Acap v CA (1995)

Acap was a tenant of the lot owned by Cosme Pido. Upon Pido's death, Acap paid the monthly rental dues to the widow Lauranciana Pido. He died intestate. The widow and her 3 sons afterward executed a notarized document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and waiver of rights" in favor of private respondant De los Reyes. Acap did not recognize De los Reyes claim of ownership over the land as he contended that the land still belongs to the heirs of Cosme Pido, and won't pay the rent demanded by De los Reyes. Issue: Whether or not the subject Declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is recognized mode of acquiring ownership? Can it be considered a deed of sale? Palero-Tan charged Urdaneta with Conduct Unbecoming a Court Personnel for stealing her ring and bracelet. Urdaneta claims he found a pklastic sachet containing the said jewelry under his table and thought it belonged to a litigant and took them for safekeeping. Investigating lawyer found Urdaneta guilty of the charge.

In a contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is a mode of extinction of an ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. De los Reyes, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver of document which neither recites the elements of either a sale or donation or any other derivative modes of acquiring ownership.

Palero-Tan Urdaneta (2008)

Despite all the opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute the charges against him, he failed to do so. Respondent even admitted finding the small plastic sachet containing complainants ring and bracelet and keeping the jewelry in his possession until he purportedly threw them away. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something. The Civil Code, in Article 719, explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities, thus: Article 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the finding has taken place. The finding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he deems best. If the movables cannot be kept without deterioration, or without the expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the publication. Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses.

Del Rosario Ferrer

v.

(2010)

In 1968, Sps. Gonzales executed a document entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini, covering the spouses lot and the house on it. Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document. Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in 1968. A few months

The donation is inter vivos.

That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving

later, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972. In 1998, Jarabini filed a petition for the probate deed of donation mortis causa. Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his fathers assignment of his rights and interests in the property to her.

spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime. Puig v. Peaflorida - in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donees acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated. Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign.

Villanueva Branoco

v.

(2011)

Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses Branoco to recover a parcelof land. The former claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Vere, who in turn, bought the property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo declared the property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. In their answer, the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo byway of donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards. The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the property, and ordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to Gonzalo. Rodrigo (sale) Vere (sale) Gonzalo Rodrigo (donation) Rodriguez (sale) Sps. Branoco The trial court rejected Spouses Branocos claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer. On appeal, the CA granted the Spouses appeal and set

DONATION WAS VALID. IT WAS INTER VIVOS. Having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another." Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the property will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of Rodriguez signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti , not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give half of the produce of the land to ApoyAlve during her lifetime." Thus, the Deed's stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it. The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x xx [inter vivos] transfers."

aside the trial court's ruling. it held that the deed of donation is one of inter vivos. In his petition, Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years. Blanco v. Rivera Eugenia sold her undivided share to Petitioner. The sale could not be registered because the original owners copy of the tile was allegedly in the custody of Respondent who refused to surrender the same and who did not consent to the sale. Eugenia again sold her undivided share to Respondent through a quitclaim deed. Sale was registered and Respondent took possession of the property. Petitioner then sought the assistance of the barangay insisting that the lot was sold to him. However, he cannot present the original TCT. Respondent denied that he knew of the prior sale to petitioner and filed a case for quieting of title.

Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing such practice.

RESPONDENT IS THE OWNER BEING THE FIRST TO REGISTER IN GOOD FAITH AS REQUIRED BY ART. 1544. When immovable property is sold to two different buyers at different times, ownership is determined in accordance with Article 1544 of the Civil Code. Art 1544: Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall pertain to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person, who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. The requirement of the law is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith. The vendee who first registers the sale in good faith in the registry of property has a preferred right over another vendee who has not registered his title. This is true even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. More credit is given to registration than to actual possession. But the law is clear mere registration of title is not enough. Good faith must concur with registration. What holds relevance and materiality is not whether the second buyer is a buyer in good faith but whether he registers such second sale in good faith, meaning, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. Here, both the trial and appellate courts declared respondent to be the true owner of the property. He was uncontestedly the first to register his ownership over the property, untainted by proof of any knowledge of the prior sale. Respondents acquisition and registration of the property were therefore in good faith.

(2006)

Central Philippine University v. CA

In 1939, Don Ramon Lopez Sr. executed a deed of donation in favor of CPU together with the following conditions: a) The land should be utilized by CPU exclusively for the establishment & use of medical college; b) The said college shall not sell transfer or convey to any 3rd party; c) The said land shall be called Ramon Lopez Campus and any income from that land shall be put in the fund to be known as Ramon Lopez Campus Fund. However, on May 31, 1989, the heirs of Don Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, reconveyance& damages against CPU for not complying with the

DONATION IS REVOKED. A clear perusal of the conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the donation. Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the donation and recovery of the property donated cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done. Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be

(1995)

conditions. The heirs also argued that CPU had negotiated with the NHA to exchange the donated property with another land owned by the latter.

burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least transmission of rights and interests. 10 Records are clear and facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance. Simple donation, not onerous. Petitioner/Plaintiff cannot be deemed the owner for lack of acceptance. It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void. Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the donor and noted in both the deed of donation and the separate instrument embodying the acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by petitioner. For this reason, the subject lot cannot be adjudicated to him.

