Symposium Article

Stanley Hoffmann: Three brief essays

Robert O. Keohane
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 408 Robertson Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1013, USA. E-mail: rkeohane@princeton.edu

Abstract In a famous essay, Isaiah Berlin contrasted two intellectual styles, that
of the fox, who knows many small things, and that of the hedgehog, who knows one big thing who has one big idea or works within one theoretical tradition. Stanley Hoffmanns work reflects both styles. In his descriptive work he is a fox, who knows many things. In his discussions of ethics, he is a hedgehog who knows one big thing: that an ethical dimension is inherent in cogent interpretation. As a critic of American foreign policy, Hoffmann has combined these styles, arguing that the United States is too prone to lecture others rather than to engage in the give-and-take of bargaining. And he has always emphasized the layered and complex nature of world politics. French Politics (2009) 7, 368378. doi:10.1057/fp.2009.26 Keywords: world politics; Stanley Hoffmann; American foreign policy; intellectual style; complexity; ethics

Introduction
It is a great honor to participate in this symposium in honor of Stanley Hoffmann, whom I have known since I entered Harvard Graduate School 48 years ago for most of his adult life and for two-thirds of mine. He is a remarkable man, whose ironic sense of humor has kept him young in spirit. Indeed, perhaps because of a shift in my perspective, he seems younger to me now than in 1961 when he was Professor Hoffmann and I was a very green graduate student, barely 20-year-old. We were colleagues at Harvard for 11 years, we have co-authored several articles and co-edited several books, and we continue to be friends. Those of us who have followed Stanleys work know that he is by temperament and inclination an essayist, whose penetrating reflections on international relations theory and American foreign policy are known to readers of the New York Review of Books as well as professional students of
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international relations. For this essay about his scholarship, I will follow the lead of this marvelously multi-faceted scholar and commentator, by offering three mini-essays. The first of these was presented at the American Political Science Association meetings in August 2008. It attempts to capture Stanleys distinctive intellectual style combining empirical eclecticism with a strongly held and well-defined moral sense. The second mini-essay, presented as a talk at Stanleys eightieth birthday celebration at Harvard in early December 2008, picks up some motifs of Stanleys long engagement with the study of American foreign policy by focusing on something that seems inherent in much of the American style of foreign policy: lecturing others. The third mini-essay is a set of reflections on contemporary themes, stimulated by Stanley Hoffmanns career of brilliant, insightful reflection on change in world politics.

