Using Economic Methodology to Assess Competing Models of Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia Author(s): Wing Thye Woo Reviewed work(s):

Source: ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 3 (MARCH 1991), pp. 307-321 Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25770325 . Accessed: 27/04/2012 22:31
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ASEAN

Economic

Bulletin Vol. 7, No.

Economic Using Methodology Assess Models Competing Economic Policy-Making Indonesia

Wing ThyeWoo

to of in

policies (exchange rate, expenditure, credit and agricultural policies) are considered, rural and regional interests are found to be important determinants of policy choices. The second flaw of conventional wisdom is that its predictions of the course of state-society interaction have been falsified. Outcomes are more in line with the predictions from a corporatist model.

Two principles from economic methodology (revealed preference and prediction) are used to test competing models of the Indonesian state. The dominant models in the literature can be encompassed by the characterization that effectivepolitical participation is limited to the highest echelon of the military and bureaucratic structure, and to thebiggest capitalists. This view is flawed in two ways. First, it was deduced from an incomplete application of the revealed preference principle. Its empirical basis lies in thedistributional consequences of only one systemic policy ? trade policy. When the distributional impact of four other systemic

The dominant views of the Indonesian state can be summarized as follows: the highest echelon of themilitary and bureaucratic structure and the biggest capitalists have captured the instru ments of the state and are using them for their benefit.1 The purpose of this article* is to chal lenge this elite-oriented rent-seeking view of the state. In light of Robert Bates' Indonesian research which documented how elite-oriented rent-seeking states inAfrica have systematically exploited their agricultural sectors,2 it would

Part 1 Politics andPolicy

But this corollary of urban-bias has not been trueof Indonesia. Indonesia has in fact been very active in promoting rural development since the establishment of theNew Order government of President Soeharto in 1966. Indonesia even de valued its currency by 50 per cent in 1978, when therewas no balance of payments reason todo so, in order to effect an income transfer to the rural areas. Since devaluations are traumatic affairs3 and directly reduce thewelfare of the urban elite because of their greater consumption of im ported goods, there is something missing in the conventional view of the state-society relation ship in Indonesia.

follow that Indonesia must have been doing the same if the dominant views were true. March 307 1991

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The

veracity of the competing models of the state will be tested by using two Indonesian principles common in economic analysis: the revealed preference principle and the prediction principle. The revealed preference principle can be roughly translated as "paying more attention towhat people actually do than towhat they may This means that, provided policy-makers say".4

and the political constraints that it faces. This knowledge would allow the observer to charac terize the nature of the interaction beween the state and civil society, and to help in predicting the evolution of the relationship. Indonesia provides a good case to apply the revealed because

are competent and that the period of observation is long enough, an observer should be able to infer from the policies which are repeatedly chosen both the objective function of the state

rents to state and private enterprises. If the proponents of the narrow models had considered a larger set of systemic policies, they might have seen the state-society relationship in Indonesia as less exploitative, and been more correct in their predictions. This article is organized as follows. Part 2 discusses the dominant models of the Indonesian state, and Part 3 presents an alternative hypoth

structure is essentially determined by the posture of trade policy.) These narrower models had been deduced from the observation that Indone sia's protectionist trade policy was channelling enormous

esis of Indonesia being an implicit corporatist state. Part 4 draws out the predictions of the models in Parts 2 and 3. Parts 5 and 6 present some evidence from the conduct of exchange rate and public expenditure policies to support the proposed model of an implicit corporatist state.6 Part 7 ends with some general observations.

"the predictions of an incorrect model are un likely to stand up well to the test of time". Most economists have long held this prediction prin ciple to be the only unbiased way of choosing among competing paradigms.5 The dominant models with their focus on political repression and on the generation of rent for the elite predict

theNew Order preference methodology has been in power for over 15 years, government hence giving us a long time span to search for patterns in policy-making. The prediction principle can be translated as

Part 2 Existing Models of the

Indonesian State Cultural Determinism In the firstcategory are those studies which as sert that the Indonesian state isunique. All of its political expressions, motivation and dynamics represent the subliminal impulses of the complex Javanese culture. The extreme version claims in fact that the relationship between state and society today is not much different from that in pre-colonial Indonesia. The term "cultural deter minism" captures well the flavour of the works which portray Indonesia as a "mystical, Dual istic society".7 Proponents of this tarian nature of the byproduct of a feudal ized by an extensive view regard the authori regime as the inevitable state which is character form of a patron-client

a secular worsening of state-society relations. This article shall show that events have so far falsified this prediction. Our conclusion from the application of the revealed preference and prediction principles is that the Indonesian state ismuch more corpo ratist than the dominant views. The characteri zation of the ruling coalition as consisting of the army, the bureaucracy, and capital is too nar row: we must also include the peasantry and regional interests in order to be able to explain the distributional thrust of Indonesia's macro economic policies. The reason why the narrower

models have omitted these two groups is because the only systemic economic policy their propo nents examined was trade (industrial) policy. (In an open economy like Indonesia, the industrial

network unique to Indonesia (bapakism). Some have even ventured the opinion that the history of Indonesia is a constant rerun of a timeless script set to an elaborate Javanese rhythm.8 The decision makers are merely mimic men in V.S. sense of mindlessly playing out the Naipaul's

