Domination, Contention

DOMINATION, CONTENTION, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF INEQUALITY: A THEORETICAL PROPOSAL
Viviane Brachet-Marquez
ABSTRACT
I propose a theoretical framework that species dynamic principles involving the generalized and ubiquitous everyday interaction of society and state actors alternately in upholding and undermining the rules that spell the unequal distribution of power and resources. The framework proposed brings together a historically specic micro-process contention with a general macro-principle of permanence and change in the distributive rules the creation, renegotiation, and occasional destruction of a generally durable yet continuously contested pact of domination. Inequality represents simultaneously a central organizing principle of social life and a recurring source of conict over rights and rules, the latter being the practical rules that govern interaction in specic cases of contention, giving governing agencies the necessary exibility to act casuistically, giving in here, and throwing its weight there, with new formal rules sometimes following that process, or old ones falling in disuse.
Theorizing the Dynamics of Social Processes Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Volume 27, 123161 Copyright r 2010 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0278-1204/doi:10.1108/S0278-1204(2010)0000027008
123
124
VIVIANE BRACHET-MARQUEZ
In this scheme, the state is a historically created organizational and coercive agent embodying and enforcing the currently valid pact, mostly through legal/coercive, but also ideological power over its territory of jurisdiction. State forms are specic to each historically constructed pact of domination, so that there is no such thing as a state in general, but a series of historically constructed states, each with its rules of who should get what and peculiar ways of maintaining inequality between dominant and dominated.
Why do people comply unquestioningly, most of the time, with rules that dene an unequal distribution of access to power and resources? Inequality is omnipresent and justied in a variety of institutional arenas, from kinship to religion to work environments, so that we are literally trained and retrained every day of our lives, to accept that we will take our places, and take for granted the places of others, in the hierarchy of power and wealth. In doing so, we are also trained to reproduce inequality, enforcing its rules on kin and subalterns, while bowing to the authority of our hierarchical superiors. Yet we do not always comply. We often bicker, temporize, protest, and drag our feet, and sometimes we simulate compliance while quietly sabotaging rules and inventing alternative ones tacitly shared by select groups. We also get into disputes over who owns what or should get what. In such cases, higher authorities are often called in to help settle the dispute: in premodern times, the priests and local lords; today, the police and the courts. And here again, in the process of settling the dispute, inequality may be either reinforced or weakened in the particular instance. In the perspective presented here, inequality is the result of a complex set of interactions taking place between agents1 over time in other words, a process.2 Inequality is embedded in macro-historical processes, as different regions and nations have acquired, through their history, widely different levels of inequality, and institutional systems maintaining it.3 But it is also present in everyday micro-processes whereby individuals, groups, and collectivities either conrm or question one or another aspect of inequality through their transactions and, in doing so, alternately validate or transgress some rule spelling inequality. These rules are not invariably clearly spelt out, and the authorities enforcing them are not always equipped to impose them. They evolve over time in societies that are never static: people move up and down hierarchy ladders, acquire rather than inherit wealth and status, higher authorities often mediate disputes rather than impose order from above, and courts and cases vary in their interpretation of the law.
Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality
125
To understand theoretically how inequality is instituted, reproduced, and transformed, we must therefore be able to grasp how these everyday dynamic processes shape their respective societies historical trajectories. To express the workings of these dynamic processes, I propose a theoretical framework that brings together contention, a concept designating interactive conictive micro-/meso-processes, with a general transhistorical process4 of the renegotiation and occasional destruction of a broad set of rules over who should get what or pact of domination. In this framework, states5 are continuously engaged in engineering and enforcing rules that spell inequality, but these attempts are also continuously being resisted and renegotiated through contention by societal actors (elite as well as subaltern). In short, inequality is seen as representing simultaneously a central organizing principle of social life and a perennial source of change within society. In order to bring together these two conceptions of conictive interaction, I draw from two distinct intellectual traditions with no connecting doors between them, and no specic interest in the problem of inequality. One views inequality as generated from above as states conquer territories and dominate their population, whereas the other focuses on everyday conictive interactive nexi through which people confront each other in the pursuit of what they perceive as their interests. I will briey review both so as to make clear what aspects will be incorporated in the model proposed.
1. STATE MAKING6 AS CREATING AND ENFORCING INEQUALITY FROM ABOVE

Although the 1960s saw the birth of crucial pioneering work in the historical study of state making (Hintze, 1975; Hobsbawm, 1962; Moore, 1967), enduring interest in the subject would take roots from the 1970s on, with such landmarks as Perry Andersons Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974a), Tillys Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975), and Michael Manns (1986, 1993) monumental study of the historical birth and shaping of particular civilizations, empires, and nation-states.7 These works, which emphasized such activities as war making, taxation, policing, control of food supply, and the formation of bureaucratic cadres, which were difcult, costly, and often unwanted by large parts of the population (Tilly, 1975, p. 6), opened the way for the systematic study of the history of state building in Europe. In many of these studies, Western states were seen to
126
have emerged from the history of territorial conquests and losses between militarized elites (Hintze, 1975; Finer, 1975; Downing, 1992; Tilly, 1990, 1993; Tallett, 1992; Porter, 1994). The argument supporting the military conception of state making centered on the impact of war making on the rationalization of state coercive, scal, and organizational capacities (Finer, 1975). Enduring domination over a conquered territory by a victorious elite was therefore seen as inseparable from the creation of an extractive/ administrative apparatus the state dedicated to securing and enhancing the power of the conqueror become sovereign, along with that of his close followers, or polity members (Tilly, 2000). In other words, to reap the fruits of conquest, inequality had to be created and enforced via extracting resources from the local population. As Tilly later put it, some conquerors managed to exert stable control over the populations in substantial territories, and to gain routine access to part of the goods and services produced in the territory; they became rulers (1990, pp. 1415). States also harnessed preconquest inequalities to their own ends by coopting the local elite, or simply destroy it, as did Spanish and Portuguese conquerors. The thrust of state making (also called state formation) studies that ourished from the 1980s onwards was in tracing the growth of states apparatuses and power over their territories in different periods and locations. In antiquity, conquest was said to have generated scal revenues by producing enough crops to maintain conquering armies through the slave labor acquired with conquest, so that battle elds provided the manpower for cornelds, and vice-versa (Anderson, 1974b, p. 28).8 In medieval Europe, rulers initially extracted surplus resources from agricultural laborers on their own (initially appropriated) land, as did their vassals who would conance the costs of war. In Spanish America, extracting tribute from the indigenous population was the rst step to consolidating conquest. Even where state building was based more on trading than direct extraction, that is, more capital than coercion intensive (Tilly, 1990), armies had to be raised and trade routes protected, so that scal capacity fed into military power and military power into scal expansion of the state. In our contemporary world, Hitlers attempt to conquer Europe or Russias success in keeping her colonial conquests until the end of the short twentieth century are unthinkable without formidable coercive/extractive capacities supplemented, at given junctures, by slave labor.9 More than a mere conceptual denition of states, coercive and extractive control over a given territory was therefore found to be a requirement for the stabilization of any kind of domination, hence the creation of specialized bodies states to ensure a continuous ow of resources and military manpower via forced
127
cooperation. Administration, in this context, refers to the more or less effective ways in which these basic resources are collected and managed. Following this general line of enquiry, studies of the formation of European states offer a rich pageant displaying the ways in which these requirements were fullled in early states,10 with important variations in the degree to which they were achieved, and in the role of representative assemblies in limiting royal power of taxation (and hence war-making propensity). On the other side of the debate, however, it has been pointed out that not all states were born through war (Mann, 1986, 1988), and that Europe was engaged in wars for very long periods without new states being produced (Centeno, 2002, p. 104). England also gured as a prime counterexample to the war-making/state-making thesis by remaining uninvolved in European wars from the end of the Hundred Years war to 168811 (Brewer, 1988). So, the military view was mostly based on Spain and France, typical cases of early involvement in European wars, although also of entrenched inefcient administrative practices that drove them to scal bankruptcy at the close of the eighteenth century, crowned by revolution for France and by the loss of her empire in the early 1800s for Spain. Moreover, comparing the war record of European states with that of Latin American states was said to indicate that the rst has been a unique unreplicated phenomenon (Centeno, 1997, p. 1569).12 Interest in Latin American state formation13 is less developed than studies of European states for a number of reasons, mostly the enduring preponderance in scholarship on this region of the development paradigm that dominated academia until dependence replaced it, following the publication in 1966 of Cardoso and Falettos path-breaking study.14 Yet, as attention shifted to class structure and to transnational relations of exploitation between core and periphery, the state remained in the shadow of class processes. With ODonnell, however, the state made a forceful comeback as the political component of domination in a territorially delimited society, and as an organizationalinstitutional complex endowed with administrative and coercive capacities (1984, p. 200). The importance of this conception lies in its being grounded in the principle of inequality arising out of the differential control of given resources, according to which it is usually possible to obtain that the dominated adjust or control their behavior to t the express, tacit or presumed will of the dominant (1984, pp. 200201). The same dual conception of the state is expressed synthetically by Oscar Oszlak who denes state formation as implying simultaneously the formation of a political instance articulating domination in society and
128
the materialization of this instance in a set of interdependent institutions allowing for the exercise of domination. The state is, in this way, social relation and institutional apparatus (1997, p. 16). Here, state making is not only the acquisition and exercise by states of specic capacities over a territory but also a relational historical process between state and society that shapes the conditions of domination. The main contribution to the study of state making in Latin America (mainly by historians) consists, however, not in verifying the degree to which states achieved domination over their territories during given periods but in showing that peasants do engage in national political struggles, although their participation is often subsequently submerged, and their demands left unmet.15 Following the liberal revolution of the 1850s in Mexico in which peasants in Morelos, Guerrero, and Puebla allied with the liberals against the French/conservative coalition, the Mexican state is said to have incorporated some demands from below as part of its popular agenda, in contrast with the Peruvian state that has repeatedly repressed popular demands and participation in national struggles (Mallon, 1995, p. 311), although that might be debatable, judging from the despoiling effect of Mexicos liberal laws (18571910) on peasant access to land. At stake was not merely to establish that peasants were in fact involved in specically national political struggles (as opposed to the local defense of land and community), but to demonstrate that the cross-class alliances formed between disaffected elites and peasants (often in addition to other lower class groups) shaped the trajectory and marked the turning points of state making in the nineteenth century (Guardino, 1996) and beyond (Mallon, 1995; Knight, 1986). Mallon (1995), for example, asserts that Mexicos peasants were participating in a democratic revolution, whereas Zeitlin (1984) adduces that Chilean peasants who joined in the elite uprising of the 1850s were taking part in a bourgeois revolution that failed. Yet it is equally possible that these peasant soldiers were primarily defending their communities,16 and that rebelling elites were more inspired by the prospect of consolidating their regional power and local autonomy than by such lofty goals as democracy and equal citizenship (Sinkin, 1979; Bazant, 1985). In any case, victorious liberals in Mexico did little (beyond ofcial discourse and the never implemented 1857 Constitution) to incorporate their lower class allies into a set of democratic rules of domination, adopting instead a specic brand of authoritarian liberalism soon to be followed by a 32-year dictatorship. What followed in the Chilean case from the 1850s rebellions was the transformation of a narrowly conservative autocratic system into a parliamentary oligarchic one, which soon incorporated the
129
previously rebellious elites (Loveman & Lira, 1999) but left out their lower class allies. Focusing our attention on regional interelite and popular struggles that marked state making in Latin America also destroys the myth of a united capitalist class and the instrumentalist view of the capitalist state as exclusively protecting capitalist interests. To consolidate state power under their hegemony, the victors in coups detats turned to repress mainly members of their own class: stopping the losers from plotting to unseat their government (or inviting a foreign power to do so), ensuring that taxes were not hoarded in provincial/state treasuries, and that no local armies were raised in preparation for a coup. To keep the passive cooperation of the masses, they also had to limit the exactions imposed by elites on the populations under their jurisdiction, not unlike premodern state elites in Europe had done centuries earlier. In a way, European and Latin American studies of state making can be considered complementary in their views of the relation between state and society. The rst have concentrated on the conditions for the acquisition by incipient state apparatuses of administrative, scal, and coercive capacities while leaving on the margins what kinds of power congurations, principles of domination over society, and social inequalities were thereby created. The second, by contrast, have emphasized that states act as agents articulating and enforcing the principles of domination that structure society, yet have shown relatively little interest (excepting Centeno, 2002) in the processes whereby state capacities grow and wane. At the same time, both camps have tended to make evolutionist assumptions, either by dening the acquisition of key capacities as the process toward fully developed statehood, implicitly understood as the nishing line, or by insisting on a historical endpoint in the capitalist bourgeois state (Oszlak, 1997; Torres Rivas, 2006). Therefore, both views predene the direction in which states in formation will progress, implicitly pronouncing the end of history (or assuming an entirely different postformation process) when relatively stable state institutions have been established. From the perspective taken in this chapter, both traditions have also failed to emphasize the processes whereby states are engaged through their institutional apparatuses in reinforcing the power and economic hegemony of dominant (classes, large corporations, elite corps, etc.) over dominated groups in society, thereby enforcing these relations of inequality. Although the Latin American scholars cited above opened the door for this conceptualization, they fell short of dening the arenas within which these interactions between states and society could be observed and researched.
130
Likewise, students of early European states have treated selected state decisions (to make war, raise taxes, etc.) as evidence of a process of state formation taking place, but detached from the give-and-take between state and society that generated, modied, or nullied these decisions. In such accounts, we rarely know how various elites reacted to specic state actions, and even less how ordinary people dealt with them. Although relatively recent work on everyday state making has aimed at lling this gap (Scott, 1985, 1990; Knight, 1994; Gilbert & Nugent, 1994), it has usually presented the dominated as intent on blunting state actions through resistance and quiet sabotaging rather than conictively engaged in opposing them. In sum, what is needed in order to turn the study of state making into a lens making visible, the dynamics of inequality is the denition of a process whereby state and society actors engage each other, either peacefully in the sense of taking for granted the ways in which power and resources are distributed, or conictively when states or nonstate actors trigger violent collective responses when attempting to increase the level of exactions that shape inequalities in society.
2. MAKING AND CONTESTING THE RULES FROM BELOW: CONTENTION

