations are considered to be negations of able-bodiedness. Therefore, I feel that Kains (1996) interpretation of Nietzsche has pertinence for validating a disabled sensibility. No longer will we be considered the negation of a quality life. No longer will we be considered heroic representations to be put on a pedestal. Nor will we be vilified or pitied as representations of what can go wrong with humanitys fragile existence. Our experience of disability must be embraced in order for there to be the creation of a new meaning of life.
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Link Natives
Their attempt to make you feel guilty for the entire history of colonialism is the ultimate expression of the ascetic ideal, and this hatred of life will ultimately be externalized in violence against the Other Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 1986 [Pascal, ..The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt, p.146-147]
The foregoing teaches us this: that hatred of the West is really a hatred of all cultures concentrated on a single one. In the beginning, one finds nothing loveable in oneself, but in the end, one loses the ability to love others. If the value attached to other cultures is in proportion to the disdain for our own, it is certain that this fascination will decline as one is reconciled with one's own society, or at best will linger in a kind of esthetic eclecticism. A doctrine that preaches the liberation of the human race cannot possibly be based on the hatred of an entire civilization. Man does not work to diminish but to increase himself, and there is every reason to mistrust a form of humanism that begins by leaving out a quarter of the surface of the globe and calling for the consignment of a whole society to hatred and oblivion. The great religions, philosophies, and belief systems are so linked to one another that to reject one is to reject all. It is futile to hope that the systematic cultivation of shame will miraculously open us up to far-off societies, and wipe away misunderstandings. Some may say this sense of guilt is our last chance to retain some modicum of respect for the oppressed. But this is pure cynicism, because it means admitting that, aside from a vague feeling of unease, there is nothing that ties us to them. The proclaimed abandonment of Eurocentrism is still an involuntary act, and the first precondition of the acceptance of others is a consensus about our respect for our own culture. Let us become our own friends first, so that we can become friends of others again. If we are tired of our own existence, others are of little use. To love the Third World, for it to have a future, does not require a repudiation of Europe, and the future of industrialized countries does not require that they forget the nations of the Southern hemisphere. Every self-destructive wish carries with it a generalized negativity that envisions the end of the world.
Making you responsibility for the history of colonialism negates life and results in totalitarian violence in the name of guilt purging. Bruckner, French writer and philosopher, 1986 [Pascal, ..The Tears of the White Man: Compassion as Contempt, p.126-127]
When the West is blamed for the evils of the world, three main types of accusations are presented: Guilt by history: You are responsible for the frightful genocide of colonialism that was carried on against Indians and blacks from the Renaissance to the twentieth century by your ancestors. Guilt by contagion: You are guilty of being the happy descendants of these unscrupulous freebooters, and you must not forget that your prosperity is built on the corpses of millions of natives. Guilt by confirmation: You demonstrate that you are no better than your conquering forefathers because you do not react when hunger kills children and new nations are pushed into underdevelopment by your selfishness. In short, the present is the consequence of the past, and the future will repeat it. The question is not open to discussion-day by day and year by year the list of sins grows longer, sins imputed to a community of people on whom weighs the ancestral suspicion of having fouled the wellsprings of life. Evil is a sort of anthropological curse that attaches to people in countries of the temperate zones. The West is supposed to be cruel and toxic-like cat hairs are to an asthmatic. No matter what we may do, our error remains and we cannot expiate our sins. By a device like that used n anti-Semitism or racism, collective characteristics are cited, and a whole group of people in all their variety are treated as a single person whose criminal nature is ascribed. There are no more human beings, simply entitiesthe French, the Germans, the Americansin the same way as one talks of the Jews and the Arabs. The amalgamation of a certain group of people, regime, or government guilty of certain actions with the people they belong to transforms political guilt into metaphysical guilt. If the West is genocidal by definition (the way ice is cold), if the responsibility is collective and goes back to the dawn of time, what is the point of denouncing its inherent criminality here or there in El Salvador, Brazil, or South Africa, and seeking to protect its victims? What is past is past, irrevocably; why should we be eternally responsible for it? How long will the peoples of Europe continue to be blamed for the atrocities committed by their ancestors? When will it end, this genealogical blackmail that, in the name of reparations and collective interests, would make us the indirect accomplices of slave trading, massacres, and pillage? There is nothing so dangerous as this idea of collective responsibility, which is transmitted indefinitely from generation to generation, and which evokes memories of the worst sort of totalitarian coercion. In the context of French history, our army applied the concept of collective responsibility in Algeria, when, in response to a guerrilla attack, it razed villages, massacred citizens, and tortured suspects. A respect for the past cannot be allowed to lead to confusion of debts and charges. Penance for the wrongs of the past cannot be irretrievably committed to a seamless and endless history. To suppose that Europeans and Americans are naturally or culturally evil is as intellectually lazy and moralistic as to say the opposite. It avoids thinking seriously about contemporary conditions of violence and oppression. It is wrong to declare that the West is guilty simply because it exists, as if it were an insult to creation, a cosmic catastrophe, a monstrosity to be wiped off the face of the earth.
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The question of Israel is fundamental in this regard. Through non-recognition of the Jewish state, the entire Western World is held to be illegitimate.
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Link Anti-Capitalism
They resent capitalism, scapegoating it for all their inadequacies and hatred of the world Buccola 9 (Nicholas, Political Science Professor at Linfield College, The Tyranny of the Least and the Dumbest: Nietzsches
Critique of Socialism, Quarterly Journal of Ideology, http://www.lsus.edu/Documents/Offices%20and %20Services/CommunityOutreach/JournalOfIdeology/NietzscheonSocialismJournalofIdeologyRevised.pdf) Throughout his writings Nietzsche identifies socialists as underprivileged human beings. They believe themselves to be suffering and they seek to find the cause of their pain. Unlike Christians, who blame the entire world, themselves included, for their suffering, socialists are unwilling to blame themselves. Instead, socialists condemn, slander, [and] besmirch society (TI 34). They are, in Nietzsches words, the apostles of revenge and ressentiment; they seek to find someone responsible for their failure and to punish them. Nietzsche labels this way of looking at the world the pessimism of indignation. It is manifest when an individual exclaims: How can I help that I am wretched! But somebody must be responsible, otherwise it would be unbearable! (WP 765). In the case of the socialist, responsibility is discovered in those who support and maintain the unjust political and economic hierarchies that exist in society. The socialist, then, seems to be saying: I am wretched because the system has made me so! If we overturn the system and punish those who supported it, I will cease to be wretched. Here we see the connection between the idealism discussed above and the pessimism of indignation. In addition to finding someone to blame, the socialists also invent a blueprint for a new social order that could pull people out of a state of wretchedness. It is useful to think of Nietzsches rejection of socialism as structurally identical to his denunciation of anti-Semitism. The socialist and the anti-Semite are, in Nietzsches mind, birds of a feather because each places a scapegoat at the center of his theory of justice: [The underprivileged] need an appearance of justice, i.e., a theory through which they can shift responsibility for their existence, for being thus and thus, on to some sort of scapegoat. This scapegoat can be God in Russia there is no lack of atheists from ressentiment or the social order, or education and training, or the Jews, or the nobility, or those who have turned out well in any way (WP 765). This is among the most powerful defenses of Nietzsche against the charge that he was an anti-Semite or proto-Nazi. It is clear that the common denominator that he loathes in socialism and anti- Semitism is each outlooks rejection of personal responsibility and manufacture of an explanation that blames others for their being thus and thus. For Nietzsche, the fact that socialism and anti-Semitism differ in who they blame is beside the point. What matters is that each has identified as evilprecisely the good man of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful man, the ruler, but dyed in another color, interpreted in another fashion, seen in another way by the venomous eye of ressentiment (GM I: 11). Nietzsche identifies the pessimism of indignation as a psychological disease that afflicts those who are unwilling to accept their lot in life and seek to blame others for their position. He contends that we ought to view socialists and others suffering from the pessimism of indignation as invalids who feel better for crying out, for whom defamation is a relief (WP 373). In other words, socialist activism and agitation is, dayto- day, a form of catharsis for the underprivileged. In short, Nietzsche tells us, the pessimism of indignation invents responsibility in order to create a pleasant feeling for itself (WP 765).
Their rejection of the capitalist world as a bad one ignores that we only have one world- their pushes toward utopia ignore that we have to enjoy our world now Buccola 9 (Nicholas, Political Science Professor at Linfield College, The Tyranny of the Least and the Dumbest: Nietzsches
Critique of Socialism, Quarterly Journal of Ideology, http://www.lsus.edu/Documents/Offices%20and %20Services/CommunityOutreach/JournalOfIdeology/NietzscheonSocialismJournalofIdeologyRevised.pdf) Socialism is another in a long line of idealist systems that are, on Nietzsches view, inherently flawed. Idealists, in short, reject this world and embrace another. The mischief of idealism began with Socrates and Plato, who created a world of Truth, or realm of Being, and in so doing brought about a denaturalization of moral values. As you will see below, this move is problematic for Nietzsche for many reasons. For now, it will suffice to say he believed that overthrowing otherworldly ideals was central to his craft. Idealism, in his view, deprived reality of its value, its meaning, its truthfulness and, as such, Socrates represents a moment of the profoundest perversity in the history of values (EH 2 and WP 430). The Grandfather of Socialist Thought: Christianity Although much could be said about the relationship between Christianity and socialism, I will limit my consideration to two major points of contribution. First, I discuss the relationship between Christian and socialist idealism. This will include brief reflections on the striking parallels Nietzsche sees in the Christian and socialist rejection of this world. Second, I explore the socialist adoption of the Christian idea of the equality of souls before God. I will conclude this section with an exploration of why Nietzsche thought the socialist ideal represents nothing but a clumsy misunderstanding of [the] Christian moral ideal (WP 340). First, Nietzsche identifies Christianity as an idealist philosophy that, like Platonism, rejects this world for another. While Socrates and Plato contended that the realm
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of the Forms, or the World of Being, is what really matters, Christians emphasize the importance of an eternal Kingdom of Heaven for believers (WP 161). In both cases, it is worth noting that Bliss is not necessarily something that can be achieved through a transformation of this world. Rather, both Plato and Jesus can be interpreted as offering individuals a philosophy of life that they can establish within themselves. The essential point for Nietzsche is this: the Christian, in typical idealist fashion, condemns, disparages, [and] curses the world (WP 373). According to Nietzsche, Christs emphasis on personal transformation was not shared by St. Paul. Whereas primitive Christianity is, on Nietzsches reading, possible as the most private form of existence, the Christianity of St. Paul is much more public and, thus, more like a political doctrine (WP 211). Once we begin to view Christianity as a social doctrine instead of a personal one, we can see how it can be read as a forerunner to socialism. Nietzsche saw the Christian slave revolt in morality as quite similar to later political revolutions. Christianity offers the poor and lowly a gateway to happiness and, for Nietzsche, to this extent the rise of Christianity is nothing more than the typical socialist doctrine. The things of this world that the gospel passes judgment upon property, gain, fatherland, rank and status, tribunals, police, state, church, education, art, the army are all typical of the socialist doctrine (WP 209). The second foundational contribution of Christianity to the socialist doctrine is the idea of equality of souls before God. It is important to point out that Nietzsche is not arguing that socialists accept the tenets of Christianity as a matter of faith. Rather, like so many political actors throughout history, he thinks socialists are adept at using Christian ideas for their own purposes: The socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; that is their most subtle piece of shrewdness (WP 765). In The Antichrist, Nietzsche calls the equality of souls before God the pretext for the rancor of all base-minded, this explosive of a concept which eventually became revolution, modern idea, and the principle of decline of the whole order of society (AC 162). Nietzsche traces the warpath of this idea quite explicitly in Will to Power: mankind was first taught to stammer the proposition of equality in a religious context, and only later was it made into morality: no wonder that man ended by taking it seriously, taking it practically! that is to say, politically, democratically, socialistically (WP 762). With these two foundational contributions the rejection of this world and the equality of all souls established, we can now turn to consider why it is that Nietzsche concludes the socialist ideal is nothing but a clumsy misunderstanding of [the] Christian moral ideal. While it is true that Nietzsche identified socialism and other progressive theories as cults of Christian morality under a new name, he thought that they fundamentally misunderstood Christianity (WP 340). What was it that he thought the socialists misunderstood about the Christian moral ideal? These doctrines represent misunderstandings of the Christian moral ideal because they transfer the arrival of the kingdom of God into the future, on earth, in human form (WP 339). In Nietzsches mind, the emergence of socialism and similar theories can, in part, be contributed to the death of God. Without the hope of glory in the next world, socialists and others seek to transform this one (WP 340). The emergence of the socialist ideal is, in Nietzsches mind, part of our payment for having been Christians for two thousand years (WP 30). For the complete development of the doctrine of this-worldly transformation, though, we must turn away from the Christians and to the philosopher who Nietzsche identified as the bridge between Platonic-Christian idealism and the socialist idealism of the nineteenth century Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
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Link Environmental Racism