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1991 March

308

role expected of them.9 Brian May describes the economic advisers to President Soeharto as follows: historic One frequentlyhas the opinion that the tech nocrats, though not without technical skill, have theirhearts less than theirheads inwhat theyare doing; in a sense they are only going motions of conducting an economy through the Western lines.10 along Given this perceived entrenchment of un these cultural values, the possibility of eco

of the state apparatus Western standard, but may appear primitive by the state bureaucracy is now more institutional ized than at any earlier point in history. Given the progress in political institutionalization and economic restructuring since 1949, one cannot The "rationalization"

conclude that Indonesia is hopelessly mired in a pre-capitalist mentality and is hence doomed to remain a patrimonial state in theWeberian sense of being personalistic, particularistic and

paternalistic. changing indigeneous writers despaired over in Indonesia. The rela nomic development between state and society is seen as a tionship stagnant one with servitude demanded of, and willingly borne by, the masses. To be specific, Soeharto's "policies are incomprehensible from the point of view of any articulation of popular representative national interest,but are perfectly rational from the point of view of a state with an Capital Determinism "Capital determinism" is an apt description of the works in the second category because they analyse Indonesia from theMarxist perspective. Capital determinism differs from cultural deter minism in that it sees nothing unique about the Indonesian state has been itshistorical mission of facilitat merely fulfilling ing capital accumulation. Capital determinism is thus like cultural determinism in that it also as mimic regards Indonesian policy-makers Indonesian men. state. The

theAnderson, May and Sievers conclusion that the persistence of cultural values is so over whelming that the state under Soeharto is es sentially indistinguishable from a pre-Dutch Javanese state. There are too many aspects in today's Indonesia showing that the two centuries rule has radically transformed the of Dutch political culture and intellectual environment. more plausible to attribute the For example, it is restrictive foreign investment laws in Indonesia to economic nationalism aroused by the bitter war for independence than to an atavistic sense If Soeharto were indeed the of xenophobia. of a traditional ruler, he would not have clone felt the need to legitimize his god-king status the through popular elections. Furthermore,

ancestry much older than Indonesia's."11 Since cultural values do affect one's perception of costs and benefits, few scholars would dare to allege that cultural factors do not influence policy making. It is difficult, however, to accept

In this case, themimic men are unknow ingly working to further the cause of capital accumulation. The state-society relationship is straightforward: the state is an instrument of the propertied classes to exploit the other classes. There are two strands to the capital determin ism literature: the international capitalists' (or, dependent) state, and the domestic capitalists' state. A typical assertion from the dependent state strand is that under "the post-1966 regime a complete open-door policy was adopted vis-a-vis

comparative advantage doctrine is certainly not an indigeneous Javanese concept, but yet it is very strongly held by the "mimic men" whom these cultural determinists belittle.

contradicted.13 First, the Indonesian Govern ment has consistently promoted national capital at the expense of international capital. Second, the standard of living in the periphery (rural areas) has actually gone up and not down.

the inflow of foreign capital."12 This allegation is more hospitable accurate only in that Soeharto is than Soekarno toward foreign investment.What state theorist neglects is that the dependent Indonesia is stillmore hostile to foreign capital than its Southeast Asian neighbours. The de pendent state model is untenable for Indonesia because two of its key predictions have been

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1991 March 309

marily

on behalf of domestic undertaken, capital, there is no "capital determinism" in his work. He takes as proof of this thesis the fact

accumulation, argues that the actions of the state are to promote the interests of Indonesian national capital and not the interests of inter national capital.14 But since Robison does not present a model of how state actions are pri

the implausibility of applying the inter national capitalists' state model for Indonesia and in general Richard Robison, attempting to salvage the basic Marxist tenet that the role of the state is to facilitate the process of capital Given

model.

role for the "politico-bureaucrats" pendent because the growth policies were initiated in the early 1970s when few of them had substantial ties to business. Why Robison continues to push his model given these admissions is a contradic tion waiting to be resolved. The Praetorian State

state He admits that the Indonesian role in its rela "a relatively autonomous plays tions in capital"16, and he attributes this failure of his Marxist framework to intra-capital con flicts. Robison has to assign a strongly inde

that he could document how state capital and private domestic capital have expanded under the Soeharto regime. In the absence of a class-based analysis, Robison's hypothesis is observationally indistin guishable from the sycophantic proposition that state is devoted to economic the Indonesian development for the benefit of all segments of society and not primarily for the benefit of in fact,writes: capital. Robison, While (Soeharto's government) may politically exclude the dominant social forces fromdirect access to political power, it rules, neverthe with theirgeneral acquiescene and in their less, general interests.It provides the conditions for economic growth and the stability of the existing social order ... Indeed, it is extremely sensitive to discontent amongst those classes [which, according to Robison, are the urban
middle classes, the national rural

Since Soeharto is a former army general and the army is themost important group inGOLKAR, the ruling coalition, several writers have called Indonesia a praetorian (or army) state.17 How ever, back in 1978, an astute observer of the military had noted that it does not contain "important centers of power independent of the central authority" and the president does not engage in "a continuous process of bargaining with other officers."18 It is clear that Soeharto is now less depen dent on the military than ever. Events in 1988 in March, Soeharto support this conclusion: appointed a military lawyer as his Vice-President over the protests of the army; in August, he appointed the firstcivilian to head .the state pe troleum company (an army preserve

since its

tensive lower ranks of statebureaucracy] which constitute itsbase of social support... Policies are a matter of both judgement and response to specific pressures. But they are in the last analysis conditioned by the social order in which the state is located.15 Robison's an answer analysis just does not provide to whether it is capital which is the state or the state harnessing

landowning

classes,

traders,

the bourgeoisie, the ex and

included civilians on the executive board of the internal security apparatus. The army supports the Soeharto government and receives in return important (and lucrative) administrative posts but it does not set the national agenda. Indo nesia may have, arguably, been a praetorian state administration, in the first few years of the Soeharto but it is certainly not now. State

he establishment 1966); and, in September, in

controlling capital to the task of economic growth. To be fair, Robison also recognizes the im state plausibility of his domestic capitalists'

The Bureaucratic

Other observers have concluded that Indonesia cannot be termed an army state in the sense that the state serves primarily the needs of the

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1991 March 310

military. There is little dispute that the civilian elite has both influenced and bureaucratic benefited from the economic policies enacted since 1966.William Liddle notes that "the New Order appears to have shifted from a system of personal rule to an institutionalized presidential army-bureaucratic complex."19 Karl Jackson has advanced a version of this model which he calls a bureaucratic polity because "political power and participation [are] monopolized by the highest levels of the civil and military bureaucracies."20

Part 3

An Alternative Characterization

of

State-Society Relations: The Implicit Corporatist State It is clear from the preceding review that it is necessary to broaden the existingmodels beyond the domestic capitalists, the army and the bu reaucracy to include other major social coali tions. Our contention is that we must accord great importance to the rural sector and to re