The rst step to an interactive theory of the dynamics of inequality is to dene a process taking place in empirically observable arenas. We are therefore not talking about self-propelled phenomena (Tilly, 1995) inferred from interrelations between variables (as in urbanization, secularization, or differentiation), but about real people pursuing objectives and, in doing so, coming in contact with state agents endowed with variably legitimate legal and coercive power. A crucial contribution in that direction is the model for the process of contentious politics proposed by Charles Tilly and his group of colleagues (hereafter, Tilly & col. mainly McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tilly & Tarrow, 2007; Tilly, 1995, 2001, 2008a, 2008b; Aminzade et al., 2001).17 Contention signies confrontation between collectives18 over disputed rights or property in which the state is involved. Interest focuses not on ordinary contention that designates making claims that bear on someone elses interests (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 4) but on political contention (hereafter, contention or contentious politics) dened as episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claim and their objects when (a) at least one
131
government is a claimant, an object of claim, or a party to the claim, and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5). This denition excludes conict taking place privately, or public conict to which the state is not party. It also excludes conictive interaction in which one party submits to the others power, as in public ogging or other forms of inicting punishment when its object does not (or more likely cannot) resist, and is therefore in no position to dispute who is entitled to what. Furthermore, it excludes spontaneous conictive encounters in which violence may be used, but no particular claims are issued, as in verbal assaults, st ghts, riots, or bar broils. Finally, although the denition does not specify it, it is clear from the examples cited as illustration that the state includes legislative and judicial functions. A further distinction is drawn between contained and transgressive political contention, where the rst refers to contention in which all parties to the conict were previously established as constituted political actors (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 7) and the second to contention in which at least some parties to the conict are newly self-identied political actors, and/or at least some parties employ innovative collective action (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 8).19 The authors interest (as well as mine in this chapter) favors the transgressive side of political contention, although they note that the two forms most frequently grow out of each other and interact, so that the distinction between institutionalized and uninstitutionalized politics is said to be an articial one. In transgressive contention, however, we are unlikely to nd contention over bankruptcy or breach of contract, but wage disputes may occasionally go beyond institutionalized channels of collective bargaining. The point of proposing such a broad denition is to bring under the same conceptual and processual umbrella diverse forms of political contention, such as strikes, public demonstrations of protest, social movements, rebellions, and revolutions, previously studied with widely separate theoretical instruments. The whole theoretical thrust of the model proposed is to show that once divided up into their respective dynamic mechanisms, or recurrent causes which in different circumstances and sequences compound into highly variable but nonetheless explicable effects (Tilly, 1995, p. 1610), the most diverse forms of contention will be comparable, as they will share a number of mechanisms that will produce essentially the same effects in a wide range of circumstances (Tilly, 2001, p. 20). Commonalities in mechanisms will demonstrate that very different kinds of contentious interactions represent, in fact, the same broad phenomenon.20 Among the mechanisms most cited are those of competition, negotiation, mobilization, repression, and radicalization.
132
Leaving aside, for the moment, whether contentious politics of all kinds and shapes display various combinations of the same mechanisms, which, in the end, is an empirical question,21 I would like to draw attention to a number of aspects of the contention model that are problematic from the point of view of a theory of inequality: the reasons for which people will contend; the relationship of contendants claims to the established order and the role of the state; the nature of mechanisms in relation to agency; and the problem of going from micro- to macro-forms of contention. 2.1. Why People Get Involved in Contentious Interactions On the basis of the denition of contention above, only interests appear to be at stake in the decisions to participate in claim making (the claim, if realized, would affect the interests of one of the claimants). Yet in the same work, historically accumulated culture (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 22) is also singled out as an important element in contention, and so is identity, repeatedly mentioned as subject to shifting in the course of the process of contention. Both concepts speak to the more emotional aspects of contention, yet are neither part of its denition nor mentioned as mechanisms moving participants in one direction or another. Grievance, on the other hand, appears only once, but not in the sense normally understood. What of the long nursed grievances of eighteenth-century French peasants in the face of resurgent feudal rights (Anderson, 1974a)? Or should we think of La Grande Peur22 as some irrational behavioral manifestation irrelevant to protest against the French Ancien Regime and unrelated to the demands for equality inscribed in the Cahiers de Doleances? Or how should Mexican peasants of the liberal era (18541910) have felt when their land was declared public and sold to haciendas, or simply conscated by the latter? Interests are neutral with respect to feelings of right and wrong, whereas grievances express sentiments of injustice (Moore, 1978). If, contrary to Tilly & col., we postulate that grievance is a possible and, indeed, frequent ingredient of contention, its essence is contestation over who holds the legitimate claim in a dispute and should therefore, by right, win over the other. 2.2. Based on What Norms and on Whose Authority Are Contentious Claims Settled The qualication of claims as legitimate or illegitimate implies the existence of rules and norms that are known to the contestants, so that the dispute is
133
really about what principles (law or custom) should prevail in deciding whose claim will be recognized as right. But who will be the judge of which of the claimants is right, and who will apply the sentence? According to Tilly & col.s denition, the state appears as a claimant, an object of claim, or a party to the claim; in other words, as a contestant of the same kind and on the same level as any other, with interests and claims of its own.23 This denition fails to acknowledge the role of the state as rule enforcer, so that its presence in a dispute necessarily involves its power to pronounce legitimate this rather than that claim, and enforce a settlement in favor of the winner of the best claim. In addition, some claims will be directed against actions perpetrated by the state, considered illegitimate by some of the contendants, also with reference to a set of rules, in which case what is being disputed is the states use or misuse of the established rules. In apparent contradiction with the denition of contention cited above, the relationship between contendants claims and the established order is clearly indicated on Fig. 2.1 in McAdam et al. (2001, p. 45) that opposes challengers or opponents to the regime to polity members, its defenders. The interactive sequence depicted in the gure is said to involve at least one set of state actors and one insurgent (sic) group. There is, therefore, unresolved ambivalence in the conception of contentious politics Tilly & col. propose.
2.3. Mechanisms or Strategic Decisions? What moves the process of contention? Although in their case analyses, McAdam et al. (2001, pp. 4150) show reexive actors engaged in strategic interaction and using resources innovatively, these same actors are nevertheless assumed to repeatedly reenact a limited set of strategies abstracted as mechanisms, or class(es) of events that alter relations among specied sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations (p. 24). The notion of mechanism in Tilly & col. rests, therefore, on contradictory assumptions: either contendants are conscious strategic actors, and therefore constantly invent new ways of pursuing their objectives, or they are habitus-bound reproducers of cultural patterns (Bourdieu, 1977), in which case it is ingrained cultural habits rather than actors that move contentious interaction. In one case, we have innitely variable resources prompting variable strategies and hence far too many mechanisms, whereas in the other, we have a both predictable and limited repertoire of responses repeating themselves, yet providing no key to the interactive dynamics of contention. Granted that contenders on the ground will, most usually,
134
combine known with new strategies and repertoires, it remains that the innovative character of transgressive contention a central concern in Tilly & col. is insufciently specied theoretically, even though such specications have been proposed on both sides of the debate. On the habitus side, Wacquant (1989, p. 45), unlike Bourdieu (1977), concedes that actors may consciously carry out strategic cost and benet calculations, but insists that such calculations are all determined by habitus. Sewell (1992), on the other hand, spells out four conditions enabling people engaged in interaction to invent: the multiplicity of structures, transposability of schemas, unpredictability of resource accumulation, and resource polysemia. The debate on agency in relation to the generation of new or old contentious mechanisms becomes even more complex when we bring in inequality, as we must then specify what real choices contendants have in view of their unequal access to power and resources, and to what extent innovative contention can change such parameters. Participants in contention will, in principle, be both enabled and limited in their choices of strategic decisions and repertoires by the rules of access to power and unequal distribution of resources. But transgressive contention is precisely the attempt to overstep authorized (or at least tolerated) ways in which people exercise power and to nd resources and schemas to win their cause, so that the very same process of contention, if successful in restructuring some portion of political reality, may effect changes in the value of conventional resources (e.g., the value of being a man rather than a woman, or an aristocrat rather than a commoner). 2.4. From Micro- to Macro-Contention In addition to providing explanatory devices, the notion of recurring mechanisms by Tilly & col. provides a bridge from micro- to macroprocesses, by stipulating that small and large contentious processes can be analyzed with these same instruments. As Tilly states:
regularities in political life are very broad, indeed, trans-historical, but do not operate in the form of recurrent structures and processes at a large scale. They consist of recurrent causes which in different circumstances and sequences compound into highly variable but nonetheless explicable effects. Students of revolution have imagined they were dealing with phenomena like ocean tides, whose regularities they could deduce from sufcient knowledge of celestial motion, when they were actually confronting phenomena like great oods, equally coherent occurrences from a causal perspective, but enormously variable in structure, sequence and consequences as a function of terrain, previous precipitation, built environment, and human response. (1995, p. 1610)
135
To dispense with large processes, or the problem of specifying how small contentious processes become large ones, Tilly & col. divide streams of contentious politics into event segments to each of which a mechanism is attached. They then treat these constructed segments as processes, so that the only difference between micro- and macro-contention will be in the number of such segments, with large numbers of them being said to constitute episodes. For example, the July 1789 facet of the French Revolution is said to be an episode consisting of some combination of mobilization, identity shift and polarization, three very general but distinct processes and mechanisms in contentious politics (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 28). Mechanisms, on the contrary, are considered causal insofar as they repeatedly alter relations among specied sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 24). Yet, taking mobilization as one such mechanism, can we really say that the mobilization of the Parisian populace in July 1789 implies the same transformations as, for example, that of farmers blocking roads with tractors in protest over low agricultural prices (a typically French contemporary contentious event)? In one case, the authority of the state is being directly attacked, whereas in the other, discontent is voiced and change is demanded, publicly and transgressively, but with no intent to challenge the regime. Although national conagrations such as the French Revolution can be described by concatenations of different abstract elements representing groups of events (such as mobilization), such descriptions will do little to bring out the dynamics of institutional transformation, which is what students of revolution have been trying to do. Granting that contentious politics must stay grounded in the collective mobilization of real people interacting in real time and places, it does not follow that such processes should exclusively be understood from the collectively dened perspective of the people engaged in that process. We should be able to make a distinction between such group dynamics and the place occupied by particular episodes of these small-scale processes in largescale processes of transformation of the relations between state and society. To go back to the events of July 1789, a micro-interpretation of the deeds would tell us what threats were perceived by the contendants (the regiments encircling the city), the objectives they were pursuing (nding weapons to defend the city), why they went to the Bastille (to nd gun powder to load their weapons), and also probably why they were angry (they felt betrayed by the Kings failure to hold his promises). But July 1789 must also be looked at from the perspective of how it links up with various other contentious nodes openly challenging the bankrupt French state, such as the
136
Third Estate declaring itself National Assembly and abolishing feudal rights on its own self-proclaimed authority. The French Revolution, in that view, is not a sum of small segments describing what contendants did or how they felt as a result, but a loosely coordinated set of contentious networks organizing attacks on the established order and proclaiming new rules and principles of authority: the end of feudalism, of royal absolutism, and of privileges. In Sewells words, we are looking at a set of events that touch off a chain of occurrences that durably transform previous structures and practices (2005a, p. 227). If, by the latter we understand primarily the rules of domination and inequality that characterize a society at a particular moment, we can make a claim that contention is the process through which durable ruptures in structures are created, and that we should therefore analyze them from the macro-perspective of a process of institutional change. By reducing explanations of large processes24 to an enumeration of a combination of mechanisms extracted from small ones, Tilly & col. offer a peculiar solution to the problem of aggregation that deserves further examination. But rst we must make some distinctions that will clarify the discussion. The problem of aggregation from small to large is twofold: rst, we must ask under what conditions a small contentious episode may either link up with, or blossom into, a large national contentious complex: that is, a problem of shifting levels of analysis. Second, we must ask if we are trying to go from a single unit act, such as who started the American Revolution, to sequences of typied events, such as mechanisms, and or to a generic entity, such as contention or revolution. The latter is a problem of shifting levels of abstraction25. Table 1 shows the different combinations of the distinct levels along these two dimensions. From Table 1, we can see what option Tilly & col. have adopted to solve the problem of aggregation. They avoid the common sin of explaining a generic entity, for example, revolution, by summing up a set actions situated on the unit or small societal acts levels of analysis, and of inferring from there to the large societal level. Instead, they rst assert that revolution as a generic phenomenon is a misnomer, and choose instead contention to refer generically to either the small or the large societal analytical levels (cells 6 and 9 of Table 1).26 They then break up the process of contention and this is where aggregation takes place into sequential segments of agentdriven occurrences abstracted as mechanisms that operate on a level of abstraction intermediate between single acts and generic entities (cells 5 and 8 of Table 1). At this point, however, they implicitly merge the two highest levels of abstraction by treating mechanism as a generic term in its own right
137
Table 1.
Levels of Analysis and Abstraction in Tilly & col.

