Happiness and Politics Author(s): Raymond Geuss Source: Arion, Third Series, Vol. 10, No.

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Happiness

and Politics

RAYMOND GEUSS

Revolution

during the French that "Happiness is a new Saint-Just context and interpreted from its idea in Europe."1 Extracted very literally, this does not seem prima facie a terribly plausi ble opinion to hold. Surely many people before the eighteenth announced

./"XT the height

of the Terror

century had rather a clear idea of what they thought happiness at any rate, such as Epicurus, was; many ancient philosophers, Zeno of Kitium, Aristotle, had views, sometimes elaborate and and highly articulated views, about the nature of happiness, about what chances known human individuals it.What of attaining this. might is more, do to increase their have Saint-Just will

Does Saint-Just, then, perhaps mean that the idea of 'col is a new thought? Does he think lective' or 'public' happiness that ancient philosophers had views about the potential hap piness of individuals, but none about what itwould mean for to be happy? 'Happiness,' after all, like community in modern ideal, 'liberty,' is a term which great to refer either to individuals or to groups. principle purports I can speak of an individual human being, Alkibiades, Caval that other canti, or John Knox as being happy (or free), but the Decla ration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (article one in the version of 1793) also speaks of the 'bonheur commun' of a as the goal of political association, and uses the community level to which this 'goal' has been attained as a criterion for evaluating a given polity.2 If I follow this usage, presumably, I can say that the Roman Republic was 'happy' whereas the in the early eighteenth century was not, or that r?gime France in 1794 was happier than in 1744. ancien a human

i6

HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

once notoriously claimed that society Thatcher Margaret bias toward individ does not exist, and this strong modern ualist conceptions might give further impetus to a historical (and also, by the way, argument to the effect that 'happiness' not of were originally used only of individuals, 'liberty') groups, and ought strictly still to be taken to refer in the lit to groups is a eral sense only to individuals. Application extension. To say that unwarranted metaphorical seemingly that a city is happy is just a shorthand for saying something statement can be put more correctly as a simple aggregative in the such as that most of the individuals about individuals, sense human individuals can be are 'happy' (in whatever city in political philoso happy). This is a familiar phenomenon to note that the process of 'exten and it is important phy sion' can go in either direction. That is, terms that originally to groups, but terms can be extended refer to individuals used of groups can come to refer to individuals. originally to refer to the processes seems originally Thus 'deliberation' come to a de by which groups of people discuss matters and to the presumed internal dia when may engage they weigh up logue course of ac of some proposed the merits and disadvantages tions Many people find this kind of extension inherently du bious and grounds for suspicion that some kind of category cision, and then it is extended individuals in which mistake is being made. extension' 'metaphorical I am suggesting that one try to see not as a potentially dubious after of all thought and lan in each case about what

but as the very life-blood guage-use.4 As long as one is clear thought,

one means, one can see this dual usage of 'happiness' as po we have at our dis tentially an enrichment of the vocabulary posal to think about politics and the good life. if Saint-Just meant that the ancients Unfortunately, had no

he was completely wrong. of 'public happiness,' conception Ancient authors assume that one can speak equally of indi even goes further viduals or cities as being 'happy.'5 Aristotle than this and specifically says (Politics 13 24a5) that when one calls a group or an individual 'happy' one is using the

Raymond

Geuss

17

argument he uses, however, which depends on the claim that 'happy' in this respect is like 'wealthy,' does not convince but rather completely, should be seen as warning us of certain dangers.7 Even ifwe assume that we know what individual?originally, in the case of an 'wealthy' means then many useful possessions, having having large applying the issues of distri

term

in the same

sense.6 The

and, perhaps nowadays, having much money, and secure entitlements and lines of credit?in bution

term to a group of people, a city, or a state, arise and become problematic for which there are no in the case of the individual. If the city is an or analogues we can assume association that the re ganized political sources available will be divided among various individuals who make

up the city, but that there will also be a sector of in individuals things held 'in common' or 'publicly.' Various also own houses, but the Cambridge (including me) may as a public corporation itself owns school City of Cambridge

tracts of land, etc. By virtue of buildings, police vehicles, count as a 'wealthy' city? By now, would Cambridge what, virtue of what we could call the 'private' wealth of the indi viduals who live there? Does or this mean the total wealth the average wealth? virtue of the value tion which Or does Cambridge count as wealthy by of the resources owned by the corpora Or perhaps by taking or public hands in the