Stanley Hoffmann: Empirical Fox, Moral Hedgehog

In a famous essay, Isaiah Berlin contrasted two intellectual styles, that of the fox, who knows many small things, and that of the hedgehog, who knows one big thing who has one big idea or works within one theoretical tradition. Stanley Hoffmann seems to me to epitomize both styles in different aspects of his work. As a commentator on the messy empirical reality of international relations, Hoffmann has always been a fox. In his first major work on the subject, published in 1960, he declares that the most general laws of international relations are bound to be fairly trivial generalizations, for in the social sciences regularities are found only at the level of wholes, which must be broken up if we want to understand reality. Exclusive emphasis on regularities leads to the rediscovery of platitudes (Hoffmann, 1960, p. 42). As a result, he recommends, as an approach to understanding international relations, what he calls historical sociology, really a sort of comparative historical sociology at a macroscopic level of analysis. Theory, for Hoffmann, is simply a set of questions applied to history. He says admiringly that his teacher, Raymond Aron, plunges theory into history in order to prevent theory from ever going beyond the teachings of history and from becoming more rigid and more prescriptive than history allows (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 55). For Hoffmann, the empirical study of international relations must be essentially interpretive, using a deep knowledge of history, and context, to understand the significance of events, to sort out the important from the unimportant, the auguries of future changes from transient ephemera. The study of international relations is, therefore, a form of what Clifford Geertz called thick description, searching not for laws but for meaning.
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In searching for meaning, Hoffmann appears torn, as many of us are, between a recognition that much in international relations remains the same over the centuries, and a realization that massive changes are indeed occurring in our own era. It seems to me that he began with a bias against change, inculcated by Aron, whom Hoffmann characterizes as holding that international politics, as a state of war, follows a different logic and different rules from those of transnational society and the international economic system, and that ultimately force dominates: clubs are trump. Hoffmann approvingly quotes Arons contention that it is always the interstate system based on calculations of force which dominates international society (1987, p. 58). But I do not think that Hoffmann, despite his filial attachment to Aron, was ever fully comfortable with this static conception of world politics especially with the always in the sentence just quoted. He is too progressive as a thinker, too alert to and fascinated by change, to have been captured by the view that fundamentals remain constant. Yet there is a tension in his worldview between this alertness to change and an analytical stance that, by looking so much to history and emphasizing the autonomy of the logic of international relations, is profoundly conservative. Perhaps this tension reinforces the fox image: knowing many things that are somewhat inconsistent with one another can be both the mark of a great mind and a source of theoretical modesty. If Stanley is a fox in his descriptive work, on ethical issues he is a hedgehog. Even at the beginning, Hoffmann was also interested in ethics, and this theme has become stronger, it seems to me, throughout his career. But Hoffmann was never simply interested in preaching, although he entitles the normative section of Janus and Minerva Sermons and Suggestions. He always wanted to show that an ethical dimension is inherent in cogent interpretation. Throughout his works, he criticizes Realism for having a theory of means without a theory of ends, and in 1960 he declared that intellectuals need first to clarify what values they would like to see promoted in the world, and to relate these values to the world as it is, far more closely than we usually do (Hoffmann, 1960, p. 187). In an elegant essay on the political ethics of international relations, published in 1988, he notes an interesting convergence on ethical issues between explicitly normative work, such as that of Charles Beitz and himself, and the more scientific work on international cooperation, such as that of Robert Axelrod and myself. As Anne-Marie Slaughter wrote in comments on a draft of this essay: While an ethical approach was Hoffmanns fixed star, his fox sensibilities allowed him to see ethical contributions in both explicitly normative work and more positive theories of cooperation an insight that gets lost when the methodology takes over. For Hoffmann, both the explicitly normative literature and the work on cooperation under anarchy seek, in his own words, a way out of conflicts within the constraints of the Westphalian system (1988, p. 11).
