This article was downloaded by: [Social Relations Library] On: 31 March 2010 Access details: Access Details:

[subscription number 788738694] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Ethnic and Racial Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713685087

The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US

Nazli Kibria

First published on: 12 July 2007

To cite this Article Kibria, Nazli(2008) 'The 'new Islam' and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US', Ethnic and Racial

Studies, 31: 2, 243 266, First published on: 12 July 2007 (iFirst) To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01419870701337593 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870701337593

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 31 No. 2 February 2008 pp. 243266

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US

Nazli Kibria

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

Abstract In this paper I look at the growth of revivalist Islam the new Islam within Muslim migrant communities in Western societies. I do so through a comparative analysis of how Bangladesh-origin Muslims in Britain and the US view and understand revivalist Islam, especially its popularity among youth within their communities. I explore the effects of national context, exploring the ways in which variations of history and context of settlement shape the character of revivalist Islam in the British and US Bangladesh-origin communities. I find that Bangladesh-origin Muslims in Britain and the US see the growth of revivalist Islam to be a response to the growing salience of Muslim as a public identity for them in these countries. Other explanations include a deep sense of political and cultural alienation from the West, coupled with a desire, especially among the younger generation, to distance oneself from an identification with Bangladesh. The impact of national context is evident in how these understandings are expressed as well as in their implications for patterns of incorporation. The growth of revivalist Islam appears to be a far more contested matter among the Bangladesh-origin community in Britain than it is in the US.

Keywords: Bangladeshi immigrants; Muslim youth; revivalist Islam; identity; second-generation Muslims; South Asian immigrants.

Contemporary Muslim migrant settlements in North America and Western Europe are marked by the visible growth of revivalist Islam (Aminah 2000; Werbner 2002; Cainkar 2004; Roy 2004; Schmidt 2004; Peek 2005). Based on a fundamentalist model of Muslim identity and practice, the new Islam as it is often called, has been especially popular among migrant youth, including those born and raised in the receiving societies. These developments raise questions about the particular appeal of revivalist Islam, especially for migrant youth, as

# 2008 Taylor & Francis ISSN 0141-9870 print/1466-4356 online DOI: 10.1080/01419870701337593

244

Nazli Kibria

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

well as the implications of this trend for the incorporation of Muslim migrant communities. In this paper I explore these issues through a qualitative study of perspectives on the new Islam among Muslim Bangladesh-origin persons in Britain and the US. Writings on revivalist Islam draw our attention to the global scope and character of the organizations, ideologies and conflicts that underlie this movement. In the case of migrants to the West, the rise of the new Islam has also been attributed to the exigencies of the migration experience. That is, revivalist Islam offers a way of coping with the challenges posed by living in a new society, especially one in which Muslims find themselves to be a minority. What has, however, been relatively neglected in this discussion is the variable of national context and its possible role in shaping and mediating the rise of revivalist Islam within Muslim migrant communities in the West. Reflecting what Halliday (1999) has described as the widespread assumption of homogeneity in the Muslim world, Muslim migrants in the West are often viewed as a singular and monolithic group. In this paper I explore the potential significance of national context through a case-study of views of revivalist Islam within Bangladesh-origin migrant communities in Britain and the US and prevailing explanations for its popularity among youth. Do Bangladeshis experience and view the growth of revivalist Islam differently, depending on whether they are in Britain or the US? And what do these differences, if any, suggest about the potential role of national context in shaping the rise of revivalist Islam? Muslim migrant youth in the West The contemporary era has been marked by the widespread growth and visibility of movements of revivalist Islam within Muslim societies and communities. I use the term revivalist Islam to refer to a model of Muslim identity and practice that is marked by what Sutton and Vertigans describe as praxis, or the fusion of theory and action (2005, p. 8). Specifically, there is a concern for scripturalism and totalism, a return to basic principles and an emphasis on the significance of Islamic thought for all aspects of life (see Antoun 2001; Roy 2004; Turner 2004). As exemplified by the discourse of such powerful revivalist movements as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami, a central and notable tenet of revivalist Islam has been the notion of a global Muslim ummah a transnational suprageographical community of fellow Muslims (Hassan 2002). Revivalist Islam is an increasingly important feature of many Western societies and its Muslim migrant settlements. As reflected in the popularity of such youth-oriented groups as the Muslim Students Association in the US and the Young Muslim Organization in Britain,

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

245

the growth of revivalist Islam has been especially prominent among the youth segment of Muslim migrant communities. To be sure, it is by no means the case that all Muslim migrants or all Muslim migrant youth are active participants and supporters of revivalist groups and movements. There are those who reject and shun such organizations and others who are supportive in nominal or uneven ways. Notwithstanding this diversity of involvement, the fact that revivalist Islam has been an important trend among youth in these communities is difficult to dispute. As Glynn notes in her work on Bangladeshis in East London: although it its impossible to give exact numbers of people involved, that is not the point. [The] new Islam . . . has absorbed the energies of the most active young members of the community, allowing it to have an effect well beyond its simple numerical strength (2002, p. 969). In explaining the turn to the new Islam among youth, scholars have pointed to the impact of the social and psychological dislocations of migration. Especially when the society from which they have come is one with a Muslim majority, Muslim migrants find themselves in an environment in which Islam is no longer normative and institutionalized as it was in the past. This results in enhanced reflexivity and a questioning of previously taken-for-granted assumptions about what it means to be Muslim. In his work on Muslim migrants in Europe, Olivier Roy (2004) argues that under these circumstances of deinstitutionalization, migrants are driven to search for a pure Islam, one that is focused on a strict return to the true tenets of Islam. Analysts also agree that around the world today, for Muslim migrants and others, revivalist Islam is fueled by a deeply felt political and ideological rift and even enmity between Muslims and the Western world (Sutton and Vertigans 2005). Recent military conflicts, such as the US-led invasion of Iraq, have clearly fuelled this sense of division. In addition, for migrants in the West, the perception of a Muslim West divide is also fostered by local encounters with religious stigma. In fact many observers contend that for Muslims in the West today, experiences of hostility and exclusion from the dominant receiving society are pervasive and endemic. Since the 1980s, and particularly after 9-11 the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US there has been widespread vilification of Muslims. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of this stigmatization, in its scope and depth, has led some to argue that in the West today, Muslim identity has undergone racialization, acquiring an ascriptive and naturalized character. With this development, Muslims have become a stigmatized racial group. Thus Alexander writes with reference to the British context: Muslims have... become the new black[s] with all the associations of cultural alienation, deprivation and danger (2000, p. 15).