[Bureaucratic polity is characterized] by the degree to which national decision-making is insulated from social and political forces out side thehighest elite echelons in thecapital city. Like islands cut off from the social seas sur rounding them,bureaucratic polities are largely own societies and impervious to currents in their may be more responsive to external pressures [The] president is the final arbiter ... It is Soeharto who decides who gets what shares in return for supporting the president and his programs. As long as resources are supplied to meet the nonservicegoals of the active politi cal elite, the president's inclinations determine broad outlines, even though he may yield on specificpoints.21 The chief problem of the bureaucratic polity paradigm is its narrowness. It explains the pol icies of the state either in terms of rent seek ing activities or ideological conflicts within the bureaucratic elite, and ignores the effects of societal demands on the actions of the bureau cratic polity. Jackson's hypothesis is incapable
emanating from the international arena ...

gional interests in explaining policy formation.22 These two groups have won themselves a place within the "corporate board" through having had a history of past belligerence which threat ened the existence of the state. Specifically, successful governance of Indonesia needs to accommodate agrarian radicalism, regionalism, ethnicity and religious diversity.

Agrarian Radicalism One of the New Order's chief concerns is to avoid conditions favourable to the resuscitation of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or PKI). Until PKFs sup in 1965, it and its affiliated organiza pression tions had over 23 million members,23 and most of themembers were landless peasants in Cen

tral and East Java. The political lesson is clear: one effective way of preventing the resurgence

population. Even though communism has not been a serious threat for the last 20 years, the fear of it goes beyond official rhetoric. Several thousand employees at the state petroleum com

the of PKI is by improving livesof the rural

weredismissedin 1986 old because of their pany

of explaining why Indonesia, unlike Nigeria and Mexico, has devoted so much resources to the development of the agricultural sector. If the bureaucratic polity were indeed so politically insulated from themasses, therewould not have been the need to embark on the ambitious ex pansion of rural schools and on the improve ment of the irrigation systems.

communist connections, and over 700 employees at the Ministry of Public Works were undergoing background checks in 1988. This official fear of communism may actually reflect the official awareness that agrarian radi calism has a long tradition in Java.24 There is belief that a the widespread millenarianistic Javanese messiah would eventually emerge and to the creation of an ideal lead the peasants after a violent confrontation with the society

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1991 March 311

forces of oppression. The seriousness with which the government regards peasant movements can be seen in the eight-year jail sentence meted out in 1978 to a Javanese mystic who had declared himself themessiah and had asked Soeharto to step down. It is noteworthy that the "Toward Salvation" manifesto drafted by themystic was the signed by the first former Vice-President, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Indo nesia, the leader of the Indonesian Protestant Church Islamic
generals.

are consistently catered to in the economic poli cies undertaken. Itmay appear awkward to label the president, themilitary, the bureaucracy, the domestic capitalists, the rural sector and the regional interests as members of the corporate board because there is no formal bargaining mechanism to reconcile competing demands. In short, one is uneasy because the fabled "smoke filled" backroom where deals are struck cannot be identified. The interesting question iswhether an explicit to forum is always required for a coalition answer is no. To take a "bottom survive. The

Council, Scholars'

the head Council,

of the National and two retired

Regionalism, Ethnicity and Religion Indonesia comprises 13,000 islands, home to 300 ethnic groups which speak more than 250 dis tinct languages and whose religious practices vary widely. The main religious tension is and the santri between the abangan Muslims are nominal Muslims. The abangan Muslims

of order in line" analogy: the maintenance over the world. The queues to public toilets all peaceful state of affairs invariably endure even though no prior explicit agreement has been reached and even though there are no enforcers of the implicit social contract. The reason the system works is because everyone knows that self-enforced queuing is the only way to get the job done expeditiously. survives in the implicit coalition Hence, Indonesia because themembers know from long

Muslims who subscribe to ancient Javanese be liefs (kebatinan), and the santriMuslims are the orthodox Muslims. The abangan-santri distinc follows the tion, to a close approximation, Islanders. ethnic* cleavage of Javanese-Outer The Javanese live in central and east Java and account for nearly half of the 165 million

interestwithin the decision mak ing process. A social coalition is deemed to be on the corporate board if its political demands the coalition's ASEAN Economic Bulletin

corporate board does not mean that the social coalition has explicit representation in a par ticular individual who argues exclusively for

Indonesians. This diversity resulted in numerous secession attempts in the 1950s. The Darul Islam rebellion to establish a fundamentalist Muslim state lasted from 1949 to 1965, and embodied the political rivalry between the abangan Javanese and the santri non-Javanese. The latest violent incident arising from regionalism occurred inmid-1990 in Acheh, Sumatra. The sense of alienation in the Outer Islands has not been helped by the fact that the inner circle of theNew Order gov ernment is dominated by Javanese. It must be pointed out that being on the

experience the interests and reactions of each is needed to keep the implicit other.25 What coalition together is not an explicit forum where every member is reminded at every meeting of their competing interests, but a strong chairman who brokers reasonably fairly among these inter ests. It is for this reason that we see the unusual

merely the compromise byproduct of competi tion amongst the elite groups. The reason why Soeharto has not acted more autocratically with his independent status is that he recognizes the self-limiting perhaps nature of such acts. Since his enhanced power came from popular cognizance of his penchant for a fair distribution across the coalition, any

degree of decision-making concentrated in, and the broad executive powers granted to, the president. Since the authoritarian nature of the state renders themedium run accountability of Soeharto's actions to be very low, and there are substantial differences in interests and ideology among the major social coalitions, he must be considered an independent force rather than

1991 March312

prolonged deviation from this practice would increase the power of the board of directors. This may account for Lucian Pye's observation that Soeharto, unlike his predecessor, Soekarno, of does not regard "uninhibited acceptance power as an inherent personal right."26 to as The fact that Soeharto has managed the various sectoral con tutely accommodate cerns quite well can be seen in his winning of an increasing proportion of the popular vote.