is the City of Cambridge? the sum of all the wealth in private city? This is a serious

issue not simply with reference to wealth, but also with reference to the concept of 'happiness.' Aristo tle's breezy analysis seems to be trying to divert attention from this issue, but Plato faces up to it squarely at the begin when one ning of book four of the Republic (41^-42106), of Socrates' to Socrates' interlocutors, Adeimantus, objects whole mode of proceeding in describing his ideal city. The ideal city is supposed to be an ideally happy (e?8aifxa)v) city, that is a city which instantiates and realizes what it is to be a to the fullest, which is a fully flourishing city specimen of what a city should be. Plato claims this is a city in which all

18 HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

life are per human as possible distinct sub efficiently by are assigned to a given Individuals groups. subgroup according to a highly developed principle of division of labor, so that each person does only that for which he or she has the the essential functions and of communal formed as well greatest natural aptitude. Adeimantus, however, points out that in the city thus described, none of the people will be fully happy. This does not depend on surreptitiously shifting from Plato's technical sense of 'happiness' men who is successfully, efficiently sense of happiness everyday (enjoyment or sat we can well imagine that individuals in a although (being a perfect speci one's task) to discharging

the common

not be terribly satisfied with their lot. instantiate the Platonic Rather, city might although fully instanti what it is to be a city, none of the individuals would ate and realize humanity at its fullest, be fully flourishing in stances of humanity; rather they would be locked into the exercise of particular social functions. Perfectly discharging one's task as a human discharging The happiness of the city would then be quite dis ideal-city. in a significant way tinct and would from the diverge or collec its members taken either individually happiness of the impor tively.8 For the purposes of the present discussion, tant point is that Plato seems to admit that happiness could, in principle, be a systemic property of the society as a whole that was not reducible to any straightforward summation of the states of happiness of the individual members. As Aristo tle puts the point (Politics 1264b 19-20)?one he himself re is construed as being like 'even' (as in 'odd jects?'happiness' it and even'). A given number, e.g., 14, can be 'even' without + 7, are themselves case that its constituents, e.g., 7 being the even. Perhaps it is not yet completely clear inwhat this 'hap as distinct from that of the in of the city as a whole piness' is clear is that these ancient but what consists, rate had a very robust sense of 'public at any philosophers indeed. happiness' dividuals efficiently be the same thing as being won't one's specific role as a cobbler-in-the

isfaction), Platonic city would

Raymond

Geuss

19

how one turns it, then, Saint-Just seems simply to be wrong. Perhaps we can make sense of what he says by the political context within which his claim was considering in favor of the enactments made. Saint-Just was speaking No matter that have come decrees lution called to be known as the Vent?se Decrees. These to for the expropriation and the use of the resources of enemies thus made of the revo available

like this, though, far support "poor patriots." Measures from being a novelty of eighteenth have a century France, for agrarian reforms very long history in theWest. Demands have involved very extensive redistribution of to the poor were a recurrent feature of the political at least from the time and social life of the Roman Republic of the Gracchi (second century bc), and by the end of the that would lands rival war-lords Republic ated land of opponents routinely using the expropri to reward supporters. Saint-Just's would have been that the reasons he were

point, then, presumably and the Committee of Public depended but that

essentially in the past arguments for measures like these de not on appeals to happiness but on appeals to some pended So to say that the idea of happiness was a other grounds. new one would mean not that no one in Europe had ever the idea of (individual or communal) before, happiness was being that for the first time a systematic attempt made to adopt happiness as an explicit social goal in a polit ically effective way. Perhaps we can become clearer about had but what by 'happiness' by con which he might have thought things people in the past would have used to support fundamental sorts of other institutions or drastic forms of action. What Saint-Just trasting it with might other might have meant

Safety gave for these measures on some reference to human happiness,

then, does he think his, and our, ancestors grounds, have given for this kind of decree? One contrast

perfectly reasonable thing he might have meant was a between the world of late eighteenth century Eu and two other historical periods which preceded it and rope were widely considered to be completely distinct from it and