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

246

Nazli Kibria

Muslim migrants have of course responded to these conditions of hostility and stigmatization in varied and situationally shifting ways. Thus Grewal (2003) notes how in the immediate aftermath of 9-11, there were Muslims in the US who engaged in protective strategies such as visible displays of the American flag and avoidance of neighbourhoods with mosques. At the same time, the dynamics of reactive solidarity have also been powerfully evident. In the face of intensified scrutiny and hostility, Muslims have developed a greater and more self-conscious sense of collective identity, and more interest in the cultivation and support of Muslim institutions and movements. In a study of Muslim university students in New York and Colorado, Peek notes their efforts in the aftermath of 9-11 to strengthen and assert their identities at this time in order to strengthen their positive self-perception and correct public misconceptions (2005, p. 240). For later-generation Muslim youth, revivalist Islam may provide a particularly attractive source of community, support and self-esteem. For one thing, their expectations of equitable treatment from and acceptance by the dominant society are likely to be higher than that of their immigrant parents. Thus the experience of Muslim stigmatization provokes a particularly sharp reaction among them. Under these conditions, revivalist Islam offers a well-defined set of rules by which to conduct ones life and to assert a sense of positive difference from the dominant society. It also gives a powerful sense of membership in a global community that transcends citizenship and nationality. Analysts have noted the particular appeal of the ummah ideology for Muslim migrants and particularly for their offspring who are coping with the dislocations and tensions of identity generated by the migration process (Aminah 2000; Masood 2005). Scholars also note that for Muslim migrant youth, the experience of marginalization may be further compounded by a growing sense of alienation from the immigrant community (Jacobsen 1997; Aminah 2000; Glynn 2002; Masood 2005). Given their limited exposure to the homeland, later-generation youth are increasingly unable to relate meaningfully to the ethnic culture of their parents. At the same time, they feel distant from and unaccepted by the dominant society. Confronted then with a deep sense of cultural and social void, these later-generation migrants turn for support and meaning to the institutions and ideologies of revivalist Islam. Among other things, revivalist Islam may provide Muslim migrant youth with a means to assert their distinction and independence from the immigrant generation. Of note here is that the new Islam which attracts the young may be quite different from the style of Islam practised by the immigrant generation. Among South Asian immigrants, for example, religious practices are heavily informed by homeland folk traditions and

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

247

ideologies of nationalism as well as the mystical traditions of Sufi Islam. The divided approaches towards Islam along generational lines may become a flashpoint for family conflicts produced by the strains and tensions of the migration process. Thus Jacobsen (1997) in her study of British Pakistanis, describes how revivalist Islam is invoked by the young as a source of authority and legitimacy in its efforts to reject the restrictions imposed on them by their parents and, more generally, to assert their independence. She writes: many of the respondents criticized their parents for maintaining interpretations of Islam which are excessively confining or narrow, and based their arguments on the notion of there being a distinction between the ethnic culture to which their parents adhere . . . and the true teachings of Islam (Jacobsen 1997, p. 241). To summarize, the literature usefully draws our attention to a critical set of shared conditions for Muslim migrants in the West. The rise of revivalist Islam reflects the challenges of migration, in particular of settlement in an environment in which Islam is no longer widely institutionalized and in fact perceived by some to be at odds with the dominant society. In general, Muslims in the West have faced growing anti-Muslim sentiment. For migrant youth who face marginalization in both the dominant society and the immigrant community, revivalist Islam may offer a powerful means to assert a positive and distinctive sense of identity. In this paper I look at the experiences of some Muslim migrants who are of shared national origins but who are settled in different Western countries. Using this case-study approach, I hope to offer insights into the formative role played by national contexts. While the exclusive focus on Bangladeshis is a limitation of the study, it is also one that allows for intensive exploration of the complex intersections of national-specific traditions of Islam, migration and receiving society conditions. In what follows, I use the term national context to refer to the specific set of incorporation conditions that face the migrant group in question. These conditions are shaped by the groups history of migration and adaptation to the society of settlement, the nature of transnational ties with the country of origin, as well as the politics and policies of incorporation prevalent in the receiving society. My analysis begins then with a discussion of the national contexts of Bangladeshorigin migration to Britain and the US. Comparing national contexts: Bangladesh migration and settlement in Britain and the US The history of Bengali1 migration to Britain can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase dates from the early twentieth century

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

248

Nazli Kibria

when seamen from the Sylhet region entered Britain and took up work in local textile mills, leather factories and, eventually in small restaurants. This flow of migrant men, largely rural, and unskilled in background, was facilitated in the post World War II years by the 1948 Nationality Act which allowed unrestricted entry into Britain for the citizens of former colonies. The size of the migration flow at this time was, however, sharply limited by the restrictions placed on the overseas travel of Bengalis by the Pakistani government through such mechanisms as the denial of passports. With the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, these restrictions disappeared but, by this time, entry into Britain had also become more difficult. Starting with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962,2 a series of increasingly restrictive laws worked to limit the flow into Britain of persons from its former colonies (Hickman 2005). The 1970s thus marks the second and current phase of Bangladesh migration to Britain. If the first phase was marked by an overwhelming predominance of men with a sojourning orientation towards their stay in Britain, the second phase has involved family reunification and permanent settlement. That is, much of the migration flow has resulted from the sponsorship of family members by those already present in Britain. Thus the Bangladesh community in Britain today is no longer dominated by male bachelors but consists of settled families. At the same time, the roots of current migration flows in earlier established networks have made for important continuities over time in the character of the community. For example, the Bangladeshorigin community in Britain remains overwhelmingly regional in identity and orientation. To the extent that homeland ties persist, they are focused on Sylhet, expressed in trips back to ancestral villages in Sylhet and the support of charitable works in that region. Transnational Sylhet-centred ties have also been fostered by a not uncommon strategy of returning to marry. That is, some families have recruited marriage partners for their children from home districts in Sylhet. This has served as an important mechanism of ongoing immigration for Bangladeshis into Britain as well as reinforcement of ties with Sylhet. Today there are 283,063 persons of Bangladesh origin in Britain. There are significant enclaves of Bangladeshis in the old industrial neighbourhoods of Tower Hamlets, East London and Oldham, Great Manchester. Observers note that young British-born Bangladeshis continue to be heavily reliant on the low-paid and unskilled service sectors in which their parents held jobs; intergenerational upward mobility has been limited (Gardner 1995; Eade and Garbin 2002). According to UK National Statistics (2005), 60 per cent of Bangladesh-origin men are employed in the distribution, hotel and restaurant industry. A study in Oldham reports unemployment rates