Levels of Abstraction
Levels of analysis
Single unit action sets
Sequences of typied events 2 X 5 Social appropriation, certication, and diffusion mechanisms 8 Infringement of elite interests, suddenly imposed grievances,c and decertication mechanisms
Generic entities 3 X 6 Contention
Individual Small societal
1 X 4 Strike in Lenin shipyard, Gdansk 1980a 7 Formation of cross-class coalition of contenders to regime in Nicaragua 1970sb
Large societal
9 Contention
Case analyzed in Tilly and Tarrow (2007, pp. 115118). Case analyzed in McAdam et al. (2001, pp. 196207). c Dened as singular events that dramatize and heighten the political salience of particular issues (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 202), in this case the Managua earthquake of 1974 dramatizing the ills of the Somoza dictatorship.
b
(instead of merely a list of typied events), on the strength of the hypothesis that empirical narratives, once analyzed, will invariably yield a limited list of variously combined mechanisms.27 Finally, mechanisms are said to explain causally the historical sequences under study. What can we say about aggregation between levels of analysis in Tilly & col.? Despite their insistence that many local unit struggles (such as the Gdansk strike among shipyard workers analyzed in Tilly & Tarrow, 2007) often blossom into large societal ones (in this case, the Polish solidarity movement), they provide no theoretical rule stating how the shift should take place. There is no encounter between single dissident groups, no linking institution (although the Catholic Church loomed large in that particular contention), and no strategic deliberations by smaller with higher leaders or coalitions of smaller groups with the incipient national movement: a large national movement just coalesced. On Table 2, I have removed the assumption that the last two highest levels of abstraction can be merged, so that contention remains in the intermediate level of abstraction corresponding to a list of mechanisms extracted by the
138
Table 2.
Levels of Analysis and Levels of Abstraction in the Model Proposeda.

