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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 349 REPUBLIC ACT NO.

349 - AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN ORGANS OR ANY PORTION OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS Section 1. A person may validly grant to a licensed physician, surgeon, known scientist, or any medical or scientific institution, authority to detach at any time after the grantor's death any organ, part or parts of his body and to utilize the same for medical, surgical or scientific purposes. Similar authority may also be granted for the utilization for medical, surgical, or scientific purposes, of any organ, part or parts of the body which, for a legitimate reason, would be detached from the body of the grantor. Section 2. The authorization referred in section one of this Act must; be in writing; specify the person or institution granted the authorization, the organ, part or parts to be detached, the use or uses of the organ, part or parts are to be employed; and signed by the grantor and two disinterested witnesses. If the grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the authorization may be executed by his guardian with the approval of court; in default thereof, by the legitimate father or mother, in order, named. Married women may grant the authority referred to in section one of this Act, without the consent of the husband. A copy of every such authorization must be furnished the Secretary of Health. Section 3. An authorization granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be bind the executors, administrators and successors of the deceased and all members of his family. Section 4. Any law or regulation inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed. Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1056 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1056 - AN ACT TO AMEND REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINE, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO LEGALIZE PERMISSIONS TO USE HUMAN ORGANS OR ANY PORTION OR PORTIONS OF THE HUMAN BODY FOR MEDICAL, SURGICAL, OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS" Section 1. Sections one of Republic Act Numbered Three hundred forty-nine, entitled "An Act to legalize permissions to use human organs or any portion or portions of the human body for medical, surgical, or scientific purposes, under certain conditions", is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 1. A person may validly grant to a licensed physician, surgeon, known scientist, or any medical or scientific institution, including eye banks and other similar institutions, authority to detach at any time after the grantor's death any organ, part or parts of his body and to utilize the same for medical, surgical, or scientific purposes.cralaw "Similar authority may also be granted for the utilization for medical, surgical, or scientific purposes, of any organ, part or parts of the body which, for a legitimate reason, would be detached from the body of the grantor." Section 2. Section two of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows: "Section 2. The authorization referred to in section one of this Act must: be in writing; specify the person or institution granted the authorization; the organ, part or parts to be detached, the specific use or uses to which the organ, part or parts are to be employed; and, signed by the grantor and two disinterested witnesses.cralaw "If the grantor is a minor or an incompetent person, the authorization may be executed by his guardian with the approval of the court; in default thereof, by the legitimate father or mother, in the order, named. Married women may grant the authority referred to in section one of this Act without the consent of the husband. "After the death of the person, authority to use human organs or any portion or portions of the human body for medical, surgical or scientific purposes may also be granted by his nearest relative or guardian at the time of his death or in the absence thereof, by the person or head of the hospital, or institution having custody of the body of the deceased: Provided, however, That the said person or head of the hospital or institution has exerted reasonable efforts to locate the aforesaid guardian or relative.cralaw "A copy of every such authorization must be furnished the Secretary of Health." Section 3. A new section is hereby created immediately after section two of the aforesaid Republic Act Numbered Three hundred forty nine which shall hereafter be designate as section two-A, and shall read as follows: "Section 2-A. The provisions of sections one and two of this Act notwithstanding, it shall be illegal for any person or any institution to detach any organ or portion of the body of a person dying of a dangerous communicable disease even if said organ or portion of the human body shall be used for medical or scientific purposes. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be punished with an imprisonment of not less than six months nor more than year. If the violation is committed by an institution, corporation or association, the director, manager, president, and/or other officials and employees who, knowingly or through neglect, perform the act or acts resulting in said violation shall be held criminally responsible therefor." Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.cralaw

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7846 AN ACT REQUIRING COMPULSORY IMMUNIZATION AGAINST HEPATITIS-B FOR INFANTS AND CHILDREN BELOW EIGHT (8) YEARS OLD, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 996, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE Section 1. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 996, is hereby amended to read as follows: Section 2. Scope. Basic immunization services shall include: (a) BCG Vaccination against tuberculosis; (b) Inoculation against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis; (c) Oral poliomyelitis immunization; (d) Protection against measles; (e) Immunization against rubella; (f) Immunization against Hepatitis-B; (g) such other basic immunization services for infants and children below eight years of age as determined by the Secretary of Health in a department circular: provided, that newborn infants of women with Hepatitis-B shall be given immunization against Hepatitis-B within twenty-four (24) hours after birth. Section 2. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter. Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved, December 30, 1994.