Crusades for environmental justice mirror the racist, warmongering rhetoric used to justify genocides and mass violence Zimmerman 4 (Michael Zimmerman, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Humanities and the Arts at CU,
Boulder, Nietzsche and Ecology: A Critical Inquiry, 2004, http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/paper_zimmerman_nietz_and_ecology.pdf ) Until recently, liberal white Americans environmentalists might have asked: What does any of this have to do with our concern to preserve wild habitat loss in order to slow the extinction spasm now taking place? Indeed, they would have summarily dismissed suggestions that racialism or even racism were influencing their attitudes and practices. About fifteen years ago, however, African-Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities began to assert that their communitiesmany of which were poor and located in urban areaswere negatively affected by 9 what is now called environmental racism. Environmental justice advocates charged that mainstream environmental organizations: a) were composed almost entirely of white people, b) tended to ignore urban pollution, land use issues, and installation of toxic waste dumps in areas that disproportionately affected poor and non-white groups, c) focused primarily on preserving wilderness, and d) sometimes adopted anti-immigrationist views consistent with racist or ethnocentric organizations on the grounds that non-white immigrants could not be trusted to preserve the land. Until recently, anti-anthropocentrism led many environmentalists to assume that humans were a pestilence upon nature; hence, only virgin or untouched land was pure and worthy of being called wilderness. Pre-contact America was regarded as such a wilderness, to which original condition the land ought to be restored, if possible. Some anthropologists, however, have not hesitated to charge that racism underlies such attitudes, which depict Native Americanswho in fact substantially altered North America for millenniain what can be regarded as at best a demeaning manner. Forty years ago, O.C. Stewart wrote: The fact that even the more historically minded American ecologists have started their evaluation of the influence of man upon nature with the landing of the Pilgrims follows from the view that American Indians were part of nature like other animals. Aborigines could be ignored more easily than buffalo as forces of nature [!]. Not only scientists but all whites of European ancestry have always found it difficult to take the Indians seriously enough to learn from them. The relationship between Indians and whites started with the assumption that the Indians were only part of the natural environment. This logically led to the point of view that the American natives had nothing to teach sophisticated Europeans. (Stewart, 1963, 119,121; cited in Kay, 2002, 245-246) Nietzsche would not have had a problem with rank-ordering races, but he would have dismissed the yearning for pristine or original nature. Living in a European landscape tilled 10 and managed by humans for thousands of years, he had little interest in wilderness, partly because he assumed that there was no land untouched by human hands. Racist and antiimmigrationist comments made years ago by some American members of Earth First!, as well as the resurgence in Europe of far-right wing groups concerned about the relationship between blood purity and environmental well-being, confirm the conviction of many moderns that concern about the well-being of nature is sometimes bound up with reactionary social attitudes, including ecofascism. (Biehl, 1995; Geden, 1995; Olsen, 1999; Staudenmeier, 1995; Zimmerman, 1995) Recently, Mark Sagoff has demonstrated that in speaking of invasive species, many scientific and environmentalists use the same vitriolic, fear-mongering, Otherhating language used by early twentieth century Americans critics who warned that the degenerate, semi-human masses (mostly Eastern European Jews and Southern European Catholics) were threatening to displace an America composed of white American Protestants.3 (Sagoff, 1999) If Nietzsche were magically transported to the year 2004 and asked to explain the psychological and/or socio-cultural roots of environmental problems such as global warming, acid rain, and species extinction, he would be unable to do so without a crash course in contemporary natural and social science, as well as in twentieth-century history. As his knowledge increased, Nietzsche would discover that the genetic revolution in Darwinism, as well as comparative and empirical anthropological research, undermined central aspects of the doctrines of race and breeding that were common in his era. Moreover, given the astonishingly evil purposes to which National Socialism put such racial doctrines, he might even renounce some dimensions of his aristocratic antimodernism. If Nietzsche could confront with real comprehension todays ecological problems in light of the events of the past century, I suggest, he would not write what he wrote more than a century ago. A little earlier, we spoke of Nietzsches attack on the ascetic ideal, its attendant slave morality, and the degenerate scientific modernity that shares such morality, even after having 11 slain the Biblical God. Despite all this, however, Nietzsche made clear that ascetic man was far more interesting, morally profound, and ultimately more promising than the blond beasts, to whom we are nevertheless indebted for having used their violence to establish societies that were gradually taken over by violence-condemning and antiaristocratic ascetic priests and philosophers. Agreeing in some respects with those who complain that man is enslaved and
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debilitated by modern society, Nietzsche excoriated Rousseau for ascribing moral goodness to primitive humans (BT 2, 19; SE, 201; HH, 216, 463; D, preface, 3; TI, 552), whereas in fact early human life was characterized by horrendous violence, unmediated resurrection of which Nietzsche did not recommend. Instead of reverting to the murderous assaults justified by the blonde beasts master morality, which was far too close to the morality governing other animals red in tooth and claw, Nietzsche sought to transcend man as he is: herd man, maggot man, ascetic man, insipid socialist man, peace loving man, and evendare I say it? environmentalist man. Insofar as Nietzsches historical scheme exemplifies a three-phase movementpre-modern, modern, and post-modernhis scheme shares the same Gnostic eschatology animating the work of Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx. (Voeglin, 2000) According to Nietzsche, the danger of dangers is that man will allow the ascetic morality at work in socialism and democracy to prevent attainment of the highest power and splendor actually possible to the type man. (GM, preface, 6) Anticipating and helping to make possible the attainment this kind of human being are central themes in Nietzsches thought. By bringing master and slave morality into constructive confrontation with one another (GM, I, 16), by channeling instinctual energyrather than either immediately giving in to it, or else suppressing itinto the process of human self-overcoming, people willing to experiment may help to give rise to higher man, the Roman Caesar with the soul of Christ. (WP, 983) Lest we get carried away here, however, let us recall that Nietzsche affirmed that higher men would be both willing to make use of others, and even do violence against them, all of which 12 would be justified insofar as it furthers the goal of saving humankind from the despair and nihilism that he saw stemming from the death of God. While a new goal is needed to replace that provided by the otherworldly God and the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche often indicated that this goalwhich would require total mobilization of human activitywould be to generate a few extraordinary human beings, whose noble traits and astonishing capacities would be so aesthetically pleasing that they would justify the suffering, struggle, and effort required for ordinary mortals to exist. In a moment, we will return to what is required of humankindand the Earthto fulfill this new goal. First, however, let us consider how Nietzsches concern about the need to justify human life tempers his critique of anthropocentrism.
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Link Agency
A belief in agency and an individuals capacity for moral choice arises from an ethic of resentment and punishment Joanne Faulkner, University of New South Wales, 2008 [The Journal of Nietzsche Studies Spring/Autumn]
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche opposes to a belief in free will what I will attempt to argue is his ownadmittedly underdevelopednotion of agency, in terms of an innocence of becoming. That it refers us to a mode of agency is by no means obvious, and, indeed, in some lights it appears to involve more a suspension of agencyrather like the ordinary concept of innocence that precedes it. What is remarkable about the innocence of becoming, and what makes it particularly useful for a rethinking of political agency post-9/11, is that it complicates conventional assumptions about the relation between innocence and agency by coupling freedom with fatalism. The understanding of agency that emerges from this meditation on innocence (conceived as an agnosticism about good and evil) is more modest than most, to be sure, dwelling as it does within the interstices of events that the individual cannot control. But perhaps such a subtle conception of agency is needed in the present, particularly restricted political context. Perhaps, in other words, and to echo Nietzsche, the greatest events emerge from the quietest stirrings of thought (Z:2 Of Great Events). If, for Nietzsche, agency is embedded within a notion of innocence already shifted from its everyday [End Page 74] context, then our conception of agency must also be transfigured and strange. My hope is that through it we might begin to think about innocents as capable of thought and action and of citizens as not always already imbued with guilt insofar as they act politically (i.e., agitate, criticize, or demonstrate). Nietzsches genealogy of our common concept of free will shows it to be intimately connected with notions of guilt. He argues in TI, for instance, that the attribution of free will is motivated by a desire to find someone accountable for ones grievances: what he calls the instinct for punishing and judging (TI Errors 7). We find free will where we want to find guilt and exact revenge: and thus free will is often the first premise of any argument for punishment. Identifying free will in another allows us to locate an offending action, attribute it to the conscience of the perpetrator, and finally, extract from them a penalty or debt (Schuld). To talk of free will, then, is a complex expression of cruelty: of an intention to find fault and to punish it. Nietzsches rearticulation, in GM, of the social contract myth had already emphasized the integral connection between the development of moral agency and punishment. Moreover, Nietzsche argues that the socialization of the individual involves developing an attitude of self-hatred, or guilt, achieved by means of the internalization of an instinct for cruelty that would otherwise have been indulged in relation to an external object (GM II:16). The individual is cultivated through a painful process of self-alienation and -punishment. One earns the right to make promises only after having endured a regime of discipline and cruelty, wherein one part of the self subdues and subjects another part of the self to it. Thus is generated a vicious circle of self-hatred, guilt, debt, and punishment of the other, otherwise known as society, the judicial system, and moral law.
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Link Oppression
Demanding social justice for historical injury codifies ressentiment and locks subordinated groups in their subordination. Brown, Professor of Womens Studies @ UC Santa Cruz, 1995 [Wendy, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity
pg. 66-70] Liberalism contains from its inception a generalized incitement to what Nietzsche terms ressentiment, the moralizing revenge of the powerless,"the triumph of the weak as weak. "22 This incitement to ressentitnent inheres in two related constitutive paradoxes of liberalism: that between individual liberty and social egalitarianism, a paradox which produces failure turned to recrimination by the subordinated, and guilt turned to resentment by the "successful"; and that between the individualism that legitimates liberalism and the cultural homogeneity required by its commitment to political universality, a paradox which stimulates the articulation of politically significant differences on the one hand, and the suppression of them on the other, and which offers a form of articulation that presses against the limits of universalist discourse even while that which is being articulated seeks to be harbored withinincluded inthe terms of that universalism. Premising itself on the natural equality of human beings, liberalism makes a political promise of universal individual freedom in order to arrive at social equality, or achieve a civilized retrieval of the equality postulated in the state of nature. It is the tension between the promises of individualistic liberty and the requisites of equality that yields ressentiment in one of two directions, depending on the way in which the paradox is brokered. A strong commitment to freedom vitiates the fulfillment of the equality promise and breeds ressentiment as welfare state liberalism --- attenuations of the unmitigated license of the rich and powerful on behalf of the "disadvantaged." Conversely, a strong commitment to equality, requiring heavy state interventionism and economic redistribution, attenuates the commitment to freedom and breeds ressentiment expressed as neoconservative antistatism, racism, charges of reverse racism, and so forth. However, it is not only the tension between freedom and equality but the prior presumption of the self-reliant and self-made capacities of liberal subjects, conjoined with their unavowed dependence on and construction by a variety of social relations and forces, that makes all liberal subjects, and not only markedly disenfranchised ones, vulnerable to ressentiment: it is their situatedness within power, their production by power, and liberal discourse's denial of this situatedness and production that cast the liberal subject into failure, the failure to make itself in the context of a discourse in which its selfmaking is assumed, indeed, is its assumed nature. This failure, which Nietzsche calls suffering, must either find a reason within itself (which redoubles the failure) or a site of external blame upon which to avenge its hurt and redistribute its pain. Here is Nietzsche's account of this moment in the production of ressentiment: For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering, more exactly, an agent; still more specifically, a guilty agent who is susceptible to suffering in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy . . . . This ... constitutes the actual physiological cause of ressentiment, vengefulness, and the like: a desire to deaden pain by means of affects, . . . to deaden, by means of a more violent emotion of any kind, a tormenting, secret pain that is becoming unendurable, and to drive it out of consciousness at least for the moment: for that one requires an affect, as savage an affect as possible, and, in order to excite that, any pretext at all. Ressentiment in this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overwhelms the hurt; it produces a culprit responsible for the hurt; and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these operations both ameliorate (in Nietzsche's term, "anaesthetize") and externalize what is otherwise "unendurable." In a culture already streaked with the pathos of ressentiment for the reasons just discussed, there are several distinctive characteristics of late modern postindustrial societies that accelerate and expand the conditions of its production. My listing will necessarily be highly schematic: First, the phenomenon William Connolly names "increased global contingency", combines with the expanding pervasiveness and complexity of domination by capital and bureaucratic state and social networks to create an unparalleled individual powerlessness over the fate and direction of one's own life, intensifying the experiences of impotence, dependence, and gratitude inherent in liberal capitalist orders and constitutive of ressentiment.24 Second, the steady desacralization of all regions of life -- what Weber called disenchantment, what Nietzsche called the death of god would seem to add yet another reversal to Nietzsche's genealogy of ressenti;nent as perpetually available to "alternation of direction." In Nietzsche's account, the ascetic priest deployed notions of "guilt, sin, sinfulness, depravity, damnation" to "direct the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves . . . and in this way exploit[ed] the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of selfdiscipline, selfsurveillance, and selfovercoming. "25 However, the desacralizing tendencies of late modernity undermine the efficacy of this deployment and turn suffering's need for exculpation back toward a site of external agency.26 Third, the increased fragmentation, if not disintegration, of all forms of association not organized until recently by the commodities marketcommunities, churches, familiesand the ubiquitousness of the classificatory, individuating schemes of disciplinary
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society, combine to produce an utterly unrelieved individual, one without insulation from the inevitable failure entailed in liberalism's individualistic construction27 In short, the characteristics of late modern secular society, in which individuals are buffeted and controlled by global configurations of disciplinary and capitalist power of extraordinary proportions, and are at the same time nakedly individuated, stripped of reprieve from relentless exposure and accountability for themselves, together add up to an incitement to ressentiment that might have stunned even the finest philosopher of its occasions and logics Starkly accountable yet dramatically impotent, the late modern liberal subject quite literally seethes with ressentiment. Enter politicized identity, now conceivable in part as both product of and reaction to this condition, where "reaction" acquires the meaning Nietzsche ascribed to it: namely, an effect of domination that reiterates impotence, a substitute for action, for power, for selfaffirmation that reinscribes incapacity, powerlessness, and rejection. For Nietzsche, ressentiment itself is rooted in reaction -- the substitution of reasons, norms, and ethics for deeds -- and he suggests that not only moral systems but identities themselves take their bearings in this reaction. As Tracy Strong reads this element of Nietzsche's thought: Identity ... does not consist of an active component, but is reaction to something outside; action in itself; with its inevitable self-assertive qualities, must then become something evil, since it is identified with that against which one is reacting. The will to power of slave morality must constantly reassert that which gives definition to the slave: the pain he suffers by being in the world. Hence any attempt to escape that pain will merely result in the reaffirmation of painful structures. If the "cause" of ressentitnent is suffering, its "creative deed" is the reworking of this pain into a negative form of action, the "imaginary revenge" of what Nietzsche terms "natures denied the true reaction, that of deeds."29 This revenge is achieved through the imposition of suffering "on whatever does not feel wrath and displeasure as he does30 (accomplished especially through the production of guilt), through the establishment of suffering as the measure of social virtue, and through casting strength and good fortune ("privilege," as we say today) as self-recriminating, as its own indictment in a culture of suffering: "it is disgraceful to be fortunate, there is too much misery.31 But in its attempt to displace its suffering, identity structured by ressentiment at the same time becomes invested in its own subjection. This investment lies not only in its discovery of a site of blame for its hurt will, not only in its acquisition of recognition through its history of subjection (a recognition predicated on injury, now righteously revalued), but also in the satisfactions of revenge, which ceaselessly reenact even as they redistribute the injuries of marginalization and subordination in a liberal discursive order that alternately denies the very possibility of these things and blames those who experience them for their own condition. Identity politics structured by ressentiment reverse without subverting this blaming structure: they do not subject to critique the sovereign subject of accountability that liberal individualism presupposes, nor the economy of inclusion and exclusion that liberal universalism establishes. Thus, politicized identity that presents itself as a selfaffirmation now appears as the opposite, as predicated on and requiring its sustained rejection by a "hostile external world."32
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***Impacts***
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2NC Turns Case Extinction

The suicidal nihilism fostered by the affs sense of safety in security causes their impacts to become inevitable in the world post-plan Owen and Ridley, 2K [David, assistant director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, Aaron, senior lecture
and associate director of the Centre for Post-Analytic Philosophy at the University of Southampton, Dramatis Personae, in Why Nietzsche Still? ed. Alan Schrift, pp. 149-151]
The modern condition offers both a threat and a promise. Nietzsche argues that the self-destruction of the ascetic ideal threatens to undermine our capacities for "self-discipline," "self-surveillance," and "self-overcoming" and our disposition to truthfulness precisely because we now lack an overarching goal in the service of which these capacities and this disposition are cultivated. But this undermining does not entail any diminution of our dissatisfaction with our this-worldly existence: the suffering endemic to life itself remains; all that has gone is the (ascetic) mode of valuing that rendered such suffering meaningful, and hence bearable. Thus Nietzsche discerns the outlines of a creature whose best capacities have atrophied and whose relationship to its own existence is one of perpetual dissatisfaction. The threat here is obvious: What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound nausea; also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these two were one day to unite, they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the "last will" of man, his will to nothingness, nihilism. And a great deal points to this union. (GM III:14) So suicidal nihilism beckons. The one response to the situation that is absolutely ruled out is the one that has so far proved most successful at addressing problems of this sort, namely, adoption of the ascetic ideal, because the present crisis is caused by the self-destruction of that ideal. But Nietzsche argues that two plausible responses to the crisis are nonetheless possible for modern man. Both of these involve the construction of immanent ideals or goals: one response is represented by the type the Last Man, the other by the type the Ubermensch. The first response recognizes the reality of suffering and our (postascetic) inability to accord transcendental significance to it and concludes that the latter provides an overwhelming reason for abolishing the former to whatever extent is possible. This has the effect of elevating the abolition of suffering into a quasitranscendental goal and brings with it a new table of virtues, on which prudence figures largest. In other words, this response takes the form of a rapport a soi characterized by a style of calculative rationality directed toward the avoidance of suffering at any cost, for example, of utilitarianism and any other account of human subjectivity that accords preeminence to maximizing preference satisfaction. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche portrays this type as follows: "What is love? What is creation? "What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the Last Man and blinks. The earth has become small, and upon it hops the Last Man, who makes everything small. His race is as inexterminable as the flea; the Last Man lives longest. "We have discovered happiness," say the Last Men and blink. They have left the places where living was hard: for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs oneself against him: for one needs warmth. Sickness and mistrust count as sins with them: one should go about warily He is a fool who still stumbles over stones or over men! A little poison now and then: that produces pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at last, for a pleasant death. They still work, for work is entertainment. But they take care the entertainment does not exhaust them. Nobody grows rich or poor any more: both are too much of a burden. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse Formerly all the world was mad," say the most acute of them and blink. They are clever and know everything that has ever happened: so there is no end to their mockery. They still quarrel, but they soon make upotherwise indigestion would result. They have their little pleasure for the day and their little pleasure for the night: but they respect health. We have discovered happiness, say the Least Men and blink. (Z: 1 Prologue 5) Nietzsche's hostility to this first form of response is evident. His general objection to the Last Man is that the Last Man's ideal, like the ascetic ideal, is committed to the denial of chance and necessity as integral features of human existence. 'Whereas the ascetic ideal denies chance and necessity per se so that, while suffering remains real, what is objectionable about it is abolished, the Last Man's ideal is expressed as the practical imperative to abolish suffering, and hence, a fortiori, what is objectionable about it that is, our exposure to chance and necessity. This general objection has two specific dimensions. The first is that the Last Man's ideal is unrealizable, insofar as human existence involves ineliminable sources of suffering not least our consciousness that we come into being by chance and cease to be by necessity. Thus the Last Man's ideal is predicated on a neglect of truthfulness. The second dimension of Nietzsche's objection is that pursuit of the Last Man's ideal impoverishes and arbitrarily restricts our understanding of what we can be and, in doing so, forecloses our future possibilities of becoming otherwise than we are. Thus the Last Man's ideal entails an atrophying of the capacities (for selfovercoming, etc.) bequeathed by the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche brings these two dimensions together in Beyond Good and Evil: "You want, if possible and there is no more insane 'if possible'to abolish suffering .... Well being as you understand it that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptiblethat makes his destruction desirable" (BGE 225).
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he Aff is a misguided enlightenment move to avoid our inevitable encounter with death this narcissistic anxiety rationalizes mass slaughter and culminates in its own end Land 92 (lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University (Nick, The Thirst for Annihilation pg. 77-79)
An utter intoxication such as this is quite different from its Kantian anticipation, although Kant too contests the right of dogmatic theology to guide his journey: Nothing but the sobriety of a critique, at once strict and just, can free us from this dogmatic delusion, which through the lure of an imagined felicity keeps so many in bondage to theories and systems. Such a critique confines all our speculative claims rigidly to the field of possible experience; and it does this not by shallow scoffing at ever-repeated failures or pious sighs over the limits of our reason, but by an effective determining of these limits in accordance with established principles, inscribing nihil ulterius on those Pillars of Hercules which nature herself has erected in order that the voyage of our reason may be extended no further than the continuous coastline of experience itself reachesa coast we cannot leave without venturing upon a shoreless ocean which, after alluring us with ever-deceptive prospects, compels us in the end to abandon as hopeless all this vexatious and tedious endeavour [K IV 392 3]. For Kant it is not enough to have reached the ocean, the shoreless expanse, the nihil ulterius as positive zero. He recognizes the ocean as a space of absolute voyage, and thus of hopelessness and waste. Only another shore would redeem it for him, and that is nowhere to be found. Better to remain on dry land than to lose oneself in the desolation of zero. It is for this reason that he says the concept of a noumenon isa merely limiting concept [K IV 282]. In this way the Occidental obsession with the object consummates itself in the blind passivity of its nihilism. Beyond experience, it is suggested, there must be thought an unknown something [K III 283], although we are unable to comprehend how such noumena can be possible [K III 281]. More precisely: [The noumenon]is not indeed in any way positive, and is not a determinate knowledge of anything, but signifies only the thought of something in general, in which I abstract from everything that belongs to the form of sensible intuition [KIII 281]. That no transcendent object is found is an event which retains the sense of a lost or absent object, rather than that of a contact with or through objectlessness. The ocean has no sense except as a failure of the land. Even whilst supposedly knowing nothing of the noumenon, which, we are told, has no assignable meaning [K III 303], one somehow still knows that it would be something other than objectless waste without end, or the void-plane touched upon at zero-intensity. Kant is peculiarly adamant in this respect: [W]e cannot think of any way in which such intelligible objects might be given. The problematic thought which leaves open a place for them serves only, like an empty space, for the limitation of empirical principles, without itself containing or revealing any other object of knowledge beyond the sphere of those principles [K III 285]. The noumenon is the absence of the subject, and is thus inaccessible in principle to experience. If there is still a so-called noumenal subject in the opening phase of the critical enterprise it is only because a residue of theological reasoning conceives a stratum of the self which is invulnerable to transition, or synonymous with time as such. This is the real or deep subject, the self or soul, a subject that sloughs-off its empirical instantiation without impairment, the immortal subject of mortality. It only remains for Hegel to rigorously identify this subject with death, with the death necessitated by the allergy of Geist to its finitude, to attain a conception of deaths for itself. But this is all still the absence of the subject, even when of is translated into the subjective genitive, and at zero none of it makes any difference. With Kant death finds its theoretical formulation and utilitarian frame as a quasiobjectivity correlative to capital, and noumenon is its name. The effective flotation of this term in philosophy coincided with the emergence of a social order built upon a profound rationalization of excess, or rigorous circumscription of voluptuous lethality. Once enlightenment rationalism begins its dominion ever fewer corpses are left hanging around in public places with each passing year, ever fewer skulls are used as paperweights, and ever fewer paupers perish undisturbed on the streets. Even the graveyards are rationalized and tidied up. It is not surprising, therefore, that with Kant thanatology undergoes the most massive reconstruction in its history. The clerical vultures are purged, or marginalized. Death is no longer to be culturally circulated, injecting a transcendent reference into production, and ensuring superterrestrial interests their rights. Instead death is privatized, withdrawn into interiority, to flicker at the edge of the contract as a narcissistic anxiety without public accreditation. Compared to the immortal soul of capital the death of the individual becomes an empirical triviality, a mere re-allocation of stock. In the Analytic of the Sublime in his Third Critique Kant tentatively raises the possibility that we might taste deatheven if only through a negative pleasurebut nowhere does he raise the possibility that death might savage us. Even when positivized as noumenon, death remains locked in the chain of connotations that passes through matter, inertia, femininity, and castration, resting in its pacified theistic sense as toothless resource and malleable clay. There is no place, no domain, for base matter in Kants thinking, since even auto-generativity in nature is conceived as a regulative analogue of rational willing. One must first unleash the noumenon from its determination as problematic object in order to glimpse that between matter and death there is both a certain identity and an intricate relation, or, in other words: a unilateral difference appending matter to the edge of zero. Not that this complicity has anything to do with the inertia crucial to the mathematical idealization of matter, or with any other kind of mechanical sterility. Matter is no more simply dead than it is simply anything else, because simplicity is the operator of the transcendent disjunction between subject and
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object which effaces base materiality. The death proper to matter is the jagged edge of its impropriety, its teeth. If death can bite it is not because it retains some fragment of a potency supposedly proper to the object, but because it remains uncaged by the inhibition objectivity entails. Death alone is utterly on the loose, howling as the dark motor of storms and epidemics. After the
ruthless abstraction of all life the blank savagery of real time remains, for it is the reality of abstraction itself that is time: the desert, death, and desolator of all things. Bataille writes of the ceaseless slippage of everything into nothing. If one wants, time [V 137], and thinks of himself as a tooth of TIME [I 558]. It could also be saidin a more Nietzschean veinthat zero-becoming has its metaphor in a bird of prey, for which every object is a lamb. Repression always fails, but nowhere is there a more florid example of such failure than the attempt to bury death quietly on the outskirts of the city and get down to business. Only the encrusted historical superficies of zero are trapped in the clay, distilling death down to its ultimate liquidity, and maximizing its powers of infiltration. Marx notes this filtration process in Capital, where he remarks about money/death that it does not vanish on dropping out of the circuit of the metamorphosis of a given commodity. It is constantly being precipitated into new places in the arena of circulation vacated by other commodities [Cap 114]. Dead labour is far harder to control than the live stuff was, which is why the
enlightenment project of interring gothic superstition was the royal road to the first truly vampiric civilization, in which death alone comes to rule.
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2NC Turns Case Suffering

