Irzik and Grünberg 1995

The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies? Author(s): Grol Irzik and Teo Grnberg Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 285307 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/687658 . Accessed: 03/12/2012 07:44
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Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 46 (1995), 285-307
Arch
Kuhn: Allies? or Close Enemies GiurolIrzik and Teo Grtinberg
Carnap
and
ABSTRACT and We compareCarnap's Kuhn'sviewson science.Althoughthereareimportant are betweenthem,the similarities striking.The basisfor the latteris a differences conventionalist orientedsemantic pictureof science,whichsuggests pragmatically that the view that post-positivistphilosophy of science constitutesa radical revolutionwhich has no interestingaffinitieswith logical positivismmust be mistaken. seriously 1 2 3 4 5 6 Introduction Linguisticframeworks and scientific theories Semantic holism in Carnap in Semantic incommensurability Carnap revolutionsaccording to Carnap Scientific Paradigms, lexicons, and scientific revolutions 6.1 Paradigms 6.2 Lexicons 6.3 Scientific revolutions 7 Status of language change and theory change 8 Logical syntax as metaperspective? 9 Concludingremarks
1 Introduction
Although the popular myth has it that Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn are philosophical arch enemies, it is becoming more and more clear that they are in fact close allies. Carnap's positive reception of The Structureof Scientific Revolutionshas been documented by Reisch [1991] who has also remarked that Kuhn's normal science corresponds to activity within Carnapian scientific language and that scientific revolution as a Kuhnian paradigm shift is similar to the transition from one Carnapian scientific language to another. Friedman [1991, 1992, 1993] has convincingly argued against the view that Carnap's and logical positivists' philosophy is a naive form of foundationalist empiricism blind to historical developments in the sciences. Earman [1993] has drawn attention both to some striking
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similarities and important differences between Carnap and Kuhn. The similarities include the thesis of incommensurability in the sense of untranslatability and the rejection of language-independent neutral facts. The differences Earman cites are Kuhn's adherence to a form of semantic holism which cannot be found in any of Carnap's writings, the conspicuous absence of degree of confirmation among Kuhn's criteria for theory-choice, and Carnap's view that scientific theories are not chosen or accepted but only rendered probable. Very recently, Kuhn himself contributed to this discussion by emphasizing a 'deep difference' between Carnap's and his own position. Commenting on Carnap's untranslatability thesis, he wrote: But, if I understandCarnap's position correctly, the cognitive importanceof languagechange was for him merelypragmatic.[1] One languagemight permitstatements that could not be translated into another,but anythingproperly classified scientific as knowledge could be both stated and scrutinized either language,using the in samemethodand gainingthe sameresult... [2]Language changeis for cognitively significant me as it was not for Carnap(Kuhn[1993b], pp. 313-14). In this paper we shall present a systematic, though by no means comprehensive comparison of Carnap's and Kuhn's views. We firmly believe, on the one hand, that the similarities go well beyond those already pointed out and, on the other hand, that there are other differences which are gone unnoticed. Reisch's analogy depends on treating theories as languages or linguistic frameworks. But in Carnap's view scientific theories are not identical with linguistic frameworks, although every scientific theory has of course its own linguistic framework. We shall argue that (i) Carnap's linguistic frameworks function like Kuhn's lexical structures, (ii) Carnap's scientific theories both surprisingly resemble and at the same time diverge from Kuhn's paradigms in certain respects, and (iii) Carnap's and Kuhn's characterizations of scientific revolutions are nearly identical given the similarities in the first two points. Sections 2, 5, and 6 are devoted to these issues. We disagree with Earman in that a holist account of meaning can be traced to Carnap's post-Aufbau writings. To be sure, Carnap does hold the thesis of semantic incommensurability as Earman points out, but that thesis makes sense and becomes an integral part of Carnap's philosophy only if it is coupled with his semantic holism. We also show that in Carnap's writings one can find the view that meanings of observation terms are partially theory-laden. Theory-ladenness further strengthens Carnap's incommensurability thesis. We will defend our claims in Sections 3 and 4.
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As for Kuhn's own assessment of the similarities and differences between Carnap and himself, we argue that Kuhn is wrong in his interpretation of Carnap's untranslatability thesis (his claim in [1]). With regard to the issue of cognitive/epistemic significance, we note that Kuhn uses the term in several senses. In its usual sense Carnap and Kuhn agree: language change is pragmatic since it does not involve truth or probability attribution. But Kuhn uses his notion of structured lexicon in two other, related senses: constitutive of possible experience and constitutive of science and scientific rationality. It is in these senses Kuhn endorses the view that language change as well as the criteria for evaluating it are cognitively significant. As we shall see, the disagreement between Carnap and Kuhn in this respect is partly real, partly semantic. We will argue for these points in Sections 7 and 8.
2 Linguistic frameworks and scientific theories