Approved: June 12, 1954

Republic Act No. 7170

January 7, 1992

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE LEGACY OR DONATION OF ALL OR PART OF A HUMAN BODY AFTER DEATH FOR SPECIFIED PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:: Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Organ Donation Act of 1991". Section 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act the following terms shall mean: (a) "Organ Bank Storage Facility" - a facility licensed, accredited or approved under the law for storage of human bodies or parts thereof. (b) "Decedent" - a deceased individual, and includes a still-born infant or fetus. (c) "Testator" - an individual who makes a legacy of all or part of his body. (d) "Donor" - an individual authorized under this Act to donate all or part of the body of a decedent.1awphilalf (e) "Hospital" - a hospital licensed, accredited or approval under the law, and includes, a hospital operated by the Government. (f) "Part" - includes transplantable organs, tissues, eyes, bones, arteries, blood, other fluids and other portions of the human body. (g) "Person" - an individual, corporation, estate, trust, partnership, association, the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations; or any other legal entity. (h) "Physician" or "Surgeon" - a physician or surgeon licensed or authorized to practice medicine under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. (i) "Immediate Family" of the decedent - the persons enumerated in Section 4(a) of this Act. (j) "Death" - the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. A person shall be medically and legally dead if either:1awphilalf (1) In the opinion of the attending physician, based on the acceptable standards of medical practice, there is an absence of natural respiratory and cardiac functions and, attempts at resuscitation would not be successful in restoring those functions. In this case, death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or (2) In the opinion of the consulting physician, concurred in by the attending physician, that on the basis of acceptable standards of medical practice, there is an irreversible cessation of all brain functions; and considering the absence of such functions, further attempts at resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance would not be successful in resorting such natural functions. In this case, death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time when these conditions first appeared. The death of the person shall be determined in accordance with the acceptable standards of medical practice and shall be diagnosed separately by the attending physician and another consulting physician, both of whom must be appropriately qualified and suitably experienced in the care of such parties. The death shall be recorded in the patient's medical record. Section 3. Person Who May Execute A Legacy. Any individual, at least eighteen (18) years of age and of sound mind, may give by way of legacy, to take effect after his death, all or part of his body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof. Section 4. Person Who May Execute a Donation.

(a) Any of the following, person, in the order of property stated hereunder, in the absence of actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent or actual notice of opposition by a member of the immediate family of the decedent, may donate all or any part of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in Section 6 hereof: (1) (2) (3) (4) Spouse; Son or daughter of legal age; Either parent; Brother or sister of legal age; or

(5) Guardian over the person of the decedent at the time of his death. (b) The persons authorized by sub-section (a) of this Section may make the donation after or immediately before death. Section 5. Examination of Human Body or Part Thereof . A legacy of donation of all or part of a human body authorizes any examination necessary to assure medical acceptability of the legacy or donation for the purpose(s) intended. For purposes of this Act, an autopsy shall be conducted on the cadaver of accident, trauma, or other medico-legal cases immediately after the pronouncement of death, to determine qualified and healthy human organs for transplantation and/or in furtherance of medical science. Section 6. Persons Who May Become Legatees or Donees. The following persons may become legatees or donees of human bodies or parts thereof for any of the purposes stated hereunder: (a) Any hospital, physician or surgeon - For medical or dental education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, therapy or transplantation; (b) Any accredited medical or dental school, college or university - For education, research, advancement of medical or dental science, or therapy; (c) Any organ bank storage facility - For medical or dental education, research, therapy, or transplantation; and (d) Any specified individual - For therapy or transplantation needed by him. Section 7. Duty of Hospitals. A hospital authorized to receive organ donations or to conduct transplantation shall train qualified personnel and their staff to handle the task of introducing the organ donation program in a humane and delicate manner to the relatives of the donor-decedent enumerated in Section 4 hereof. The hospital shall accomplish the necessary form or document as proof of compliance with the above requirement. Section 8. Manner of Executing a Legacy. (a) Legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may be made by will. The legacy becomes effective upon the death of the testator without waiting for probate of the will. If the will is not probated, or if it is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the legacy, to the extent that it was executed in good faith, is nevertheless valid and effective. (b) A legacy of all or part of the human body under Section 3 hereof may also be made in any document other than a will. The legacy becomes effective upon death of the testator and shall be respected by and binding upon his executor or administrator, heirs, assigns, successors-in-interest and all members of the family. The document, which may be a card or any paper designed to be carried on a person, must be signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses who must sign the document in his presence. If the testator cannot sign, the document may be signed for him at his discretion and in his presence, in the presence of two witnesses who must, likewise, sign the document in the presence of the testator. Delivery of the document of legacy during the testator's lifetime is not necessary to make the legacy valid.