A life of pain and suffering is a life that is rich in affirmation. The way that the aff conceptualizes solutions avoid the positive aspects of life and stalls them from overcoming the suffering they seek to solve. Philip J. Kain, PhD, professor of philosophy at Santa Clara University, 2009, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy,
Nietzsche, Virtue, and the Horror of Existence, ProQuest Suppose that you can, as Aristotle suggests, look back over your life as a whole and feel that it was a good one a happy one. Would that make you want to live it again? Would you at the moment in which you feel that your life was a happy one also crave nothing more fervently than to live it again? What if your life was a joyous life or a proud life? It is quite clear isnt it that you could have a very positive attitude toward your life, and not at all want to live it again? In fact, wouldnt the prospect of eternal repetition, if the idea grew upon you and gained possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness? Wouldnt the expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing? Wouldnt it empty your life of its significance and meaning? Most commentators seem to assume that the only life we could expect anyone to want to live again would be a good life. That makes no sense at all to me. On the other hand, most would assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the sort of life it makes any sense to want to live again. I think Nietzsche was able to see that a life of intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again. This requires explanation. For years Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea and vomiting. Often he was unable to work and confined to bed. He fought this. He tried everything. He sought a better climate. He watched his diet fanatically. He experimented with medicines. Nothing worked. He could not improve his condition. His suffering was out of his control. It dominated his life and determined his every activity. He was overpowered by it. There was no freedom or dignity here. He became a slave to his illness. He was subjugated by it. What was he to do? At the beginning of the essay, Concerning the Sublime, Schiller wrote: nothing is so beneath the dignity of a human being as to suffer violence . . . whoever cowardly suffers it, tosses his humanity aside . . . Every human being finds himself in this position. He is surrounded by countless forces, all superior to him and all playing the master over him . . . If he can no longer oppose physical forces with a corresponding physical force, then nothing else remains for him to do to avoid suffering violence than to do completely away with a relation so deleterious to him and to destroy conceptually a brute force that he in fact must endure. However, to destroy a force conceptually means nothing other than to submit to it voluntarily.39 While Nietzsche does not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, nevertheless, this is exactly what Nietzsche does. What was he to do about his suffering? What was he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every moment of his life? What was he to do about the fact that it was robbing him of all freedom and dignity? What was he to do about this subjugation and slavery? He decided to submit to it voluntarily. He decided to accept it fully. He decided that he would not change a single detail of his life, not one moment of pain. He decided to love his fate. At the prospect of living his life over again, over again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with every detail of suffering and pain, he was ready to say, Well then! Once more!40 He could not change his life anyway. This way he broke the psychological stranglehold it had over him. He ended his subjugation. He put himself in charge. He turned all it was into a thus I willed it. Everything that was going to happen in his life, he accepted, he chose, he willed. He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to overcome his illness except by embracing it.
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2NC Inevitability Extinction

Human extinction is inevitabletheir demand that we escape this inevitability further push the world towards a freedomless world where our short lives cant be enjoyed Jerry Sherman, Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, no date [http://evansexperientialism.freewebspace.com/sherman01.htm] Epistemic pessimism is about these motives, about what we are trying to do. Nietzsche understands knowledge as an attempted power-relationship with the world, a way of trying to handle it. And he concludes that nothing can be done with it, except for a possible aesthetic mastery. Let me show some examples. The clearest statements of this view come from the early, unpublished works, but consider first the passage already seen from Beyond Good and Evil 22, where Nietzsche writes: "[A new interpreter] might, nevertheless, end by asserting the same about this world as you do, namely that it has a `necessary' and `calculable' course, not because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate consequence at every moment." If the universe lacks laws, then one cannot do much with it. One does not know how to interact successfully with it. Nietzsche knew, of course, that technology is a successful interaction with a lawful world, but he is not enthralled with this ability. His pessimism keeps sight of the fact that in the long run technology does not solve the human problem. It cannot overcome death of either the individual or the species. We can do limited things, but ultimately science does not make sense of the world. The last clause in the quoted sentence is obscure, but it suggests that we should not look in some "beyond" for explanations and purposes: what you see is what you get, and it has no order into which we can successfully fit our human lives. Consider the following passage, which appears with slight variations in three places in the early Nachlass, including essays called "On the Pathos of Truth" and the better known "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense": "In a remote corner of the universe there was once a star on which clever animals discovered knowledge. It was the proudest and most deceptive minute of world history, but only a minute. After nature had taken only a few breaths the star began to grow cold and the clever animals were forced to die. And it was time, for while they were priding themselves on having discovered so much, they finally discovered, to their consternation, that all their knowledge had been wrong. They died and cursed truth as they died. 4 This pessimism about knowledge is based partly on the fact that technology's successes are temporary. In this respect, Nietzsche has a strange bedfellow in Bertrand Russell. He begins his 1903 essay, "A Free Man's Worship," with a story, as told by Mephistopheles to Dr. Faustus, that is remarkably like the short account of failed knowledge above. It is the story of a heartless creator who performs a pointless drama of human existence and then says, "It was a good play; I will have it performed again." It is as if Russell were writing his own version of Nietzsche's eternal return. After this story, Russell preaches an existentialist message: Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals must henceforward find a home. That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins--all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built . . ..5 Russell expressed these sentiments early in his career and shortly after Nietzsche's death, without allying himself with Nietzsche or expressing any appreciation of his import. And, of course, Russell did not enter into the great distrust of rationality that Nietzsche was bringing into the twentieth century. Nevertheless, when he says that "all the noonday brightness of human genius [is] destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system," he sees the power of knowledge reduced in the long run to impotence. He also agrees with Nietzsche's pessimism when he says that "man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving," and that "his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms." If our ideas are the product of accident, how likely is it that they can successfully get a grip on this world and turn it to human advantage? Russell comes close to saying that this world is one with which we can do nothing. But the person who says that directly, under the influence of Nietzsche, and who clearly interprets Nietzsche in this epistemically pessimistic way, is Heidegger. He does this through the way he understands Nietzsche's doctrine of "eternal return" or "eternal recurrence of the same." In Heidegger's eyes, this doctrine presents the world as one with which we can do nothing. It is the "most abyssmal thought," the "greatest burden." It shows us that "The collective character of the world. . . into all eternity is chaos."6 It is a chaos that lacks order but not necessity-the same point made above in Beyond Good and Evil: it is a "necessitous chaos."7 Furthermore, the world as presented through the eternal return is "the necessitous chaos of perpetual becoming."
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Humanity is doomed as a specieswe should embrace its death from nuclear war as part of the evolutionary process Roger G Morrison, lecturer in Buddhist Studies at University College Chester, 1997 [Nietzsche and Buddhism p. 78-80]
Regarding mankinds future, Nietzsche cannot see how mankind as a species, can now differ from any other species in not being superseded: The becoming drags the has-been along behind it: why should an exception to this eternal spectacle be made on behalf of some little star or for any little species upon it! Away with such sentimentalities! And, although Nietzsche does not spell it out, it seems to me to allow that, if we take Darwins theory seriously, it is entirely conceivable that we shall be superseded by some better adapted species to whom we shall be the apes: What is the ape to men? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment? And just so shall me be to the Ubermensch: a laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. But with Darwins theory the possible future species will not, according to Nietzsche, be Ubermenschen, but quite the opposite. And it may be that this future species, if they inherit some of our traits, may decide to terminate our species just as we have done to some others. Or, again, inhering from us our taste for good meat, they may decide on gastronomic grounds to farm us as fodder for their kitchens; or use us as we use other species for scientific experiments as we will be nearest to them in the scala naturae. Of course, all this is highly improbable: if any new and favorable mutation did emerge within our species, given the nature of our species, it would perhaps meet with various fates none of which would be likely to guarantee the propagation of its advantage. Our species can be extremely jealous! Also, remaining within our species, there can be no unconditional guarantee for our future. Today we know only too well that a global nuclear war and its after-effects may terminate our speciesbut not all species: perhaps the cockroach of the ant would survive. And, in Darwins terms, they would of necessity be the fittest and, in the evaluative language Darwin sometimes slips into, the higher species. We would become just another extinct species for some possible future paleneotologist to puzzle over. Or, again, what if we were to be invaded by some of Fred Hoyles space bugs which simply wiped us all out. As Flew remarks in his Evolutionary Ethics: An individual or a species can perfectly well have many splendid corporeal and mental endowments without ensuring that it has what is in fact needed for survival: men who are wretched specimens, both mentally and physically, mayand all too often dokill superb animals; and the genius has frequently been laid low by the activities of unicellular creatures having no wits at all. Some of the examples I have given may not be probable, and I am being rather unfair to Darwin, but they are possible and illustrate that there are no a priori reasons for us to assume any guaranteed ascent up the Great Chain of Being towards some state of perfection. Indeed, there are no reasons even to assume our continuation as a species. The human species, like any other, is contingent.
We are merely energy drifting among the universe death is just part of a natural process of energy transformation Robert Lanza, Professor at the Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Wake Forest University and Chief Scientific Officer of Advanced Cell Technology, 02/17/11, The 8 Biggest Scientific Myths, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-lanza/the-8-biggest-scientific-myths_b_823696.html#s241176&title=Death;
hhs-ab We've been taught that we're just a collection of cells and that we die when our bodies wear out. But our belief in death is based on the premise that we play little or no role in reality. However, experiments show the opposite: the observer critically influences the outcome. You can't see things through the bone surrounding your brain. Everything is a whirl of information occurring in your mind. According to biocentrism, space and time are the mind's tools for putting it all together. Death doesn't exist in a timeless, space-less world. Moreover, energy can't be created or destroyed. Although bodies selfdestruct, the "me" feeling is just a fountain of energy in our head. But this energy doesn't go away at death. It has no reality independent of you. Each person creates their own sphere of realit y. Another well-known aspect of science is that observations can't be predicted absolutely. Instead, there's a range of possible observations, each with a different probability. One mainstream explanation is the "many-worlds" interpretation, which states each of these possible observations corresponds to a different universe (the "multiverse"). Everything that can happen occurs in some universe. Death doesn't exist in any real sense in these scenarios. All possible universes exist simultaneously regardless of what happens in any of them.
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2NC Inevitability Suffering