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

249

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

for young Bangladesh-origin men (ages 1624) to be as high as 25 per cent, almost double the rate (13 per cent) experienced by their white counterparts (Dale et al. 2002). As shown in Table 1, a variety of indicators show Bangladesh-origin persons in Britain to be in a position of relative socioeconomic disadvantage. In comparison to Indian and Pakistani-origin persons in Britain, among Bangladeshis, male unemployment rates are higher, self-employment rates are lower and there are fewer persons with educational qualifications. While the socioeconomic gap between Bangladeshis and Pakistanis is moderate, it is extremely wide with Indians. As described by Eade (1996), p. 236), the early 1980s was a time of significant political mobilization and development for the Bangladeshorigin community in Britain. Over the course of the 1980s, the community increasingly turned its attention to participation in antiracist campaigns, faced as they were with the growing strength of the racist politics of the National Front and British National Party. The period was one of growing involvement for the community in local politics as Bangladeshis worked to develop representation on local councils3 and to push for changes in housing, education and jobs. The activism of this period was often marked by an emphasis on issues of class and racial unity, at times under the broadly inclusive banner of black. The participation by British Bangladeshis in the 1989 Muslim protests against Rushdies The Satanic Verses is often cited as a watershed, signaling a movement away from the anti-racist politics of the 1970s and 1980s and towards a focus on the politics of Islam. Reflecting this development, the 1990s were a period of intensive growth in Britain of Muslim institutions, including mosques and Islamic schools. The July 2005 terrorist attacks in London may mark the beginning of yet another political phase for Bangladeshis in Britain. While the precise character of this emerging phase is not yet
Table 1. South Asian origin populations in Britain: socioeconomic indicators and characteristics
Bangladeshi Total population Unemployment rates, males (%) Self-employment rates* (%) Professional employment rates* (%) With educational qualifications**(%) 283,063 18 10 9.8 56 Indian 1,053,41 1 7 13 17.8 82 Pakistani 747,285 14 23 9.3 66

Source: UK National Statistics Online 2005, Focus on ethnicity and identity. * as a percentage of all in employment. ** those with GCSE (O-level) attainment or higher.

250

Nazli Kibria

clear, it does appear to mark a time of intensified official scrutiny for Muslim communities in Britain. In comparison to Britain, Bangladesh migration to the US has a more recent history. In the years after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, small numbers of Bangladeshis, mostly students and professionals, took advantage of the liberalized 1965 US immigration laws to enter into the US. However, it is only since the 1980s that the Bangladesh presence in the US has become a notable one. According to the 1980 census there were 5,880 Bangladeshis in the US, a number that rose to 92,235 in 2000. Because of the recency of migration, the Bangladesh-origin population in the US is today an overwhelmingly foreign-born one, a pattern that contrasts with Britain where the British-born are coming to predominate. The late twentieth-century Bangladesh migration to the US has occurred through a variety of legal mechanisms, including employer and family sponsorship as well as the Diversity Program, popularly known as the Green Card Lottery.4 A review of 19962001 data from the US Immigration and Naturalization Services showed family sponsorship, the Diversity Program and employment-based preferences to account for 57.4 per cent, 30.5 per cent and 10 per cent of Bangladesh admissions respectively (Kibria forthcoming). Reflecting the variety of admission mechanisms involved, the Bangladesh American population today is a diverse one, involving persons from a wide range of regional and socioeconomic backgrounds. This is in contrast to the Bangladesh British community whose relative homogeneity in these respects reflects its embeddedness in a limited number of historically established migration networks. Of particular relevance to understanding the growing socioeconomic diversity of the Bangladesh American population is the fact that whereas the employment-based provisions for entry in US immigration laws have favoured skilled workers and professionals, the Diversity Lottery has offered entry opportunities to persons of less privileged socioeconomic background. In general, what the available socioeconomic data on Bangladesh Americans show is an emerging pattern of socioeconomic polarization, one in which more recent entrants tend to be disadvantaged in comparison to earlier settlers.5 As shown in Table 2, 48.4 per cent of Bangladeshis in the US are college educated and 19.3 per cent have less than a high school education. While 30 per cent of Bangladeshi men are in managerial and professional occupations, 40 per cent hold jobs in the service or production/manufacturing sectors. The growing employment of Bangladeshis in low-level service jobs is exemplified by their visible presence in the New York taxicab industry (Kibria 2005). Table 2 also shows that, as in the British context, in the US as well, Bangladeshis are in a position of relative socioeconomic

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

251

Table 2. South Asian origin populations in the US: socioeconomic indicators and characteristics
Bangladeshi Total population (N) College graduate or more (%) Less than high school (%) Median household income ($) Persons below poverty line (%)* Persons in managerial and professional occupations (%)* Persons in service and production/ crafts/operators occupations (%)* Self-employed persons (%)*
Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

Indian 1,036,600 71.9 9.7 70,000 5.0 49.6 21.6 9.8

Pakistani 233,020 51.6 17.3 47,400 11.2 30.1 13.8 10.1

92,235 48.4 19.3 40,000 16.3 23.6 30.4 8.0

Source: 2000 Census of 5 per cent Public Use Microdata Sample, weighted data. * Persons aged 2564 and in the labour force.

disadvantage in comparison to the other major South Asian groups. Once again, the gap between Indians and Bangladeshis is an especially pronounced one. In recent years, as the numbers of Bangladeshis in the US has grown, business and residential enclaves of Bangladeshis (e.g. Astoria, New York) have emerged in some urban areas of the US. Of particular note is the New York metropolitan area which is home to about half of all foreign-born Bangladeshis in the country (Kibria 2005). Nonetheless, Bangladesh settlement patterns in the US are overall more varied and less concentrated in a few limited areas than they are in Britain. As far as political developments are concerned, the 9-11 attacks have clearly marked an important period of change. Prior to 9-11, community organizations and activities were marked by a focus on cultural activities and homeland political concerns. In the aftermath of 9-11, organizations, such as the Bangladeshi-American Foundation Inc. (BAFI), which are explicitly concerned with fostering the communitys engagement with the US political system have emerged (Kibria 2005). These developments have undoubtedly been spurred by a growing sense of vulnerability among community members. Following the 9-11 attacks, Bangladeshis in the US found themselves, along with other South Asians, to be the targeted victims of hate-crimes.6 The community has also felt the impact of the various surveillance measures for Muslim immigrants instituted by the US government. These have included mandatory special registration and interviews with immigration authorities as well as detainment and deportation for those suspected of illicit activities (Maira 2004, p. 220). In summary then, the British and American Bangladeshi communities are clearly different in important respects. The British community is a more long-established one, and has a larger proportion of