(c) The legacy may be made to a specified legatee or without specifying a legatee. If the legacy is made to a specified legatee who is not available at the time and place of the testator's death, the attending physician or surgeon, in the absence of any expressed indication that the testator desired otherwise, may accept the legacy as legatee. If the legacy does not specify a legatee, the legacy may be accepted by the attending physician or surgeon as legatee upon or following the testator's death. The physician who becomes a legatee under this subsection shall not participate in the procedures for removing or transplanting a part or parts of the body of the decedent. (d) The testator may designate in his will, card or other document, the surgeon or physician who will carry out the appropriate procedures. In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is not available, the legatee or other persons authorized to accept the legacy may authorize any surgeon or physician for the purpose. Section 9. Manner of Executing a Donation. Any donation by a person authorized under subsection (a) of Section 4 hereof shall be sufficient if it complies with the formalities of a donation of a movable property. In the absence of any of the persons specified under Section 4 hereof and in the absence of any document of organ donation, the physician in charge of the patient, the head of the hospital or a designated officer of the hospital who has custody of the body of the deceased classified as accident, trauma, or other medicolegal cases, may authorize in a public document the removal from such body for the purpose of transplantation of the organ to the body of a living person: Provided, That the physician, head of hospital or officer designated by the hospital for this purpose has exerted reasonable efforts, within forty-eight (48) hours, to locate the nearest relative listed in Section 4 hereof or guardian of the decedent at the time of death. In all donations, the death of a person from whose body an organ will be removed after his death for the purpose of transplantation to a living person, shall be diagnosed separately and certified by two (2) qualified physicians neither of whom should be: (a) A member of the team of medical practitioners who will effect the removal of the organ from the body; nor (b) The physician attending to the receipt of the organ to be removed; nor (c) The head of hospital or the designated officer authorizing the removal of the organ. Section 10. Person(s) Authorized to Remove Transplantable Organs. Only authorized medical practitioners in a hospital shall remove and/or transplant any organ which is authorized to be removed and/or transplanted pursuant to Section 5 hereof. Section 11. Delivery of Document of Legacy or Donation. If the legacy or donation is made to a specified legatee or donee, the will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, may be delivered by the testator or donor, or is authorized representative, to the legatee or donee to expedite the appropriate procedures immediately after death. The will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, may be deposited in any hospital or organ bank storage facility that accepts it for safekeeping or for facilitation or procedures after death. On the request of any interested party upon or after the testator's death, the person in possession shall produce the document of legacy or donation for verification. Section 12. Amendment or Revocation of Legacy or Donation. a) If he will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, has been delivered to a specific legatee or donee, the testator or donor may amend or revoke the legacy or donation either by: (1) The execution and delivery to the legatee or donee of a signed statement to that effect; or (2) An oral statement to that effect made in the presence of two other persons and communicated to the legatee or donee; or

(3) A statement to that effect during a terminal illness or injury addressed to an attending physician and communicated to the legatee or donee; or (4) A signed card or document to that effect found on the person or effects of the testator or donor. (b) Any will, card or other document, or an executed copy thereof, which has not been delivered to the legatee or donee may be revoked by the testator or donor in the manner provided in subsection (a) of this Section or by destruction, cancellation or mutilation of the document and all executed copies thereof. Any legacy made by a will may also be amended or revoked in the manner provided for amendment or revocation of wills, or as provided in subsection (a) of this Section. Section 13. Rights and Duties After Death. (a) The legatee or donee may accept or reject the legacy or donation as the case may be. If the legacy of donation is of a part of the body, the legatee or donee, upon the death of the testator and prior to embalming, shall effect the removal of the part, avoiding unnecessary mutilation. After removal of the part, custody of the remainder of the body vests in the surviving spouse, next of kin or other persons under obligation to dispose of the body of the decedent. (b) Any person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms of this Act shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding of this Act. Section 14. International Sharing of Human Organs or Tissues. Sharing of human organs or tissues shall be made only through exchange programs duly approved by the Department of Health: Provided, That foreign organ or tissue bank storage facilities and similar establishments grant reciprocal rights to their Philippine counterparts to draw organs or tissues at any time. Section 15. Information Drive. In order that the public will obtain the maximum benefits from this Act, the Department of Health, in cooperation with institutions, such as the National Kidney Institute, civic and non-government health organizations and other health related agencies, involved in the donation and transplantation of human organs, shall undertake a public information program. The Secretary of Health shall endeavor to persuade all health professionals, both government and private, to make an appeal for human organ donation. Section 16. Rules and Regulations. The Secretary of Health, after consultation with all health professionals, both government and private, and non-government health organizations shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary or proper to implement this Act. Section 17. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, ordinances, rules and regulations, executive or administrative orders, and other presidential issuance inconsistent with this Act, are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly. Section 18. Separability Clause. The provisions of this Act are hereby deemed separable. If any provision hereof should be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall remain in full force and effect. Section 19. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Approved: January 7, 1992