inevitably cause "large scale outbreaks of mass opposition."28 Furthermore, since trade restric tions directly benefit the domestic capitalists, and the army and bureaucratic elite who have business investments, the dominant models would also predict that large-scale deregulation of trade is not possible. Given the wider membership of our implicit corporatist model, it predicts a policy-making

GOLKAR

and 73 per cent in 1987.27 To sum up, our im plicit corporatist state model can be quite ac as curately described by President Soeharto the strong chairman of the board, the army and bureaucratic elite as the senior partners, and indigenous capital, rural sector and re gional interests as junior partners. The econ omic policy-making process can be described thus: the different lobbies and advisory groups propose policy initiatives, and the President adopts those which are either compatible with his innate preferences, or vital to maintaining

1971,62 per cent in 1977,64 per cent in 1982

won 62 per cent of the votes cast in

process with substantial checks and balances. Unless compensating policies are simultaneously implemented, there is a limit to how far any given group can force the passage of policies directly favourable only to itself and deleterious (even if indirectly) to thewelfare of the other members of the coalition. Our proposed model hence pre dicts that there would not be an upward trend either in the intensityof state-society antagonism or in the number of trade restrictions.

Part 5 Exchange Rate Management: The Inscrutable Oriental? It is folklore among political scientists and policy that: Currency devaluation
dramatic ? even

his position as the overarching patron. At the policy-making level, the economic inter ests of the rural sector and theOuter Islands are

economists

bolstered by the arguments of the professional economists (popularly referred to as technocrats) who work at theMinistry of Finance and the Their National Planning Body, BAPPENAS.

is one of
?

the most
of

traumatic

measures

acceptance of the comparative advantage prin ciple leads them to emphasize the development of the nonoil export industries, particularly agri and labour-intensive commodities cultural manufactured goods. They support favourable treatment of the agricultural sector because it supplied 82 per cent of nonoil exports in 1970, and 75 per cent in 1980.

economic policy thata government may under take... [Currency] devaluation has come to be regarded as a measure of last resort,with countless partial substitutes adopted before
devaluation

luctance of officials arises in large measure from the [fact that a] devaluation will disturb an implicit social contract among different ? or at leastwill jar some segmentsof society out of theiracquiescence in the existing groups state of affairs, with its numerous implicit
compromises ? and officials are understand

is finally

undertaken

...

The

re

ably anxious about The Predictions of the Competing Models Part 4 the dominant models are based on the are geared perception that economic policies toward the enrichment of a few, they tend to predict that the jackboot of military rule would Since ASEAN Economic Bulletin
equilibrium.29

... disturbing the social

The author went on to point out that a devalua tion appeared to double the probability that a ruling group would be removed from power, and to triple the odds that theMinister of Finance

would be relieved.

1991 March 313

its strange enough, Indonesia devalued the rupiah, by 50 per cent in November currency, 1978 when therewere no signs of the balance of payments deteriorating. There were in fact per sistent newspaper reports from April to July that a rupiah appreciation was imminent.30 It is true that most economists were in agreement that there would be a need in the future, when Indonesia's oil reserves were closer to depletion, to devalue in order to boost nonoil exports. But inOctober 1978 therewas certainly little expec tation of an immediate devaluation. An authori tative commentary on the economic situation in Indonesia written on the very eve of the concluded:

Yet

power of export revenue declined by 33 per cent between 1973 and 1975, and the subsequent recovery was so slow that the 1978 value was the same as in 1973. It is important to stress that the overvalued exchange rate harmed the entire agriculture sector and not just the export component be cause all agricultural products are tradeables

devaluation

given that Indonesia, by its geography, is open to smuggling. The harm was widespread because in 1977, 58 per cent of the labour force in Java were directly engaged in agricultural activities and 65 per cent of the labour force in the Outer Islands were doing so.

The overall picture for Indonesia's balance of payments in the current fiscal year is thus still reasonably reassuring.On a longer view, it is difficult to resist the traditional balance of payments pessimism of economists everywhere, officialand unofficialalike.31 The primary reason for this unexpected de valuation lies in the economic difficulties and political tensions associated with the reallocation of resources being forced upon the economy by an overvalued exchange rate.32 The overvalua tion of the rupiah was the result of maintaining

the exchange rate at 415 rupiahs to the dollar despite the large domestic inflation from 1974 to 1977. This meant that Indonesian producers of tradeables were experiencing a profit squeeze. The prices of their output were fixed by inter national competition but the prices of their domestic inputs were being driven up by the double-digit inflation. Indonesian watchers were not aware Many of the deleterious effects of the overvalued sector.33 exchange rate on the agricultural Nonoil nonLNG in physical exports, measured units or in dollar earnings, had grown steadily throughout the 1972-78 period. The distress of the nonoil export industries is clearly seen only when their export earnings are expressed in terms of local purchasing power, i.e. by the number local purchasing

Islands, and the fact that exchange rate policy was in the hands of the technocrats. The 1978 devaluation was not an aberration. The New Order government showed no subsequent ? 38 per cent in 1983 and reluctance to devalue 45 per cent in 1986. Could the narrow models of the Indonesian state explain the 1978 devaluation in terms of rent-seeking activities by a capitalist-army Outer cabal? Presumably, bureaucracy they would latch on to a primary motivation for devalua tions suggested by Heinz Arndt when he dis cussed the 1983 devaluation. He pointed out that:
In Indonesia's accrue where a consid a devalua

to devalue This Indonesian willingness the exchange rate in a healthy balance of payments situation stands in stark contrast to the reluc tance of most developing countries to devalue even when the balance of payments situation is desperate. We attribute this willingness to both the political strength of the peasants and the

erable part of the country's export earnings

directly to the government,

circumstances,

tion operates in effectas a tax, the easiest and in the short run themost effectivetax instru ment at the government's disposal.34 It is important to stress thatArndt was referring to the direct revenue increase coming from the revaluation of the oil taxes at the new exchange rate, and not the indirect revenue increases which

of basketscontaining mix of goods typically the

consumed by Indonesians. The

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March314 1991

usually appear in themedium run as the results of the higher income and exports induced by the devaluation.35 This belief in the primary of the revenue en hancement factor may explain why many econ

and their consequences. Fiscal policy is singled out for attention because it is under the jurisdic tion of the technocrat-controlled Ministry of
Finance.