252

Nazli Kibria

British-born persons within its ranks. The British community, unlike the American one, has been concentrated in its origins and orientation in the Sylhet region of Bangladesh. The US migrants have tended, in contrast to their British counterparts, to be from urban and educated backgrounds. The general socioeconomic profile of the US community is a more favourable one as highlighted by the far higher proportion of persons in managerial and professional jobs in the US by comparison to Britain. At the same time, the ever-sharpening pattern of socioeconomic polarization within the Bangladesh American population suggests that large segments of both the US and British communities are in a shared position of socioeconomic disadvantage. Of note too is the fact that in both Britain and the US, Bangladeshis are socioeconomically marginalized in comparison to other South Asian groups, especially Indians. As far as active engagement with host society politics, the Bangladeshi community in Britain clearly has a far longer and well-established tradition and institutional framework than in the US. Of particular note is the comparative absence in the US of a community history of participation in anti-racist campaigns. There are also important general differences between Britain and the US as national contexts. In the US, in comparison to Britain, traditions of civic nationalism and immigration are such as to offer relatively favourable opportunities for integration. Immigration has been a central and long-standing feature of national identity in the US, in a manner that is not the case in Britain. The difference is captured, in part, by the popular comment: the US is a country of immigrants, while Britain is a country with immigrants. Reflecting this assessment, a New York Times report on South Asian Muslim youth in Britain notes that integration into the dominant society may be more difficult for them than their US counterparts: Reared in an often racist milieu, they feel excluded from mainstream British society, which has so far not yielded to hyphenated immigrant identities as [in] America (Waldman 2005). It is also the case that immigrants to Britain and the US confront and negotiate racial environments that are distinctive in certain respects. Both in absolute and proportional terms, the non-white population in the US is much larger than in Britain (Loury, Modood and Teles 2005, p. 7). The colouring of Britain has been fuelled by immigration, much of it since World War II, from formerly colonized countries. In the US, the presence of the non-white population is reflective not only of immigration but also of a history of slavery. Among the specific consequences of these divergent histories are different notions of racial hierarchy. As Song (2003), p. 123) observes, in the US, the racial hierarchy is widely understood to be one that is organized around the polarized racial positions of white Americans and African Americans. Faced with this sharply defined racial

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

253

hierarchy, non-white immigrants may work to differentiate themselves from African Americans, in an effort to avoid the stigma of location at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. In Britain too, as in the US, the racial hierarchy is defined by the dominance of whites. But in Britain, it is a generalized conception of minorities (rather than a particular minority group) that has defined the lower end of the hierarchy. Thus both scholars and activists in Britain have often emphasized the commonality of experience among minorities in relation to the white majority. It is of note however that this undifferentiated view of the minority experience in Britain is an increasingly contested one. Indeed, some argue that it is working-class Muslims who now define the bottom of the British racial hierarchy (Modood 1994; Anwar 1998).
Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

Study methods The analyses that follow are based on materials from an ongoing study of Islam and identity in the Bangladesh diaspora. I draw here specifically on my findings from fieldwork conducted during 20014 with persons of Bangladesh origin in Britain and the US. In both countries, I attended community events and gatherings, and visited local mosques and community centres. My fieldwork was concentrated in London and New York the two major centres of Bangladeshi settlement in Britain and the US. In Britain, I conducted in-depth interviews with forty-four persons and in the US, with fifty-eight persons of Bangladeshi origin. The interviews took place in either Bangla or English, depending on the preference of the informant. They lasted from one to three hours and most were tape-recorded. Tapes and notes were later transcribed and, if necessary, translated into English. I located respondents through snowball sampling methods whereby those interviewed were asked for referrals to other potential informants. In doing so I made an effort to avoid over-sampling from a particular social network by limiting the number of referrals from any one snowball chain and continuing to recruit participants from other sources. I particularly sought referrals to persons who would expand the range of sample, especially in terms of socioeconomic status as well as levels of participation in Muslim organizations and groups. The interviewees ranged in age from 18 to 68, and they included approximately equal numbers of women and men. In the British sample, eighteen of the forty-four informants were first-generation immigrants; twenty-two informants were either second or third generation7 immigrants. In the US sample, thirty-four of the fiftyeight interviewees were first-generation immigrants and twenty-four were either 1.58 or second-generation immigrants. Reflecting larger

254

Nazli Kibria

demographic patterns, the US sample, in comparison to the British one, included a somewhat larger proportion of persons with college-level educations and working in technical or professional jobs. In the British sample, thirteen of the twenty-two later-generation informants described themselves as being heavily involved in Muslim organizations and groups. In the US, the proportion was slightly less, involving eleven out of the twenty-four later-generation informants. Making sense of the new Islam In what follows I turn to the accounts of Bangladesh-origin persons in Britain and the US about the new Islam its place in their own lives and in that of others around them, especially Bangladesh-origin youth. As we will see, the British and American accounts were marked by a number of common themes. But there were also some notable differences, reflecting variations of national context. Bengali Islam, new Islam, and an intergenerational divide In describing their approaches towards and understandings of Islam, my later-generation informants in both Britain and the US often spoke of feeling distant from Bengali Islam or the style of Islam prevalent in Bangladesh. Confirming the findings of other studies (see Glynn 2002), I found that the more religiously involved later-generation Bangladeshis were especially critical of the deep-rooted presence in Bengali Islam of local Bengali folk and Sufi traditions such as the worship of saint cults and harvest festivals. These practices were seen as contrary to pure Islam, violating the religions core tenets and spirit. But I also found critiques of Bengali Islam to revolve around two other notions. These were notable for their widespread presence among not only those who were religiously involved but also among those whose support for and participation in revivalist movements was negligent. The first idea was that Bengali Islam, unlike true Islam, legitimated social inequalities, such as those of social class and gender, as evidenced by the highly stratified and unjust nature of contemporary Bangladesh society. The second criticism was that in its unreflexive and routinized character, Bengali Islam was contrary to the selfconscious spirit of devotion necessary to the belief and practice of true Islam. Unlike Bengali Islam, the new Islam was vitally premised on individual choice and self-reflection. More generally, Bengali Islam represented tradition and hierarchy, in contrast to the reflexive modernity and equality of the new Islam. Both the British and American informants spoke of how the Bengali Islam versus new Islam dichotomy could be part of a sense of