Lagazo v. CA

(1998)

Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded in July 1975 a 60.10square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate. Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed a SPA in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Espaol authorizing him to execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot. Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Espaol to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority. Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the lot in favor of the Plaintiff. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot. Plaintiff then sent a demand letter to the defendant to vacate the lot. Defendant claims that the lot was sold to them by the Eduardo.

Cayetano v. Leonides (1984)

Petitioner Cayetano maintains that since the respondent judge Leonidas allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

This contention is without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: Art. 16 par. (2). xxx xxx xxx

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Art. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.

URETA V. URETA

(2011)

Alfonso had 14 children. In 1969, he executed 4 Deeds of Sale in order to reduce inheritance taxes. One of the Deeds of Sale was in favor of Policronio, covering 6 lots and which are the properties in dispute in this case. No monetary consideration was given for the sales, and Alfonso continued to own the lots until his death in 1972.

CC842 does not apply to this case. CC842 refers to the freedom of disposition by will, while this case involved a Deed of Sale. Alfonsos heirs need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes befor assailing the validity of the Deed of Sale.

Policronio died in 1974. Policronios heirs claimed the 6 lots belonged to their late father and as such should be excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonsos estate. They claimed Alfonsos heirs cannot assail the validity of the Deed of Sale since CC842 should apply. SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, vs. SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO (Rule 45) Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died. During her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother. Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," and an additional seven square meters was added to the land. After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners. Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance; it was already sold during the lifetime of their mother. Under Article 1311 of the NCC, whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights, and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs. The heirs have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. At the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid. This is because even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any

them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents. Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents. Petitioners still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages before the RTC of Pasig City. OSCAR C. REYES vs.RTC, ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION, and RODRIGO C. REYES BRION, J (Rule 45) Zenith and Rodrigo filed a derivative suit with the SEC against Oscar to obtain an accounting of the funds and assets of ZENITH INSURANCE CORPORATION and to determine the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes that were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated by Oscar. When RA 87997 took effect, the SECs exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the RTC designated as a special commercial court. Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit claiming that the complaint is not a bona fide derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased Anastacia. The RTC denied the motion. CA via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus: affirmed the RTC and denied the petition. Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo C. Reyes (Rodrigo) are two of the four children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation (Zenith). Pedro died in 1964, while Anastacia died in 1993. No settlement and partition appear to have been made with Anastacias estate.

physical division.

Ruling: (To determine the nature of the dispute, the two-tiered test is applied: the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. The controversy must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of the parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.) Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties? While Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith, he holds them in two capacities: in his own right with respect to the 4,250 shares registered in his name, and as one of the heirs of Anastacia Reyes. Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacias death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estates partition, deemed co-owners thereof. This status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the corporation, unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares.The transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedents estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation. Note that the case at bar is different from Abejo v. Dela Cruz and TCL Sales Corporation v. Court of Appeals where the transferees held definite and uncontested titles to a specific number of shares of the corporation. In the present case, each of Anastacias heirs holds only an undivided interest in the shares. This interest, at this point, is still inchoate and subject to the outcome of a settlement proceeding; the right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance will not be determind until all the debts of the estate of the decedent are paid. In short, the heirs are only entitled to what remains after payment of the decedents debts.

BLAS vs SANTOS

Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz and had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children namely: Maria Gervacio Blas (one of the plaintiffs), Marta Gervacio Blas (one of the defendants), and Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died and is survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein namely, Manuel, Leoncio and Loid. Subsequently after Martas death, Simeon contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of second marriage, no liquidation of the properties of Simeon and Marta was made. A week before Simeons death, he executed a last Will and Testament, and he also ordered a preparation of a document (Exhibit A) because the properties he had acquired during his first marriage with Marta had not been liquidated and were not separated from those acquired during the second marriage. Such document contains promises by Maxima to respect the disposition of said will and to give one-half (1/2) of the properties she and her husband will leave to the heirs, legatees or beneficiaries named in the will (the heirs of Simeons 1st marriage). Pursuant to this document, the plaintiffs instituted an action against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos to secure a judicial declaration that one-half (1/2) of the properties left by Maxima be adjudicated to them. Upon filing of opposition by the administratix, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.

The heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage because the same were already included in the mass properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will. However, they can claim promised properties under the document containining promises by Maxima to give one-half (1/2) of the properties she and her husband will leave to the heirs of her Husband in the latters 1st marriage(EXHIBIT A). Exhibit A appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of the execution of such document, which provides as follows: Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already provocation been instituted. Being a compromise, which is an obligation, it is just to convey and deliver the subject properties. Absent the compromise, however, a claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage can no longer lie because the same were already included in the mass properties constituting the estate of Simeon and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will. The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos made in Exhibit A is to hold one-half of her share in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husbands heirs in the latters first marriage, with the obligation of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last will and testament. This kind of compromise/promise is valid.

Balus vs. Balus

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was sold to the bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. In 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, as the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo. It only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father. Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time. Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. A Deed of Sale of Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. In 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. The RTC decided in favor of petitioner. The CA ruled in favor of respondent.