omists reacted negatively to the 1986 devalua tion. For example, two of the three non-official observers interviewed by theJakarta Post on the day of the event "considered the devaluation as a drastic action to save the budget". The first observer questioned

the drastic monetary measure"; and the second viewed the government as tending "to come up with surprises without considering their impact on the business world".36 The 1986 devalua tion differed from the earlier two devaluations in thatmany commentators not only expressed the usual pessirhism about the ability of de valuations to boost exports but also outrage over this back-handed way of raising taxes. Arndt's point that the rupiah value of the oil is certainly taxes increases with a devaluation

of otheroptions short [had]studiedthoroughly

"whether

the government

It is not possible to conclude from the ex 1whether a penditure structure given in Table rural bias exists because only a few of the items in it can be easily classified either as pro-rural or pro-urban. The obvious pro-rural items are "fertilizer subsidy" and most of the INPRES i.e. Presidential Instruc (Instruksi Presiden, tions) programme. The 1986/87 fertilizer subsidy allocation pro vides a striking example of rural-income main tenance. In the 1986/87 recession, while total

which

rency, notably external debt service payments. The claim that a devaluation would ease budget ary pressures is correct only if the oil tax exceeds the debt service; otherwise the reverse is true.37

correct. It is amiss, however, in not mentioning that Indonesia also has substantial routine ex in foreign cur penditure that is denominated

The fact is that the budget deficit was directly reduced by the 1978 and 1983 devaluations but If we rule widened by the 1986 devaluation.38 out technocratic incompetence, the 1986 deval uation could not have been motivated by reve
nue enhancement consideration at all.

In brief, the narrow models' view of deval uations being due to an avaricious state con resources by whatever stantly appropriating "non-visible" means cannot be sustained. Part 6 Preferences as Revealed Expenditure Pattern by the

While efficiency is clearly an important reason for the decentralized decision-making feature of INPRES public works projects, what may have been equally important is the dispensation of political patronage to the village-level elite. The commitment to rural development can

Presidential decrees for specific purposes. The programmes are funds chan general INPRES to finance public nelled to local authorities works projects chosen at their own discretion.40

the state rice agency rice at a timewhen BULOG, the floor price, was on the guarantees verge of bankruptcy because of the runaway costs of storing the excess rice from the bumper harvests of yesteryears!39 The INPRES programmes were started by

nominal spending of the government fellby 7 per cent in response to lower domestic revenue, fertilizer subsidy actually rose by 20 per cent in an attempt to check the fall in rural Javanese income. What is really noteworthy about this is that the peasants were encouraged to grow more

Fertilizer subsidies benefited the agricultural sector directly, and the first sectoral INPRES programme by focusing on primary schools in particular benefited the rural sector dispro portionately. 2 focuses on a number of welfare Table measures to provide an alternative way of

also be deduced from the fact that the first two programmes started after the 1973 oil price increase were targeted toward the rural sector.

In this section, the implicit corporatist state hypothesis is verified by examining the expen diture pattern of the Indonesian Government ASEAN Economic Bulletin

1991 March315

23583.2 1164.2 21421.6 22824.6 2730.3 18311.0 14355.9 8076.0 5299.3 19380.8 13917.6 11716.1 4305.7 3684.3 1977.9 . subsidy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.1 197.0 6805.4 4223.2 2102.7 3323.1 1224.5 684.1 2776.5 931.0 784.8 534.5 228.3 53.4 189.5 78.5 Service Debt 70.7 73.7 4212.6 4316.9 4018.3 2757.0 2277.7 2023.3 2418.1 1419.9 3046.8 1001.6 893.2 636.6 200.4 Personnel 593.9 420.1 268.9 1316.0 534.9 1022.0 962.0 928.1

64.6 25.9 42.4 54.8 13.0 Roads 101.1 0.0 130.0 70.1 13,0.0 506.7 374.2 142.4 0.0

1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1980/81 1979/80 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88

3260.9 4466.5 3474.4 2533.2 3219.5 2724.6 1480.3 590.9 851.0 384.9 1. 744.5 150.0 Departments 221.6 167.3 2087.7 752.2

255.6 15.2 167.5 105.2 71.4 IPEDA 157.2 132.4 94.5 87.2 63.1 42.2 52.5 34.6 28.0 19.5 0.0 64.6 80.3 30.0 Health 4. 110.6 87.3 78.8 26.9 50.4 26.3 20.8 15.2 5.3 0.0 114.5 246.6 76.3 100.8 12.4 417.2 0.0 526.1 Markets 374.5 0.0 0.0 572.0 2.5 549.3 25.5 267.4 1.3 155.8 1.2 249.8 6.0 Primary 111.8 11.5 57.3 10.6 85.0 3.0 49.9 4.4 17.2 4.5 19.7 schools

8. 109.0 243.7 511.2 448.7 5.6 474.9 326.7 565.3 385.5 291.0 64.0 10.0 Others 75.1 109.8 79.8 67.7 9.471.4 Project aid1663.9 62.33507.7 114.1 195.9 773.6 737.6 987.3 1316.3 1429.7 1924.9 3867.5 3408.7 3503.4 5425.7

Distribution

6.