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

255

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

generational division, between the immigrant generation and the later generations. That is, the immigrant generation, because of its greater connection with Bangladesh, was also understood to be more closely aligned with Bengali Islam. However, it was also the case that a sense of generational division in relation to the new Islam was far sharper and more pervasive in Britain than in the US. As noted by Glynn (2002, p. 983) in her analysis of British Bengali life, in Britain this divide has at times taken on a sharply political character. She describes a number of well-publicized political issues on which Bangladeshiorigin parents and their Islamist children have taken opposing public stands.9 When I was in the midst of fieldwork, a hot topic of discussion was community disagreement over the observation of the South Asian Muslim tradition of Shab-e-Barat.10 There was much talk of how the younger generation had distanced themselves from the observation of Shab-e-Barat, viewing it as a prime example of the cultural syncretism that was characteristic of Bengali Islam. The older generation objected, vigorously defending Shab-e-Barat as an important Muslim practice. In Britain then, the notion of a generational divide on religion and specifically on Islamic practice has become a standard theme of Bangladeshi community discourse. In this discourse, the turn to revivalist Islam among the young is typically attributed by elders to crises of identity, specifically to an absence among the young of meaningful connection to Bengali culture. We see this in the account of a community leader in London, a man in his 50s who had migrated to Britain in the 1970s as a young adult: We, our generation, we were religious-minded (dharmik), not fundamentalist (moulobadi). My generation does not have the identity problem, we are Bangali.11 But the younger generation, they dont know what it is to be Bangali. On the other hand, they are not part of British society. So where will they go? They go to Young Muslim Brotherhood. In the US, this understanding of a community generational divide around the new Islam, while by no means completely absent, was far less pervasive and institutionalized in the communitys public discourse than it was in Britain. This difference may reflect the fact that the Bangladesh-origin population in the US, unlike in Britain, is an overwhelmingly foreign-born one. Thus it is immigrants (rather than the US-born) who tend to dominate community forums and a generation-based political divide has yet to become highly visible in the community. Also of relevance are recent trends of Islamization and the spread of revivalist Islam in Bangladesh (see Riaz 2004). Because Bangladeshis in the US tend to be more recent

256

Nazli Kibria

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

migrants, they are more likely than their British counterparts to have been exposed to revivalist Islam before migration. They are then both more familiar with and receptive to the new Islam that attracts their offspring. Indeed, my materials suggest that participation in the institutions and activities of revivalist Islam is more likely in the US to be a family affair, not simply tolerated but even actively supported by immigrant family elders. I found that parents in the US often welcomed the new Islam into their childrens lives, viewing it as a useful tool by which to avert the social and cultural assimilation of their children into the mainstream society. Moniza, a mother of three children and living in Queens, New York did feel some regret about her childrens growing distance from Bengali culture as they moved towards the new Islam. But she took great comfort from the fact that they were not becoming American: When Sara [14-year-old daughter] started wearing hijab [headscarf] and becoming active in the Muslim groups, I didnt know what to think about it. I dress in a decent way and I think that our Bengali culture and dress is very decent, very modest. I dont think we need to cover our heads to be decent. But I tell myself, it is better for my daughter to be hijabi [someone who wears hijab] than to be American. I look at how the young American girls dress. I look at the problems of this culture, how children treat their parents with disrespect. It is not so bad that Sara is becoming involved in religion. If in the US, the new Islam was seen by parents as useful for averting cultural assimilation, in Britain, the emphasis instead was on how it produced distance, taking children away from the ethnic community. A common theme among British parents was that of loss of losing children to the new Islam. Amin, the father of four children, had lived in East London for almost three decades, since his late teens. He struggled with how two of his children had become deeply involved with the revivalist East London mosque. Amin was far more concerned about the influence of the new Islam than that of British society on his children. He quickly dismissed the possibility of their integration into the latter, given racism: Our community, our culture, is being torn apart by the influence of places like the East London mosque. The British people dont accept us, they have never accepted us and they will never accept us. I have lived here for many years, but I never questioned my Bangali identity. My children, they tell me, we are not Bangali; these are

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

257

old-fashioned ideas. Our children are being pulled away from us, we are losing them. Muslim and Bangladeshi as public identities Both the British and US informants spoke at some length about the importance of Muslim as a public and ascribed identity in British and US society. That is, in the eyes of others, and especially in the dominant society, one was seen as a Muslim; it was ones identity as Muslim that was the most meaningful for others. For all the informants, but in a particularly marked way for those in the US, the salience of Muslim as a public identity had been enhanced by the events of 9-11. Both the British and American informants were keenly aware of how the growing significance of Muslim as a public identity had generated a growth of interest in Islam, particularly among latergeneration Bangladeshis. Many observed that attendance by young Bangladeshis at Islamic study groups had risen quite dramatically in recent years. In speaking of the power of Muslim identity, both the British and American informants comparatively referred to their experience of Bangladeshi as a public identity. Whereas for the British, this was another important public identity, for the Americans, Bangladeshi was experienced in largely invisible terms and thus understood to be of limited significance. In the US, as I was often told, ones assertion of Bangladesh origins is often greeted with a blank stare or the response of Bangladesh? Wheres that? Tahmina, a 19-year-old woman who had grown up since the age of 7 in the Boston area gave an eloquent description of such encounters and how they reinforced her sense that Muslim was a far more potent public identity than Bangladeshi: Americans dont see us as Bangladeshi. If they just see us on the street, maybe they think that we are Indian, or Mexican, Latin American. It does depend on how one looks, and how one is dressed. If I say Im from Bangladesh, the most common reaction is Wheres that? Or: Oh, thats the place with all the starving people. They have no idea. But if they understand that Im Muslim, either from my name or for whatever reason, then its different. Im not saying that they actually have real knowledge of Muslims either, but the idea of Muslim means something to them whereas Bangladesh means almost nothing to them. As Tahminas words suggest, to the extent that Bangladesh did in the US evoke meanings during encounters within the dominant society, it was of a desperately poor country, ravaged by natural disasters, poverty and corruption. These meanings were not such as to