20 HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

each from the other: ancient world was

the Christian-feudal

era and the world

of the ancient Mediterranean

prehensible were the active heroic virtue, played of one glory. in zero-sum and

and empires. The city-states one of perpetual war and it is thus com that the most valued kinds of human properties Such ones of aggressive success, excellence, virtues are characteristically dis

contexts inwhich the success competitive is the failure, or even death, of the other: Patroklos or or Achilles, Pallas or Turnus, Turnus or Ae Hektor, Hektor neas. The hero seeks always to be first and to attain glory. This heroic ethos but it can be extended a moral is originally code of individuals, too: Athens to political communities,

or Sparta, Rome or Carthage. After all, such communities are as fully engaged in a network of competitive relations with other communities as individuals are with other indi viduals. When sible subject
or gain glory,

the city itself comes to be construed as a pos can succeed or fail, that can exhibit excellence,
then these can become the goals of conscious

political action. Thus agrarian reform could be thought to be connected with erence to the political power, strength, city.9 For the city to be secure, powerful, needed soldiers. Under ancient conditions diers were

in the ancient world and and justified by ref security of the

it and renowned, the best such sol

to arise from the class of independent expected farmers. Thus the city could have an interest in the peasant turn the land which would of agricultural redistribution useless, rural poor into prosper landless, and thus militarily ous farmers who were potential soldiers. This might have had nothing to do with the happiness of the individuals who were the beneficiaries of that redistribution. in any case, was not at all a necessary part of Happiness, can choose a short, glorious life the heroic package. Achilles or a long, presumably life at home in fertile Ph comfortable the gods and commits is humiliated suicide; thia; Ajax by Aeneas' life is a model of pietas, virtus, and labor, but hardly In ancient drama, 'happiness' is the lot not of of happiness.10 the heroic protagonist of tragedy, but of the anti-hero who is

Raymond

Geuss

21

in Aristo in comedy?the Dikaiopolis who wants peace, feasting, and sex, not phanes' war and glory. Thus it is not unreasonable to think that re a handful of politically moral marginal gardless of what have thought or said, real public action philosophers might the central character Acharnians in the ancient world erence was to one or another characteristically of the complex conducted of terms by ref like basic

security, virtue, success, glory. The claim that one would ori ent political action toward then well be 'happiness' might to represent a historical departure.11 conceived Ages in Europe were no stranger to the politics of individual and dynastic competition, heroism, and the pursuit of glory. These seem de facto to have contin ued to inform the living and thinking at least of the politi The Christian Middle classes, but the advent of Christianity meant of another ideal: the quest for the salvation of the individual soul, or 'beatitude.' One might think of this cally dominant the recognition a ter as a recognition of two distinct concepts of happiness, restrial kind ordered around the peaceful enjoyment of the of which goods of life, and a celestial kind, the possibility was disclosed realization to humanity by Divine Revelation, of which could be attained only on the relation and the full after between death.

There was wide

these disagreement two kinds of happiness, to see but even those most disposed tended strictly beatitude and earthly happiness as compatible to subordinate the latter to the former. So one can, after all, make announcement. What is new sense of Saint-Just's reasonable in the eighteenth century is that to the possible list of free-standing

happiness or of the hap a group, and one can think of the happiness of a piness of group in either of two ways. First, it can be thought of as some more or less simple aggregate of the happiness of the individuals, just as one can speak of a city as or as 'glori ifmany individual citizens are wealthy 'wealthy' one can think of ous' if many citizens are glorious. Second, constituent

'happiness' gets added grounds for public action.12 We can speak then of individual

22 HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

the happiness ducible. That

of a group city as 'wealthy,' meaning by that to designate a high level of public wealth even if all the individuals are poor; or of a city

of the group as something that is not thus re is, we can construe speaking of the 'happiness' in analogy to the cases in which we speak of a

as 'glorious' if its armies or football teams defeat, by virtue of their extreme discipline and coordination, all comers even is particularly (or, if though no individual member glorious an individual has derives from the glory of the any glory rather than the other way around). army or team as a whole This still, to be sure, leaves open the question of just what either in the individual or in the group 'happiness' means case. I wish happiness: sire-relative to distinguish First, externalist families of conceptions or objectivist views, second, and finally, overall-assessment views. three the most of de