2649.1 2639.7 2489.0 1315.4 1883.3 1546.9 669.9 1209.4 976.1 83.9 522.3 313.0 284.5 108.6 Subsidies 478.4 201.9 regions to0.0 215.0 253.0 166.7 100.7 86.8 Subsidies 75.4 61.5 54.0 20.8 47.4 253.1 280.0 287.3 253.0 to provinces 224.0 227.2 281.6 39 124.9 Food 0 43.5 50.0 141.0 0.0 subsidy 1.0 0.0 Fertilizer Subsidy 0.0 33.0 134.5Subsidies 193.9 162.6 87.1 70.9 107.3 kabupatens 194.6 194.1 119.4 12.8 62.4 59.1 69.1 42.5 19.2 226.0 220.8 188.6 to Other routine expenditures 100.4 265.1 179.4 325.7 451.7 483.9 628.1 444.8 712.2 1019.5 1075.3 1077.1 1215.6 1746.9 1907.7 2055.2 Total11951.5 routine expenditure 438.1 713.3 1016.1 1332.6 1629.8 2148.9 2743.7 4061.8 5800.0 6977.6 6996.3 8411.8 9428.9 13125.6 15826.6 by of Programmes Total9951.9 development expenditure 298.2 450.9 961.8 1397.7 2054.5 2156.8 4014.2 2555.6 5916.1 6940.0 7359.6 9899.2 10873.1 8296.0 7756.6 Rupiahs) TABLE 1 of (Billions Expenditure 50.7 31.0 23.9 5.719.2 Subsidies 23.2 19.8 15.9 11.4 villages to0.0 98.9 3.252.0 Sectoral Inpres programmes 25.0 65.1 94.1 176.0 137.0 377.2 584.5 599.7 604.9 574.5 538.8 535.3 INPRES 98.9444.2 2programmes 540.4 336.8 218.8 39.3 General 92.8771.2 448.1 143.7 129.0 98.6824.4 48.7 181.6 88.4 715.5 101.3 70.5753.7 167.7 91.6 326.3

125.0 31.8 283.6 participation 22.583.4 40.8 91.1 108.7 217.9 166.9 252.8 128.5 476.5 480.9 336.6 591 7 336.1 412.3 207.4 82.6(PMP)

371.4

420.1

324.2

& Timor Jaya Irian 5. 10.4 5.0 East 4.0 9.0 5.5 3.3 4.2 5.2 5.7 6.6 6.9 6.8 6.4 7.2 5.0

736.3

Government 7. capital Total expenditure

Indicators of Impact of Government Expenditures on Rural and Urban Areas Rural Part A Basic Needs Outcomes: Consumption, Health and Education School enrollment ratio for 7-12 year olds Urban Indonesia

TABLE 2

197158 198081 1984 100

Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 livebirths)

100 114
114 87

73 90

100
140

60 84

1971 150 1980

Daily calorie intake in 1976 a) national average 1954 b) bottom 40 per cent of sector 1471 Part B

105 1933 NA

1852 1434

1964-65 survey Java (excluding Jakarta) Outer Islands 0.334 Indonesia 0.348 1970 survey Java Outer Islands 0.330 Indonesia 0.339 1976 survey Java Outer Islands 0.298 Indonesia 0.304 Part C

Income Distribution Outcome as Measured byGini Coefficients (inequality increaseswith size of coefficient) 0.329 0.304 0.364 0.344 0.298 0.332 0.300 0.327 0.397 0.306 0.368 0.337 0.341 0.389 0.321 0.328 0.346 0.357 0.311 0.346

0.296

Population Below DifferentPoverty Lines

1970

1976 47 27 14 63 37 18 41 23

1980
Proportion Number (Millions) (Percentages)

Poor Very Poor Destitute

Proportion Number (Millions) (Percentages)

56 37 20

65 43 23

Proportion Number (Millions) (Percentages)

60 34 9 13

World Bank country reportson Indonesia. Sources: Part A are from the 1979 and 1984 Part B data are fromTable 2 of G. Hughes and I. Islam, "Inequality in Indonesia: A Decomposition Analysis". Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, July 1981. Part C data are fromTables 2.11 and 2.14 in Sjahrir, Basic Needs in Indonesia: Economics, Politics and Public Policy, Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies, 1986. determining the thrust of Indonesian econo mic policy, especially its fiscal policy. We have to those which limited the welfare measures to the poorest segment. This particularly apply is because the provision of services to meet the ASEAN Economic Bulletin 1991 March317 "basic needs" of the poor is heavily dependent on government expenditure.

per cent of rural children in the 7 to 12 age group attended school compared with 73 per cent of

PartA ofTable 2 shows thatin 1971,only 58

In the 1971-80 period, the infantmortality rate in both areas showed an equal drop of 36 points. The surprising finding here is that the rural poor may actually eat better than the urban poor, 1,471 calories per day in the rural sector as

urban children. In 1980, the figures were 81 per cent and 90 per cent respectively, and in 1984 the enrolment rate was 100 per cent in both areas.

presidents of peasant origin who did not pursue agriculture-oriented policies. The prediction of worsening state-society re lations in Indonesia by the narrow capitalist

army-bureaucracy models has not occurred. If anything, the higher proportion of votes cap

against 1,433 in the urban sector. The three basic needs indicators in Part A paint a picture of improvement in social services being pro vided in the countryside and imply that the does not neglect the Indonesian Government 2 shows how the distribu tion of income has evolved under the Soeharto regime. The outstanding feature is that the in come distribution in the rural areas has become rural population. Part B of Table

more

equal over time. The Gini coefficient for the overall rural sector fell from 0.35 in 1964-65 to 0.34 in 1970 and then to 0.30 in 1976. We ascribe this improvement in rural income distri bution to the development projects designed to raise the income level of the poorer and more

may be decreasing at lower levels in rural areas." The Edmundsons attribute the now greater ad ministrative efficiency to the "increasing aware ness on the part of politicians that support of the peasants is necessary for long term stability." second prediction of the elite-oriented rent-seeking model that there would be a steady proliferation of trade restrictions has also been falsified. It is true that under the guise of off The

of trust toward the central government than there had been in 1971."42 Material progress was evidently widespread43 and "corruption

two geographers who have been Edmundson, attitudinal and economic changes in tracking two East Javanese villages, conclude that in both villages in 1981 "there was a greater expression

an attenuation rather than an accentuation of hostility in the relationship. Evidence of reduced state-society tensions is also found in micro studies of Indonesian villages. Wade and Stella

tured GOLKAR by

in the lastelectionindicates

the proportion and number of people in the destitute category were half of those in 1970. Part 7 The Conclusion

disenfranchised peasants. Our interpretations of Parts A and B is sup ported by the research of Sjahrir on themeeting of basic needs in Indonesia.41 He found a con siderable decline in the number of people below the poverty line, see Part C of Table 2. In 1980,