According to Carnap, a linguistic framework or language form L is characterized by syntactical and semantical rules (see [1958b] and [1963b], pp. 900-1 & 923). The most important syntactical rules are rules of formation which define what it is to be a sentence of L, and rules of transformation which define what it is to be a consequence of another in L. Semantical rules, on the other hand, include rules for truth-conditions for the sentences of L, rules of designation which specify the relations between the terms of L and their designata, and meaning postulates which express the logical meaning dependencies that hold between the meanings of the primitive descriptive terms of L. A fundamental distinction and a related principle encapsulate Carnap's philosophical attitude towards language forms. Carnap sharply distinguishes between questions of reality and existence, internal and external to a linguistic framework. Internal questions have theoretical answers which can be justified on the basis of the rules of the framework. External questions, on the other hand, raise the problem of reality of entities prior to the endorsement of any linguistic framework. The external questions (or answers) make sense only when they are construed as questions (or proposals) about the adoption or rejection of a linguistic framework as a whole and as such fall under the scope of Carnap's principle of tolerance: 'We have in every respect complete liberty with regard to the forms of language' ([1934/1937], p. xv), and 'Every one is free to choose the rules of his language and thereby his logic in any way he wishes' ([1963a], p. 55). For example, the decision to use the thing language is not a cognitive, but merely a practical decision motivated by theoretical factors like simplicity, efficiency, and fruitfulness. These factors are theoretical in the sense that there is a fact of
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the matter, decidable by our experiences, concerning the question whether the thing language is simpler or more efficient than, say, the phenomenalist language. Nevertheless, the decision to employ this or that language is not cognitive because these factors do not constitute confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world, nor do they allow for truth-attribution to claims of reality (see Carnap [1958b], p. 208). In short, external questions have only pragmatically (or in Carnap's terminology, practically) justifiable conventional answers. This is the essence of Carnap's pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalism. The conventionality of the answers is semantic because they are about the choice of a linguistic framework; it is pragmatically oriented because the answers can be justified only by considerations indicated above, which do not provide confirming evidence for the reality of entities that the framework talks about. This implies that there is no one correct linguistic framework, so the choice between them is not epistemic but pragmatic. Let us now look at Carnap's characterization of scientific theories. As is well known, Carnap divides the language of a scientific theory into two parts, the observation language and the theoretical language, and takes a theory to be the conjunction of theoretical postulates T and correspondence rules C-for short, TC. Theoretical postulates express the fundamental laws about a certain domain of phenomena and contain as descriptive terms only theoretical ones which belong to the theoretical language. Correspondence rules, on the other hand, are 'mixed sentences' which contain at least one observation term coming from the observation language and one theoretical term. In conjunction with the theoretical postulates, they partially interpret the theoretical terms of the theory and facilitate its application to phenomena by permitting the derivation of observation sentences. Having briefly summarized Carnap's conception of scientific theories and linguistic frameworks separately, we now consider the relationship between the two. Obviously, every scientific theory must be formulated in some linguistic framework. Since Carnap believed that it is essential to distinguish between the theoretical and observation languages and consequently to bifurcate the descriptive terms of a theory into two classes accordingly, the linguistic framework of the theory must be constructed under the constraint of this bifurcation. Assuming the usual formal machinery necessary to carry out logical and mathematical inferences, one needs to specify the syntactical and semantical rules for both observational and theoretical primitive descriptive terms. The syntactical rules may be left aside for they are not interesting for our purposes. The most important semantical rules are, first, those that interpret the observation terms as directly referring to observable properties of things or the
Enemies or Allies? Carnap and Kuhn.-
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observable relations between them, and, second, those that express meaning postulates both for observation and theoretical terms. Thus, the term 'red' gets part of its meaning from meaning postulates like 'Colours green and red cannot occur simultaneously at the same place' and the term 'warm' from postulates like 'For any x and y, if x is warmer than y, then y cannot be warmer than x'. The formulation of the meaning postulates for theoretical terms, on the other hand, turned out to be much more difficult, and Carnap finally settled for the conditional sentence RTC D TC, where RTC is the Ramsey sentence of TC.1 (See [1963b], pp. 963-66 and [1966], Ch. 28). In addition to the syntactical and semantical rules, the linguistic framework of a scientific theory must also include methodological rules which determine the conditions under which hypotheses within the theory can be tested, confirmed, and disconfirmed. That Carnap gave enormous importance to the articulation of these rules is evident from his studies on inductive logic. With the specification of the methodological rules the construction of the linguistic framework of a theory is completed.
3 Semantic holism in Carnap

By semantic holism we mean the doctrine that the theoretical postulates of a theory contribute to the meaning of theoretical terms occurring in them and that a change in the theoretical postulates results in a change in meaning. Contrary to Earman, we claim that Carnap is a semantic holist in this sense. Speaking of the postulates of theories like classical electromagnetism and quantum mechanics, Carnap notes that 'In the context of such a theory, in contrast to empirical generalizations, the very meaning of the theoretical terms is dependent on postulates' ([1968], pp. 148; our emphasis). Carnap's notion of partial interpretation provides clear and rigorous evidence for his (and our) claim. According to Carnap, theoretical terms of a theory get their partial meaning or interpretation from the conjunction of T and C, nothing else: In contrast,the meaningsof the theoretical termsof Vt generally go However,a partialinterpretation beyondwhatis directlyobservable. of the theoretical termsand of the sentencesof L containingthemis providedby the following two kinds of postulates:the theoretical postulates . . . and the correspondence postulates . . (Carnap [1963b], 959). p.
Let tl,..., tn be the theoretical terms of a theory TC. Then TC has the form TC(tl,..., tn). The Ramsey sentence of TC is the statement 3 x ... 3 xnTC(xl,..., Xn) where xl,..., Xn are variables of the same type as tl,...,tn respectively, and TC(xl,...,xn) results from substituting in TC(tl,...,tn) the variables xl,...,xn for the terms tl,...,tn respectively.
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Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg a Lateron I considered methodwhichwas alreadyused in science, in theoretical of especially physics,namelytheintroduction 'theoretical rules, concepts'throughtheoretical postulatesand correspondence the characterof these and investigated logical and methodological concepts(Carnap[1928/1969], viii-ix; our emphasis). pp.
Theoretical postulates serve two different functions. To the extent they are interpreted by correspondence rules that connect them to the observation terms, they serve for the assertion of factual relations. But they are also vehicles for introducing theoretical terms and partially interpreting them. Carnap explicitly acknowledges their double function: In contrastto the O-terms, T-terms not fullyinterpreted. the are They haveonly as muchinterpretation is attributed themthroughthe as to postulateTC but these postulateshave a doublefunction.They not to of only contribute the determination the meaningsof the T-terms but they also set forth the factual content of the theory (Carnap [1958/1975], 82). p. That correspondence rules play a double role is well known: by relating the theoretical terms to the observation terms they both help the derivation of observation sentences (and thus serve a factual function) and partially specify the meaning of theoretical terms (and thus serve a semantic function). What is not so well known is that theoretical postulates also have this dual role. Nobody denies their factual function. The question is whether they have a semantic role as well. In his [1956] Carnap makes clear that it is not necessary to have a correspondence rule for each theoretical term. So some theoretical terms are left without being directly interpreted by the correspondence rules. How then do such terms acquire meaning? The answer is through the theoretical postulates which relate them to other theoretical terms which are interpretedby the correspondence rules. Hence the semantic function of the theoretical postulates (see Carnap [1956], p. 48). What may have prevented Carnap readersfrom recognizing the doctrine of semantic holism in his works is his firm commitment to the analyticsynthetic distinction. Because every meaningful sentence is either analytic or synthetic, one may think that theoretical postulates cannot have a semantic and factual function simultaneously. Since their factual function is obvious, it seems natural to deny their semantic function. But the fact is theoretical postulates can be synthetic and yet play a double role. The reason is this: Carnap has proposed to split a theory TC into two components, RCTCD TC and RTC, where RTC represents the observational content of the theory and RTC D TC represents the meaning postulate for the theoretical terms. If one agrees with this proposal, physical postulate(s) T is clearly synthetic since it is not entailed by the
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meaning postulate RTC D TC, but it is entailed by the conjunction (RTC D TC). RTC, which is equivalent to TC. This means that T has both a semantic and a factual function; the former is expressed by the first conjunct, the latter by the second. Without semantic holism we can neither fully understand Carnap's views on scientific revolutions nor make sense of his thesis of semantic incommensurability.
4 Semantic incommensurability Carnap in