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

258

Nazli Kibria

enhance the perceived advantages of affirming a Bangladeshi identity. Indeed, a number of US informants spoke of feeling some embarrassment about admitting that they were from Bangladesh in certain situations because of the countrys poor international image. Jamshed, a 24-year-old living in Brooklyn, New York, described with some irony how he never tried to counter the negative imagery by bringing the more positive aspects of Bangladesh to the attention of others. In a tone of defiant frustration, he instead affirmed the problems of Bangladesh: When I tell people Im from Bangladesh, they say, Oh yeah, poor, starving people. Floods and famines. Its a fact of course, what can you say? I say, yes, its poor and starving and you know weve been ranked as the first or second most corrupt country in the world. [Laughing] Other countries are famous for their food or music, were famous for being poor and corrupt. Studies show that immigrant groups in the US may use a strategy of ethnonational identification in order to cope with racism. That is, they work to disidentify from racial stigma and to concurrently publicly emphasize their ethnonational origins as an alternative identification to a racial one (Fernandez-Kelly and Schauffler 1994; Kibria 2002). For example, Waters (1999) has described how immigrants from the Caribbean to the US may at times emphasize such ethnonational identities as Jamaican in order to avoid stigmatization as black. My findings suggest that among Bangladeshis in the US, Bangladeshi is rarely invoked as part of such a strategy of counterpoint to the identity of Muslim and its attendant stigmatization. In Britain, in contrast to the U.S, informants were far less likely to have experienced the response of Bangladesh? Wheres that? The greater British familiarity with Bangladesh is no doubt a reflection both of the history of British colonialism in South Asia as well as the long-standing presence of a Bangladeshi migrant community in Britain. As in the US, in Britain too, the perceived advantages of affirming a Bangladeshi identity were diminished by negative imagery. In the British case however, this imagery was rooted not only in the international reputation of Bangladesh as a country, but also in specific local stereotypes that reflect the history and conditions of Bangladesh settlement in Britain. Fawzia, an informant who had been born and raised in London, spoke of prevailing stereotypes of Bengalis as backward, lowly educated and poor. But, as her remarks suggest, the stereotypical traditionalism of Bangladeshis was not without its redeeming features. Orientalist notions of Bangladeshis as hardworking and family-oriented were also at play:

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

259

The assumption is that Bengalis are in the restaurant trade or in an inferior sort of job if they are working at all. The assumption is that they dont have much education, theyre backward and have forced marriages. The positive part is that Bengalis are seen as familyoriented and hard-working. As a community they stick together and take care of each other. Theres actually a lot of admiration out there for our culture. Thus if in both Britain and the US, Muslim was acknowledged to be a dominant public identity, in the US it was experienced in more exclusive terms. In Britain, Muslim and Bangladesh seemed to co-exist as layered public identities. Among the possible consequences of this variation is a greater likelihood in Britain that the later generations will continue to acknowledge their Bangladeshi identity, faced as they are with a situation in which others recognize it. Moral corruption and narratives of mobility In both Britain and the US, Bangladeshi understandings of revivalist Islam were marked by its conception as a response, a possible antidote to the moral and spiritual corruptions of Western culture. Even those whose own religious involvements were quite minimal spoke of how Islam, and in particular the new Islam, was a counter-trend to the dangers posed by Western culture, of immorality, materialism and selfabsorption. Many spoke of a moral and spiritual opposition between Muslim and American/British culture. This opposition, particularly in its conception of American/British culture, was further understood in relation to two different types of mobility narratives. The first was of upward class mobility, accompanied by some degree of integration into the dominant receiving society. The second and contrasting one was of a downward spiral into urban underclass culture. While neither of these narratives was exclusive to either the British or American informants, I found that British informants were more likely to invoke narratives of downward mobility and the US informants, ones of upward mobility. Mahfuz, an engineering student in the US, spoke at some length of the moral contrasts of Muslim and American culture, and the dangers posed by efforts to achieve upward mobility through assimilation into the mainstream culture. Mahfuz was particularly critical of what he saw as the immigrant generations tendency to try to be like whites in their effort to gain acceptance and to succeed in the dominant US society. In his remarks, Mahfuz conflates notions of American white and mainstream culture, thus highlighting the racialized quality of this narrative of upward mobility, in particular its association with white Americans:

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

260

Nazli Kibria

A lot of Bangladeshi [immigrant] parents are blindly copying the white culture, in the way that they conduct themselves. They want to fit in, to succeed. They do this even though they dont really know any American people in more than a superficial way. I have been growing up being able to compare our Muslim culture and American culture. American culture has a lot of problems. I have a close white friend and she is a perfect example. She is extremely wealthy, a horrible student, and she takes depression drugs. Her father is a psychiatrist and he prescribed the drugs for her and her mother and sister take them too. This is very common to American life, its always to take the easy way out, instead of searching within for strength.
Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

As I have mentioned, narratives of upward mobility were less prominent in the British accounts than the US ones. An exception was Enamul, a British informant who had been born and raised in a poor neighbourhood of East London and who self-consciously described himself as one of the success stories of the community. Enamul had attended an elite university and he now held a management post at a London bank. While many of his childhood peers had remained locked in the low-level service jobs of his parents generation, he had managed to overcome these disadvantages. He also prided himself on resisting the dangers of absorption into British culture through involvement in Muslim organizations and self-conscious efforts to maintain a Muslim lifestyle. As in the previous account, here too, in the context of upward mobility, British culture is strongly associated with whiteness: I think my profile is a little different from the average Bengali because I have always tried to make sure that I know enough about British culture so that I can get ahead and protect myself. But I have not forgotten my roots. I attend Citywide, weekly meetings at the mosque here where Muslim professionals get together to talk about various issues. When I compare myself to my white colleagues at work, I definitely see a difference. I feel that as a Muslim I have a sense of discipline and purpose about myself which is quite lacking in the average white person. I dont drink and smoke, I dont womanize, and I work hard. I know what is important my family, my spirit and my commitment to being a good Muslim. As observers have noted, involvement in religious groups and organizations may offer an important alternative path for at-risk Muslim youth. That is, the new Islam, for disadvantaged youth, can prevent a trajectory of downward spiral into the world of delinquency and disengagement from the labor market (Masood 2005; Waldman