views, To the modern temperament,

externalist or objectivist conceptions ist ones which start with some notion

forms of convincing of happiness are natural of basic forms of mini

mally healthy or especially vibrant or vigorous functioning of human being, and then go on to define happiness as the exer in a minimally cise of these functions viable or an especially vibrant counts as the healthy, robust and vigorous way. What of an individual is in principle independent of the functioning of that indi shifting beliefs, desires, feelings, and opinions A human be not in a vigorous way who was functioning to know that and to feel pleased, but this likely it was, the invariably be the case and even when

vidual. would might feeling

be secondary to the function and knowledge would consist not in being pleased but in would ing.13 Being happy able to work and reproduce, etc. being well fed, fully mobile, The views of Plato and Aristotle are most naturally construed as having this structure. To move now from the individual to the collective case, we have seen how Plato's theory seems to in principle be posit a functioning of the whole which would from functioning of the individuals. Despite our disin which clination to take seriously the ideological metaphysics and the Aristotelian the Platonic view, there is underpins distinct

Raymond

Geuss

23

to be said for thinking of a society as a continuing that lasts potentially enterprise beyond the lifetime of any individual and for countenancing it as a distinct level of given something some concep functioning having its own integrity. Without tion like this, albeit a non-metaphysical one, it is very hard to see how we could even begin to think about, for instance, our relations to future generations. seems to play a Such an objective conception of happiness state. Indi role in some versions of the theory of the welfare vidual happiness may be connected with idiosyncratic forms of private enjoyment and may thus be both unpredictable and an inappropriate object of governmental action, but pub means providing some objectively lic happiness specifiable set of accessible resources and services to all members of the so defined ciety so as to ensure that each has at least a minimally standard of living: health care, food, shelter.^ There is no need to be philistine about what this comprises; it can include an established church with tional radio service that broadcasts public picture galleries, psychic and emotional services, a na of concerts, performances and the satisfaction of various human needs, as long as these can be shown extensive pastoral

to be objectively for human flourishing. As noted necessary on an objectivist view it need not invariably be the above, case that successful was attended functioning by enjoy ment?some not enjoy being healthy, perverse people might but even so, health could retain its standing as a constituent of public happiness?but this is compatible with there being an important range of aspects of human life in which know and ing that the function was being successfully performed enjoying itwas an integral part. Itwould then be an objective truth about our nature that in some areas we needed forms of this kind of self-awareness and self activity that permitted affirmation. This can still be an 'objective' conception if one thinks that it is true that one must have some kind of self affirmation The (in order to function in a healthy way) independ ent of whether one knows that this is the case or not.15 second family of conceptions of happiness start from

24 HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

the idea that we to move me

humans

are creatures

of desire.

These

de

sires are real internal

states of some kind, that have a power to do things in the world, although not neces

might be very self-controlled sarily an irresistible power?I are also or in the grip of another stronger desire. Desires no relation to my highly variable and shifting, may stand in basic constrained and are not necessarily functioning, directed at any natural object.16 When by being I am hungry and eat, I can be said to be happy in a perhaps sense. I am happy, however, rather debased and rudimentary forms of human this is a natural function which

I am performing but because at that moment eating was what I desired to do. as satisfaction of these de should be understood Happiness to have no relation even if they happen, as they might, sires, not because man imperatives of the hu Imay desire things that in the short or body am happy must long run are not good for me. To say that I to do with my getting these de essentially have something needs and soul. sires that I have to the basic or the functional

or not that is even com satisfied, whether with my physical well being. patible to experience?it be Desire itself is uncomfortable might as oddly, indirectly, or per various other things too, such versely satisfying, but this is in addition to being uncomfort and religious figures able. As various philosophers, moralists, a desire is satisfied, another one will when have emphasized,^ arise and follow nature of human on the heels of the first immediately. It is the life that it is composed of desires that come

satis and go, and the very idea of an absolute show-stopping sense. The idea of having all faction of desire doesn't make satisfied is the idea of not having any un desires maximally fulfilled desire, and that is very like the idea of being dead.18 As if this were not enough, many have argued that there is a truly and fully happy life and a one. A happy life is not sufficiently charac merely contented terized as one inwhich given desires are maximally satisfied, but must have a certain minimal richness, variety, complex a distinction between ity, novelty, and intensity. Thus some would say that a person

Raymond

Geuss

25

with

an exceptionally is low level of desire and aspiration less happy than a person with more complex and demanding desires, even ifmore of the first person's desires were in fact that a fully happy human in part to developing If human powers. of new desires will be an this is the case then the generation satisfied. life must Some have be devoted that a cer integral part of the happy life,1? and that means tain amount of non-satisfaction will have to be part of a fully happy life, since 'new' desires will by their very nature be ones I have not yet been able to satisfy. If this is the case, in the pursuit of happiness might seem to require us to move two incompatible at once: toward maximal directions satis set of desires we satisfiable of the desires we have, have evolved new desires. and toward going beyond the in the direction of as yet un even claimed

faction

con There is a degenerate form of the idea that happiness sists in satisfaction of desires which has played an important role in much recent social theory.20 This approach identifies satisfaction where what trolled There ences certain satisfaction of one's preferences, are taken to mean articulated wants, i.e., 'preferences' you say you want or what your behavior in highly con indicates you want. (such as betting) be all sorts of good reasons to prefer prefer might to desires as the basic entities with which to work in conditions areas of life and politics?for a start, desires are fre and for vari unfocused, of desires with

quently deeply buried, ill-formed, ous reasons not fully and clearly or even articulated on the other hand, are epistemically articulable; preferences, accessible and well defined in a way desires are not. One can thus work success or easily, use them to evaluate the etc. failure of various government programs, it is also precisely this relative clarity and precision with as the final objects relative them inappropriate think about such things as human happiness. to them more

However, that makes which whole we

reason for which people could object to the One major is a difficulty in the very idea ideal of public happiness that there is anything at the collective level that could be suffi

26 HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

ciently

like a human

individual

as locus of desire

for one

to

speak in a clear and coherent way about those collective de seem to be sires being satisfied. The best one could get would some version 'degenerate' The third kind of conception takes it to con of happiness sist not in the satisfaction of my desires, but in some form of I am happy if I find my life worthy of ap self-approval. analogue to what I have called the a social welfare form of happiness, function.21 of a collective

is at issue here is an at proval as a life for me to live.22What titude or a judgement. This sense of 'happiness' is clearly the case that I distinct from the previous two. It is obviously need not approve of healthy human functioning?lots of re must I approve of what I in fact ascetics do not?nor ligious addicted smokers dis desire, even ineluctably desire?many that the judgement life not, as a matter of fact, to be completely disjoint from the rhythm of origi will be more of desire?I nation and satisfaction likely to make a positive judgement about my life and say that I am if I have just satisfied a pressing desire than if I keenly happy, feel an unfulfilled desire. This suggests that our attitude or judgement about our lives might be as shifting and unstable are. The characteristic as our desires (and their satisfaction) view ought whole of ancient seems to have been that one philosophers to try to find a stable attitude toward one's life as a is based on a correct assessment of it.23 This which approve of smoking. One might expect and attitude one has toward one's own

a standpoint from that I have at my disposal presupposes even if only in recollec I can see my life as a whole, which tion and imagination, and moreover that I have it in my illusion, to see it as power to see my life clearly and without ancient philosophers, Stoic it really is. Many especially seem to have believed that, particularly with a philosophers, bit of training and reflection, one can learn to retain such an attitude, ablingly pher who claimed to be happy even while being because he knew he had given his life an overall in the presence insistent unsatisfied desire?like even when of an otherwise the ancient dis philoso tortured, shape of

Raymond

Geuss

27

which

he was right to approve. Modern people are perhaps I may well never settle less sanguine about this possibility. into a fixed judgement on my life as a whole, or Imay not be able to attain fixity of judgement until it is too late for it to to not everyone may be in a position or perhaps I should sayMandarin, atti adopt he thought tude of Chou En-lai, who, when asked whether had been a good or a bad thing, fa the French Revolution By extension, the Olympian,

matter.

mously replied that itwas too early to tell. If the account I have given above is approximately correct, do not look encour the prospects for individual happiness aging: We no longer accept the natural teleology that under wrote the objectivist the complete satisfaction of approach, is radically unstable and even, to put it paradoxically, desire as a general human goal because inherently unsatisfactory of a given desire will give rise to a new de any satisfaction sire. Finally, we are no longer so sure we will be able to come assessment to a single, stable evaluative of our lives as a less to one that has some property of 'truth.' whole, much What kind of happiness then is at issue in the politics 'new' European idea? Could a politics guided by Saint-Just's directed In his Saint-Just says that by passing the decrees France will show Europe that to tolerate "even one unfortunate it is no longer willing (mal or oppressor" on French territory.24 It is perhaps not heureux) fanciful to see these two terms as designating completely of the 'happiness' Saint-Just slightly different dimensions goes on to laud. On the one hand, the succoring of individ a program of public ual need takes its natural place within the maintenance of happiness which takes this to presuppose, the minimal welfare of all individuals in the society. From the cannot effectively undertake the in fact that the government coherent task of rendering people positively happy by maxi mizing the satisfaction of their desires, it by no means follows that it cannot taining minimal sensibly prevent distinct standards of living. The 'malheur9 by main second dimension of ever hope to be successful? at happiness in favor of the Vent?se Decrees, speech

28 HAPPINESS AND POLITICS

'happiness' refers to the absence of 'oppression.' 'Oppression' is conceptually distinct from poverty. It seems but a step from as to democracy, the project of the elimination of oppression a political system in which equal citizens rule themselves. In itsworst incarnations, be conceived as having 'poverty' might an almost purely naturalist component even by people who to give great weight to the variability of human and the autonomy of human desire. Whatever public are, we is, and no matter what people's opinions happiness is not compatible think that public happiness with might beliefs gross malnutrition Public happiness among large segments of the population. as absence of oppression seems to fit most into the third of my three families of conceptions of are inclined

easily happiness. That means that there must be a clear social locus or position or standpoint from which some general judgement can be made, which will be like about the society as a whole the judgement the individual was about his or her life as a whole. supposed to be able to make There must be a voice that

or a clear so gives this judgement or assessment embodiment is cial agent who can adopt the relevant attitude. If happiness of poverty and of oppression, then there must be no absence formed a moderately stable that no oppression exists. If, when judgement is at issue is my happiness, then I am the final judge of what so similarly when what is at issue is 'our' collective hap that, 'we' should make the final assessment of that. Who, piness, poverty has to have to the effect though, is 'we'? To say that 'we' should be 'everyone' is no an swer to the question the is precisely because that question question of who speaks for everyone, or instance is 'our' real voice? There are three candidates structure which that is,what real agency first is the and someone

for this honor. The

governmental for 'us all.' In a democracy that is presumably The Parliament,

is the designated official like that of contemporary

speaker Britain

or the Queen-in-Parlia

ment, or perhaps the Cabinet, that is, nowadays effectively the will speak for us when Prime Minister. they speak in They all the established rules cor their official capacity following

Raymond

Geuss

29

a system is functioning prop rectly. Itmight seem that if such itwill instantiate a very quick and straightforward way of erly to human happiness via a direct con from democracy moving will by their very nature be happy ceptual link. Democracies can polities in the most significant of the senses of 'happy' that of concern to politics. After all, one might argue, a democ be the society racy is by definition a system in which whatever does Ifwhat collec by its members. much as it can de life people have depends?as tive political what they themselves decide, pend on any human agency?on in a democracy have the best chance to live a col they surely is the result of a decision

lective life of which they will approve. In such a system, if it no individual 'oppressors' like Louis Capet, there are works, or the members of the French aristocracy. I think one should resist this shortcut because tween democracy political mechanism.25 there is an important difference be as ideal and as the designation of any real

To speak of democracy as an ideal is to 'the people have the of a political system in which speak it power.' In the ancient world of small direct democracies, to see what was being was perhaps relatively unproblematic meant were by saying made, were decisions that the people ruled: whatever an assembly which in principle made by could attend, and which many people did regularly at

anyone tend. In contrast, to speak of any real modern representative is to engage in rule as a democracy system of parliamentary an extremely contestable form of theoretical interpretation of in its everyday the system functions is going on when elections by themselves Do multi-party (or, for that way.26 in conjunction with any specifiable further set of real matter, what political are ones institutions) ensure that societies inwhich they exist in which the people rule? Does Tony Blair necessar

us and the rest of ily speak for me when he repeatedly gives to understand that Britain under New Labor is a the world admirable society? I submit that a moment's happy, morally on these questions will incline the thought serious reflection ful toward The second a negative answer to it. for the position candidate of vox societatis is

30 HAPPINESS

AND

POLITICS

'public opinion.' This seems to me a totally hopeless choice. can is exceedingly Public opinion fragile and its utterances be very indistinct: more if the official political importantly, structures do not reflect my views about whether the life we are leading isworthy of approbation, why should I have any more reason to expect public opinion always to do so? is the voice of the people speaking di The third possibility riot, lynching, po or alternatively in grom, eventually to see the vivid expressions of approval?torchlight parades celebrations of sporting troops off to the front, spontaneous etc. Here again if not literally everyone is out on victories, rectly that there are two sides to this the streets, that will mean there will not be an obviously story, and thus privileged po sition from which to make a definitive judgement. Even when the voice sage may extremely is strong, direct, and virtually unanimous, the mes be indistinct, and the transmission will usually be intermittent. if raucously in civil disturbance, civil war or revolution,

raises the ideological stakes and human expec Democracy without tations, necessarily commensurately increasing our to satisfy our desires, or to adopt a positive attitude ability toward our life as a whole. that which I might find it more some someone It is a standard galling collective liberal sentiment^ a situation in to tolerate

attitude effectively own life and my assessment of my in which money, uation resources, or services are straight forwardly extorted from me by an individual oppressor who makes

else, defining what

is institution, political am to have toward my I own happiness than a sit

no claims to be contributing to my happiness. This views about the invio be a relict of Christian may religious to have a firm lability of the soul, but it is one that continues hold on the minds in theWest. Under what circum of many stances do I experience a 'democratic' decision inwhich I be as a decision of 'someone else'? to a defeated minority long

a question of capital importance for any is obviously and one the answer to which will depend on a democracy are probably extra wide variety of factors, many of which This

Raymond

Geuss

31

political derlines

and few of which the need which

are at all well

understood.

It un

text within

possible takes place. politics The story has been told many times how, as he was to be guillotined, Saint-Just pointed to the Declaration of Man and of the Citizen and I was

to take the widest

view of the con led out of the of the did

Rights

inscribed on the wall

said: "After all, Conciergerie, In the debates that preceded that."2-8 Constitution of 1793, Saint-Just was the Convention

the one who

the promulgation of the took the view that the task

confronting simple: "If you want a re attach yourself to the people and act only for it. The public, is simple. Happiness is no further away form of its happiness than from the private person."xv Saint-Just ob from peoples viously suggest simistic one. NOTES
is a slightly expanded version of a talk I gave at a conference to in April 2002 in Kyoto. Iwish and Human "Democracy Happiness" thank the sponsors of this Conference, the Institute for the Integrated Study This paper Generations to Kyoto. est une Duval Emmerich, Sonenscher "Le but de id?e neuve (Paris en Europe" 1984), 715. ?d. Michel Zeev in Oeuvres de Compl?tes I am particularly indebted Lawrence Hamilton, Istvan of the topic le bonheur of this paper. commun." The and its President, Prof. Tae-Chang Kim for the kind invitation

took this to be an optimistic thought. I have tried to here that it can equally be taken as a rather pes

on

of Future

1. "Le bonheur Saint-Just, to John Dunn, Hont, 2. Article documents

and Michael

Hilary Gaskin, for discussions toute soci?t? est

One, show a parallel

use of

'bonheur

de tous' and Nj

'bonheur

publique.'

3. S. Hampshire,

Justice

is Conflict a view

(Princeton, of

1999). has been

if one 4. Particularly developed by Nietzsche tinction Nietzsche's 5. An though between

takes

and Wittgenstein literal and metaphorical und L?ge taken

"?ber Wahrheit example the word

the dis de-emphasize in usage. This is clearest perhaps in einem au?ermoralischen Sinne." Pindar, Isthmia 7, line 1 (al

language and which

like that which

virtually is u?Kap

at random: not e??aiuxov).

there

6. Aristotle does not, of course, have at his disposal the modern termi so what he says is that the of 'meaning,' of the city is the nology happiness same as that of the individual. 7. The conjunction of happiness and wealth is presumably not coinci

32 HAPPINESS AND POLITICS

dental.

The

word

which

does (euoaiuwv) 'happy' it is paired with another of 'wealthy, 8. Plato's differences prosperous' response between

as the canonical one for gets established occur in Homer, it does first appear but when seems to retain a strong connotation word which et dies 826). (???ioc, Hesiod, Opera later not objection to claim is to emphasize that although the natural they are not

to this apparent individuals and

to be expected they are as happy as they can reasonably happy simpliciter, is then further developed in the be (given their natural This endowments). of the metals in the Pla of the most doctrines (415)?one myth repellent tonic corpus. with a deter compatible the particular beneficia 9. Public defense on these grounds is, of course, to see to it that one's own partisans were mination ries of the proposed policy. 10. Aeneid n. 1.8-11, 12.435-36, etc.

is the only goal of the revo does not claim that happiness Saint-Just include and fraternity; also lution. Other liberty, equality, goals would on in the discourse for instance, and glory virtue, (as mentioned, frugality, of the army, Oeuvres the reorganization [note 1], 412). Compl?tes 12. See A. Hirschman, 1992), 105-7. reference in The to Aristotle, Philosophical see Re Rival Views of Market Society (Cambridge, ma

of this with 13. For further discussion special "Two Conceptions of Happiness" Richard Kraut, view 88 (1979), 167-97.

as one that will be a universal be presented distri 14. That the provision to all?or bution of equal benefits that North American fata morgana not a matter of any logical necessity, for all'?is but 'equal opportunity a fact about what seems merely stances where notions of equality ded. 15. This was 16. Hobbes the view gives that viable under modern politically have become ideologically deeply circum embed

of the early Marx.

the most early modern perhaps striking theory of a to an antecedent is in no way form of desire subordinated good, see Leviathan, whether real or apparent, 6, 11. chapters 17. In particular hauer. Buddhists, and, among Western philosophers, Schopen

bridge,

18. Jonathan Lear, Happiness, MA 2000).

Death,

and

the Remainder

of Life

(Cam

von Humboldt, Ideen 19. See Wilhelm des Staates zu bestimmen der Wirksamkeit conveniently 20. Classic Pure in Reclam: works Stuttgart 1967).

zu einem (originally

Versuch, 1792-95,

die Grenzen now most

on the P. Samuelson, "A Note in Econ?mica, N.S. 5 (1938), Theory K. Arrow, and Individual Values Social Choice 19 51), (New York 61-71, Choice and Social Welfare and A. Sen, Collective (San Francisco 1970). in this tradition include: of Consumers' Behaviour" 21. To pursue this further would require discussion of Nietzsche's view of

Raymond

Geuss

33

the Dionysian by Durkheim, 22. To necessarily tinguish

Freud,

in Geburt der Trag?die), (especially and Castoriadis.

and

subsequent

accounts

of approval judge that a life isworthy to judge that it is worthy simpliciter, between 'happy' and 'good.'

as a life for me to live is not so it is still possible to dis

Ethica Nicomachea 23. Aristotle, 109909-1101321, 1098316-17, The modern seems to have been most who inter H77b24~26. philosopher ested in this issue is the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit (see especially ? S 46-60). 24. "Que l'Europe apprenne que vous ne voulez plus un malheureux un oppresseur . . .," Oeuvres sur le territoire fran?ais (note Compl?tes I have translated 'unfortunate' 715. The word above, 'malheureux,' course, means 'unhappy.' and Illusion in Politics Socialism (Cambridge 2001), 110-28. (New York 25. See my History 26. See J. Schumpeter, 1950), esp. part 4. to the specific reference "Two Concepts of Lib ni 1), of

Capitalism,

and Democracy

its classic formulation, 27. Given although with concept of 'liberty,' not 'happiness' by Isaiah Berlin, erty," Pour Essay on Liberty (Oxford 1963). 28.

Marx-Engels Just's

"C'est pourtant moi qui ai fait cela." K. Marx, Die Heilige in Familie Werke "Saint (Berlin 1980) vol. 2, 129. See also B. Williams, Sense of Humanity Illusion," Making (Cambridge 1995).

la r?publique, au peuple, et ne faites 29. "5/ vous voulez attachez-vous rien que pour lui. La forme de son bonheur est simple, et le bonheur n'est loin des peuples loin de l'homme in Oeuvres pas plus qu'il n'est priv?" Compl?tes (note 1), 423.