Levels of Abstraction
Levels of analysis
Single unit action sets
Sequences of typied events
Generic entities
Individual
1 Zapata occupies land with armed men 4 Anenecuilco and other villages attempt in vain to reclaim their land 7 Zapata group joins Maderos struggle against D az regime
2 Violation of norms via land conscation in multiple cases 5 Negotiation, invasion, and repression mechanisms
3 Dispersed contention 6 Localized rebellious contention 9 Revolutionary contention
Small societal
Large societal
8 Phases a, b, c of Mexicos revolutionary process: alliances, alliance breakups, negotiations, and reneging on commitments mechanisms
Case analyzed in Brachet-Marquez and Arteaga Perez (2010).
analyst. Additionally, I have distinguished between different generic types of contention, so that the latter term becomes a family of generic concepts rather than a single generic one. In Table 2, aggregation takes place on both scales. Along the scale of abstraction, cells 1, 4, and 7 are single instances of occurrences (or cases) which are, in turn, typied via mechanisms in cells 2, 5, and 8 respectively. The latter, in turn, are each identied as members of a generic class of events, respectively, called dispersed, localized rebellious, and revolutionary contention.28 The logical link between the rst and last level of abstraction is, therefore, instantiation, as it also is in the cases in Table 1. Aggregation from small to large units of analysis in Table 2 is achieved by linking the individual, small societal, and large societal through strategic agency. Agency here means that the collectives that confront each other in contention deliberate, enter coalitions, seek alliances, negotiate with the opponents or the state, renege on their promises, etc. This means that we must view the growth from small to large not as something that
139
spontaneously or mysteriously happens, but as a result of intra- and intergroup deliberative processes in which internal hierarchies and leadership play important roles: the small history of the Mexican Revolution started in various parts of the country, particularly in the village of Anenecuilco, whose land had been stolen by a neighboring hacienda and whose members collectively decided to occupy it by force. Subsequently, they allied with other villages through a political club, and collectively decided to offer their services to a much larger contentious process led by Francisco Madero who had declared his decision to start an armed rebellion against Dictator Porrio D az,29 on the strength of an article in the Plan de San Luis Potosi electoral platform stipulating that illegally appropriated land should be returned to its rightful owners. Between the two contentious sets of events, there is no necessary link, except a very risky collective decision to use force (probably very much inuenced by Zapata, the de facto chief of the village coalition), one that could very well not have been taken, leaving as the only option for Anenecuilco villagers to be peons on their own sequestered land, as had happened in countless other villages (Womack, 1969). The links between cells 2, 5, and 8 follow the same rule: step one is represented by the individual facts that land has been conscated by hacienda owners in various parts of the state of Morelos, Guerrero, and Puebla; in step two are the mechanisms of contentious politics used to ght back despite the threat of repression; and step three categorizes the previous steps as rebellious contention. On this last level, there is progression in the intensity and spread of the generic phenomenon of contention from scattered to localized and to revolutionary contention, which summarizes in more abstract generic terms the upward shift in unit of analysis that has taken place in cells 1-4-7 and 2-5-8, respectively. In sum, in both tables, the concatenation of mechanisms of contention is the general process taking place at intermediate levels of abstraction on any of the three analytical levels identied. The main difference between the two tables lies in the rule of aggregation from small to large units of analysis, and the qualication of contention (respectively, as dispersed, localized and revolutionary) at the highest abstraction level in Table 2. Of course, identifying agency as the condition making possible the passage from small to large in contention processes leads us to open a new Pandoras box, as it leaves unanswered the question of what impels contendants to act this rather than that way in any given situation, leaving contingency as the last resort solution. But agency, at least, points us in the right direction: internal deliberation, internal dissentions, and frequent splits within the contending collectives, debates, and changes in the group discourses elaborated in defense of the claims,
140
changes in membership, and/or leadership, etc. It also conforms to the postulate, implicit in both the contention and state making perspectives presented, that things happen because actors make strategic choices, whatever their interpretation of the situation, as when French peasants burn castles rather than join the Parisian contentious crowds, or when Morelos villagers erroneously believe that Madero will return their land once elected. Based on the critical considerations and suggested changes presented in sections 1 and 2 of the chapter, we can now turn to the task of building a theoretical bridge between state making and contention, two initially incommensurate perspectives, and theorize the process by which the relations between state and society can be seen to generate and reproduce inequality.
3. STATE MAKING AND CONTENTION AS COMPONENTS OF AN INTERACTIVE VIEW OF INEQUALITY: THE PACT OF DOMINATION APPROACH
State making, although it takes place over centuries, represents a discontinuous process with unforeseen stops, regressions, and many transformations taking place by ts and starts. To encompass this wide variety of movements therefore requires a longue duree time framework. Contention, on the contrary, erupts at particular moments and develops in the courte duree. To make compatible these two time frameworks, I will recast the interactions between state and society that state making represents as the historical structuring of complex and differentiated sets of rules, or pacts of domination designating who should get what in the exercise of power and the apportionment of economic surplus (Table 3). Contention, on the other hand, will be dened as the dynamic process driving the change taking place 3 in the pact of domination take place. The notion of pact and domination juxtaposes compliance to known rules (pact) and the possible use of coercion (domination), both jointly present in historical arrangements, to express the idea that a given distribution of power and resources will be complied with, often over very long periods, although never becoming fully or permanently hegemonic. The notion of pact also implies that given levels of inequality are accepted and taken for granted as normal.
141
Table 3.
The Dynamics of State and Society Pact of Domination: Who Is Entitled to What.
Rules of Access to Wealth Who may own sources of wealth, (land, mines, rights to trade, etc) Who pays taxes and how much Who may engage in what economic activities How should work be remunerated
Rules of Access to Power Who may engage in contestation (assembly, deliberation, association, demonstration) and consultations (plebiscite, suffrage, and holding ofce) Who is exempt from public justice Who may rule Who may be represented To whom is the ruler accountable
State Mediation of the pact of domination Regulates or represses contestation Allows or prohibits consultation Judges and punishes according to privilege/law Appoints and res governmental ofcers Has monopoly over the means of coercion Taxes according to privileges or law Distributes monopolies, franchises, and ofces Assigns, protects, or conscates property Makes or proposes laws
Given that distributive arrangements are never nal, any currently undisputed level of inequality therefore represents, in a longue duree perspective, a momentary pause or stalemate between the parties ghting for a bigger share of power, privileges, and economic surplus, during which contention is low, and mostly restricted to resistance. In keeping with a view of state making as the alternation between the creation, reproduction, and destruction of pacts of domination, the authority exercised by states is conceived as both legitimate and contested at all times, so that hegemony in the sense of an endpoint is never nally achieved. Yet, state rule does stabilize for variably long periods in the sense of being taken for granted by the majority, although never in any nal manner. In addition to dominating their population through the threat of coercion, states must therefore also acquire skills at building legitimating discourses that make domination more palatable and inequality less visible.30 An interactive view of state making also directs us to see the incorporation into ofcial ideologies not only of rules favoring the wealthy
142
and the powerful, but also of deeply ingrained popular cultural transcripts (including discrimination toward minority groups), of demands from below for improvements in social and economic conditions, and of the legitimacy of protests against the abuses of specic ofcials or elites. The most extreme example is the populist state31 that dignies the people by professing to rule in its name and do its biddings while ruling in a paternalistic and authoritarian fashion, especially when backed by military power (as fascist Italy or peronist Argentina) or by a powerful one-party state (as Mexico for most of the twentieth century). Yet there is no doubt that the populist state, in order to stay in power, must meet some demands from below (some real, others more symbolic), so that some important transactions between top and bottom will take place.32 Nationalism,33 invented during the American and French Revolutions and perfected in the twentieth century through two world wars, is, however, the quintessential example of the engineering from above of a political culture, based on the promise of emancipation from contested conditions of domination. Nationalism may rally the people against the external enemy threatening the community of free citizens, or mobilize against the colonizer with the promise of forming an independent nation. As with populism, the nationalist discourse must deliver on some of its promises, so that nationalisms, will, willy-nilly, breed nations (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992). Yet, it is to be understood as a continuously contested and negotiated discourse, the outcome of transactions between dominant and dominated. Given that states are only variably successful at establishing a legitimating discourse while controlling their subject populations, the history of territories under their jurisdiction can be seen as a succession of variably long periods during which compliance is generally assured, followed by episodes of intensifying contention in response to the states attempts to gain more power, increase scal exactions, or tolerate more despotic/exploitative exactions on subaltern groups by its elites, in other words, redene the pact of domination in ways that negatively affect the share of power and surplus to which the population at large, or selected elites, feel they are entitled. Some conceptual clarications are in order, lest the notion of pact as it is used here, may be misunderstood. Pact is to be taken heuristically rather than literally, in the sense that everything looks as if there were an agreement between members of a society not to ght over the disposition of power and resources, and accept (enthusiastically or grudgingly) a stabilized form of domination and distribution as normal and even, for some, legitimate. The notion of pact, as understood here, has little to do with contract, in which subordinate people would be seen as agreeing to
143
explicitly, dened rules. Far from constituting undisputed and shared knowledge (as a contract would), pacts of domination are continuously subject to strategic redenitions and manipulations by state or societal actors of opposed interests. The discrepancy between the public transcript of domination and that culturally elaborated by various groups will alternately foment hegemony, accumulate private rage, or provoke collectively voiced feelings of injustice (Moore, 1978). Neither should we think of a pact of domination as a unique set of clear rules neatly dividing society between the dominant and the dominated, or applying uniformly to all within each of these social categories, but as a multiplicity of smaller overlapping sets of rules, so that there is not one single mode of power and exploitation but a large collection of crisscrossing legal and normative principles connecting the dominated to the dominant through rights and obligations: workers to capitalist employers, sharecroppers to landowners, domestic servants to household heads, women to their fathers or husbands, etc. Finally, it is important to note that although democratic pacts of domination generally put an end to radical forms of contention and hence sudden political change, the same general mechanisms of contention over rules operate in them, although they take on more gradual institutionalized forms. Democracies are therefore distinguished not only by the list of attributes that identify them as such, but by the historically specic interrelations and mutual expectations they establish between state and society, by their distinct political cultures, their widely shared standards of legitimate rules of the game, and so on. We may therefore speak of qualitatively different families of democracy, as for example corporatist, liberal, and social democracy, none of which is, in principle, more democratic than the others, but each characterized by its style of interaction between state and society, role of the state, and redistributive schemes. Additionally, far from having abolished inequality in the distribution of power and resources, democracies, especially emergent ones, publicize equalizing discourses while often preserving stark economic differences.34 Rather than exceptions to the general contentious dynamics of permanence and change, democracies can therefore be regarded as a family of pacts of domination with basic similarities but also important internal differences. A hypothetical succession of pacts of domination (PD) is shown in Fig. 1, beginning at T2 through T3 with violent conquest, followed by military occupation, coercive pacication, and a division of the spoils among the victors, followed by the coercive institution of rules stabilizing the distribution of power and resources. Thereafter follows the institutionalization of these
144
T1 T2 T4 T5
T7
PD1
PD2
PD3
T3
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 Etc.
T6
PD0 institutionalized = established order Challenge and state response = critical juncture PD1 imposed = new order established coercively PD1 institutionalized = return to order Challenge and state response = critical juncture PD2 imposed = new order established coercively PD2 institutionalized = return to order
Apprenticeship
Fig. 1.
From One Pact of Domination (PD) to the Next.