Suffering is an unavoidable condition of being human the idea we can control the world and eliminate suffering destroys all value to life. Kain 7 (Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence,"
the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/6/09) We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin. Eternal recurrence, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (WP 55). It implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is no plan, no purpose, no reason for it. Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, we must see that there is meaning hereit is just that it lies precisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself, meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, suffering for no reason at all. But at the very same time, this creates the innocence of existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering. That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt. There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (TI "Errors" 8; HH 99). If suffering just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We are innocent. This itself could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be loving one's own redemption from guilt. Eternal recurrence brings the bermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the bermensch. Eternal recurrence gives the bermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness. It fills the void. With what? It fills it with something totally familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with one's own liferepeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but (given the horror of existence) suffering cannot be avoided anyway, and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of sin, punishment, or guilt. It has been reduced to a life of innocence. Moreover, as Nietzsche has said, it is only meaningless suffering that is the problem. If given a meaning, even suffering becomes something we can seek (GM III:28). Eternal recurrence, the fatedness of suffering, its meaningless repetition, makes our suffering innocent. That might well be reason enough to embrace it. Or, although we may not be able to embrace it ourselves, I think we can at least see why Nietzsche mightand even why it might make sense for him to do so. [End Page 59] Eternal recurrence also gives suffering another meaning. If one is able to embrace eternal recurrence, if one is able to turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it," then one not only reduces suffering to physical suffering, breaks its psychological stranglehold, and eliminates surplus suffering related to guilt, but one may even in a sense reduce suffering below the level of physical suffering. One does not do this as the liberal, socialist, or Christian would, by changing the world to reduce suffering. In Nietzsche's opinion that is impossible, and, indeed, eternal recurrence of the same rules it outat least as any sort of final achievement.23 Rather, physical suffering is reduced by treating it as a test, a discipline, a training, which brings one greater power. One might think of an athlete who engages in more and more strenuous activity, accepts greater and greater pain, handles it better and better, and sees this as a sign of greater strength, as a sign of increased ability. Pain and suffering are turned into empowerment. Indeed, it is possible to love such suffering as a sign of increased power. One craves pain"more pain! more pain!" (GM III:20). And the more suffering one can bear, the stronger one becomes. If suffering is self-imposed, if the point is to break the psychological stranglehold it has over us, if the point is to turn suffering into empowerment, use it as a discipline to gain greater strength, then it would be entirely inappropriate for us to feel sorry for the sufferer. To take pity on the sufferer either would demonstrate an ignorance of the process the sufferer is engaged in, what the sufferer is attempting to accomplish through suffering, or would show a lack of respect for the sufferer's suffering (GS 338; D 135). To pity the sufferer, to wish the sufferer did not have to go through such suffering, would demean the sufferer and the whole process of attempting to gain greater strength through such suffering. Let us try again to put ourselves in Nietzsche's place. He has suffered for years. He has suffered intensely for years. He has come to realize that he cannot end this suffering. He cannot even reduce it significantly. But he has finally been able to break the psychological stranglehold it has had over him. He is able to accept it. He wills it. He would not change the slightest detail. He is able to love it. And this increases his strength. How, then, would he respond to our pity? Very likely, he would be offended. He would think we were patronizing him. He would not want us around. He would perceive us as trying to rob him of the strength he had achieved, subjugate him again to his suffering, strip him of his dignity. He would be disgusted with our attempt to be do-gooders, our attempt to impose our own
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DDI 12 SS Nietzsche K meaning on his suffering (treating it as something to pity and to lessen) in opposition to the meaning he has succeeded in imposing on it.
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Impact VTL
The affirmative denies the inevitability of suffering this destroys all value to life as the search for a perfect world becomes endless Marinos Diamantides, PhD Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, March 2003, SYMPOSIUM: NIETZCHE AND
LEGAL THEORY (PART II): THE COMPANY OF PRIESTS: MEANINGLESSNESS, SUFFERING AND COMPASSION IN THE THOUGHTS OF NIETZSCHE AND LEVINAS, Cardozo Law Review In relation to the classical philosophical problem posed by suffering there is, as the two quotes above indicate, an intriguing common emphasis on meaninglessness in the works of Nietzsche and Levinas, which renders fertile the reading together of their two distinct philosophies. The difference is that for Levinas, the acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of suffering without resentment is only the "least one can say." Indeed, Nietzsche exposed man's denial of absurd suffering "only" in order to support his case against the sentimentalism of Christian ethics and deontological and utilitarian moralities, which either attribute meaning to suffering or seek to rid life of it, ultimately denying life itself - for to live is also to suffer. Levinas, on the other hand, argued the inevitability of events of senseless suffering breaching from within the hermeneutically ordered world of meaning. Moreover, he viewed this as proof of the inevitability of the idea of infinity in a non-metaphysical sense, for it is "included" into the finite world of being as what cannot be matched by experience or representation, leaving a surplus of awe, astonishment, obsession. Immanence, therefore, is all there is, but to that we add that it cannot cease undergoing the idea of infinity, like an ill man who undergoes his condition. In Levinas' ethical discourse, infinity gets expressed in the "face of the other" and is transformed into obsession with providing succors for meaningless suffering. Suffering, left to its own devices, ridicules experience by always being "too much." In turn, it takes another being that comes to the rescue, thinking itself "infinitely responsible" for all the suffering it encounters, for suffering to be given an appropriate response. With this quasi-transcendental possibility in mind, this paper introduces and critically analyzes Nietzsche's notion of "affirmative compassion," as distinct from moral pity and, gradually, suggests the need for its reformulation as both an instance of will to power and as submission to the ethical imperative to care for the other. Given the un-saintly reputation of Nietzsche, however, the paper cannot but begin by paying tribute to his famous critique of pity, that "morbid emotion" that accompanies the denial of the senselessness of suffering and ultimately compels the nihilistic rejection of life itself. This is done in the first section in which I basically report on my law students' take on Nietzsche in the context of a course on medical law and moral reasoning. In sum, I report that Nietzsche's ideas help one critique the extensions of [*1277] traditional legal doctrines of responsibility for man-made harm - sustained by the beliefs in the causal understanding of the world, in moral autonomy and agency - in relation to litigation that raises questions over the meaning of, and standard of care for, suffering that no one has caused. These doctrinal extensions are, arguably, instances of a hypertrophy of legal consciousness, indicating lack of understanding of the chaotic nature of the world of human affects in the face of absurd suffering and denial of the passion, obsession and delirium that correlate to the disequilibrium, meaninglessness and anarchy of suffering. In this connection, I offer a number of examples, often involving judgments that concern kinds of beings that blatantly manifest this senselessness, ranging from insensate beings in coma to the unborn. In the second section, I examine Nietzsche's views on how meaningless suffering affects the man of power. Because of Nietzsche's conviction that cruelty and indifference are no longer options for contemporary man, I focus on Nietzsche's formulation of a "noble compassion" that would be "affirmative" or "life-enhancing" - compassion within a meaningless universe. Such compassion is part of the becoming of beings with a "surplus of power," as opposed to morally submissive or hedonistic beings. Crucially, this is compassion that does not relinquish self-love in the process, and does not lead to the self becoming physically or emotionally "contaminated" by the suffering it witnesses.
Affirmation by way of eternal recurrence brings value to life. Steven V Hicks & Alan Rosenberg, Department of Philosophy at Queens College & Associate Professor of Philosophy at Queens College, 2003, Nietzsche and Untimeliness: The "Philosopher of the Future" as the Figure of Disruptive Wisdom, The Journal of
Nietzsche Studies 25 1-34, Muse Here, Nietzsche employs a disruptive figure, the demon, to articulate an "untimely" nonascetic myth, the myth of the recurrence cosmology, in order to facilitate the eventual acceptance of an alternative practical nonascetic doctrine for life. His disruptive figures help him to postulate a possible alternative nonascetic ideal for those future postmoral humans (who can perhaps dispense with the myth) in order to help them become the kind of people who would consider the demon's message "divine." The untimely myth of the recurrence cosmology provides a disruptive strategy of sorts for finding intrinsic value in life itself, that is, for valuing the process of living as an end in itself and not merely as a means to an end beyond the process. 55 It provides a way to formulate a figurative test of one's underlying attitude toward life. The demon asks us to take the willingness to relive one's (figurative) recurring life as a measure of the affirmation of one's
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actual nonrecurring life. The transformative effect of accepting the demon's "crushing" message is that those people who possess the "courage of conscience" to "joyfully react to it" will not be tempted to disesteem life by contrasting it with something eternal, unalterable, suprahistorical, or intrinsically good, i.e., some "true world" [End Page 20] or "afterworldly" view. Likewise, by having the myth of eternal recurrence promoted by a disruptive, self-consuming figure, Nietzsche can commend a possible nonascetic competitor ideal to universal attention in a way that is nondogmatic and open-ended. Both the presentation as well as the content of the commended alternative ideal would accord with Zarathustra's transvaluative question, "This is my way; but where is yours?" (Z III, 11). The figure of the demon challenges us to "learn the meaning of [our] own individual lives" from the general "picture of life" presented by the recurrence myth (cf. UM III, 3). He invites each of us to consider what would be the transformative effects in our own lives of accepting the ideal of affirming eternal recurrence. What would this require of us? What kind of life would it entail? The demon cannot tell us; we must discover it ourselves. We must become, in Zarathustra's words, "our own judge and law-giver" (Z I, 17). The ideal of recurrence does not tell us beforehand what our alternative values should be, only that whatever they are, they should always be rooted in gratitude and service to life rather than resentment against it. To be a possible alternative to the ascetic ideal, it would admittedly have to supply some general content, namely, do whatever is necessary to affirm eternal recurrence; for example, overcome the oppression of your present situation if it prevents you from getting a sufficient sense of power and effectiveness in relation to life except by devaluing life. 56 But the implementation of the ideal would always be particularistic, contextual, nondogmatic, and open-ended.
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Impact Nihilism
Jacqueline Scott, PhD in humanities, associate professor at University of Memphis, 1998, Continental Philosophy Review, Nietzsche and decadence: The revalutaion of morality, ProQuest While the strong decadents may not be able to elude decadence fully because of the necessity of placing a value on life, they can avoid the problems of the weak decadents by questioning the value of values and understanding the role that morality has played in the past whether it has served ascending or descending life. This is the task which Nietzsche himself took on and goaded his fellow free spirits to address. 40 This is the reason that Nietzsche talked about the revaluation of values as the focus of his later works as opposed to the will to power, the eternal recurrence, or the bermensch. Nietzsche did not talk about the destruction of values in general, instead he talked about nding a way to change the value we place on our rationales for existence. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche claimed that philosophers would be deceiving themselves in believing that they could elude decadence by making war on it. At most, they could alter its expression, they do not abolish the thing itself. 41 The philosopher must battle decadence by altering his expression of it, but he must not deceive himself by believing that he will ever successfully elude it. As opposed to claiming to have discovered objective, universal truth values, and creating systems of morality based on them as do the weak decadents, Nietzsche proposed that strong decadents embrace the fact that they created the values on which their rationales for existence are based. They should also emphasize that they created these rationales for themselves and those like them. These values are characterized by the fact that they afrm life both the good and evil by proclaiming that their lives are worth living. The strong decadent then must walk a ne line in terms of the creation of values. He must avoid creating moralities that are symptoms of decay, as did his weak counterparts, but he must also avoid the temptation to do away with values altogether. For Nietzsche, it was not a viable option that philosophers do away with values because then they would not be carrying out the fundamental task of their profession assigning values. More importantly, they would then be giving into nihilism which Nietzsche thought would lead to suicide. So they must create values but the strong decadent feels compelled to create them from a radically different perspective than that of his weak counterparts. 42 In short, he must try to maintain a position between the two types of weak decadent values: fabricated optimism and the pessimism of resignation. The strong decadent must realize that the reverence human beings have had in the past for morality and for the good in life, in general, has been problematic. It was a faade that was meant to deny the fact that the world is ungodly and inhuman. While such an approach might have fullled our immediate needs, in the long term, because it involved a rejection of meaningless, chaotic reality and grew out of weakness, it has been harmful. Strong decadents must then be able to turn their backs on this mendacious optimism and become pessimists who admit the problematic nature of existence. This pessimism holds its own danger: a hatred of life so great that one will longer wish to live; one will no longer will life. These extremes are both expressions of nihilism because they spring from an inability to contend with the complex nature of our lives. The strong decadent must avoid the false reverence of the optimist as well as the suicidal Either/Or of weak pessimism (Either abolish your reverences or yourselves!) and still create values. 4
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Impact Violence
Violence is only a product of slave morality and the attempts to control disorder in the world Deleuze 74 (Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Desert Islands and Other Texts, p. 119, AD: 7/9/09)
This original depth, Zarathoustra's celebrated height-depth, must be named the will to power. Of course, Mr. Birault figured out how we must understand the term "will to power." It's not wanting to live, because how could whatever life is want to live? It's not a desire for domination either, because how could whatever it is that dominates desire to dominate? Zarathoustra says: "The desire to dominate: now who would call that a desire?" The will to power, then, is not a will that wants power or wants to dominate. Such an interpretation would indeed have two disadvantages. If the will to power meant wanting power, it would clearly depend on long established values, such as honor, money, or social influence, since these values determine the attribution and recognition of power as an object of desire and will. And this power which the will desired could be obtained only by throwing itself into the struggle or fight. More to the point, we ask: who wants such power? who wants to dominate? Precisely those whom Nietzsche calls slaves and the weak. Wanting power is the image of the will to power which the impotent invent for themselves. Nietzsche always saw in struggle, in fighting, a means of selection that worked in reverse, turning to the advantage of slaves and herds. This is one of Nietzsche's great observations: "The strong must be defended just like the weak." Certainly, in the desire to dominate, in the image of the will to power which the impotent invent for themselves, we discover a will to power: but at its lowest level. The will to power has its highest level in an intense or intensive form, which is neither coveting nor taking, but giving, creating. Its true name, says Zarathoustra, is the virtue that gives.4 And the mask is the most beautiful gift, showing the will to power as a plastic force, as the highest power of art. Power is not what the will wants, but that which wants in will, that is to say, Dionysos.
The aff authorizes limitless violence as an attempt to correct the imperfections of our existence Deleuze 83(Gilles, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Lyon, Paris, and Lycees, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 118-119, AD: 7/9/09)
The imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibilities, perpetual accusation. All this replaces aggression. "The aggressive pathos belongs just as necessarily to strength as vengefulness and rancour belong to weakness" (EH I 7 p. 232). Considering gain as a right, considering it a right to profit from actions that he does not perform, the man of ressentiment breaks out in bitter reproaches as soon as his expectations are disappointed. And how could they not be disappointed, since frustration and revenge are the a prioris of ressentiment? "It is your fault if no one loves me, it is your fault if I've failed in life and also your fault if you fail in yours, your misfortunes and mine are equally your fault." Here we rediscover the dreadful feminine power of ressentiment: it is not content to denounce crimes and criminals, it wants sinners, people who are responsible. We can guess what the creature of ressentiment wants: he wants others to be evil, he needs others to be evil in order to be able to consider himself good. You are evil, therefore I am good; this is the slave's fundamental formula, it expresses the main point of ressentiment from the typological point of view, it summarises and brings together all the preceding characteristics. This formula must be compared with that of the master: I am good, therefore you are evil. The difference between the two measures the revolt of the slave and his triumph: "This inversion of the valuepositing eye . . . is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile world" (GM 1 10 pp. 36-37). The slave needs, to set the other up as evil from the outset.
7. Turn Violence is complicit in a negative will to power the process of security involves purging the world of all difference. Der Derian 98 (James, Prof of PoliSci at the U of Massachusetts, "The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and
Baudrillard," Cianet, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html, AD: 7/7/09) Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. 33 Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of
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death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. Since Nietzsche has suffered the greatest neglect in international theory, his reinterpretation of security will receive a more extensive treatment here. One must begin with Nietzsche's idea of the will to power, which he clearly believed to be prior to and generative of all considerations of security. In Beyond Good and Evil , he emphatically establishes the primacy of the will to power: "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength--life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the most frequent results." 34 The will to power, then, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power. It can, in its negative form, produce a reactive and resentful longing for only power, leading, in Nietzsche's view, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings--including self-preservation--are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for ". . . life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitation--but why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages." 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life: "life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war." 36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science , Nietzsche asks of the reader: "Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" 37
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Impact Wars*
The only way to prevent unending war is to relinquish fear of catastrophe the affirmative is selfdefeating and makes its own impacts inevitable Beres 94 (Louis Rene, Ph.D., Princeton University, Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, Self-determination,
international law and survival on planet earth, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Spring, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 1)
Humankind is different. Of course, the spectacle of catastrophe and annihilation has been with us from the beginning, and the seeming insignificance of individual life appears to be confirmed by every earthquake or typhoon, by every pestilence or epidemic, by every war or holocaust. Yet, each of us is unwilling to accept a fate that points not only to extinction, but also to extinction with insignificance. Where do we turn? It is to promises of immortality. And from where do we hear such promises? From religion, to be sure, but also from States that have deigned to represent God in his planetary political duties, n46 and that cry out for "self-determination." How do these States sustain the promise of immortality? One way is through the legitimization of the killing of other human beings. And why is such killing the ostensible protection of one's own life? An answer is offered by Eugene Ionesco as follows: I must kill my visible enemy, the one who is determined to take my life, to prevent him from killing me. Killing gives me a feeling of relief, because I am dimly aware that in killing him, I have killed death. My enemy's death cannot be held against me, it is no longer a source of anguish, if I killed him with the approval of society: that is the purpose of war. Killing is a way of relieving one's feelings, of warding off one's own death. n47 There are two separate but interdependent ideas here. The first is the rather pragmatic and mundane observation that killing someone who would otherwise kill you is a life-supporting action. Why assume that your intended victim would otherwise be your assassin? Because, of course, your own government has [*17] clarified precisely who is friend and who is foe. The second, far more complex idea, is that killing in general confers immunity from mortality. This idea, of death as a zero-sum commodity, is captured by Ernest Becker's paraphrase of Elias Canetti: "Each organism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the sun, and declares life good." n48 Or, according to Otto Rank, "The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the Sacrifice, of the other; through the death of the other one buys oneself free from the penalty of dying, of being killed." n49 It is time, in the Spanish philosopher Unamuno's words, "to consider our mortal destiny without flinching." n50 This, lamentably, is easier said than done because the human instinct that clings to life flees from death as the very prototype of evil, and because each singular individual is able to counter the observed fact of mortality with entire categories of exceptions. Such solipsistic boasts have been identified by George Santayana as follows: Any proud barbarian, with a tincture of transcendental philosophy, might adopt this tone. "Creatures that perish," he might say, "are and can be nothing but puppets and painted shadows in my mind. My conscious will forbids its own extinction; it scorns to level itself with its own objects and instruments. The world, which I have never known to exist without me, exists by my co-operation and consent; it can never extinguish what lends it being. The death prophetically accepted by weaklings, with such small insight and courage, I mock and altogether defy: it can never touch me." n51 Nevertheless, the fact of having been born augurs badly for immortality, and the human inclination to rebel against an apparently unbearable truth inevitably produces the very terrors from which individuals seek to escape. In its desperation to live perpetually, humankind embraces a whole cornucopia of faiths that offer life everlasting in exchange for undying loyalty. In the end, such loyalty is transferred from the faith to the State, which battles with other States in what political scientists would describe as a struggle for power, but which is often, in reality, a perceived final conflict between the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness. The advantage to being on the side of the Sons of Light in such a contest is nothing less than the prospect of eternal life. n52 But the result is ongoing wars around the world. [*18] How, then, do we end
these terrible wars? Most important, we must first understand them as manifestations of humankind's unwillingness to accept personal death. Death defines world politics because individuals wish to escape death. The ironies are staggering, but the connections persist and remain unexamined.
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***Alt***
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2NC Alt Solvency - Extinction

Facing extinction allows us to get over the anxiety of complete destruction it becomes a willful affirmation Cioran 34 (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 90, AD: 7/7/09)
Let us return to original chaos! Let us imagine the primordial din, the original vortex! Let us throw ourselves into the whirlwind which has preceded the creation of form. Let our being tremble with effort and madness in the fiery abyss! Let everything be wiped out so that, surrounded by confusion and disequilibrium, we participate fully in the general delirium, retracing our way back from cosmos to chaos, from form to swirling gyres. The disintegration of the world is creation in reverse: an apocalypse upside down but sprung from similar impulses. Nobody desires to return to chaos without having first experienced an apocalyptic vertigo. How great my terror and my joy at the thought of being dragged into the vortex of initial chaos, that pandemonium of paradoxical symmetry - the unique geometry of chaos, devoid of sense or form! In every whirlwind hides a potential for form, just as in chaos there is a potential cosmos. Let me possess an infinite number of unrealized, potential forms! Let everything vibrate in me with the universal anxiety of the beginning, just awakening from nothingness! I can only live at the beginning or the end of this world. Jacqueline Scott, PhD in humanities, associate professor at University of Memphis, 1998, Continental Philosophy Review, Nietzsche and decadence: The revalutaion of morality, ProQuest At the same time, while self-afrmation was for Nietzsche the noblest goal, he claimed that most people have sought the less noble and easier goal of self-preservation. These values of self-preservation represent an aversion to life and are a rebellion against the most fundamental presuppositions of life. Nevertheless, as rationales although they essentially will nothingness, they are a will and thereby preserve the species. Man would rather will nothingness than not will. 7 The problem with self- or species-preservation as a goal is that the true and proper goal of life is expansion, not preservation: The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims as the expansion of power and, wishing for that, frequently risks even sacrices selfpreservation. 8 For Nietzsche then, the best type of rationale is one whose goal is self-enhancement by way of an afrmation of ones life, and it is only the healthiest individuals who will be able create and live by such a rationale. It is their opposites, those who are distressed and weak, who have traditionally created rationales for preservation which they labeled systems of morality. 9 According to Nietzsche, the philosopher was the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who has the conscience of the over-all development of man, and he will make use of religions for his project of cultivation and education. 10 The philosopher, then, is responsible for creating the rationales for existence which are necessary for the over-all development of man. Nietzsche claimed that modern morality, as opposed to creating the conditions for both the enhancement of the species and for the production of people of great deeds, was leading to stagnation and even the decay of the species. This diminution was the greatest danger for everyone because it signaled the inability to carry out our most fundamental, distinctly human task. Our moralities no longer served to provide us with rationales for existence. Instead, modern moralities only made us feel a certain weariness for this world and for the species in general. The worst type of decadent, though, is one, like the Christian, who teaches that one must blame oneself this choice of being harmful to oneself is the formula for decadence. 11 It teaches hatred of oneself, particularly hatred of ones instincts. One is taught that in order to do penance for the past sins of other humans, one must selessly devote ones life to serving others and to having pity for them, because one is not worthy of ones own attention. Nietzsche referred to this as un-selng or self-denial and contended that such an approach was unhealthy because the priestly leaders who created it made self-destruction a sign of value and duty. 12 A symptom of this type of decadence is assigning the unegoistic an absolute value, and considering the egoistic abhorrent. Such a world can be evidenced in the Kantian morality. Its emphasis on disinterested motives devalues the importance of the individuals desires and needs in short, it is an extirpation of the instincts: Not to seek ones own advantage that is merely a gleaf for a quite different, namely psychological fact: I no longer know how to nd my advantage. . . Disintegration of the instincts!. 13 This approach (I am worth nothing), in turn, has lead to the weak pessimists point of view that nothing is worth anything life is not worth anything. 14 Our will to create, to perform good deeds or even to search out those who are able to do such acts is atrophying from lack of use. As opposed to truly improving the species, modern moralities are only leading us down the road to decay. One can see then the importance Nietzsche assigned to rationale for existence in terms of the creation of culture and the survival of the species in general. While assigning values to his life (the creation of moralities) is the primary task of the philosopher, it is also a danger for
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him. 15 There is the danger that the moralities he creates will only cause the eventual demise of the species. In fact, this Nietzschean problem of morality is even more hazardous than that the creation of moralities is necessary for the enhancement of the species, yet, the assigning of values is a sign of decadence.1
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2NC Alt Solvency - Suffering