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

261

2005). The account of Maher, a 21-year-old from Cambridge, Massachusetts, affirms the potentially important role of the new Islam as an alternative to absorption into underclass youth culture. Maher had come to the US in his early teens with his family. By his late teens Maher had become disengaged from school and increasingly rebellious and defiant towards his parents. But through a turn to religion he was able to turn his life around: For the past year or so, I have become more involved with my religion. Islam has given me peace. I have a sense of purpose, of discipline. Some tablighis [missionaries] came to the house and invited me to the mosque to pray. There is a new mosque down our street. I started to go. I also went to an istema [Islamic assembly] in Pennsylvania to learn how to be a good Muslim. Before that I was going through some tough times. I was basically living in my car, with friends, staying out all night. I couldnt find peace anywhere. In high school I started hanging out with the bad crowd. These were mainly African American kids who basically had been in trouble all their lives. A lot of them are in jail now or dead. I became one of them. I became black. I looked black and I was treated like I was black. As suggested by Mahers words, the US narratives of downward spiral were likely to be marked by the explicit presence of African Americans as a reference point. That is, in the understandings of the Bangladesh Americans, absorption into underclass culture brought association with African Americans and it attendant racial stigma. While in Britain as well, the spectre of downward mobility was also generally viewed to be part of a minority experience, it was less clearly tied to that of a particular minority group. In a related vein, the British informants were more likely to see the problem of noshto chele or boys gone bad as one that was coming from within the community, generated by Bangladeshi youth themselves. This was in contrast to the US accounts, where the problem was understood to be a matter of young Bangladeshis being led astray by other minority group youth. Underlying these differences in perspective were structural variations of national context. In comparison to the US, Bangladeshis in Britain have a longer history of socioeconomic disadvantage and segregation from the dominant society. Conclusions Popular understandings of revivalist Islam assume its fundamental hostility to modernity (Turner 2004, p. 197). But my findings suggest a more complex relationship (cf. Sutton and Vertigans 2005).

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

262

Nazli Kibria

Bangladeshis in Britain and the US saw the rise of revivalist Islam in their communities, particularly among the young, to be part of a movement of modernity (cf. Roy 2004; Schmidt 2004). In their constructions of the new Islam as modern, immigrant and homeland religious traditions specifically those of Bengali Islam were a point of contrast. Bangladesh itself was a representation of tradition and a point of contradistinction for expressions among the later-generation informants, of their own modern identity. My materials thus draw attention to how unitary conceptions of the country of origin may be important for Muslim migrants in their understandings of the new Islam. But the new Islam and its rise was understood to be not only about affirming modernity. It was also an expression of antipathy towards and anxiety about modernity, in particular of the dangers of moral and spiritual corruption posed by it. Reflecting the impulse of what Antoun (2001) had described as a search for purity in an impure world, Bangladeshis in Britain and the US spoke of how revivalist Islam could be a means for protecting oneself from the moral laxity, commodification and spiritual vacuity in the surrounding culture. As we have seen, the rise of the new Islam was widely understood by both the British and American Bangladesh-origin informants to be a response to racism and feelings of alienation from the West as well as a rejection of Bengali Islam and all that it represented. The impact of national context was evident not so much in the presence or absence of these themes, but rather in the specific form taken by them, and in their particular consequences. If in both communities, the new Islam was understood to hold particular interest for the young, in Britain it was more likely to be viewed as a source of generational conflict and division. Underlying this difference is the dense quality of Bengali community ties in Britain, reflecting a history of sharp exclusion from the dominant society as well as the presence of vigorous transnational ties and networks. It was also the case that in both national contexts, Muslim was a potent public identity for the Bangladeshis, a critical social marker in the dominant society. But in Britain, unlike the case in the US, the fact of ones Bangladeshi origins was also likely to receive acknowledgement and recognition in public, dominant society settings. If this difference persists into the future, it may be that later-generation Bangladeshis in Britain will in the long-run be more inclined than their counterparts in the US to show greater interest in and attachment to their Bangladeshi identification, given its significance in the eyes of others. The impact of national context was evident also in the types of narratives of mobility that laced through the discussions of what was

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

263

appealing to Bangladesh-origin youth about the new Islam. For the US informants, fears of cultural loss and assimilation were frequently tied to notions of upward mobility, of the prospects of integration into the mainstream US society. In contrast, many of the British Bangladeshis with whom I spoke were more conscious and concerned about the dangers of downward mobility, of integration into underclass British culture. Among other things, this finding brings our attention to how socioeconomic contexts that are quite varied may support the rise of the new Islam. While the turn to revivalist Islam may indeed be a response to marginality and disadvantage, it cannot be simply reduced to the idea of coping with poverty (cf. Sutton and Vertigans 2005). What explains the basic similarity in understandings of the new Islam among the British and American Bangladeshis? Especially given the quite divergent histories of Bangladeshi settlement in Britain and the US, I expected to see more pronounced differences. It may of course be the case that the differences will become more visible in the future, as the recently settled Bangladesh American community develops a longer history and more distinctive patterns of integration into the US. But there are also compelling reasons to believe that the new Islam will continue to be understood in quite similar ways by Bangladeshis on both sides of the Atlantic. Both British and American Bangladeshis respond to the rise of the new Islam from their location within societies that are certainly different but also share many features. Britain and the US are Western liberal democracies that have both been grappling, in recent times, with notions of what it means to be a multicultural and multiracial society. Among Muslims, Britain and the US are likely to be viewed as close allies, both culturally and politically. In addition, contemporary revivalist Islam is clearly a global and transnational movement, with ideologies and organizations that extend across space (see Mandaville 2001). Whether it is in London or New York, Muslim migrants have the opportunity to participate in a common network of Islamic organizations. A related point is the growing prospects for the development of transnational networks of information and ideas between Bangladeshis in Britain and Bangladeshis in the US. In other words, common approaches towards revivalist Islam may be fostered in the two communities by the exchange of information between them a process that is clearly facilitated by the development of the internet and other communication technologies. It is of note that in the past, these exchanges were limited by the strongly regional (Sylheti) character of the Bangladesh British community, which did not favour the development of connections with the more regionally diverse (in origins) Bangladesh American population.

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

264

Nazli Kibria

A better understanding of how national context shapes the growth of revivalist Islam for migrants clearly requires that we look at a wider array of migrant groups and contexts than those that have been examined in this paper. Contemporary revivalist Islam is a global and transnational movement. But it is also likely to reflect the impact of national context, and more generally, the tremendous heterogeneity of the Muslim migrant experience. Acknowledgements This research was funded in part by a 20034 grant from the American Sociological Association, Fund for the Advancement of the Discipline.
Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

Notes
1. I use the term Bengali rather than Bangladeshi when discussing the pre-1971 period, before the establishment of the Bangladesh state. 2. The law restricted entry to Commonwealth citizens who has been born in the US or held a passport issued by the UK government. 3. Loury, Modood and Teles (2005, p.11) note that the penetration of local councils by Commonwealth immigrants has coincided with the progressive weakening of local government in Britain. 4. The lottery is open only to those from countries that have sent fewer than 50,000 people to the US in the past ve years. 5. US Bureau of Census 2005 (5 per cent Public Use Microdata Sample) on foreign-born Bangladeshis shows that in 1980, 66 per cent were college graduates, a percentage which declined to 46 per cent in 2000. 6. The National Asian Pacic Legal Consortium (2001) reports that in the three-month period following the 11 September attacks, there were nearly 250 bias-motivated incidents and two murders targeting Asian Pacic Americans. 7. I counted as second-generation those who were the children of immigrants and either born in the host country or had arrived there before the age of 12. The third-generation included those who were the grandchildren of immigrants. 8. The term 1.5 generation refers to those who arrived in the host country in their teenage years. 9. Glynn (2002) writes of the visibility of this generational divide in a demonstration against Maulana Sayedee, a Jamat-i-Islami Member of the Parliament in Bangladesh who is accused of 1971 war crimes in Bangladesh. 10. In Bangladesh and throughout South Asia, Shab-e-barat is observed as the night of good fortune. The belief is that ones fate for the coming year is determined on this night. Many observe fasting during the day and pray throughout the night. 11. Bangali and Bengali are generally used interchangeably to refer to persons from Bangladesh and more generally from the Bengal region of South Asia.

References
ALEXANDER, CLAIRE 2000 The Asian Gang: Ethnicity, Identity, Masculinity, Oxford: Berg Press

The new Islam and Bangladeshi youth

265

AMINAH, MOHAMMAD-ARIF 2000 A Masala identity: young South Asian Muslims in the U.S, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 20, no. 1/2, pp. 6787 ANTOUN, RICHARD 2001 Understanding Fundamentalisms: Christian, Islamic and Jewish Movements, Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press ANWAR, MUHAMMAD 1998 Between Cultures, London: Routledge CAINKAR, LOUISE 2004 Islamic revival among second-generation Arab-American Muslims: the American experience and globalization intersect, Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, vol. 6, no. 2. pp. 99120 DALE, ANGELA, SHAHEEN, NUSRAT, KALRA, VIRINDER and FIELDHOUSE, EDWARD 2002 Routes into education and employment for young Pakistani and Bangladeshi women in the UK, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 94268 EADE, JOHN 1996 Nationalism, community and the Islamization of space in London, in Barbara Metcalf (ed.), Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 21733 EADE, JOHN and GARBIN, David 2002 Changing narratives of violence, struggle and resistance: Bangladeshis and the competition for resources in the global city, Oxford Development Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 13751 FERNANDEZ-KELLY, PATRICIA and SCHAUFFLER, Richard 1994 Divided fates: immigrant children in a restructured US economy, International Migration Review, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 66289 GARDNER, KATY 1995 Global Migrants, Local Lives, Oxford: Clarendon Press GLYNN, SARAH 2002 Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 96988 GREWAL, INDERPAL 2003 Transnational America: race, gender and citizenship after 9-11, Social Identities, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 53562 HALLIDAY, FRED 1999 Islamophobia reconsidered, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 892902 HASSAN, RIAZ 2002 Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society, Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University Press HICKMAN, MARY 2005 Ruling an empire, governing a multinational state: the impact of Britains historical legacy on the ethno-racial regime, in G. Loury, T. Modood and S. Teles (eds), Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, pp. 2149 JACOBSEN, JESSICA 1997 Religion and ethnicity: dual and alternative sources of identity among young British Pakistanis, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 23856 KIBRIA, NAZLI 2002 Becoming Asian American: Second-Generation Chinese and Korean American Identities, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press * 2005 South Asian Americans, in Pyong Gap Min (ed.), Asian Americans: Contempor* ary Trends and Issues, 2nd edn, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, pp. 20627 * Forthcoming South Asians, in M. Waters and R. Ueda (eds), The New Americans: * Encylopaedia of the New Immigration, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press LOURY, GLENN, MODOOD, TARIQ and TELES, Steven 2005 Introduction, in G. Loury, T. Modood and S. Teles (eds), Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118 MAIRA, SUNAINA 2004 Youth culture, citizenship and globalization: South Asian Muslim youth in the United States after September 11th, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 2210241 MANDAVILLE, PETER 2001 Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma, London and New York: Routledge MASOOD, EHSAN 2005 A Muslim journey, British Prospect, August, 113, www. prospectmagazine.co.uk MODOOD, TARIQ 1994 Political blackness and British Asians, Sociology, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 85976

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

266

Nazli Kibria

Downloaded By: [Social Relations Library] At: 04:05 31 March 2010

NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC LEGAL CONSORTIUM 2001 Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacic Americans, National Asian Pacic Legal Consortium, Washington D.C. RIAZ, ALI 2004 God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleeld ROY, OLIVIER 2004 Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, New York, NY: Columbia University Press SCHMIDT, GARBI 2004 Islamic identity formation among young Muslims: the case of Denmark, Sweden and the US, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 3145 SONG, MIRI 2003 Choosing Ethnic Identity, Cambridge: Polity Press SUTTON, PHILIP and VERTIGANS, Stephen 2005 Resurgent Islam: A Sociological Approach, Cambridge: Polity Press TURNER, BRYAN 2004 Fundamentalisms, spiritual markets and modernity, Sociology, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 195202 UK NATIONAL STATISTICS http://www.statistics.gov.uk/ WALDMAN, AMY 2005 Seething unease shaped British bombers newfound zeal, New York Times, 31 July WATERS, MARY 1999 Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press WERBNER, PNINA 2002 The predicament of diaspora and millennial Islam: reection in the aftermath of September 11, public lecture given at the University of California, Irvine, February 2002, www.ssrc.org/sept11/

NAZLI KIBRIA is Associate Professor of Sociology, at Boston University ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, Boston University, 96 Cummington St., Boston, MA 02215, USA. Email: nkibria@bu.edu