rules during PD1, which gradually becomes natural and taken for granted throughout T4, with mostly everyday forms of resistance and nonviolent contention. But at T5, the system returns, under changed historical circumstances, to a situation of increased contentious politics between new (or old) sets of contendents, opening a new cycle of confrontations and negotiations over the distribution of power and resources (T5T6), which creates a new set of rules of domination under PD2, in turn followed by their institutionalization throughout T7. History is not frozen at this point, so that we must represent the continuation of these recurring cycles of power recongurations as a future PD3. In this general model, state forms are specic to each historically constructed pact of domination, and therefore will rise and fall with them. The state exists as an instance of domination of a particular kind as well as a set of agencies enforcing it (Oszlak, 1978, 1997; ODonnell, 1984). Therefore, there is no such thing, empirically, as a general state form, not even a general capitalist or a socialist state form, but instead a large collection of historically constructed states, each with its rules of who should get what and peculiar ways of maintaining order through a combination of the carrot and the stick. The military state in Argentina, for example, literally collapsed under defeat in the Malvinas War with Great Britain35, and this very breakdown made possible the resurgence, in 1983, of democratic rule. The set of state institutions that were then created anew, far from being nal, subsequently went through a crisis of elite contention
145
triggering galloping ination that spelt the collapse of the economy and most state functions in the late 1980s, followed by the restabilization of a restricted democracy (ODonnell, 1994; Alonso, 1998). States are therefore never nally structured but will take on different power congurations, giving birth to new or transformed pacts of domination. From this general perspective, the history of the relationship between state and society is that of a succession of temporary (although often very long) pacts marked, at turning points, by tightly concatenated clusters of structure-changing contentious episodes when these pacts are renegotiated either nonviolently (as in central Europe in the 1990s) or through some form of social upheaval.36 To effect such structural changes in pacts of domination, there is no need to rely on extraordinary or unusual macro-processes. I propose to base the dynamics in pacts of domination on contentious politics, regarded as an everyday omnipresent process of interaction within society and between state and society, which normally only reproduces the rules of domination, but periodically transforms them. In this perspective, the historical trajectory of societies can be seen as periodically punctuated by moments of more frequent and intense forms of contentious politics likely to bring about ruptures (some large, others barely visible) in established structures (Sewell, 2005a). Whereas contentious episodes are, in normal circumstances, no more than manifestations of local discontent attached to limited demands that can be accommodated within the status quo, they acquire, at such critical junctures, the capacity to bring about pact changing events by multiplying and variously combining their forces. The Cuban revolution, for example, was an event that marked the history of Latin America as a critical juncture triggering in other countries demands from below for less unequal resource distribution in the form of contentious politics that ranged from peaceful (yet severely repressed) student protest to extended guerilla warfare. The event also stood as a landmark for conservative forces all over Latin America that gave their full support to the cold war in the form of dirty war practices that ran the whole gamut of mass imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and genocide in the case of Guatemala (Vela, 2009). Critical junctures, however, are rarely predictable and often not always clearly visible (except retrospectively), as, for example, the 1974 Managua earthquake that showed to all, including elites, how Nicaraguas dictator Somoza chose not to distribute international aid to a devastated population. But even an apparently subdued population, violently purged of opponents for almost two decades, such as Chiles under Pinochet, could suddenly join in contentious street demonstrations of protest in the late
146
1980s, openly expressing its disaffection from the 16-year-old supposedly institutionalized (and even constitutionalized) dictatorship.37 Revolutions are rare events, and successful revolutions even rarer, but more than other forms of contention, they are the process by which pacts of domination are swept away and replaced. But most of the time, when we think of contention as potentially event-creating interaction between state and society, we are not referring to a single all encompassing process, but either to regionalized or to sector-specic contentious movements that challenge only partially the established order (e.g., a strike, an emancipatory religious movement, or an independent party in an authoritarian regime), or to a myriad of mostly unconnected small or intermediate processes of contention, all different in timing, kind, and intensity. Such minor tremors are usually absorbed by the system with only casuistic solutions applied,38 or institutionally nested (in factories, small towns, and large complex organizations), so that the rules being contested and transformed bring changes that are relatively insulated between one sector and another. African-Americans, for example, may have achieved lower degrees of inequality in comparison to white Americans with respect to education and jobs, while remaining largely segregated socially and residentially. Women have obtained increased access to education since World War II, but they are still paid less for the same job levels and must still face many forms of culturally entrenched inequality in their homes. Bringing contention to bear on institutional change also poses the problem of aggregation with contention understood now as part and parcel of the process of interaction between state and society. To understand how units of contention go from small to large remains an empirical question, as indicated earlier. But given that we have opted for the creation of events (understood as structural ruptures) through agency, we are under obligation to show how contentious episodes become connected to each other to form larger contentious networks, or fail to connect either as a result of strategic decisions by the collectives engaged in the contentious struggles or by divide and rule manipulations by the state.39 Tilly & col.s methodology of analyzing contentious episodes is particularly helpful in this respect, as it forces us to go step by step through each contentious process and register when it connects with or disconnects from other such processes. But in order to do this kind of analysis, we must also turn our lens to the processes internal to contention collectives insofar as these lead us to understand their capacity for gaining popular appeal and obtaining powerful allies, and hence to spread territorially and provoke class coalitions, something that is absent in but not incompatible with Tilly & col.s perspective.
147
The problem of aggregation also leads us to ask what difference any single or group of contentious nodes represents for potential changes in the pact of domination. This is probably where the most intractable problem of aggregation lies. We could try to hypothesize that the more local the context in which a contentious episode emerges, the less likely it is of expressing demands and grievances directly relevant to shifts in the pact of domination, and vice versa that contentious episodes of national scope would be more likely to have constructed a discourse addressing the validity or legitimacy of central aspects of the pact of domination. But I suspect we would nd many counterexamples of initially insignicant local contentious episodes growing in appeal and impact due to their very radicalism, whereas some widely diffused national ones may remain light on challenging the pact of domination.40 Yet it stands to reason that although aggregation along the unit of analysis dimension is not logically related to impact on rules, small localized contentious events are less likely than large publicly visible ones to have much impact on any portion of the pact of domination, unless contendants can form alliances with other contending groups and either jointly negotiate changes with the state, or challenge the latter in direct confrontation. But in any case, the passage from the group dynamics of contention to the societal dynamics of inequality is a big leap for which there is no ready solution except to say that whether the resolutions applied by state agents to any particular contentious episode (be they concessions or repression) have any impact outside of and beyond the initial cases of contention is still an open question that requires further scrutiny. Finally, when trying to establish a bridge between contention and changes in the pact of domination, we are under obligation to establish the link between inequality and the nature of the claims expressed in contentious processes, which will almost invariably be indirect. Clearly, not all forms of contention are about inequality, but many will be, and we will usually be able to interpret whether the demands voiced are translatable as demands for more (or less) political equality o for better (or worse) economic equality.41 The translation is, of course, easier in revolutionary processes in which mobilizing discourses usually promise more social justice and equality between citizens. In smaller contentious events, the disputes may more frequently be about one group claiming rights, property, or electoral victory over the other, but the outcome will still be about giving more or fewer resources and power to one subaltern group in relation to a dominant one. In synthesis, the proposed model sees the social ordering of inequality in the distribution of power and resources simultaneously through the making and transformation of a pact of domination, a transhistorical macro-lens
148
that is conceptually identied across historical periods but assumes different empirical forms and parameters,42 and through the micro-lens of real-time and place-bound processes of contention over a variety of issues dened by each contentious episode. The basic process to be studied is therefore contention: its dynamics, the creativity of its participants, its visible immediate outcomes, and its hypothetical long-term repercussions. At the same time, however, contention is envisioned as the dynamic principle that makes domination both sustainable and contestable, so that the making and unmaking of rules of domination through contention is held to be a central organizing principle of social life: through contention, the rules of unequal distribution of power and material resources are being alternately reproduced and challenged, and tacitly or actively sanctioned by state agents. But although, as Sewell put it, Structures are constructed by human action, and societies y are continually shaped and reshaped by the creativity and stubbornness of their human creators (2005b, p. 110), the latter rarely envisage or control the long-term consequences of their contentious actions. The effects of the events of July 1789, for example, went far beyond anything its participants had anticipated or struggled for: the king pulled back the troops that had encircled Paris, called back Necker, the popular Swiss nance minister, and could do nothing against the National Assembly becoming the de facto political authority, soon to become de jure as well. Yet, as Sewell (1992) also insists, social reality is fractured, and the structural opportunities for effecting change through these micro-processes are inherently open-ended, discontinuous, and contingent (2005b, p. 110). Finally, and most importantly, there are crucial structuring processes other than contention primarily market and transnational relations that compete with and often transform the processes I have delineated. Some types of state actions, for example, cannot be achieved via coercion, as the warring sovereigns of premodern Europe discovered early on, leading them to coax rather than coerce capital into nancing their military adventures. Todays states also make considerable concessions to capital, in open or covert violation of the rules that apply to ordinary citizens, and are prone to dictate regressive social or scal distributive policies in response to pressures from creditor countries. The pressures and policy inuence that powerful foreign powers can exert on small polities, on the other hand, are common knowledge in our contemporary globalized world. But geopolitics is no newcomer, so that we can assert that state power has always been limited, to a variable extent, by external power congurations, especially in the capitalist periphery. The fact that such processes have not been included in the model
149
proposed in this chapter is no indication that they are being discounted, only that they are considered as pertaining to processes exogenous to it.
4. CONCLUSION
Summing up the argument presented, the chapter has examined two general models of interaction between state and society, with a view to selectively appropriating them in the construction of a theory of the reproduction and transformation of inequality. The theoretical framework proposed denes dynamic principles involving the generalized and ubiquitous everyday interaction of society and state actors alternately in upholding and undermining the rules that spell the unequal distribution of power and resources in society. The framework proposed brings together a historically specic micro-process contentious politics with a general yet historically embedded macro-principle of permanence and change in distributive rules the pact of domination. Together, they congure the process of the creation, renegotiation, and occasional destruction of generally durable yet continuously contested rules and norms underlying the unequal apportionment of power and resources. In this scheme, inequality has been shown to represent simultaneously a central organizing principle of social life and a recurring source of contention over rights and rules in which the state plays the vital role of enforcing current rules and sanctioning deviations, but also of creating unifying ideologies (e.g., citizenship, nationalism), making case by case concessions, or responding to pressures by modifying said rules. This view is informed by the dual conception of the state as a political instance of domination and organizationalinstitutional complex endowed with administrative, coercive, and ideological capacities. In this general framework, state forms are historically constructed entities shaping and shaped by the pacts of domination to which they are respectively attached, each with its rules of who should get what and peculiar ways of maintaining inequality between dominant and dominated. We can now attempt to provide a theoretically informed answer to the question that initiated this chapter, namely, why people unquestioningly comply, most of the time, with rules that dene an unequal distribution of access to power and resources. We could represent the answer to this question as a continuum going from ideological hegemony at one extreme to coercion at the other, with contention in the middle taking up most of the space but ranging from mere resistance to deance. These possible contentious and noncontentious responses to state making are represented
150