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Hoffmanns earlier work had a prudential, realist tone, but his ability to see multiple dimensions of issues is exemplified by his move, during his career, toward what he calls a transformist approach to international relations. In an essay first published in 1970, he pleaded for greater restraint by the superpowers, which goes back to the traditional view, held by Aron, that there are sharp differences between domestic and international politics. He suggested that greater restraint would mean that attempts at influencing the behavior of a state must aim primarily at its external behavior on the various old and new chessboards of international affairs instead of being aimed at internal control (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 312, his italics). But by the early 1980s, Hoffmann was arguing that incrementalism is morally objectionable, and calling for a transformist liberal strategy that would aim at improving the hold of liberal values and institutions in as many polities as possible (1987, p. 411). Although he gave Henry Kissinger a nod as the best recent example of a conservative statesman, he now emphasized the extraordinary shortcomings of conservative statecraft (Hoffmann, 1981, p. 230). Hoffmanns dramatic turn from restraint to a strategy that would, in his words, go way beyond Kant (1987, p. 411) seems to me to have been driven by his ethical sensibility. By 1981, he had concluded that despite many difficulties both of conceptualization and implementation, the United States should have a human rights policy (Hoffmann, 1981, Chapter 3), and in 1983 he was arguing that promotion of human rights was a moral imperative for the United States. South Africas apartheid policy was especially obnoxious to Hoffmann, who vigorously rejected the view expressed by officials in the Reagan administration that rights violations by anti-communist authoritarian regimes could be justified or at least accepted. In 2006, he called for a concentrated effort to protect human rights and for collective armed intervention when necessary to remove genocidal regimes (2006, pp. 214215). Particularly telling is the shift in prevalent verb modes between the fox-like Hoffmann of empirical analysis to the hedgehog of ethics: from the cool descriptive language of is and the conditional forecasts of what may occur, to the language of must and ought. In his writings over the past 25 years on human rights, Hoffmann is a hedgehog who knows one big thing: the sanctity of human rights and the moral obligations of those with power to defend the rights of the weak. So how do the fox and the hedgehog coexist within the mind of one brilliant and highly observant individual? The first clue to an answer is that Hoffmann is a deeply humanistic and historical scholar with a sense of responsibility to speak to the public as well as to fellow scholars. He does not feel constrained by a positivist distinction between facts and values, and he can let his principled commitments drive his work, as he is not trapped by commitment to any particular social science theory or method. The duty of an intellectual, says
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Hoffmann, is to dismantle prejudice, national self-righteousness, and parochial views, patiently and painstakingly, to protest constantly against inequity and violence, which is not very easy; it is to be the conscience of national society (1981, p. 226). Second, it is actually advantageous for the ethical hedgehog to be an empirical fox. Principled commitments do not require political closure, but because Hoffmann cares about effectiveness they do require a multidimensional understanding of reality. As he says tellingly in his 1988 essay on ethics and international affairs, the first duty of an ethicist is to be an expert (Hoffmann, 1988, pp. 1819). Next to cynicism, he declares, the greatest threat to morality is disembodied idealism (Hoffmann, 1988, p. 18). Finally, Hoffmann, in his writings, puts himself in the position of the statesman male or female while still keeping his ironic distance. In this respect, he is like Hans J. Morgenthau, whom Hoffmann both admired and criticized. Morgenthau declared that Political Realism enabled the analyst to look over the shoulder of the statesman as the statesman was making his decisions, but Morgenthau also saw his role as speaking truth to power, not as serving as confidential advisor to the Prince. Hoffmann does not believe in the magical ability of realism to decipher the meaning of events, but also puts himself in the position of the statesman unlike the standpoint taken by most social scientists currently studying international relations. Although Hoffmann criticizes policy science (1987, p. 23), he returns again and again to the statesman, and what he or she should do. Hoffmann, in effect, tells the statesman to combine a fox-like judgment of the complexity of reality with the hedgehogs commitment to clear ethical principles. For instance, in his compelling essay contrasting Rousseau and Kant, Hoffmann concludes with the claim that the statesmans difficulty is that he must play the game of international competition, from which he can escape only exceptionally, and at the same time he ought not to lose sight of Kants ideal. He ought not to give up the hope of a future world community, but he cannot act as if it already existed (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 47). Stanley Hoffmanns voice has been so important precisely because his focus on the dilemmas of statesmen enables him to transcend the growing gap between the academic study of world politics and informed political commentary. This gap has left much of the academic work arid or platitudinous, and much of the commentary superficial, uninformed by research. In bridging the gap between academia and policy, Hoffmann creates a connection between pragmatism and idealism. He seeks an embodied idealism pursuing ideals in full awareness of the fact that, as he once put it, idealists can fall into the hell of good intentions (Hoffmann, 197778). Simultaneously fox and hedgehog, he demonstrates in his writings how awareness of complexity and a passion for ethical improvement can work together, and how,
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as he also says, a state of dissatisfaction is a goad to research (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 23).