Radically questioning ethics and values opens up space for new political possibilities this turns any of their cede the political arguments Brown, 2000 (Wendy, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University and UC Berkeley Humanities Fellow
Nietzsche for Politics in Why Nietzsche Still? Edited by Alan Schrift, pg. 209-211) To pursue these possibilities, I want to consider first Nietzsche the genealogical "psychologist," the thinker who deploys speculative genealogies to probe the psychological production of values such as justice, equality, or Christian morality. What is the significance of Nietzsche's diagnostic pose and genealogical approach for reconceiving a relation ship of theory to politics? How does genealogy itself refigure the relation between the intellectual and the political? How does genealogy's crossing of philosophy and history open up the political present without it self taking the place of politics? "We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge," Nietzsche begins On the Genealogy of Morals, "and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves" (GM PI). It is this ignorance that Nietzsche seeks to redress with his genealogical tracings of the desires (not only the unmediated will to power but also its thwarted forms-envy, resentment, jealousy, and revenge) that materialize into the moral and political formations of equality, liberal justice, and the state. Unlike other genres of philosophical or historical criticism, including those delineated in his own "Advantages and Disadvantages of History for Life," genealogy permits an examination of our condition that interrogates its very terms and construction. Genealogy reveals the terms by which we live by rupturing them, by doing violence to their ordinary ordering and situation. In this, genealogy paradoxically aims to dislocate that which is both its starting point and its object: the present. And in that dislocation, it also dislocates the conventions of politics, morality, and epistemology constitutive of the present. Nietzsche's intentions with genealogy can also be figured as calling into question the familiar through a complex of strategic reversals. Consider section 6 of the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, which begins, This problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity ... seems at first to be merely something detached; an isolated question mark; but whoever sticks with it and learns how to ask questions here will experience what I experienced-a tremendous new prospect opens up for him, a new possibility comes over him like a vertigo, every kind of mistrust, suspicion, fear leaps up, his belief in morality, in all morality, falters-finally a new demand becomes audible. (GM P6) In this account of genealogical movement, Nietzsche reminds us that genealogy is, at bottom, a form of artful questioning, a way of asking "what really happened there" about a commonplace. He reminds us too that when this question truly grips the questioner, it disturbs a much larger nest of beliefs than that with whic1h the genealogist begins. One might think here not only of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals but of Foucault's History of Sexuality and the way that each calls into question the structure and function of conventional beliefs and standard histories about their subject- and not only the beliefs and histories themselves. The questioning Nietzsche recommends is necessarily of a historical kind. specified in the next portion of the passage quoted above: let us articulate this new demand [that has become audible by virtue of questioning the value of the morality of pity]: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question-and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired. (GM P6; latter two emphases added) Calling into question a commonplace (in this case the value of the morality of pity) produces a new political possibility (a critique of morality as such), which in turn produces a need for a new kind of knowledge (a particular kind of history of morality). A radical critique of moral values requires knowing the history of how they were occasioned, the conditions under which they grew, changed, and took hold-precisely the history that must be buried by values that naturalize themselves as universal and transhistorical. But there is something else highlighted by this passage: the movement between knowledge and politics, between questioning and demand, consists of an oscillation that does not collapse these terms into one another. Questioning produces an experience of vertigo; the vertigo produces a demand; the demand requires new knowledge; Ind the new knowledge can materialize into a new worldview. The questioning and the political demand incite each other, but the chain of incitation would be aborted if the movement collapsed through direct politicization of knowledge or a reduction of politics to questioning. Nietzsche continues: One has taken the value of these "values" as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing "the good man" to be of greater value than "the evil man," of greater value in the sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general. ... But what if the reverse were true? What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the "good," likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future? ... So that precisely morality would be to blame if the highest power and splendor actually possible to the type man was never in fact attained? So that precisely morality was the danger of dangers? (GM P6)
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***2NC Blocks***
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AT: Framework
We meet we are the status quo The role of a policy-maker is inherently that of resentment and nihilism because it is based upon resentment and the desire for a better world. Before one decides to take on the nihilistic role of policymakers, you must first decide the PRIOR question of the attitude to take towards life and well win its more important to reject nihilism thats Saurette Forcing debate to be about instrumental desirability imposes mastery and violence into the realm of politics. This deplaces debate with absolutism and totalitarianism Saurette 96 (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them:
Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory. Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09) Arendt contends that this rule-based conception of political action assumed a hegemonic and 'natural' status only when the philosophical transformation of Western civilisation created an intellectual framework which necessitated interpreting politics as rulership. From this perspective, the importance of Arendt's thought is that she reveals the way in which the Will to Order/Truth has created the parameters of the modern understanding of politics. According to Arendt, our modern notion of politics is an inevitable consequence of the Platonic Will to Truth/Order. After Plato's Republic, politics could no longer be conceived of as the freedom to act with equals, but could be conceptualised only as the ordering of society according to the world of forms. With this paradigmatic substitution of making for acting, homo faher becomes the model political actor, and the realm of human affairs can be interpreted only in terms of work. Further, through this transformation, the concepts of mastery, control, and violence are inextricably imposed onto the realm of politics. As Arendt notes, 'Mr] the Republic, the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman applies his rules and standard; he "makes" his City as the sculptor makes a statue; and in the final Platonic work these same ideas have even become laws which need only be executed'.27 The politician is idealised as the craftsman whose skill lies first in perceiving the ideal form of the product-to-be, and second, in organising the means to execute its production. This transformation inverts both the practice and the meaning of politics on at least two levels. First, the 'end' of political action becomes measured in terms of the ability of actors to replicate an ideal form. As Arendt notes, this instrumentalised model of politics evaluates action solely on the grounds of a means-ends calculus which risks devolving into an eternal regression of ungroundable utility. Arendt states that `[t]he trouble with the utility standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication is that the relationship between means and end on which it relies is very much like a chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context'.' The only possible way to stabilise this chain is to posit an eternal and perfect end, such as justice, order, or God, which acts as an unquestioned goal due to its perfect truthfulness. The essence of the Platonic, and later Christian and Enlightenment, conceptions of political action, then, is the ability to ground the final end through recourse to an unquestionable 'truth'. By resituating political judgement in the realm of ideals, this model denies that meaning derives from the apparent world of human affairs, and replaces debate, action, and plurality with absolutes and ideals. The dichotomisation of the ideal and apparent worlds results in a second inversion. The notion of politician as craftsman undermines the possibility of action in the political sphere by attempting to deny the very condition of plurality and natality. The prerequisite qualities of equality and persuasion are replaced by the precepts of fabrication: mastery and violence. Plural political action is renounced in favour of the unquestioned order of rulership and mastery (which destroys the potential for natality and plurality), or by the coercion of violence (which simply overwhelms any possibility of action through sheer strength). This consequence is then circularly justified by the belief that the end of action can be nothing more than the realisation of the Real World in the Apparent World. The conception of community through equality and difference is inexorably replaced by the understanding of political community constructed through mastery, control, and rule. The dual inversion of politics-as-making explicitly reveals the profound impact of the philosophical foundation of the Will to Order/Truth on the modern conception of politics. Within this philosophical order, politics must be understood as a process of fabrication in which the end utopian goal justifies and underpins rulership, controls and domination. From this perspective, the development of a variety of Real World ideals (Platonic justice, Christian salvation, or vulgar Marxist utopianism) which guide political action have disguised the entrenched consistency of the understanding of politics-as-making. It is precisely this 'definition' of politics that must be exposed and problematised. For politics-as-making is neither a 'natural' nor
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'realistic' conception of politics, but rather a historical consequence of a specific philosophical foundation. As such, it is neither factual nor beyond critique.
Nothing happens when you vote affirmative instead vote negative as a means of establishing an ethical relationship with suffering. If we win the alternative is good in the abstract, you should vote negative. Kain 7
(Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/6/09) jl
To appreciate how committed he is, suppose we are incorrigible do-goodersliberals, socialists, or Christians. We just cannot bear to see anyone suffer. Suppose we find a researcher who is working on a cure for Nietzsche's disease. This researcher thinks that within a few years a drug can be produced to eliminate the disease. Suppose the researcher is right. And suppose that just as Nietzsche has solidly committed to eternal recurrence, just as he is able to love his fate, just as he has decided he would not change the slightest detail of his life, we tell him about this cure. How would Nietzsche respond? Would he accept the cure? Would he give up his hard-won attitude of accepting his migraines, nausea, and vomiting, of refusing to desire any change? Would he revert to his old attitude of hoping to reduce his suffering, trying out whatever might accomplish this? Would he give his illness a chance to reassert its psychological stranglehold? We must remember that our supposition is that he would actually be cured in a few years. But he would also forgo the discipline, the strengthening, the empowerment that a commitment to eternal recurrence and amor fati would have made possible. Although his illness would be cured, he would not have developed the wherewithal to deal with any other sufferingin a world characterized by the horror of existence. We cannot know whether Nietzsche would decide to take the cure or not. What we can be sure of is that if he did, he would not be the Nietzsche we know. Kierkegaard retells the story of Abraham and Isaac. God commands Abraham to take his only son to Mount Moriah and to sacrifice him there as a burnt offering. Faithful Abraham sets off to obey God's will. But just as he arrives, just as he has drawn his knife, just as he is about to offer his son, he is told instead to sacrifice the ram that God has prepared. Kierkegaard suggests that if he had been in Abraham's position, if he had sufficient faith in God and had obeyed him as Abraham did, if he had been able to summon the same courage, then, when he got Isaac back again he would have been embarrassed. Abraham, he thinks, was not embarrassed. He was not embarrassed because he believed all along, by virtue of the absurd, that God would not require Isaac.24 What about Nietzsche? Let us assume that Nietzsche has fully committed to eternal recurrence and amor fati, that he has come to love his fate, that he has decided he would not change the slightest detail. Moreover, he has announced this to the world in his writings. Let us assume that over the years this commitment has empowered him, given him greater strength. We do-gooders now inform him that we can cure his disease and eliminate his suffering. Even further, suppose we were able to prove to him that eternal recurrence is impossible. Would Nietzsche be embarrassed? Maybe. But it is not absolutely clear that he would be. He might respond that believing in eternal recurrenceperhaps even by virtue of the absurdallowed him to face the horror of existence. He might respond that it does not really matter whether his life will actually return. The only thing that matters is the attitude he [End Page 61] was able to develop toward his present life. He might respond that it does not really matter that it has become possible to cure his particular illness; there is still plenty of other suffering to be faced given the horror of existence. He might respond that what matters is the strength he was able to gain from believing in eternal recurrence and loving his fate, not whether eternal recurrence is actually true.
Questions of political consideration miss the point of the criticism the ballot is an ethical choice to save ourselves White, 90 (Alan, Professor of Philosophy Williams College, Delusion Frames, From Within Nietzsches Labyrinth,
http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/Without%20frames.htm , AD: 7/9/09) jl The most provocative teachings I find in Nietzsche are not political, but rather ethical; Nietzsche does not attempt to tell us how to save the world, but rather how to save ourselves -- how to save ourselves from living lives that we will come to view with regret rather than with pride. And he teaches that we can do that without becoming supermen who blithely crush their supposed inferiors beneath their feet.
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The ballot must be used as an ethical action instead of roleplaying, only transforming our own personal relationship with suffering can solve Newman 0 (Saul, Senior Lecturer in Politics @ U of London, Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, Theory & Event - Volume 4, Issue 3, Muse,
AD: 7/8/09) jl
Rather than having an external enemy -- like the State -- in opposition to which one's political identity is formed, we must work on ourselves. As political subjects we must overcome ressentiment by transforming our relationship with power. One can only do this, according to Nietzsche, through eternal return. To affirm eternal return is to acknowledge and indeed positively affirm the continual 'return' of same life with its harsh realities. Because it is an active willing of nihilism, it is at the same time a transcendence of nihilism. Perhaps in the same way, eternal return refers to power. We must acknowledge and affirm the 'return' of power, the fact that it will always be with us. To overcome ressentiment we must, in other words, will power. We must affirm a will to power -- in the form of creative, life-affirming values, according to Nietzsche.[56] This is to accept the notion of 'self-overcoming'.[57] To 'overcome' oneself in this sense, would mean an overcoming of the essentialist identities and categories that limit us. As Foucault has shown, we are constructed as essential political subjects in ways that that dominate us -- this is what he calls subjectification.[58] We hide behind essentialist identities that deny power, and produce through this denial, a Manichean politics of absolute opposition that only reflects and reaffirms the very domination it claims to oppose. This we have seen in the case of anarchism. In order to avoid this Manichean logic, anarchism must no longer rely on essentialist identities and concepts, and instead positively affirm the eternal return of power. This is not a grim realization but rather a 'happy positivism'. It is characterized by political strategies aimed at minimizing the possibilities of domination, and increasing the possibilities for freedom.
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AT: Perm
No perms the alternative is the status quo. Any perm that solves would have to sever their change in the status quo. This is illegitimate and a voting issue because we cant get a link if they can kick the 1AC. [Extend links and stuff] The link overwhelms the net benefit to the permutation Turanli We trust in just one roll of chance. The perm fails because it tries to manipulate chance to produce a better outcome Deleuze 1986 (Gilles, French philosopher, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 27-8) vp
Whereas the thrown dice affirm chance once and for all, the dice: which fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny which brings the dice back. It is in this sense that the second moment of the game is also the two moments together or the player who equals the whole. The eternal return is the second moment, the result of the dicethrow, the affirmation of necessity, the number which brings together all the parts of chance. But it is also the return of the first moment, the repetition of the dicethrow, the reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself. Destiny in the eternal return is also the "welcoming" of chance, "I cook every chance in my pot. And only when it is quite cooked do I welcome it as my food. And truly, many a chance came imperiously to me; but my will spoke [0 it even more imperiously, then it went down imploringly on its knees - imploring shelter and love with me, urging in wheedling tones; 'Just see, 0 Zarathustra, how a friend comes to a friend!' "(Z III "Of the Virtue (hat makes small" 3 p. 191). This means that there are fragments of chance which claim to be valid in themselves, they appeal to their probability, each solicits several throws of the dice from the player; divided among several throws, having become simple probabilities, the fragments of chance are slaves who want to speak as masters. 24 But Zarathustra knows that one must not play or let oneself be played, on the contrary, it is necessary to affirm the whole of chance at once (therefore boil and cook it like the player who wants the dice in his hands), in order to reunite all its fragments and to affirm the number which is not probable but fatal and necessary. Only then is chance a friend who visits his friend, a friend who will be asked back, a friend of destiny whose destiny itself assures the eternal return as such.
Perm fails We must affirm every moment of life, and the desire for even the smallest change negates life as a whole. Thiele 90 [Leslie, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism , pg 203]
Nietzsche held that all existence was inextricably meshed. To alter the slightest detail affects the whole. The constitution of an individual is not selective: it entails all of its pleasure and pain, knowledge and ignorance, limitations and experience. The constitution of history is no different. Circumstance begets identity. It follows that were anything different in history, one would not have come to be as one is. To have arrived at the moment of experiencing the Dionysian rapture, then, is to embrace everything that led to this moment: The first question is by no means whether we are content with ourselves, but whether we are content with anything at all. If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves but all existence. For nothing is self-sufficient, neither in us ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to produce this one event-and in this single moment of affirmation all eternity was called good, redeemed, justified, and affirmed. (WP 532-33)
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AT: Turn Relativistic

Were not relativist the alt is an authoritative ethic of strength Frazer 6 (Michael, Ph.D in political philosophy from Princeton, postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project at
Brown University. Proferssor of Enlightenment polyphi @ Harvard, On Nietzschean Ethnic: The Compassion of Zarathuras: Nietzsche of Sympathy and Strength, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=421638) Zanezor Nietzsches demand for a new, higher morality can be harmonized with his perspectivism when one acknowledges, following Nehamas, that Nietzsches perspectivism need not imply ethical relativism.15 Specifically, perspectivism is entirely compatible with the idea that certain perspectives are better than others. Nietzsche captures this idea by rejecting interpretations of the world that represent only provisional perspectives, perspectives . . . from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were (JGB I:2, p. 200). Nietzsche can even take this one step farther and consider that there might be one privileged perspective which is better, not just than some others, but better than all othersnot in the sense of being more objective or giving a truer picture of things, but in the sense of being more urgent or more commanding. Such a perspective would be the single best perspective for human beings to take on the world; its view on existence would be ethically authoritative for creatures such as ourselves.
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AT: Turn Violence/Genocide*
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AT: Extinction/Death First/ Life Ultimate Good

Its inevitable - Faulkner Turn: Their elevation of life as the ultimate value is nihilism. Trying to preserve life ignores the necessity of death. Greg Garrard, Bath Spa University, 2006 [COLLOQUY text theory critique 12 (2006)]
One of the most hopeful and cogent of Nietzsche's works is The Gay Science (Die Frohliche Wissenschaft), subtitled la gaya scienza, in which a madman proclaims the death of God to the bemused sceptics in the market square, the prophet Zarathustra is introduced, and, according to Laurence Lampert the new politics of earthly affirmation is tied to a reformed and joyous science.7 Opposed to the deadly bad conscience of the morality of mores and the self-importance of the tragic hero, is the wise laughter of the gay scientist who affirms the eternal return of all beings as they are. Nietzsche proposes a programme of de-deification of nature, together with a naturalization of humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature.8 He asks: ...how could we reproach or praise the universe ? Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness and unreason or their opposites: it is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it wish to become any of these things; it does not by any means strive to imitate man. None of our aesthetic and moral judgements apply to it. Nor does it have any instinct for self-preservation or any other instinct; and it does not obey any laws either. Let us beware of saying there arelaws in nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses. Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of purposes that the word "accident" has meaning. Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life. The living is merely a type of what is dead, and a very rare type.9 Nietzsches radical anti-anthropomorphism might seem to rule out nearly any statement about nature therefore as an anthropomorphism including, by the way, the one just cited although clearly only specific types of assertion are the true targets here. Religious or superstitious claims are first in the firing line, but contemporary science as a form of mechanistic piety is also implicated. Lynn White's essay called for a Franciscan revival in order that Christianity might make up for centuries of ecologically destructive, anti-natural teaching, but if Nietzsche is right, such a substitution of responsible stewardship for the human dominion apparently mandated in the Bible would leave a mouldering divine corpse propped up in His Heaven, powerless to prevent further degeneration into nihilism. Zarathustra advises otherwise:
Mere survival not enoughits better to risk extinction to overcome humanity Max More, Head Extropy Institute, 2001 [http://www.kurzweilai.net/articles/art0106.html?printable=1]
Joy assigns a high probability to the extinction of humanity if we do not relinquish certain emerging technologies. Joy's implicit calculus reminds me of Pascal's Wager. Finding no rational basis for accepting or rejecting belief in a God, Pascal claimed that belief was the best bet. Choosing not to believe had minimal benefits and the possibility of an infinitely high cost (eternal damnation). Choosing to believe carried small costs and offered potentially infinite rewards (eternity in Heaven). Now, the extinction of the human race is not as bad as eternity in Hell, but most of us would agree that it's a utterly rotten result. If relinquishment can drastically reduce the odds of such a large loss, while costing us little, then relinquishment is the rational and moral choice. A clear, simple, easy answer. Alas, Joy, like Pascal, loads the dice to produce his desired result. I view the chances of success for global relinquishment as practically zero. Worse, I believe that partial relinquishment will frighteningly increase the chances of disaster by disarming the responsible while leaving powerful abilities in the hands of those full of hatred, resentment, and authoritarian ambition. We may find a place for the fine-grained voluntary relinquishment of inherently dangerous means where safer technological paths are available. But unilateral relinquishment means unilateral disarmament. I can only hope that Bill Joy never becomes a successful Neville Chamberlain of 21st century technologies. In place of relinquishment, we would do better to accelerate our development of these technologies, while focusing on developing protections against and responses to their destructive uses. My assessment of the costs of relinquishment differ from Joy's for another reason. Billions of people continue to suffer illness, damage, starvation, and all the plethora of woes humanity has had to endure through the ages. The emerging technologies of genetic engineering, molecular nanotechnology, and biological-technological interfaces offer solutions to these problems. Joy would stop progress in robotics, artificial intelligence, and related fields. Too bad for those now regaining hearing and sight thanks to implants. Too bad for the billions who will continue to die of numerous diseases that could be dispatched through genetic and nanotechnological solutions. I cannot reconcile the deliberate indulgence of continued suffering with any plausible ethical perspective. Like Joy, I too worry about the extinction of human beings. I see it happening everyday, one by one. We call this serial extinction of humanity "aging and death". Because aging and death have always been with us and have seemed inevitable, we often rationalize this serial extinction as natural and even desirable. We cry out against the
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sudden death of large numbers of humans. But, unless it touches someone close, we rarely concern ourselves with the drip, drip, drip of individual lives decaying and disintegrating into nothingness. Some day, not too far in the future, people will look back on our complacency and rationalizations with horror and disgust. They will wonder why people gathered in crowds to protest genetic modification of crops yet never demonstrated in favor of accelerating anti-aging research. Holding back from developing the technologies targeted by Joy will not only shift power into the hands of the destroyers, it will mean an unforgivable lassitude and complicity in the face of entropy and death. Joy's concerns about technological dangers may seem responsible. But his unbalanced fear-mongering and lack on emphasis of the enormous benefits can only put a drag on progress. We are already seeing fear, ignorance, and various hidden agendas spurring resistance to genetic research and biotechnology. Of course we must take care in how we develop these technologies. But we must also recognize how they can tackle cancer, heart disease, birth defects, crippling accidents, Parkinson's disease, schizophrenia, depression, chronic pain, aging and death. On the basis of Joy's recent writing and speaking, I have to assume that we disagree not only about the facts but also in our basic values. Joy seems to value safety, stability, and caution above all. I value relief of humanity's historical ills, challenge, and the drive to transcend our existing limitations, whether biological, intellectual, emotional, or spiritual. Joy quotes the fragmented yet brilliant figure of Friedrich Nietzsche to support his call for an abandonment of the unfettered pursuit of knowledge. Nietzsche is telling the reader that our trust in science "cannot owe its origin to a calculus of utility; it must have originated in spite of the fact that the disutility and dangerousness of the 'will to truth', or 'truth at any price' is proved to it constantly." Joy has understood Nietzsche so poorly that he thinks Nietzsche here is supporting his call for relinquishing the unchained quest for knowledge in favor of safety and comfort. Nietzsche was no friend to "utility". He despised the English Utilitarian philosophers for their enthroning pleasure or happiness as the ultimate value. Even a cursory reading of Nietzsche should make it obvious that he valued not comfort, ease, or certainty. Nietzsche liked the dangerousness of the will to truth. He liked that the search for knowledge endangered dogma and the comforts and delusions of dogma. Nietzsche's Zarathustra says: "The most cautious people ask today: 'How may man still be preserved?'" He might have been talking of Bill Joy when he continues: "Zarathustra, however, asks as the sole and first one to do so: `How shall man be overcome?"... "Overcome for me these masters of the present, o my brothers--these petty people: they are the overman's greatest danger!" If we interpret Nietzsche's inchoate notion of the overman as the transhumans who will emerge from the integration of biology and the technologies feared by Joy, we can see with whom Nietzsche would likely side. I will limit myself to one more quotation from Nietzsche: And life itself confided this secret to me: "Behold," it said, "I am that which must always overcome itself. Indeed, you call it a will to procreate or a drive to an end, to something higher, farther, more manifold: but all this is one... Rather would I perish than forswear this; and verily, where there is perishing... there life sacrifices itself--for [more] power... Whatever I create and however much I live it--soon I must oppose it and my life; ... 'will to existence': that will does not exist... not will to life but... will to power. There is much that life esteems more highly than life itself. Zarathustra II 12 (K: 248) Like Nietzsche, I find mere survival ethically and spiritually inadequate. Even if, contrary to my view, relinquishment improved our odds of survival, that would not make it the most ethical choice if we value the unfettered search for knowledge and intellectual, emotional, and spiritual progress. Does that mean doing nothing while technology surges ahead? No. We can minimize the dangers, ease the cultural transition, and accelerate the arrival of benefits in two ways: We can develop a sophisticated philosophical perspective on the issues. And we can seek to use new technologies to enhance emotional and psychological health, freeing ourselves from the irrationalities and destructiveness built into the genes of our species.
The desire to preserve the human species reflects herd morality destroys all value to life Quain 2009 (Tony, Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Georgetown University,
http://www.tonyquain.com/philo/200611NW.shtml) "Whether I contemplate men with benevolence or with an evil eye, I always find them concerned with a single task : to do what is good for the preservation of the human race. Not from any feeling of love for the race, but merely because nothing in them is older, stronger, more inexorable and unconquerable than this instinctbecause this instinct constitutes the essence of our species, our herd."1 With this grand assertion, the 19th century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche opens Book I of The Gay Science, a work encompassing most of his influential ideas on morality, religion, and man and society. But does the preservation of the species imply the need to ensure the preservation of every individual? Even if it did, does Nietzsche believe that this primal instinct has served man well? Is there a basic human dignity that demands that our herd take care of allof its members? What does Nietzsche have to contribute to our understanding of the charity and benevolence of a political society? Specifically, would Nietzsche favor or oppose a generous, redistributive welfare state? I shall argue that in his writing Nietzsche makes it quite clear that he would oppose state redistribution of wealth, both from the point of view of those from whom wealth is taken and those to whom it is given.2While he does not in The Gay Science directly confront or discuss the merits of welfare politics, his views on pity, benevolence, dignity, morality, equality, pain, and happiness all contribute to a mosaic quite contemptuous of charity and its motives and
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consequences. Nietzsche would reject the welfare state as being, at the same time, both weak submission to self-negating morality and a projection of power of the strong over the weak. Nietzsche's approach is individualistic. While he often speaks of the origins, development, and ails of society in general, his writing is nowhere intended to sway the designs or designers of the collective; he directs his attention always to the individual as an individual. Following this style, the evidence of his rejection of the welfare state shall be presented as the admonitions he dispenses to three kinds of people3: the Benefactor, who gives what he has to assist those in need; the Moralist, who demands that others do the same; and the Recipient, who accepts the charity of others or the manna of a compassionate state. The argument will conclude with a possible alternative Nietzsche offers to the welfare state.
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AT: Accepting Death Bad

The alt is politically empoweringa pessimistic acceptance of the world opens up radical possibilities Dienstag, 2004 (Joshua Foe, PhD. in polsci from Princeton, "Tragedy, Pessimism, Nietzsche," New Literary History 34:1, Johns
Hopkins Literary Press, Project Muse Like Nietzsche, then, Steiner derives tragedy from pessimism and accounts for the decline of tragedy by reference to the triumph of optimism. But what follows from this account, it should now be clear, need not be a reactionary aesthetics or politics. Whatever Steiner's intent (which I do not pursue here, though I think it has often been oversimplified), Nietzsche's "Dionysian pessimism" is the source of his most radical claims, claims that have, most recently, appealed to a series of radically democratic political theorists. Tracy Strong describes Nietzsche's politics as a "politics of transfiguration," and it is this theme of self-shaping and self-transformation against a tragic background which is the key link between Nietzsche and such figures as Camus, Arendt, Foucault, and William Connolly. Each of these writers has found in Nietzsche a portrait of energetic individuality that can be supportive of democracy while remaining distinct from the liberal assumptions that are often assumed to be a necessary complement to democratic theory. Nietzsche's pessimism does not require elitism, and it does not recommend passivity. Instead, as these twentieth-century inheritors of Nietzsche have seen, it sanctions a process of identity-renovation based not on an assumption of the self's natural integrity but, to the contrary, on an acknowledgment of its fundamental instability and perishability. While acknowledging limits to the human condition, this is a politics of possibility more radical than most. It makes little sense, therefore, to link pessimism (or pessimism-cumtragedy) with conservative politics. The pessimistic spirit is
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Action is illusory Waiting for change to come as an event is passive nihilism it gives us the feeling of activism while keeping everything the same, replicating problems Zupancic 3 (Alenka, Prof of Philosophy at the U of Ljubljana, The Shortest Shadow, p 70, AD: 7/8/09) jl
I should point out, however, that the true value of Nietzsches thought does not lie simply in prophecies and diagnostics like these. And his philosophy should not be understoodas it is by Heidegger as an attempt at, or a project of, overcoming nihilism. As Alain Badiou correctly points out, for Nietzsche, the act is not an overcoming. The act is an event. And this event is an absolute break, the proper name of which is Nietzsche.37 Or, to put it in a slightly different manner, Nietzsche is not simply a severe analyst of contemporary discontent in civilization, of its forms and causes, endowed with the additional gift of prophecy concerning the eventual overcoming of this condition. He is already a break; he is already something different. Various forms of what he defines as nihilism may still persist for centuries to come. And yet, with Nietzsche, something elsea different configuration of thoughthas already taken place. That is to say, complaining about (or criticizing) the (post)modern condition, while waiting for or aspiring to an event that will finally change this condition, is in itself as nihilistic as the world this attitude denounces as nihilistic. In other words, the possible stepping out of the nihilist either/or is not an act that has to refer to some future point (when the world and its ways will change), but an act that can refer only to past and present points where this stepping out already has its real territory. The true importance of Nietzsches thought is situated here: not in the fact that it can help us to perceive and criticize the nihilist condition, but, rather, in the fact that it already carries within itself the Real of a different configuration.
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AT: Progress Good

Faith in the value of progress creates the notion we must always search for universal truth without attaching any value or meaning to existence we become animals without value on a constant search to find truth in the world. Saurette 96 (Paul, Prof of political theory/science at John Hopkins University, I mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid Them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the
Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory. Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25, number 1. pp. 3-6, AD: 7/6/09)
Science, however, is not an overcoming of the Will to Truth, but merely the most complete, empty, and nihilistic ascetic ideal. It refutes 'faith' but retains an unquestioned belief in itself. Although science claims to follow no authority, its `unconditional will to truth is faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if as an unconscious imperative... it is the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth' .58 The scientific Will to Truth is both the most advanced and the most dangerous manifestation of the Will to Order/Truth, because in spite of its disavowal of the Christian dichotomised world, it retains a belief in Truth without attaching any value or meaning to existence.59 With the rise of science, then, the sole virtue of the Christian Will to Truth/Order, the 'faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in his irreplaceability in the great chain of being, [becomes] a thing of the past. Man has become an animal, literally and without reservation or qualification'.' The radical scepticism of science is the 'suicidal nihilism' of the late-modern age, 'affirming as little as it denies'.' It is the process by which all such 'transcendent' grounds are dissolved in a corrosive scepticism: the true world becomes a fable. The central value of our culturetruthdrives us towards ceaseless unmasking....The irony, as Tracy Strong observes, is that this discovery does not liberate us from the sense that we must have truth in order to have meaning, that meaning is somehow inextricably tied to truth or the universal. We continue to search for what we know does not exist, confirming our growing sense of meaninglessness; worse, we come to be at home in this exhaustion of meaning." Ironically, then, Nietzsche suggests that it is precisely the nihilism of scientific faith which pushes man 'onto an inclined planenow he is slipping faster and faster away from the centre into what? into nothingness? into a penetrating sense of nothingness'," The danger of the late-modern nihilistic Will to Truth is that this reactive 'will to negation', while yearning for a truthful foundation, can only destroy and negate. Even anthropocentric recreations of authoritative Truth, such as faith in progress, utilitarian happiness-for-everyone, socialist utopias, or Kant's secularised teleologies, cannot survive the scrutiny of this nihilistic Will to Truth. As Michael Haar notes, [a]fter having killed Godi.e. after having recognized the nothingness of the `true world'and after having placed himself where God once was, Man continues to be haunted by his iconoclastic act: he cannot venerate himself, and soon ends up by turning his impiety against himself and smashing this new idol." The radical and untempered scepticism of scientific Will to Truth undermines the foundational meanings of the modern world and thus threatens modern life with the prospect of unconditional nihilism. The Will to Truth must become 'conscious of itself as a problem' if it is to avoid this fate. And with the historical stage of late modernity, we are able to explore the possibilities of this self-overcoming of the Will to Truth. As Nietzsche states, `[w]e finally come to a complete stop before a still more basic question. We ask about the value of this will. Suppose we want Truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?'"
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AT: We Should Stop Suffering*

Thats impossible suffering is an inevitable and necessary part of life, trying to negate it only destroys the point of living thats Saurette The direct result of suffering is greatness only by embracing our suffering and learning to use it to make us better can we become truly heroic for what does not kill us, makes us stronger Cioran 34 (E.M, Romanian Philosopher, Prof of Philosophy at Andrei Saguna, 1934, On the Heights of Despair, p. 6-7, AD:
7/7/09) I am: therefore the world is meaningless. What meaning is there in the tragic suffering of a man for whom everything is ultimately nothing and whose only law in this world is agony? If the world tolerates somebody like me, this can only mean that the blots on me the so-called sun of life are so large that in time they will obscure its light. Lifes beastliness trampled me under foot and oppressed me, clipped my wings in full flight and stole all my rightful joys. 1 the enthusiastic zeal and mad passion I put into becoming a brilliant individual, the demonic charm I adopted to gain an aura in the future, and the energy I spent on an organic, glamorous, inner rebirth, all proved weaker than the beastly brutality and irrationality of this world, which poured into me all its reserves of negativity and poison. Life is impossible at high temperatures. Thats why I have reached the conclusion that anguished people, whose inner dynamism is so intense that it reaches paroxysm, and who cannot accept normal temperatures, are doomed to 1 fall. The destruction of those who live unusual lives is an aspect of life's demonism, but it is also an aspect of its insufficiency, which explains why life is the privilege of mediocre people. Only mediocrities live at life's normal temperature; the others are consumed at temperatures at which life cannot endure, at which they can barely breathe, already one foot beyond life. I cannot contribute anything to this world because I only have one method: agony. You complain that people are mean, vengeful, ungrateful, and hypocritical? I propose the agony method to rid you of all these imperfections. Apply it to every generation and its effects will soon be evident. Maybe in this way I too could become useful to mankind! Bring every man to the agony of life's last moments by whip, fire, or injections, and through terrible torture he will undergo the great purification afforded by a vision of death. Then free him and let him run in a fright until he falls exhausted. I warrant you that the effect is incomparably greater than any obtained through normal means. If I could, I would drive the entire world to agony to achieve a radical purification of life; I would set a fire burning insidiously at the roots of life, not to destroy them but to give them a new and different sap, a new heat. The fire I would set to the world would not bring ruin but cosmic transfiguration. In this way life would adjust to higher temperatures and would cease to be an environment propitious to mediocrity. And maybe in this dream, death too would cease to be immanent in life.
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AT: VTL Inevitable

Value to life is only able to be retained through the alternative life isnt intrinsically valuable, its value comes through living life through affirmation Hicks & Rosenberg 3 (Steven V, Department of Philosophy @ Queens College, Alan, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Queens College,
Nietzsche and Untimeliness: The "Philosopher of the Future" as the Figure of Disruptive Wisdom, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 25 1-34, Muse, AD: 7/9/09)
Here, Nietzsche employs a disruptive figure, the demon, to articulate an "untimely" nonascetic myth, the myth of the recurrence cosmology, in order to facilitate the eventual acceptance of an alternative practical nonascetic doctrine for life. His disruptive figures help him to postulate a possible alternative nonascetic ideal for those future postmoral humans (who can perhaps dispense with the myth) in order to help them become the kind of people who would consider the demon's message "divine." The untimely myth of the recurrence cosmology provides a disruptive strategy of sorts for finding intrinsic value in life itself, that is, for valuing the process of living as an end in itself and not merely as a means to an end beyond the process. 55 It provides a way to formulate a figurative test of one's underlying attitude toward life. The demon asks us to take the willingness to relive one's (figurative) recurring life as a measure of the affirmation of one's actual nonrecurring life. The transformative effect of accepting the demon's "crushing" message is that those people who possess the "courage of conscience" to "joyfully react to it" will not be tempted to disesteem life by contrasting it with something eternal, unalterable, suprahistorical, or intrinsically good, i.e., some "true world" [End Page 20] or "afterworldly" view. Likewise, by having the myth of eternal recurrence promoted by a disruptive, selfconsuming figure, Nietzsche can commend a possible nonascetic competitor ideal to universal attention in a way that is nondogmatic and open-ended. Both the presentation as well as the content of the commended alternative ideal would accord with Zarathustra's transvaluative question, "This is my way; but where is yours?" (Z III, 11). The figure of the demon challenges us to "learn the meaning of [our] own individual lives" from the general "picture of life" presented by the recurrence myth (cf. UM III, 3). He invites each of us to consider what would be the transformative effects in our own lives of accepting the ideal of affirming eternal recurrence. What would this require of us? What kind of life would it entail? The demon cannot tell us; we must discover it ourselves. We must become, in Zarathustra's words, "our own judge and law-giver" (Z I, 17). The ideal of recurrence does not tell us beforehand what our alternative values should be, only that whatever they are, they should always be rooted in gratitude and service to life rather than resentment against it. To be a possible alternative to the ascetic ideal, it would admittedly have to supply some general content, namely, do whatever is necessary to affirm eternal recurrence; for example, overcome the oppression of your present situation if it prevents you from getting a sufficient sense of power and effectiveness in relation to life except by devaluing life. 56 But the implementation of the ideal would always be particularistic, contextual, nondogmatic, and open-ended.
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AT: Util/Consequentialism*
[read the turns case block] Turn: Their utilitarian calculus undermines life. Abandoning the demand to prudently preserve the herd is key to overcoming nihilism Jonny Anomaly, Tulane University, 2005 [The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 29 (2005) 1-15]
What does it mean to espouse the values of a herd animal? We have already encountered some of the values Nietzsche associates with slave moralityhumility, industriousness, pity, but in what sense are they "herd" values? If the fundamental goal of an animal within a herd is its own preservation, and if its own preservation depends upon the health of the herd of which it is a member, then, Nietzsche supposes, the moral principles of that group will tend to reflect the kind of egalitarianism embodied in Bentham's dictum, "Everybody counts for one, and nobody for more than one."7 Nietzsche considers this the essence of herd mentality: "[I]t is the instinct of the herd that finds its formula in this ruleone is equal, one takes oneself for equal" (WP 925). According to Nietzsche, this egalitarian formula originates from the benefit that comes from reciprocal cooperation among equals in a group, but has been extended by Christian morality to apply to all peopleincluding unequals. Nietzsche thus construes the golden rule as a precept of "prudence" or mutual advantage, observing that "John Stuart Mill believes in it"as the basis of morality, but that he fails to grasp its prudential origin (WP 925).8Nietzsche also portrays egalitarian values as myopic, dangerous, and potentially self-subverting. This is because, Nietzsche thinks, the opposite of these valuespain, suffering, inequality; in short, "evil"is equally indispensable for the survival and happiness of the very herd that seeks to eradicate it. Accordingly, Nietzsche sharply criticizes Bentham's hedonic calculus (which correlates happiness maximization with pain minimization) as inconsistent with utilitarian goals. In its place, Nietzsche stresses the necessity of physical suffering and intellectual struggle for the self-improvement of each and, by extension, the vitality and happiness of the group. He accordingly rebukes the proponent of any morality that makes the reduction of suffering its fundamental goal: "[I]f you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, worthy of annihilation and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: the religion of comfortableness" (GS 338). This religionor, more specifically, moralityof comfort thwarts its own goals by attempting to eliminate all suffering (BGE 44).9 In a passage that anticipates what we now call the "hedonic paradox," according to which pleasure is diminished when we pursue it directly, Nietzsche ridicules those who, like Bentham, seek to maximize individual or collective happiness by minimizing pain: "[H]ow little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together" (GS 338).10 He goes on to underline the idiosyncratic nature of suffering and the simplemindedness of those who heedlessly strive to relieve the [End Page 3] suffering of others. "It never occurs to them," Nietzsche adds, "that ... the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell" (GS 338).
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***2NC Indicts**** AT: Nazi/Fascist

We dont read any evidence by Nietzsche Nietzsche wasnt a Nazi. He rejected German nationalism and ethnocentrism Kellner 92 (Douglas, "Modernity and Its Discontents: Nietzsche's Critique", Professor at UCLA, Ph.D., Philosophy, Columbia
University, http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/modernityanditsdiscontents.pdf) Although some of Nietzsche's ideas on race were taken up by German fascism, their concept of a German master-race and anti-semitism were far from Nietzsche's own thought. Nietzsche was a strong critic of German nationalism and, as Kaufman has demonstrated (1950), he was also critical of anti-semitism and various proto-fascist values with which he has sometimes been associated by both his champions and his critics. Although Nietzsche took up some Darwinian categories, he inverted Social Darwinism by arguing that often the slaves, the weaker, used cunning and intelligence to subjugate the stronger (1967; also 1968b: 75-6). He also argued that the Darwinian concept that self-preservation was the fundamental human drive was misleading, writing: "The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of power and, wishing for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation" (1974: 291-292). Nietzsche thought that the will to power and struggle were more fundamental than a will to survive, to mere self-preservation, and that cultural diversity and struggle would produce a genuinely healthier and stronger culture. Thus, rather than racial separation or purity, Nietzsche believed that mingling of different races and the development of a multicultural society in which different groups competed would create a stronger European polity that would overcome the banal nationalisms and national chauvinisms of his day. Moreover, Nietzsche constantly theorized gender, class, national, and ethnic differences and thus emerges as a theorist of difference against the homogenizing trends of modernity and the tendencies of theorists to wipe out these differences in a more generalized concept of human beings. To be sure, Nietzsche said many problematical things about women, workers, and various cultures and nationalities, but he also had some sharp insights into the differences between classes, genders, and nations, and believed that affirmation of difference and particularities created stronger individuals and societies. Moreover, as I argue in a later section, his concept of multiperspectival seeing requires that one try to overcome the biases of one's social position and perceive things from many perspectives, thus Nietzsche anticipates postmodern theories of perspectivism and their celebration of difference and otherness -- a theme I return to later in this chapter. Nietzsche consistently presented himself as a "good European" and advocated "repudiation of national, class and individual vanity" (1983: 363). Thus, despite comments about "blond beasts" which would seem to connect him with German fascism, Nietzsche celebrated cultural diversity and Europe, anticipating contemporary multicultural theory, and attacked narrow nationalism, antisemitism, and the belief that any one nation constituted a "master race." Yet he was generally hostile toward socialism, anarchism, feminism, and other political movements of the day. In general, Nietzsche equated Christianity and democratic political movements as expressions of resentment of the weak against the strong and as devaluations of this world, this existence, in favor of another world, an ideal future. Both, in his view, exude pity and sympathy for the disadvantaged and advocate equality and the well-being of all.
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AT: Racist
We dont read any evidence by Nietzsche Nietzsches radical critique prevents any sort of stratification based on biology Hatab, 02 (, Lawrence J., The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Old
Dominion University). Appel concedes that a political agon can be healthy and prevent the establishment of entrenched, permanent hierarchies (NCD, p.162). But he poses an important question, which is in the spirit of French neo-liberal critics of Nietzschean politics: Might not a radical agon all the way down in political life "debunk" important democratic "verities" such as universal suffrage, equal respect, and human rights? This is indeed a pressing question that many postmodern writers have not addressed adequately. Yet Appel, like many critics of postmodernism, simply assumes the truth and necessity of these traditional democratic notions, without much articulation of how agonistics threatens these notions, and without any defense of the viability of these notions in the wake of Nietzschean genealogical criticisms. Such criticisms have been effectively advanced by Foucauldian appropriations of Nietzsche that reveal how modern "reason" cannot help being caught up in what it presumes to overcomenamely regimes of powerand consequently cannot help producing exclusionary effects and constraints that belie the modern rhetoric of emancipation. Nietzsche's genealogical critique of liberal democratic ideals, I think, is important and still relevant for political philosophy. The question at hand turns on two possibilities: Does the critique presume a refutation of these ideals or does it open up the possibility of redescribing these ideals in quasi-Nietzschean terms? Appel presumes the former possibility, I take up the latter, while agreeing that most postmodern appropriations of Nietzsche have not done much to address either possibility. We cannot assume the truth of universal suffrage, equality, and human rights by ignoring Nietzsche's trenchant attacks. My strategy has been to redescribe democratic ideals in the light of Nietzschean suspicions of their traditional warrants. Universal suffrage, equality, respect, and political rights can be defended by way of a postmodern via negativa that simply rules out grounds for exclusion rather than postulates conditions that warrant inclusion. Nietzschean perspectivism, metaphysical suspicion, and agonistics simply destabilize politics and prevent even ostensibly democratic propensities from instigating exclusions or closed conceptions of political practice. In what follows I will briefly address two questions: How can a Nietzschean agonistics be extended to the body politic so as to be viably democratic? How can agonistics redescribe respect and political rights without the baggage of traditional egalitarianism so forcefully assailed by Nietzsche? Appel does indicate that his appraisal of political Nietzscheanism is not meant to discredit Nietzsche but to invite democrats to face Nietzsche's challenge and defend democratic ideals (NCD, p.167). He admits that Nietzsche forces us to ask: Why equality? Equality of what? (NCD, p.169). We cannot dismiss Nietzsche's aristocraticism as irrelevant, uninteresting, or trivial (NCD, p.170). The strategy of my work has been to take up this challenge, not by reiterating or renewing defenses of egalitarianism but by trying to show that democracy need not be committed to traditional egalitarian rhetoric and so can approach a Nietzschean comfort with social stratification in ways that Nietzsche did not expect or think through. Appel is right in calling to account selective appropriations of Nietzsche by postmodern democrats who ignore or sidestep his elitism. Few writers who celebrate difference and democratic openness in Nietzsche's name have embraced his affirmation of excellence. There is difference and then there is difference. Excellence is a form of difference that implies gradations and judgments concerning superior and inferior, better and worse performances. Many have embraced a Nietzschean openness to difference on behalf of a generalized liberation of diverse life styles and modes of self-creation. 19 Such a generalized emancipation, however, would repulse Nietzsche. He was interested in fostering special individuals and high achievements. I wonder whether certain postmodern celebrations of difference conceal a kind of egalitarianism in their avoidance or suppression of Nietzsche's clear comfort with social stratification. And it is important, in my view, to sustain a sense of excellence that is vital for both democratic politics and cultural production. 20 Excellence and democracy are compatible as long as excellence is understood in a contextual and performative sense, rather than a substantive sense of permanent, pervasive, or essential superiority
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AT: Anti-Semitic/Genocidal
We dont read any evidence by Nietzsche Nietzsches philosophy contains tools to fight against anti-Semitism. Yovel 02 Hans Jonas Professor of Philosophy (Yirmiyahu, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Uses and Abuses of a
Philosophy, Nietzsche contra Wagner on the Jews ed. by Jacob Golomb, Robert Solomon Wistrich) But even without considering psychology, there are sufficient philosophical grounds for Nietzsche's active adoption of antianti-Semitism. The anti-Semitic movement contained and heightened most of the decadent elements in modern culture that Nietzsche's philosophy set out to combat: 1. Anti-Semitism as a mass movement was seen by Nietzsche as vulgar, ideological, a new form of "slave morality" representative of the herd. 2. Anti-Semitism was a popular neurosis, affecting weak people who lacked existential power and self-confidence. 3. Anti-Semitism, especially in Germany, served to reinforce the Second Reich and the cult of the state, which Nietzsche, "the last Unpolitical German," had denounced as "the New Idol." 4. Anti-Semitism was also a lubricant of German nationalism, which the mature Nietzsche opposed most insistently (though he did so "from the right"). 5. Anti-Semitism also depended on racism, which Nietzsche's philosophy rejected as a value distinction among groups, though he did use race as a descriptive category. Nietzsche favored the mixing of races within the new Europe he envisaged. 6. At the root of anti-Semitism lay a common genealogical structure of fear, insecurity, existential weakness, and, above all, ressentiment the malignant rancor against the mentally powerful and self-affirming, as well as the hatred toward the other as a precondition for self esteem. The ardor of the anti-Semite conceals his or her deep insecurity: he does not start with the celebratory affirmation of his own being, but with the negation of the other by which alone the anti- Semite proves able to reaffirm his own self-which he does in an overblown, empty, and arrogant manner. Nietzsche's four negations - those of nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, and the cult of the state-also explain why he was bound to have opposed fascism and Nazism, although these ideologies successfully manipulated his philosophy for their devious purposes.
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AT: Sexist
We dont read any evidence by Nietzsche Despite prejudices, Nietzsches alternative is key to breaking down patriarchy Helm 4 (Barbara Prof @ Institute for Philosophy, University of Tbingen, and Max-Planck Research Centre for Ornithology,
Andechs, Germany, "Combating Misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by Turn-of-the-Century German Feminists," The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27 (64-84), Muse, AD: 7/9/09) jl In 1896, Simmel called Nietzsche's "deed" of centering ethics in the self "the Copernican revolution of moral philosophy," an allusion to Kant. 97 Nietzsche's worldly approach to politics and ethics traced truth and morality to the interests of those in power and yielded analytical tools for social change. What was formerly considered "truth" was now discussed as social construction and subject to change. 98 Contemporary feminists were quick to realize that his contextual and perspectival approach could help them identify and combat power structures that served women's oppression. Nietzsche's approach made room for new concepts of ethics and gender relations, implying great promises for future improvements of society, 99 and was thus explosively liberating to Wilhelmine women who had been expected to perpetuateeven improvethe moral basis of society. Some of the most radical feminists adumbrated new ethical and religious programs. 100 Clearly Nietzsche's ethics appealed to progressive women while appalling the more conservative. In accordance with his perspectivism, Nietzsche repeatedly encouraged others to find approaches of their own in order to move "beyond" contemporary standards. His emphasis on "self-creation," "higher development," and individualism was a great source of inspiration, attractive to feminists of all backgrounds. Conservatives emphasized "aristocracy of the spirit" and "selftranscendence" as goals for female character development. Unorthodox socialists regarded "self-overcoming" as "revolutionary practice" in anticipation of a new society. 101 Bourgeois conservatives and unorthodox socialists tried to temper "Nietzschean" individualism by humanist values that they either claimed to find in Nietzsche's own writing or brought, a "female addition," to bear on his male approach.
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______________ ***Aff Answers***
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Framework Card
The framework for your ballot should be to endorse and evaluate incremental progressive institutional actions just rolling the dice does nothing David E. McClean,1 Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, 2001 (http://72.14.203.104/search?
q=cache:WXaoUBni6uIJ:www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%2520Conference/Discussion %2520papers/david_mcclean.htm+foucault+habermas+slapped+cud&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=1) Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faithbased initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to
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truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."
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Perm Card
The process of changing education should be gradual and situated within current structures because sudden and radical breaks are impossible Golomb, 6 [Jacob, professor of philosophy at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Can One Really Become a "Free Spirit Par
Excellence"or an bermensch?, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 32, p. 22-40] We also have to bear in mind that even Nietzsche was not a pure Nietzschean. His ideal type, the ahistorical free spirit par excellence, was solely a regulative ideal, which, among other things, was a means to provide an antidote to the tendency of the Germans in his time to fill up the existential void incurred by the "death of God" by embracing extreme ideological and political substitutes (like Communism or Nationalism). By this ideal he strove to fight the dangerous overemphasis prevalent in contemporary German culture on historicism and on the Hegel-inspired "mighty historical movement" (HL 59). In "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," though Nietzsche was opposed to German trends of making history a scientific and objective enterprise, he does not object to the use of the past for the service of life in the present. He argues only against a past that overpowers the present and annihilates any of its novel and vital elements, so that, inter alia, it also destroys the future. More vitality and less historicity are his prescription in this essay for the "we free spirits," who were individuals who did not act in an ahistorical vacuum and were not some kind of existential tabula rasa without memories, identity, and sensibilities rooted in their culture, heritage, and people. Nietzsche did not believe that one may succeed in severing all of one's linkages with one's previous history.18 He only attacked the popular illusion that it was possible to sever oneself completely from tradition, to become a "free spirit" by indiscriminately rejecting one's entire past. For psychological reasons Nietzsche did not believe that such a "liberation" is even feasible, let alone desirable. He was not at all reluctant to oppose either the metaphysical traditions of the past or the accepted Christian ethic. But he did not profess to be a nihilist or to seek a complete break with the past and its values. Neither was he a radical revolutionary, freed of the restraints of tradition and descending into the historical arena from an atemporal, ahistorical pinnacle. Nietzsche's commitment was to a path of self-transformation that is arduous and painstaking; the rigors of self-education and the anguish of self-conquest constitute a process of slow and difficult evolution. He believed in a steady educational advance, devoid of grand illusions, which only gradually leads one to new patterns of life and thought (see HL chap. 3). It goes without saying that in any social-historical context no one can free oneself absolutely from one's own ethos, history, heritage, and linguistic culture and float in thin air, as it were. Hence nobody can become a free spirit par excellence but can only become a part of the nexus of "we free spirits."
The perm solves best seeking new ways to reshape the world is a form of life-affirmation we create new ways of being. Suffering is a contingent fact to say its inevitable is willful blindness and that blocks off the best path to celebration of life. May 5 Todd, Clemson University, To change the world, to celebrate life, Philosophy Social Criticism 2005; 31; 517, sagepub
For those among us who seek in philosophy a way to grapple with our lives rather than to solve logical puzzles; for those whose reading and whose writing are not merely appropriate steps toward academic advancement but a struggle to see ourselves and our world in a fresher, clearer light; for those who find nourishment among impassioned ideas and go hungry among empty truths: there is a struggle that is often waged within us. It is a struggle that will be familiar to anyone who has heard in Foucaults sentences the stammering of a fellow human being struggling to speak in words worth hearing. Why else would we read Foucault? We seek to conceive what is wrong in the world, to grasp it in a way that offers us the possibility for change. We know that there is much that is, to use Foucaults word, intolerable. There is much that binds us to social and political arrangements that are oppressive, domineering, patronizing, and exploitative. We would like to understand why this is and how it happens, in order that we may prevent its continuance. In short, we want our theories to be tools for changing the world, for offering it a new face, or at least a new expression. There is struggle in this, struggle against ideas and ways of thinking that present themselves to us as inescapable. We know this struggle from Foucaults writings. It is not clear that he ever wrote about anything else. But this is not the struggle I want to address here. For there is, on the other hand, another search and another goal. They lie not so much in the revisioning of this world as in the embrace of it. There is much to be celebrated in the lives we lead, or in those led by others, or in the unfolding of the world as it is, a world resonant with the rhythms of our voices and our movements. We would like to understand this, too, to grasp in thought the elusive beauty of our world. There is, after all, no
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other world, except, as Nietzsche taught, for those who would have created another one with which to denigrate our own. In short, we would like our thought to celebrate our lives. To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift ones allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a selfdeception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harms way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once.
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Life Key to VTL

To refuse to solve suffering is also to abandon the celebration of life. May 5PhD from Penn State University in 1989, and has been at Clemson since 1991 (Todd May, To change the world, to celebrate life, Philosophy & Social Criticism 2005 Vol 31 nos 56 pp. 517531nex)
. IX And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they arent in Tibet, even if they arent Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? Whats the next move in this campaign, whats the next campaign? Isnt there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. Its where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if its for their sake that youre involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you dont exist. Its not a moment of yours that you sacrice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. Youve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. X Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Pontys Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments. 9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, nally, in our esh as the esh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indenitely only upon other visibles . . . 10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucaults work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unnished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without lifecelebration is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both MerleauPonty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.
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Extinction doesnt make you stronger their arguments dont apply when discussing extinction level impacts Wrisley, No Date [George, Ph.D., Adjunct Instructor at George Washington University; Nietzsche and Sufferinga Choice of Attitudes and Ideals, draft of
paper presented in Nov 2004, http://www.georgewrisley.com/Nietzsche%20and%20Suffering.doc]
That harsh conditions somehow better both the individual and the species is surely only true to a degree. For example, when Nietzsche writes, Out of lifes school of war: What does not destroy me, makes me stronger, this is clearly not universally true. There are two constraints: first, there is a point of diminishing returns. If I am shot in the head, survive, but lose my memory, many motor skills, and the ability to fully grasp what is happening around me, I am not destroyed but I am surely not stronger because of it (though this will possibly depend on the second constraint). Conversely, if my cat scratches my hand by accident, the suffering I thereby experience is not going to the kind from which I can become stronger. So, there are low and high degrees of suffering that seem to be ruled out. Second, even if what I suffer is only the loss of a pet, my job, or a hand, I am not automatically made stronger by living through it. There
are times where all we can do is hold on as best we can, hoping that the pain will stop; in such cases we do not overcome the suffering, but just do our best to ride it out. Whether I come out stronger depends on what my attitudes towards suffering are and whether I can use those attitudes to see the suffering as an opportunity for growth and strengthening, and then whether I have the strength to carry out the growth. Concerning the strengthening of the species through harsh conditions, we can also imagine limiting cases. Conditions of great plague or natural disaster in which our strength of will and body are of no use are not going to be conditions under which the species is strengthened. Further, it is not entirely clear why we should think murder and theft strengthen the species, as Nietzsche seems to claim.
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AT: Suffering Inevitable

Suffering is not monolithic intentional violence can and should be prevented Jessica Weinhold 2004 Help your congregation do something about violence, Fall http://www.pcusa.org/ideas/2004fall/violence.htm ]
It is important to note that different forms of suffering permeate our personal and corporate contexts. Thus, not all forms can be equated or responded to uniformly. In the case of domestic and sexual violence, this suffering is not inevitable (like natural disasters, for example); it is intentional and above all else unnatural. Therefore, this form of violence must be addressed on its own terms. It must be distinguished as a particular form of suffering that occasions a unique form of grief and demands a uniquely definitive response from clergy and congregation.
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Turn Eugenics
Its subjective and we shouldnt decide it for others turns the alt Schwartz et al, 2 [Lisa, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine, Department of General Practice, University of Glasgow, Glasgow,
UK; Paul Preece, Theme Coordinator of Medical Ethics, Dundee Medical School, Ninewells, Dundee, UK; and Rob Hendry, Medical Advisor, Medical & Dental Defense Union of Scotland, Mackintosh House, Glasgow, UK, Medical Ethics: A Case-Based Approach, p. 112, November] The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients' judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.
Their evaluation of when lives are worth living results in eugenics and makes it impossible to affirm life Eisenberg, 2005 (Daniel, Medical Doctor, Department of Radiology at the Albert Einstein Medical Center, The Death of Terry Schiavo: An Epilogue, 4/10,
http://www.aish.com/societyWork/society/The_Death_of_Terri_Schiavo_An_Epilogue.asp)
We have unfortunately seen such hubris result in terrible loss of life over the past century. The belief that medicine can determine which lives are worth preserving was an intrinsic part of the pre-Nazi German medical establishment (see "Why Medical Ethics"). In the late 1920's and early 1930's: a number of prominent German academics and medical professionals were espousing the theory of "unworthy life," a theory which advanced the notion that some lives were simply not worthy of living. . . If Mengele himself (an infamous physician who performed murderous experiments on live concentration camp inmates) became a cold-blooded monster at the height of his Nazi career, he certainly learned at the feet of some of Germany's most diabolical minds. As a student Mengele attended the lectures of Dr. Ernst Rudin, who posited not only that there were some lives not worth living, but that doctors had a responsibility to destroy such life and remove it from the general population. His prominent views gained the attention of Hitler himself, and Rudin was drafted to assist in composing the Law for the Protection of Heredity Health, which passed in 1933, the same year that the Nazis took complete control of the German government. This unapologetic Social Darwinist contributed to the Nazi decree that called for the sterilization of those demonstrating the following flaws, lest they reproduce and further contaminate the German gene pool: feeblemindedness; schizophrenia; manic depression; epilepsy; hereditary blindness; deafness; physical deformities; Huntington's disease; and alcoholism1. The scary part of the Terri Schiavo debate has been the blurring of the line between life and death, and between medical data and morality. Why does the medical knowledge of the physician seem to translate into skill in evaluating thevalue of life? We are a society easily open to suggestion. Our opinions are strongly influenced by the media. And as Dr. Milgram proved with his obedience experiments, our moral judgments are most easily swayed by authority figures. So when doctors espouse a belief that some patients are "as good as dead," who are laypeople to disagree? We see the murderous outcome when our natural tendency to trust authority figures is exploited in the area of evaluating value of life. If the doctors tell us that some lives are not worth preserving, we may feel that we lack the knowledge to disagree. This drives home the crucial need to carefully assess who our authority figures are and whether they are functioning within the area of their expertise. In an excellent article examining the role of nurses in the eugenics programs of Nazi Germany, Susan Benedict, a professor at the College of Nursing of the Medical University of South Carolina in Charleston, writes:2 During the Nazi era, so-called "euthanasia programs" were established for handicapped and mentally ill children and adults. Organized killings of an estimated 70,000 German citizens took place at killing centers and in psychiatric institutions...The German people were exposed to the idea of euthanasia through posters, movies, and books supporting the destruction of "lives not worth living". A 1936 book entitled Sendung und Gewissen (Mission and Conscience) was published in Germany by an ophthalmologist and was widely read. This novel told the story of a young wife with multiple sclerosis who was euthanized by her physician-husband. This novel was important in preparing the ground for the euthanasia programs3 It was made into a movie "Ich Klage an!" ("I Accuse") and was widely shown during
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these years. Two other popular movies of the time also dealt with euthanasia, Life Unworth Life (1934-1935) and Presence without Life (1940-1941)4 . "Opfer der Vergangenheit (Victims of the Past, 1937) was produced under Hitler's direct order and shown by law in all 5,300 German theaters."5 These films argued that keeping seriously ill people alive was against the basic principles of nature. The results of the active participation of the medical community in the determination of which lives were worth preserving were devastating. "By the time the Third Reich lay in ruins, German doctors had sterilized at least 460,000 men and women diagnosed as unfit or disturbed dispatched 250,000 to 300,000 chronically ill patients by means of starvation, gas inhalation, prolonged sedation and toxic injections; gassed and cremated more than 10,000 infants and children with disorders ranging from congenital heart disease to epilepsy."6 And so, with help of the medical establishment, the most civilized and scientifically advanced country in the world, destroyed its own people, because their lives were simply "not worth living." Did these doctors and nurses appreciate how far they had strayed from their duty to care for the sick? Evidence from the Nuremberg trials seems to point to the inescapable conclusion that many of the perpetrators never appreciated the ethical disconnect between their actions and their medical mission. Their medical personas were subsumed into their political and philosophical views. It is only because they were doctors and nurses that they had the opportunity to cause such great harm. They became leaders in Nazi Germany7 and used their medical knowledge to further their personal utilitarian agendas. I make no apology regarding my stance on the Terri Schiavo case. In the guise of misplaced compassion, using our legal system's "due process" as legal sanction, the American courts legalized the killing of those people whose lives are not worth living. Many Americans have accepted the information that they have seen in the media with little question. While the courts probably acted appropriately within the scope of their jurisdiction, the people of this compassionate nation should do some deep soul searching and ask themselves whether they have been sold a "bill of goods" and misled by those it trusts most -- its doctors and courts. Are we so sure that life without consciousness is not life? The real significance of the Terri Schiavo case is not that one woman was killed. The outcome of the case has called into question the lives of all disabled people. Can the supporters of removing Terri Schiavo's feeding tube honestly answer why we should not euthanize a profoundly retarded child who will never have any real self awareness? Should depressed people with refractory deep depression be given lethal doses of painkillers for their own good? Who will be the arbiter of such decisions? I worry that our society is descending once again into the abyss of a particularly pernicious form of ethical relativism which attributes value only to certain lives based on whatever set of standards are currently in vogue. As the value placed on life declines, but the cost of medical care increases, even greater pressure will be placed on the disabled (who "cost" too much to maintain) to do us all a favor and die. I sincerely hope that there is a remaining bastion of common sense and morality among the millions of Americans who have a basic faith in the value of life. They do not need medical degrees to understand that life is intrinsically valuable. They understand that life does not derive its value from the ability to derive enjoyment from the world. (see: Should Terri Schiavo Live or Die?) The neurologist ended his letter in the following way: Western neurologic practice, opinion and ethics recognize these conditions (PVS and Alzheimer's disease) as terminal in contradistinction to "Halachic law". It would seem that medical ethics at least in the U.S., has become more informed or evolved beyond an archaic Halachic law. Dr. Eisenberg states in his essay , "The key to analyzing any situation is to realize that good ethics start with good facts." On this, I wholeheartedly concur and as a bedside clinician who deals with these cases, would offer this as a prescription to Dr. Eisenberg. Given a choice between the enlightened ethics of my correspondent and the "archaic" ethics of Jewish law, I really see no choice. He is not the first educated person to announce to the world that traditional ethics are passe. But throughout history, the cheapening of life has inevitably led to the deaths of innocent people. Whether it is a communist nation that devalues the intellectuals or ethnic groups that cheapen the lives of their rivals, in every instance the beginning of the end is the concerted attempt to convince the population that some lives just don't matter.
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Turn Genocide
deas have consequences Nietzsche knew he would be used for Genocide and so does the Neg Lang, 2002 [Berel, Prof of Humanities @ Trinity College Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? P 60-2]
But there is a gap between logic and rhetoric, and it is in this space that the charge of Nietssches responsibility for his fascism gains its purchase. It is not only that at the center of Nietzsches social critique was a theory of how political power evolved (his genealogy) but that he recognized that groups who thought in terms of collective rather than individual power, in the mystification of group will and spirit, would in fact, they already had in his lifetime see in the conception of power which he advanced a justification for their own collective, not individual, use of that predicate. He was as much aware of this as he was more generally of the easy subtle, subterranean, glib transition effected when individuals, failing to find sufficient capacity in themselves, join together to assert it: this is the basis of his critique of bourgeois society in which he lived, a comfortably outfitted version of the slave-morality from which it emerged. (If you wish to know which of them has won for the present, Rome or Judea, he asks, there can be no doubt: consider to whom one bows down in Rome itself today (GM, I:16). We find Nietzsche, then, in opposition to essential features of the fascism that purported to follow him historically, aware of elements in his own thought that might be appropriated by its advocates for their own purposes and yet willing to accept the risk of such misrepresentation. Not, as I emphasized, unknowingly, and not without remonstrating with those who did this (or might yet) without speaking out: Nietzsches antinationalist statements, as I have indicated, are numerous and unequivocal, as are his many anti-anti-Semetic statements, which are themselves often related to his antinationalistic declarations. To defend the post-Enlightenment Jewish culture in Europe and specifically in Germany as Nietzsche did, in the face of then current anti-Semitism, was already to recognize and contest the protofascism best known to Nietzsche through his acquaintance with the Bayreuth circle around Wagner. What more than this, one might ask, could or should Nietzsche have done? I have not yet even mentioned the defense on his behalf of the readerly equivalent of caveat emptor (I suppose it would be caveat lector), which absolves the seller (in the case of interpretation, the author) of any product liability. Is not reading, after all, even more than in the case of more ordinary acquisitions, a purely voluntary act? And cannot the reader see more fully what he or she is getting than with most other purchases? to assign responsibility to the author in this transaction, even if only up to a point, would argue for the founding of an agency to test books for their effects much as the Food and Drug Administration does in the United States when it assesses ingested products. Only assume that words or books ideas do indeed have consequences (intellectual, moral, psychological, historical), and that those effects may be cloaked in the texts that provide a medium for them and the question of the role and extend of the authors responsibility then becomes unavoidable. What, however, does this mean in practice? Should Nietzsche be held responsible for not anticipating the rise of Mussolini and Hitler and their fascist states or more modestly, for the use they or their supporters made of him? But already in his own lifetime, we saw, he was aware of the conflicting appropriations of his work, including the use made of him by partisans whom he thought he had been attacking. Nietzsche himself labels On the Genealogy of Morals a Streitschrift a polemic thus a representation in his own hand of what he took to be a declaration of war against the world of known values, in choosing the means, we know (and he certainly knew) that we also choose the end. He was aware, then, of the risk, and yet he preferred the risk because of what it entailed: that is, the responsibility of each self, each reader, to create himself, to make himself the individual of whom Nietzsche spoke. And then he accepted this risk even if it also nourished the possibility of abuse that later in fact ensued. His was not only a variation of a manufacturer whose product unexpectedly turns out to be dangerous (although even for that, the charge of negligence may at times be warranted), but knowing something of the potential danger and weighting it against the possible benefits of writing what he did, he held steady in his course. What more would be required than this to invite (and for Nietzsche to accept) a judgment of responsibility? Not (at least not directly) for what the fascists did, and not for their contribution to the misinterpretation, by which they took the step from privileging the individual to privileging the group and then the state but for his sake of the misinterpretation which if it is not decisive is not negligible either. What this amounts to is failing to build a fence around what he did mean so as to separate it (and its consequences) from what he did not mean and evidently failing (more precisely, refusing) to do this, because that would in his view have diminished the force of what he did for those who interpreted him correctly. In sum: Nietzsche accepted the risk of misinterpretation, in sufficient if not (as it could not have been, then or ever) full knowledge willing to chance misinterpretation (and so too, its consequences). He was willing, in other words, to have views ascribed to him that ran counter to those he held willing to accept the risk because of the challenge he posed in doing so. It was for his audience to decide in the face of Nietzsches attack on them how they would respond with Nietzsche unwilling to hedge that attack by additional qualifications even if because that refusal a certain unwanted outcome (i.e., misinterpretation) became more probable. Because the changes required to enter those would also have conduced to the weakening or diminution of what he wished, even more strongly, to affirm.
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This means voting Neg is allowing genocidal misinterpretation to occur Golomb and Wistrich, 2002 [Jacob, teaches philosophy at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Robert, Neuberger Chair of Modern European History
at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism? P 3]
Nietzsche was clearly an elitist who believed in the right to rule of a good and healthy aristocracy, one that would, if necessary, be ready to sacrifice untold numbers of human beings. He sometimes wrote as if nations primarily existed for the sake of producing a few great men, who could not be expected to show consideration for normal humanity. Not surprisingly, in the light of the cruel century that has just ended, one is bound to regard such statements with grave misgivings. From Mussolini and Hitler to Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hussein, the last eighty years have been riddled with so-called political geniuses imagining that they were beyond good and evil and free of any moral constraints. One has to ask if there is not something in Nietzsches philosophy with its uninhibited cultivation of a heroic individualism and the will to power, which may have tended to favor the fascist ethos. Mussolini, for example, raised the Nietzschean formulation live dangerously (vivi pericolosamente)
to the status of a fascist slogan. His reading of Nietzsche was one factor in converting him from Marxism to a philosophy of sacrifice and warlike deeds in defense of the fatherland. In this mutation, Mussolini was preceded by Gabriele dAnnunzio, whose passage from aestheticism to the political activism of a new, more virile and warlike age, was (as Mario Sznajder points out in his essay) greatly influenced by Nietzsche. Equally, there were other representatives of the First World War generation, like the radical German nationalist writer, Ernst Junger, who would find in Nietzsches writings a legitimization of the warrior ethos (as David Ohana makes clear).
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Extinction First
Only preventing extinction allows the alternative to occur without the fight for preservation, there is nothing to overcome Connolly, 91 [William, Professor of Political Science at John Hopkins University, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, p. 186]
Zarathustra says: "The most concerned ask today, 'How is man to be preserved?' But Zarathustra is the first and only one to ask: 'How is man to be overcome?'" 16 The idea is to stop worrying about the preservation of man, to strive to create a few overmen. Leave to their own devices those who insist upon being consumed by resentment, so that a few can cultivate another type of humanity. The new type to be cultivated consists of a few free spirits who fend off the resentment against the human condition that wells up in everyone, a few who rise above the insistence that there be symmetry between evil and responsibility, who live above the demand that some guilty agent worthy of punishment be located every time they themselves suffer, who recognize that existential suffering is a precondition of wisdom. But this typological differentiation between man and overman no longer makes much sense, if it ever did. For the overmanconstituted as an independent, detached typerefers simultaneously to a spiritual disposition and to the residence of free spirits in a social space relatively insulated from reactive politics. The problem is that the disappearance of the relevant social preconditions confounds any division of humanity into two spiritual types. If there is anything in the type to be admired, the ideal must be dismantled as a distinct caste of solitary individuals and folded into the political fabric of late-modern society. The "overman" now falls apart as a set of distinctive dispositions concentrated in a particular caste or type, and its spiritual qualities migrate to a set of dispositions that may compete for presence in any self. The type now becomes (as it already was to a significant degree) a voice in the self contending with other voices, including those of ressentiment. This model is implicitly suggested by Foucault when he eschews the term "overman" (as well as "will to power") and shifts the center of gravity of Nietzschean discourse from heroes and classical tragic figures to everyday misfits such as Alex/Alexina and Pierre Rivire. The textual moves are, I think, part of a strategy to fold Nietzschean agonism into the fabric of ordinary life by attending to the extraordinary character of the latter. I seek to pursue this same trail. The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circumstances require that many give the sign of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole. But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. The shift results partly from the late-modern possibility of self-extinction. In this new world the failure to "preserve man" could also extinguish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together so that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this entanglement is worked out, that the "overman" as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities definitive of the "human." If the overman was ever projected as a distinct typeand this is not certainit now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendency.
Double Bind Either A. There are things about life that are worth living means preventing extinction is a prerequisite or B. there are no values and you should probably just vote Aff Wymore, 92 [John, Nietzsche, Von Hildebrand, and Human Fulfillment ALETHEIA]
In order to develop my criticism of Nietzsche, that a Nietzschean view of value would empty the world of the meaning necessary by which a full and affective life is possible, I want to draw upon Dietrich von Hildebrand's insight into "categories of importance" developed especially in his Ethics. Von Hildebrand there elucidates three "categories of importance"*: the category of the "important in itself," that is, the intrinsically valuable or precious; that of the "subjectively satisfying"; and that of the importance of the "objective good for the person." (1) The important in itself is that which ought to exist because of its intrinsic worth, such as the preferring of truth over error. (2) That which derives its importance because it pleases us makes up the category of the subjectively satisfying. (3) Air, shelter, food, and medicine are all important as objective goods for the person. They act beneficently for and upon man. All these "moments" of importance draw things out of neutrality. They are the motivation by which things take on interest for us. Love may emerge from neutrality, significant, because it is pleasurable to me; hence it is subjectively satisfying. Or it may emerge from neutrality because love produces truly beneficial elements in persons; hence, it is an objective good for the person. Or, finally, one can have insight into the essence of love itself and see it to be entirely precious in virtue of its immanent nature.
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Love emerges from neutrality and is significant, above all else, because of its own essence not because it does something beneficial or because it brings about my pleasure, but because of what it is in itself. It is good that love qua love exist rather than not exist. It is precious in and of itself, and its existence adds a priceless treasure to living. Nietzsche completely denies the category of importance that we term the important in itself, or the intrinsically valuable. He claims that objective reality is value neutral. In Nietzsche's mind there is nothing intrinsically precious which can, of its own nature or act, be the reason for its being lifted out of neutrality. Value is never discovered; it is only created. Hence, we enter at birth into a world which has no pre given meaning, and it is up to the individual to create significance by a fiat of the will. It is on the basis of this denial of the important in itself that a completely Nietzschean view would render a fully human life impossible insofar as life is experienced strictly along the lines Nietzsche declares. This is because human life in order to be full and vital depends upon the experience of things which have the power, that is, the sufficient weight and grandeur of being, capable of eliciting responses such as we have mentioned. Gratitude, deep joy, reverence, humility, awe, admiration, and love come about from our contacts with values for which we can be grateful, about which we can feel joy, before which we can experience reverence, humility, awe, or admiration, or to which we may give ourselves in love. All these affective states presuppose conscious objects of knowedge, prior to any act of the will, to which we respond or by which we are moved. For instance, we respond with admiration to great honesty or courage, or with thanksgiving for a precious gift, or with appreciation and gratitude to the loyalty of a friend. We respond to these things in the way that we do because of the knowledge of their significance, the experience of their ontological and qualitative weight, especially to their intrinsic beauty. According to von Hildebrand: "there exist certain affective responses which are essentially value responses, that is, are motivated only by values. Such, for instance, are esteem, veneration, and admiration" (Ethics, p. 211). Nietzsche seems to miss entirely the fact that a joyful life depends upon the existence of intrinsically precious objects and qualities which are capable of engendering our response of joy. Von Hildebrand wrote: "those things endowed with value possess a capacity of bestowing delight" (p. 36). What Nietzsche fails to note is that joy and thanksgiving, as well as many other feelings consciously related to their objects, do not arise from knowing objects or acts which are, in themselves, value neutral. The world, insofar as it is perceived as value neutral, could only engender negligence, boredom, and indifference. It is precisely because of this that a man [person] blinded to objective value, holding a thoroughly Nietzschean outlook cannot by that very fact experience the preciousness and goodness of life. All external reality, in itself, is neutral for him. The Nietzschean man necessarily lives in a world, that in terms of significance, is dull and flat because all objectivities are equally neutral in his eyes. Prior to the Nietzschean fiat by which anything meaningful exists, nothing has meaning; and in this context the only due responses are ones such as we have said, negligence, boredom, and indifference. Nor does the human will have the power to generate affective responses of the sort we have mentioned from objects which are given as neutral prior to a subject's act of willing or constituting. Despite Nietzsche's declaration of human potential, the power of one's will is limited. Specifically, the Nietzschean fiat is a myth in reference to affective states. While the will is free and in our immediate control, affective responses are not. Quoting von Hildebrand: "we never can engender any affective response by a fiat, nor can we command it by our will as we can any activity. Love, for instance, is always granted to us as a gift" (p. 203). Were we to decide a neutral thing shall have importance, and then try to will it so, e.g., a rock, it would be absurd to speak of our newly created state of love, or esteem, or awe, or reverence for the rock. The Nietzschean man [person] finds himself [herself] in the predicament of being faced with the perception of a value neutral world and then having to do the impossible and will affective responses of joy, esteem, and gratitude. It cannot be done.
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Ethics Key
The denial of an ethical attachment to suffering debases the value to life---your alternative condemns the weak to endless suffering---this condemnation eliminates the very thing that makes us human Ronald Hilton, professor emeritus at Stanford University and fellow at Hoover, 5/15/04 (http://wais.stanford.edu/General/general_individualsniezsche.htm)
Adriana Pena answers Christopher Jones on the subject of Nietzsche, to which we have devoted inordinate space. This is therefore the final posting on the subject: "He rails against vindictiveness. How about railing against those who harm others without provocation? Are they not a lot worse? Or does he advocate that bright, gifted people be allowed to do what they want, and the rest of us should grin and bear it because they are so gifted? As Orwell pointed out, that means that if Shakespeare came back to life, and he turned out to be a child molester, we should look the other way because he might write another "King Lear" I have read enough of NIetzsche to be disgusted. Yes, he rails against ressentiment, but not against harming people who just get in their way (as his hero, Cesare Borgia did). He rails against the "slave mentality" and praises de "master mentality", but the slaves would not have that mentality if they had not been enslaved by the "masters". His ideal is that the powerful should ride over the weak, and the weak should count themselves lucky if they survive the experience, and cheer the one who crushes them. He evidently finds it offensive that enslaved people should desire to be free or to better their condition, and he calls that a conspiracy against the noble mentality (noble, is the ancient term of someone who did not work for a living, but forced others to provide for him, letting them have enough of a pittance not to die...)". [continues] Adriana Pena says of Nietzsche "About the silly idea of going "Beyond Good and Evil", I may cite a line from a song "If nothing's wrong, then nothing is right". Whoever wishes to go beyond judgement must stop making judgements himself. If Nieztsche was really serious about going beyond Good and Evil, he would make no judgement of Christianity, to call it either good or evil, but just accept it as part of the natural order. I suspect that when people talk about going beyond good and evil, they only want to find an excuse to do as they please, but that they do not think through the implications. A moral, or ethical sense, a sense of right and wrong is one of the traits that separates us from animals. Chickens in the yard do not concern themselves about Right and Wrong, have no sense of sin, and do not bemoan their mistakes, being free of guilt. To pretend to surpass our ethical sense is not to go above men, but to regress to animals". RH: I agree completely. Nietzxche was part of the fin de sicle confusion which led to World War I. The fact that Nietzsche went insane tells us something.
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Cede the Political

Nietzsches regressive flight from ethics disables any base for productive change---their alternative is incapable of enacting any form of positive politics
Steven Conway, philosophy at Penn State, 1992 (http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:N7yELNZBsoJ:www.subverbis.com/essays/chestertonnietzsche.rtf+nietzsche+ethics+genocide&hl=en) For all Nietzsche's rallying cries for courageous action to would be masters, little action resulted. Nietzsche's courage was hollow and ineffectual to Chesterton. He compared Nietzsche to Joan of Arc to prove his point. "Nietzsche only praised the warrior; she was the warrior...we know she was not afraid of an army, while Nietzsche, for all we know, was afraid of a cow" (Chesterton 247). Where the will was liberating to Nietzsche, Chesterton found freedom in possessing the courage to accept orthodoxy and 'its manifold paradox. Nietzsche's freedom was ephemeral at ,best. Inherent in the concept of will was a desire for self limitation. A choice, once made, was an acceptance of something and a rejection of everything else. "Art is limitation. The essence of every picture is a frame" (Chesterton 243). In essence, freedom had enslaved itself (Chesterton 240). All choices had the same moral weight if Nietzsche was correct in stating that the choice itself was singularly important. Hitler's decision to commit genocide and a decsion to eat a ham sandwich cannot be separated (Chesterton 246). Change itself had become unchangeable; it had become institutionalized and, thus reified in the Marcusian sense of the word.
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DDI 12 SS Nietzsche K

Link The State

Link Environmental Racism

2NC Turns Case Extinction

2NC Turns Case Suffering

2NC Inevitability Extinction

2NC Inevitability Suffering

2NC Alt Solvency - Extinction

2NC Alt Solvency - Suffering

AT: Turn Relativistic

AT: Turn Violence/Genocide*

AT: Extinction/Death First/ Life Ultimate Good

AT: Accepting Death Bad

DDI 12 SS Nietzsche K AT: Inaction Bad

AT: Progress Good

AT: We Should Stop Suffering*

AT: VTL Inevitable

*2NC Indicts** AT: Nazi/Fascist

______________ Aff Answers

Life Key to VTL

AT: Suffering Inevitable

Cede the Political

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