in Fig. 2. When they participate in contentious politics, people start from a basic capacity for creative agency, pursuing objectives that relate to immediate situational pressures that they interpret within the connes of their local collectively elaborated frames of reference. It is therefore irrelevant to ask whether such and such a contending group was being patriotic as opposed to narrowly egoistic in its aims when it launched an episode of contention: Parisian crowds were moved to attack the Bastille in July 1789 by what they perceived as an emergency situation requiring immediate action, while a small group of Mexican peasants unwittingly started a revolution when occupying forcefully their illegally conscated elds, and then only for the express purpose of sowing the corn they needed for survival.43 In combination with other contentious processes, both of these contentious episodes were instrumental in profoundly changing the rules of unequal distribution of power and resources in their respective societies. In the macro-analytical perspective of the dynamics of change in a pact of domination, what counts is how individual contentious incidents multiply and combine their forces, often (but not invariably) constructing in the process a unifying discourse, such as the nation in danger (in 1792 France) or the Agrarian reform (in 19101920 Mexico). In the theoretical scheme proposed, I have dened three interrelated analytical levels peoples cognitive capacity for creative agency, group level contention, and the societal transformation of the pact of domination (Fig. 3). The processes taking place at each level have been integrated in the following ways: rst, creative agency is linked to the capacity to oppose reexively (instead of reproducing practically) the rules of who should get what via transgressive contention; second, contention is said to be the process through which people express their discontent and voice their specic demands for more access to power and a greater share in wealth; and third, changes in the pact of domination are seen as contingently produced through the process of contention, which itself depends on creative agency. These analytical levels do not refer to the aggregation from small to large or from concrete to abstract discussed earlier; the rst level represents a postulate on which the second is dependent; the second, in turn, represents the observable process that we, social scientists, must examine, analyzing it rst on its own level of the processes that propel people to act out their recriminations and their grievances or seek their interests; and the third level represents the perspective of long range changes in the rules of inequality or pact of domination, independently of actors intentions or comprehension of such processes. The model proposed is grounded in a real observable and researchable process, based on the postulate of creative agency, but this process is
A State Making
B Conditions of coercion & extraction resentedas unfair D Contention
C Conditions of coercion & extraction found acceptable E Compliance F Thin hegemony G Thick hegemony J Defiance
H Resistance
I Contestation
Institutionalized or tolerated: march, charivari, carnival
Extra-institutional & repressed if detected: pilfering, sabotaging, banditism
Institutionalized or tolerated: pamphlets, clubs, parties, elections
Extra-institutional tolerated or outlawed: social movements, mobilizing for rebellion
Non-violent: petitions, demonstrations, heresies
Violent: riot, guerilla warfare, uprising
Fig. 2.
State Making via Compliance vs. Contention. 151
152
Level I
AGENCY (postulate) Creative Agency Level II COLLECTIVE RESPONSE (social process) Contention Level III PACT OF DOMINATION (interpretative scheme) Long Waves of Changes in Society Permanence within Waves of Changes Compliance Reproductive Agency
Fig. 3.
Postulate, Process, and Interpretive Scheme.
interpreted from the perspective of the social ordering of inequality as featured in the concept of pact of domination. As stipulated by Tilly & col., limited collective conicts are amenable to study with the same theoretical categories and analytical levels as wider social conagrations, but only if we agree to link small to large contention networks via agency and distinguish the micro-dynamics of contention from their macro-implications for changes in the pact of domination. Tilly & col.s stipulation that no macro-processes should be invoked to explain macro-contention has also been incorporated in the proposed model, for indeed, the pact of domination is no solid entity to be moved through collective human agency, but an interpretive device that focuses the researchers lens on the changing division of power and modes of extraction of the economic surplus, and relates these patterns to the process of contention regarded as the dynamic principle that shapes the social ordering of inequality in society. The notion of pact of domination therefore serves to represent analytically the temporarily crystallized yet ever changing outcome of the continuous process of interaction between state and society that alternately spells compliance and contention over who gets what, and in doing so reproduces and transforms the structure of inequality.
153
NOTES
1. I am using Giddens denition: To be an agent is to be able to deploy y a range of causal powers, including that of inuencing those deployed by others y Action depends upon the capability of the individual to make a difference to a preexisting state of affairs or course of events (1984, p. 14). 2. Processes will be dened here as time-ordered sequences of occurrences following a causal plot (Abbott, 1992; Sewell, 2005b; Somers, 1994), and events as concatenations of occurrences that signicantly transform structure (Sewell, 2005a, p. 100). 3. On contemporary interregional differences in levels of inequality and a discussion of historical processes underlying these differences, see Mann and Riley (2007). 4. By transhistorical, I mean a process that is conceptually identied across historical periods but assumes different empirical forms, parameters, and duration in different locations and historical periods. 5. For reasons that will become clear below, the state is dened here as the political instance of domination and organizationalinstitutional complex endowed with administrative and coercive capacities over its territory of jurisdiction (ODonnell, 1984; Oszlak, 1997). 6. In what follows, I would not be assuming that the state is the power supreme independent of class or elite power, simply that the state is a necessary instrument of domination in any but the most simple societies, regardless of who are the polity members, or whether they govern directly or are merely the beneciaries of the rules enforced by state agencies. 7. Although not encompassing a whole society, we should also mention E. P. Thompsons immensely fruitful contributions from his studies of English culture, in its historical and class variations (1975, 1991, 2001). 8. Manns (1986) study of ancient civilizations suggests, however, that the logistics of state conquest and surplus extraction in the ancient world were a great deal more complex than this lapidary formula would suggest, as the capacity of states to control territory was greatly constrained by the limited range within which troops and supplies could be transported. In addition to conquest, therefore, diplomacy and alliances with conquered elites were used, not without risks of backring. 9. According to Mann (2005), up to one-third of Nazi Germanys war preparing labor force was, at some point, made up of camp prisoner labor, and many dye-inthe-wool Nazis were opposed to the nal solution on the grounds that it took away workers necessary to the war effort. The Japanese use of Asian slave labor during World War II is also well known, as is Stalins use of Gulag prisoners as slave labor, mainly through Solzhenitsyns work. 10. For studies of state making in Europe, see Aminzade (1993), Anderson (1974a), Brewer (1988), Downing (1992), Ertman (1997), Gorski (2003), Mann (1986, 1988, 1993), and Tilly (1975, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1997a, 1997b, 2005a, 2005b). 11. In response to Louis XIVths expansionary drive to conquer the countries adjoining Frances borders. (les frontieres naturelles, as he claimed). 12. This rebuttal leads Centeno (1997, p. 1569) to propose three prerequisites for wars to strengthen the state that were generally absent in early Latin American state
154
making: the states ability to draw nancial resources and political support from its own population, sufcient administrative skills prior to war preparations to face the ensuing explosion of revenues and expenditures, and undisputed hegemony over a territory. One might add, also, the ingrained corruption practices inherited from 400 years of resisting Spanish control over people and resources (which West European countries also suffered from, but perhaps not with the same intensity, especially England). 13. For studies of structuring state power from above in Latin America, see Chiaramonte (1997), Dunkerley (2002), Gootenberg (1989), Lopez-Alves (2000), ODonnell (1976, 1980, 1984), Oszlak (1978, 1981, 1997), Peloso and Tennenbaum (1996), Torres Rivas (1979, 2006), Walker (1999), and Williams (1994). 14. Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina (Cardoso & Faletto, 1966) would appear in its English revised version in 1979, more than 10 years after its publication in Spanish had spawned a rich homegrown literature on dependence, which nevertheless neglected the subject of state making. 15. See, for example, Stern (1987), Katz (1988), Nugent (1988), Mallon (1983, 1994, 1995), Meyer (1973, 1974), Gilbert and Nugent (1994), Knight (1986, 1994), Guardino (1996), Manrique (1981), Warman (1976), Tutino (1986, 1987), and Reina (1980). 16. For example, Mexicos nineteenth century civic militias pertaining to the National Guard recruited peasant soldiers who were often called upon to defend against French invaders the very same villages where their families lived. 17. In what follows, I will exclude from the discussion Tillys Durable Inequality (1998), which represents inequality as generated within organizations through their incorporation of ascriptive cultural denitions of unequal pairs (men/women, white/ nonwhite, etc.). 18. Collectives refer to organized groupings such as villages, agrarian communities (as, e.g., ejidos in Mexico), rms, unions, professional associations, political clubs, etc. But the term does not include state agencies. 19. Action is considered innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-representation, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 8). We should note that these provisos would include terrorist attacks (as in car or airplane bombs), along with erstwhile sit-ins as innovative forms of collective action. 20. Ohlin Wright has referred to this form of theorizing as combinatorial structuralism whereby a menu of elementary forms is provided (in this case mechanisms) and more complex structural congurations, then, are analyzed as specic forms of combination of these elementary forms(2000, p. 460). 21. The model developed by Tilly & col. is debated point by point in Brachet Marquez and Arteaga Perez (2010). 22. La Grande Peur (or the Great Fear), a peasant movement that developed in MayJuly of 1789, was triggered by rumors that bandits had been recruited by aristocrats to destroy crops and hoard grain in order to sell it at the highest price (something that had been done periodically during the Ancien Regime). The fear of these bandits spread rapidly throughout the countryside, causing peasants to attack and burn castles. 23. A few pages on, the authors mention that government may operate as mediator, target, or claimant (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 5), but there is no mention of government acting as arbiter or rule enforcer.
155
24. In what follows, I will not qualify processes as large or small or intermediate rather than micro or macro because the present discussion is not about generalizing from the individual to the whole society, but from small aggregated interactive processes to extended ones over a national territory. 25. I owe this distinction to Alford and Friedland (1985, p. 20). 26. Even though one of the subtitles reads Mechanisms in Revolutionary Contention (McAdam et al., 2001, p. 198), implying that there are different kinds of contention. 27. We studied six cases of contention in Brachet-Marquez and Arteaga Perez (2010) and found an extremely wide spread of mechanisms with very few (such as negotiation, coalition, or repression) repeating themselves, even though the cases of contention under study were limited to three villages situated in Morelos within a time period from 1909 to 2009. One of these villages, Anenecuilco, is Emiliano Zapatas native village, where the rst contention leading to the Mexican Revolution took place, according to our analysis. 28. The reason why contention is qualied in cells 3, 6, and 9 will be explained in Section 3. 29. At that point, there is still no revolution as Maderos intent is simply to oust the dictator so as to reestablish the 1857 Constitution that has stipulates a no reelection rule. After his assassination in 1913, the group of opponents to the new dictatorship will call themselves constitutionalists for the same reason. It will be the small contention born in Anenecuilco that will eventually inject revolutionary elements which the other allied contendants will be unable to exclude, despite all their efforts. 30. Scotts (1990) distinction between thick and thin hegemony may be usefully mentioned here, insofar as not questioning state authority does not necessarily imply identifying with its symbols and shibboleths, but merely complying without much enthusiasm. 31. For a discussion of populism in Latin America, see Ianni (1968), Conniff (1999), Moscoso Perea (1990), and Quintero Lopez (2004). 32. This has been argued, for example, in a revisionist version of peronism in Argentina, rst interpreted as a straight dictatorship, and later viewed as receptive to labor demands (Portantiero & Murais, 1969). 33. I am not including in this denition stateless nationalism, as in Basque, Breton, or Quebecquois nationalisms. 34. On the recent rise of inequality in developed countries, see Alderson, Beckeld, and Nielsen (2005) and Moller, Alderson, and Nielsen (2009). 35. It is important to note, however, that such defeat was not the cause of the generalized disaffection by conservative elites and opponents to the regime alike; what precipitated the fall of the generals was the fact that they publicly declared military victory while sending young men (and boys) to their certain death, and collecting extra moneys from the civil population in order to support a war that had already been lost. 36. In the special case of democratic pacts of domination, change is no longer achieved by challenging the PD in toto, but through the electoral process and the use of rules (e.g., parliamentary rules) stipulating legitimate ways of effecting change. Nevertheless, contention as the collective expression of demands, as is well known, is never absent from democratic social formations.
156