Lecturing Others: The American National Style of Foreign Policy

One of Stanley Hoffmanns most distinctive and lasting contributions to the study of American foreign policy is his brilliant portrayal of the American national style, in Gullivers Troubles. In that volume, Hoffmann argued that Americas besetting sin is not moralism or idealism or legalism, but rather what he called formulism and formalism. Formulism means the reduction of complexity to the holy simplicity of a hallowed slogan (Hoffmann, 1968, p. 126). Formalism denotes a failure to appreciate political, historical and societal processes that lie below the surface. For Hoffmann, formulism and formalism are accompanied by principles that take the form of abstract dogmas and moral imperatives (1968, p. 116). These principles do not constitute ideologies, but they share two features with ideologies: their supposed transcendence of national interests and their rootedness in general views about human nature and society (1968, p. 115). Stanley does not put the issue quite this way, but it seems to me that the natural consequence of formalism and formulism, and the abstract principles that they accompany, is that lecturing others becomes the manifestation of the American national style. The lecture by the President, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense becomes Americas characteristic means of diplomacy. The American official begins with general principles peace, security, economic growth, democracy and then tells foreign audiences how they should act to achieve these goals. Lecturing others has become so ingrained in American foreign policy that it seems to come naturally to our foreign policy elites of either party. But in this essay, I want to contrast lecturing with two other approaches that can be employed by great powers that want to make a difference in the world, bargaining and institution-building. Bargaining is of course the Realist approach to foreign policy: great powers negotiate with one another, warily exchanging less valuable concessions by themselves for concessions of greater value to them by others. Metternich and Bismarck are often seen as the heroic figures of such great power diplomacy, although I see Salisbury as also one of its master practitioners. Faced with a series of conflicts with the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, Salisburys cabinet made a series of bargains in which Britain made concessions on the Canadian border and in Panama. Henry Kissinger says somewhere that the mark of a statesman is the ability to see that often it is wise to sacrifice material gains for intangible ones: Salisbury understood this, and got
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a centurys aid and protection from the United States in return for a little bit of wilderness and the sacrifice of some treaty privileges that would have soon been swept away in any event. The United States has pursued a policy of bargaining with China which may explain why China policy is one of the few successes of the Bush administration. But toward much of the world, we seem to prefer to offer lectures on sovereignty or self-determination, democracy or the war against terror. The obvious hypocrisy is an ordinary vice, as Judith Shklar would have said. But lectures can get in the way of bargains. The other mode of diplomacy is institution-building. Of course institutionbuilding requires bargaining, as Moravcsiks work on the European Union (EU) shows. But the core of institution-building as a foreign policy practice is to alter participants interests and incentives by making cooperation more productive through creating facilitating frameworks and enhancing mutual credibility. Institutions are worthless without potential common interests; but given these interests, they can make it easier for states to realize them, and they can reduce the chances that feuds will escalate. Yet institutions only help if many states have stakes in them. This means that all states have to make concessions. The United States used to be the chief institution-builder in world politics, but Europe has recently become the champion advocate of institutions, and they have learned a few lessons from us about moralistic lecturing as well. An institutional strategy is convenient for Europe, since it is over-represented in the old institutions and, typically, European states are founders of the new ones. Hypocrisy, as an ordinary vice, is not limited to the United States. European countries were the principal foot-draggers in the renegotiation of International Monetary Fund quotas to newly emerging economies over the past couple of years. I suggested, recently, at the British Foreign Ministry that if Britain and France really wanted UN reform, they could offer to give up their individual seats for an EU seat, conditional on other reforms they desired. Somehow, they have not called me back for further discussions of this suggestion. A little bit of lecturing is quite acceptable in world politics, when subordinated to a combination of bargaining and institution-building. But when lecturing becomes a substitute for bargaining and institution-building, it will simply be seen as hypocritical posturing. Leaders of dominant states may get away with it because no one dares object, but the lecturing leader of a declining power, or one with exorbitant ambitions, is likely to be ineffective. In one of the most perceptive passages in Gullivers Troubles, unfortunately buried in the middle of a paragraph on page 383, Hoffmann says that a great power is a nation that succeeds in adapting its style and institutions to changing patterns of international relations. How well has the United States
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adapted its lecturing style principled, formalistic and formulistic to changing conditions? Arguably, the American style was well adapted to the Cold War. The scattered, often demoralized non-communist countries of Europe and Asia looked to a leader with a plan: a formula for recovery and security. The United States had that formula. Americas formula was combined, however, with a penchant for institutions, which reinforced its material and military power and made its promises more credible. Bolstered by great self-confidence, the result was the combination of hard power and soft power that the Soviet Union could not hope to match. Bargaining was secondary the Cold War did not end with a Grand Bargain but with Soviet collapse. Hence, the United States did not have to adapt its national style. Much of the work of foreign policy was done by its dynamic economy and its free society. Its formulistic lectures, such as those of President Ronald Reagan, seemed simply to make explicit the flow of history. History did not come to an end in the 1990s, but its course shifted. Yet, in an odd way, the American style of lecturing others seemed to fit the new conditions just as well as the old ones. Who could now doubt that the United States was riding a wave a democratic wave of historical change? When President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a new world order, he was serious, no matter how lugubrious this seemed to seasoned observers of world politics. The United States had lectured others on what to do, and now they seemed actually to be doing it. Its leaders even sought to promote their neo-liberal vision of world capitalism, in which states would not do naughty things in financial crises such as bail out their banks and reflate their economies. And they had both the material resources and the institutions to implement this vision. During the last decade, however, much has changed. Our social and economic practices from support for the death penalty and refusal to ratify human rights conventions to poorly regulated capitalism and overt religiosity increasingly set us apart from other democracies. The United States squandered immense amounts of hard and soft power in its virtually unilateral invasion of Iraq. Donald Rumsfelds lectures about New Europe and Old Europe did not appeal to our long-term allies. Continuing current account deficits and deregulation at home, followed by the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression, have weakened the financial basis of American power and made a mockery of our attempts to maintain control over international financial institutions. The summit meeting of 14 November 2008 was a marker of this shift. Under these conditions, lectures cut less ice. As Fareed Zakaria has emphasized in The Post-American World, the United States is no longer central to a number of developments in world politics, including relations between the two largest countries, India and China.
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The United States is still very powerful, and its economy remains resilient, with great potential for innovation. But it is no longer the indispensable nation. Others continue to listen, but they are less inclined to bow their heads or bend their knees. In my view, the United States needs to take Stanley Hoffmanns advice of almost 40 years ago. We need to adapt our national style. There is no need to abandon our principles, but we need to engage in more bargaining including with adversaries and more institution-building particularly with those that have substantial common interests with us. Lectures should be mostly relegated to the classroom and to forums such as the one in which this essay was first delivered.