works would have to attribute the big resource transfer to the agricultural sector either as the economic triumph of neoclassical logic over rent-seeking demands or as the result of the peasant background of the President. The im portance of the peasant background variable should not be exaggerated, however. There are too many examples of authoritarian African

evidence in Parts 5 and 6 support the presence of the agrarian radicalism and regional ism variables in the Indonesian policy-making equation. Without these two variables, previous

quantitative restrictions on imports. However, this increase in rents was not permanent as predicted by conventional wisdom. This is be cause most of the import-competing industries are in urban Java and the higher prices of manufactured goods represent an implicit tax on the residents in the rural sector and in the Outer Islands. The "victims" (represented by the technocrats) were able to force consider able rollbacks in import restrictions. The pro portion of manufacturing production protected by quantitative restrictions fell from 49 per cent inmid-1986 to below 35 per cent at the end of

setting the negative effects of the 1982 oil price decline on the balance of payments, state and private capital were able to sharply escalate

1987. The liberalization of the trade regime con inued in 1988, with the most prominent case being the withdrawal of a monopoly import licence on plastics issued to a state firmwhich

ASEAN

Economic

Bulletin

March 318 1991

ventional labour shortage explanation for why rural income inEngland went up after the Black Death cannot be adequate because serfdom was reimposed in Poland after the calamity. He sug

exclusively with "a Hong Kong-based company which lists two of the president's sons as directors."44 Agrarian radicalism causing the state to in corporate the welfare of the agricultural sector into policy formulation is not without prece dent. Robert Brenner points out that the con deals

larger set of systemic policies than the narrower models (exchange rate policy, public expendi ture policy, agricultural policy, credit allocation policy and trade policy versus trade policy alone).46 The second reason for preferring the

thismodel is theoretically more satisfactory be cause it represents a wider application of the revealed preference principle. It was deduced from observing the distributional impact of a

gests that the greater proneness of the English is respon peasants to be politically mobilized The point sible for the difference in outcome.45 here is that the systemic policies (exchange rate, agricultural, financial and expenditure policies) which have raised rural income and moderated regional inequity over the last 15 years in Indo nesia are less the outcome of a compassionate state than the upshot of a state savvy of its past history of rural radicalism and secessions. To sum up, there are two reasons why state is superior to the narrower models. the

is because conventional corporatist model wisdom has done poorly in the prediction test. Antagonism between the state and civil society has not been increasing steadily, and there limit on the appears to be a politically-imposed of trade restrictions to benefit state and growth private capital. The importance of whether an elite-oriented rent-seeking model or this implicit corporatist state model is true is obvious. They offer vastly

model of the Indonesian corporatist (implicit)

First,

different predictions about what would happen when the present presidential term ends in 1993. How they differ is a topic for another article with a different focus.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

* I thank an criticisms,and am grateful to theparticipants of the International anonymous refereefor insightful Conference on Economic Policy Making Process, Bali, Indonesia, 6-9 September 1990, forhelpful comments. 1. This characterization of conventional wisdom as an army-bureaucracy-capital coalition covers as special cases the fourdominant models of the Indonesian state to be discussed inPart 1. 2. Robert Bates,Markets and States inTropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981).
3.

MA: MIT, 1986). 4. The term 'revealedpreference'was coined by Paul Samuelson ("A Note on thePure Theory of Consumer's fromhis buying behaviour. 5. Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics", inEssays inPositive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. 6. Another paper supplies evidence from the financial sector and agricultural policies, and fromcross-country comparisons to support our position. See Wing Thye Woo, "The Economic Policy-Making Equation in University of California at Davis, 1988. Indonesia", Pacific Rim Studies ProgramWorking Paper No. 13, 7. The cultural determinism label ismine and this characterization of Indonesia is fromAllen Sievers, The JohnsHopkins Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic Development inConflict (Baltimore: "The Press, 1974) p. xiii inPreface. The notable works in this traditionare Benedict O'Gorman Anderson, Idea of Power in Javanese Culture" inC. Holt, B. Anderson and J. Siegel (ed.) Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1972); Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Lucien Pye, Asian Paul, 1978);Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Blackburn,Aust: Fontana, 1980); Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 1991 March319
Behavior", Economica, February 1938) to describe the deduction of the structure of a consumer's preference

See,

for example,

David

Denoon,

Devaluation

under Pressure:

India,

Indonesia,

and

Ghana

(Cambridge,

ASEAN Economic Bulletin

University Press, 1985); and Allen Sievers, TheMystical World of Indonesia: Culture and Economic Devel opment inConflict (Baltimore,MD: JohnHopkins Press, 1974). 8. This iswhy proponents of this view have referred disparagingly to the Soeharto government as the new Mataram. Mataram was the last dominant kingdom on Java, and Soeharto's home village was under its 9. V. S. Naipaul, TheMimic Men (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1967). 10. Brian May, op. cit., p. 373. 11. From B. Anderson, "Nationalism and the State inModern Indonesia", mimeo, 1982; quoted in R. Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney,Aust.: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 117. 12. Sritua Arief and Ado Sasono, Indonesia: Dependency and Underdevelopment, META, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 1981,p. 70.Other analyses of Indonesia being a dependent stateareRex Mortimer (ed.) Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated Modernization, (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973); and David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building An Elite for Indonesia" in SteveWeissman (ed.) The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid (San Francisco, CA: Ramparts Press, 1975). Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism 13. The classic statementon, and predictions of, thedependency hypothesis is and Underdevelopment inLatin America, Monthly Review Press, 1967. 14. The general failureof thedependencymodel isadmitted by one of itsforemostproponents, Peter Evans. See his "Foreign Capital and the Third World State", inMyron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (eds.), Understanding Political Development (Little and Brown, 1988). The best statement of the domestic model for Indonesia isRichard Robison, op. cit. capitalists' state 15. Robison, op. cit., p. 120-22, emphasis added. 17. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1978); and David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: IndonesianMilitary Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984). By the classification scheme inEric Nordlinger, Soldiers inPolitics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs,NY: Prentice-Hall, 1977), Indonesia is a praetorian state of the ruler-type. 18. Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military: Structure, Procedure and Effects on Indonesian Society" in Jackson and Pye (eds.) Political Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley,CA: University of California, 1978), p. 78. 19. R. William Liddle, "Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule and Political Institutions" inPacific Affairs, 1985, p. 70-71. In a laterarticle ("The Politics of Shared Growth: Some Indonesian Cases", Comparative Politics, much more January 1987), Liddle broadened the scope of effective political participation further:"there is beneath-the-surfacepolitical activity in the New Order than the standardmodel ofmilitary and bureaucratic authoritarianism leads us to expect... [and that] thecentral state apparatus does notmonopolize thepolicy process." Liddle however did not elaborate what groups ought to be included in thebroader coalition. See Woo (1988, op. cit.) fora discussion of this second Liddle article. 20. Karl Jackson, "The Prospects forBureaucratic Polity in Indonesia" in Jackson and Pye (1975) op. cit.,
21. 16. Robison, op. cit., p. 374. control.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

tions in Indonesia" inJackson and Pye (1978) op. cit., p. 4 and p. 17,emphasis added. A more detailed statementof our implicitcorporatistmodel is in Wing ThyeWoo, "The Economic Policy Making Equation in Indonesia", Pacific Rim Studies Program Working Paper No. 13,University of California at Davis, 1988. Antonie Dake, In theSpirit of theRed Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and Peking, 1959-1965, Mouton, Netherlands, 1973; p. 1-2. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism In Java: ItsSetting and Development," in Claire Holt, Benedict Anderson and James Siegel (eds.) Culture and Politics in Indonesia, op. cit. The co-ordination of actionswithout regular explicit consultations should not be regarded as unusual. This is standard operating procedure foroligopolistic industries in theU.S. which face antitrust laws. Pye, op. cit., p. 113. In p. 119,Pye notes that Soeharto does not pretend "that he can do anything and
everything."

p. 395. Karl Jackson,

"Bureaucratic

Polity:

A Theoretical

Framework

for the Analysis

of Power

and Communica

27. Figures from William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1987:The New Order at the Power," mimeo, 1988. Height of its 28. Harold Crouch, "Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia", World Politics, July 1979, p. 587. The same predictionwas made 10years earlier by W. F. Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java", Pacific Viewpoint,Vol. 10, 1969.

ASEAN Economic Bulletin

1991 March 320

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Richard Cooper, "CurrencyDevaluation inDeveloping Countries", Essays in InternationalFinance, No. 86, June 1971,PrincetonUniversity. For example "Revaluation is not the Solution", Warta Berita, 6 April; "Revaluation as an April's Joke", Sinar Harapan, 13April; "Would a Revaluation be More Beneficial?" Merdeka, 5May; "A Suggestion that theRupiah Should be Revalued", Merdeka, 24May; "Again, it isnot necessary todevalue or revalue", Suara Karya, 24 June; and "Weak US Dollar Upsets Indonesia's Balancing Act", Far Eastern Economic Review, July 21. H. W. Arndt, "Survey of Current Developments", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, November, 1978, p. 10. A detailed analysis of the 1978 devaluation is in Wing Thye Woo and Anwar Nasution, "Indonesian Sachs Economic Policies and Their Relation toExternal Debt Management", published as Book I inJeffrey (ed.) Developing CountryDebt and Performance, Volume 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). This is why Ross Garnaut ina hard-hittingassessment of thedevaluation written one year later ("Survey of Current Developments", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, November 1979) called it "perverse" behaviour, and extolled "the value of stable and credible exchange rate arrangements". Heinz Arndt, "Survey of Recent Developments", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, August 1983. The indirect revenues can appear immediately if the overvalued official rate had prompted substantial smuggling.A devaluation would reduce the incentive to smuggle and thus raise legal export volume (and export taxes) immediately.See theanalysis of the 1966devaluation in Wing ThyeWoo, Bruce Glassburner and Anwar Nasution, "Macroeconomic Crisis and Long-Term Growth: The Case of Indonesia, 1965-1985". Jakarta Post, 13September 1986. This point was not lost on all non-official economists, e.g. Frans Seda inKorhpas, 13 September 1986; Mohammed Sadli inKompas, 30 September 1986; and Anne Booth inBulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, December 1986. See Table II.4.10 in Wing Thye Woo, Bruce Glassburner and Anwar Nasution, op. cit. The fact thatmore rice is produced does not mean that the rice policy benefits the urban classes too. Additional rice is available only with additional subsidies, and most taxes are collected from the urban
dwellers.

village programme was started at the very beginning of the Soeharto era to alleviate rural which was allowed to deteriorate under Soekarno. unemployment and to rebuild the rural infrastructure With the growth of theoil sector in the early 1970s, the INPRES districtand province programmes were more than one village, and, partly, because the village started partly to handle projects which affected administratorswere not able to absorb more funds. 41. Sjahrir, Basic Needs inIndonesia: Economics, Politics and Public Policy (Singapore: Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies, 1986). 42. Wade Edmundson and Stella Edmundson, "A Decade of Village Development inEast Java", Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, August 1983. Central Java, 43. This was also noted of a different village by James Sterba ("Progress Comes to a Tiny Village in Measured inBanks,Motorbikes andGarbage", The Asian Wall Street JournalWeekly, 5October 1987)who had predicted a pessimisticoutcome for the village in a 1971New York Times Magazine article. The INPRES
44. "Reform without favour: Indonesia eases curbs on imports and trade", Far Eastern Economic Review,

45.

Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development inPre-Industrial Europe", Past and Present, February 1976. This explanation is not without controversy, however. See T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin (eds.) The BrennerDebate (Cambridge University Press, 1985). Evsey Domar ("The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis", Journal of Economic History, March 1970) also offersa political Woo As noted earlier, the distributional effectsof agricultural and credit policy are discussed in
op. cit.). explanation.

1December

1988, p. 62.

46.

(1988,

Wing Thye Woo isAssistant Professor of Economics and Head University of California at Davis.

of the Pacific Rim Studies Program at the

ASEAN

Economic

Bulletin

321

March 1991