37. General Pinochet had a constitution approved in 1980 in which he was to act as life senator. 38. That is, solutions that solve the case, but do not have any repercussions outside of it. 39. For example, Zapatas failure to join forces with Villa in the Aguascalientes Convention when together they had the military upper hand on Carranza, and the latter still did not have the support of the United States. 40. The Mexican revolution exemplies this situation. It is said to have started in 1909, at the national level, with Francisco I. Maderos declaration to become a presidential candidate. But his mobilizing discourse almost exclusively consisted in reviving the no reelection constitutional rule that had been disregarded for 30 years, along with the rest of the 1857 constitution. We may say, in this case, that Madero was aiming at breaking a (de facto) rule of access to power, but nothing much else, and that he was appealing, mostly to disaffected elites who would not have dreamed of starting a social revolution. After his escape from jail and declared intent to unseat D az, Madero accepted an offer of military help by a small insignicant political group (the Melchor Ocampo club), led by a young peasant called Emiliano Zapata. That insignicant group which pursued a program that directly attacked the economic status quo (to give the land back to their rightful peasant owners) offered its help on the strength of article 3 in Maderos Plan of San Luis that stipulated that illegally taken land should be restituted. The article was there, but not the intent, as the future would show. Soon enough, conict would break out between the allies following Maderos ascent to power and his subsequent attempts to stamp down on nascent zapatismo. 41. By demands for worse equality, I am referring to elite (and international creditor) demands for policies that increment the degree of inequality. One example thereof are the neoliberal restructuring and stabilization policies and regressive social reforms carried out throughout the 1990s in Latin America and other peripheral societies, which concentrated wealth in fewer hands and incremented the level of poverty and unemployment in these regions. Naturally, such demands are disguised as demands for better economic, and even better social conditions, so that my qualication of them as worse in terms of equality is interpretive, based on a large accumulation of evidence of their consequences. 42. The term transhistorical as it is used here does not imply outside of history, but a benchmark to compare different historical periods. In that sense, state making surely does differ in early seventeenth-century Prussia as compared to early eighteenth-century France or early ninneteenth-century Mexico or, to take a more extreme comparison, fth century-BCE Athens. But we can recognize in each case a general model of state making that encompasses all of those historically specic formations. So, the relation of general to particular in the notion of state making does not lose its thoroughly historical standing for being analytic, as it provides only a general framework with which to examine historical periods. 43. The contentious episode in Mexico summarily represented on Table 2 took place in 1909, when the Hacienda del Hospital whose owners had sequestered elds belonging to the village of Anenecuilco refused to let the latter sow in time for the spring crop, and the state government refused to intervene. Emiliano Zapata, still an unknown young village chief, proceeded to occupy said elds with 80 armed men to
157
protect village people while they did their work. The state government subsequently abstained from responding to hacienda demands for their expulsion.
REFERENCES
Abbott, A. (1992). What do cases do? Some notes on activity in sociological analysis. In: C. C. Ragin & H. S. Becker (Eds), What is a case? Exploring the foundations of social inquiry (pp. 5382). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Alderson, A. S., Beckeld, J., & Nielsen, F. (2005). Exactly how has income inequality changed? Distributional change in core societies. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 46, 405424. Alford, R. R., & Friedland, R. (1985). Powers of theory. Capitalism, the state and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Alonso, G. V. (1998). Democracia y reformas: las tensiones entre decretismo y deliberacion. El mico, 38(150), 595626. caso de la reforma previsional argentina. Desarrollo Econo Aminzade, R. (1993). Ballots and barricades class formation and republican politics in France, 18301871. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Aminzade, R., Goldstone, J. A., McAdam, D., Perry, E., Sewell, W. H., Jr., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, P. (1974a). Lineages of the absolutist state. London: New Left Books. Anderson, P. (1974b). Passages from antiquity to feudalism. London: New Left Books. Bazant, J. (1985). Mexico from Independence to 1867. In: L. Bethell (Ed.), The Cambridge history of Latin America (pp. 423470). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brachet-Marquez, V., & Arteaga Perez, J. (2010). Studies in contention and the dynamics of domination. Manuscript. El Colegio de Mexico, DF. Brewer, J. (1988). The sinews of power. War, money and the English state 16881783. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1966). Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Centeno, M. A. (1997). Blood and debt: War and taxation in nineteenth-century Latin America. American Journal of Sociology, 102(6), 15651605. Centeno, M. A. (2002). Blood and debt. War and the Nation State in Latin America. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Chiaramonte, J. C. (1997). Ciudades, provincias, Estados: orgenes de la nacion argentina (1800 1846). Buenos Aires: Ariel. Conniff, M. L. (Ed.) (1999). Populism in Latin America. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. Downing, B. (1992). The military revolution and political change. Origins of democracy and autocracy in early Modern Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dunkerley, J. (Ed.) (2002). Studies in the formation of the Nation-state in Latin America. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London. Ertman, T. (1997). Birth of the leviathan. Building states and regimes in early modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
158
Finer, S. E. (1975). State and nation building in Europe: The role of the military. In: C. Tilly (Ed.), The formation of National States in Western Europe (pp. 84163). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gilbert, J., & Nugent, D. (Eds). (1994). Everyday forms of state formation. Revolution and the negotiation of rule in modern Mexico. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Gootenberg, P. (1989). Between Silver and Guano. Commercial policy and the state in postindependence Peru. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gorski, P. S. (2003). The disciplinary revolution. Calvinism and the rise of the state in early modern Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Guardino, P. (1996). Peasants, politics and the formation of Mexicos National state. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hintze, O. (1975). Military organization and the organization of violence. In: F. Gilbert (Ed.), The historical essays of Otto Hintze. New York: Oxford University Press. Hobsbawm, E. (1962). The age of revolution. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Hobsbawm, E. (1992). Nations and nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ianni, O. (1968). O colapso do populismo no Brasil. R o de Janeiro: Civilizacao brasileira. - Katz, F. (1988). Riot, rebellion and revolution. Rural conict in Mexico. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Knight, A. (1986). The Mexican revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Knight, A. (1994). Weapons and arches in the Mexican revolutionary landscape. In: J. Gilbert & D. Nugent (Eds), Everyday forms of state formation. Revolution and the negotiation of rule in Modern Mexico (pp. 2468). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Lopez-Alves, F. (2000). State formation and democracy in Latin America 18101900. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Loveman, B., & Lira, E. (1999). Las suaves cenizas del olvido. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones. Mallon, F. (1983). The defense of community in Perus central highlands: Peasant struggles and capitalist transition, 18601940. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mallon, F. (1994). Reexions on the ruins: Everyday forms of state formation in nineteenth century Mexico. In: J. Gilbert & D. Nugent (Eds), Everyday forms of state formation. Revolution and the negotiation of rule in modern Mexico (pp. 69106). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Mallon, F. (1995). Peasant and nation. The making of postcolonial Mexico and Peru. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Mann, M. (1986). The sources of social power, I. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mann, M. (1988). States, war and capitalism. Studies in political sociology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mann, M. (1993). The sources of social power, II: The rise of classes and nation-states 17601914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mann, M. (2005). The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mann, M., & Riley, D. (2007). Explaining macro-regional trends in global income inequalities, 19502000. Socio-Economic Review, 5(1), 81115. Manrique, N. (1981). Las guerrillas indgenas en la guerra contra Chile. Lima: Centro de Investigacion y Capacitacion.
159
McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). Dynamics of contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Meyer, J. (1973). Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias (18211910). Mexico DF: Secretar a de Educacion Publica (SEP). Meyer, J. (1974). Reexiones sobre movimientos agrarios y historia nacional en Mexico. In: P. C. Mukherjee (Ed.), 1986. Movimientos agrarios y cambio social en Asia y Africa (pp. 246247). Zamora, Mexico: El Colegio de Michoacan. Moller, S., Alderson, A. S., & Nielsen, F. (2009). Changing patterns of income inequality in the U.S. counties, 19702000. American Journal of Sociology, 114(4), 10371101. Moore, B. (1967). The social origin of dictatorship and democracy. Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Moore, B. (1978). Injustice. The social bases of obedience and revolt. White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Moscoso Perea. (1990). El populismo en America Latina. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. Nugent, D. (Ed.) (1988). Rural revolt in Mexico and U.S. intervention. La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S. Mexico Studies. Oszlak, O. (1978). Formacion historica del estado en America Latina: elementos teorico metodologicos para su estudio. Estudios CEDES, 1(3)Buenos Aires. n rica del Estado en America Latina. San Oszlak, O. (Ed.) (1981). Ensayos sobre la formacio histo Jose de Costa Rica: EDUCA. n Oszlak, O. (1997). La formacio del Estado argentino. Orden, progreso y organizacion nacional. Buenos Aires: Planeta. ODonnell, G. (1976). Estado y alianzas en la Argentina, 19561976. Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (CEDES). ODonnell, G. (1980). Comparative historical formations of the state apparatus and socioeconomic change in the third world. International Social Science Journal, 32, 717729. ODonnell, G. (1984). Apuntes para una teor a del Estado. In: O. Oszlak (Ed.), Teora de la burocracia estatal (pp. 199250). Buenos Aires: Paidos. ODonnell, G. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, 5(1), 5569. Peloso, V. C., & Tennenbaum, B. (Eds). (1996). Liberals, politics and power: State formation in XIXth century Latin America. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press. Portantiero, C., & Murais, M. (1969). El movimiento obrero en los orgenes del peronismo. Buenos Aires: Instituto Torcuato di Tella. Porter, B. (1994). War and the rise of the state. The military foundations of modern politics. New York: Free Press. Quintero Lopez, R. (2004). Nueva crtica al populismo limitaciones de la investigacion social eno al populismo. Quito: Abya Yala. Reina, L. (1980). Las rebeliones campesinas en Mexico (18211906). Mexico DF: Siglo XXI. Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the arts of resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sewell, W. H., Jr. (1992). A theory of structure: Duality, agency and transformation. American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), 129. Sewell, W. H., Jr. (2005a). Historical events as transformations of structures: Inventing revolution at the bastille. In: W. H. Sewell, Jr. (Ed.), Logics of history. Social theory and social transformations (pp. 225270). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
160
Sewell, W. H., Jr. (2005b). Three temporalities: Toward an eventful sociology. In: W. H. Sewell, Jr. (Ed.), Logics of history. Social theory and social transformations (pp. 81123). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sinkin, R. (1979). The Mexican reform 18551876. A study in liberal Nation-building. Austin, TX: University of Texas Institute of Latin American Studies. Somers, M. (1994). The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach. Theory and Society, 23, 605649. Stern, S. J. (Ed.) (1987). Resistance, rebellion and consciousness in the Andean peasant world, eighteenth to twentieth century. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Tallett, F. (1992). War and society in early modern Europe, 14951715. New York, NY: Routledge. Thompson, E. P. (1975). Whigs and hunters. The origins of the black act. New York: Pantheon Books. Thompson, E. P. (1991). Customs in common. New York, NY: The New Press. Thompson, E. P. (2001). In: D. Thompson (Ed.), The essential E.P. Thompson. New York, NY: The New Press. Tilly, C. (Ed.) (1975). The formation of national states in Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Tilly, C. (1986). The contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tilly, C. (1990). Coercion, capital and European states AD 9901992. Oxford: Blackwell. Tilly, C. (1993). European revolutions 14921992. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Tilly, C. (1995). To explain political processes. American Journal of Sociology, 100(6), 1594 1610. Tilly, C. (1997a). War making and state making as organized crime. In: C. Tilly (Ed.), Roads from past to future. Boston, MA: Rowman and Littleeld. Tilly, C. (1997b). Parliamentarization of popular contention in Great Britain, 17581834. Theory and Society, 26, 245273. Tilly, C. (1998). Durable inequality. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Tilly, C. (2000). Processes and mechanisms of democratization. Sociological Theory, 18, 116. Tilly, C. (2001). Mechanisms in political processes. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, 2141. Tilly, C. (2005a). Identities, boundaries and social ties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Tilly, C. (2005b). Regimes and contention. In: T. Janoski, R. A. Alford, A. M. Hicks & M. A. Schwartz (Eds), The handbook of political sociology. States, civil societies, and globalization (pp. 423440). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2008a). Contentious performances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2008b). Explaining social processes. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Torres Rivas, E. (1979). En torno a los problemas de la formacion del Estado: La experiencia centroamericana de 18211840. Paper presented at the I Seminario Latino-americano de Pol ticas Publicas, December 1979, Sao Paulo, Brazil. n Torres Rivas, E. (2006). La restauracio conservadora. Carrera y el destino del Estado Nacional. Unpublished doc. Tutino, J. (1986). From insurrection to revolution in Mexico. Social bases of agrarian violence, 17501940. Princeton University Press. Tutino, J. (1987). Peasants and politics in XIXth century Mexico. Latin American Research Review, 22, 237244.
161
n Vela, M. (2009). Los pelotones de la muerte. La construccio de los perpetradores del genocidio guatemalteco. Unpublished Dissertation, El Colegio de Mexico. Wacquant, L. J. D. (1989). Toward a reexive sociology: A workshop with Pierre Bourdieu. Sociological Theory, 7(1), 2663. Walker, C. F. (1999). Smoldering ashes: Cuzco and the creation of republican Peru, 17801840. Durham: Duke University Press. Warman, A. (1976). Y venimos a contradecir: los campesinos de Morelos y el estado nacional. Mexico DF: Centro de Investigaciones Superiores, Instituto Nacional de Antropolog a e Historia (CIESAS). Williams, R. G. (1994). States and social evolution. Coffee and the rise of national governments in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Womack, J. (1969). Zapata and the Mexican revolution. New York: Knopf. Wright, E. O. (2000). Metatheoretical foundations of Tillys durable inequality. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 42, 458474. Zeitlin, M. (1984). The civil wars in Chile (or the Bourgeois revolutions that never were). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Domination, Contention