Themes in the Study of World Politics

This final mini-essay was prepared as a set of comments on a lecture that Stanley Hoffmann was planning to give at Princeton on 8 December 2008. Characteristically, he was unwilling to give me, as a commentator, a text of his talk before presenting it; so I prepared some preliminary remarks that I was planning to adapt to his actual talk. Unfortunately, he was unable to deliver the lecture due to a sudden illness contracted by his wife, Inge who fortunately recovered entirely within a few weeks. I was left with my notes, which have become the basis for this final mini-essay. In trying to anticipate what Stanley would say, I decided that he would adopt his characteristic approach, pointing out in new and insightful ways how complicated world politics is. So I thought about the layered and complex nature of contemporary world politics by focusing on themes in the academic literature that illuminate this complexity. I decided to focus on eight themes a combination of which, I argue, could help guide research and writing on world politics today. 1. The classic international relations theory theme: World politics is driven by state interests, weighted by power. These interests are shaped both by position in the world system and by domestic politics. Policies reflect state interests; outcomes reflect interests and power. This is an old theme but remains important in Hoffmanns work and in the field as a whole. One implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is that, as state interests are increasingly heterogeneous and power is diffusing, order will be increasingly complicated to achieve. 2. The interdependence-globalization theme: The world is more tightly connected than ever before. Transnational actors, ranging from multinational firms to securities traders to international terrorists, are increasingly
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3.

4.

5.

6.

important. One implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is that it will be even more complicated to achieve order than the diffusion of state power alone would suggest. More broadly, the implication of globalization is that societies are increasingly affected by what happens elsewhere, and international cooperation is therefore more urgent. The institutionalization theme: World politics is more institutionalized than ever before. Outcomes are not determined by the institutions but a very large part of diplomacy goes through the institutions and is affected by the incentive structures they create. Great powers establish credibility largely through multilateral institutions. One implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is that no state that fails to create a coherent strategy to work with and through multilateral institutions will have a successful foreign policy. The rising power theme: A classic problem in international relations is how to accommodate the interests of rapidly rising powers for instance, Germany and the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan between the wars. China is gaining power resources spectacularly rapidly; India and Brazil are also increasingly factors to be dealt with. This theme suggests that, since world politics is more institutionalized than ever before, accommodating rising powers means making fundamental changes in the influence structures of multilateral institutions. This is very difficult, as the failure of Security Council reform demonstrates. But it is essential, as the obsolescence of the G-7 and the rise of the G-20 in response to the global financial crisis indicates. The dynamic instability of capitalism theme: Joseph Schumpeter (1942) described capitalism in terms of creative destruction, and Charles Kindleberger (1978) traced the histories of what he called manias, panics, and crashes. The world, it is now clear, went through a mania of assetinflation during the first years of the twenty-first century and, having experienced a panic in the fall of 2008, is now dealing with the effects of a crash. One implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is that states and publics need now to work to ensure that the destructioncrash phase of another Kindleberger Cycle does not have the disastrous political consequences of the Great Depression. The social mobilization theme: Karl Deutsch (1953) was the pioneer in analyzing how individual attitudes have become important for large-scale politics, as a result of mass communications. Individual attitudes are many times more significant now than when Deutsch spotted the trend over 50 years ago. An implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is that what Joseph Nye (2004) has dubbed soft power the ability to persuade and the attractiveness that leads to emulation is more important than ever in world politics.
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7. The globalization of informal violence theme: State violence became globalized in the nuclear age. Since 9/11, informal violence such as terrorism has become globalized. One implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is obvious: none of us is safe from potential terrorist attack. 8. The network governance theme: The impact of the Internet and other means of cheap, rapid communication is generating what Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) calls a networked world. One implication of this theme for contemporary world politics is that connectivity the ability to communicate effectively and quickly with a wide variety of actors in many different cultures is more important as a source of power than ever before. These are only eight themes; others could be mentioned that would be equally important. But they do indicate the exciting vistas open to new generations of students of world politics at least to those who follow Stanley Hoffmanns lead of continually reflecting on change in world politics, and thinking imaginatively about how it is changing, and how human beings should respond.

References
Hoffmann, S. (ed.) (1960) Contemporary Theory in International Relations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Hoffmann, S. (1968) Gullivers Troubles: Or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy. New York: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations. Hoffmann, S. (1981) Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Hoffmann, S. (1987) Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview. Hoffmann, S. (1988) The political ethics of international relations. Seventh Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy; New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Hoffmann, S. (2006) Chaos and Violence: What Globalization, Failed States, and Terrorism Mean for U.S. Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Other works cited:

Deutsch, K.W. (1953) Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. New York: Wiley. Hoffmann, S. (197778) The hell of good intentions. Foreign Policy 29: 326. Kindleberger, C.P. (1978) Manias, Panics, and Crashes. New York: Basic Books. Nye, J.S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs Press. Schumpeter, J.A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper. Slaughter, A.-M. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zakaria, F. (2008) The Post-American World. New York: Norton.
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