Theft of Intangibles: Laurel vs. Judge Abrogar (Supreme Court, 2009) Intellectual property is an intangible property. Electric voice signals and pulses are intangibles too. Can these be subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code? If I were to answer the question in 2008, I would have said that theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code is only committed in relation to tangible property. I would have argued that the element asportacion or taking, refers only to physical taking of tangible personal property. Since you cannot physically hold or take intangible personal property, then there is no taking to speak of. If you answered this way, you might have scored full points for a bar question on the matter. After all, the weight of authority based on pre-2009 jurisprudence is that theft can only be committed against tangible personal property. As of 13 January 2009 however, the weight of authority has shifted. The Supreme Court in an EN BANC RESOLUTION declared: Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the definition of the term "personal property" in the penal code provision on theft had been established in Philippine jurisprudence. This Court, in United States v. Genato, United States v. Carlos, and United States v. Tambunting, consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Moreover, since the passage of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the term "personal property" has had a generally accepted definition in civil law. In Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain, "personal property" is defined as "anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real property)." Thus, the term "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code provisions in accordance with the rule on statutory construction that where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute, in which they are used, the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they have been previously used. In fact, this Court used the Civil Code definition of "personal property" in interpreting the theft provision of the penal code in United States v. Carlos. Cognizant of the definition given by jurisprudence and the Civil Code of Spain to the term "personal property" at the time the old Penal Code was being revised, still the legislature did not limit or qualify the definition of "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code. Neither did it provide a restrictive definition or an exclusive enumeration of "personal property" in the Revised Penal Code, thereby showing its intent to retain for the term an extensive and unqualified interpretation. Consequently, any property which is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil Code and capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS 153 SCRA 390 FACTS: Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same properties. The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The respondent court held that the REM was null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not a Real Estate Mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on a lot belonging to another? HELD: A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building was a valid mortgage. As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act. SERGS PRODUCTS AND GOQUIOLAY V. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE 338 SCRA 499 FACTS: PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in favor of PCI. Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage. The Issue: A. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported bySERGS became real property by virtue of immobilization. HELD: The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature. Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. TSAI V. COURT OF APPEALS 336 SCRA 324 FACTS: EVERTEX secured a loan from PBC, guaranteed by a real estate and chattel mortgage over a parcel of land where the factory stands, and the chattels located therein, as included in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract. Another loan was obtained secured by a chattel mortgage over properties with similar descriptions listed in the first schedule. During the date of execution of the second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased machineries and equipment. Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed for insolvency proceedings. It failed to pay its obligation and thus, PBC initiated extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. PBC was the highest bidder in the public auctions, making it the owner of the properties. It then leased the factory premises to Tsai. Afterwards, EVERTEX sought the annulment of the sale and conveyance of the properties to PBC as it was allegedly a violation of the INSOLVENCY LAW. The RTC held that the lease and sale were irregular as it involved properties not included in the schedule of the mortgage contract. HELD: While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of REM and CM executed by

the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and appellate courts show that the intention was to treat the machineries as movables or personal property. Assuming that the properties were considered immovables, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. Meralco vs CBAA 114 SCRA 273 Facts: Pursuant to a pipeline concession issued under the Petroleum Act of 1949, Republic Act No.387, Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila a pipeline system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and buried not less than one meter below the surface along the shoulder of the public highway. The pipes are embedded in the soil while the valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end. Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property and issued Tax Declarations. Issues: Whether or not the Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is a subject to a realty tax Held: The Court ordered that CBAA did not with grave abuse and discretion and acted within its jurisdiction in sustaining the holding of the provincial assessor that Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to a realty tax for the following reasons that the pipes are machinery or improvements and regarded as realty because they are constructions adhered to the soil. It is attached to the land in such away that it cannot be separated there from without dismantling the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. In so far as the pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the flow of the oil, it is in a sense a machinery within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code. Thus, the Court dismiss the petition and the questioned decision and resolution of the lower court is affirmed. Meralco vs CBAA 114 SCRA 260 Facts: This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed in 1969 by Manila Electric Company on a lot in SanPascual, Batangas which it leased in 1968 from Caltex (Phil.), Inc. The storage tanks are made of steel plates welded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisting of compacted earth as the outermost layer. The tank is not attached to its foundation. It is not anchored or welded to the concrete circular wall. Its bottom plate is not attached to any part of the foundation by bolts, screws or similar devices. The tank merely sits on its foundation. Pipelines were installed on the sides of each tank and are connected to the pipelines of the Manila Enterprises Industrial Corporation. The Board concludes that while the tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation itself and the walls, dikes and steps, which are integral parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the pipelines are attached to the tanks and required Meralco to pay realty taxes on the two tanks. Issue: Whether or not the 2 oil tanks installed by Meralco in Batangas is a subject to a realty tax. Held: The SC ruled that while the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. Thus, the two tanks should be held subject to realty tax because they were considered real property. Henceforth, the petition is dismissed. The Board's questioned decision and resolution are affirmed. Caltex vs CBAA 114 SCRA 296

Facts: This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines)Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The building or shed, the elevated water tank, the car hoist under a separate shed, the air compressor, the underground gasoline tank, neon lights signboard, concrete fence and pavement and the lot where they are all placed or erected, all of them used in the pursuance of the gasoline service station business formed the entire gasoline service-station. The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease. Issue: Whether or not the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery enumerated are subject to realty tax Held: The Assessment Law provides that the realty tax is due "on real property, including land, buildings, machinery, and other improvements". SC hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Note: Improvements is a valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes. Machinery shall embrace machines, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances and apparatus attached to the real estate. It includes the physical facilities available for production, as well as the installations and appurtenant service facilities, together with all other equipment designed for or essential to its manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purposes. Acap vs CA GR No. 118114; Dec. 7, 1995 Facts: The title to a lot in Negros Occidental was issued and is registered in the name of spouses Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In 1975, Felixberto sold the lot to Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro Acap was tenant of a portion of the land. When ownership was transferred in1975, Acap continued to be the registered tenant and religiously paid his rentals to Pido, and after his death, to his widow Laurencia. Pido died intestate and his surviving heirs (wife and four children) executed a document (Declaration of heirship with waiver of rights),adjudicating the land equally amongst themselves, and waiving all their rights in favour of Edy de los Santos. The title continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the Declaration of Heirship with waiver of rights, Edy filed it with the Registry of Deeds as part of a notice of adverse claim against the original certificate of title. Edy told Acap personally he was the new owner of the land and that the lease rentals (10 cavans of palay per annum) were to be paid to him. Allegedly, Acapagreed and complied. In 1983 however, Acap refused to pay any further lease rentals, prompting private respondent to get the assistant of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. AMAR officer informed Acaps wife about Edys ownership, but she said she and her husband did not recognize the ownership over the land. After four years, Edy filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Acap, as he refused to pay agreed rentals. The trial court decided in favor of Edy & stated that the evidence had established that the subject land was "sold" by the heirs of Cosme Pido to Edy. It forfeited Acaps preferred right under PD

27 and ordered Acap to deliver the farm to Edy which was affirmed by the CA. Issue: W/N the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights can be considered a deed of sale in favour of Edy de los Santos of the lot in question. Held: The Declaration of Heirship was not the same as a contract/deed of sale. In a contract of sale, one party obligates himself to transfer ownership and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a certain price. A declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a private instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement. There is a difference between sale of hereditary rights and waiver. The first presumes a deed of sale. The second is a mode of extinction of ownership. Edy, being a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido cannot conclusively claim ownership on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of a sale, donation or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership. The fact that the adverse claim was duly proven does not prove ownership. Itis nothing but a notice of adverse claim. In itself is not sufficient to transfer title to Edyde los Reyes. Heirs of the late Joaquin Limense vs. Rita vda. De Ramos, et al., G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009. Property; builder in good faith. When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. In this case, the co-ownership was terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of Joaquin Limense. Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners may oblige respondents to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own expense, if they so decide. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around. Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, ispreclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land. The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being out rightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or (2) to sell the land to the builder. MARGARITA F. CASTRO vs. NAPOLEON A. MONSOD [G.R. No. 183719. February 2, 2011.] FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Pias City, and covered by TCT No. T-36071, with an area of 130 sq.m. Respondent, on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner, located at Moonwalk Village, Las Pias City. There is a concretefence, more or less two (2) meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing, since his property is located at an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of petitioner's

property. Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of his property over the property of petitioner, in view of the latter's manifest determination to remove the embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes. The RTC ordered, among others, the cancellation of respondents adverse claim at the back of TCT No. T-36071. It ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered the retention of the annotation at the backof the TCT 36071, not as an adverse claim but a recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support. The issue in this case is whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties and, if it does, whether the same may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate. SUPREME COURT RULING: Article 437 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper. However, such right of the owner is not absolute and is subject to the following limitations: (1) servitudes or easements, 18 (2) special laws, 19 (3) ordinances, 20 (4) reasonable requirements of aerial navigation, 21 and (5) rights of third persons. Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent. It was established that the properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioner's property. Unless restrained, the continued excavation of the embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling. We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from making injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent. However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come to court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to be recognized and respected. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. vs. City of Pasig G.R. No. 166838, June 15, 2011. FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of several parcels of land with (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with TCT No. 518403, which was situated in (Cainta). The two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued. TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870. The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.[6] Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.[7]

On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition[8] for the settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date. On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,[9] docketed as Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon (the subject properties). Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.[10] Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting the real property taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the subject properties are within its metes and bounds.[11] Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a prejudicial question to the resolution of the case.[12] ISSUES: 1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the resolution of the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta; and 2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucias TCTs. HELD: We agree with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia Local Government Code; real property government unit entitled to collect. (J. Abad) tax; local

on installment a 300 square meter parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 165456,[6] located in Antipolo, Rizal.[7] Upon full payment of the purchase price, a Deed of Absolute Sale[8] was executed on August 31, 1976 in his favor.[9] Consequently, the old title, TCT No. 171453,[10] which was a transfer from TCT No. 165456,[11] was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. N-10772,[12] was issued in his name. [13] Since then, he has been dutifully paying real property taxes for the said property.[14] He was not, however, able to physically occupy the subject property because as a member of the Philippine Air Force, he was often assigned to various stations in the Philippines.[15] On December 23, 1993, when he was about to retire from the government service, respondent Barangan went to visit his property, where he was planning to build a retirement home. It was only then that he discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo Dulfo (petitioner Dulfo) and his family.[16] On February 4, 1994, respondent Barangan sent a letter[17] to petitioner Dulfo demanding that he and his family vacate the subject property within 30 days. In reply, petitioner Atty. Rogelio J. Jakosalem (petitioner Jakosalem), the son-in-law of petitioner Dulfo, sent a letter[18] claiming ownership over the subject property. On February 19, 1994, respondent Barangan filed with Barangay San Luis, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law against petitioners.[19] No settlement was reached; hence, the complaint was filed before the Prosecutors Office of Rizal.[20] The case, however, was dismissed because the issue of ownership must first be resolved in a civil action.[21] On May 28, 1994, respondent Barangan commissioned Geodetic Engineer Lope C. Jonco (Engr. Jonco) of J. Surveying Services to conduct a relocation survey of the subject property based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans TCT.[22] The relocation survey revealed that the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family is the same property covered by respondent Barangans title.[23] On November 17, 1994, respondent Barangan filed a Complaint[24] for Recovery of Possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3423, against petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City. Respondent Barangan prayed that petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem be ordered to vacate the subject property and pay a monthly rental of P3,000.00 for the use and occupancy of the subject property from May 1979 until the time the subject property is vacated, plus moral and exemplary damages and cost of suit.[25] Petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem claimed that the subject property was assigned to petitioner Jakosalem by Mr. Nicanor Samson (Samson);[27] that they have been in possession of the subject property since May 8, 1979;[28] and that the property covered by respondent Barangans title is not the property occupied by petitioner Dulfo and his family.[29] Petitioners Arguments Petitioners Dulfo and Jakosalem contend that the CA erred in reversing the findings of the RTC as respondent Barangans property was not properly identified.[49] They claim that the relocation survey conducted by Engr. Jonco violated the agreement they made before the Barangay that the survey should be conducted in the presence of both parties.[50] They also claim that the title number stated in the Land Purchase Agreement is not the same number found in the Deed of Absolute Sale.[51] They likewise insist that laches and prescription barred respondent Barangan from filing the instant case.[52] Lastly, they contend that the damages ordered by the CA are exorbitant, excessive and without factual and legal bases.[53] Respondents Arguments Respondent Barangan, on the other hand, argues that being the registered owner of the subject property, he is entitled to its possession.[54] He maintains that his Torrens title prevails over the Assignment of a Right[55] presented by petitioners.[56] Moreover, laches and prescription do not apply against him as there was no delay on his part to assert his right to the property.[57] ISSUE:

Under Presidential Decree No. 464, or the Real Property Tax Code, the authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the property is situated. This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code. Thus, while a local government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries. The Court cited the case of Mariano, Jr. v Commission on Elections which stated that the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law. Rogelio J. Jakolsalem, et al. vs. Roberto S. Barangan G.R. No. 175025. February 15, 2012. On August 13, 1966, respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan (respondent Barangan) entered into a Land Purchase Agreement[5] with Ireneo S. Labsilica of Citadel Realty Corporation whereby respondent Barangan agreed to purchase

Respondent Barangan is entitled to recover the subject property? Yes HELD: Damages; Torrens system; Laches and prescription. Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession, a person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title. Jurisprudence consistently holds that prescription and laches can not apply to registered land covered by the Torrens system because under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. In this case, respondent Barangan was able to prove the identity of the property and his title. To prove his title to the property, he presented in evidence the following documents: (1) Land Purchase Agreement;[59] (2) Deed of Absolute Sale;[60] (3) and a Torrens title registered under his name, TCT No. N-10772.[61] To prove the identity of the property, he offered the testimonies of Engr. Jonco, who conducted the relocation survey,[62] and Estardo, the caretaker of the subdivision, who showed respondent Barangan the exact location of the subject property. [63] He likewise submitted as evidence the Verification Survey Plan of Lot 11, Block 5, (LRC) Psd-60846, which was plotted based on the technical description appearing on respondent Barangans title.[64] Petitioners contention that the relocation survey was done in violation of their agreement deserves scant consideration. Petitioners were informed[65] beforehand of the scheduled relocation survey on May 29, 1994 but they opted not to attend. In fact, as testified by respondent Barangan and Engr. Jonco, the relocation survey had to be postponed several times because petitioners refused to participate.[66] By refusing to attend and participate in the relocation survey, they are now estopped from questioning the results of the relocation survey. [67] Records also show that during the trial, the RTC ordered the DENR to conduct a resurvey of the subject property; but petitioners moved that the same be abandoned claiming that the resurvey would only delay the proceedings.[68] To us, the persistent refusal of petitioners to participate in the relocation survey does not speak well of their claim that they are not occupying respondent Barangans property. In fact, their unjustified refusal only shows either of two things: (1) that they know for a fact that the result would be detrimental to their case; or (2) that they have doubts that the result would be in their favor. Neither is there any discrepancy between the title number stated in the Land Purchase Agreement and the Deed of Absolute Sale. As correctly found by the CA, TCT No. 171453, the title stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale, is a transfer from TCT No. 165456, the title stated in the Land Purchase Agreement.[69] Hence, both TCTs pertain to the same property. Respondent Barangan is entitled to actual and moral damages as well as attorneys fees. REPUBLIC v RURAL BANK OF KABACAN 25 January 2012 Sereno SHORT VERSION: Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator; measured not by takers gain, but the owners loss. The equivalent to be rendered to the property should be real, substantial, full and ample. It does not include earth fill, and should only be awarded to the present owner of the expropriated property. FACTS: National Irrigation Authority (petitioner) was a GOCC with original charter (RA 3601); it was specifically authorized under PD 552 to exercise the power of eminent domain. NIA needed parcels of land to construct the MalitubogMarigadao Irrigation Project.

8 September 1994: it filed with the RTC of Kabacan a complaint to expropriate a portion of three parcels of land (total: 14497.91 sqm). Lot 3080: registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan Lot 455: registered under RG May, Ronald and Ronaldo, allsurnamed Lao Lot 3039: registered under Littie Sarah Agdeppa 11 July 1995: NIA filed an amended complaint to include Leosa Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as registered owners of Lot 3039. 25 September 1995: NIA filed a second amended complaint to properly allege the area sought to be expropriates, the exact address of the properties and their owners. It also prayed to be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing with the PNB P19246.56 (provisional value). 31 October 1995: respondents filed an answer saying, among otherallegations, that NIAs valuation of their property was inaccurate 11 September 1996: RTC issued an order forming a committee to determine the fair market value of the expropriated properties to establish just compensation There were two reports: Committee 1: area to be occupied 18930 sq m; there were Melina trees, banana clumps and coco trees Committee 2: fair market value = P65 per sq m based on BIR zonal valuation; on the improvements: P200 per gmelina treeolder than four years old; P150 per gmelina tree older thanone year; P164 per coco tree; also added to computation thevalue of earthfill excavated from Lots 3039 and 3080. RTC judgment: 18930 sq m to be expropriated to NIA P1230450 for the areas to be expropriated P5128375.50 to Lot 3080 owners for removed earth fill P1929611.30 to Lot 3039 owners for removed earth fill P60000 for one-year-old gmelina trees P3786000 for four-year-old gmelina trees P2460 for coconut trees CA affirmed RTC decision, but deleted the inclusion of the value of the earthfill ISSUES: was the just compensation awarded correct? YES should MargaritaTaboada and Portia Ortiz compensation for Lot 3080? NOT YET REASONING: ON JUST COMPENSATION Just compensation was the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. Measured not by takers gain, but the owners loss. The equivalent to be rendered to the property should be real, substantial, full and ample. Sum equivalent to the market value of the property (broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government). The RTC followed the procedure under 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 67 in forming a committee to determine just compensations. The first committee conducted an ocular inspection and determined the exact areas affected, as well as the improvements. When the members couldnt agree on valuation, the RTC selected anew committee to do so. The second committee also conducted an ocular inspection; it obtained data from the BIR, interviewed adjacent property owners and considered Provincial Ordinance 173providing the value of the properties and improvements for tax purposes. Napocor v Diato-Bernal : just-ness of could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. In that case those were sworn declarations of realtors in area, tax declarations and zonal valuation from the BIR. The Supreme Court then rejected the

be

paid

committee report for not being based on any documentary evidence. In the present case, the committee members based their recommendations on reliable data and considered various factors thataffected the value of the land and the improvements. Adoption of the provincial ordinance was allowed even though petitioner argued that it reflected 1999 market values when the actual taking was in 1996. Factual findings of the trial court and CA were binding on the SC. There was no legal basis to separate the value of excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties. Soil had no value separate from that of the expropriated land; just compensation referred to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually lost; the value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. Napocor v Ibrahim : rights over land were indivisible; cited NCC Art437, stating that the ownership of land extended to the surface as well as the subsoil under it. The CA: the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land tothe surface area only. NIA, now being the owner of the expropriated property, has the right to enjoy and make use of the property in accordance with its mandate and objectives as provided by law. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public improvements. ON COMPENSATING ALLEGED OWNERS The CA awarded payment to Taboada and Ortiz based on Rural Bank of Kabacans non-participation in the proceedings and its subsequent manifestation that it didnt own Lot 3080 anymore. Eminent domain cases involved expenditure of public funds; trial courts should be circumspect in their valuation of just compensation awarded to owners of expropriated property. CA shouldnt have relied on Rural Banks declaration to validate Taboada and Ortizs claim of entitlement to the payment. The law imposed certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real property to be valid. The conveyance must be in a public document and registered in the Register of Deeds where the property was situated. The TCT covering Lot 3080 was still in Rural Banks name. The trialcourt should have required the bank/T&O to show proof of theconveyance. RULING: Petition partly granted; just compensation affirmed; case remanded to RTC to establish present owner of Lot 3080. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011 FACTS: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic. G.R. No. 168812 (MCIAA Petition)

On September 29, 1997, one Albert Chiongbian (Chiongbian), alleging to be the owner of Lot Nos. 761-A and 762-A but which the Inocians were now claiming, moved and was later allowed to intervene. During the pre-trial, MCIAA admitted the following facts: 1. That the properties, which are the subject matter of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, are also the properties involved in Civil Case R-1881; 2. That the purpose of the expropriation was for the expansion of the old Lahug Airport; that the Lahug Airport was not expanded; 3. That the old Lahug Airport was closed sometime in June 1992; 4. That the price paid to the lot owners in the expropriation case is found in the decision of the court; and 5. That some properties were reconveyed by the MCIAA because the previous owners were able to secure express waivers or riders wherein the government agreed to return the properties should the expansion of the Lahug Airport not materialize. During trial, the Inocians adduced evidence which included the testimony of Ricardo Inocian (Inocian) and Asterio Uy (Uy). Uy, an employee of the CAA, testified that he was a member of the team which negotiated for the acquisition of certain lots in Lahug for the proposed expansion of the Lahug Airport. He recalled that he acted as the interpreter/spokesman of the team since he could speak the Cebuano dialect. He stated that the other members of the team of negotiators were Atty. Pedro Ocampo, Atty. Lansang, and Atty. Saligumba. He recounted that, in the course of the negotiation, their team assured the landowners that their landholdings would be reconveyed to them in the event the Lahug Airport would be abandoned or if its operation were transferred to the Mactan Airport. Some landowners opted to sell, while others were of a different bent owing to the inadequacy of the offered price. Inocian testified that he and his mother, Isabel Lambaga, attended a meeting called by the NAC team of negotiators sometime in 1947 or 1949 where he and the other landowners were given the assurance that they could repurchase their lands at the same price in the event the Lahug Airport ceases to operate. He further testified that they rejected the NACs offer. However, he said that they no longer appealed the decree of expropriation due to the repurchase assurance adverted to. The MCIAA presented Michael Bacarizas (Bacarizas), who started working for MCIAA as legal assistant in 1996. He testified that, in the course of doing research work on the lots subject of Civil Case No. CEB-18370, he discovered that the same lots were covered by the decision in Civil Case No. R1881. He also found out that the said decision did not expressly contain any condition on the matter of repurchase. G.R. No. 168770 (Ouano Petition) Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB20743. Answering, the Republic and MCIAA averred that the Ouanos no longer have enforceable rights whatsoever over the condemned Lot No. 763-A, the decision in Civil Case No. R1881 not having found any reversionary condition. The issue of the right of the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City to repurchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties. HELD:

The Republic and MCIAAs petition in G.R. No. 168812 is bereft of merit, while the Ouano petition in G.R. No. 168770 is meritorious. Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAAs predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties. This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the government merely held the properties condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011. Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-inFact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011. Vicente Yu Chang and Soleda Yu Chang VS Republic GR No. 171726 February 23, 2011 LTD: Public Domain FACTS: Petitioners father L. Yu Chang executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property with the Mayor of Pili, Camarines Sur, Justo Casuncad. Office of Solicitor General (OSG) filed an opposition, saying that the land is legally classified as Public Domain, forest land. HELD: Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as amended by PD 1073 provised that: The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose title have not

been perfected or completed, may apply to Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a Certificate of title thereof, under the Property Registration Decree. In order that petitioners application for registration of title my be granted, they must first establish the following: 1. That the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the Public Domain 2. That they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945. Jose Amunategui vs Director of Forestry provides that: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Republic of the Philippines v. Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011. FACTS: On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration[3] of a parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-200706,[4] located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square meters. Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer[5] dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No. 22206[6] for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment[7] of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application. ISSUE: Should his application be granted? RULING: No because Petitioner failed to prove that he and his predecessor have been in possession of the land since 12 June 1945. Neither can be qualify under the 30-year prescription period rule since the land was declared alienable less than 30 years from the date of his application. P.D. No. 1529; requisites for registration of title. Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide: SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. x x x x Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Republic of the Philippines v. Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011. HOW DO YOU PROVE THAT THE SUBJECT LAND FORMS PART OF THE DISPOSABLE AND ALIENABLE LAND?

BY PRESENTING A CERTIFICATION AND REPORT FROM THE DENR-CENRO STATING THAT THE LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE. The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report[19] dated July 17, 2001 submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since January 21, 1987. In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic,[20] we have ruled that a certification and report from the DENRCENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the classification of the land described therein. We held: In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic,[21] we ruled that said Certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject property as public and alienable land. We similarly ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals[22] and intoned therein that the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the classification or re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the subject lot. HOW DO YOU PROVE THAT YOU AND YOUR PREDECESSOR WERE IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION? BY TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX RECEIPTS. FOR NO ONE IN HIS RIGHT MIND WOULD BE PAYING TAXES FOR A PROPERTY THAT IS NOT IN HIS ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION.[28] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SINCE WHEN SHOULD YOU AND YOUR PREDECESSOR POSSESS THE PROPERTY? SINCE 12 JUNE 1945 OR EARLIER UNDER SECTION 14 (PAR. 1) OF PD 1525. Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his predecessors-ininterest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent any showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual,[23] we reiterated, However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale[24] dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration No. 11078[25] for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952.[26] In Llanes v. Republic,[27] the Court held that tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.[28] However, even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[29] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX CAN POSSESSION BE LATER THAN THE PERIOD SINCE 12 JUNE 1945 OR EARLIER?

YES, UNDER SECTION 14, PAR. 2 OF PD 1525. OCCUPATION MUST BE AT LEAST 30 YEARS AT THE TIME OF APPLICATION PURSUANT TO THE PRESCRIPTION PROVISION UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. BUT THERE ARE TWO REQUIREMENTS: (1) THE 3O YEAR PERIOD MUST BEGIN FROM THE TIME THE LAND IS DECLARED ALIENABLE; AND (2) THERE MUST BE A DECLARATION BY THE DENR THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC SERVICE OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH. But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject land since 1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529? To this question we likewise answer in the negative. An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws. The laws on prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty years.[30] On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.[31] In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled, Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)[32], and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.[33] In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general public use.[34] Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this case indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case. Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENRCENRO certification and report is enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription. Although we would want to adhere to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice[35] we are constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow respondents application for registration.

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