That Carnap held the thesis of semantic incommensurability may surprise most readers. After all, that thesis is regarded as one of the hallmarks of the post-positivist philosophy of science. Nevertheless, there is no doubt about Carnap's endorsement of it: In translatingone languageinto anotherthe factualcontent of an empiricalstatementcannot always be preservedunchanged.Such if of changesare inevitable the structures the two languagesdifferin essential respects.For example:while many statementsof modern physics are completely translatableinto statements of classical so The physics, this is not so or incompletely with otherstatements. latter situation arises when the statement in question contains or which simply concepts(like, e.g., 'wave-function' 'quantization') do not occurin classicalphysics;the essential point beingthat these includedsince they presupposea concepts cannot be subsequently language form of (Carnap [1936/1949], 126;ouremphasis). p. different The semantic incommensurability as untranslatability expressed in this passage, we believe, captures the gist of what Kuhn's later writings have emphasized as 'local meaning incommensurability': 'The claim that two theories are incommensurable is then the claim that there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into which both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or loss' (Kuhn [1983a],p. 670). The thesis of semantic incommensurability is a direct consequence of Carnap's semantic holism. For if the meanings of certain theoretical terms are determined (no matter how partially) by the theoretical postulates in which they occur, changing those postulates necessarily change the terms' meanings, so it becomes impossible to translate sentences containing such terms from one theory into another without residue. Consequently, to the extent the theoretical postulates of, say, Newton's and Einstein's theories differ, terms like 'mass' will not have the same meaning. Needless to say, this was exactly Kuhn's point in his Structure(cf. Kuhn [1970], pp. 101-2). An objection might be that even if we take Carnap's incommensurability thesis seriously with respect to theoretical sentences, it does not apply to
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observation sentences because the meanings of the latter are fixed independently of the former. Being an empiricist, the objection goes, Carnap believes that observation sentences directly acquire meaning from facts of pure observation free from the infusion of theory. But if so, the meaning of observation terms, and afortiori of observation sentences, does not change from one theory to another. A neutral observation language leaves no room for serious semantic incommensurability. This objection would have been valid if Carnap had actually held the view attributed to him concerning the meanings of observation terms. But in fact Carnap did believe that they are partially theory-laden. To begin with, Carnap nowhere says that the entire meaning of an observation term is given ostensively by sense-experience or observation. Such a view is more Humean than Carnapian. What Carnap does say is that (i) the observational sentences of a language are imagined or presupposed to be completely understood by its users in the same way, and that (ii) the observation terms are interpreted to refer to the observable properties of things or the relations between them (Carnap [1956], pp. 40-1; [1963a], p. 78). (i) seems to be a mere proposal about the construction of the observation language rather than a fact. It just says: let us assume that the meanings of observation sentences are nonproblematic in the language community. This proposal, of course, may have been motivated by the fact that such sentences are more quickly decidable than theoretical ones, but that does not affect our point (cf. Carnap [1936/1953], pp. 63-4). (ii) is a semantical rule which indicates the references of terms like 'red', 'hot', 'warmer than', etc. Because it fixes extension rather than intension, it does not suffice to specify meanings in the strict sense (Carnap [1958a], Sections 4 and 45). That not all of the meaning of an observation term is acquired through observation is evident from the fact that meaning postulates contribute to its meaning as well. Thus, as we saw, 'red' gets part of its meaning from postulates like 'Red is a colour' and 'What is red all over is not green'. More importantly, theories also are partially responsible for the meanings of such terms. Here is how. Carnap's physicalism asserts that every protocol sentence expressing the content of an experience can be translated into the physical language with the help of certain laws such that the two sentences have the same meaning (Carnap [1932/1934], p. 93; [1935], p. 95). Thus, 'a note of such and such pitch and intensity' in one language becomes 'material oscillations with such and such frequency and amplitude' in another. Similarly, 'red' means not a mental disposition to certain stimulus but the physical property of an object, described by the reflection of light of a certain wavelength. Couple this physicalism with the view that two sentences share a common content if one can be inferred from the
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other (Carnap [1932/1934], p. 91; [1935];pp. 57-8). To the extent that such inferences presuppose the laws of currently accepted theories, what we get is no less than the theory-dependence of the meanings of observation terms.2 (See also Oberdan [1990], especially pp. 27 and 34.) We thus see that three crucial theses-semantic incommensurability, semantic holism, and theory-ladenness of the meaning of observation terms-which are attributed to post-positivists exclusively were actually held by Carnap and form a coherentunity in his maturephilosophy. Without semantic holism semanticincommensurabilitywould be groundless;without theory-ladenness it would be severely restricted to the theoretical terms. This is not the place to trace the origins of Carnap's maturation in detail, but it is worth noting that it is the natural consequence of the 'liberalization process' which he began circa 1932. In barest outline, it goes something like this. First, verification is replaced by confirmation which is always a matter of degree. Thus, there is no such thing as conclusive verification or complete confirmation. Second, although Carnap had entertained the idea of an infallible protocol in The Unity of Science, he soon gave it up for the view that the confirmation of even an observation sentence can never be complete in the sense that, no matter how large is the number of confirming observations, it may be false. Because observation sentences are fallible, they are naturally revisable; sometimes their revision may be affected by theoretical considerations. Therefore, all observational sentences are theory-dependent in the sense that they can be revised by theory. This means that Carnap's mature philosophy rejects the idea of science based on the unshakeable, certain foundations of observation or sense-experience. Finally, a theoretical statement such as a law cannot be tested in isolation from other statements because a law is a general statement from which no singular observation sentences can be deduced unless it is conjoined with such sentences and often with other theoretical ones. Testing is a holist affair (known as Duhem-Quine thesis today), and so when there is a conflict with experience, a decision must be taken as to whether the law or the auxilary assumptions are to be blamed: 'Thus, the test applies, at bottom, not to a single hypothesis but to the whole system of physics as a system of hypotheses (Duhem, Poincare)' (Carnap [1934/1937], p. 318).3 The upshot is that once the infallibility of
2
While Carnap recognizes the theory-ladenness of observation in the senses that the meaning of every observation term is infected by theory and that every observation sentence is revisable by theoretical considerations (as we shall see, the latter follows from Carnap's rejection of infallible protocols), there is a third, psychological sense which many postpositivist philosophers including Kuhn have made much use of. Observation is theoryladen also in the sense that retinal images do not completely determine our visual experiences. We do not know if Carnap has ever held such a view. 3 Later, Carnap develops his well-known apparatus of degree of confirmation. However, it applies not to the whole theory but rather to the hypotheses formulated within it.
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observation is rejected, conclusive refutation goes by the board as well. Note that all of the views we have summarized here are usually considered as 'post-positivist' despite the fact they were held by Carnap as early as 1930s. It may be thought that Carnap's semantic incommensurability thesis and the thesis of theory-ladenness of the meaning of observation terms do not sit comfortably with his observation-theoretical terms dichotomy. To be sure, such a dichotomization turned out to be a mistake and was the most severely criticized aspect of Carnap's philosophy. Its critics have rightly pointed out the untenability of drawing such a distinction in a nonarbitrary way. But, interestingly, Carnap himself acknowledged this very early on. It is worth quoting him at length: A predicate'P' of a languageL is calledobservable an organism for a person)N, if for suitablearguments, 'b', N is able under (e.g. e.g. to suitablecircumstances come to a decisionwith the help of few observations about a full sentence,say 'P(b)',i.e. to a confirmation of either'P(b)'or '-iP(b)'of sucha degreethat he willeitheracceptor reject'P(b)'. is This explanation necessarily vague. Thereis no sharpline between and observable non-observable ... predicates For the sakeof simplicity we will here drawa sharpdistinctionbetweenobservable and nonobservablepredicates.By thus drawingan arbitrary line between observableand non-observable predicatesin a field of continuous in we degreesof observability partlydetermine advancethe possible is answersto questionswhetheror not a certainpredicate observable by a givenperson(Carnap[1936-7/1953], 63-4; our emphasis). pp. Elsewhere, Carnap makes the same point with respect to the entities to be observed (see his [1966], p. 226). We are told that since observability forms a continuum, i.e. there is a continuum of things from the observable to the non-observable, a distinction between kinds of terms (or entities) has to be arbitrary no matter where one draws the line. Note that what is defined is not the absolute notion 'observable' but 'observable-in-L for an organism', which makes the relative and pragmatic nature of the definition obvious; a term which is observable in one language may be theoretical in another. In 1932 Carnap recognized that the construction of an observation language must be a convention. His paper 'On Protocol Sentences' is an attempt to show that there are different ways to structure an observation language, each serving different purposes, having different advantages. Thus, there is no fact of the matter concerning which observation language is the 'correct' one. Nevertheless, although what counts as an observation term and consequently as an observation sentence is somewhat arbitrary and language-dependent (that is, dependent upon the language of the
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scientific theory, L) and although meaning is theory-laden, once such sentences are decided upon, they provide an objective basis relative to L for confirming and disconfirming hypotheses within the theory with the help of methodological rules. Hence, objectivity is secured despite semantic incomensurability and theory-ladenness.
5 Scientific revolutions according to Carnap

Another persistent theme which allegedly divides logical positivists and post-positivist philosophers of science concerns the growth of scientific knowledge. We are repeatedly told that Carnap and his friends believed that scientific progress is a continuous accumulation of facts, an incremental process in which revolutions play no interesting role. Nothing can be further from the truth. Carnap takes scientific revolutions very seriously, and there is a natural place for them in his conception of linguistic frameworks and scientific theories. According to Carnap, scientific revolutions occur in two ways: by a change in the rules of the linguistic framework of the theory or a change in the theoretical postulates. The most succinct formulation of this is found in Carnap's reply to Quine in the Schilpp volume: First of all, I shouldmake a distinctionbetweentwo kinds of readjustmentin the case of a conflictwith experience, namely,betweena changein the language,and a merechangein or additionof, a truthvalue ascribedto an indeterminate statement(i.e, a statement whose truth-value not fixedby the rulesof language, by thepostulates is say of logic, mathematics, physics).A changeof thefirst kindconstiand tutesa radicalalteration, sometimes revolution, it occursonlyat a and certain decisive historically pointsin thedevelopment science.On the of otherhand,changesof the secondkindoccureveryminute.A change in the first kind constitutes,strictly speaking,a transition from a languageLn to a new languageLn + 1 (Carnap[1963b],p. 921; our emphasis). So a shift from one linguistic framework to another is a revolution. Recall that a linguistic framework is defined by its rules. Altering them would alter the scientific language and result in a revolution. Of particularinterest would be the adoption of differentmeaning postulates and methodological rules. The former would give us new terms or new meanings for old terms, and the latter would give us new methodological rules for testing and confirmation. Alternatively, a revolution can also occur if the theoretical postulates of the theory changes. As we pointed out above, these postulates express the fundamental laws of the theory. Since one of their functions is to introduce new theoretical terms, the addition of such terms is tantamount to the
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addition of new postulates for them, and that is precisely what happens during scientific revolutions: This class [i.e. the class of the theoreticalterms]will generallybe changedonly when a radicalrevolutionin the systemof scienceis made, especiallyby the introductionof a new primitivetheoretical term and the addition of postulatesfor that term (Carnap[1956], p. 51). It is because the theoretical postulates introduce theoretical terms and partially contribute to their meanings that they are recalcitrant to refutation by experience, like the analytic sentences. Indeed, the passage we have quoted from the Schilpp volume ends noting just that: To be sure, this status [analyticity a language] certainconsein has in case of changesof the secondkind, namely,that analytic quences sentencescannot changetheir truth-value. this characteristic But is not restricted analyticsentences; holds also for certainsynthetic to it sentences,e.g., physical postulates and their logical consequences p. (Carnap[1963b], 921). That not every change in theory constitutes a radical revolution is also evident from Carnap's treatment of correspondence rules. He writes: I am not thinkingnow of a revolution physics,in whichan entirely in new theory is developed,but of less radicalchanges that modify existing theories. Nineteenth-centuryphysics provides a good had and example,becauseclassicalmechanics electromagnetics been littlechangein formanydecades, therewasrelatively and, established, laws.Thebasictheoriesof physicsremained fundamental unchanged. There was, however, a steady addition of new correspondence werecontinuallybeing developedfor rules,becausenew procedures this or that magnitude (Carnap [1966],pp. 237-8). measuring This passage makes also clear that Carnap views the formulation of new correspondence rules as an activity akin to Kuhn's notion of paradigm articulation, which in no way involves revolutionary changes.
6 Paradigms, lexicons, and scientific revolutions

In this section we shall first draw attention to the similarities and differences between Carnap's scientific theories and Kuhn's paradigms. Then we will argue that Carnap's linguistic frameworks function very much like Kuhn's lexical structures. Finally, we will show that, given the similarities, Carnap's and Kuhn's characterizations of scientific revolutions are almost identical.
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6.1 Paradigms
In the 'Postscript' to his Structure [1970] and in his [1977] Kuhn has clarified what he means by 'paradigm' by distinguishing between two senses of the term: disciplinary matrix and exemplar. A disciplinary matrix consists of three components: symbolic generalizations, methodological commitments and values, and models and metaphysical commitments. Let us begin with symbolic generalizations. Kuhn says that they serve two functions: they 'function in part as laws but also in part as definitions of some of the symbols they deploy' ([1970], p. 183; our emphasis). As we saw, this is exactly how Carnap views theoretical postulates; they express the fundamental laws of the theory, but at the same time interpret the theoretical terms occurring in them. No wonder then that a paradigm, like Carnap's theoretical postulates, is not open to refutation by experience during normal science and can only be rejected wholesale. To clinch our point, we note that Kuhn draws a strong link between their rejection and revolutions: 'I currently suspect that all revolutions involve, among other things, the abandonment of generalizations the force of which had previously been in some part that of tautologies' (ibid., pp. 183-4). The second component of the disciplinary matrix which we will consider consists of methodological commitments.4 As an example of the former, Kuhn mentions the Cartesian view that all fundamental laws must describe motions of particles and their interactions ([1970], p. 41). In Carnap's philosophy, this and similar commitments find a natural place in the choice of rules for the construction of the language of the scientific theory. They roughly amount to the requirement that the language be a physicalistic one. Other methodological rules such as those which specify how scientific tests should be carried out and when it is reasonable to accept or reject a given hypothesis all fall under Carnap's rules of testing and confirmation. The third component of the disciplinary matrix includes models and quasi-metaphysical commitments which give rise to the methodological commitments discussed above. Models may provide the scientific community with useful analogies, as in the case of viewing an electric circuit as a steady-state hydrodynamic system; or they themselves may be the objects of metaphysical commitments as when heat is identified with the kinetic energy of the constituent parts of bodies (see [1977], p. 298). Notice that what Kuhn calls a metaphysical commitment in the example of heat is nothing but a correspondence rule in Carnap's view; it relates the
4 Although Kuhn's [1970] lists 'values' among the constituents of the disciplinary matrix, his [1977] does not. We exploit this omission to our advantage and focus on methodological commitments only.
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theoretical concept 'kinetic energy' to the observation term 'heat'. The identification of the pressure of a gas with the bombardment of the gas molecules against the walls of the container may be viewed in the same way. Indeed, any metaphysical commitment of this sort will be a correspondence rule in Carnap's view. This is not to say, however, that Kuhn merely adopts a different terminology for correspondence rules. Kuhn's novel idea is to transfer their function to the acquired ability to see similarity relations and thus to exemplars. Recall that in Carnap's view correspondence rules play two roles: bestow empirical meaning upon the theoretical terms and apply the theory to phenomena. Kuhn concedes their first role, but at the same time points out that this is not the only way formalized theories acquire empirical content: Those philosophers who exhibit scientifictheoriesas uninterpreted formal systems often remarkthat empiricalreferenceenters such theories from bottom up, moving empiricallymeaningfulbasic vocabulary into the theoretical terms. Despite the well-known difficultiesthat cluster about the notion of a basic vocabulary,I of of cannotdoubt the importance that routein the transformation into the sign for a particularphysical an uninterpreted symbol concept. But it is not the only route. Formalismsin science also attachto natureat the top ... (Kuhn[1977],p. 300). Kuhn believes that 'theoretical' terms may attach to nature at the top without the mediation of 'basic observation' terms (which is one reason why the observation-theoretical terms dichotomy is untenable, thus constituting a notable difference between Kuhn and Carnap). According to Kuhn, the acquired ability by training to see resemblances between diverse problems is precisely the mechanism which accounts for this attachment mistakenly attributed to the correspondence rules (see [1977], p. 306). These concrete problems and their model solutions, i.e. exemplars, Kuhn believes, provide a much more accurate and illuminating way of understanding how a theory applies to nature. Needless to say, there is nothing in Carnap's conception of theory or in his notion of linguistic framework which corresponds to Kuhn's exemplars, and therefore Kuhn is entirely justified when he claims originality for his notion. The analogy (with the necessary qualifications we have indicated) between Carnap's conception of scientific theory and Kuhn's notion of disciplinary matrix gives substance to the claims that Kuhnian normal science corresponds to activity within Carnapian theory and that Kuhn's revolution as paradigm shift is for Carnap a transition from one theory to another precisely when the theoretical postulates change. Thus, assigning a
Enemies or Allies? Carnap and Kuhn.-
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truth-value to an empirical statement (e.g. computing the value of a constant) or changing its already assigned truth-value (i.e. altering an auxiliary assumption), and adding new correspondence rules due to the discovery of new procedures for measuring magnitudes are all activities which closely resemble puzzle-solving. This kind of activity takes place within the same framework with no changes in the theoretical postulates and, naturally, is accumulative. By contrast, a revolution is the replacement of one set of theoretical postulates by another, much like Kuhn's paradigm shift, and is necessarily non-cumulative since truth-values of certain synthetic sentences may change.
6.2 Lexicons
So far the analogy has been drawn at the level of theory and paradigm. But it goes deeper and extends to theory language. In his recent writings [1983a, 1983b, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b] Kuhn has increasingly emphasized the linguistic and conceptual changes during scientific revolutions. He points out that every scientific theory has its own distinctive structured taxonomic lexicon. Accordingly, the normal vs revolutionary science distinction now appears as the distinction between activities which require a change in the scientific lexicon and those that do not (Kuhn [1991], p. 7). A scientific lexicon is a particular network of kind terms, bearing towards one another certain mutual relations which comprise its structure. Typical structural relations are overlap and genus/ species relations. For example, the no-overlap principle expresses an important restriction over the structure of every lexicon: 'No two kind terms ... may overlap in their referents unless they are related as species to genus' (ibid., p. 4). The lexicon is prerequisite to the formulation of scientific problems and their solutions, description of nature and its regularities. Given this notion of structured lexicon, Kuhn makes several important points, all of which are shared by Carnap. First, what characterizes scientific communities are shared taxonomic lexicons and lexical structures which are necessary for successful communication. Consequently, 'incommensurability becomes a sort of untranslatability, localized to one or another area in which two lexical structures differ' (Kuhn [1993b], p. 329). As we have seen in Section 4, this is exactly Carnap's point as well. Second, Kuhn tells us that revolutions can be characterized as significant changes in the lexicons of scientific theories. When the lexical categories change, so do the criteria relevant to categorization and the way objects are distributed among the preexisting categories (Kuhn [1987], p. 20). Since different lexicons permit different descriptions and
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generalizations, scientific development is necessarily discontinuous. We find the same point in Carnap; a scientific revolution occurs either when the theoretical postulates of a theory change or when its linguistic framework does. A radical alteration takes place in the scientific vocabulary in the former case since new theoretical postulates introduce new terms into the theory or give new meanings to old ones. These in turn require new rules, thus resulting in a change in the linguistic framework of the theory. Finally, for Kuhn, although lexicons are neither true nor false, whether a given statement is a candidate for true/false is lexicon-dependent. Once a positive answer is given to the question of candidacy one can then ask if it is rationally assertable or not. Kuhn says that 'given a lexicon, the [latter] answer is found by something like the normal rules of evidence' ([1991], p. 9; see also [1993b], p. 330). Carnap could not have agreed more; for according to him, a sentence may express a proposition in the language of one theory but not in another. Prior to the specification of the vocabulary and the rules of the language there is no answer to the question 'Is this the kind of sentence that can be true or false?' Only after an affirmativeanswer is given to this question, can further questions like 'Is the sentence true or false?', 'Is it rationally assertable or not?' be meaningfully raised. Carnap's studies on inductive logic can be seen as heroic attempts at formulating, relative to a given language, the rules for rational assertability or, at least, for assigning degree of confirmation.
6.3 Scientific revolutions

Given the similarities between Kuhn's paradigms and Carnap's scientific theories on the one hand, and between what Kuhn says about lexicons and what Carnap says about linguistic frameworks on the other, it is not at all surprising that the two philosophers have nearly identical views about scientific revolutions. Thus, both believe that there are mainly two ways in which revolutions in science occur: either by a paradigm (theory) change, or by a lexical (language) change. While Kuhn characterizes scientific revolutions as paradigm shifts in his Structure, Carnap conceives of them as changes in the theoretical postulates. These postulates function very much like Kuhn's symbolic generalizations, and that is why their views about revolutions are so similar. Alternatively, as Kuhn has emphasized in his post-Structure writings, a revolution can also occur when the scientific lexicon changes. Revolutions involve, among other things, novel discoveries which cannot be described within the existing lexical network, so scientists feel forced to adopt a new one. In a similar vein, Carnap has argued that a shift from one linguistic framework to another also constitutes a radical revolution.
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Note that the two ways revolutions can occur are intimately related since the scientific theory and the language in which it is formulated are intertwined. Since one function of the theoretical postulates (or symbolic generalizations) is to introduce new terms into the language of the theory, a change in them is ipsofacto a change in the lexicon. A change in the latter in turn generates a change in the lexical structure or, alternatively, in the rules (notably, the meaning postulates) of the linguistic framework. Conversely, changing the linguistic framework or the lexical structure also changes the theory because different semantical rules or overlap conditions give rise to different theories. In fairness to Kuhn, we wish to add that we have no intention of belittling his enormous contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of science. In this respect probably no single philosopher has achieved as much as he has. Both his paradigm, which contains the novel idea of exemplar, and his structured lexicon provide a much richer and more detailed description of normal and revolutionary science than anybody else's. Yet it is truly remarkable to find many of Kuhn's views in Carnap's ahistorical approach.
7 Status of language change and theory change

Kuhn believes that the main difference between Carnap and himself is that lexicon change is cognitively/epistemically significant for him as it was not for Carnap according to whom the change is merely pragmatic. There is no doubt that in Carnap's pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist view external questions concerning the choice between alternative linguistic frameworks are not 'theoretical' but 'practical', i.e. pragmatic in the sense that there is no fact of the matter concerning which framework is the (more) correct one. Although hypotheses formulated within the framework can be confirmed and rendered more probable, confirmation is not applicable to the choice of the linguistic framework itself. Consequently, for Carnap criteria for evaluating internal and external questions are radically different. For the latter, they consist of simplicity, efficiency, fruitfulness, and the like; for the former they are confirmation and truth. Lexicon change is pragmatic for Kuhn as well in the sense explained above. Since lexicons are not the sort of things that can be true or false, 'its logical status is that of convention' and eachlexiconmakespossiblea corresponding formof lifewithinwhich the truthor falsityof propositions maybe bothclaimedandrationally but can of justified, thejustification lexiconsor of lexicalchange onlybe pragmatic (Kuhn[1993b], 330-1; our emphasis). pp. Kuhn's criteria for evaluating both lexical and theory change are well
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known: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. But since there is no intrinsic connection between satisfying these criteria and being (more) true or probable, the justification of revolutionary theory change is also pragmatic in the same sense. So far Carnap and Kuhn agree. But Kuhn uses the term 'cognitive/epistemic significance' in two other, but related senses: first, lexicons are 'constitutive of possible experience of the world' ([1993b], p. 331; cf. also [1983a], pp. 682-3). More explicitly, and Experience predictionare possibleonly with the describedand describerseparated,and the lexical structurewhich marks that in can ways, each resulting a different, separation do so in different though never wholly different,form of life. Some ways are better suitedto some purposes,some to others.But none is to be accepted as true or rejectedas false;none gives privileged accessto a real, as an invented,world.The ways of being-in-the-world whicha against for lexiconprovides not candidates true/false are p. (Kuhn[1991], 12). Because they constitute possible ways of experiencing the world, they provide the key to the knowledge of the world. It is in this sense that language change is cognitively and epistemically significant for Kuhn but not for Carnap. To our knowledge, Carnap nowhere held the view that linguistic frameworks (nor scientific theories) constitute experience or objects of experience. What Carnap believed is that they constitute meanings (after all, that is what meaning postulates are for) and that truth about the world is relative to a choice of language: not Theanswer a questionconcerning to realityhowever depends only or (and upon that 'reality', upon the factsbut also upon the structure the set of concepts)of the languageused for description(Carnap [1936/1949], 126). p. But that is not the same as saying that language provides preconditions of possible experience. With its Kantian spirit such a view may be appealing to Kuhn who seems also to be sympathetic to the Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena, but it is foreign to Carnap's philosophy.5 Second, Kuhn believes that the 'five criteria' for evaluating scientific theories and structured lexicons are also cognitive/epistemic in the sense that they are constitutive of science and scientific rationality. Scientific activity is characterized as such because it satisfies these criteria which are operative during both normal and revolutionary science, during periods of
5
(For Kuhn's affinity to Kant see, for example, his [1991], pp. 11-12; see also HoyningenHuene's meticulous [1993],especially Ch. 2.) The differencebetween Carnap and Kuhn that we discuss here seems to result from Carnap's distinction between material and formal modes of speech. Kuhn's remarks about constitution of experience in the material mode may well become statements about constitution of meaning when translated into the formal mode, in which case the difference seems less serious than it first looks.
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both lexical stability and change. Since they are the sole criteria for puzzlesolving which, according to Kuhn, is the main way knowledge of nature is gained, he sees them at the same time as instruments for knowledge production. Consequently, the five criteria can be instrumental without losing their cognitive/epistemic status (Kuhn [1993b], p. 338; see also [1983b]). But this does not strike us as a deep difference since they both appeal to similar criteria for comparing rival theories and languages (lexicons). Whereas Carnap considers the answers to external questions as practical for the reason that they do not involve reality, truth, or probability attribution, Kuhn considers them as cognitive, epistemic, and rational, but not because they involve such attributions, but rather because they satisfy the five criteria which are constitutive of science, scientific rationality, and even experience of the world. It follows that the disagreement between Carnap and Kuhn concerning theory and lexicon change is largely semantic.
8 Logical syntax as metaperspective?

We believe Kuhn is also wrong when he qualifies Carnap's untranslatability thesis: One languagemightpermitstatementsthat could not be translated into another,but anything as properlyclassified scientificknowledge couldbe bothstatedandscrutinized eitherlanguage, in usingthesame methodandgainingthe same result(Kuhn [1993b],pp. 313-14; our emphasis). Kuhn seems to think that as far as untranslatability is concerned, there is a significant difference between scientific knowledge statements and others; so, presumably, Carnap's untranslatability thesis does not hold for scientific statements. But as we saw in Sections 4 and 6, that is simply false. According to Carnap, the linguistic framework of a scientific theory severely restricts the kind of statements that can be made in that theory. Oddly, there is no clue in the work from which Kuhn's quotation above comes as to why he thinks that in Carnap's view scientific knowledge claims have a nature independent from the language in which they are stated such that they can be expressed in any language. We can only guess. Perhaps Kuhn has in mind Friedman's interpretation of Carnap's notion of logical syntax. According to this interpretation, logical syntax can be seen as 'an attempt to articulate a neutral metaperspective from which we can survey all possible linguistic frameworks...' (Friedman [1992], p. 95; see also his [1993], p. 52). This may have led Kuhn to think that in Carnap's philosophy the logical syntax of a language as the theory of the linguistic
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framework of that language provides a neutral framework within which scientific knowledge claims (even those made by incommensurable theories) can be expressed and evaluated.6 We find two problems with such a view. First, the metalanguage of logical syntax is not the framework in which scientific knowledge statements are expressed. Their place is the object language for which the logical syntax is constructed, and all object language statements are subject to semantic incommensurability. Consequently, Kuhn's claim that Carnap's philosophy implies that scientific knowledge can be stated in any language is not justified. Second, as Goldfarb and Ricketts [1992] and Alan Richardson [1994] convincingly show, due to G6del's theorems and Carnap's principle of tolerance (which applies to metalanguages as well) there is no single, universal and neutral metalanguage which could be shared by all parties in all controversies. Indeed, the following argument can be derived from their papers. In Carnap, to evaluate a scientific theory among alternatives in different linguistic frameworks we must evaluate them by means of a syntax language, i.e. a syntactic metalanguage. By virtue of G6del's limitative results, a syntax language must be mathematically stronger than the object language. Hence, a syntax language presupposes a mathematical theory, so that by the principle of tolerance there is a plurality of alternative syntax languages for a given object language. (For example, we may choose between a classical or an intuitionistic syntax language.) The evaluation of the syntax language and the mathematical theory involved depends on 'a syntax of the total language, which contains both logico-mathematical and synthetic sentences' (Carnap [1934/1937], p. 317). Hence, the choice and the evaluation of an appropriate syntax language depend on the linguistic framework for our selected scientific theory. We are thus in a full circle; to evaluate a scientific theory we need that same theory. Consequently, recourse to a syntax language does not provide a neutral metaperspective for the evaluation of scientific theories and their linguistic frameworks.
9 Concludingremarks
Our comparative analysis, if right, suggests two bold conclusions. First, it undermines the widely held belief that post-positivist philosophy of science represents a revolutionary departure from its arch-rivalpositivism, at least in the context of Carnap's and Kuhn's works. Second, the two styles of
6
Note that Kuhn is aware of Friedman's paper. Both that paper and Kuhn's response to it (in 'Afterwords') have been published in World Changes, which grew out of a conference on Kuhn's philosophy (Kuhn [1993b]).
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doing philosophy of science epitomized by Carnap and Kuhn should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Our paper also raises two obvious questions, especially for the sociologist: why has the logical positivist movement been misunderstood so badly? And, what were the reasons for its decline? Answering these questions and establishing more adequately the conclusions suggested seem to us to be projects worth pursuing.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Stephen Voss and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. Philosophy Department Bogazifi University 80815 Bebek, Istanbul Turkey Philosophy Department Middle East Technical University 06531 Ankara Turkey
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Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 46 (1995), 285-307

Kuhn: Allies? or Close Enemies GiurolIrzik and Teo Grtinberg

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

Carnap and Kuhn:Enemies or Allies?

2 Linguistic frameworks and scientific theories

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

Enemies or Allies? Carnap and Kuhn.-

3 Semantic holism in Carnap

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

4 Semantic incommensurability Carnap in

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

Carnap and Kuhn:Enemies or Allies?

5 Scientific revolutions according to Carnap

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

6 Paradigms, lexicons, and scientific revolutions

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

Enemies or Allies? Carnap and Kuhn.-

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

6.3 Scientific revolutions

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

7 Status of language change and theory change

GitrolIrzik and Teo Griinberg

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

8 Logical syntax as metaperspective?

Giirol Irzik and Teo Griinberg

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

Smeaton,Countessvon Zeppelin,originallypublishedas LogischeSyntax der

von JuliusSpringer), & London,KeganPaul Trench,Trubner Co.

Sprache, Schriften zur WissenschaftlichenWeltauffssung,Vol. 8 (Vienna, Verlag

GiirolIrzik and Teo Griinberg

Carnap and Kuhn: Enemies or Allies?

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