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Domination, Contention

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

DOMINATION, CONTENTION, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF INEQUALITY: A THEORETICAL PROPOSAL

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

1. STATE MAKING6 AS CREATING AND ENFORCING INEQUALITY FROM ABOVE

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

2. MAKING AND CONTESTING THE RULES FROM BELOW: CONTENTION

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Levels of Analysis and Abstraction in Tilly & col.

Single unit action sets

Generic entities 3 X 6 Contention

Individual Small societal

Levels of Analysis and Levels of Abstraction in the Model Proposeda.

Single unit action sets

Sequences of typied events

3 Dispersed contention 6 Localized rebellious contention 9 Revolutionary contention

Case analyzed in Brachet-Marquez and Arteaga Perez (2010).

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

From One Pact of Domination (PD) to the Next.

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

B Conditions of coercion & extraction resentedas unfair D Contention

Institutionalized or tolerated: march, charivari, carnival

Extra-institutional & repressed if detected: pilfering, sabotaging, banditism

Institutionalized or tolerated: pamphlets, clubs, parties, elections

Extra-institutional tolerated or outlawed: social movements, mobilizing for rebellion

Non-violent: petitions, demonstrations, heresies

Violent: riot, guerilla warfare, uprising

State Making via Compliance vs. Contention. 151

Postulate, Process, and Interpretive Scheme.

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Domination, Contention, and the Negotiation of Inequality

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen