68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation G.R. No. 83589. March 13, 1991.

* RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER vs. OF CUSTOMS, and

Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. VOL. 195, MARCH 13, 1991 Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith. PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of Appeals. Lantin, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Dakila F. Castro & Associates for private respondent. SARMIENTO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari, instituted by the Solicitor General on any clear showing to that bad they were behalf of the public officers-petitioners, seek the nullification and setting aside of the Resolution1 dated May 25, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10509, entitled Solmac Marketing Corporation vs. Ramon Farolan, public Acting Commissioner to pay of Customs, and in and Guillermo private Parayno, Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division, which adjudged personal these officers solidarily Marketing their capacities respondent Solmac Corporation temperate

GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF OF CUSTOMS INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION DIVISION, petitioners, SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Damages; Good Faith, defined; Good faith refers to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.The respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial courts finding that: x x x with reference to the claim of plaintiff to damages, actual and exemplary, and attorneys fees, the Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants defense of good faith premised on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter: We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. In Abando v. Lozada, we defined good faith as refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be established by convincing evidence. Same; Same; Public Officers; Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are by not actionable or absent motivated malice gross negligence amounting faith.But

1
Page

even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the evidence submitted by the National

damages in the sum of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and P25,000.00, as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. This challenged resolution of the respondent court modified its decision2 of July 27, 1987 by reducing into halves the original awards of P100,000.00 and of P100,000.00 in P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and attorneys damages. (Strangely, the fees and litigation expenses, respectively, keeping intact the original grant the concept of temperate first name of petitioner Farolan stated in the assailed resolution, as well as in the decision, of the respondent court is Damian when it should be Ramon, his correct given name. Strictly speaking, petitioner Ramon Farolan could not be held liable under these decision and resolution for he is not the one adjudged to pay the huge damages but a different person. _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation Nonetheless, that is of no moment now considering the disposition of this ponencia.) The relevant facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: At the time of the commission of the acts complained of by the private respondent, which was the subject of the latters petition for mandamus and injunction filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 84-23537, petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division. They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the government as clearly indicated in the title of the case in the lower courts and even here in this Court. Nevertheless, they were both held personally

x.3 However, as adverted to at the outset, in the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, the one held personally liable is a Damian Farolan and not the petitioner, Ramon Farolan. Also as earlier mentioned, we will ignore that gross error. Private respondent Solmac Marketing Corporation is a corporation

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kilograms of what is technically known as polypropylene film, valued at US$69,250.05. Polypropylene is a substance resembling polyethelyne which is one of a group of partially crystalline lightweight thermoplastics used chiefly in making fibers, films, and molded and extruded products.4 Without defect, polypropylene film is sold at a much higher price as prime quality film. Once rejected as defective due to blemishes, discoloration, defective winding, holes, etc., polypropylene film is sold at a relatively cheap price without guarantee or return, and the buyer takes the risk as to whether he can recover an average 30% to 50% usable matter.5 _______________ VOL. 195, MARCH 13, 1991 Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation This latter kind of polypropylene is known as OPP film waste/ scrap and this is what respondent SOLMAC claimed the Clojus shipment to be. The subject importation, consisting of seventeen (17) containers, arrived in December 1981. Upon application for entry, the Bureau of Customs asked respondent SOLMAC for its authority from any government agency to import the goods described in the bill of lading. Respondent SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the fibers

liable for the awarded damages (s)ince the detention of the goods by the defendants (petitioners herein) was irregular and devoid of legal basis, hence, not done in the regular performance of official duty x x

Page

of the importation were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap.6 In other words, the Clojus shipment was not OPP film scrap, as declared by the assignee respondent SOLMAC to the Bureau under of Customs the of Letter and BOI Governor of which No. (LOI) Lilia is R. Bautista, if but not oriented prohibited, polypropylene importation Instructions restricted, 658-B.

Dakila Castro, counsel for the private respondent, and the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on the other, ensued, to wit: 4. In a letter dated August 17, 1982, the BOI agreed that the subject imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. 5. On January 20, 1983, (the late) Atty. Dakila Castro, (then) counsel of private respondent wrote to petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking first. 6. Atty. Dakila Castro then wrote a letter dated October 6, 1983, to BOI Governor Hermenigildo Zayco stressing the reasons why the subject importation should be released without drilling of holes. 7. On November 8, 1983, BOI Governor H. Zayco wrote a letter to the Bureau without of Customs of on stating 17, that the as to subject the the goods drilling may of be prior holes released to on the all drilling holes August inasmuch 1982 goods arrived for the release of the importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them

Specifically,

Sections 1 and 2 of LOI No. 658-B provide that: 1. The importation of cellophane shall be allowed only for quantities and types of cellophane that cannot be produced by Philippine Cellophane Film Corporation. The Board of Investments shall issue guidelines regulating such importations. 2. The Collector of Customs shall see to the apprehension of all illegal importations of cellophane and oriented polypropylene (OPP) and the dumping of imported stock lots of cellophane and OPP. Considering authorized that by the the BOI shipment and by was law, different petitioners from what had and been Farolan

Parayno

withheld the release of the subject importation. On June 7, 1982, petitioner Parayno, then Chief of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division, wrote the BOI asking for the latters advice on whether or not the subject importation _______________ dated May 7, 1982; Original Record, 27. 6 Exhibit 5 for the defendants, now the petitioners herein; Original

endorsement

importations of waste/scrap films. 8. On February 1, 1984, petitioner Commissioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for definite guidelines regarding the disposition of importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) then being held at the Bureau of Customs. 9. On March 12, 1984, Minister Roberto Ongpin of Trade, the BOI

Record, 56. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation

Chairman, wrote his reply to petitioner Farolan x x x.8 (This reply of Minister Ongpin is copied in full infra.) On March 26, 1984, respondent Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC as above mentioned. It prayed for the unconditional release of the subject importation. It also prayed for actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. As prayed for, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

3
Page

may be released.7 A series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on one hand, and between the late

After hearing on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision on _______________ VOL. 195, MARCH 13, 1991 Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation February 5, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants to release such the subject to be importation done with immediately utmost without as drilling time of is holes, of the subject only to the normal requirements of the customs processing for release dispatch essence; and the preliminary pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.9 From the decision of the trial court, Solmac, the plaintiff below and the private respondent herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals only insofar as to the denial of the award of damages is concerned. On the other hand, the petitioners did not appeal from this decision. They did not see any need to appeal because as far as they were concerned, they had already complied with their duty. They had already ordered the release of the importation without drilling of holes, as in fact it was so released, in compliance with the advice to effect such immediate release contained in a letter of BOI dated October 9, 1984, to Commissioner Farolan. Thus, to stress, even before the RTC rendered its decision on February 5, 1984, the Clojus shipment of OPP was already released10 to the private respondent in its capacity as assignee of the same. Be that as it may, the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in their personal and private capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public officers. injunction hereto issued is hereby made

After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision11 on July 27, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation WHEREFORE, defendants the appealed Farolan judgment is modified Parayno by ordering in the their

Ramon

and

Guillermo

solidarily,

personal capacity, to pay the plaintiff temperate damages in the sum of P100,000, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and P50,000 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. Costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. On August 14, 1987, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. On May 25, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution modifying the award of damages, exemplary to wit: temperate in the damages sum of in the sum of and P100,000.00, damages P50,000.00,

permanent until actual physical release of the merchandise and without

P25,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. The respondent court explained the reduction of the awards for exemplary damages and attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in this wise: 3. In our decision of July 27, 1987, We awarded to plaintiff-appellant P100,000 as temperate damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. Under Art. 2233 of the Civil Code, recovery of exemplary damages is not a matter of right but depends upon the discretion of the court. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must always be reasonable. In view of these provisions of the law, and since the award of temperate damages is only P100,000.00, the amount of exemplary award of damages may as not be at par as temperate may damages. serve An the P50,000.00, exemplary damages already

Page

purpose, i.e., as an example for the public good. Likewise, the attorneys fees and expenses The of litigation in the have to be reduced to 25% of the amount of temperate damages, or P25,000.00, if the same have to be reasonable. reduction amount of exemplary damages, and attorneys fees and expenses of litigation would be in accord with justice and fairness.12 The petitioners now come to this Court, again by the Solicitor General, assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the respondent court: I _______________ VOL. 195, MARCH 13, 1991 Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation The Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the finding of the trial court that the defense of good faith of petitioners (defendants) cannot be discredited. II The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging petitioners liable to pay

x x x with reference to the claim of plaintiff to damages, actual and exemplary, and attorneys fees, the Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants defense of good faith premised on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter:14 We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies.15 In Abando v. Lozada,16 we defined good faith as refer[ring] to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscion_______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation able and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be established by convincing evidence. We had reviewed the evidence on record carefully and we did not see any clear and convincing proof showing the alleged bad faith of the petitioners. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners claim of good faith. First, there was the report of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) dated January 25, 1982 that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject

temperate damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.13 These two issues boil down to a single question, i.e., whether or not the petitioners acted in or, good faith in not they immediately be held releasing liable, in the their questioned importation, simply, can

importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene, a plastic product of stronger material, whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited, under LOI 658-B.17 It was on the strength of this finding that the petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, the petitioners testified that, on many occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released.18 Third, petitioner Parayno also testified during the trial that up to that time (of the trial) there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding

personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent. We rule for the petitioners.

5
Page

The respondent court committed a reversible error in overruling the trial courts finding that:

the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene (OPP), as the letters of BOI Governors Tordesillas and Zayco of November 8, 1983 and September 24, 1982, respectively, ordering the release of the subject importation did not clarify the BOI policy on the matter. He then testified on the letter of the BOI Chairman Roberto Ongpin dated March 12, 1984, which states in full: Thank you for your letter of 1 February 1984 on the subject of various importations withheld imports. I have discussed the matter with Vice-Chairman Tordesillas and Governor Zayco of the Board of Investments and the following is their explanation: 1. On 22 June 1982, the BOI ruled that importation of OPP/PP film scraps intended for recycling or repelletizing did not fall within _______________ VOL. 195, MARCH 13, 1991 Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation the purview of LOI 658-B. 2. On 17 August 1982, the BOI agreed that holes could be drilled on subject film imports to prevent their use for other purposes. 3. For importations authorized prior to holes should depend on purpose for 22 June 1982, the the drilling of was by of Oriented and Polypropylene the (OPP) over and the Polypropylene disposition of (PP) such Customs confusion

Should your office have any doubts as to the authorized intended use of any imported lots of OPP/PP film scraps that you have confiscated, we have no objection to the drilling of holes to ensure that these are indeed recycled. I have requested Governor Zayco to contact your office in order to offer any further assistance which you may require.19 It can be seen from all the foregoing that even the highest officers (Chairman Ongpin, Vice-Chairman Tordesillas, and Governor Zayco) of the BOI themselves were not in agreement as to what proper course to take on the subject of the various importations of Oriented Polypropylene (OPP) and Polypropylene (PP) withheld by the Bureau of Customs. The conflicting recommendations of the BOI on this score prompted the petitioners to seek final clarification from the former with regard to its policy on these importations. This resulted in the inevitable delay in the release of the Clojus shipment, one of the several of such importations. The confusion over the disposition of this particular importation obviates bad faith. Thus the trial courts finding that the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the Clojus shipment pending a definitive policy of the BOI on this matter is correct. It is supported by substantial evidence on record, independent of the presumption of good faith, which as stated earlier, was not successfully rebutted. When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to

perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the

which

importations

approved by the BOI that is, for direct packaging use or for recycling/ repelletizing into raw material. The exemption from drilling of holes on Solmac Marketings importation under Certificates of Authority issued on 1 April 1982 and 5 May 1982 and on Clojus importation authorized in

6
Page

1982 were endorsed by the BOI on the premise that these were not intended for recycling/repelletizing.

management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that

petitioners regarding

first the

obtain

from of

the the

BOI

the

latters

definite of

guidelines oriented

be, that an official duty has been regularly performed23 applies in favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was private respondents burden to overcome this juris tantum presumption. We are not persuaded that it has been able to do so. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed Resolution of the respondent court, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10509, dated May 25, 1988, is SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera concur. Petition granted. Resolution annulled and set aside. Note.Public SCRA 869.) o0o 168(1991)] [Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation, 195 SCRA officials are not liable for damages for performing their (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,

disposition

various

importations

polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These cellophane/film products were competing with locally manufactured which were polypropylene then already and oriented to polypropylene meet local as raw materials sufficient demands,

hence, their importation was restricted, if not prohibited under LOI 658-B. Consequently, the petitioners can not be said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement, i.e., LOI 658-B, was faithfully complied with. But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps,20 contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.21 After all, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.22 In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may _______________ VOL. 195, MARCH 13, 1991

duties required by law and absent bad faith. (Mabutol vs. Pascual, 124

7
Page

179 Hellenic Philippine Shipping, Inc. vs. Siete

case, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB under Sec. G.R. No. 149553. February 29, 2008.* NICOLAS LAYNESA and SANTOS LAYNESA, petitioners, vs. PAQUITO and PACITA UY, respondents. Administrative Law; Agrarian Reform Law; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); Jurisdictions; De_______________ ** Additional member pursuant to Special Order No. 485 dated February 14, 2008. * SECOND DIVISION. VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy spite the reclassification of an agricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA 7160, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the the land in question of for an threatened agricultural ejectment land to and nonredemption.Despite reclassification 50 of RA 6657 the agrarian on the DAR reform quasi-judicial has primary and the matters under Primary the DAR matters. powers shall of the to DAR. It bears and original of case the of and that stressing adjudicate reform Natural that jurisdiction have determine exclusive jurisdiction means of is its in

jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian except those falling exclusive Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Resources is in (DENR). with jurisdiction because Sec. 50 seeming conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts, preference experience vested agrarian expertise explicit reform also

except for the DA and DENR, all agrarian reform matters are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR. Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Department of Agrarian Reform arising Adjudication from agrarian Board reform (DARAB) matters retains even jurisdiction though the over disputes or landowner

respondent interposes the defense of reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural use.We rule that the DARAB retains jurisdiction though the over disputes arising or from agrarian reform the matters defense even of landowner respondent interposes

reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural use. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy Damages; Court ruled that the exercise of ones rights does not make him liable for damages, thus One who exercises his rights does no injury.In Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 (1990), we ruled that the exercise of ones rights does not make him liable for damages, thus: One who exercises his rights does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a persons exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.

agricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA 7160, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in question for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following reasons: (1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Likewise settled is the rule the that jurisdiction of an over the subject land for matter is determined ejectment by and the its allegations of the complaint. DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 was filed by tenants agricultural threatened redemption from respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments

8
Page

of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter and involve the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such being the

Same; Exemplary

Damages; Court ruled

that exemplary

damages may

and Nicolas continued as tenants, and delivered the owners share of the produce to Cuba, Jr. and Bienvenido.2 On January 13, 1993, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land, transferring the property to respondent Pacita Uy, married to respondent Paquito Uy, in consideration of PhP 80,000. Cuba, Jr. was named owner of the land. Notably, the Deed was not registered with the Register of Deeds. Later, Cuba, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment or Transfer of Rights of the undelivered owners share of the produce in favor of Pacita. On July 13, 1993, Pacita demanded that the Laynesas vacate the land. She claimed that she had purchased the land. The Laynesas asked for proof of Pacitas acquisition, but she could not produce any. Subsequently, Pacita returned and again demanded that the Laynesas

only be awarded if the act of the offender is attended by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner.In Government Service Insurance System v. Labung-Deang, 365 SCRA 341 (2001) and Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 686 (2004), this Court ruled that temperate damages will only be awarded by virtue of the wrongful act of a party. Whereas in Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Vasquez, 399 SCRA 2007 (2003), we ruled that exemplary damages may only be awarded if the act of the offender is attended by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Rogelio N. Tormes for petitioners. Botor, Hidalgo, Botor & Associates for respondents. VELASCO, JR., J.: In 1938, Robert Morley was the owner of a four (4)-hectare parcel of land in Barrio Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur. Petitioner Santos Laynesa was his tenant over two and a half (2 1/2) hectares of the land. In 1947, Morley sold the 4 has. to Sixto Cuba, Sr. He maintained Santos as the tenant over the 2 1/2-hectare portion while instituting petitioner Nicolas Laynesa, son of Santos, as his tenant over the remainder of VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy the property. On May 20, 1974, Original Certificate of Title No. 1660 on the property was issued to Cuba, Sr.1

vacate the property, this time exhibiting the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistrered Land signed by Cuba, Jr. Consequently, the Laynesas filed on October 13, 1993 a petition against Pacita with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 730 for Legal Redemption entitled Santos Laynesa, et al. v. Paquito Uy. The Laynesas primarily sought that they be allowed to redeem the land from Pacita.3 Thereafter, on November 25, 1993, Pacita filed a complaint docketed as DARAB Case No. 745 entitled Pacita Uy v. Santos Laynesa, et al. for Collection DARAB. _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy Cuba, Jr. died intestate on December 23, 1993.4 of Rentals and Ejectment against the Laynesas with the

9
Page

On October 25, 1979, Cuba, Sr. died intestate, survived by his children, Sixto Cuba, Jr., Carmelita Cuba Sunga, and Bienvenido Cuba. Santos

On February 10, 1994, the Laynesas deposited PhP 80,000 in the form of a Cashiers Check with the Clerk of Court of the DARAB by way of consignation of the redemption price of the property. Meanwhile, the heirs of Bienvenido filed a petition with the Camarines Sur Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the judicial declaration of presumptive death of their father who had been missing since 1984.5 Afterwards, on June 20, 1994, the heirs of Bienvenido, with Reynoso and Carmelita Sunga, filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. P1963 for Annulment of Sale of Real Estate against the spouses Uy with the Camarines Sur RTC. They prayed that the court declare the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land executed by Cuba, Jr. in favor of the spouses Uy as null and void, and the property returned to Cuba, Sr.s intestate estate. The DARAB dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the two cases filed before it by the parties.6 Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. P-1963 amicably settled their dispute. In a Compromise Agreement approved by the RTC, the parties agreed to divide the property into two portions. Two hectares of rice lands would be transferred to the spouses Uy, and the remaining portion to Cuba, Sr.s heirs. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 23276 over a portion of the property with an area of 20,000 square meters in the names of the spouses Uy. Meanwhile, Pacita obtained a certification from the Municipal Agricultural Office (MAO) that the property was not prime agricultural property, and from the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) that TCT No. 23276 was not covered _______________ VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008

by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) or by Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27. The certifications were sought so the land could be reclassified as industrial land. On May 29, 1995, the Municipal Council of Tagbong, Pili, Camarines Sur approved Resolution No. 67, which embodied Ordinance No. 28 and reclassified the land from agricultural to industrial. On July 17, 1995, the Laynesas filed a Complaint dated July 13, 1995, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 and entitled Nicolas Laynesa, et al. v. Paquito Uy, et al. for Threatened Ejectment and Redemption with a Prayer for the issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the DARAB. In the Complaint, the Laynesas sought to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 23276 for PhP 40,000. In their Answer dated August 15, 1995, the spouses Uy alleged that the Laynesas had no cause of action against them, and even assuming that the had Laynesas no had, the since action the was land already had barred by estoppel reclassified and as laches, the complaint was already moot and academic, and the DARAB jurisdiction already been industrial land. On January 12, 1996, DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Isabel E. Florin

issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered 1. Granting the petition for redemption by the plaintiffs herein of the two-hectare Riceland now titled in the name of Pacita E. Uy with TCT No. T-23276, for Nicolas Laynesa, his .5 hectare tillage and for Santos Laynesa, his 1.5 hectares tillage in the consolidated amount of P60,000.00; 2. Ordering the conveyance of subject lots to herein plaintiffs as abovestated;

10
Page

Laynesa vs. Uy

3.

Ordering

defendants

to

pay of

plaintiffs

temperate

damages fees

of of

Hence, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. _______________ 7 Id., at pp. 65-66. 8 Id., at pp. 67-69.

P15,000.00;

exemplary

damages

P20,000.00;

Attorneys

P12,000.00; and appearance fees of P2,400.00. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy 4. Declaring the injunction permanent, unless the appropriate Order

9 Id., at pp. 87-103. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (Chairperson, now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Perlita Tria-Tirona. VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008

allowing conversion is thereby presented. SO ORDERED.7 Thereafter, the spouses Uy filed a Motion the adjudicator, but with the modification to for Reconsideration. In an set aside the award of

Order dated February 27, 1996,8 the DARAB affirmed the Decision of damages. The spouses Uy appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled DARAB without jurisdiction On May 16, 2001, the CA issued a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.

Laynesa vs. Uy The Issues [T]he Honorable Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division), seriously erred and/or committed grave error in: A. Holding that at the time of the filing of the Complaint (V-RC-028-CSBranch 1) the land subject matter of the case ceases to be agricultural by virtue of the reclassification made by Municipal Ordinance No. 28 of Pili, Camarines Sur, so that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the dispute involving said land and that the Decision of the DARAB is null and void. B. Holding that the reclassification alone of an agricultural land by a Municipal Ordinance from agricultural to any other uses without the necessary conversion Order from the DAR is enough to divest the DAR of jurisdiction to hear and determine any agrarian disputes involving the land.10 The pivotal issue in this case is whether the reclassification of a lot by a municipal ordinance, without the Department of Agrarian Reforms (DARs) approval, suffices to oust the jurisdiction of the DARAB over a petition for legal redemption filed by the tenants.

59454, reversing the Decision of the DARAB. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the DARAB, Annex A of the Petition and its Resolution, Annex B of the Petition are set aside and reversed. The Complaint of the Respondents and the counterclaims of the Petitioners are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.9 According to the CA, had the been evidence on record Thus, shows the that when had the no

11

Laynesas filed their action with the DARAB, the property was no longer agricultural jurisdiction. but reclassified. DARAB

Page

There are strict requirements for the valid reclassification of land by a local government unit The resolution of this case is not that simple. There is no question that petitioners-Laynesas are the tenants of the previous owner of the land. As such, disputes pertaining to the land tenancy were within the jurisdiction of the DAR. However, respondentsspouses Uy posit that after the issuance of Municipal Council Resolution No. 67, reclassifying the land on May 29, 1995, the land ceased to be agricultural and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Previously, under Republic Act No. (RA) 3844, all agrarian disputes fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Later, the jurisdiction over such disputes _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy went to the RTCs.11 When RA 6657, otherwise known as the

However, jurisdiction

Section over and

56

of

RA

6657 of all

vested the criminal

original offenses

and

exclusive of just from

controversies prosecution

involving

determination

compensation

arising

violations of RA 6657 to RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts. From the cited legal provisions, it cannot be disputed that the DAR, through the DARAB, shall exercise quasi-judicial functions and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all disputes involving the enforcement and implementation of all agrarian reform laws. Sec. 4 of RA 6657 tells us which lands are covered by the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, thus: Section 4. Scope.The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

shall cover; regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. (Emphasis supplied.) _______________ VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy However, in 1991, RA 7160 or the Local Government Code was passed

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, took effect on June 15, 1988, the adjudication of agrarian reform disputes was placed under the jurisdiction of the DAR, thus: Section 50. Quasi-Judicial vested reform matters with primary and the matters involving shall Powers to have of the DAR.The and original DAR is hereby agrarian over all those

into law, granting local government units the power to reclassify land. Being a later law, RA 7160 shall govern in case of conflict between it and RA 6657, as to the issue of reclassification. Title I, Chapter 2, Sec. 20 of RA 7160 states: SEC. 20. Reclassification hearings for the purpose, of Lands.(a) authorize the A city or municipality of may,

jurisdiction

determine of

adjudicate jurisdiction

exclusive

implementation

agrarian

reform,

except

falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

through an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public reclassification agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of

12
Page

x x x x Notwithstanding an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.

Agriculture economic determined

or value by

(2) for the

where

the

land

shall

have or

substantially That

greater as such

(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approval thereof. (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending,

residential,

commercial,

industrial Provided,

purposes,

sanggunian

concerned:

reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: (1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

or modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657. Pursuant to RA 7160, then President Fidel Ramos issued Memorandum

percent (15%); (2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten

Circular No. (MC) 54 on June 8, 1993, providing the guidelines in the implementation of the above Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code, as follows: SECTION 1. Scope and Limitations.(a) Cities and municipalities with

percent (10%); and (3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided,

further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to [RA 6657], otherwise known as The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act. (b) The President of may, the when National public interest and so requires and upon

comprehensive land use plans reviewed and approved in accordance with EO 72 (1993), may authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition, subject to the limitations and other conditions prescribed in this Order. (b) Agricultural lands may be reclassified in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture (DA), in accordance with the standards and guidelines prescribed for the purpose; or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes as determined by the the sanggunian DA, HLRB, concerned, DTI, the city/municipality other lands concerned should on notify the DOT and concerned agencies

recommendation

Economic

Development

Authority,

authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph. (c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, to prepare their respective comprehensive shall be land the use primary plans and through zoning ordinances which

continue enacted

dominant bases for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settleSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy

proposed

reclassification of agricultural

furnishing them copies of

the report of the local development council including the draft ordinance on the matter for their comments, proposals and recommendations within seven (7) days upon receipt. (c) However, such reclassification shall be limited to a maximum of the percentage of the total agricultural land of a city or municipality at the time of the passage of the ordinance as follows:

13
Page

ments, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such plans.

VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy (1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen

set in paragraph (d) hereof. For this purpose, NEDA is hereby directed to issue the implementing guidelines governing the authority of cities and municipalities to reclassify lands in excess of the limits prescribed herein. SECTION 2. Requirements and Procedures for Reclassification.(a) The

percent (15%); (2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten

city or municipal development council (CDC/MDC) shall recommend to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, the reclassification of agricultural lands within its jurisdiction based on the requirements of local development. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED not be Laynesa vs. Uy (b) Prior to the enactment of an ordinance reclassifying agricultural lands as provided under Sec. 1 hereof, the sanggunian concerned must first secure the following certificates [from] the concerned national government agencies (NGAs): (1) A certification from DA indicating AO 20, s. of 1992, as non(i) the total area of existing agricultural lands in the LGU concerned; (ii) that which lands are not classified as non-negotiable for conversion

percent (10%); and (3) (d) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%). In addition, the following types of agricultural lands shall

covered by the said reclassification: (1) Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries subject

to Section 65 of RA 6557; (2) Agricultural lands already issued a notice of coverage or voluntarily

offered for coverage under CARP. (3) Agricultural lands identified under

negotiable for conversion as follows: (i) All irrigated lands where water is available to support rice and other crop production; (ii) crop All irrigated lands where water is not available for rice and other production but within areas programmed for irrigation facility

or reclassification under AO 20 (1992); and (iii) that the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for

agricultural purposes in the case of Sec. 1 (b-1). (2) A certification from DAR indicating that such lands are not

rehabilitation by DA and National Irrigation Administration (NIA); and (iii) All irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with form

distributed or not covered by a notice of coverage or not voluntarily offered for coverage under CARP. (c) The HLRB shall serve as the coordinating agency for the issuance

funding commitments at the time of the application for land conversion or reclassification.

14

(e)

The

President

may,

when

public

interest

so

requires

and

upon

of

the

certificates for LGUs to

as the

required HLRB,

under upon

the receipt

preceding be of such

paragraph. by application,

All the the

Page

recommendation of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits

applications concerned

reclassification

shall,

therefore,

submitted

HLRB shall conduct initial review to determine if:

(1) and (2)

the

city

or

municipality

concerned

has

an

existing

comprehensive

Should

the

land feasible

subject for

to

reclassification the DA

is shall

found

to

be to

still the

land use plan reviewed and approved in accordance with EO 72 (1993);

economically

agriculture,

recommend

LGU concerned alternative areas for development purposes. the proposed reclassification complies with the limitations prescribed (f) Upon hereof, issuance the of the certifications concerned enumerated now in Section an 2 (b)

in SECTION 1 (d) hereof. Upon determination that the above conditions have been satisfied, the HLRB shall then consult with the concerned agencies on the required certifications. being The HLRB is in shall excess inform of the concerned the agencies, city shall or be municipality of the result of their review and consultation. If the land reclassified the limit, application submitted to NEDA. Failure of the HLRB and the NGAs to act on a proper and complete application within three months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as approved thereof. (d) Reclassification of agricultural lands may be authorized through an

sanggunian

may

enact

ordinance

authorizing the reclassification of agricultural lands and providing for the manner of their utilization or disposition. Such ordinance shall likewise update the comprehensive land use plans of the LGU concerned. (Emphasis supplied.) It is because of the authority granted to a city or municipality by Sec. 20 of RA 7160 coupled with the implementing guidelines laid down in MC 54 dated June 8, 1993 that the CA was convinced to rule that the disputed lot is no longer agricultural but industrial land and, hence, the DARAB does not have or has lost jurisdiction over the subject matter of DARAB Case No. V-RC-028. This position is incorrect. Despite the reclassification of an agricultural land to non-agricultural land by a local government unit under Sec. 20 of RA 7160, the DARAB still retains jurisdiction over a complaint filed by a tenant of the land in question reasons: SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy (1) Jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.12 Likewise settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.13 DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 was filed by the tenants of an agricultural land for threatened ejectment and its redemption from respondents. It cannot be questioned that the averments of the DARAB case clearly pertain to an agrarian reform matter and involve the for threatened ejectment and redemption for the following

ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, after conducting public VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy hearings for the purpose. Such ordinance shall be enacted and approved in accordance with Articles 107 and 108 of the IRR of the LGC. (e) Provisions of Sec. 1 (b-2) hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, the concerned shall seek the advice of DA prior to the

sanggunian

enactment of an ordinance reclassifying agricultural lands. If the DA has failed to act on such request within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed to have been complied with.

Page

15

implementation of the agrarian reform laws. Such being the case, the complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR. It bears stressing that the DAR has primary the the jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters those falling Agriculture involving under and (DA) implementation exclusive Department of the of agrarian reform except of the Department and of Natural jurisdiction

Respondent Pacita only procured a MAO certification that the property was not prime agricultural property. The MARO certified that the land was not covered by the OLT under PD 27. These two certifications will not suffice for the following reasons: (1) Sec. 20 of RA 7160 requires submission of the recommendation or certification feasible property. (2) Sec. 20 requires a certification from the DAR that the land has not yet been distributed to beneficiaries under RA 6657 which took effect on June 15, 1988 nor covered by a notice of coverage. In the case at bar, the MARO certification which pertains only to PD 27 does not suffice. (3) Respondents have not shown any compliance with Sec. 2 of MC 54 on the additional requirements and procedures for reclassification such as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boards report and recommendation, the requisite public hearings, and the DAs report and recommendation. Based on the foregoing reasons, respondents have failed to satisfy the requirements prescribed in Sec. 20 of RA 7160 and MC 54 and, hence, relief must be granted to petitioners. Landowners must understand that while RA 7160, the Local Government Code, granted local government units the power to reclassify agricultural land, the stringent requirements set forth in Sec. 30 of said Code must be strictly comSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy or certification from sound attests the for only DA that the lot land is ceases In no to this be case, prime economically the MAO agricultural agricultural that the purposes.

the

Environment

Resources (DENR). Primary jurisdiction means in case of seeming conflict between the jurisdictions of the DAR and regular courts, preference is vested with the DAR because of its expertise and experience in agrarian reform matters. Sec. 50 is also explicit that except for the DA and DENR, all agrarian reform matters are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR. (2) Sec. 20(e) of RA 7160 is unequivocal that nothing in said section

longer

shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of [RA] 6657. As such, Sec. 50 of RA 6657 on quasijudicial powers of the DAR has not been repealed by RA 7160. In view of the over foregoing reasons, we disputes arising from rule that the DARAB retains reform matters even

jurisdiction

agrarian

though the landowner or respondent inter_______________ VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy poses the defense of reclassification of the subject lot from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

16
Page

On the issue of whether there has been a valid reclassification of the subject lot to industrial land, we rule that respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to buttress their assertion that all the conditions and requirements set by RA 7160 and MC 54 have been satisfied.

plied with. Such adherence to the legal prescriptions is found wanting in the case at bar. Be that as it may, the DARAB erred in awarding damages to

and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to _______________ VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff

petitioners. In Saba v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the exercise of ones rights does not make him liable for damages, thus: One who exercises his rights does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results from a persons exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria.14 This principle was further explained by this Court in the case of

suffered some pain and suffering. Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or

Custodio v. Court of Appeals, to wit: However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right there to must recover be both damages. a right To of warrant action for the a recovery legal of damages, wrong

omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. In other be words, in order et that the If, as law will give redress in for an act a

inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; for and the damages damage are the Thus, recompense there can or be compensation awarded suffered.

causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must damnum injuria. may happen many cases, person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.15 Thus, in Government Service Insurance System v. Labung-Deang16 and Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,17 this Court ruled that temperate damages will only be awarded by virtue of the wrongful act of a party. Whereas attended manner.18 in by Cathay bad Pacific or Airways, done in Ltd. v. Vasquez, fraudulent, we or ruled that

damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff by a concurrence person of injury it. The to the plaintiff and for legal the

17

responsibility

the

causing

underlying

basis

exemplary damages may only be awarded if the act of the offender is faith wanton, malevolent

award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty

Page

In the instant case, the RTC awarded damages to petitioners on the ground that respondents dumped earthfill materials during the pendency of the case. It must be pointed out that the RTC did not issue a preliminary respondents. Contrary to this finding of the trial court, respondents did not act in bad faith or in a wanton, fraudulent, or malevolent manner; consequently, petitioners are not entitled to an _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Laynesa vs. Uy award for damages. Respondents dumping of earth filling materials on the subject land was but a lawful exercise of their rights as owners of the land. It must be remembered that respondents attempted to have the land reclassified through the Municipal Government of San Juan, Pili, Camarines Sur by virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 67 which embodied official Ordinance was No. 28. Given the disputable respondents presumption were justified that to duty regularly performed,19 injunction or temporary restraining order (TRO) against

though

this

may

have

prejudiced

or

injured

petitioners,

respondents

cannot be made liable for it. As stated, respondents cannot be penalized for a lawful act. Similarly, the instant case does not fall under any of the grounds set forth in Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. Thus, there are also no grounds for the DARABs petitioners. Therefore, the RTCs award for exemplary and temperate damages, as well as attorneys and appearance fees, must be deleted. _______________ VOL. 547, FEBRUARY 29, 2008 Laynesa vs. Uy WHEREFORE, February the petition is GRANTED. The May 16, 2001 CA grant of attorneys fees and appearance fees in favor of

Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 59454 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 27, 1996 DARAB Order and January 12, 1996 Decision of DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Florin in DARAB Case No. V-RC-028 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award for temperate and exemplary damages and attorneys and appearance fees is DELETED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Carpio concur. Quisumbing (Chairperson), J., On Official Leave. Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside. (Acting Chairperson), Azcuna**, Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ.,

presume that the reclassification of the land was lawful. It was also natural for respondents to conclude that such reclassification resulted in the dispossession of petitioners as tenants, there being no tenants of industrial land. Thus, respondents, at the time, could lawfully exercise their proprietary rights over the land, including the dumping of earth filling materials thereon. Moreover, the pendency of the case before the RTC, absent a preliminary injunction or TRO against respondents, would not preclude respondents from exercising their rights. Although this reclassification has now been declared to be ineffectual, for failing to comply with the provisions of RA 7160, respondents cannot be made

18
Page

liable for damages. Respondents exercise of acts of ownership over the land, at a time that the reclassification had not yet been declared as invalid and ineffectual, is a lawful exercise of their rights. And even

Notes.While

the

jurisdiction

of

tribunal,

including

quasi-judicial

agency over the subject matter of a complaint or petition is determined by the allegations therein, in determining jurisdiction, it is not only the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy that should be determined, but also the status of relationship of the parties; The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) exercises its quasijudicial powers through its adjudicating arm, the DARAB. (Cuba vs. Cuenco, Jr., 502 SCRA 324 [2006]) The reclassification of lands to non-agricultural cannot be applied to

defeat vested rights of tenant-farmers under Presidential Decree No. 27. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 503 SCRA 378 [2006]) o0o _______________ **Additional member as per Special Order No. 485 dated February 14, 2008 [Laynesa vs. Uy, 547 SCRA 200(2008)]

Page

19

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996.* ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Evidence; admissibility recognized Hearsay is Rule; Exception; on to necessity the One and of the exceptions to of the the to

Same; No

Same;

Same; that

The

admission is either

against dead, far

penal

interest

cannot

be or the

accepted in the instant case as the declarant is not unable to testify. showing declarant was more mentally 38 weightier incapacitated of the why reason physically incompetent made which the Section rules

contemplates.But

importantly,

admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing that Zoilo which is either 38 dead, mentally incapacitated His or physically absence incompetent from the Sec. obviously contemplates. mere

hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Its grounded trustworthiness.One is that exceptions hearsay rule pertaining

jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records always as show for that the defense of did not exert that not any would even serious let an effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is the the admission extrajudicial evidence is innocent thus declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, when statement authenticated increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Criminal Law; Murder; Actual Damages; Actual damages if not supported by the evidence on record cannot be granted.The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victims elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina. However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted. 432

declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that (t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness. _______________ * FIRST DIVISION. VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals Same; Same; Declaration Against Interest; Requisites.There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration

20

must

concern

fact

cognizable

by

the

declarant;

and

(c)

the

Page

circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Public Attorneys Office for petitioner. BELLOSILLO, J.: Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.1 At at four a oclock in the at morning Dump of 24 June 1989 Trento, Julieto Agusan Malaspina del Sur. Jr., alias Jonie who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was conversing with him; that _______________ VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would kill all those from San Isidro because Jonie, the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brothers house where he met Jonie; that Jonie admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as there were many persons milling around the house Jonie jumped out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight oclock in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.5 The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found

together with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was benefit dance Site, Tudela, Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair.2 to Suddenly his side. wound petitioner stabbed fled. Malaspina Before he the in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his companions succumbed rushed to the Petitioner on his victim that gaping abdomen muttered

petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum reclusion temporal to seventeen as maximum, (17) years and to indemnify the four (4) months of heirs of the victim

Julieto Malaspina the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs.6 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court; hence, this petition for review. Petitioner petitioner Malaspina, contends was in that the and the appellate judgment court of erred identified conviction when as and it the in held killer that of

Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.3 Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was due to stab wound at left lumbar region 1-1/2 in. in length with

21

extracavitation of the small and large intestines.4

positively affirming

categorically

holding

Page

petitioner liable for damages to the heirs of the victim.

Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left lumbar region. This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three (3) prose_______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals cution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the knife wielder. It

Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since exception it is to the a declaration hearsay rule. against penal The socalled interest and confession therefore an of Zoilo was

allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on 24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., confessed that he killed Malaspina in retaliation; that he even showed him the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and, if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The following day however he learned that the self_______________ VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 435 Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals confessed killer was gone and that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.9 For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina, Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he

must be stressed that these witnesses has known petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely implicate him. That it was another person who committed the offense is too incredible. No less than petitioners own witness, Nerio Biscocho who claimed he also saw the killing, testified that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., the petitioner, and Jonie Fuentes are one and the same person. Thus COURT: Q.Who is this Joni Fuentes and Alejandro Fuentes? A.That x x x7 Joni Fuentes is the same of that or the accused Alejandro

was told by the townsfolk that Zoilo had already fled.10 One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that (t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would

Fuentes. I do not know his real name but he is called as Joni, sir, x

22

On cross-examination witness Biscocho further admitted that he himself would call petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., as Joni or Jonie Fuentes, as some of his friends did, but victim Malaspina occasionally called petitioner Junior.8

Page

not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.11 There testify; are (b) three the (3) essential must requisites concern for a the fact admissibility cognizable of by a the

opined

that

the

court

below

erred

in

not

admitting

Exh.

as

the

statement of a fact against penal interest. For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, shocking to the sense of justice.13 Let us assume that the trial court did admit the Let statement us of Zoilo and on that that Zoilo basis was acquitted accused-appellant. assume further

declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to declaration declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes, Jr. is not admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. We are not unaware of People v. Toledo,12 a 1928 case, where Justice Malcolm writing for the Court endeavored to _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals reexamine the declaration of third parties made contrary to their penal interest. In that case, the protagonists Holgado and Morales engaged in a bolo duel. Morales was killed almost instantly. Holgado who was seriously wounded gave a sworn statement (Exh. 1) before the municipal president declaring that when he and Morales fought there was nobody else present. One (1) month later Holgado died from his wounds. While the Court agreed that Toledo, who reportedly intervened in the fight and dealt the mortal blow, should be exonerated on reasonable doubt, the members did not reach an accord on the admissibility of Exh. 1. One group would totally disregard Exh. 1 since there was ample testimonial

subsequently captured and upon being _______________ VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals confronted with his admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement. But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him upon ipso the facto unavailable to under this rule.14 every For it is of incumbent defense produce each and piece

23
Page

evidence to support an acquittal. The second group considered Exh. 1 as part of the res gestae as it was made on the same morning when the fight occurred. A third group, to which Justice Malcolm belonged,

evidence that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records always as show for that the defense of did not exert that not any would even serious let an effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is the the admission extrajudicial evidence is innocent thus declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, when statement authenticated increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as explained in Toledo The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great prove possibility their of the fabrication that of falsehoods, the doors and be the closed inability to to untruth, requires such

medium period of the penalty, i.e. reclusion perpetua, should have been imposed on petitioner.17 Petitioner basis of maintains the mere that assuming of that the he committed sister, the crime it is

error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on the testimony victims Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.18 To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.19 Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.20 _______________ VOL. 253, FEBRUARY 9, 1996 Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony of the victims elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina.21 However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been by incurred, receipts the and Court which can only to give credence been to those

evidence.15 _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The suddenness of the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim, made the stabbing of Malaspina treacherous.16 However, the court a quo erred in imposing an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Murder under Art. 248 of

supported

appear

have

genuinely

expended in connection with the death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be granted.22 WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR. guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to reclusion perpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted.

24

The

Revised

Penal to

Code death.

is

punishable aside

by from

reclusion

temporal

in

its the

maximum

period

Since

treachery

qualifying

Page

crime to murder there is no other modifying circumstance proved, the

SO ORDERED. Padilla concur. Judgment affirmed with modification. _______________ (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ.,

21 TSN, 19 June 1991, p. 4. 22 In People v. Wenceslao, G.R. No. 95583, 12 August 1992, 212

SCRA 560, the Court disallowed claim for actual damages, the same being merely based on a typewritten list of expenses submitted by the father of the deceased without any competent proof presented in court. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED L.T. Datu and Co., Inc. vs. NLRC Notes.Declaration against interest may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. (Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 745 [1994]) Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423 [1993]) o0o [Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 430(1996)]

Page

25

VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca G.R. No. 143819. January 29, 2002.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GERRY CUENCA y MEDRANO, JACKSON CUENCA (at large), CRISANTO AGON y MAGPANTAY, and BERNIE AGON (at large), accused. GERRY CUENCA y MEDRANO and CRISANTO AGON y MAGPANTAY, appellants. Witnesses; So long as the witnesses testimonies agree on substantial matters, their witnesses inconsequential nor and are the testimonies inconsistencies verity agree of on and contradictions matters, dilute long neither as the credibility their testimonies.So

arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and value. Same; The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient for conviction because truth is established not by the quantity, but by the quality of the evidence.This Court has ruled in a number of cases that the testimony of a witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient for conviction because truth is established not by the quantity, but by the quality of the evidence. Evidence; in be issue Circumstantial through on an the which the fact Evidence; Requisites; the fact Words finder and draws The Phrases; from latter the is an

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact inference basis of which evidence established.In the absence of direct evidence, appellants may convicted as circumstantial proves draws a from evidence. in the defined inference that indirectly finder fact issue through

substantial dilute

inconsequential nor the fact

inconsistencies by appellants

contradictions insignificant

neither their credibility to the

verity of their testimonies. In the instant case, the inconsistencies cited and immaterial essential testified tothe killing of the victim. Same; The trial courts assessment of the witnesses and their credibility is entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of _______________ * THIRD DIVISION. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca significance and value.As a rule, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court, because it had a better opportunity to observe

which

evidence

established.

Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites concur: (1) more than one circumstance is present, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable unbroken doubt. chain The totality beyond of the evidence doubt must the constitute guilt of an the showing reasonable

accused, to the exclusion of all others. Alibi; Well-settled is the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.Well-settled is the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused was to prove that they were likewise somewhere else demonstrate when it the was crime committed; they must that

26

the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses while they were testifying. Indeed, its assessment of the witnesses and their credibility is entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with

physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.

Page

Criminal Law; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Requisites; There was treachery where the accused, together with their co-accused, helped each other in ensuring the execution of their nefarious intention to beat up and kill the victim who was unarmed and with no opportunity to defend himself.Treachery is present when the following VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca conditions are present: (1) the means of execution employed gives the victims no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate, and (2) the means of execution are deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the prosecution succeeded in showing that appellants, together with their co-accused (who are still at large), helped each other in ensuring the execution of their nefarious intention to beat up and kill the victim who was unarmed and with no opportunity to defend himself. Same; Same; Conspiracy; Words and Phrases; Conspiracy exists when two there or more persons come to an agreement when and two or decide more on the commission of a felony.The prosecution was likewise able to show that was conspiracy. Conspiracy exists persons come to an agreement and decide on the commission of a felony. It is not necessary that there be direct proof that the co-conspirators had any prior agreement to commit the crime; it is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Same; Same; Damages; The principle enunciated in People v. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 (1999), where an award for the loss of earning capacity to the heirs of the deceased was granted despite the absence of documentary evidence to substantiate such claim, the Court treating the testimony of the victims wife as sufficient to establish the basis for the grant, has been modified by the new ruling in People v. Panabang,

capacity

to

be

improper.

True,

in

People

v.

Verde,

we

granted

an

award for the loss of earning capacity to the heirs of the deceased despite the absence of documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. We deemed the testimony of the victims wife sufficient to establish the basis for the grant. However, the new ruling in People v. Panabang modifies this principle and now precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof. The bare testimony of the brother of the deceased Felicisimo Castillo that, at the time of his death, Wilfredo Castillo was earning P250.00 daily as carpenter is not sufficient proof. APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City,

Batangas, Br. 12.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Dominador M. Mauhay for accused-appellants. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca PANGANIBAN, J.: The testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and positive, is

sufficient to support a conviction for murder. Truth is established by the quality, not necessarily by the quantity of the evidence. The Case Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon1 appeal the February 7, 2000

27

G.R. Nos. 137514-15, 373 SCRA 560, 16

January

2002, which

now

Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City (Branch 12) in Criminal Case No. 0132-98, which found them guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof. We also find the court a quos award of P4,800,000 for loss of earning

Page

The RTC disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE, direct the Court for March finds the accused and GERRY CUENCA with and one under

another, with intent to kill, with treachery and grave abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, beat and stab with the use of said bladed/pointed and hard instruments, suddenly and without warning, one Wilfredo Castillo, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, which directly caused his death.4 When arraigned on April 27, 1998, appellantswith the assistance of their lawyersentered a plea of not guilty.5 Because their co-accused were at large, trial on the merits proceeded only as against them. The Facts Version of the Prosecution In its Brief,6 the Office of the Solicitor General summarized the

CRISANTO AGON, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, both as principals by participation dated having 27, conspired 1998, and confederated and another in the commission of the crime of [m]urder, as alleged in the Information defined penalized Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to pay the heirs of Wilfredo Castillo the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, the sum of P38,800.00, as actual damages, the sum of P4,800,000.00 for loss of earning capacity, the sum of P20,000.00, as moral damages and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. The period during which both accused are under preventive

imprisonment shall be deducted from their sentence. Finally, Jackson let also warrants and of arrest be issued Agon against for the accused immediate

prosecutions version of the facts as follows: On February 14, 1998, around 9:30 in the evening, while lying down with his wife and family in his house at Module Subdivision, Barangay Tambo, Lipa City, Batangas, Marcial Morillo7 heard a commotion taking place outside his house. Dogs were barking loudly, so he decided to go out of the house to see what was happening outside. He then saw a man being mauled and beaten by four (4) persons. Upon seeing the incident, he hid himself behind a PLDT telephone post. From a distance of about ten (10) meters, he recognized the four (4) assailants as Gerry Cuenca, assailants Jackson and Cuenca, the victim Crisanto for Agon (8) and Bernie since Agon, they while were the all person being mauled was Wilfredo Edok Castillo. Marcial knew the four eight years neighbors, Gerry and Jackson being brothers and Crisanto and Bernie being father and son. He witnessed Crisanto hold Edoks left hand while Bernie held his right hand. _______________

Cuenca

Bernardo

Bernie

their

apprehension.3 On March 17, 1998, Lipa City Assistant City Prosecutor Mario G.

Mayuga filed the Information charging appellants and their co-accused as folows: _______________ VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca That on or about the 14th day of February, 1998 at about 9:30 oclock

28

in the evening, at Barangay Tambo, Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction armed of this Honorable Court, and the above-named instruments, accused, conspiring then and with bladed/pointed hard

Page

confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually aiding one

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca Gerry was at Edoks front and to the right while Jackson was at Edoks front and to the left and both were beating Edok continuously. Gerry and Jackson each used a piece of wood in hitting Edok several times on the face, head, chest and other parts of his body. Edok tried to struggle but his efforts proved futile. Edok then gave in, stooped down and eventually lost consciousness (Lumug[m]ok na po siya). The four (4) assailants then carried Edoks body with one holding on to his right arm, the other one x x x his left arm and the other two each held the right and left leg[s] of Edok towards the direction of Calabarzon Highway. Thereafter, Marcial returned to his house but did not tell his wife about the incident because she was nerbiyosa. He did not want the members of his family to get involved in the incident because he feared for their safety. The The mauling where incident lasted incident approximately was twenty (20) by minutes. the light place the happened illuminated

of Edoks body which was found inside a well in the forest. The body was retrieved from the well which was about fifteen (15) meters deep. There were blood stains around the well. Coconut trees surrounded the area. The body was recovered between Masagana Subdivision and Adelina Subdivision, which was a forested area and about one-half (1/2) kilometer from where the mauling incident took place. Around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 15, 1998, Feliciano reported to the Desk Officer, SPO2 Alberto Libao of the Lipa Police Station, that the body of his in brother, Barangay Wilfredo Tambo. Castillo, Thereafter, had been found in the forested area Police Inspector Romeo

Mitra, PO2 Enrico Tapalla, SPO4 Renaldo Saludo and SPO3 Pablo de Luna were dispatched to the crime scene to investigate the incident. Feliciano went with them. When Edoks body was retrieved, SPO4 Saludo noticed the VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca presence City. About 7:30 in the evening of February 15, 1998, Dr. Corazon Sabile, Health Officer of Lipa City, conducted an autopsy on Edoks body. The physical examination yielded the following results: there were nine (9) injuries on the head, two (2) of which were stab wounds, one stab wound on the right frontal area of the right ear which reached the skull and the second stab wound also at his right ear; one (1) lacerated gaping wound on the head; there were several contusions and hematoma on both eyes which could have been caused by mauling, and hematomas on the middle mandibular area and the lateral mandibular area (chin) which could have been caused by mauling or the dumping of the cadaver in to the well; there are also linear abrasions on the right lateral neck area that could have been caused by forcible contact; of stab wounds, blows and hematomas on his body. The

coming from the moon and the electric bulb at the electric post which was at the top of the roof of a house near the place of the incident. The following morning, February 15, 1998, Marcial met Feliciano Castillo, Edoks brother, who told him that they were looking for Edok. Marcial did not mention to Feliciano that he had witnessed the mauling of Edok because he was afraid that he might be implicated and involved in the incident. On February 15, 1998, around 2:30 in the afternoon, a neighbor named Silo passed by Marcials house and told him that they were looking for Edoks body. Marcial joined in the search in the forest for about one hour and then he went home.

cadaver was then taken to Funeraria San Sebastian at Balagbag, Lipa

29

About

oclock

in

the

afternoon

of

February

15,

1998,

Feliciano

Page

dropped by the house of Marcial and said that Edoks body had been found and borrowed Marcials flashlight in order to help in the recovery

there were nine (9) wounds on the body, that is, four (4) stab wounds and five (5) abrasions; the first stab wound was on the third intercostal space midelavicular area, the second on the fifth intercostal space, right midelavicular area, the third on the 8th intercostal space midelavicular area, and the fourth [was] on the right lumbar area; the said wounds were almost of the same depth, that is 5 cms; all of the said wounds could have been caused by a sharp pointed instrument; she also found five (5) abrasion on the body, i.e., in the left midscapular area, left infrascapular area, on the vertebral line, on the right midscapular area and on the vertebral line; that the abrasions are called gasgas and could have been caused by forcible contact; she also found in the extremities of the cadaver two (2) stab wounds on the right anterior thigh 4 to 5 cms. deep; she also found three (3) abrasions on the right forearm, left posterior arm and left posterior hand which could have been caused by forcible contact. The internal examination on the victims body revealed that 200 ml. of blood were found in the fleural cavity which could have come from the perforations of the right ventricle of the heart; the liver and upper lobe of the right lung were perforated; there were complete fractures on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th of both ribs which alone were sufficient to cause death. The mauling was aggravated by the dumping of Edoks body in the well. Considering the nature and number of injuries Edok sustained, no medical attention and assistance could have saved his life. The cause of Edoks death was Hypovolemia secondary to multiple stab wounds. On February 16, 1998, Marcial Morillo told Ruben Castillo about the mauling incident which (Morillo) had witnessed on the night of February 14, 1998. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca

Version of the Defense Appellants gave the following narration of the facts:9 The defense maintained that in the evening of February 14, 1998

accused Jackson Cuenca and Bernie Agon together with three [V]isayan [C]alabarzon workers identified as Obet, Nognog and Ruel were in the house of Yolanda Cuenca in the evening of February 14, 1998 at Brgy. Tambo, Lipa City about one kilometer away from the place of Marcial Morillo, Morillo the the alleged crime eyewitness, in whose While place these according persons to Marcial in said was committed. were

house of Yolanda Cuenca, they heard a voice calling for Jackson who was identified as Wilfredo Castillo. Jackson Cuenca came out [of] the house and asked Wilfredo Castillo what was the problem[;] however, Wilfredo Castillo immediately hacked him who was wounded at the right side of his back. Witness Yolanda Cuenca brought him inside her house and attended visitors to his wound. outside While and bringing a him inside the took house, place. Jackson was struggling to be free, [and] the three Visayan [C]alabarzon workers went thereafter commotion During the commotion, Yolanda Cuenca heard somebody [utter] the words sobra-sobra na ang ginagawa mo sa mga tao dito. The following day, February 15, 1998, two of the three Visayan Calabarzon Workers namely Obet and Nognog arrived at the house of Yolanda Cuenca and told her that she [would] say that she saw and heard nothing about the commotion. Accused Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon were not in the house of Yolanda Cuenca where the commotion took place [o]n the evening of February 14, 1998 and they were not also near the house of Marcial Morillo where the crime took place allegedly [o]n the evening of February 14, 1998. On that time and date, they were at the house of Roger Dimaculangan at Normanz Village, Tambo, Lipa City helping in the preparation of food for the baptismal party on February 15, 1998. Other than accused-appellants and other Andy Obille, Benjamin Anterola and Romy Anterola people were there. Accused-appellants vehemently

30
Page

Bothered by his conscience, on February 17, 1998, Morillo went to the Lipa Police Station to report the incident.8 (Citations omitted)

denied that they were the ones who killed Wilfredo Castillo alias Edok in the evening of February 14, 1998.10 _______________ VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca The Trial Courts Ruling The RTC convicted was appellants credible. because It said: the the lone Court prosecution believes witness, gives

In their Brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following alleged errors: 1. The honorable trial court erred in giving weight to the testimony of the alleged lone eyewitness, Marcial Mor[c]illo. _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca 2. The honorable trial court erred in not considering that the victim died of multiple stab wounds and not due to injuries caused by a piece of wood. 3. The honorable trial court erred in not considering the defense of alibi of accused-appellants in the appreciation of the whole evidence presented by the prosecution and defense.14 This Courts Ruling After reviewing the records of this case, we find no cogent basis to reverse liabilities. First Issue: Credibility of Lone Prosecution Witness Appellants assail the credibility of Marcial Morcillo, the lone prosecution witness. They contend that the trial court erred in giving full credence to Morcillos testimony, because it was not in accordance with common experience and observation of mankind.15 We disagree. We carefully reviewed the testimonies of both the prosecution and appellants conviction. We however modify the award of civil

Marcial positive because

Morcillo,

and

weight to the candid, vivid and detailed account of the incident and identification of all the it is clear, accused by Marcial and devoid Morcillo, not only of any signs of straight-forward

artificiality, but also because it vibrates with truth and sincerity.11 The court a quo held that conspiracy attended the killing: In this case, Crisanto and Bernie Agon were each holding the hands of Wilfredo Castillo, while the brothers Gerry and Jackson Cuenca helped each other in beating him with a piece of [wood] about one (1) meter long x x x. After Castillo slumped and lost consciousness, the four (4) accused helped each other in carrying Wilfredo Castillo towards the Calabarzon Highway going to the direction of Batangas City. Verily, at the precise moment of the execution of the crime, the accused acted in concert to accomplish a common objective to take the life of Wilfredo Castillo. The fact that Marcial Morillo did not witness the actual stabbing and killing of Wilfredo Castillo is of no moment.12 It disbelieved the defenses of denial and alibi. Hence, this appeal.13

31

Issues

Page

defense witnesses, as well as the other pieces of evidence on record.

We are convinced that the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to Morcillos testimony, which we reproduce in part as follows: QOn February 14, 1998, around 9:30 oclock in the evening, do you remember where you were? AI was inside my house sir. QWhere was your house on that date, February 14, 1998, 9:30 oclock in the evening? AAt Module Subdivision, Tambo, Lipa City sir. QWhat were you doing around that time, 9:30 oclock in the evening of February 14, 1998 inside your house in Module Subdivision, Tambo, Lipa City? AWe were already lying down sir. _______________ VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 129 People vs. Cuenca QYou said we, who were with you in your house? AMy wife and my family sir. QWhile you were then already lying down on that date, February 14, 1998 around 9:30 oclock in the evening, do you remember x x x any unusual incident that transpired?

AThere was a commotion of people sir. QHow did you come to know that there was a commotion of people? AMy dog and the dogs of my neighbors were barking sir. QWhat did you do when you heard this commotion of people and

barking of the dog and the dogs of your neighbors? AI went out of the house and looked for [what] the commotion was all about[,] sir. Q What did you see when you looked [for] where this commotion [was] coming [from] or what was causing this commotion? A I saw a person being beaten by four (4) persons sir. Q Were these four (4) persons or in what place in relation to your house where these four (4) persons beating one person? A In the street sir. Q How far is that place from your own house? A About ten (10) meters sir. Q

32
Page

AYes sir. QWhat was that unusual incident that transpired?

Where person? A

were

you

when

you

saw

four

(4)

persons

beating

one

(1)

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca Q Of these were (4) persons whom you named Gerry Cuenca while and ago Crisanto [among

I was hiding behind [a] PLDT Telephone post sir. Q From the place where you were hiding behind a PLDT Telephone Post, how far [away from you] were these four (4) persons who were beating another person x x x? A 10 meters sir. Q Were you able to recognize these four (4) persons who were beating another person? A Yes, sir. Q Who were these four (4) persons whom you saw were beating another person. A Crisanto Agon, Bernie Agon, Jackson Cuenca and Gerry Cuenca sir.

Agon them]? A

the persons

whom you

pointed

[to] a

Yes sir. Q Were you able to recognize the person whom these four (4) accused were beating? A Yes, sir. I recognized him. Q Who was that person who was being beaten by these four (4) accused, Gerry Cuenca, Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon? A Edok Castillo sir. Q Do you know the complete name of this Edok Castillo? A

Page

33

130

I quite remember, it is Alfredo Castillo, sir. Q And how were Gerry Cuenca, Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and

Q How about Bernie Agon, what hand of Edok Castillo was he holding? A The right hand sir. Q How about Gerry Cuenca? Where was he positioned in relation to Edok Castillo when he was beating Edok? A Right front portion of Edok Castillo sir. Q How about Jackson Cuenca, where was he positioned in relation to

Bernie Agon beating this Edok Castillo? A The father and son were holding Edok Castillo and the brothers were beating him sir. Q When you said that the father and son were holding Edok Castillo while the brothers were beating him, who are you referring to when you said the father and son? A Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon sir. Q How was Crisanto Agon holding Edok Castillo while the brothers were beating Edok Castillo? A The father and son were holding [both hands of] Edok Castillo. Q What hand was Crisanto Agon holding?

Edok Castillo while he was beating Edok Castillo? A He was standing towards the left front of Edok Castillo sir. Q Aside from stooping down, what else was Edok Castillo doing while he was being beaten by Gerry Cuenca and Jackson VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca Cuenca and while Bernie Agon and Crisanto Agon were holding his two hands? A

34
Page

A Left hand sir.

He lost consciousness sir. Q Why do you say that he lost consciousness? A Lumugmok na po siya. Q But before Edok Castillo actually fe[l]l or lumugmok what was he doing while he was being beaten up? A He could not do anything anymore sir. Q After Wilfredo anything more? A [T]hey carried him towards Calabarzon, sir. Q By the way, how many times did Gerry Cuenca and Jackson Cuenca hit Edok Castillo? A I could not remember, but he was hit several times, sir. Q In what part or parts of the body of Edok Castillo was he hit by th[o]se beating [him up], if he was ever hit? Witness pointing his face, to his head, to his chest and to his right face below the eye. Q You said that after Gerry Cuenca and Jackson Cuenca [beat] up Edok Castillo while he was being held [by] his two (2) hands by Crisanto and Bernie Agon, he fell down or lumugmok [and] he was carried to Calabarzon[;] what do you mean by this Calabarzon? A The highway going to Batangas sir. Castillo [fell] or lumugmok, what did Gerry Cuenca,

They help[ed] each other in carrying him sir. Q How did they carry actually this Edok Castillo? A The two (2) were carrying him by [both his] hands[,] one [holding] on each hand and the other two (2) were holding on [both his] feet sir.16 On cross-examination Morcillo consistently maintained, despite intense

Jackson Cuenca, Crisanto Agon and Bernie Agon do to him if they did

grilling and repeated attempts of the defense counsel to _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca discredit him, that appellants were the ones who had mauled the victim. True, of the defense that counsel resulted tried in to impeach his credibility in his during the cross-examination by leading him through an intricate and annoying maze questions minor inconsistencies testimonial declarations. Nevertheless, Morcillo remained steadfast in his narration of what he had witnessed on the night of February 14, 1998. So long as the witnesses testimonies and agree on substantial dilute matters, their

inconsequential

inconsistencies

contradictions

neither

credibility nor the verity of their testimonies.17 In the instant case, the inconsistencies cited by appellants are insignificant and immaterial to the essential fact testified tothe killing of the victim.18 As a rule, this Court will not disturb the factual findings of the trial court, because it had a better opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct weight of and the of is the witnesses witnesses even while and they their and were binding, testifying. is if not Indeed, to tainted its great with assessment credibility entitled

35
Page

Q How did the four (4) carry Edok Castillo towards the Calabarzo[n] which is the road according to you going to Batangas City? A

conclusive

arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and value.19 This Court has ruled in a number of cases20 that the testimony of a witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient for conviction because truth is established not by the quantity, but by the quality of the evidence. Second Issue: Cause of the Victims Death Appellants also contend that Morcillo did not see how the victim was stabbed. All he said was that he saw them beat up the victim _______________ VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca with a piece of wood. Thus, they said that the trial court erred in concluding that the deceased had succumbed, not to multiple stab wounds, but to injuries caused by a piece of wood.21 In the absence of direct evidence, appellants may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The latter is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact finder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free.22 Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites

To require direct eyewitness testimony when circumstantial evidence is sufficiently established would, in many cases, expose society to felons who would be unreasonably set free.24 _______________

21 The trial court resorted to circumstantial evidence, as follows: Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon were positively identified as present at the place of the incident at the time of its commission; that Crisanto was positively identified as one of the two (2) persons holding one of the hand[s] of Wilfredo Castillo; that Gerry Cuenca was also positively identified as the person at the right front of Wilfredo Castillo and one of the two (2) persons who beat Wilfredo Castillo with a piece of wood; that Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon were also identified as two (2) of the four (4) persons who carried the unconscious Wilfredo Castillo towards the Calabarzon Highway going to the direction of Batangas City; and [that], the next day, the victim was found dead with several stab wounds and abrasions. All told the circumstantial evidence for the prosecution surmounted the constitutional presumption of innocence. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca In the present case, the postmortem examination shows that the victim sustained multiple lacerations and abrasions plus eight stab wounds.25 The following pieces of circumstantial evidence show beyond reasonable doubt that appellants are responsible for the killing: First, Morcillo positively identified appellants as members of around 9:30 in the evening on February 14, 1998. the group

concur: (1) more than one circumstance is present, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

36

The totality of the evidence must constitute an unbroken chain showing beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, to the exclusion of all others.23

that had ganged up on the victim and mauled him near his residence

Page

Second, victim.

the

witness

saw appellants

acting

in

unisonbeating

up

then

Defense of Alibi Well-settled is the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.26 In the case before us, appellants claim that at the time the crime

carrying towards the Calabarzon Highwaythe unconscious body of the

Third, the victims corpse was recovered the next day inside a well, which was less than a kilometer away from the place of the mauling. Fourth, the victim suffered all from of multiple which stab wounds, that he abrasions, had been

contusions

and

lacerations,

indicated

heavily beaten up. This was consistent with the narration of Morcillo on how he saw appellants maul the victim less than 24 hours before the dead body was discovered. Fifth, appellants were the last persons seen with the victim before he died. Sixth, the other accused, Jackson Cuenca (brother of Appellant Gerry Cuenca) and Bernie Agon (son of Appellant Crisanto Agon) fled from their residence in Lipa City, and they have continuously evaded arrest up to the present. Finally, Morcillo had no ill motive to testify against appellants. From the foregoing circumstances, it is undisputed that appellants were physically present at the locus criminis and its immediate vicinity, and that an eyewitness positively identified them to be members of the group that had mauled and removed the victim from the crime scene prior to the discovery of his corpse. _______________ VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 135

happened, they the RTC said:

were at the

residence of Roger Dimaculangan, which

was located also at Barangay Tambo, Lipa City. Dismissing this claim,

Alibi and denial are inherently weak and easily contrived. This is why the accused must prove with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the place and time the felony was committed. This the accused failed to do. The distance between the house of Roger Dimaculangan, where both accused claimed to be at the time the f[e]lony was committed and the locus criminis is just a few kilometers away. It can be travelled in a few minutes by bicycle. Thus, it was not impossible for Gerry Cuenca and Crisanto Agon to leave and, after killing Wilfredo Castillo, return to the house of Dimaculangan without anybody noticing their absence. In any event, whom to the alibi he and saw denial helping of cannot each overcome other City. in the categorical and the and credible Wilfredo positive testimony of Marcial Morcillo identifying both accused as among those holding is beating rule that Castillo and thereafter carrying him towards [C]alabarzon Highway going direction Batangas Basic identification prevails over denial and alibi.27 Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellants to have been at scene of the crime their on the evening that of February were 14, also 1998, at the notwithstanding friends testimonies they

37

People vs. Cuenca Third Issue:

Page

Dimaculangan residence.

_______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Cuenca Conspiracy and Treachery The trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of murder because treachery, which was alleged in the Information, had attended the killing. On this point, the trial court aptly explained: Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is

commit the crime; it is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.30 Despite affirming appellants conviction, we nonetheless modify the

monetary awards. _______________ VOL. 375, JANUARY 29, 2002 People vs. Cuenca The award life of is P50,000 in accord as indemnity ex delicto for the loss of the the

treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods o[r] forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In the instant case, Crisanto and Bernie Agon were holding both hands of Wilfredo Castillo, while Gerry and Jackson Cuenca were beating him with a piece of wood on the different parts of his body. Wilfredo Castillo was unarmed and defenseless. Hence, treachery was present.28 Treachery is present when the following conditions are present: (1) the means of execution employed gives the victims no opportunity to defend themselves deliberately succeeded or or in to retaliate, that and (2) the In means this together case, with of execution the their are consciously showing adopted. appellants, prosecution co-accused

victims

with

prevailing

jurisprudence.31

Likewise,

award of P20,000 as moral damages is reasonable. However, the actual damages granted is improper and should be reduced from P38,800 to P7,300 considering that only the latter amount, representing burial expenses, was duly supported by receipts. The unsubstantiated balance of P31,500 should be deleted.32 We also find the court a quos award of P4,800,000 for loss of earning capacity to be improper. True, in People v. Verde,33 we granted an award for the loss of earning capacity to the heirs of the deceased despite the absence of documentary evidence to substantiate such claim. We deemed the testimony of the victims wife sufficient to establish the basis for the grant. However, the new ruling in People v. Panabang34 modifies this principle and now precludes an award for loss of earning capacity without adequate proof. The bare testimony of the brother of the deceased Felicisimo Castillo that, at the time of his death, Wilfredo Castillo was earning P250.00 daily as carpenter35 is not sufficient proof. In Panabang, we held duly that the indemnification Jose for loss of earning the

(who are still at large), helped each other in ensuring the execution of their nefarious intention to beat up and kill the victim who was unarmed and with no opportunity to defend himself. The prosecution was likewise able to show that there was conspiracy.

38

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement and decide on the commission of a felony.29 It is not necessary that there be direct proof that the co-conspirators had any prior agreement to

capacity

must be

proven. Justice

C. Vitug, expressing

current view of the Court, wrote: Indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven. A self-serving statement,

Page

being unreliable, is not enough. The father of the victim has testified on the latters monthly income of P12,000.00. But for lost income to be recovered, there must likewise be an unbiased proof of the deceaseds average, not just gross, income. An award for lost of earning capacity refers to the net income of the deceased, i.e., his total income net of expenses. x x x.36 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Vistan vs. Angeles WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED but the actual

damages awarded by the RTC is REDUCED from P35,850 to P7,300 while the grant of P4,800,000 for loss of earning capacity is DELETED. SO ORDERED. Melo concur. Judgment affirmed with modification. Notes.Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (People vs. Regalario, 220 SCRA 368 [1993]) A and circumstantial which was evidence not which has not been by adequately itself, be established, basis of (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ.,

corroborated,

cannot,

the

conviction. (People vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231 [1994]) o0o [People vs. Cuenca, 375 SCRA 119(2002)]

Page

39

No. L-11037. December 29, 1960] EDGARDO CARIAGA, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, def endant and appellant. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant and appellee. 1.DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE ONLY IN INSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ART. 2219 OF THE CIVIL CODE.Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages may be recovered. Plaintiffs' claim for moral damages not falling under any one of them, the same cannot be granted. 2.ID.; ID.; WHEN RECOVERABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

APPEAL

from a

judgment of the

Court of First Instance

of Laguna.

Alikpala, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo for defendant and appellant. E. appellants. Gov't appellee. DIZON, J.: Corp. Counsel A. Padilla and Atty. F. A. Umali for A. Fernandez and L. H. Fernandez for plaintiffs and

UNDER ART. 2220 OF THE CIVIL CODE.Neither could defendant LTB be held liable to pay moral damages to plaintiffs under Art. 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because said defendant did not act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith. 3.ID.; ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; ONLY PARTIES TO CONTRACTS BREACHED ARE ENTITLED TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES RESULTING THEREFROMSince the present action is based upon a breach of contract of carriage and plaintiff's parents were not a party merit. VOL. 110, DECEMBER 29, 1960 Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company 4.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW THE ClVIL CODE.The ; ATTORNEY'S present case FEES; not CASE NOT any FALLING of the thereto their and claim were for not actual themselves and injured as a result is of the collision, compensatory damages without

At about 1:00 p. m. on June 18, 1952, Bus No. 133 of the Laguna Tayabas Alfredo Laguna, Bus with Companyhereinafter left its station a Edgardo Cariaga, referred at to as the LTBdriven for of student by Lilio, the Moncada, Azcarraga St., medical Manila,

fourth-year

University of Santos Tomas, as one of its passengers. At about 3:00 p. m., as the bus reached that part of the poblacin of Bay, Laguna, where the national highway crossed a railroad track, it bumped against the engine of a train then passing by with such terrific force that the first six wheels of the latter were derailed, the engine and front part of the body of the bus were wrecked, the driver of the bus died instantly, while many of its passengers, Edgardo among them, were severely injured. Edgardo was first confined at the San Pablo City Hospital from 5:00 p.m., June 18, 1952, to 8:25 a. m., June 20 of the same year when he was taken to the De los Santos Clinic, Quezon City. He left that clinic on October 14 to be transferred to the University of Santo Toms Hospital where he stayed up to November 15. On this last date he was taken back to the De los PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

UNDER ANY OF THE INSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ART. 2208 OF falling under instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover attorney's fees.

Page

40

Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Santos Clinic where he stayed until January 15, 1953. He was

VOL. 110, DECEMBER 29, 1960 Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Railroad appealed. The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in awarding only Company. From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB

unconscious during the first 35 days after the accident: at the De los Santos Clinic Dr. Gustilo removed the fractured bones which lacerated the right frontal lobe of his brain and at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital Dr. Gustilo performed another operation to cover a big hole 011 the right frontal part of the head with a tantalum plate. The LTB paid the sum of P16,964.45 for all the hospital, medical and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18, 1952 to April 1953. From January 15, 1953 up to ApriI of the same year Edgardo stayed in a private house in Quezon City, the LTB having agreed to give him a subsistence allowance of P10.00 daily during his convalescence, having spent in this connection the total sum of P775.30 in addition to the amount already referred to. On April 24, 1953 the present action was filed to recover for Edgardo Cariaga, from the LTB and the MRR Co., the total sum of P312,000.00 as actual, compensatory, sum of moral and in exemplary the damages, and for his LTB parents, the P18,000.00 same concepts. The

P10,490.00 as compensatory damages to Edgardo; in not awarding them actual and moral damages, and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay attorney's fees. On the other hand, the LTB's principal contention in this appeal is that the trial court should have held that the collision was due to the fault of both the locomotive driver and the bus driver and erred, as a consequence, in not holding the Manila Railroad Company liable upon the cross-claim filed against it. We shall first dispose of the appeal of the bus company. Its first

contention is that the driver of the train locomotive, like the bus driver, violated the law, first, in sounding the whistle only when the collision was about to take place instead of at a distance at least 300 meters from the crossing, and second, in not ringing the locomotive bell at all. Both contentions are without merits. After considering the evidence presented by both parties the lower court expressly found: "* * * While the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing, the engineer sounded two long; and two short whistles and upon reaching a point about 100 meters from the highway, he sounded a long whistle which lasted up to the time the train was about to cross it. The bus proceeded on its way without slackening its speed and it bumped against the train engine, causing the first six wheels of the latter to be derailed." * * * * * * *

disclaimed liability claiming that the accident was due to the negligence of its co-defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, for not providing a crossing bar at the point where the national highway crossed the railway track, and for this reason filed the corresponding cross-claim against the latter company to recover the total sum of P18,194.75 representing the expenses paid to Edgardo Cariaga. The Manila Railroad Company, in turn, denied liability upon the complaint and cross-claim, alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident. The lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident and, as a result, rendered judgment sentencing the LTB to pay Edgardo Cariaga the sum of P10,490.00 as compensatory damages. with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint, and dismissing the cross-claim against the Manila

Page

41

"* * * that the train whistle had been sounded several times before it reached the crossing;. All witnesses for the plaintiffs and the defendants are uniform in stating that they heard the train whistle sometime before the impact and considering that some of them were in the bus at the time, the driver thereof must have heard it because he was seated on the left front part of the bus and it was his duty and concern to observe such fact in connection with the safe operation of the vehicle. The other L.T.B. bus which arrived ahead at the crossing, heeded the warning- by stopping and allowing happened to said vehicle. On the PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Cariaga us. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company other hand, the driver of the bus No. 133 totally ignored the whistle and noise produced by the approaching train and instead he tried to make the bus pass the crossing before the train by not stopping' a few meters from the railway track and in proceeding ahead." The above findings of the lower court are predicated mainly upon the testimony credibility, sufficient of we to Gregorio do not Ilusondo, find his in a the witness record We for any have, the fact Manila or Railroad Company. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the LTB to assail his circumstance no other discredit testimony. therefore, the train to pass and so nothing

violation of section 91 of Article 1459, incorporated in the charter of the said MRR Co. This contentionas is obviousis the very f oundation of the cross-claim interposed by the LTB against its co-defendant. The former, therefore, had the burden of proving it affirmatively because a violation of law is never presumed. The record discloses that this burden has not been satisfactorily discharged. The Cariagas, as appellants, claim that the award of P10,000.00

compensatory damages to Edgardo is inadequate considering the nature and the after effects of the physical injuries suffered by him. After a careful consideration of the evidence on this point we find their contention to be well founded. VOL. 110, DECEMBER 29, 1960 Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company From the deposition of Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a neurosurgeon, it appears that, as a result of the injuries suffered by Edgardo, his right forehead was fractured necessitating the removal of practically all of the right frontal lobe of his brain. From the testimony of Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, a psychiatrist, it may be gathered that, because of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo, his mentality has been so reduced that he can no longer finish his studies as a medical student; that he has become completely misfit for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around without someone helping him, and has to use a brace on his left leg and feet. Upon the whole evidence on the matter, the lower court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced his intelligence by about 50 % ; that due to the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quite and retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his death."

alternative but to accept the findings of the trial court to the eff ect, firstly, that the whistle of the locomotive was sounded four timestwo long and two short"as the train was approximately 300 meters from the crossing"; secondly, that another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo Cariaga was a passenger, paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing", whileas the LTB itself now admits (Brief p. 5)the driver of the bus in question totally

42
Page

disregarded the warning. But to charge the MRR Co. with contributory negligence, the LTB claims that the engineer of the locomotive failed to ring the bell altogether, in

The impression one gathers f rom this evidence is that, as a result of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga, he is now in a helpless condition, virtually an invalid, both physically and mentally. Appellant LTB admits that under Art. 2201 of the Civil Code the

Edgardo follows:

Cariaga's

claim

for

moral

damages

and

attorney's

fees

was

denied by the trial court, the pertinent portion of its decision reading as

"Plaintiffs' claim for moral damages cannot also be granted. Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages may be covered and the case under consideration does not fall under any one of them. The present action cannot come under paragraph 2 of said article the because as such Laguna it is not of one the Bus of quasidelict and and cannot be considered between because Tayabas pre-existing contractual Edgardo relation Cariaga.

damages for which the obligor, guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good faith, is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted, provided such damages, according to Art. 2199 of the same Code, have been duly proved. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo Cariaga consisting of medical, hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17,719.75 are within this category. We are of the opinion, however, that the income which Edgardo Cariaga could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus No. 133 owned and operated by the LTB. At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine in a reputable university. While his scholastic record may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4C), it is, nevertheless, As the regards LTB, sufficient the to justify that of he the assumption possibly easily that earn be he as could a have finished the course and would have passed the board test in due time. income could could medical as the practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the amount P300.00 expected minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies.

Company

Neither could defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company be held liable to pay moral damages to Edgardo Cariaga under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because said defendant did not act fraudulently or in bad faith in connection therewith. Defendant Laguna Tayabas Bus Company had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith. "The plaintiff fees, Edgardo because Cariaga this is also does not not entitled fall to recover any of for the

attorney's

case

under

instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code." VOL. 110, DECEMBER 29, 1960 Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company We agree with the trial court and, to the reasons given above, we add those given by this Court in Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. (101 Phil., 523, 530, 533) : "A mere perusal of plaintiff's complaint will show that his action against the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach of contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the that defendant plaintiff to bring when him he 'safely received and the without injuries mishaps' to his destination, and it is to be noted that the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab used

43
Page

Upon consideration of all the facts mentioned heretofore, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the compensatory damages awarded to Edgardo Cariaga should be increased to P25,000.00.

involved

herein,

Gregorio

Mira,

has

not

even

been

made

party

punished therefor. Altho (a) owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable for damages caused by their and employees corporations and household in helpers kind acting of within the are scope of their assigned task (Article 218 of the Civil Code); and (c)

defendant to this case. "Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiff's action in this case, is he entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article 2219 of the Civil Code says the following: 'Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

employers

engaged

any

industry

analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35. * * * * *

subsidiary civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company in the discharge of their duties (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain this action under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes just mentioned and against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code. "The present complaint is not based either on a 'quasi-delict causing physical injuries' (Art. 2219, par. 2, of the Civil Code). From the report of the Code Commission on the new Civil Code We copy the following: 'A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After a careful deliberation, obligations it was do agreed to use from the term 'quasi-delict' for those which not arise law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or

criminal offenses. They are known in Spanish legal treatises as 'culpa, aquiliana', culpa-extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delitos'. The phrase 'culpa-extracontractual' or its translation 'extra-contractual-fault' was eliminated because it did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations. 'Aquilian fault' might have been selected, but it was thought inadvisable to refer to so ancient a law as the 'Lex Aquilia'. So 'quasi-delict' was chosen, which more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law classification of obligations, and is in harmony with the nature of this kind of liability.'

"Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the first two may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find, however, with

44

regard injuries'.

to

the with

first this one

that case that

the

defendant 'criminal the

herein offense

has

not

committed in the plaintiff

in is

connection

any

offense

resulting

physical

Page

The

committed

against

Gregorio Mira, and that is why he has been already prosecuted and

The

Commission also the

thought of the possibility of adopting

the

word from

were rendered before the effectivity of the new Civil Code (August 30, 1950) and for the further reason that the complaints filed therein were based on different causes of action. "In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral

"tort" from Anglo-American law. But "tort" under that system is much broader than Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising non-contractual negligence. 'Tort' in AngloAmerican jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal act, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the Project/ (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 161-162). "In the case of Cangco, vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We

damages by the trial court has to be eliminated, for under the law it is not a compensation awardable in a case like the one at bar." What has been said heretofore relative to the moral damages claimed by Edgardo Cariaga obviously applies with greater force to a similar claim (4th assignment of error) made by his parents. The claim made by said spouses for actual and compensatory damages is likewise without merits. As held by the trial court, in so far as the LTB is concerned, of LTB carriage f or the to the present which simple action said is based were they upon not a a not breach party, of and contract of the spouses that

established the distinction between obligation derived from negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of contract. Thus, we said: 'lt is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially in the VOL. 110, DECEMBER 29, 1960 Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection arising of EX supervision. Article 1903 only is not to applicable to obligations CONTRACTU, but extra-contractual

neither can they premise their claim upon the negligence or quasidelict reason were themselves injured as a result of the collision between the LTB bus and the train owned by the Manila Railroad Company. Wherefore, modified as above indicated, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against appellant LTB. Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed with modification. [Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 110 Phil. 346(1960)]

obligationsor to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to CULPA AQUILIANA.' and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL.'

45
Page

"The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., (82 Phil., 359; 46 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 2023); Lilius et al. vs. Manila Railroad, 59 Phil., 758) and others, wherein moral damages were awarded to the plaintiffs, are not applicable to the case at bar because said decisions

VOL. 49, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines No. L-28512. February 28, 1973. PEDRO R. DAVILA and PRECIOSA C. TIRO, plaintiffs-appel-lants, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, defendant-appellant Torts and damages; Common carriers; The standard of care required of common carriers is that of extraordinary dili-gence.Article 1733 of the New Civil in Code the binds common . . . carriers, for the from safety the of nature the of their business and by reasons of public policy,. . . to observe extraordinary diligence vigilance passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. Same; Same; Burden of proof that extraordinary diligence in transporting passengers was observed is on the common car-rier.Article 1756 of the New Civil Code fixes the burden of proof by providing that in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. Same; Same; Responsibility of common carriers for safe-ty of passengers cannot be dispensed with by notice and stipu-lations.Article 1757 of the New Civil Code states that the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers . . . cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, otherwise. Same; Same; Facts showing common carrier did not observe the by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or

crashed; (c) cross-winds had a velocity of either 20 to 25 knots or 25 to 35 knots an hour which considering the relatively short distance from Romblon to Mt. Baco (crash site) and the brief span of time it would take to fly that distance, cross-winds with the velocity stated could not have possibly deviated the plane by as much as 32 miles; (d) the report of the Weather Bureau at the time showed that visibility was 15 miles between Romblon and SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines Mt. Baco and that the clouds from 2,700 to 7,000 feet elevation were scattered and the profile of the probable weather cross-section along airway Amber I during the flight shows that at 6,000 feet (the planes prescribed altitude) the airline was clear and free of clouds; (e) the defendant airlines investigating team reported that the probable cause (of the accident) was the inability of the pilot to intersect airway Amber I over Romblon and maintain track within its designated airway lane for reason unknown; and (f) the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for his flight, at least between Romblon and Manila. HELD: The pilots action was a violation of air-traf-fic be rules to which, under any the case, circumstances, the accident may directly attributable. In

absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the defendant as to who and why the accident occurred the presumption is that it was at fault, under Article 1756 of the Civil Code. Same; Same; Indemnity of death of passenger is P12,000.Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the indemnity due to the heirs of the deceased who was the victim of a tortious act, the amount should be increased to P12,000.00. Same; Same; Normal lifespan of the deceased who was single and 30 years old when he died is 33-1/3 years. However, circumstances relating to his physical condition may reduce this to 25 years.At the age of 30 years, ones normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years according to the

standard of care required of it.The facts of the case at bar showed

46

that (a) the pilot did not intercept airway Amber I over Romblon as it was supposed to do, and that the pilot did not give his position then although Romblon was a compulsory checking point; (b) the plane deviated from the prescribed route by 32 miles to the west when it

Page

formula adopted by this Court in Villa Rey Transit vs. C.A. (31 SCRA 511) on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However, although the deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had complained pains of and and been treated feeling for of such ailments It as is backaches, chest occasional tiredness.

here to exercise extraordinary diligence, as required by law, does not amount provision. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. to anyone of the circumstances contemplated in the said

Rodriguez, J.

reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider, for purposes of these case, a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years. Same; Same; Earning Capacity under Art. 2206(1) in relation to Art. 1764 of the for New Civil Code own means gross earnings less necessary by the expenses deceaseds living.The amount recoverable The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Dizon, De Guzman & Vitug and Pedro R. Davila for plaintiffsappellants. Siguion appellant. MAKALINTAL, J.: In Civil Case No. 5728 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (Pedro R. Davila and Preciosa C. Tirol, plaintiffs, vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., defendant) judgment was rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs various sums of money, as follows: (1) For the death of Pedro T. Davila, Jr. the amount of P6,000.00; (2) For the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines at the rate of P12,000.00 per annum for five (5) years in the amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos. (P60,000.00): (3) For moral damages in favor of the plaintiffs Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); Reyna, Montecillo, Belo & Ongsiako for defendant-

heirs of a victim of tort is not loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of VOL. 49, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. In the case at bar, the de-ceaseds earnings from three sources of income was P15,000.00 a year (as radio station manager, lawyer-practitioner and farmer). A deduction of P600.00 a month considering that the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one source, is reasonable. The amount of P7,800 net yearly income multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs. Same; Same; When exemplary damages not justified.Under Article 2232

47

of the Civil Code, the court may award exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The failure of the defendant

Page

(4) For exemplary damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00); (5) For actual damages the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) broken down to as follows: A rolex watch valued at P600.00; a pistol worth P300.00; burial expenses P600.00; for the lot and the mausoleum P3,500.00; (6) For Attorneys fees the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or a total amount of One Hundred and One Thousand Pesos (P101,000.00) To pay the costs of this proceedings. Both parties appealed directly to this Court in view of the aggregate of the amounts awarded, the judgment having been rendered before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 5440. In this appeal the plaintiffs seek an increase in said amounts, and the defendant, complete exoneration from, or at least mitigation of, liability. The case arose from the tragic crash of a passenger plane of the defendant which took the lives of all its crew and passengers. The plane, identified as PI-C133, was a DC-3 type of aircraft, manufactured in 1942 and acquired by the defendant in 1948. It had flown almost 18,000 hours at the time of its ill-fated flight. Despite its age, however, it had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. On November 23, 1960, at 5:30 in the afternoon, it took off from the Manduriao Airport, Iloilo, on its way to Manila, with 33 people on board, including the planes complement. It did not reach its destination, but crashed at Mt. Baco, Mindoro, one hour and fifteen minutes after takeoff. A (massive search was undertaken by the defendant and by other parties as soon as it was realized that the planes arrival in Manila was overdue. The plaintiffs, parents of Pedro T. Davila, Jr., who was one of VOL. 49, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 501 Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines could only from 19, conflicting 1960, a newspaper letter of reports, until they the received, on

December

condolence

from

defendants

president Andres Soriano, informing them that their son had died in the crash. And it was only on December 29 that his body was recovered and taken back to Iloilo. The issues before the trial court, and now before Us in this appeal, are whether or not the defendant is liable for violation of its contract of carriage and if so, for how much. The provisions of the Civil Code on this substantive question of liability are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers, from the nature of their business and by reasons of public policy, . . . to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance . . . for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of each case. Article 1755 establishes the standard of care required of a common carrier, which is, to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. are presumed Article to 1756 fixes at the fault burden or to of proof by providing that in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers have been have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. Lastly, Article 1757 states that the responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers . . . cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise. The route prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration for the flight of plane PI-C113 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960 was IloiloRomblon-Manila, the latter stage, denominated as airway Amber I, being

48
Page

the passengers, had no definite news of what had happened to their son, getting what information they 501

a straight lane from Romblon to Manila. The prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The plane reported its position after take-off and again when it was abeam the Roxas homer. However, it did not intercept airway Amber I over Romblon as it was supposed to do, and the pilot did not give his position then although Romblon SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines was a compulsory checking point. The fact was that the plane had it

there was testimony that the cross-winds had a velocity of either 20 to 25 knots or 25 to 35 knots an hour. Considering the relatively short distance from Romblon to Mt. Baco and the brief span of time it would take to fly that distance, cross-winds with the velocity stated could not have possibly deviated the plane by as much as 32 miles. The defendant points out that the navigational instrument on board the plane consisted of two (2) sets of automatic direction finders (ADF) which, when found after the crash, showed a reading that the aircraft was headVOL. 49, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines ing north, which was the proper flight direction. This point, however, is of no vital significance in this case since it does not explain why the aircraft was 32 miles off its prescribed route in the first place. It is suggested that the pilot did not notice the drift of his plane because of poor visibility due to thick clouds, which prevented him from making the corresponding correction on the basis of visual references to the terrain outside. But according to Maj. Mijares himself the report from the Weather Bureau at the time showed that visibility was 15 miles between Romblon and Mt. Baco and that the clouds from 2,700 to 7,000 ft. elevation were scattered. And the profile of the probable weather crosssection along airway Amber I during the flight (Exh. 33-A) shows that at 6,000 ft. the airlane was clear and free of clouds. The suggestion therefore that the pilot was practically flying blind and consequently failed to notice the drift of the aircraft is not justified by the evidence. Indeed even the investigating team of the defendant under the chairmanship of Capt. Jaime Manzano concluded in its report that based on the limited evidences available, the board is of the opinion that the probable cause was the inability of the pilot to intersect airway Amber I over Romblon and to maintain track within its designated airway lane for reasons unknown.

deviated from the prescribed route by 32 miles to the west when wreckage was found was 6,800 ft.

crashed at Mt. Baco. The reading of the altimeter of the plane when its

There is a suggestion that in the course of the flight between Romblon and Mindoro the aircraft was drifted westward by the cross-winds then blowing in the region. The defendant, however, has not given a definite explanation as to why, if such was the case, the pilot failed to make the necessary correction in his flight to compensate for the drift. According to the defendants witness, Maj. Mijares, Chief of the Aviation Safety Division of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and Chairman of the from of CAA the Investigating Weather for Committee, was there so the the was good aircraft; a navigational Mt. error, Baco to and which several factors contributed: the weather observation at that time Bureau the say, not of be between and Romblon and the wind aloft was quite strong, which would be also one the causes I drifting would the of other the strong probability, the plane would malfunction aircrafts

navigational instrument. He further explained that a cross-wind can drift if the pilot will not make the necessary correction, if his navigational instrument is malfunctioning and the visual reference outside the aircraft could not make the necessary corrections.

49
Page

There is nothing in the testimony of Maj. Mijares to show just how strong the cross-winds were in the region at the time, although in the investigation of the accident by the Senate Committee on transportation

What is undisputed therefore is that the pilot did not follow the route prescribed for his flight, at least between Romblon and Manila. Since up to that point over Romblon, where he was supposed to intersect airway Amber I, the weather was clear, the most reasonable conclusion is that his failure to do so was intentional, and that he probably wanted to fly on a straight line to Manila. It was a violation of air-traffic rules to which, under the circumstances, the accident may be directly attributable. In any case, absent a satisfactory explanation on the part of the

The deceased, Pedro Davila, Jr., was single and 30 years of age when he died. At that age ones normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years, according to the formula (2/3 x [8030]) adopted by this Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals3 on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. However, although the deceased was in relatively good health, his medical history shows that he had complained of and been treated for such ailments as backaches, chest pains and occasional feelings of tiredness. It is reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider, for purposes of this case, a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years. In the same case of Villa Rey Transit this Court stated: __________________ VOL. 49, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines . . . earning capacity, as an element of damages to ones estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, less the necessary expense for his own

defendant as to how and why the accident occurred, the presumption is that it was at fault, under Article 1756 of the Civil Code. The next question relates to the amount of damages that should be awarded to the plaintiffs, parents of the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines deceased. The trial court fixed the indemnity for his death in the

amount of P6,000.00. Pursuant to current jurisprudence on the point it should be increased to P12,-000.00.1 The deceased was employed as manager of a radio station2, from

which he was earning P8,400.00 a year, consisting of a monthly salary of P600.00 and allowance of P100.00. As a lawyer and junior partner of his father in the law office, he had an annual income of P3,600.00. From farming he was getting an average of P3,000.00. All in all therefore the deceased had gross earnings of P15,000.00 a year. According to Article 2206, paragraph (1), of the Civil Code, the

living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered, that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from

defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased and indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. This Article, while referring to damages for death caused by crime or quasidelict, is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

three (3) different sources, namely, from managing a radio station, from law practice and from farming, the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one source. Together with his living expenses, a deduction of P600.00 a month, or P7,200.00 a year, seems to Us reasonable, leaving a net yearly income of P7,800.00. This amount, multiplied by 25 years, or P195,000.00 is the

Page

50

amount respect.

which

should

be

awarded

to

the

plaintiffs

in

this

particular

interest thereon from the finality of this judgment. With costs against the defendant. Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Judgment modified. Notes.Liability for quasi-delict arises if the following requisites are

Actual losses sustained consist of the following, as found by the trial court: Rolex Watch P600.00; pistol P300.00; Burial Expenses P600.00; and cost of cemetery lot and mausoleum P3,500.00. Under Article 2206, in relation to Article 1764, of the Civil Code, the parents of the deceased are entitled to moral damages for their mental anguish. The trial court awarded P10,000.00 in this concept, and We find no justification to change the award, considering the long period of uncertainty and suffering the plaintiffs underwent from November 23, when the plane crash occurred, to December 19, when they received a letter from the defendants president confirming the death of their son, and again to the following December 29, when his body was finally recovered and taken back to them. With respect to the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, it is Our opinion that the same should be elimiSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines nated. According to Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in contracts and quasi-contracts the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The failure of the defendant here to exercise extraordinary diligence, as required by law, does not amount to anyone of the circumstances contemplated in the said provision. The trial court has awarded attorneys fees of P10,000.-00. We do not find this award groundless or the amount thereof unreasonable.

present: (1) Damage, injury or prejudice to the offended party; (2) An unlawful act or omission amounting to fault or negligence of which the defendant responsible, personally, was or some (3) A other direct person casual for whose acts he is the guilty; connection between

negligent act or omission and the damage, injury or prejudice; and (4) No pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 16 Phil. 8; Fores vs. Miranda, L-12163, March 4, 1959; Barredo vs. Garcia & Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Art. 2176, New Civil Code). In an action for quasi-delict, the burden of proof is on the person

claiming damages to show that the proximate cause of his damage or injury was the fault of defendant or of his employee or one for whose acts he is vicariously liable (Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 402). Once the negligence of the employee is proved, the VOL. 49, FEBRUARY 28, 1973 Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines employers negligence is presumed prima facie. (Campo vs. Camarote, 53 O.G. No. 9, 2794). The defendant, in an action based on quasi-delict, may thus raise the negligence Sarabia, Attractive of 104 the Phil. plaintiff 1050), would or be of another where as the a defense so-called vs. (Paulan Doctrine vs. of except

51

The total of the different items above enumerated is P232,000.00. The judgment of the court a quo is therefore modified accordingly and the defendant is ordered to pay the said amount to the plaintiffs, with legal

Page

Nuisance

applicable.

(Taylor

Manila

Electric

Railroad & Light Co., supra).

Another

defense

commonly

available

to

the

defendant,

particularly

in

vehicular accident cases, lies in the so-called Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. This doctrine states that a person who chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, has the last clear notwithstanding the

negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, supra). This doctrine does not apply where the concurrent or successive negligent acts independently or omissions of two of each other, are, or more in persons, although the direct acting and combination,

proximate cause of a single injury. In such cases, both tortfeasors are liable for the resulting injury even if the act of one alone might have caused 1088). The defense of contributory negligence of the offended party will cause only the reduction of the damages which may be awarded to him if such contributory negligence contributes only to his own injury. The rule is otherwise, where the offended partys negligence contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, in which case such contributory negligence will bar the recovery of damages (Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359). LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE the entire injury or damage. (Sabido vs. Custodio, 17 SCRA

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume 1, page 656 on Damages; and page 244 on Common Carriers. Jarencio, H.U., Torts and Damages, 1972 Edition.

Page

52
[Davila vs. Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA 497(1973)]

VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 27, 1968 Raagas vs. Traya No. L-20081. February 27, 1968. MELQUIADES RAAGAS and ADELA LAUDIANO RAAGAS, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. OCTAVIO TRAYA, MRS. OCTAVIO TRAYA and BIENVENIDO CANCILLER, defendants-appellants. Civil procedure; Judgment on the pleadings; Rule stated.A judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading." (Section 1 of Rule 19 of the new Rules of Court). Same; Same; Where answer tenders an issue; Case at bar.An

on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount (Tomassi v. Villa-Abrille, L7047, Aug. 21, 1958; Suntay Tanjangco v. Jovellanos, et al., L-12332, June 30, 1960; Delfin v. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., L-23348, March 14, 1967). In Malonzo v. Galang, L-13851, July 27, 1960, we reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation awarded, is "it not is, necessary nevertheless, in order that that moral the damages claimant may be essential satisfactorily

prove the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal relation to defendant's acts." APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Miguel V. Tiausas for plaintiff-appellee. Victoriano M. Realino for defendants-appellants. CASTRO, J.: The complaint filed on April 1, 1960 with the Court of First Instance of Leyte (civil case 2749) by the spouses Melquiades Raagas and Adela Laudiano Raagas against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido Canciller, alleges in essence that on or about April 9, 1958, while the latter was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by his co-defendants, along the public highway in MacArthur, Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-year old son Regino, causing his instantaneous death. The plaintiffs ask for actual damages in the sum of P10,000, moral, nominal and corrective damages in a sum to be determined by the VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 27, 1968 Raagas vs. Traya court, Pl,000 as attorney's fees, Pl,000 for expenses of litigation, plus costs.

averment in the answer to the effect that the defendants SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Raagas vs. Traya "have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect to tendering a valid issue. (Philippine National Bank v. Lacson, L-9419, May 29, 1957; Benavides v. Alabastro, L-19762, Dec. 23, 1964). Same; Same; Rule as to allegations for damages.Even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted (Abubakar Tan v. Tan Ho, L18820, Dec. 20, 1962; Lim Kiok v. Bataan

53
Page

Cigar and Cigarette Factory, L-15861, April 16, 1960). Actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend

In

their answer with counterclaim

for moral and actual damages and

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Raagas vs. Traya did not have a current year registration plate x x x for the year 1958 when the accident occurred," that "this failure x x x has the ef fe ct of adm itting hypothe tica lly operated x x x the said truck without proper license x x x when the accident occurred," and that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation (article 2185, new Civil Code)." The court went on to conclude that under the circumstances a judgment on the pleadings was "irremediably proper and fitting." The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this Court because the issues raised are purely of law. Section or 10 of Rule 35 the of the old Rules of of Court1 the authorized a

attorney's fees, filed on April 22, the defendants specifically deny that Canciller was "driving recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that the truck "was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the right side of the road"; that it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear tire of the said truck are not to blame for and the died", and accident consequently was have the defendants negligence which "entirely exercised

attributable to an unforeseen event" or due to the fault of the child and of his parents; that the defendants-spouses due diligence in the selection and supervision of their driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946 only after a thorough study of his background as a truck driver; and that each time they allowed him to drive it was only after a check of his physical condition and the mechanical fitness of the truck assigned to him. On May 4 the plaintiffs' moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the claim that the defendants' answer not only "failed to tender an issue" but as well "admitted material allegations" of the complaint. This motion was set for hearing on June 18. On the previous day, however, the clerk of court received a telegram from the defendants' counsel, requesting for postponement of the hearing to July 2 on the ground that he was sick of influenza. The lower court denied the request for lack of "proper notice to the adverse party", and considered the case submitted for decision upon the filing of the plaintiffs' memorandum. On June 24 it rendered a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, Pl,000 actual damages, Pl,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs."

judgment on the pleadings "where an answer fails to tender an issue, otherwise admits material allegations adverse party's pleading." The vital issue, therefore, to which the other issues are subsidiary or interstitial, is whether the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on the pleadings. It is our view that the court erred. The plaintiffs' claim f or actual, moral, nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of tendering a valid issue. We so held in Philippine National Bank vs. Lacson, L-9419, May 29, 1957 and in Benavides vs. Alabastro, L-19762, Dec. 23, 1964. In Abubakar Tan vs. Tian Ho, L-18820, December 29, 1962 and Lim Giok vs. Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory, L-15861, April 16, 1960,

54
Page

The court reasoned that the denial in the answer of the charge of reckless driving "did not affect the plaintiffs' positive allegation in their complaint that the truck x x x

we held that even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. In Tomassi vs. Villa_______________ VOL. 22, FEBRUARY 27, 1968 Raagas vs. Traya Abrille, L-7047, August 21, 1958, Suntay Tanjangco vs. Jovellanos, et al., L-12332, June 30, 1960, and Delfin vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al, L-23348, March 14, 1967, 1967A PHILD 453, we declared in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and on evidence of the actual amount. Finally, in Malonzo vs. Galang, et. al., L-13851, July 27, 1960, we reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to defendant's acts." The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full-blown trial on the merits at which the parties will be afforded every opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective contentions and defenses. ACCORDINGLY, the judgment on the pleadings of June 24, 1960 is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs. Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J. , Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,

Judgment set aside and case remanded to court of origin for trial on the merits. Note.The rule in Malonzo vs. Galang, L-13851, July 27, 1960, restated in the foregoing case seems to have modified in San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, L-21879, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 292 (citing Darang vs. Belizar, L-19487, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 214), where it was held that: "In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discreSUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Yap vs. Republic tion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendants' acts. (Italics supplied). [Raagas vs. Traya, 22 SCRA 839(1968)]

55
Page

Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave.

VOL. 109, JULY 27, 1960 No. L-13851. July 27, 1960] DEOGRACIAS F. MALONZO, petitioner, vs. GREGORIA T. GALANG and FRANCISCO GALANG, respondents. 1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ATTORNEY'S FEES RECOVERABLE IN CLEARLY UNFOUNDED SUITS; ARTICLE 2208, PAR. (4) CIVIL CODE.Article 2208, Par. (4) of the Civil Code authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff," and in view of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner's action against respondents is clearly unfounded, the award of attorney's fees in the instant case is correct and proper. 2.ID.; ID.; APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 2208 TO DEFENDANTS; Malonzo vs. Galang "a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding" to be one of those

analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered or it would have been expressly mentioned! in Art. 2219 as it was in Art. 2208, or else Art 2208 would have been incorporated by reference in Art. 2219. 5.ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF FACTUAL BASIS MUST BE SATISFACTORILY PROVED; MORAL DAMAGES DESIGNED TO COMPENSATE ACTUAL INJURY AND NOT TO IMPOSE PENALTY ON WRONGDOER.While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art 2217) and its causal relation to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in -the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Algarra vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil., 284.) MUST BE PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Felixberto V. Castillo for petitioner. F. M. Ejercito for respondents. REYES, J. B. L., J.: On October 5, 1946, Gregoria T. Galang, wife of Francisco G. Galang, received from Deogracias T. Malonzo a loan of P5,000.00 under a check which Gregoria cashed at the drawee bank National City Bank of New York, Manila.

COUNTERCLAIM OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.The provision of Article 2208, par. 4, of the Civil Code applies equally in favor of a defendant with a counterclaim for attorney's fees, considering that a counterclaim is a complaint by the defendant against the original plaintiff. 3.DAMAGES; ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

PROVED; ARTICLE 2199; CIVIL CODE.Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved (Art. 2199). Hence, where neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has pointed out any specific facts which afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages had over and above award attorney's of fees and costs that respondents suffered, an compensatory damages should

not be allowed. 4.ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; CLEARLY UNFOUNDED SUIT NOT AMONG GROUNDS FOR MORAL may DAMAGES.Although be awarded in Art. 2219 also provides to those

56

that moral

damages

"analogous

cases"

enumerated therein, the Code could not have intended

Page

Subsequently, on April 17, 1947, the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation loaned to Francisco G. Galang a check in the sum of P14,968.00 drawn against the Philippine National Bank, Galang endorsed the check to Deogracias F. Malonzo, who cashed it on April 25, 1947. Out of the proceeds of the check, P10,000.00 was applied to the payment of the share and participation of Francisco Galang Malonzo. The balance of PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Malonzo vs. Galang P4,968.00, together with P32.00 delivered in cash to Malonzo, paid off, according to Galang, the loan of P5,000.00 extended by the former to Galang's wife on October 5, 1946. However, Malonzo alleged that he returned said amount of P4,968.00 to Galang, partly in cash (P1,000.00) and partly in a check for P3,968.00 dated May 19, 1947, made payable to Gregoria T. Galang and drawn against the Philippine Trust Co. Claiming Galang that the P5,000.00 on August loan 27, obtained 1955 for from the him by Gregoria thereof, T. plus in a fishing venture with

to this Court, urging that there was no legal basis for the award to respondents of compensatory and moral damages, and of attorney's fees. As to attorney's fees, the award is correct and proper, in view of the finding of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's action against respondents is clearly unfounded, since Article 2208, par. (4), of the New Civil Code authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding VOL. 109, JULY 27, 1960 Malonzo vs. Galang against the plaintiff". a This provision for applies attorney's equally fees (as in in favor this et. of a

defendant the

under

counterclaim (Pongos vs.

case), al., 84

considering that a counterclaim is a complaint by the defendant against original plaintiff Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., Phil., 499; 47 Off. Gaz., [2] 733), wherein the defendant is the plaintiff and the original plaintiff the defendant. In regard to other items of compensatory damages supposedly suffered by respondents (i. e., in addition to attorney's fees and costs that are also included in the filed concept a of actual or compensatory suit against damages): respondents assuming that they are recoverable in this case under the theory that petitioner's having clearly unfounded constitutes a tort against the latter that makes the former "liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of" (Art. 2202, New Code), these damages can not, however, be presumed, but must be duly proved (Art. 2199). Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has pointed out any specific facts which afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages had over suffered. and above the attorney's other fees hand, and the costs award that of respondents Upon

Galang on October 5, 1946, had remained unpaid, Malonzo sued the spouses payment interests and attorney's fees (C.C. No. 27303, CFI of Manila). The trial court refused to believe Malonzo's version that the loan in question had not yet been paid: held that the same had already been liquidated as claimed by the defendant spouses; and found that the check for P3,968 delivered by Malonzo to Gregorio T. Galang on May 19, 1947 had nothing to do with said loan and was in payment of another loan which she extended to Malonzo just a few days before the check was issued. The lower court also found that the complaint was clearly unfounded, dismissed the same, and sentenced Malonzo to pay the Galang spouses under their counterclaim P500.00 compensatory and

57

moral damages, and P1,000.00 attorney's fees. On appeal to the Court of Appeals by Malonzo, the judgment of the court a quo was affirmed in toto. From this decision, Malonzo appealed

compensatory damages to respondents was merged by the trial court in a round sum (P500.00) that also included moral damages, showing that this amount was not what respondents had proved to have suffered, but

Page

simply what the court believed to be reasonably due to them for having been made to suit. defend For what the two we courts do found to be the a clearly of unfounded this reason, not think award

Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its causal relation to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the VOL. 109, JULY 27, 1960 Aquino vs. Delizo wrongdoer (Algara vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil., 284). The trial court and the Court of Appeals both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondent were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplary damages. The foregoing discussion makes it unnecessary to further dwell on the other points raised by the appeal. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that the award of compensatory and moral damages to respondents is eliminated, but is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcin, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur. Decision modified. _______________ [Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil. 16(1960)]

compensatory damages to respondents should be allowed. Finally, with respect to moral damages, we are inclined to agree with petitioner that these damages are not recoverable herein, notwithstanding the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that his complaint against respondents was clearly unfounded or unreasonable. It PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Malonzo vs. Galang will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages may be recovered (Art. 2219). A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying for award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages. It is true that Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to those enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended "a clearly unfounded civil action or proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art. 2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in Art. 2219. Besides, Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries", as an. instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, 96 Phil., 321), excepting, of course, the special torts

58
Page

referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).

VOL. 6, JUNE 1, 1906 Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers [No. 2720. June 1, 1906.] JUAN SANZ Y SANZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. VICENTE LAVIN AND BROTHERS, defendants and appellees. 1.DEBTS.Among various demandable debts it is to be presumed that payment is to be applied to the one which is most onerous. (Article 1174, Civil Code.) 2.DAMAGES; PROOF, SUFFICIENCY OF.An unbroken line of decisions, both arising before from and the a after the "that of promulgation every contract or of the for the Civil Code, of has some established doctrine breach judgment whether damages, result whether

by mistake in making the liquidation, we included the stipulated interest at ten per cent per annum by capitalizing them, and thus it was attempted to collect interest upon interest, which was not lawful, although usual in the business community, consequently in the written argument presented (p.4). In the facts set forth in the complaint no statement is made of any other basis for the indebtedness than the notarial instrument dated March 31, 1885, by which Paulino Lavin, the ancestor, acknowledges the indebtedness as a result of an accounting with the late Vicente Milla, under whom the plaintiff claims the sum of 18,000 pesos which Lavin undertook to pay at the rate of 2,000 pesos per annum, commencing from that date, "undertaking in case of breach of contract to indemnify the creditors for the damages which might be suffered by reason of failure in the payment, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the date of the breach of the contract. * * *" But the appellant contends that, in addition to this source of to the trial court, the amount demanded was reduced to eighteen thousand seventy-six pesos and fifty-five centavos (18,076.55)"

provision of the law, must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been suffered." (Judgments of the supreme court of Spain of the 13th and 26th of November, 1895; December 7, 1896; and September 30, 1898.) PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. J. R. Serra, for appellant. Vicente Foz, for appellees. ARELLANO, C. J.: The complaint prays for a judgment for the sum of 33,768.50 pesos, Mexican currency, but the appellant in his brief says that "in this sum,

indebtedness, which in the course of the trial, and in the judgment, was referred to as "the old account" there is another, arising from accountscurrent which subsequent to March 31, 1885, were continued between the plaintiff and and which Lavin, was as shown by the correspondence evidence, which this took claim place presented as documentary

being designated as the "new account," VOL. 6, JUNE 1, 1906 Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers and whatever may be the amount of this "new account" none of the parties have undertaken to fix or determine. There has been neither liquidation nor allegations in support of it, nor any concrete proof. No reference was made to it in the complaint with a view to distinguish one amount from the other, or to fix the respective balances due upon

Page

59

each, nor for the purpose of determining what is the amount demanded as principle and what is the stipulated interest. The court below the debt in its decision by deals the solely with the socalled of March "old 31,

the. defendants shows payment of 1,807.95 pesos. Payments are not to be supposed or inferred but must be proved as facts. Consequently the commentary contained in the decision as to the plaintifTs first letter is superfluous. concerning contended The the as to same letter an of is true March as 10, that to a the statement by virtue part only of in of the the decision it is to payment 1886, which

account,"

evidenced

public

instrument

1885. He disregards entirely that part of the evidence which refers to the so-called "new account," and has rendered his decision solely with respect to the indebtedness of the 18,000 pesos secured by a mortgage of real property, and to determining whether or not this therefore, mortgage canceled. Although the demand has been reduced from 33,000 to 18,000 pesos, it appears that the appellant in his brief still insists that the former sum included both accounts. He says that on account of interest alone, since 1890, when the stipulated yearly payments ceased, more than 10,000 pesos is due, which added to the amount acknowledged in a letter from Paulino Lavin to be due, makes a sum total greater than the entire amount demanded. We consider that it was both reasonable and in conformity with good pleading for the judge to have limited his decision to the allegations of the complaint, which rests entirely upon the mortgage deed of March 31, 1885. The judgment, therefore, was of necessity, limited to the question presented by the complaint, viz, whether the 18,000 pesos mentioned in that instrument had or had not been paid. The conclusion laid down in the decision, in harmony with the answer of the defendants, to the effect that the 2,000 pesos corresponding to the first yearly payment have been paid, is not acceptable. The evidence presented by PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers he and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in the and amount had that the been paid. His decision was that it had been more than paid, and, directed registration of same Registry of Deeds be

inference

large

corresponding

1886 had been made. The

payment shown

have been made is that which appears from the evidence introduced by the defendants, viz, 1,346.35 pesos. With respect to the annual payment due in 1887, the court credits the application of payment made by -the defendant in his letter of October 4 of that year, but this correction is improper, for against this application of payment no objection was made by Paulino Lavin, and such acquiescence is equivalent to an agreement and has the force and efficacy of a contract. (Art. 1172 of the Civil Code.) The payments shown to have been made during this year, according to the evidence presented by the defendants, amount to 1,679.46 pesos. As regards the year 1888, the finding of the payments made is correct, the amount being 2,048.78 pesos. The finding is also correct as to the year 1889, in which the payments made were 2,200 pesos. All these payments make a total of 9,082.54 pesos, so that at the end of that year the indebtedness was reduced to 8,917.46 pesos. The appellant in his brief says: "Since the 31st of December, 1889, no more than $601 had been paid on account of the mortgage debt * * * " (p. 3). This sum should be deducted from the amount of 8,917.46 pesos above referred to, as also should that of 2,734.44 pesos accepted by the plaintiff, without any special statement made to the defendants as to the application of the same, as appears from his testimony at the trial. As a rule, as among various demandable debts, it is to be presumed that the payment is to be applied to the one which is most onerous, according to article 1174 of the Civil Code. These payments

Page

60

made

by

Lavin

from

December

29,

1891,

to

July

1,

1894,

to

the

(2)By

minors

of

Lavin

amount above stated, and accepted by the VOL. 5, JUNE 1, 1906 Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers plaintMf, should be applied to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt of his father as being the more burdensome as compared with the indebtedness arising from his current accounts. It appears that one of the mortgaged properties was sold by agreement with the plaintiff at public auction by the family counsel of the Lavin minors, on August 14, 1893, for the sum of 5,500 pesos to Miguel Ortis, who, by a notarial document dated February 27, 1894, sold it for the. same amount to Servillo Robles, representative of Juan Sanz y Sanz (defendants' Exhibits A, B, and D); therefore, the amount obtained from this sale, which the plaintiff accepts as applied to the payment of the mortgage deed (par. 10 of the complaint), is not, as therein stated, the sum of 3,500 pesos, but the sum of 5,500 pesos, as appears from the notarial document above cited. This, under the provisions of section 285 refers of the We Code can of be Civil Procedure, in the as is the to sole evidence the or to be the accepted. discover nothing considered letters which appellant

................................................................................................. 5,500.00 (3)By Vicente Lavin

.................................................................................................. 2,737.44

Making

total

of

............................................................................................ 17,920.98 which pesos. This amount we can not consider as a debt to be paid by the deducted from 18,000 pesos leaves a balance of only 79.02

defendants, for in the evidence presented by the plaintiff himself we find a letter from Vicente Lavin dated the 31st of December, 1895 (Exhibits A, B, No. 10), which contains the following paragraph: "While in your city I delivered to your aunt, Sra. Ta Doa Dominica, $300 and subsequently ?100; I said nothing to you, believing PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers that she would inform you of this so that you might enter this payment

which

any

admission

statement

effect of which would be to vitiate, modify, or in any way affect the explicit terms of that document. Consequently, this sum must also be deducted from the balance due upon the indebtedness in 1889. We consider that the following payments have been proved by

documentary evidence and by admissions of the parties: (1)By Paulino Lavin

in

the

book

*"

Dominica

Sanz

was,

according

to

the

deed

of

.....................................................................................................

settlement (plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, No. 15), the widow of Vicente Milla, whose estate was the owner of this claim, and in that deed it is stated as a fact that this lady had "received money paid on account of the claim against Paulino Lavin."

61
Page

$9,683.54

Appellant's third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error having thus been disposed of, it remains for us to examine the first two. The second assignment concerns the document designated as "Exhibits A, A, B, B, No. No. 17," 11, which which is is not the in the record, and consequently the receipt 31, this by assignment can not be considered. The first assignment refers to Exhibit document acknowledging Paulino Lavin of 2,000 pesos in cash on the 16th day of June, 1883, prior to the execution of the notarial instrument of March 1885, upon which, as we have already pointed out, the entire complaint rests. This document was not admitted in evidence by the trial court. As to the claim, although it was prior to the notarial instrument referred to, reference is made to it in two letters of Vicente Lavin presented as evidence by the plaintiff. In one of them dated June 29, 1894, he says: "I hope that the $2,000 covered by the receipt which my father left as security for the debt, as you told me, will not be included by you in the account or in the percentage, for, as you are aware, your aunt said that I would not have to pay that * * " *" (Exhibits A, B, No. 8). In another letter dated February 26, 1895: "I beg you not to forget to send me a statement of what we owe your aunt, and to let me know whether I can count upon the $2,000 which you told me you would not put in the account. I should be obliged to you if you do not include same nor the interest, in accordance with your promise to me from the beginning * * *" (Exhibits A, B, No. 9). At all events this account is entirely foreign to the mortgage debt, no connection between the two having been shown and the court committed no error in refusing to VOL. 6, JUNE 1, 1906 Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers

It appears evident from numerous statements of the appellant that in the amount amount interest sued of from for the is included, of the although without in Upon determining addition this to point, the the with exact legal the the principle, date stipulated interest

complaint.

exception of what Vicente Lavin says in the letters cited, we find the statements in the eleventh paragraph of the complaint to the effect that the plaintiff waived his right to collect interest from the heirs of Paulino Lavin from 1885 to March, 1894. It must also be borne 111 mind that in the second clause of the statement of March 31, 1885, so frequently referred 'to, it is expressly provided "that the principle due shall not draw interest." It was, however, agreed, as stated, that the debtor "should undertake, in case of a breach of contractthat is, to pay the $2,000 per annumto indemnify the creditor for any damage which the delay in payment might cause him, by the payment of interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum * * *," It appears, therefore, that the interest stipulated was not intended as a compensatory interest or even as interest payable upon default, but that this clause must be considered as constituting the penalty for the damages which might be suffered by th(3 creditor in case of default in payment. There does not appear to have been any mora er re, and although it is true there does appear to have been demands for payment on the part of the creditor, there appear to have been demands made after the extension of the time requested by the debtors and accepted by the creditor. But however that may be, the unbroken line of the decisions, both before and after the promulgation of the Civil Code, has established the "doctrine constantly recognized and declared by the supreme court (of Spain) that every judgment for damages, whether arising from a breach of contract or whether the result of some provision of the law, must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED UnitedStates vs. Almond

62

admit the receipt (Exhibit No. 11). ThLs, of course, is without prejudice to its materiality in an independent suit, as to which we make no decision in this case.

Page

alleged

to

have

been

suffered."

(Judgments

of the

supreme

court of

Spain of the 13th and 26th of November, 1895, December 7, 1896, and September 30, 1898.) Such proof has not been made in this case. For the reasons stated we affirm the judgment appealed from in so far as it absolves the defendants from the complaint and order the cancellation of the mortgage and the inscription made in the Registry of Property in consequence thereof, the appellant to pay the costs of both instances. After the expiration of twenty days judgment will be entered in accordance with this decision, and ten days thereafter the cause will be returned to the trial court for execution. So ordered. Torres, Mapa, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed. ___________ [Sanz vs. Lavin Brothers, 6 Phil., 299(1906)]

Page

63

VOL. 24, AUGUST 30, 1968 Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez No. L-22183. August 30, 1968. THE RECEIVER FOR NORTH NEGROS SUGAR COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. PEDRO V. YBAEZ, ET AL., respondents. Civil law; Old Civil Code; Where the Civil Code of 18.89 was applied because the events that gave rise to the action took SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez place in 1937 and the action was commenced in 1940.Where the acts and events that gave rise to the action for moral damages and attorney's fee took place in 1937, and such action was commenced in 1940, the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 shall apply (Cf. Art. 2253, new Civil Code). Same; Damages; Scope of liability for damages arising from act or

manifestations mental or

of his

life: physical or material, moral or psychological, financial, economic, social, political, and religious

spiritual,

(Castro v. Acro Taxicab Co., 82 Phil. 359, 381). It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The article the does not who limit may or specify the active thus subjects, much the less the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and person recover damages, warranting inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor. This Court had granted moral damages not only to the person who himself was injured (Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 59 Phil. 768), but also to the legitimate children and heirs of the deceased (Alcantara v. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 473). Parents, even natural, have also been awarded damages for the death of their children (Manzanares v. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821; Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 427). Same; Under the new Civil Code a brother and/or sister of the victim of culpa aquiliana cannot be awarded moral damages; Case at bar.It may well be said that culpa aquiliana,, or quasi delict, is punished both by the old Civil Codethe previous legislationand by the new Civil is Code. But a less provided 2206 moral VOL. 21, AUGUST 30, 1968 Receiver for North Negrtis Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased of legitimate for in the and new severe sanction, or penalty, for culpa aquiliana Civil Civil Codewhich descendants provides and that only the may

omission characterized by fault or negligence; To whom moral damages may be granted; Article 1902 of old Civil Code construed.AYticle 1902 of the old Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage done. A person is liable for damage done to another by any culpable act; and by culpable act is meant any act which is blame-worthy when judged by accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society (Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP-Agustinos Recoletos, et al., 39 Phil. 587). The word "damage" that a in said article, may comprehending suffer in as it and does all all the

the new illegitimate

Code. It follows, therefore, that Article spouse, demand ascendants

64

caused by quasi-delictshould

be applied

in

the case at bar. Hence,

Page

damages

human

being

any

petitioner herein, who claims moral damages for the death of his brother

Cesar V. Ybanez caused by quasidelict, is not entitled to, and should not have been awarded, moral damages, by the Court of Appeals (Heirs of Gervacio Gonzales v. Alegarbes, L-7821, May 25, 1956). Same; Attorney's fees are not a proper element of damages. The

prosecution reck-

for

double

homicide

and

serious

physical

injuries

through

_____________ 1 Properly the only respondent is Pedro V. Ybanez because Rosario V. Ybanez died leaving as her only heir her brother Pedro V. Ybanez. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez less imprudence was instituted against Gil Dominguez, driver of the car, and to Primitivo institute Gustilo and civil Loreto for Perez, operator and brakeman, Gustilo and respectively, of the locomotive. The offended parties reserved their right separate actions damages. Primitivo Loreto Perez were tried together and acquitted of the crime charged. Gil Dominguez was also acquitted in a separate trial. Thereafter, a civil action based on culpa aquiliana was instituted, on

Supreme Court's ruling before the new Civil Code was to the effect that attorney's fees are not a proper element of damages (Tan Ti v. Alvear, 26 Phil. 566; Borden Co. v. Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 90 Phil. 500). PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ross, Selph & Carmscoso for petitioner. Pedro V. Ibaez in his own behalf as respondent. Josc Ma. Lopez Vito for other respondents. ZALDIVAR, J.:

May 15, 1940, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by Pedro V. Ybanez and Rosario V. Ybaiiez against Primitivo Gustilo, Loreto A petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal, rendered on October and V. 14, 1963, V. in CA-G.R. Ybanez, No. 28608-R, by versus entitled her legal "Pedro V. Ybanez, Pedro Rosario represented guardian, Sugar Perez, and their employer, North Negros Sugar Company, Inc., docketed as Civil Case No. 8367, seeking to recover damages for the death of the deceased. In their answer, defendants interposed as special defense the previous acquittal of defendants Primitivo Gustilo and Loreto Perez in the criminal case, and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. At the pre-trial, on August 5, 1940, the parties agreed to reproduce in the civil case all the evidence submitted in the criminal case, as well as the decision in and the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the trial of, the criminal case. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, praying for the dismissal of the civil case. The trial court, without any further hearing, considered the case submitted, and rendered a decision dismissing the case. Appeal was taken by the plaintiffs to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was certified to this Court on the ground that the appeal merely involved questions of law.

Ybanez,

plaintiffs-appellants,

North

Negros

Company, Inc., Primitivo Gustilo, and Loreto Perez, defendants-appellees." Plaintiffs-appellants respondents in Pedro the V. Ybdfiez and Rosario the V. Ybanez, and named sister,

instant

petition,1

are

brother

respectively, and immediate heirs of Cesar V. Ybafiez who was one of two persons who died as a result of the collision between the car, where said Cesar and Inc., was in on V. the its Ybafiez No. 5, evening way was of riding by August Bacolod and the 31, City being North 1937 to driven Negros in the by Gil

65

Dominguez, Company, the car

train

owned

Sugar railroad Criminal

Page

intersection at Hacienda Santa Teresa, Manapla, Occidental Negros, while from Cadiz.

This

Court, of

in the

G.R.

No.

L-6790, court and

on

March remanded

28, the

1955, case

reversed for

the

In this appeal, or petition for review, petitioner limits itself to questioning the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it awards moral damages and attorney's fees. In its brief, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. "in ordering petitioner to pay P5,000 'as moral damages for mental anguish suffered' by plaintiffs who were brother and sister of the deceased"; and 2. "in awarding attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 to the heirs of the deceased."' 1. In support of the first assignment of error, petitioner cites paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the new Civil Code, _____________ 2 Words in quotation marks are as quoted from the decision of the Court of Appeals. 3 As quoted from the assignment of errors. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybaez which provides that in case of death caused by a crime or quasi-delict, only the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Petitioner urges that in the instant case the heirs of the deceased Cesar V. Ybanez, being his brother, Pedro V. Ybafiez, and his sister, Rosario V. Ybanez (now deceased), are not among those entitled to moral damages; consequently, the award to them of moral damages was not authorized by law. Respondent Pedro V. Ybanez, on the contrary, contends that the law applicable is in the old Civil Code, and not Article 2206 of the new Civil Code, because the accident that caused the death happened in

decision

lower

further

proceedings. During the pendency of the case in the lower court, plaintiff Rosario V. Ybanez died, leaving as her only heir, co-plaintiff Pedro V. Ybanez, to continue Company, the Inc. case. was On the other and hand, was the North Negros Sugar by its dissolved accordingly substituted

receiver Dr. Claudio R. Luzurriaga. One of the defendants, Loreto Perez, also died in the interim and the case against him was dismissed. VOL. 24, AUGUST 30, 1968 Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybacz After having received additional evidence, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered judgment, on July 23, 1958, dismissing the case anew. Appeal was taken by plaintiff Pedro V. Ybanez to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-14849, but because questions of fact were involved, and the amount involved was less than P200,000, the case was certified, on August 25, 1960, to the Court of Appeals and docketed in the latter court as Case No. 28608-R. The Court of Appeals, on October 14, 1963, reversed the judgment of the lower court and held the North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. liable for the death of Cesar V. Ybafiez, ordering it to pay plaintiff-appellant Pedro V. Ybanez for lost damages earnings consisting of the of P9,600.00 as compensatory for death damages deceased; P6,000.00

indemnity; Pl,000.00 for funeral expenses; P5,000.00 "as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the heir"; P5,000.00 "for attorney's fees, considering the years and extensive workthe protracted litigation had taken;"- and costs. A motion for reconsideration filed by defendant North Negros Sugar Company, Inc., upon the grounds, among others,

66

that

the

awards

of

moral

damages

and

attorney's

fees

were

not

warranted under the law and the circumstances attending the litigation, was denied. Hence this petition for review.

Page

1937, and the case was filed in 1940. Said respondent maintains that the ruled award by of this vs. moral Court damages in the and is authorized in vs. particularly vs. under Articles 1902, 1903, 1103, 1104, 1106 and 1107 of the old Civil Code, and as decisions Castro Lilius Acro Manila Railroad;4 Moral Gutierrez Gutierrez;5 Taxicab Inc.6

show at the later part of this opinion. This is so, because the acts and events that gave rise to the instant action took place in 1937, and the action was commenced in 1940. Article 2253 of the new Civil Code.. provides: "The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their regime; even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not recognize them x x x." The pertinent provisions of the old Civil Code are Articles 1902 and 1903. The first article provides: "Art. done." and the second article in part, provides: "Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is 1902. Any person who by act or omission causes damage to

damages, respondent urges, should be paid to the injured person; but if the injured person died as a consequence of the culpable act and the victim left no descendants or ascendants, the damages must be paid taking into consideration the principles of the general law on damages, of the law on succession, and the fact that under the old Civil Code no specific persons are indicated to be the only ones entitled to recover moral damagesto the heirs or next of kin of the victim. Respondent further cites the rulings of this Court in the cases of Bernal vs. House, et al.7; Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co.8; and Manzanares vs. Moreta9, wherein the fact of heirship, as viewed from the general principle of succession of the deceased victim, was taken into consideration in determining who would be paid the indemnity for damages. _____________ VOL. 24, AUGUST 30, 1968 Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybaez In reply, petitioner show that points moral out that although were the cases even cited before by the

another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so

enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. "Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on the occasion of the performance of their duties." This Court said: "Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any

respondent

damages

awarded

new Civil Code took effect, in none of the cases cited, however, were moral damages awarded to a brother or sister of the deceased, but only to either the victim himself, the surviving spouses, the children or the parents. To resolve the issue, we have to determine what law is applicable whether the provisions of the old Civil Code or of the new Civil Code.

person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage done x x x a person is liable for damage done to another by any culpable act; alt vs. Corporacion de PP Agustinos Recoletos, et al., 39 Phil. 587. 11 Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., 82 Phil. 359, 381. 12 Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co., 59 Phil. 768 (1934).

67
Page

We believe that the old Civil Code is the law applicable to the case at bar, subject to such modifications as are suggested, or are warranted, under the transitional provisions of the new Civil Code, as we may

13 Alcantara vs. Surro and Manila Electric Co., 93 Phil. 473, wherein the death occurred on Nov. 24, 1945. 14 Manzanares v. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821; Astudillo v. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil. 427. VOL. 24, AUGUST 30, 1968 Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez "Cada uno es responsable del dao que ha causado no solamente por su 50) On the basis of the above-quoted article, in France, moral damages for mental anguish (sentimientos afectivos) have been awarded not only to parents, children and spouse, of the victim of culpa aquiliana but also to brothers and sisters, natural grandparents, and godchildren.15 We thus see that a provision in the Civil Code of France which is substantially similar to the provision of the Civil Code of Spain, relating to culpa aquiliana, is so applied by the courts of France as to hold a person guilty of culpa aquiliana liable for moral damages to the person injured, or to his spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters, and even to godchildren. If the provision of our old Civil Codewhich was itself the Civil Code of Spain of 1889relating to culpa aquiliana were to be applied as it had been applied in France, then the person guilty of culpa aquiliana under our old Civil Code would be liable for moral damages under our to the old person injured, the or to his for spouse, moral children, for parents, mental brothers and sisters and even to his godchildren. This would mean that Civil Code liability damages anguish due to culpa aquiliana was to more persons than what our new hecho, sino tambin por su negligencia o por su imprudencia." (Ripert and Boulanger, Tratado de Derecho Civil, Vol. V, 2nd part, p.

less severe sanctionat least as regards the persons entitled to moral damagesis provided for, than under the old Civil Code. Article 2257 of the new Civil Codeone of the transitional provisions provides as follows: "Art. 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or

penalty or a deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the f ormer laws, are not applicable to those who; when said laws were in force, may have _____________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Reccivcr for North Ncyros S-uyur Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code. "If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall be (applied." (Italics supplied.) It may well be said that culpa aquiliana, or quasi delict, is punished both by the old Civil Codethe previous legislationand by the new Civil Code. But, as we have pointed out, a less severe sanction, or penalty, for culpa aquiliana is provided for in the new Civil Code. It follows, therefore, that Article 2206 of the new Civil Coclewhich provides that only.the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased caused by quasi-delictshould be applied in the instant case. Hence, petitioner herein, who claims moral damages for the death of his brother Cesar V. Ybailez caused by quasi-delict, is not entitled to, and should not have been awarded, moral damages, by the Court of Appeals.16

68
Page

Civil Code now provides in its Article 2206 which limits the liability for moral damages to the spouse and legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased. And so, under the new Civil Code, a

2. Regarding the second error assigned, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals had no special reason for awarding attorney's fees because the petitioner had not acted in gross and evident bad faith in resisting respondent's claims for damages, and the claims of respondent herein could not be characterized as "plainly valid, just and demandable" claims as contemplated under paragraph (5) of Article 2208 of the new Civil Code, considering that the two employees, for whose alleged negligent acts herein petitioner is made to answer, were acquitted in the criminal case, and the civil case for damages was dismissed by the trial court. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Appeals gave as reason for the award of attorney's fees: "considering the years and extensive workthe protracted litigation had taken." Respondent also maintains that the award must have been based by the Court _____________ VOL. 24, AUGUST 30, 1968 Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez of Appeals on Article 2208 (11) and Article 2253 of the new Civil

of Article

2208

of the

Civil

Code, authority

to

award attorney's

fees

whenever it may be 'just and equitable,' said provision is inapplicable to the present case, the same having been instituted before the effectivity of the said Code." The refusal of herein petitioner to pay the damages asked, although the case was finally decided against it, cannot be said to have been caused by bad faith. In the case of George Edward Koster Inc. vs. Zulueta,18 this Court said: "At common law, the successful party usually has no right to have the fees of his attorney, as such, taxed against his opponent (14 L. ed. 181). The Court will not ordinarily allow counsel fees to the successful party. Each party to the action must pay his own lawyer x x x. Counsel fees paid in prior action have been allowed x x x (where) the conduct of the party against whom they were allowed, so directly and certainly caused the expenditure for this purpose, that the loss of the amount so paid wrong was as to easily within the such causal of relations the to the in defendant's warrant assessment damages

compensation for it (Sears vs. Inhabitants of Nahant, 102 N. E. 491.). Our rulings before the New Civil Code took effect (the present case having arisen before) have been as follows: 'lt is not sound public policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated would party throw to pay the the fees of counsel temptation for to his the successful opponent wide door of

Code. But petitioner urges might he recovered, that the and not issue is whether or not attorney's the amount of attorney's fees in fees the

determination of which the long years of litigation given as reason by the Court of Appeals would be pertinent. Respondent's argument that the award of attorney's fees was justified under Article 2208 (11) of the new Civil Code is untenable, because the instant case was filed on May 15, 1940, or before the effectivity of the new Civil Code. This Court, in the case of Bureau of Lands vs. Samia, et al.,17 held: "That portion of the decision which awards P10,000 to respondents as attorney's fees is untenable. Although courts have, under paragraph (11)

opposing party and his _____________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Coronel vs. Couri of Industnal Relations counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions, and to apportion them arbitrarily between those pertaining properly to one branch of the case from the other.

Page

69

"This Court has already placed itself on record as favoring the view taken by those courts which hold that attorney's fees are not a proper element of damages.' (Tan Ti vs. Alvear, 26 Phil. 566; The Borden Go. vs. Doctors Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 90 Phil. 500). 'x x x Counsel fees, other than those fixed in the rules as costs, are not an element of recoverable damages.' (Jesswani vs. Masaram Dialdas, G.R. No. L-4651, May 12, 1952)." WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be

reviewed should be, as it is hereby, modified by eliminating therefrom the award of P5,000.00 for moral damages for mental anguish suffered by the heir, and the award of F5,000.00 for attorney's fees. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,

Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Decision modified. Note.See the annotation on "Attorney's Fees as Damages" under that

Firestonc Tire. & Rubber Company of the Philippines vs. Incs Chaves & Co., Ltd., L-17106, Oct, 19 1966, 18 SCRA 356, 360-371, and entitled "When the defendant is entitled to attorney's fees" under Rizal Surety & Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61, 68-69. [Receiver for North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. vs. Ybanez, 24 SCRA 979(1968)]

Page

70

for failure to deliver land which he has contracted to deliver is the VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. [No. 13505. February 4, 1919.] GEO. W. DAYWALT, plaintiff and appellant, vs. LA CORPORACIN DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS ET AL., defendants and appellees. 1.CONTRACTS; DAMAGES FOR BREACH; LIABILITY OF THIRD value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Ostrand, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. C. C. Cohn and Thos. D. Aitken for appellant. Crossfield & O'Brien for appellee. STREET, J.: In the year 1902, Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province of Mindoro, executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W. Daywalt, .a tract of land situated in the barrio of Mangarin, municipality of Bulalacao, now San Jose, in said province. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be perf ected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens certificate should be procured therefor in the name of Teodorica Endencia. A decree recognizing the right ,of Teodorica as owner was entered in said court in August 1906, but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. The parties, however, met immediately upon the entering of this decree and made a new contract with a view to carrying their original agreement into effect. This new contract was executed in the form of a deed of conveyance and bears date of August 16, 1906. The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000, and the area of the land enclosed in the boundaries defined in the contract was stated to be 452 hectares and a fraction. The said second contract was was not not immediately until carried the into effect of for the

PARTY.Whatever may be the character of the liability, if any, which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, he cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. 2.ID.; ID.; MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.The damages recoverable upon breach of contract are, primarily, the ordinary, natural and in a sense the necessary damage resulting from the breach. Other damages, known as special damages, are recoverable where it appears that the particular conditions which made such damages a probable consequence of the breach were known to the delinquent party at the time the contract was made. This proposition must be understood with the qualification that, if the damages are in the legal sense remote or speculative, knowledge of the special conditions which render such damages possible will not make them recoverable. Special damages of this character cannot be recovered unless made the subject of special stipulation. 3.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR

SALE OF LAND.The damages ordinarily recoverable against a vendor

71

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos.

reason that the Torrens certificate was not yet obtainable and in fact certificate issued period performance contemplated in the contract had expired. Accordingly, upon October 3,

Page

1908, the parties entered into still another agreement, superseding the old, by which Teodorica Endencia agreed, upon Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. receiving the Torrens title to the land in question, to deliver the same to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila, to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco, where it was to be delivered to the plaintiff upon payment of a balance of P3,100. The Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course of the proceedings relative to the registration of the land, it was f ound by official survey that the area of the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about 1,248 hectares instead of 452 hectares as stated in the contract. In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area. This attitude of hers led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, in obtaining a decree for specific performance; and Teodorica Endencia was ordered to convey the entire tract of land to Daywalt pursuant to the contract of October 3, 1908, which contract was declared to be in full force and effect. This decree appears to have become finally effective in the early part of the year 1914.1 The defendant, La Corporacin de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation, with its domicile in the city of Manila. Said corporation was formerly the owner of a large tract of land, known as the San Jose Estate, on the island of Mindoro, which was sold to the Government of the Philippine Islands in the year 1909. The same corporation was at this time W. also the owner and for of another years estate the on the same Fathers island had

maintained

large

herds

of

cattle

on

the

farms

referred

to.

Their

representative, charged with the management of these farms, was ____________ PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. father Isidoro Sanz, himself a member of the order. Father Sanz had long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the personal to be and a friendship woman all upon which of the little existed personal between force, matters of them. easily Teodorica subject to was appears influence,

important

business

accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of Father Sanz and other members of his order with whom she came in contact. Father Sanz was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 by which Teodorica Endencia agreed to sell her land to the plaintiff as well as of the later important developments connected with the history of that contract and the contract - substituted successively for it; and in particular Father Sanz, as well as other members of the defendant corporation, knew of the existence of the contract of October 3, 1908, which, as we have already seen, finally fixed the rights of the parties to the property in 1909 to in in the the question. favor defendant procurador the delivery When the Torrens Endencia, and it certificate she was of then the was finally it for to issued of Teodorica delivered

safekeeping Juan

corporation, and chief

taken

Manila where it remained in the custody and under the control of P. Labarga official the defendant was made corporation, until thereof to plaintiff

compulsory by reason of the decree of the Supreme Court in 1914. When of the defendant some corporation head sold the San to Jose the Estate, estate it of was the

72

immediately adjacent to the land which Teoderica Endencia had sold to Geo. Daywalt; many Recoletos

necessary to bring the cattle off of that property; and, in the first half 1909, 2,368 were removed corporation immediately adjacent to the property which the plaintiff had

Page

purchased

from

Teodorica

Endencia.

As

Teodorica

still

retained

With ref erence to the rate at which compensation should be estimated the trial court came to the following conclusion: "As to the rate of the compensation, the plaintiff contends that the

possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the def endant corporation were pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1, 1909, to May 1, 1914. VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. Under the first cause stated in the complaint in the present action the plaintiff P24,000, stated. of the seeks as The to recover for from the the use to defendant and corporation of the the the sum land of in damages trial court occupation

defendant corporation maintained at least one thousand head of cattle on the land and that the pasturage was of the value of forty centavos per head monthly, or P4,800 annually, for the whole tract. The court can not accept this view. It is rather improbable that 1,248 hecPHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. tares of wild Mindoro thousand head of land would during the furnish entire sufficient pasturage year, and, for one the

question by reason of the pasturing of cattle thereon during the period came the conclusion that defendant corporation was liable for damages by reason of the use and occupation premises in the manner stated; and fixed the amount to be recovered at P2,497. The plaintiff appealed and has assigned error to this part of the judgment of the court below, insisting that damages should have been awarded in a much larger sum and at least to the full extent of P24,000, the amount claimed in the complaint. As the def endant did not appeal, the propriety of allowing damages f or the use and occupation of the land to the extent of P2,497, the mount awarded, is not now in question; and the only thing here to be considered, in connection with this branch of the case, is whether the damages allowed under this head should be increased. The trial court rightly ignored the fact that the defendant corporation had paid Teodorica Endencia f or use and occupation of the same land during the period in question at the rate of P425 per annum, inasmuch as the final decree of this court in the action for specific performance is conclusive against her right, and as the defendant corporation had notice of the rights of the plaintiff under his contract of purchase, it can not be

cattle

considering

locality, the rate of forty centavos per head monthly seems too high. The evidence shows that after having recovered possession of the land the plaintiff rented it to the defendant corporation for fifty centavos per hectare annually, the tenant to pay the taxes on the land, and this appears to be a reasonable rent. There is ,no reason to suppose that the land was worth more for grazing purposes during the period -from 1909 to 1913, than it was at the later period. Upon this basis the plaintiff is entitled to damages in. the sum of P2,497, and is under no obligation to reimburse the defendants for the land taxes paid by either f them during the the land period in the land and was occupied by the three defendant thousand corporation. It may be mentioned in this connection that the Lontok tract adjoining taxes." From this it will be seen that the trial court estimated the rental value of the land for grazing purposes at 50 centavos per hectare per annum, and roughly adopted the period of four years as the time for which compensation at that rate should be made. As the. court had already found that the defendant was liable for these damages from June, 1, 1909, to May 1, 1914, or a period of four years and eleven months, question containing over hectares appears to have been leased for only P1,000 a year, plus the

73
Page

permitted that the corporation should escape liability in this action by proving payment of rent to a person other than, the true owner.

there seems some ground for the contention made in the appellant's first assignment of error that the court's computation was erroneous, even accepting the rule upon which the damages were assessed, as it is manifest that at the rate of 50 centavos per hectare per annum, the damages for f our years and eleven months would be P3,090. Notwithstanding this circumstance, we are of the opinion that the

defense to the action of specific performance which was finally decided in favor of the plaintiff in this court. The cause of action here stated is based on a liability derived from the wrongful interference of the defendant in the performance of the contract between the plaintiff and Teodorica Endencia; and the large damages laid in the complaint were, according to the proof submitted by the plaintiff, incurred as a result of a combination of circumstances of the following nature: In 1911, it appears, the plaintiff, as the owner of the land which he had bought from Teodorica Endencia entered into a contract (Exhibit C) with S. B. Wakefield, of San Francisco, for the sale and disposal of said lands to a sugar growing and milling enterprise, the successful launching of which depended on the ability of PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. Daywalt to get possession of the land and the Torrens certificate of title. made In order to accomplish to this end, the with the plaintiff title returned for to the in Philippine Islands, communicated his arrangement to the defendant, and repeated with efforts said secure registered Wakefield. delivery compliance agreement Teodorica Endencia

damages assessed are sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land during the whole time it was used. There is evidence in the record strongly tending to show that the wrongful use of the VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. land by the defendant was not continuous throughout the year but was confined mostly to the season when the f orage obtainable on the land of the defendant corporation was not sufficient to maintain its cattle, for which reason it became necessary to allow them to go over to pasture on the land in question; and it is not clear that the whole of the land was used f or pasturage at any time. Considerations of this character probably led the trial court to adopt four years as roughly being the period during which compensation should be allowed. But whether this was advertently done or not, with we see no to sufficient the reason, in the cattle uncertainty of the record reference number of the

seems to have yielded her consent to the consummation of her contract, but the Torrens title was then in the possession of Padre Juan Labarga in Manila, who refused to deliver the document. Teodorica also was in the end prevailed upon to stand out against the perf ormance of her contract with the plaintiff with the result that the plaintiff was kept out of possession until the Wakefield project for the establishment of a large sugar growing and milling enterprise fell through. In the light of what has happened in recent years in the sugar industry, we feel justified in saying that the project above referred to, if carried into effect, must inevitably have proved a great success. The determination of the issue presented in this second cause of action requires a consideration of two points. The first is whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes himself

grazed and the period when the land was used, for substituting our guess for the estimate made by the trial court. In the second cause of action stated in the complaint the plaintiff seeks to recover f rom the def endant corporation the sum of P500,000, as damages, on the ground that said corporation, for its own selfish purposes, unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia to refrain

74

from

the

performance

of

her

contract

f or

the

sale

of

the

land

in

question and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff of the Torrens title, and further, maliciously and without reasonable cause, maintained her in her

Page

liable for damages ,to the vendee, beyond the value of the use and occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the effort to resist an action for specific performance. The second is whether the damages which the plaintiff seeks to recover under this head are too remote and speculative to be the subject of recovery. As preliminary to a deem it well consideration of the first of these questions, we that the members of the

influence and promptings of members of the defendant corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff. The attorney for the plaintiff maintains that, by interfering in the

to dispose of the contention

performance of the contract in question and obstructing the plaintiff in his efforts to secure the certificate of title to the land, the defendant corporation made itself a co-participant with Teodorica Endencia in the breach of said contract; and inasmuch as father Juan Labarga, at the time of said unlawful intervention between the contracting parties, was fully aware of the existence of the contract (Exhibit C) which the plaintiff had made with PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. S. B. Wakefield, is of San Francisco, it is insisted that the defendant of the

defendant corporation, in advising and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with the contract of sale, were actuated by improper and malicious motives. The trial court found that this contention was not sustained, observing that while it was true that the circumstances pointed to an entire sympathy on the part VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. of the defendant corporation with the efforts of Teodorica Endencia to defeat the plaintiff's claim to the land, the fact that its officials may have advised her not to carry the contract such into effect would not constitute actionable interference with contract. It may be added

corporation

liable

for the loss

consequent upon

the failure

project outlined in said contract. In this connection reliance is placed by the plaintiff upon certain

that when one considers the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on the vendor, and the doubt in which the issue was involvedto the extent that the decision of the Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court itself was dividedthe attitude of the defendant corporation, as exhibited in the conduct of its procurador, Juan Labarga, and other members of the order of the Recollect Fathers, is not difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract could not be enf orced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the

American and English decisions in which it is held that a person who is a stranger to a contract may, by an unjustifiable interference in the performance thereof, render himself liable f or the damages consequent upon non-performance. It is said that the doctrine of these cases was recognized by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542); and we have been earnestly pressed to extend the rule there enunciated to the situation here presented. Somewhat more than half a century ago the English Court of the Queen's Bench saw its way clear to permit an action for damages to be maintained against a stranger to a contract wrongfully interfering in its performance. The leading case on this subject is Lumley vs. Gye ([1853], 2 El. & Bl., 216). It there appeared that the plaintiff, as manager of a theatre, had entered into a contract with Miss

Page

75

Johanna Wagner, an knowing of the

opera singer, whereby of this contract,

she bound and, as

herself for a the declaration

the employer is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not essential. Upon the question as to what constitutes legal justification, a good

period to sing in the plaintiff's theatre and nowhere else. The defendant, existence alleged, "maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff," enticed and procured Miss Wagner to leave the plaintiff's employment. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages. The right which was here recognized had its origin in a rule, long familiar to the courts of the common law, to the effect that any person who entices a servant from his employment is liable in damages to the master. The master's interest in the service to break rendered up a by his employee is here considered as a distinct subject of juridical right. It being thus accepted that it is a legal wrong relation of personal service, the question now arose whether it is illegal for one person to interfere with any contract relation subsisting between others. Prior to the decision of Lumley vs. Gye [supra] it had been supposed that the liability here Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. under consideration was limited to the cases of the enticement of menial servants, Laborers apprentices, were and others But in to the whom case the cited English the Statutes of of the applicable. majority

illustration was put in the leading case. If a party enters into contract to go for another upon a journey to a remote and unhealthful climate, and a third person, with a bona fide purpose of benefiting the one who is under contract to go, dissuades him from the step, no action will lie.. But if the advice is not disinterested and the persuasion is used for "the indirect purpose of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff," the intermedler is liable if his advice is taken and the contract broken. The found doctrine useful, embodied in the in the cases just cited of has sometimes industry, been as a

complicated

relations

modern

means of restraining the activities of labor unions and industrial societies when improperly engaged in the promotion of strikes. An illustration of the application of the doctrine in question in a case of this kind PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. is found in South Wales Miners Federation vs. Glamorgan Coal Co.

judges concurred in the opinion that the principle extended to all cases of hiring. This doctrine was f ollowed by the Court of Appeal in Bowen vs. Hall ([1881], 6 Q. B., Div., 333); and in Temperton vs. Russell ([1893], 1 Q. B., 715), it was held that the right of action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract is not confined to contracts f or personal services, but extends to contracts in general. In that case the contract which the defendant had procured to be breached was a contract for the supply of building material. Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential ingredient in cases of interf erence with contract relations. But upon the authorities it is enough if the wrongdoer, having knowledge of the existence of the contract relation, in bad faith sets about to break it. up. Whether his motive is to benefit himself or gratify his spite by working mischief to

([1905], A. C., 239). It there appeared that certain miners employed in the plaintiff's collieries, acting under the order of the executive council of the defendant federation, violated their contract with the plaintiff by abstaining from work on certain days. The federation and council acted without any actual malice or ill-will towards the plaintiff, and the only object of the order in question was that the price of coal might thereby be kept up, a factor which affected the miner's wage scale. It was held that no sufficient justification was shown and that the federation was liable. In the United States, the rule established in England by Lumley vs. Gye [supra] and subsequent cases is commonly accepted, though in a few of the States the broad idea that a stranger to a contract can be held

Page

76

liable for

Upon

it

is

rejected,

and vs.

in

these Thorn,

jurisdictions 98 Cal.,

the

doctrine, Chambers

if &

identity of the plaintiff as the person holding the prior contract but did know of the existence of a contract in f avor of someone. It was also said arguendo, that the defendants would have been liable in damages under article 1902 of the Civil Code, if the action had been brought by the plaintiff to recover damages. The force of the opinion is, we think, somewhat weakened by the criticism contained in the concurring opinion, wherein it is said that the question of breach of contract by inducement was not really involved in the case. Taking the decision upon the point which was really decided, it is authority for the proposition that one who buys something which he knows has been sold to some other person can be restrained from using that thing to the prejudice of the person having the prior and better right. Translated corporation, for grazing use into terms applicable of to the sale the case of at the bar, the land in decision question is in to also

accepted at all, is limited to the situation where the contract is strictly personal service. (Boyson 578; Marshall vs. Baldwin 91 Ky., 121; Bourlier vs. Macauley, 91 Ky., 135; Glencoe Land & Gravel Co. vs. Hudson Bros. Com. Co., 138 Mo.; 439.) It should be observed in this connection that, according to the English and American authorities, no question can be made as to the liability of one who interf eres with a contract existing between others by means which, under known legal canons, can be denominated an unlawful means. Thus, if performance is prevented by force, intimidation, coercion, or threats, or by false or defamatory statements, or by nuisance or riot, the person using such unlawful means is, under all the authorities, liable for the damage which ensues. And in jurisdictions where the doctrine of Lumley vs. Gye and [supra] malicious is rejected, no with liability a can arise relation from a meddlesome interference contract unless

Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), indicates that the def endant having its notice the That of the Daywalt, might have been enjoined by the latter from using the property cattle thereon. defendant has corporation also been liable in this action for the damage resulting to the plaintiff from the wrongful and occupation property already determined. But it will be observed PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

some such unlawful means as those just indicated are used. (See cases last above cited.) This brings us to the decision made by this court in VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. Gilchrist vs. Cuddy Cuddy, contract the film the to owner the (29 of a Phil. Rep., 542). It there appeared cinematographic Gilchrist rental for a to film, let it under of specified the period that one a rental In and time.

Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. that in order to sustain this liability it is not necessary to resort to any subtle exegesis relative to the liability of a stranger to a contract for unlawful interference in the performance thereof. It is enough that defendant used the property with notice that the plaintiff had a prior and better right. Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done. Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability f or negligence, we take the rule to be

plaintiff

violation of the terms of this agreement, Cuddy proceeded to turn over also under a contract, defendants Espejo Zaldarriaga. Gilchrist thereupon restored to the Court of First. Instance and procured an injunction restraining the defendants from exhibiting the film in question in their theater during the period specified in the

77
Page

contract of Cuddy with Gilchrist. Upon appeal to this court it was in effect held that the injunction was not improperly granted, although the defendants did not, at the time their contract was made, know the

that a person is liable for damage done to another by any culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged for the by accepted acts legal likely be standards. to be that The idea in thus any of expressed society. vs. is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception of liability tortious it developed the Thus Gye considered, cannot said doctrine Lumley

from the improper interference with the contract by a stranger thereto, considered as an independent act generative of civil liability, and the right of action ex contractu against a party to the contract resulting from the breach thereof. However, we do not propose here to pursue the matter further, inasmuch as, for reasons presently to be stated, we are of the opinion that neither the doctrine of Lumley vs. Gye [supra] nor the application made of it by this court in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), affords any basis for the recovery of the damages which the plaintiff is supposed to have suffered by reason of his inability to comply with the terms of the Wakefield contract. Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, there is one proposition upon which all must agree. This is, that the stranger cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those at bar, that as could be recovered Endencia made against was the the immediate directly in the party bound breach to by of the the the contract would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case Teodorica it has party contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even admitting that itself coparticipant contract, can in no event exceed hers. This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. to surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in

[supra] and related cases is repugnant to the principles of the civil law. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the codes and jurisprudence of the civil law furnish a somewhat uncongenial field in which to propagate the idea that a stranger to a contract may be sued for the breach thereof. Article 1257 of the Civil Code declares that contracts are binding only between the parties and their privies. In conformity with this it has been held that a stranger to a contract has no right of action for the nonfulfillment of the contract except in the case especially contemplated in the second paragraph of the same article. (Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil. Rep., 471.) As observed by this court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compaa Trasatlntica, R. G. No. 11318 (38 Phil. Rep., 875), a contract, when effectually entered into between certain parties, determines not only the character and extent of the liability of the contracting parties but also the person or entity by whom the obligation is exigible. The same idea should. apparently be apVOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. plicable with respect to the person against whom the obligation of the contract may be enforced; for it is evident that there must be a certain mutuality permitted upon it. in the obligation, and if the stranger to a contract is not liable to sue to enforce it, he cannot consistently be held

possession. two antagonistic are capable ideas of which we have the just brought must into be It should in the first place be noted that the liability of Teodorica

78

If

the

juxtaposition

reconciliation,

process

Endencia for damages resulting from the breach of her contract with Daywalt was a proper subject for adjudication in the action for specific

Page

accomplished by distinguishing clearly between the right of action arising

performance which Daywalt instituted against her in 1909 and which was litigated by him to a successful conclusion in this court, but without obtaining right not any special annexed recovered in the of adjudication to in an every the with action to referrence for the to damages. of the they Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach of a contract is a inseparably sought be or fulfilment obligation (art. 1124, Civil Code); and it is clear that if damages are action enforce action. contract her performance As in to cannot recover interpose recovered for independent of the in Teodorica was the

purchaser has not paid the purchase money, a deduction may be made in respect to the interest on the money which constitutes the purchase price. Substantially the same rule holds with respect to the liability of a landlord who fails to put his tenant in possession pursuant to a contract of lease. The measure of damages is the value of the leasehold interest, or use and occupation, less the stipulated rent, where this has not been paid. The rule that the measure of damages f or the wrongf ul detention of land is normally to be found in the value of use and occupation is, we believe, one of the things that may be considered certain in the law (39 Cyc., 1630; 24 Cyc., 1052; Sedgewick on Damages, Ninth ed., sec. 185.)almost as wellsettled, indeed, as the rule that the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of money is to be f ound in the interest. We recognize the possibility at the that of more the extensive creation damages of the to may which be the

Endencia, therefore, it should be considered that the right of action to damages the breach res question and as exhausted in the prior suit. However, her attorneys have not seen fit to defense judicata behalf; defendant corporation was not a party to that action, and such defense could not in any event be of any avail to it, we proceed to consider the question of the liability of Teodorica Endencia for damages without reference to this point. The most that can be said with reference to the conduct of Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to carry out a contract for the sale of certain land and resisted to the last an action for specific performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff was prevented during a period of several years from exerting that control over the property which he was entitled to exert and was meanwhile unable to dispose of the property advantageously. Now, what is the measure of damages for the wrongful detention of real property by the vender after the time has come for him to place the purchaser in possession? The damages ordinarily and normally recoverable against a vendor for f ailure to deliver land which he has contracted VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919. Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. to deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the time during which it is wrongfully withheld. And of course where the

recovered

where,

time

contractual

obligation, the vendor, or lessor, is aware

of the use

purchaser or lessee desires to put the property which is the subject of the contract, and the contract is made with the eyes of the vendor or lessor open to the possibility of the damage which may result to the other party from his own failure to give possession. The case before us is not of this character, inasmuch as at the time when the rights of the parties under the contract were determined, nothing was known to any of them about the San Francisco capitalist who would be willing to back the project portrayed in Exhibit C. The extent is of the liability and the for the breach of a contract must are in be all

determined in the light of the situation in existence at the time the contract made; damages ordinarily recoverable events limited to such as might be reasonably foreseen in the light of the facts then known to the contracting parties. Where the purchaser desires PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos.

Page

79

to

protect to

himself, give

in

the

contingency from the

of

the

failure of

of

the

vendor other

605 Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. be manufactured at Greenwich until the broken one arrived to serve as a model. There was delay beyond the two days in delivering the broken shaft at Greenwich, and a corresponding delay in starting the mill. No explanation of the delay was offered by the carriers. The suit was brought to recover damages for the lost profits of the mill, caused by the delay in delivering the broken shaft. It was held that the plaintiff could not recover. The discusion contained in the opinion of the court in that case leads to the conclusion that the damages recoverable in case of the breach of a contract are two sorts, namely, (1) the ordinary, natural, and in a sense necessary damage; and (2) special damages. Ordinary damages is found in all breaches of contract where there are no special of circumstances The this sort of to distinguish paid damage. for In the an all case such specially cases from other is an contracts. instance consideration unperformed promise the

promptly

possession,

possibility

incurring

damages than such as are incident to the normal value of the use and occupation, he should cause to be inserted in the contract a clause providing f or stipulated amount to be paid upon failure of the vendor to give possession; and no case has been called to our attention where, in the absence of such a stipulation, damages have been held to be recoverable by the purchaser in excess of the normal value of use and occupation. On the contrary, the most fundamental conceptions of the law relative to the assessment of damages are inconsistent with such idea. The principles governing this branch of the law were profoundly

considered in the case of Hadley vs. Baxendale (9 Exch., 341), decided in the English Court of Exchequer in 1854; and a few words relative to the principles governing the recovery of damages, as expounded in that decision, will here be found instructive. The decision in that case is considered a leading authority in the jurisprudence of the common law. The plaintiffs in that case were proprietors of a mill in Gloucester, which was propelled by steam, and which was engaged in grinding and supplying meal and flour to customers. The shaft of the engine got

damages

broken, and it became necessary that the broken shaft be sent to an engineer or foundry man at Greenwich, to serve as a model for casting or manufacturing another that would fit into the machinery. The broken shaft could be the told delivered carrier It plaintiffs it at was Greenwich delivered be on to the the second day after its receipt by who had defendants, who at Greenwich on were the

recoverable are such- as naturally and generally would result from such a breach, "according to the usual course of things." In cases involving only ordinary damage no discussion is ever indulged as to whether that damage was contemplated or not. This is conclusively presumed from the immediateness and inevitableness of the damage, and the recovery of such damage follows as a necessary legal consequence of the breach. Ordinary damage is assumed as a matter of law to be within the contemplation of the parties. Special damage, on the other hand, is such as follows less directly from the breach than ordinary damage. It is only found in case where some exists that external or condition, as apart it could from to the actual a terms turn be to to the contract and to intervenes, were, not give affairs to

common carriers engaged in that business between these points, and would delivered second day after its delivery to them, if delivered at a given hour. The carriers were informed that the mill was stopped, but were not informed of the special purpose for which the broken shaft was desired to be forwarded. They were not told the mill would remain idle until the new

80

shaft would be returned, or that the new shaft could not VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 4, 1919.

increase damage in a way that the promisor, without actual notice of external condition, reasonably expected foresee.

Page

Concerning

this

sort of damage, Hadley vs. Baxendale

(1854)

[supra]

stipulated in the contract and informed the railroad agent that the shoes would in be thrown back upon their hands if they did not reach the destination in time. The defendants negligently failed to forward the good due season. The sale was therefore lost, and the market having fallen, the plaintiffs had to sell at a loss. VOL. 39, FEBRUARY 6, 1919. Ahern vs. Julian. In the preceding discussion we have considered the plaintiff's right chiefly

lays down the definite and just rule that before such damage can be recovered the plaintiff must PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Daywalt vs. Corporacin de PP. Agustinos Recoletos. show that the particular condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence of the breach was known to the defendant at the time the contract was made. The statement that special damages may be recovered where the

as against Teodorica Endencia; and what has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate that the damages laid under the second cause of action in the complaint could not be recovered from her, first, because the damages in question are special damages which were not within contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, because said damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. This conclusion is also necessarily fatal to the right of the plaintiff to recover such damages from the defendant corporation, for, as already suggested, by advising Teodorica not to perform the contract, said corporation could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract. Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be

likelihood of such damages flowing from the breach of the contract is contemplated and foreseen by the parties needs to be supplemented by a proposition which, though not enunciated in Hadley vs. Baxendale, is yet clearly to be drawn from subsequent cases. This is that where the damage which a plaintiff seeks to recover as special damage is so far speculative as to be in contemplation of law remote, notification of the special conditions which make that damage possible cannot render the defendant liable therefor. To bring damages which would ordinarily be treated as remote within the category of recoverable special damages, it is necessary that the condition should be made the subject of contract in such sense as to become was an express to or be implied recovered term as of the engagement. Horne vs. Midland R. Co. (L. R., 8 C. P., 131) is a case where the damage which sought special damage was really remote, and some of the judges rightly placed the disallowance of the damage on the ground that to make such damage recoverable, it must so far have been within the contemplation of the parties as to form at least an implied term of the contract. But others proceeded on the idea that the notice given to the defendant was not sufficiently full and definite. The result was the same in either view. The facts in that case were as follows: The plaintiffs, shoe manufacturers at K, were under contract to supply by a certain day shoes to a firm in London for the French government. They delivered the shoes to a carrier in sufficient time f or the goods to reach London at the time

affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant. Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Malcolm, Avancea, and Moir, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed. ____________ [GEO. W. DAYWALT, plaintiff and appellant, vs. LA

CORPORACIN DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS ET AL., defendants and appellees., 39 Phil., 587(1919)] 466

Page

81

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc. G.R. No. 158768. February 12, 2008.* TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

contractor

bound

itself

to

execute

the

project

for

respondent,

the

owner/developer, in consideration of a price certain (P130,000,000). The supplemental agreement was reciprocal in nature because the obligation of respondent of to pay the to entire complete contract the price project depended (and vice on the obligation petitioner versa).

Thereafter, the parties entered into a second contract. They agreed to extinguish the supplemental agreement as evidenced by the October 12, 1995 letter-agreement which was duly acknowledged by their respective representatives. Contracts; received delivered petitioner return indebiti, the Quasi-Contracts; when there is through excess mistake, that of to Solutio no right it had Civil the Indebiti; to Requisites; it and it it to return the If it was Article something was is

petitioner, vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., respondent. Appeals; Factual Appeals and the issues are entertained trial court are only in petition for review in a general rule, only

exceptional cases such as where the findings of fact of the Court of conflicting.As questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on _______________

demand

unduly to If

obligation been Code

arises.Because obliged of 2154. solutio

acknowledged Article 2154

overpaid, provides:

respondent. the

Embodying

principle

something is received when there is no right to demand it and it was * FIRST DIVISION. VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. For the extra-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti to arise, the following requisites must be proven: 1. the absence of a right to collect the excess sums and 2. the payment was made by mistake. Same; Same; Payment by Mistake; Presumptions; It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered.With regard to the first requisite, because the supplemental agreement had been extinguished by the mutual agreement of the parties, petitioner became entitled only to the cost of services it actually rendered (i.e., that fraction of the project cost in proportion to the SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown of fact of the CA and the trial court are

Property Group, Inc. certiorari. Factual issues are entertained only in exceptional cases such as where the findings conflicting. Contracts; Words and Phrases; A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. This case involved two contracts entered into by the parties with regard to the project. The parties first entered into a contract for a piece of work when they executed the supplemental agreement. Petitioner as

82

Property Group, Inc.

Page

percentage entitled to

of the

its

actual

accomplishment (or extent Civil of Code

in

the

project). On

It the

was

not

Same; of

Construction can only

Contracts; be

Additional upon the

Costs; the

Unjust

Enrichment; from

A the

excess

overpayment).

second

claim for the cost of additional work arising from changes in the scope work allowed written in authority work developer/owner ordering/allowing changes and written

requisite, Article 2163 of the

provides: Article

2163. It is

presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered; but, he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause. (emphasis supplied) Same; Same; Same; He who accepts, in good faith, an undue payment of a thing certain or loss and determinate of the same shall or its only be responsible and for the impairment accessories accessions

agreement of parties with regard to the increase in VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. cost (or price) due to the change in work or design modification; A contractor who fails to secure the owners or developers written authority to changes in the work or written assent to the additional cost to be incurred cannot invoke the principle of unjust enrichment.In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, we reiterated that a claim for the cost of additional work arising from changes in the scope of work can only be allowed upon the the: 1. written in authority work; and from 2. the written developer/owner agreement with the of two ordering/allowing in work or changes

insofar as he has thereby been benefited; One who receives payment by mistake in good faith is, as a general rule, only liable to return the thing to delivered.Stated return thing them simply, to respondent erroneously 2160 be of delivered the Civil excess Code units to petitioner and the latter, pursuant to Article 2154, was obliged the respondent. Article shall or its provides: Article 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a certain or loss and determinate of the same only responsible and for the impairment accessories accessions

insofar as he has thereby been benefited. If he has alienated it, he shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum. One who receives payment by mistake in good faith is, as a general rule, only liable to return the thing delivered. If he benefited therefrom, he is also liable for the impairment or loss of the thing delivered and its accessories and accessions. If he sold the thing delivered, he should either deliver the proceeds of the sale or assign the action to collect to the other party. Obligations and Contracts; Words and Phrases; Mora or Delay,

parties with regard to the increase in cost (or price) due to the change design modification.Furthermore: Compliance requisites of Article 1724, a specific provision governing additional works, is a condition precedent of the recovery. The absence of one or the other bars the recovery of additional costs. Neither the authority for the changes proved made by any nor the additional evidence price for to be paid of therefor may be other purposes recovery. (emphasis

supplied) Petitioner submitted neither one. In addition, petitioners project coordinator Estellita Garcia testified that respondent never approved any change order. Thus, under Article 1724 and pursuant to our ruling in Powton Conglomerate, Inc., petitioner cannot recover the cost it incurred in effecting the design modifications. A contractor who fails to secure the owner or developers written authority to changes in the work or written assent to the additional cost to be incurred cannot invoke the principle of unjust enrichment.

Defined.Mora or delay is the failure to perform the obligation in due time because of dolo (malice) or culpa (negligence). A debtor is deemed to have violated his obligation to the creditor from the time the latter

83
Page

makes a demand. Once the creditor makes a demand, the debtor incurs mora or delay.

Damages;

Indemnification

for damages

comprehends

not only

the

loss

Upon the completion of MPTs structural works, respondent awarded the P130,000,000 petitioner. contract on for the towers 31, architectural 1994, the works8 parties (project) executed to a Thus, January

suffered (actual damages or damnum emergens) but also the claimants lost profits (compensatory damages or lucrum cessans).Indemnification for damages damnum it is comprehends not only emergens) to but prove also the the loss suffered (actual damages lost of profits the or the claimants amount (compensatory loss by

supplemental agreement.9 The salient portions thereof were: _______________ 1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 2 Penned in by by Associate Associate Justice Justices Godardo Eloy R. A. Jacinto Jr. (retired) (retired) and and

damages or lucrum cessans). For compensatory damages to be awarded, necessary actual alleged preponderance of evidence. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Jose Angelito B. Bulao for petitioner. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

concurred

Bello,

Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals. Dated March 15, 2002. Rollo, pp. 10-18, 34-42, 81-89. 3 Dated May 29, 2003. Id., pp. 20-23, 91-94. 4 Refers to the foundation of the building, particularly the concrete and steel works up to the topping of the last floor without any finishing. 5 Rollo, pp. 55, 200, 255. 6 Exhibit A, Records, pp. 474-488. 7 Id., p. 1. 8 Refers to all the finishing works including putting up partitions, doors, windows and interior and exterior finishes. 9 Exhibit B, Records, pp. 490-492.

Property Group, Inc. Amado Paolo C. Dimayuga for Primetown Property Group, Inc. Wilfredo T. Garcia for Mario G. Co. CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61353 2 and its resolution3 denying reconsideration. In 1992, respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. awarded the contract

471

84

for the structural works4 of its 32-storey Makati Prime Tower (MPT) to petitioner parties Titan-Ikeda formalized Construction agreement and in Development a construction Corporation.5 contract6 The dated their

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 471

Page

February 4, 1993.7

Titan-Ikeda

Construction

&

Development

Corporation

vs.

Primetown

10

Exhibit

B-2,

id.,

p.

492.

Paragraph

10

of

the

supplemental

Property Group, Inc. 1. the [project] shall cover the scope of work of the detailed

agreement provided: 10. All other terms and conditions appearing in the construction contract, not otherwise in conflict with the above terms, shall remain in full force and binding upon the Parties insofar as they may be applicable with the [project] contemplated therein. 11 Exhibit A-1, id., p. 234. Art. I, par. 1.4. (Definition of Terms) of in the construction contract provided: 1.4. CONSTRUCTION MANAGER GEMM Construction and Management

construction bid plans and specifications and bid documents dated 28 September 1993, attached and forming an integral part hereof as Annex A. 2. the contract price for the said works shall be P130 million. 3. the payment terms shall be full swapping or full payment

condominium units. The condominium units earmarked for the [petitioner] are shown in the attached Annex B. 4. the [respondent] shall transfer and surrender to [petitioner] the

and its duly authorized representatives SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

condominium units abovestated in accordance with the following schedule: (a) 80% of unitsupon posting and acceptance by [respondent] of the performance bond [and] (b) 20% or remaining balanceupon completion of the project as

Property Group, Inc. Petitioner started working on the project in February 1994. On June 30, 1994, respondent executed a deed of sale12 (covering 114 condominium units and 20 parking slots of the MPT collectively valued by the parties at P112,416,716.88)13 in favor of petitioner pursuant to the full-swapping payment provision of the supplemental agreement. Shortly thereafter, petitioner sold some of its units to third persons.14 In September 1995, respondent engaged the services of Integratech, Inc. (ITI), an engineering consultancy firm, to evaluate the progress of the project.15 In its September 7, 1995 _______________ ARTICLE XIX CONSTRUCTION MANAGERS STATUS

provided in the construction contract and simultaneous with the posting by [petitioner] of the reglementary guarantee bond. 5. the contract period shall be fifteen (15) months reckoned from the release of the condominium certificates of title (CCTs) covering eighty percent (80%) of the units transferable to [petitioner] as aforesaid[.] Significantly, the supplemental agreement adopted those provisions of the construction contract which it did not specifically discuss or provide for.10 Among those carried over was the designation of GEMM Construction Corporation (GEMM) as the projects construction manager.11 _______________

Page

85

report,16 ITI informed respondent that petitioner, at that point, had only 19.1. the The authority to construction to stop managers the the in on [project] proper shall have general management, may be The and and accomplished 31.89% of the project (or was 11 months and six days behind schedule).17 Meanwhile, petitioner and respondent were discussing the possibility of the latters take over of the projects supervision. Despite ongoing negotiations, respondent did not obtain petitioners consent in hiring ITI as the projects construction manager. Neither did it inform petitioner of ITIs September 7, 1995 report. On October 12, 1995, petitioner sought to confirm respondents plan to take over the project.18 Its letter stated: The mutual agreement arrived at sometime in the last week of August 1995 for [respondent] to take over the construction supervision of the balance of the [project] from [petitioners] [e]ngineering staff and complete [the] same by December 31, 1995 as promised by [petitioners] engineer. The [petitioners] accomplished works as of this date of [t]ake over is of acceptable quality in materials and workmanship. This mutual agreement on the take over should not be misconstrued in any other way except that the take over is part of the long range plan of [respondent] that [petitioner], in the spirit of cooperation, agreed to hand over the construction supervision to [respondent] as requested. (emphasis supplied)19 _______________ VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 473 Contra, Exhibit A-9, id., pp. 483-484. The construction contract provided: ARTICLE XVII Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown RESCISSION OF CONTRACT

inspection, monitoring and administration of the [project]. They shall have whenever execution with pertaining such of stoppage this to necessary construction ARCHITECT, ensure managers, shall decide contract.

consultation matters

[RESPONDENT] architectural

engineering designs, workmanship, materials and construction. 19.2. The construction managers shall interpret the terms and conditions of this contract and shall mediate between and recommend decide on all claims of [RESPONDENT] or [PETITIONER] and shall resolve such other matters relating to the execution and progress of the works. 12 Exhibit 8, id., pp. 506-509 and Rollo, p. 23. 13 See Deed of Absolute Sale. Exhibit E, Records, pp. 380-383. This value exceeded 80% of the contract price. (The amount paid was equivalent to 86% of the contract price.) 14 Exhibits 13-P, 13-Q, 13-R, 13-S, and 13-T, Records, pp. 537541. 15 Rollo, p. 201. 473

86
Page

Titan-Ikeda

Property Group, Inc.

17. It is understood that in case of failure on the part of [PETITIONER] to complete the [project] herein stipulated and agreed on, or if the [project] to be done under this contract is abandoned by [PETITIONER] or the latter fails to SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

profits

on

the

work

done

after

rescission

of

this

contract

shall

be

considered or allowed. 7.3. [PETITIONER] and its sureties shall likewise be liable to

[RESPONDENT] for any loss caused to [RESPONDENT] in excess of the contract price. (emphasis supplied) Rescission under article XVII of the construction contract never took

Property Group, Inc. Engineers Antonio Co, general construction manager of respondent, and Luzon Y. Tablante, project manager of petitioner, signed the letter. _______________ insure its completion within the required time, including any extension thereof, and in any of these cases, [RESPONDENT] shall have the right to rescind this contract by giving notice in writing to that effect to [PETITIONER] and its bondsmen. [RESPONDENT] shall then take over the [project] and proceed to complete the same on its own account. 17.1. It is further agreed and understood that in case of rescission, [RESPONDENT] shall ascertain and fix the value of the [project] completed by [PETITIONER] such usable materials on the [project] taken. 17.2. In the all event charges that the total the expenditures prior to of [RESPONDENT] of the

place. Respondent notified neither petitioner nor its bondsmen that it was invoking its right to rescind under the contract. On the contrary, it was petitioner who drafted the October 12, 1995 letter-agreement. (The said letter was printed on petitioners letterhead.) Thus, the succeeding paragraphs quoted above are inapplicable in this case. VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. Integratechs (ITIs) Report In its September 7, 1995 report, ITI estimated that petitioner should

have accomplished 48.71% of the project as of the October 12, 1995 takeover date.20 Petitioner repudiated this figure21 but qualifiedly admitted that it did not finish the project.22 Records showed that respondent did not merely take over the supervision of the project but took full control thereof.23 Petitioner consequently conducted an inventory.24 On the basis thereof, petitioner demanded from respondent the pay_______________

supplying the scope of [PETITIONERS] work to complete the project, including against project rescission contract, and not in excess of the contract price, then the difference between the said total expenditures of [RESPONDENT] and the contract price may be applied to settle claims, if any, with the conformity of [PETITIONER] suppliers filed by workmen employed The on the if project any and should by be furnishing materials therefor. balance,

87

paid, to the [PETITIONER] but no amount in excess of the combined value of the unpaid completed work and retained percentage at the time of the rescission of this contract shall be paid. No claim for prospective 20 Exhibit F-1, id., p. 386. 21 TSN, December 19, 1997, pp. 67-68.

Page

22 Id., pp. 94-95 and Records, pp. 95-96. 23 Id. Petitioner did not protest the new arrangement. In fact, it detailed a project engineer at site who monitored only the progress of works in its condominium units. 24 Exhibits 5-E and 5-F, id., pp. 502-503. Petitioners letter dated October 17, 1995 provided a detailed account of the respondents liabilities. That letter was duly acknowledged by respondent. Change Orders

Titan-Ikeda

Construction

&

Development

Corporation

vs.

Primetown

Property Group, Inc. ment of its balance amounting to P1,779,744.85.25 _______________ n)Letter dated September 28, 1995 under B - #28 10,349.78 o) Letter dated October 12, 1995-- A, B, C, D 7,668,131.76

a) b) c) d) e) f)

CO #1 P 7,496,125.80 CO #2 160,975.87 CO # 3167,191.15 CO #4 311,799.71 Penthouse rework (structural) 1,228,781.08 support for MOS precast items Architectural Works Others

SUB-TOTALP26,220,756.97

a)Labor adjustment for architectural 290,000 x 27 7,830,000.00 VAt a)VAT for e and f (above) - 1,834,569.46 x 0.07128,419.86 b)VAT for o (above) - 7,688.131.75 x 0.07536,769.22 c)VAT for nos. 4, 11, 22 & 23 (under B letter Oct. 2, 1995) -

Equipment

605,788.38 g) Structural additive CO #1 41,400.00 h) Structural additive CO #2 276,177.00 i) VAT for structural (42,077,577 x 0.07) 2,945,430.39

145,223.52 x 0.04 5,808.94 d)VAT for architectural as of June to December 31, 1995 Accomplished as of Dec. 31, 1995100.00% Less: accomplishment as of May 1, 1995 35.57 Accomplishment as of June to Dec. 1995 64.43% VAT = 130,000,000 x 0.6643 x 0.04 3,350,360.00 e) VAT for 1 above I 1,507.52 f) VAT for A above: labor adjustment for archi-tectural 313,200.00

j) VAT for architectural (May 31) 1,849,640.00 k) [Respondents] share in modular cabinets 2,694,400.00 l) Letter dated October 2, 1995 under A Nos. 1, 8, 12, 16 37,688.00 11, 12, 17, 18, 19,

88
Page

m)Letter dated October 2, 1995 under B Nos. 4, 22 & 23 and VAT for modular Cabinets 726,878.05 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

g) Misc. additive (refer to attached A. 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, & B-25 648,211.78 SUB-TOTAL P12,814,277.32 Total change orders and other claims P39,035,033.29 ADD: Balances from other projects: Balance from Citadel project P 196,379.44 Sunnette Tower expenses advanced by [petitioner] 418,413.61 Balance due to [petitioner] from Citadel units sold by [respondent] 240,785.82 CWT and document stamp [taxes] advanced by [pe-titioner] 680,850.17 Balance due from 100% swapping MPT architec- tural contract 894,902.15 Balance from [petitioner] supplied concrete mix for [MPT] project 20,164.50 Balances projects 2,451,495.69 from other

AMOUNT DUE FROM RESPONDENT P23,421,316.08 25 Demand letter dated October 26, 1997. Exhibits 6 and 7, Records, pp. 500-504. The breakdown of the accounts is as follows: The remaining balance as of October 12, 1995 (refer to the attached) is P 5,499,233.82 Plus: Amount still payable to [petitioner] to SUBCONS (labor and materials) 16,244,635.38 VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. On February 19, 1996, petitioner sent a second letter to respondent

demanding P2,023,876.25. This new figure included the cost of materials (P244,331.40) petitioner advanced from December 5, 1995 to January 26, 1996.26 On November of 22, 1996, petitioner demanded from the respondent keys to the the

delivery

MPTs

management

certificate27

and

condominium units and the payment of its (respondents) balance.28 Because respondent ignored petitioners demand, petitioner, on December 9, 1996, filed a complaint for specific performance29 in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). _______________ Amount still needed as of October 20, 1995 P21,743,869.20 Less: Letter [dated] October 17, 1995 [amount due to petitioner]

89

LESS: Advances and payable to petitioner 18,065,212.90

Page

(supra note 24) 23,422,316.08 AMOUNT PAYABLE TO [PETITIONER] BY [RE- SPONDENT]

P 1,677,446.85 Plus: Material deliveries from October 20 to 25, 1995 102,298.00 R E V I S E D A M O U N T P 1,779,744.85 Balance as of October 26, 1995 P1,779,744.85 Add: Cost of materials delivered from December 6, 25, 1996 244,131.40 AMOUNT PAYABLE TO [PETITIONER] BY [RE- SPONDENT] P2,023,867.25 Records show that at the time petitioner was working on the (MPT) project, it was also working on respondents Sunnette Tower and Citadel projects. It is unclear in relation to which project this cost was incurred. 27 A management certificate attests to the fact that the condominium corporation is at least 60% Filipino (or that foreigners own not more than 40% of that corporation). It is a condition precedent to the issuance of condominium certificates of title. 28 Rollo, pp. 62-63. 29 Docketed as HLRB Case No. 9657. Petitioner prayed for the 1995 to January

actual costs incurred in finishing the project (or P69,785,923.47).30 In view of the pendency of the HLURB case, petitioner did not heed respondents demands. On April 29, 1997, the HLURB rendered a decision in favor of

petitioner.31 It ruled that the instrument executed on June 30, 1994 was a deed of absolute sale because the conveyance of the condominium units and parking slots was not subject to any condition.32 Thus, it ordered respondent to issue MPTs management certificate and to deliver the keys to the condominium units to petitioner.33 Respondent did not appeal this decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued upon its finality.34 Undaunted complaint by for the finality of of the sum of HLURB decision, respondent filed a money35 against petitioner in the

collection

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 58 on July 2, 1997. It prayed for the reimbursement of the value of the projects unfinished portion amounting to P66,677,000.36 _______________ VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 479 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

issuance of the management certificate and condominium certificates of title and the delivery of keys to its respective buyers. Records, pp. 4853. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. During trial, the RTC found that because respondent modified the MPTs architectural It also design, to trial petitioner deliver the had to adjust mix the and scope rebars of work.37 to Moreover, respondent belatedly informed petitioner of those modifications. failed The concrete allowed according schedule. For this reason, petitioner was not responsible for the projects delay.38 other In court thus liabilities petitioner to set-off respondents payment the keys in to the the outstanding with respondents refused to excess deliver

90

Property Group, Inc. While the complaint for specific performance was pending in the HLURB, respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner asking it to reimburse the

Page

project.39 It concluded that respondent owed petitioner P2,023,876.25.40 addition, because respondent

condominium units and the management certificate to petitioner, the RTC found that petitioner lost rental income amounting to US$1,665,260.41 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision stated: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby finding preponderance of evidence to _______________ 37 Refer to paragraph 1 of the supplemental agreement. 38 Rollo, p. 97. 39 See notes 24, 25 and 26. Respondents liabilities did not only rendered

Total Number of units 114 units Lost rental income as of July 1997 US$1,665,260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

dismissing [respondents] [c]omplaint for lack of merit. On the other hand,

Property Group, Inc. sustain [petitioners] counterclaim, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioner] ordering [respondent] to pay the former: 1. The unpaid balance of the consideration for [petitioners] services in [the project] in the amount of P2,023,867.25 with legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid; 2. Compensatory damages in the amount of US$1,665,260 or its peso equivalent at the current foreign exchange rate representing lost rental income due only as of July 1997 and the accrued lost earnings from then on until the date of actual payment, with legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid; and 3. Attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000 as acceptance fee, P1,000 appearance fee per hearing and 25% of the total amount awarded to [petitioner]. With costs against the [respondent]. SO ORDERED.42 Respondent appealed the RTC decision to the CA.43 The appellate court found that respondent fully performed its obligation when it executed the June 30, 1994 deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner.44 Moreover, ITIs report clearly established that petitioner had completed only 48.71% of the project as of October 12, 1995, the takeover date. Not only did it incur delay in the performance of its obligation but petitioner also agree to lease their respective units at stipulated

pertain to the MPT project (both structural and architectural works) but included those incurred in the Sunnette Tower and Citadel projects. 40 Rollo, p. 98. 41 Id., pp. 109-110. In a rental pool agreement, the owners of several condominium units rates and divide the rent (or their earnings) proportionately according to the area of their respective units. MPT rental pools daily rates Rate No. of Units

Studio type US$ 75

1-bedroom unit 115

91
Page

2-bedroom unit 135 3-bedroom unit 180

failed to finish the project. The CA ruled that respondent was entitled to recover the value of the unfinished portion of the project under the principle of unjust enrichment.45 Thus: _______________ See CIVIL CODE, Art. 22. The article provides: Article 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another, or by any other means, acquires or comes into possession VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. See also 1 Jose B.L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, AN OUTLINE OF PHILIPPINE CIVIL LAW, 1957 ed., 42-43. The following are the essential requisites of the action (action in rem verso): 1. enrichment by direct acquisition of plus value; 2. impoverishment of another; 3. correlation between enrichment and impoverishment (i.e., a relation of cause and effect); 4. absence of justifiable cause for either enrichment or impoverishment; and 5. lack of other remedy. The principle of unjust enrichment is inapplicable in this instance since petitioner received the condominium units and parkings slots as advance payment for services it should have rendered pursuant to the supplemental agreement. There was therefore a justifiable cause for the delivery of excess properties. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and a new one entered dismissing [petitioners] counterclaims of P2,023,867.25 representing unpaid to balance to for [its] services the in [the of project]; US$1,665,260 representing as the accrued lost earnings, and attorneys fees. [Petitioner] is hereby ordered return fully [respondent] Upon is amount by P66,677,000 of the value of unfinished [portion of the project], plus legal interest thereon until paid. payment hereby [petitioner] to aforementioned the keys and amount, [respondent] ordered deliver

[m]anagement [c]ertificate of the [Makati Prime Tower] paid to [petitioner] as consideration for the [project].46 Petitioner petition. Petitioner contends that the CA erred in giving weight to ITIs report because the project evaluation was commissioned only by respondent,47 in disregard of industry practice. Project moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this

Property Group, Inc. evaluations are agreed upon by the parties and conducted by a

disinterested third party.48 We grant the petition. REVIEW OF CONFLICTING FACTUAL FINDINGS

92
Page

_______________

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual issues are entertained only in exceptional cases such as where the findings of fact of the CA and the trial court are conflicting.49 Here, a glaring contradiction exists between the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. The trial court found that respondent contributed to the projects delay because it belatedly communicated the modifications and failed to deliver the necessary materials on time. The CA, however, found that petitioner incurred delay in the performance of its obligation. It relied on ITIs report which stated that petitioner had accomplished only 48.71% of the project as of October 12, 1995. JANUARY 31, 1994 SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT WAS EXTINGUISHED A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.50 This case involved two contracts entered into by the parties with regard to the project. _______________ VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 483 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Thereafter, the parties entered into a second contract. They agreed to extinguish the supplemental agreement as evidenced by the October 12, 1995 letter-agreement which was duly acknowledged by their respective representatives.52 While the October 12, 1995 letter-agreement stated that respondent was to take over merely the supervision of the project, it actually took over the whole project itself. In fact, respondent subsequently hired two contractors in petitioners stead.53 Moreover, petitioners project engineer at site only monitored the progress of architectural works undertaken in its condominium units.54 Petitioner never objected to this arrangement; hence, it voluntarily surrendered its participation in the project. Moreover, it judicially admitted in its answer that respondent took over the entire project, not merely its supervision, pursuant to its (respondents) longrange plans.55 Because the parties agreed to extinguish the supplemental agreement,

they were no longer required to fully perform _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. their respective obligations. Petitioner was relieved of its obligation to

Property Group, Inc. The parties first entered into a contract for a piece of work51 when they executed the supplemental agreement. Petitioner as contractor bound itself to execute of the a project price for respondent, the owner/developer, The in consideration certain (P130,000,000). supplemental

complete the project while respondent was freed of its obligation to pay the entire contract price. However, respondent, by executing the June 30, 1994 deed of absolute sale, was deemed to have paid P112,416,716.88. Nevertheless, because petitioner applied part of what it received to respondents outstanding liabilities,56 it admitted overpayment. Because petitioner acknowledged that it had been overpaid, it was

93

agreement was reciprocal in nature because the obligation of respondent to pay the entire contract price depended on the obligation of petitioner to complete the project (and vice versa).

obliged to return the excess to respondent. Embodying the principle of solutio indebiti, Article 2154 of the Civil Code provides:

Page

Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. For the extra-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti to arise, the

of October 12, 1995 was never due. The condominium units and parking slots corresponding to the said excess were mistakenly delivered by respondent and were therefore not due to petitioner. Stated simply, respondent erroneously delivered excess units to petitioner and the latter, pursuant to Article 2154, was obliged to the return them to respondent.58 Article 2160 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2160. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a thing certain or and loss determinate of the shall or only its be responsible and for the impairment same accessories accessions

following requisites must be proven: 1. the absence of a right to collect the excess sums and 2. the payment was made by mistake.57 With regard to the first requisite, because the supplemental agreement had been extinguished by the mutual agreement of the parties, petitioner became entitled only to the cost of services it actually rendered (i.e., that fraction of the project cost in proportion to the percentage of its actual accomplishment in the project). It was not entitled to the excess (or extent of overpayment). On the second requisite, Article 2163 of the Civil Code provides: _______________ VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

insofar as he has thereby been benefited. If he has alienated it, he shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum. One who receives payment by mistake in good faith is, as a general rule, only liable to return the thing delivered.59 If he benefited therefrom, he is also liable for the impairment or loss of the thing delivered and its accessories and accessions.60 If he sold the thing delivered, he should either deliver the _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. Article 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered; but, he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause. (emphasis supplied) In this instance, respondent paid part of the contract price under the

Property Group, Inc. proceeds party.61 The situation is, however, complicated by the following facts: a) the basis of the valuation (P112,416,716.99) of the condominium units and parking slots covered by the June 30, 1994 deed of sale is unknown; b) the percentage of petitioners actual accomplishment in the project has not been determined and of the sale or assign the action to collect to the other

94

assumption that petitioner would complete the project within the stipulated period. petitioner However, ceased after the on supplemental the project. agreement Therefore, was the extinguished, compensation working

Page

petitioner received in excess of the cost of its actual accomplishment as

c)

the

records

of

this

case

do

not

show

the

actual

number

of

petitioner shall deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or assign the actions for collection to respondent as required by Article 2160. DELAY IN THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT Mora or delay is the failure to perform the obligation in due time

condominium units and parking slots sold by petitioners. Because this Court is not a trier of facts, the determination of these matters evidence. The RTC must first determine the percentage of the project petitioner actually completed and its proportionate cost.62 This will be the amount due to petitioner. Thereafter, based on the stipulated valuation in the June 30, 1994 deed of sale, the RTC shall determine how many condominium units and parking slots correspond to the amount due to petitioner. It will only be the management certificate and the keys to these units that petitioner will be entitled to. The remaining units, having been mistakenly delivered by respondent, will therefore be the subject of solutio indebiti. _______________ 62 In order to determine the proportionate cost of the petitioners actual accomplishment in the project, the formula below must be used: Total project cost x % P130,000,000 of the project petitioner actually accomplished (refer to should be remanded to the RTC for reception of further

because of dolo (malice) or culpa (negligence).63 A debtor is deemed to have violated his obligation to the creditor from _______________ See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1169. The article provides: Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation. However, demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist: 1) When the obligation or the law expressly declares; or 2) When appears from that the nature and designation of the circumstances of the the time when the obligation is to it be

the

thing

delivered or the service is to rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the obligation; or 3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

paragraph 2 of the construction contract) (to be determined by the RTC) VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. What 2160 exactly in must to petitioner Article give 2154, back it to respondent? return to Under Article the

In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins. 488

relation

should

respondent

95
Page

condominium units and parking slots in excess of the value of its actual accomplishment (i.e., the amount due to it) as of October 12, 1995. If these properties include units and/or slots already sold to third persons,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

_______________ VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. the time the latter makes a demand. Once the creditor makes a

Property Group, Inc. dent took over the project for the sole reason that such move was part of its (respondents) long-term plan. Respondent, on the other hand, relied on ITIs September 7, 1995

demand, the debtor incurs mora or delay.64 The construction contract65 provided a procedure for protesting delay: Article XIV DELAYS AND ABANDONMENT 15.1. If at any time during the effectivity of this contract, [PETITIONER] shall incur unreasonable delay or slippages of more than fifteen percent (15%) of If the scheduled the work of program, sixty to (60) [RESPONDENT] days the by in from delay should of notify such [PETITIONER] in writing to accelerate the work and reduce, if not erase, slippage. notice, cases after lapse fails was receipt or [PETITIONER] where as the rectify caused and slippage, FORCE of delay

report. The construction contract named GEMM, not ITI, as construction manager.67 Because petitioner did not consent to the change of the designated construction manager, ITIs September 7, 1995 report could not bind it. In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner did not incur delay in the performance of its obligation. RECOVERY OF ADDITIONAL COSTS RESULTING FROM CHANGES The supplemental agreement was a contract for a stipulated price.68 In such contracts, the recovery of additional costs (incurred due to changes in plans or specifications) is governed by Article 1724 of the Civil Code. Article 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the landowner, can neither withdraw from the contract nor demand an increase in the price on account of higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in a written demand asking it to plans and specifications, provided: 1. such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and 2. the additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in writing by both parties.

[RESPONDENT] shall have the right to terminate this contract except in same force majeure. MAJEURE contemplated herein, determination

includes, but is not limited to, typhoon, flood, earthquake, coup detat, rebellion, sedition, transport strike, stoppage of work, mass public action that prevents workers from reporting for work, and such other causes beyond [PETITIONERS] control.66 (emphasis supplied) x x x Respondent x x x never sent x x x petitioner

accelerate work on the project and reduce, if not eliminate, slippage. If delay had truly been the reason why respondent took over the project, it would have sent a written demand as required by the construction contract. Moreover, according to the October 12, 1995 letter-agreement, respon-

Page

96

In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol,69 we reiterated that a claim for the cost of additional work arising from changes in the scope of work can only be allowed upon the: _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

70 Id., pp. 652-653; p. 531 citing Weldon Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35721, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 618, 632-634. 71 Id., p. 633. See also San Diego v. Sayson, 112 Phil. 1073; 2 SCRA 1175 (1961). We explained the rationale of Article 1724. That the requirement for a written authorization is not merely to prohibit admission of oral testimony against the objection of the adverse party can be inferred from the fact that the provision is not included among those specified in the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code. As it does not appear to have been intended as an extension of the Statute of Frauds, it must have been adopted as a substantive provision or a condition precedent to recovery. 72 TSN, December 18, 1997, pp. 127-128. The records contain neither a document allowing a change order or an agreement as to increase in cost. VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. 1. written authority from the developer/owner ordering/allowing the changes in work; and 2. written agreement of parties with regard to the increase in cost (or price) due to the change in work or design modification. 70 Furthermore: Compliance with the two requisites of Article 1724, a specific provision governing additional works, is a condition precedent of the recovery. The absence of one or the other bars the recovery of additional costs. Neither the authority for the changes made nor the additional price to be paid therefor may be proved by any other evidence for purposes of recovery.71 (emphasis supplied) Petitioner submitted neither one. In addition, petitioners project coordinator Estellita Garcia testified Inc., that respondent cannot never approved cost it any change in order.72 Thus, under Article 1724 and pursuant to our ruling in Powton Conglomerate, petitioner recover the incurred effecting the design modifications. A contractor who fails to secure the owner or developers written authority to changes in the work _______________

Property Group, Inc. or written assent to the additional cost to be incurred cannot invoke the principle of unjust enrichment.73 RECOVERY OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Indemnification (actual profits for damages or damnum damages comprehends emergens) or lucrum not but only also the the For loss suffered lost

damages

claimants

(compensatory

cessans).

compensatory

97

damages to be awarded, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of the alleged loss by preponderance of evidence.74

Page

The

RTC

awarded

compensatory

damages

based

on

the

rental

pool

as of October 12, 1995, subject to its (petitioners) allowable claims as stated in the inventory and 2. dismissing petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development

rates submitted by petitioner75 and on the premise that all those units would have been leased had respondent only finished the project by December 31, 1995.76 However, other than bare assertions, petitioner submitted no proof that the rental pool was in fact able to lease out the units. We thus hold that the losses sustained by petitioner were merely speculative and there was no basis for the award. REMAND OF OTHER CLAIMS Since respondent did not repudiate petitioners other claims stated in the inventory77 in the RTC and CA, it is estopped from questioning the validity thereof.78 However, be_______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Corporations claims for the cost of additional work (or change order) and damages. The records of this case are remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58 for: 1. the reception of additional evidence to determine (a) the percentage Titan-Ikeda of the architectural and work actually completed as by of

petitioner

Construction

Development

Corporation

October 12, 1995 on the Makati Prime Tower and (b) the number of condominium units and parking slots sold by petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation to third persons; _______________

Property Group, Inc. cause some of petitioners claims have been disallowed, we remand the records of this case to the RTC for the computation of respondents liability.79 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 15, 2002 decision and May 29, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61353 and the August 5, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City in Civil Case No. 97-1501 are hereby SET ASIDE. New judgment is entered: 1. ordering petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development

raising any question that should have been put in issue and decided in previous proceedings. 79 See Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. D.M. Consortium, Inc., G.R. No. 147594, 7 March 2007, 517 SCRA 632, 642. VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 12, 2008 Titan-Ikeda Construction & Development Corporation vs. Primetown

Property Group, Inc. 2. the computation of petitioner Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporations actual liability to respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. or viceversa, and the determination of imposable interests and/or penalties, if any.

Corporation to return to respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc. the

98
Page

condominium units and parking slots corresponding to the payment made in excess of the proportionate (project) cost of its actual accomplishment

SO ORDERED. Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and

Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur. Petition granted. Notes.There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damagesone is the loss of what a person already possesses, and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him, and in the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as ganacias frustradas or lucrum cessans, conjecture, are or not to be granted rather on by the basis of to mere some speculation, reasonably surmise, but reference

definite standard such as market value, established experience, or direct inference from known circumstances. (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 326 [2001]) Basic is the rule that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law shall be entertained since factual issues are beyond the province of the Supreme Court. (Pascual vs. Fajardo, 502 SCRA 59 [2006]) o0o

[Titan-Ikeda

Construction

&

Development

Corporation

vs.

Primetown

Property Group, Inc., 544 SCRA 466(2008)]

Page

99

No. L-13114. August 29, 1961. ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ESTHER PERALTA, defendant-appellee. Damages; Moral Damages; Appellee banned from representing herself as Mrs. S.S.; Lawful wife of S.S. not entitled to moral damages.The fact that appellee was banned from representing herself as Mrs. S.S., does not authorize, the award of moral damages in favor of the mans lawful wife, there having been no further finding that the assumption of the disputed status by appellee was made in bad faith or through culpable negligence. Same; Measure of damages in extra-contractual obligations.Damages

Issue in support case is whether child is recognized or not; Support a mere consequence of recognition.The right of natural children to be supported by their father depended exclusively on the recognition by the father of his paternity (Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 2); hence, the real issue in the support case is whether or not the child has been duly recognized, and the support is a mere consequence of the recognition. This being the case, the decision of the Court of Appeals rejecting the childs action for support did not declare him without right to support under all circumstances, and his support could therefore be considered as an element of damages childs mother. Same; Income tax deductions not reasonable basis for damages allowed for a childs maintenance.The individual income tax deduction for a child does not constitute a reasonable basis for an award of damages for his maintenance, since this is fixed for an entirely different purpose (to arrive at the net taxable income) and merely represents the amount that the state is willing to exempt from taxation. E. B. Garcia Law Offices and Ledesma, Puno, Guytingco and Antonio & Associates for plaintiffs-appellants. Quijano, appellee. RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appellants spouses Saturnino Silva and Elenita Ledesma Silva pray for the reconsideration of this Courts decision of November 25, 1960, claiming that (1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther Peraltas unauthorized use of the designation of Mrs. Esther Silva; Abellera, Santos Corrales & Nitorreda for defendantthat may be awarded to the

resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages whether he had foreseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also for lucrum cessans as required by Art. 1106. Same; Pecuniary Damages; Prescription not invoked in lower court;

Defense deemed waived.Since appellants failed to invoke the defense of prescription in the lower court, the same must be regarded as waived in relation to this claim. Same; Support; Parties and issues different; Action for support not res judicata with regard to claim for damages.The issues and parties in the childs action for support and the mothers claim for damages being different, the former action can not constitute res judicata with regard to the latter action. Same; Maintenance of child proper element of damages;

100
Page

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Silva vs. Peralta

(2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by the facts and the law. It is contended that the prohibition imposed upon appellee Esther Peralta from representing herself, directly or indirectly, as the wife of Saturnino Silva should result in an award of moral damages in favor of appellant Elenita VOL. 2, AUGUST 29, 1961 Silva vs. Peralta Ledesma, whose exclusive right to the appellation is recognized by the decision. This argument misapprehends the basis of the decision. Esther Peralta was forbidden from representing herself as Mrs. Saturnino Silva for the reason that it was proved in this case that she was not legally married to him, and because he is now lawfully married to Elenita Ledesma. But an award of damages in the latters favor would require a further finding that the assumption of the disputed status by Esther Peralta was made in bad faith or through culpable negligence and no such finding has been made in the decision. The facts are that Esther in good faith regarded herself as Saturninos lawful wife, and that the man himself led her into this belief prior to his desertion. That later on, unknown to Esther, Silva should have married his co-appellant in the United States is not sufficient to impose upon Esther any liability for damages or to destroy her original good faith, there being no proof that the existence of a valid marriage between Saturnino and Elenita was adequately driven home to Esther before this case was instituted. That the two appellants Silva were was living appellee together to as husband that and wife was certainly and with not sufficient proof, considering Saturnino Silvas past history connection conduct. Elenita

Moreover, the

trial

court found

Elenita

Silvas

claim

for damages

not

adequately proved, and we have not found in the record any justification to depart from that finding. II As to the award of damages against Saturnino Silva, it is to be noted that while the latters liability was extra-contractual in origin, still, under the Civil Code of 1889, the damages resulting from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such damages, whether he had foreseen them or not, just as he must indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also for lucrum cessans, as required by Article 1106. Article 1902 of the 1889 Civil SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Silva vs. Peralta Code of Spain formulated no standard for measuring quasidelictual

damages, the article merely prescribing that the guilty party shall be liable for the damage so done. This indefiniteness led modern civil law writers to hold that the standards set in Articles 1106 and 1107, placed in the general y rules las extra on obligations, rigen las por igual y para las las que contractuales contractuales, preestablecidas

broten ex-lege de actos ilicitos. (Roces, Notes to Fischer, Los Daos Civiles y su Reparacion, (1927). Since liability for damages arises in either case from a breach of a pre-existing obligation (to behave without fault or negligence in case of quasi-delicts, and, in case of contracts, to observe the conduct required by the stipulation), it is logical to conclude with Planiol that La responsabilidad contractual y (6 Planiol-Ripert, Derecho Civil, la extra contractual p. 529, sec. 378). tienen el mismo fundamento, por lo que se hallan sujetas en principio a identicas regalas Giorgi is of the same opinion (5 Teoria de Obligaciones, pp. 133, 207208). So is de Cossio y Corral (El Dolo en el Derecho Civil, pp. 132133):

101

How

know

Saturninos

Ledesma was any more legitimate than his previous one with appellee herself?

Page

Pero si ello es as, resulta claro que la aproximacin entre esta clase de culpa y la contractual, es cada dia mayor, hasta el extremo de que, segn hemos antes indicado, solamente se pueden sealar diferencias accessorias, y muchas veces aparentes entre una y otra. En primer trmino, porque el con-cepto de culpa contractual se extiende no slo a las obligaciones nacidas ex contractu, sino, en general, a todas aquellas preexistentes entre las partes a la realidad del acto daoso (obligaciones legales). De otra parte, llamada porque si bien consideramos deriva las cosas, la del responsabilidad extracontractual, siempre

referencia general.

una

clase

especial

de

obligaciones,

sino

todas

en

Que las disposiciones de este Captulo son aplicables en los casos de culpa extracontractual, del son no es doctrina Supremo. general constantemente Asi, y en la reconocida, sentencia a toda de por 14 la de de los jurisprudencia afirma que Tribunal de

diciembre de 1894, concretandose a los artculos 1.101, 1.103 y 1.104, caracter applicables con las clase de obligaciones, ofreciendo contradiccion especiales

quebrantamiento de un deber general, implicitamente reconocido por la ley, cual es el de que todos deben actuar socialmente con la debida diligencia, evitando causar dano a los demas, y una derecho que todo ciudadano tine, correlativamente, a no ser daado en su patrimonio y bienes sentido, por la conducta siempre dolosa entre el o neglipente autor del de dao los y dems. la En tal una habra vctima,

artculos 1.902 y 1.903; la sentencia de 15 de enero de 1902, permite interpretar los artculos 1.902, y 1.903 por los 1.103 y 1.106, a los efectos de determinar los elementos que han de entrar en la indemnizacin. La misma doctrina se mantiene en la senencia de 2 de diciembre de 1946, y en otras muchas que puediramos aducir. Whether or not the damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct consequence of Silvas deceitful maneuvers in making love to appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his wife (when Silva knew all the time that he could Esther Peralta because of his undissolved marriage to an not marry Australian

relatin juridica, constituida por este derecho y aquel deber. Este idea de unidad entre ambas instituciones se traduce en que las pretendidas diferencias en order a la extension de la indemnizacin, en ambos casos, no puedan defenderse a la vista de los preceptos de nuestro Derecho positive En efecto, no contiene el Capitul II del Ttulo XVI del Libro IV de nuestro Codigo civil norma alguna referente a la extensin de la indemnizacin que en cada caso haya de prestarse, lo que nos VOL. 2, AUGUST 29, 1961 Silva vs. Peralta obliga forzosamente a acudir a las normas generales contenidas en el Capitulo II, del Titulo I de dicho libro, IV, relativo a los efectos de las obligaciones, el 1.102, de y que ninguna las razon permite el limitar, 1.103, a las de de toda naturaleza clase se de hace

woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from appellee), is a question of appreciation. It is clear that Esther Peralta would not have consented to the liaison or That had the there birth been of had to no concealment child support was the a of direct child Silvas result because previous of this Silva marriage, connection. that the

Esther

abandoned her before it was born is likewise patent upon the record, and we can not see how said appellant can be excused from liability therefor. Silvas seduction child and were subsequent likewise the abandonment direct cause of for appellee the filing and of his the

illegitimate

102

contractual, ya que el articulo 1.101 hable genericamente de obligaciones todas en obligaciones; de los obligaciones, ninguno artculos subsifuientes

support case in Manila, and in order to prosecute the same, appellee had to quit her employment in Davao. While the case could have been filed in Davao, we do not believe that this error in selecting a more favorable venue (due to her unfamiliarity with the technicalities of the

Page

law) should be allowed to neutralize the appellant Silvas responsibility as the primary causative SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Silva vs. Peralta factor of the prejudice and damage suffered by appellee. It is argued that the maintenance of the child can not be considered as an element of damage because the childs case for support was dismissed. This contention fails to take into account the action there was for support as an acknowledged natural child, and that under the Civil Code of 1889 (the law in force when the child was born), the right of natural children to be supported by their father depended exclusively on the recognition by the father of his paternity; the rule being that the mere fact of birth gave no legal right to the child, and imposed no legal duty upon the father, except, perhaps, in cases arising under the criminal law. x x x The father was not, prior to the Civil Code, and is not now, bound to recognize his natural son by reason of the mere fact that he is the father. x x x But as to the father the question is, and always has been, has he performed any acts which indicate his intention to recognize the child as his? (Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil., pp. 2-3). It follows that in said suit, the real issue was whether the child had been duly recognized, the support being a mere consequence of the recognition. Therefore, the failure of the childs action for support did not adjudge that he was not the defendants child, but that the defendant never recognized (CA-G.R. him him No. as such. to That the under decision the all of the action Court did can of not be Appeals 24532-R) rejecting childs

The proofs so far found in the record may possibly warrant the filing of an action for compulsory recognition, under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 283, but there was no action presented to that effect. Plainly, the issues and parties being different, the result of the childs action can not constitute res judicata with regard to the mothers claim for damages against the father on account of the amounts she was compelled to spend for the maintenance of their child. On the contrary, the very fact that the child was not allowed to collect support from the father (appellant therein) merely emphasizes the account of his birth and rearing, which, in VOL. 2, AUGUST 29, 1961 Silva vs. Peralta turn, was a direct consequence of appellants tortious conduct. Since

Esther Peralta had expressly pleaded that she had to support the child (Record of Appeal, p. 27, in fine), and had prayed for such relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises, there is no reason why her expenses for the childs maintenance should not be taken into account. Appellants submit that the damages allowed for maintenance of the son should be limited to P600.00 a year, because the income tax law allows only that much deduction for each child. We do not believe that income tax deductions constitute a reasonable basis for an award of damages, since they are fixed for an entirely different purpose (to arrive at the net taxable income) and merely represent the amount that the state is willing to exempt from taxation. At that, it should be noted that the deductible amount has been lately increased to Pl,000.00 per annum. But even at P600.00 per annum, the damages suffered by appellee on this count, from 1945 to 1960, already amounts to around P9,000.00 a year, to which must be added the loss of appellees salary as executive of the Girl Scouts in Davao; so that the P15,000.00 damages awarded

103

declare

without

right

support

circumstances

seen from the following statement in the decision:

Page

by the court below is by no means excessive, as already held in our decision in chief. Appellants also contend that the claim for pecuniary damages has

rendered

untenable

against

it,

for

the

limitation

period

had

not

yet

expired when the suit was brought. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes

prescribed, because they date back to 1945. Suffice it to note that the defense of prescription was not invoked by appellants against the claim for pecuniary damages, and this defense must be regarded as waived in relation to the same. Appellants reply to the appellees first counterclaim in her second amended answer (which was for actual or pecuniary damages) read as follows (Answer to Counterclaim, Rec. App. p. 33): 1.That plaintiff is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations continued under paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the first counterclaim and, therefore, specifically denies the same. The defense of prescription was actually interposed only against the

and Dizon, JJ., concur. Motion denied. Notes.An filiation to illegitimate them. (spurious) may child be to be entitled by to the support voluntary and or

successional rights from his putative or presumed parents must prove his Filiation established compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious) child. (Paulino, etc. v. Paulino, et al., L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961). Award of moral damages against the erring spouse, for her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium and desertion of her husband is tenable because such conduct constitutes of wilful infliction of injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy (Tenchaves v. Escano, L-19671, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 677, citing Art. 21 in rel. Art. 2219 [10], new Civil Code). _______________ [Silva vs. Peralta, 2 SCRA 1025(1961)]

second counterclaim, in this wise: 1.That the cause of action alleged in the second coun SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Mendoza vs. Alcala terclaim has already prescribed more than ten years having already

elapsed. (Answer to Counterclaim, Rec. App., p. 34) The second counterclaim referred to was for damages due to mental torture, anguish and hurt feelings, all to her damage in the amount of P250,000.00 (Rec. App. p. 28). Upon the other hand, our own award for moral damages was based, not on the deceit practiced by Silva in securing different Esthers provinces assent and to her live in maritally 1954, by applying with filing pressure him, to but cause on her his to

104

subsequent

harassment of

suit against her in

otherwise

Page

abandon her childs case. As this cause of action arose less than three years before the present action was filed, the defense of prescription is

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez G.R. No. 119380. August 19, 1999.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FEDERICO LOPEZ @ AMBOY LOPEZ, accused-appellant. Criminal and Law; Murder; the Witnesses; the The natural reaction of victims of

from the moon and even from the stars is fair and sufficient to identify perpetrators of crimes. Same; Same; Same; The rule is that identification of the accused, when there is no improper motive for making it, should be given full faith and credence.Indeed, Mario Seldera was very positive that it was accusedappellant who shot them. He identified _______________ * SECOND DIVISION. VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 People vs. Lopez accused-appellant them when his as their assailant arrived and upon again reaching when Alfredo they Padapats the

criminal violence is to strive to notice the appearance of their assailants observe manner crime was committed. Accused-appellant questions the credibility of Mario Seldera. It is unbelievable, he contends, that this witness observed even minute details, such as the length and color of the shirts worn by accused-appellant and his companion, the color of their slippers, The and that the the has type no of merit. firearm took As used by accusedand General appellant, considering shooting place the suddenly Solicitor

unexpectedly.

contention

house. He again pointed to accused-appellant as the person who shot mother reported incident to the police that same night. The rule is that identification of the accused, when there is no improper motive for making it, should be given full faith and credence. In the case at bar, no reason has been shown why Mario should falsely implicate accused-appellant. Same; Alibi; The defense of alibi will be sustained where the evidence

points out, Mario Seldera went through a harrowing experience. In fact, he suffered three gunshot wounds and was given up for dead by the assailant. The memory of the massacre was etched deeply in his memory. As this Court has many times held, the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to notice the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Same; Same; Same; Illumination from the moon and even from the

of the prosecution is weak.It is claimed that accused-appellant was in his uncles house in Caurdanetaan at the time of the incident. The defense of alibi will be sustained where the evidence of the prosecution is weak. However, accused-appellant himself said that Caurdanetaan is just three kilometers from Nancalabasaan. On the other hand, his witnesses themselves testified that accused-appellants house is less than two kilometers from the scene of the crime and that the distance could be negotiated in 30 minutes by foot and even less if one runs. For alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Thus, assuming that he was indeed at the party in Asterio Sonacos house, he could have easily slipped out of the party, come

stars is fair and sufficient to identify perpetrators of crimes.It is argued that Mario could not have recognized accused-appellant because it was very dark on to the the night of November Atmospheric 15, 1991. This and is not true. According Philippine Geophysical Astronomical

Services Administration, there was 60% illumination from the moon over Umingan, Pangasinan at 9:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991. In

105

People

v.

Pueblas,

we

held

that

moon

disc

62%

full

provides

sufficient illumination in sustaining the identification of the accused and convicting him of murder. In other cases, we held that the illumination

Page

back to the group, and then be at home in time for the police to find him there. Same; motive Same; to The defense of alibi cannot was prevail who has positively over no positive improper by

We hold that accused-appellant was guilty of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime is committed only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. As the victims in this case were successively shot by accused-appellant with a shotgun, each shot necessarily constitutes one act. Accused-appellant should thus be held liable for three separate crimes. Criminal treachery Law; Murder; the Aggravating victims, Circumstances; shot, were Treachery; unarmed There and is

identification of the falsely

accused by

an eyewitness

testify.Accused-appellant

identified

Mario as the triggerman. It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by an eyewitness who has no improper motive to falsely testify. The Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Marios testimony who was only 11 when he witnessed the gruesome killing of his father and cousin and barely 13 when he took the stand. He could possibly have no other motive but to tell the truth about what he had observed. Same; Motive; Motive becomes significant only where the identity of the assailant is in serious doubt.The Court is convinced that it was accused-appellant who shot Mario Seldera, Rogelio Seldera, and Rodolfo Padapat on November 15, 1991. It is immaterial that there is no proof of motive for the attack because this becomes significant only where the identity of the assailant is in serious doubt. But in this case, the accused has been positively identified. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Quash;

where

when

were

peacefully walking along a trail when accused suddenly opened fire on them.The lower court correctly appreciated treachery as having qualified the killings of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Here, it was clearly established that the victims, when shot, were unarmed and were peacefully walking along a trail when accused-appellant suddenly opened fire on them. The swiftness of the shooting left them helpless to put up any form of defense. Same; Same; The crime committed is not frustrated, but only attempted murder, where the with injuries respect sustained to Mario by the victim the were crime not was life not threatening.But, Seldera,

frustrated, but only attempted murder. This is the gist of our rulings in several cases. For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera were not life threatening. hospital. He Dr. Santos, the to attending the physician, certified that Marios Hospital injuries would heal in seven days. In fact, he was not confined at the was referred Eastern Pangasinan District only for x-ray examination of his injuries. There is no evidence that he was given further medical attention by this hospital other than what Dr. Santos had requested. VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 People vs. Lopez

Informations; Where the accused fails to file a motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived objection based on the ground of duplicity. The Information is formally defective as it charged more than one offense in violation of Rule 110, 13 of the Revised Rules of Court. However, because of his failure to file a motion to quash, accused-appellant is

106

deemed to have waived objection based on the ground of duplicity. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision finds accused-appellant guilty of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, but sentences him for two separate counts of murder and one count of frustrated homicide.

Page

Same; Same; Damages; Formula for Unearned Income.Actual damages representing unearned income of Rogelio Seldera and Alfredo Padapat should also be awarded. Leonida Seldera testified that her husband was 43 years old when he was killed and that he earned P13,000.00 a year as a farmer. On the other hand, Alfredo Padapat testified that his son, Rodolfo, was then 25 years old when he died and that he was earning P5,000.00 of a year also income as is: a farmhand. net earning The formula (x) for = the life computation unearned capacity

________________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez feloniously attack, assault and shoot ROGELIO SELDERA and RODOLFO PADAPAT occasion Rogelio which and with caused their immediate evident and death and on the same MARIO and treachery Rodolfo and premeditation also to the wound

expectancy x gross annual income less living expenses (50% of gross annual income). Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula2/3 x [80 - age of deceased]. APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,

SELDERA on his breast to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Seldera and Padapat damage prejudice of said Mario Seldera. The 6:00 prosecution in the of presented of evidence November Lagula in showing 15, 1991, the following: At around 11, his

Pangasinan, Br. 52. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Isidro D. Sta. Maria for accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 52), finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder and ordering him to pay a total of P204,300.00 in damages. The Information2 against accused-appellant charged: That on or about the 15th day of November, 1991, in the evening, at Brgy. Nancalabasaan, municipality of Umingan, province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this New Republic of the Philippines,

evening a certain

Mario

Seldera,

father Rogelio Seldera, and his cousin Rodolfo Padapat worked in the riceland Barangay Nancalabasaan, Umingan, Pangasinan. It was harvest time and the three were hired to bundle the palay stalks which had been cut. As it was a moonlit night, the three worked in the field until around 9:00 when they started for home taking a trail alongside the Banila river. The trail is about two feet wide only, and so the three walked along the trail single file with Rogelio, being the oldest, leading the way, followed by his son Mario and by Rodolfo who was last. As they reached a sloping portion in the trail, accusedappellant uttering a Federico word, Lopez appeared armed fired at with the a shotgun. who Accusedslumped appellant had a companion, a dark man. He was unarmed.3 Without accused-appellant three, forward, face down. Accused-appellants companion went near the bodies of the victims and rolled them over with his foot. Satisfied that the victims were dead, accused-appellant and his companion left.4 However, Mario, the youngest in the group, was not killed, although he had been wounded in the back. As soon as accused-appellant and his companion had left, Mario stood up and, crying, he walked to the house of his uncle, Alfredo Padapat, the father of Rodolfo, and reported the matter. He decided not to go home as accused-appellant and his

107
Page

Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with one John Doe, whose identity has not yet been established, armed with a short firearm, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

companion

went

in

the

direction

of

their

house.

Marios

mother

was

Dr. Thelma C. Busto, the rural health physician of Umingan, Pangasinan, examined the bodies of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat on November 16, 1991. Dr. Busto described Rogelios wounds as follows:9 ______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez 1. Gunshot wound frontal area of head as point of entrance with exit at the occipital area, . . . thru and thru. 2. Multiple gunshot wounds in the chest and neck (9). Her post-mortem report on Rodolfo Padapat stated:10 Gunshot wound in the head right parieted area of head as entrance, no exit. According to Dr. Bustos reports, the cause of death of the victims was cerebral hemorrhage and cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to gunshot wounds. Testifying, she said that the gunshot wounds were alike in size and nature. Although she could not tell the type of firearm used nor determine the trajectory of the wounds, she said the wounds could have been caused by a shotgun.11 Leonida Seldera, widow of the deceased Rogelio, and Alfredo Padapat, father of Rodolfo, was testified on from the civil aspect from of the case. The about prosecution precluded inquiring these witnesses

fetched from their house and told what had happened to Ro_______________ VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 689 People vs. Lopez gelio and Rodolfo. The three then reported the incident to the barangay captain who lost no time in accompanying them to the police in Umingan, Pangasinan.5 Mario was investigated by CPL Jose Almerol. Afterwards, he was taken to the Umingan Medicare Hospital where he was treated by Dr. SullerSantos. The boy suffered three gunshot wounds on the back, right side, each wound measuring about .5 x 1 cm. The wounds were located vertically, certification the first about E) and three centimeters Mario from to the the second and the latter about two centimeters from the third.6 Dr. Santos issued a medical (Exh. referred Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital for x-ray examination. Mario positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant. He testified that accused-appellant wore a white, longsleeved shirt, blue jeans and white slippers, while his companion had a black t-shirt, black jeans and brown slippers on.7 He was able to recognize accused-appellant and notice the type and color of the latters clothes and those of the latters companions because the moon was brightly shining. He knew accusedappellant very well, because the latter used to frequent their house in Nancalabasaan to play cards with his father. In addition, Mario used to buy cigarettes from accused-appellants store. As to the gun used, he stated that it was similar to those used by security guards. When asked whether his father and accused-appellant had a quarrel on November 15, 1991, Mario said he did not know.8

events which transpired in the evening of November 15, 1991 because they were present during the testimony in-chief of Mario Seldera. The defense counsel moved for their exclusion but the prosecution manifested that they would only testify with regard to the civil aspect of the case.

Page

108

Accused-appellants defense was alibi. He claimed that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of November 15, 1991, he was in the house of his uncle, Asterio Sonaco, in Caurdanetaan, another barangay of Umingan in Pangasinan, about three kilometers from Nancalabasaan. He had a round of drinks with four friends12 over a dish of dog meat. At 11:00 that night, the party broke up and accused-appellant went home. He claimed ______________ VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 People vs. Lopez that it was dark that night and that during the party, they used a lamp for illumination.13 Accused-appellant stated that he has no previous quarrel with the two deceased nor with Mario Seldera. Nor had he been to the house of Rogelio Seldera. As to the clothes he wore on the night of November 15, 1991, he claimed he had a pair of maong pants and a t-shirt on, though he could not remember the color of the latter.14 On cross-examination, accused-appellant admitted that he was known as Amboy Lopez and that although a barriomate, Rodrigo Lopez, was also called Amboy, the latter was known more as Thunder Lopez. He also said that he had a farm in Nancalabasaan but he allegedly had not gone to the barangay proper as he only pass by the eastern part thereof.15 In his counter-affidavit,16 accused-appellant did not mention anything

The defense presented Daniel Fortunato and Mario Sonaco to corroborate accused-appellants testimony on the events which transpired in the evening of November 15, 1991. Daniel Fortunato testified that he is a barangay councilman of Caurdanetaan, Umingan, Pangasinan. He claimed that from 4:00 in the afternoon to 11:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991, he was with accused-appellant in a party where there were about thirteen18 other people, drinking gin and eating cooked _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez dog meat. Fortunato said he and Mario Sonaco helped accused-appellant home as the latter was too drunk. Accused-appellant was allegedly received by his wife.19 On the cross-examination latter may have Fortunato slipped admitted out. With that regard he to was the not always of

watching accused-appellant during the party and that it was possible that distance Caurdanetaan to the Banila river, where the incident happened, Fortunato estimated it to be about 1 1/2 kilometers, which can be covered in 20 minutes by walking and in about 11 minutes by running. Fortunato testified that accused-appellant had the same height and body build as Rodrigo Thunder Lopez although the latter was darker.20 Mario Sonaco, for his part, claimed that there were less than ten21 people evening present of in the house 15, of his brother, he Asterio Sonaco, in the November 1991. However, corroborated Fortunatos

about cooking dog meat during the party in Asterio Sonacos house on November 15, 1991 and that he went home at 8:00 in the evening. Accused-appellant gave no explanation why in his testimony in court he said he went home at 11:00 in the evening and that they killed a dog and made its meat into a dish.17

testimony that he and Fortunato took accused-appellant home at 11:00 oclock that night because the latter was drunk.22 On cross-examination, Sonaco admitted that accused-ap-pellant is his

109

nephew.23 He estimated that accused-appellants house was less than two kilometers from the Banila river. He reiterated that by taking the barangay road, the distance could be covered in 30 minutes on foot but

Page

if one runs or uses the shorter route through the ricefields, the travel time would be less.24 The defense also presented Juanito Costales, barangay captain of

On January 20, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:28 WHEREFORE, in virtue of the foregoing disquisitions accused Federico Lopez @ Amboy Lopez is hereby declared GUILTY of the crime of Double Murder With Frustrated Murder beyond reasonable ______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez doubt and is hereby sentenced to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua

Caurdanetaan, who testified that around 12:00 mid_______________ VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 People vs. Lopez night of inform November 15, 1991, that barangay of three policemen a He went in he to a his house in to the the

him

accused-appellant

was

suspect said

killing

neighboring

Nancalabasaan.

accompanied

relative to the treacherous killing of Rogelio Seldera, and to pay the heirs of the late Seldera the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as compensatory likewise of damages, sentences Thirty the for Thousand accused the (P30,000.00) Amboy killing as of moral of the Rodolfo damages, penalty same Lopez

authorities to accused-appellants house and that when the latter came out, he smelled of liquor. When asked by the policemen where he had been, accused-appellant allegedly answered he had been to a drinking party held that afternoon. Apparently finding nothing unusual, Costales and the policemen left.25 Costales asked corroborated the Mario Sonacos of the testimony on that accused-appellants 15, 1991, he

Reclusion

Perpetua

treacherous

Padapat, and to pay the heirs of the late Padapat the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as compensatory damages, and the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, and to pay civil liability or actual expenses incurred during the wake and burial and other expenses incurred relative to the interment of both deceased in the amount of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00) payable to the heirs of both victims, and finally sentences accused Amboy Lopez for the crime of Frustrated Homicide for the injuries sustained by victim Mario Seldera, with a penalty of Prision Mayor from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and to pay the widow of the late Rogelio Seldera the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) exemplary damages, and P300.00 as actual damages in the form of medical expenses. With cost de oficio. Bailbond cancelled. SO ORDERED. In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that:29

house is less than two kilometers from the scene of the crime. When about condition night November stated that it was so dark that the policemen had to use flashlights.26 Corroborating accused-appellants whose house is claim about that 100 it was meters pitch from dark the on the

evening of November 15, 1991, Lorna Gonzales, a resident of Barangay Nancalabasaan, Seldera household, testified that at around 9:00 in the evening of that day, she heard some wailing and weeping in the house of the Selderas, and that she and her husband learned that Rogelio Seldera had died. However, they did not go out of their house because it was allegedly very dark, and she was afraid that her husband might be implicated in the killing. On cross-examination, Gonzales disclosed that her house is surrounded by big camachile trees. When asked whether these could obstruct the light from the moon, she only said: It [was] dark, sir.27

Page

110

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

violence is to strive to notice the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.31 Indeed, Marios statement that accused-appellant used a shotgun in

(1) THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF MARIO [S]ELDERA; (2) THE HONORABLE OF CAPTAIN COURT JUANITO ERRED IN NOT AS CONSIDERING GONZALES THE TO THE AND

shooting him and his companions on November 15, 1991 is confirmed by the fact that the wounds suffered by the victims were similar to those caused by a shotgun fired at close range. Rogelio Seldera, who was less than three meters away from accused-appellant, had his head practically blown off. On his neck and chest were nine wounds, probably caused by pellets from the blast. Mario, who was behind his father, sustained three vertical, relatively small wounds on the right side of his back. The wound on Rodolfos head, on the other hand, although without an exit, is similar in size to that suffered by Rogelio Seldera on the head. _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez

TESTIMONIES BARANGAY

DEFENSE

WITNESSES COSTALES

LORNA

CONDITION

OF THE NIGHT; (3) THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI PUT UP BY THE ACCUSED; _______________ VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 People vs. Lopez (4) THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE

EXISTENCE OF TWO PERSONS SPORTING THE NAME OF AMBOY LOPEZ. First. Accused-appellant questions the credibility of Mario Seldera. It is unbelievable, he contends, that this witness observed even minute details, such as the length and color of the shirts worn by accused-appellant and his companion, the color of their slippers, and the type of firearm used by accused-appellant, considering that the shooting took place suddenly and unexpectedly.30 The contention has no merit. As the Solicitor General points out, Mario

It is

is not

argued true.

that

Mario to

could the

not

have

recognized Atmospheric

accused-appellant Geophysical and

because it was very dark on the night of November 15, 1991.32 This According Philippine Astronomical Services Administration, there was 60% illumination from the moon over Umingan, Pangasinan at 9:00 in the evening of November 15, 1991. In People v. Pueblas,33 we held that a moon disc 62% full provides sufficient illumination in sustaining the identification of the accused and convicting him of murder. In other cases, we held that the illumination from the moon34 and even from the stars35 is fair and sufficient to identify perpetrators of crimes. The Solicitor General observes that Mario had been walking under the light of the moon for sometime before the incident so that his eyes had sufficiently adjusted to the natural illumination, so as to enable him in identifying the accused-appellant.36 Indeed, if accused-appellant recognized

111

Seldera went through a harrowing experience. In fact, he suffered three gunshot wounds and was given up for dead by the assailant. The memory of the massacre was etched deeply in his memory. As this Court has many times held, the natural reaction of victims of criminal

Page

his

intended

victims,

there

is

no

reason

why

the

survivor

from

the

from

Nancalabasaan.

On

the

other

hand,

his

witnesses39

themselves

ambush could not have also recognized him. In the alternative, it is contended that even if there was fair illumination from the moon on the night in question, nonetheless Mario Seldera could have mistaken accused-appellant for Rodrigo Thunder Lopez.37 Again the contention is without merit. Rodrigo Thunder Lopez may also be called Amboy Lopez in the barangay, but it was not by name that Mario made his identification. In fact, Rodrigo Thunder Lopez was not even a suspect in the ambush of Mario and the latters companions. As already stated, Mario identified accused-appellant based on this witness _______________ VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 People vs. Lopez knowledge of accused-appellant. The latter was a frequent visitor in their house and this witness used to buy from accused-appellants store. Moreover, Rodrigo Lopez is darker and shorter than accused-appellant. Indeed, Mario Seldera was very positive that it was accused-appellant who shot them. He identified accused-appellant as their assailant upon reaching Alfredo Padapats house. He again pointed to accused-appellant as the person who shot them when his mother arrived and again when they reported the incident to the police that same night. The rule is that identification of the accused, when there is no improper motive for making it, should be given full faith and credence. In the case at bar, no reason has been shown why Mario should falsely implicate accusedappellant.

testified that accused-appellants house is less than two kilometers from the scene of the crime and that the distance could be negotiated in 30 minutes by foot and even less if one runs. For alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.40 Thus, assuming that he was indeed at the party in Asterio Sonacos house, he could have easily slipped out of the party, come back to the group, and then be at home in time for the police to find him there. Moreover, as already stated, accused-appellant was positively identified by Mario as the triggerman. It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification _______________ SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez of the accused by an eyewitness who has no improper motive to falsely testify.41 The Court finds no reason to doubt the veracity of Marios testimony who was only 11 when he witnessed the gruesome killing of his father and cousin and barely 13 when he took the stand. He could possibly have no other motive but to tell the truth about what he had observed. Accused-appellants 8:00 at in the in alibi of is not only 15, weak; 1991, it a is full also hour filled before and with the

inconsistencies. He said in his counter-affidavit that he went home at evening the November His shooting occurred but, in his testimony in court, he said he went home 11:00 evening. witnesses, Daniel Fortunato Mario Sonaco, said there were at least ten persons in the party at the house of Asterio Sonaco on November 15, 1991, but accused-appellant stated that there were only five.

112
Page

Second. It is claimed that accused-appellant was in his un-cles house in Caurdanetaan at the time of the incident. The defense of alibi will be sustained where the evidence of the prosecution is weak.38 However, accused-appellant himself said that Caurdanetaan is just three kilometers

The Court is convinced that it was accused-appellant who shot Mario Seldera, Rogelio Seldera, and Rodolfo Padapat on November 15, 1991. It is immaterial that there is no proof of motive for the attack because this becomes significant only where the identity of the assailant is in serious doubt.42 But in this case, the accused has been positively identified. Third. The Information is formally defective as it charged more than one offense in violation of Rule 110, 13 of the Revised Rules of Court. However, because of his failure to file a motion to quash, accusedappellant is deemed to have waived objection based on the ground of duplicity.43 The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision finds accused-appellant guilty of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, but sentences him for two separate counts of murder and one count of frustrated homicide. We hold that accused-appellant was guilty of two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Under Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime is committed only when a single act consti______________ VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 699 People vs. Lopez tutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. As the victims in this case were successively shot by accused-appellant with a shotgun, each shot necessarily constitutes one act. Accused-appellant should thus be held liable for three separate crimes.

were peacefully

walking along a

trail when accused-appellant suddenly

opened fire on them. The swiftness of the shooting left them helpless to put up any form of defense. The lower court however erred in convicting accused-appellant of

frustrated homicide for the injuries inflicted on Mario Seldera. Although it correctly appreciated the intent to kill, which can be inferred from the weapon used, the proximity of the assailants and the location of the injuries, it should have appreciated treachery in the attack. Treachery attended the shooting not only of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat but also of Mario Seldera. But, with respect to Mario Seldera, the crime was not frustrated, but only attempted For Dr. murder. the Santos, This the is the gist by of our rulings in that several not life Marios cases.45 injuries sustained Mario physician, Seldera certified were

threatening.

attending

injuries would heal in seven days.46 In fact, he was not confined at the hospital. He was referred to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital only for x-ray examination of his injuries. There is no evidence that he _______________

44 People v. Oliano, supra; People v. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996). 45 People v. Balderas, 276 SCRA 970 (1997) citing People v.

Maguikay, 237 SCRA 587 (1994) and People v. Tiu, 216 SCRA 140 (1992); People v. Cogonon, supra; People v. Gonzales, 99 SCRA 697 (1980); People v. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432 (1979); People v. Moreno, 85 SCRA 649 (1978). 46 Records, p. 13; Exh. E. 700

113

The lower court correctly appreciated treachery as having qualified the killings treachery of is Rogelio the Seldera and and Rodolfo Padapat. on The an essence of swift unexpected attack unarmed victim

Page

without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.44 Here, it was clearly established that the victims, when shot, were unarmed and

700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez was given further medical attention by this hospital other than what Dr. Santos had requested. Fourth. Certain modification should also be made with respect to the award of heirs of of be damages. Rogelio treated The Seldera as lower and civil court awarded Padapat which in P50,000.00 addition under to for the compensatory damages and P30,000.00 for moral damages to each set Rodolfo indemnity, P14,000.00 actual damages to be divided among them. The P50,000.00 should prevailing jurisprudence,47 is fixed at P50,000.00, to be awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim. Further, in accordance with our rulings in other cases,48 the amount of moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00. With regard to the amount of actual damages, Leonida Seldera and

_______________

47 People v. Piamonte, G.R. No. 91999, February 25, 1999, 303 SCRA 577; People v. Panida, G.R. Nos. 127125 & 138952, July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 66. 48 People v. Panida, supra; People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1 (1998). 49 See People v. Oliano, supra; Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75 (1958). 701

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 701 People vs. Lopez plary damages and P300.00 actual damages for medical expenses. The first item should be disallowed for lack of evidence to support it. The second item should likewise be deleted as under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. There was no aggravating circumstance treachery. As in to this the case actual other than the of qualifying circumstance the of damages P300.00, as prosecution

Alfredo Padapat testified that they could not present any receipt for their funeral expenses because the funeral agency refused to issue one in view of an unpaid balance. They have likewise allegedly lost the receipts for their joint expenses for the wake. Under the Civil Code (Art. 2199), a party is entitled to compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. However, under Art. 2224, temperate damages may be recovered if it is shown that such party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.49 As the heirs of the two victims clearly incurred funeral expenses, an award of P5,000.00 for each set of heirs by way of temperate damages should be awarded, to

failed to present any documentary proof for such, its award is improper. However, the amount of P200.00 as temperate damages may be made in its place. Actual damages representing unearned income of Rogelio Seldera and Alfredo Padapat should also be awarded. Leonida Seldera testified that her husband was 43 years old when he was killed and that he earned P13,000.00 a year as a farmer.50 On the other hand, Alfredo Padapat testified that his son, Rodolfo, was then 25 years old when he died

114
Page

be divided equally by the heirs of Seldera and Padapat. For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera, the court a quo awarded P10,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00 exem-

and that he was earning P5,000.00 a year also as a farmhand.51 The formula for the computation of unearned income is:52

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 52) is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: 1. For the death of Rogelio Seldera, accused-appellant is found guilty of

Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula53 2/3 x [80 - age of deceased] Accordingly, Rogelio Selderas unearned income is: _______________

murder and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Seldera the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as temperate damages, and P160,355.00 as unearned income. 2. For the death of Rodolfo Padapat, accused-appellant is found guilty of murder and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased Rodolfo Padapat the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as temperate

50 TSN, p. 9, June 13, 1993. 51 TSN, p. 17, June 3, 1993. 52 People v. Panida, supra,citing People v. Gutierrez, Jr., G.R. No.

damages, and P91,675.00 as unearned income. 3. For the injuries of Mario Seldera, accused-appellant is found guilty of attempted murder and is sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay Mario Seldera P200.00 as temperate damages. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur. Appealed decision affirmed with modifications.

116281, Feb. 8, 1999, 302 SCRA 643. 53 Villa-Rey Transit, Inc. v. CA, 31 SCRA 511 (1970). 702

702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Lopez

703

VOL. 312, AUGUST 19, 1999 703

115

Rodolfo Padapats unearned income is:

Cadua vs. Court of Appeals Notes.A kerosene lamp gives off sufficient illumination for the

Page

identification of persons. (People vs. Ching, 240 SCRA 267 [1995])

The illumination provided by a lighted electric post is sufficient for the proper identification of the accused. (People vs. Fulinara, 247 SCRA 28 [1995]) A startling or frightful experience creates an indelible impression in the mind that can be recalled vividly. (People vs. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141 [1997]) o0o [People vs. Lopez, 312 SCRA 684(1999)]

G.R. No. 176385. PEOPLE TOLENTINO OF y

February 26, 2008.* THE PHILIPPINES, and plaintiff-appellee, TRINIDAD y vs. EMELIO

ESTRELLA

JESUS

MARAVILLA,

accused-appellants. Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Law of the Case; Words and Phrases; When an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution; Law of the case has been

Page

116

defined

as

the

opinion

delivered

on

former

appealit

means

that

People vs. Tolentino Same; Same; Same; The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused and not even the gravity of the penalty for a particular offense can change the rule.The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused. The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is negated. An accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to present its evidence. Thus, when the trial court disallowed the appellants to present evidence on their behalf, it properly applied Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Not even the gravity of the penalty for a particular offense can change this rule. Evidence; competently magistrates, demeanor, to Witnesses; performed can conduct on weigh and the Well-entrenched by the trial to stand is the judge in rule that the unlike of the matter of

whatever is already irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.It must be pointed out that the issue on the validity of the trial courts order dated 17 May 2000 was elevated by appellants to this Court via petition for certiorari. This Court in a Resolution dated 2 December 2000, dismissed the said petition, and upheld the trial courts ruling that appellants are barred from presenting their evidence for failure to seek leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence which was denied by the lower court. Since the issue of whether or not appellants may be allowed to adduce evidence despite their failure to file a prior leave of court had already been finally put to rest, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to pass upon anew this final ruling constitutes a crass contravention of elementary rules of procedure. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is already irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such before decision the was predicated Indeed, continue must to be the facts of the case public court. courts adhere thereto because

assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most who, light appellate declarants truth and such testimony

policy, judicial orderliness and economy require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. _______________

position witness

discriminate is best

between most

falsehood.Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values declarations and competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the latter testimonies court had of witnesses, overlooked unless or it be manifestly arbitrarily shown the that facts the and disregarded

117

* THIRD DIVISION. 672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Page

circumstances of significance in the case.

VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 673 People vs. Tolentino Same; Same; Inconsistencies which are trivial and insignificant do not warrant rejection of the entire testimony nor the reversal of the judgmentaccuracy in accounts had never been applied as a standard to which the credibility of witnesses are tested since it is undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions and the passage of time.In an effort to exculpate themselves from the charges, appellants identified inconsistent statements of witness Bea such as the latters declaration that he the was a friend They of also Jesus make Trinidad an which of is the contradictory to his earlier testimony the he got mad at Jesus Trinidad four months prior to incident. issue statement of Bea during the cross-examination wherein he made mention that a gun was poked at him, which declaration is missing in the direct examination. These inconsistencies are very trivial and insignificant. Minor inconsistencies do not warrant rejection of the entire testimony nor the reversal of judgment. Accuracy in accounts had never been applied as a standard to which the credibility of witnesses are tested since it is undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions and the passage of time. Witness Beas inconsistencies rather enhance truthfulness for it erases suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself/herself or to retaliate.

Same;

Same;

Same;

Dwelling;

When

the

crime

is

committed

in

the

dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance; Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. 674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino aggravating house of circumstance. the deceased Here, the crime was is committed considered inside the

victim.

Dwelling

aggravating

primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. Same; Same; Same; Same; Dwelling cannot be appreciated when not alleged in the information.Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 considering that the same was not alleged in the information. Under Section 9, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved otherwise; even if proved but not alleged in the information, the same shall not be considered by the Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused. Same; Same; Same; Nighttime; Nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escapethere must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime and that the perpetrators nighttime Nighttime in is took both advantage cases an of it.The improperly aggravating appreciated circumstance circumstance by the when only it of is was RTC.

118

considered

aggravating

sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime and that the perpetrators took advantage of

Page

it. Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no evidence that the appellants and their companions took advantage of nighttime or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. Same; Same; Damages; When death occurs due to a crime, the

that such wounds inflicted would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury. 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino the New Civil to and Code. wanton This kind of of damage and the as is a intended of an to serve of or as a

following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases; The award of moral damages in case of violent death of the victim does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs.ex delicto VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 675 People vs. Tolentino Novelo as civil indemnity. The Court of Appeals reduced the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the RTC award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo is in order. The RTC also correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim. This does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs. Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the the Court crime as in finds was this that committed case. an To award with deter of one or more similar for aggravating circumstances, future

deterrent sufferings

serious

wrong-doings, invasion

vindication

undue

rights

injured

punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellants. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00880 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64, finding appellants Emelio E. Tolentino and Jesus M. Trinidad, guilty of the crime of Murder and two counts of Frustrated Murder. On 13 February 1998, three separate informations of Murder and two counts of Frustrated Murder were filed before the RTC against appellants, together with accused Jimmy Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. The murder case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-0258 while the two frustrated murder cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 98-0260 and No. 98-0270. The accusatory portions of the Informations read: Criminal Case No. 98-0258

transgressions,

P25,000.00

exemplary damages is proper.

119

Frustrated Murder; Damages; Evidence; Even if there was no testimony on the moral damages that he sustained, but the medical certificate issued by the hospital indicated that the victim sustained serious stab injuries inflicted by the accused, the same is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary human experience and common sense dictate

Page

For: Murder That on or about 11:10 oclock in the evening, more or less, on the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdic_______________

ANTONIO BEA, by then and there, poking a firearm at said private offended party, tying his hands with a rope and thereafter, stabbing said victim all the on different of a parts of his which but body, could thus have causing upon the the latter of by serious and mortal wounds capable of causing death, hence, performing acts as and execution produced did to not said of crime it murder timely consequence, medical to nonetheless, rendered and produce victim herein

reason of causes independent of their (accused) will, able assistance the damage prevented his death, prejudice

that is, by the which private

Penned

by

Associate

Justice

Rodrigo

V.

Cosico

with

Associate

complainant. Criminal Case No. 98-0270 For: Frustrated Murder 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino

Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-18. 2 Penned by Judge Franco T. Falcon. CA Rollo, pp. 15-29. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 677 People vs. Tolentino That the commission of the offense is attended by aggravating same and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with long firearms and 12 gauge shot gun, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, kick and strike one ANTONIO NOVELO with a shotgun, hitting him on the different parts of his body and then shot one said Antonio Novelo but missed, which ordinarily would cause the death of Antonio Novelo thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nonetheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Antonio Novelo, which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.3 During the arraignment on 13 July 1998, appellants, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered their respective pleas of not guilty.4

circumstance dwelling.

of nighttime

purposely sought to

facilitate the

Criminal Case No. 98-0260 For: Frustrated Murder That on or about 11:10 in the evening of the 29th day of August, 1997, at Purok 7, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed other and accused, to knife, attain and conspiring, a common confederating, purpose, evident did and mutually and helping there, and each

120

then

willfully, of

unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, while armed with firearms with treachery, premeditation abuse superior strength, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon one

Page

Accused Jimmy and Arnel Trinidad remained at large. Thereafter, a joint trial on the merits of the three criminal cases ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses and their respective testimonies: (1) Antonio Bea testified as an eyewitness on the killing of Josita Novelo and narrated his own near death experience; (2) Ricardo Basila testified that he saw the accused escorting Antonio Bea whose hands were tied and disclosed that he was also subjected to violent acts of the accused. He claimed that he later heard a gunshot coming from Josita Novelos house; (3) Wilfredo Llarena, a Barangay Captain, testified incident that to several the persons went (4) to his house carrying testified an injured the Antonio Bea and they proceeded to the hospital. He later reported the police officers; Antonio Novelo that accused went to the house of Josita Novelo and attempted to kill him; (5) Dr. Noli Bayani, the rural health physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body of Josita Novelo; (6) Belen Avellera testified on the existence of the _______________

partnership turned sour as Jesus Trinidad harvested the yields of the fishpond without his consent; (9) Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Manila, conducted an autopsy of the body of Josita Novelo. As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit Aa photograph of the bloody body of Josita Novelo; Exhibit A-1the x mark on the face of Josita Novelo; Exhibit Ba photograph showing the victim prostrate on the ground; Exhibits C and Dphotographs of the house where the of incident Antonio of killing Exhibit took place; Exhibit of Ethe Antonio medical certificate Bea; Fthe affidavit

Bea; Exhibit Gthe affidavit of Ricardo Basila; Exhibit Hthe affidavit of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit Ithe medical certificate of Antonio Novelo; Exhibit Jthe death certificate of Josita Novelo showing the result of the post-mortem examination; and Exhibit Kthe NBI autopsy report. The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that sometime in January 1997, Rogelio Novelo, the surviving spouse of the deceasedvictim Josita Novelo, and appellant Jesus Trinidad agreed to manage and operate a rented fishpond located at Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte. Sometime in April of the same year, when the fishpond was yielding its first harvest, Rogelio Novelo and his wife Josita brought the produce to Manila to be sold, while appellant Jesus Trinidad was left to and manage the fishpond. of. Upon that the couples return, Trinidad they was discovered that all the fish and crabs in the fishpond had already been harvested disposed Believing appellant responsible for the pilferage, Josita demanded from him either the return 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino barangay

3 Rollo, pp. 2-3. 4 Records, p. 56. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 679 People vs. Tolentino medical records of Antonio Bea; (7) SPO2 Nelson Ricierra testified that

121

Wilfredo Llarena reported to him the stabbing and the killing incidents and that he of was the a member report; (8) of the Rogelio team who made testified a follow-up Jesus investigation Novelo that

Page

Trinidad used to be his partner in operating a fishpond and that their

On 29 August 1997, at around 10:30 p.m., Antonio Bea, one of the complainants and the caretaker of the couples fishpond, was inside his house located at Purok 7, Tinagong Dagat, Barangay San Vicente, Santa Elena, Camarines Norte.5 He heard someone calling his name from outside his house. Carrying a flashlight, Bea went outside and focused his flashlight towards the direction of the fishpond watergate (prensa).6 Suddenly, someone whom he recognized to be appellant Emelio Tolentino grabbed his hand and pulled him out of the house.7 There he saw appellant Trinidad around Jesus kicked his Trinidad, Bea on behind Jimmy the his Trinidad of Then and his Arnel Trinidad. tied a Emelio Jesus rope right side back. hip, and

less 100 meters from Basilas house.11 When they arrived at the Novelo house, Jesus Trinidad called Josita Novelo to get out of the house.12 Josita Novelo went out of the house holding a light.13 Jesus Trinidad quickly grabbed Josita Novelo by her mouth and the two of them went inside Antonio upon the house together inside with the Emelio house, Novelos Tolentino, Emelio Jesus Tolentino Trinidad and and Jesus Jesus Bea. From Novelo,

Trinidad took Antonio Bea to another door leading outside and chanced Antonio Rogelio brother.14 Immediately, Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino kicked Antonio Novelo causing the latter to fall right into the fishpond and disappear from sight.15 Antonio Bea was then tied to the door from the waist down with Emelio Tolentino guarding him.16 In that position, Antonio Bea saw Josita Novelo being mauled by Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad. All of a sudden, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo on the left cheek with a gun.17 Immediately after, Emelio Tolentino entered the house and slashed the face of Josita with a jungle bolo.18 The three assailants untied the binding on Antonio

hands

appellant

Tolentino

pulled him by the rope towards the house of a certain Ricardo Basila.8 Upon reaching the house of Ricardo Basila, Arnel Trinidad called out the former. Ricardo Basila, with a flashlight in his hand, went out of his house and focused the flash_______________

5 TSN, 10 August 1998, pp. 527-528. 6 Id. 7 Id., at p. 532. 8 Id., at pp. 536-537. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 681 People vs. Tolentino

_______________

9 Id., at p. 546. 10 TSN, 8 September 1998, p. 325. 11 TSN, 10 August 1998, p. 547. 12 Id. 13 Id., at p. 549. 14 Id., at p. 550. 15 Id., at p. 551. 16 Id., at p. 54.

122
Page

910 The assailants, together with Antonio Bea, proceeded to the house of the spouses Novelo situated alongside the fishpond which was more or

17 Id., at p. 56. 18 Id., at p. 57. 682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino Beas feet while leaving the ropes tied behind his back.19 They left Novelos about house proceeding from towards the the fishpond Emelio watergate led times which the in was way, the three meters house. Tolentino Bea four 19 Id., at p. 73. 20 TSN, 22 September 1998, p. 378. 21 Id., at p. 13. 22 TSN, 10 November 1998, p. 20. 23 TSN, 24 August 1999, p. 28. 24 Rollo, p. 16. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 683 People vs. Tolentino On 19 October 1999, the prosecution rested its case and made a _______________

followed by Bea, with Jesus and Arnel Trinidad taking the rear. Without warning, Emelio Tolentino stabbed Antonio stomach with the formers jungle bolo. Antonio Bea fell into the fishpond. The assailants left the victim and boarded a boat which was operated by Jimmy Trinidad. Injured and bleeding, Antonio Bea managed to untie his hands and swim across the river to ask for help. He received help from the people of Purok 7 and Barangay captain Barangay Captain then Captain Wilfredo the Llarena victim to brought was brought to the house of the in a a hammock.20 hospital. with From The the barangay hospital, of the

Wilfredo Llarena, along

some members

police, went to the house of spouses Novelo and came upon the dead body of Josita Novelo.21 Dr. Noli Bayani, the Rural Health Physician of Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, conducted an autopsy of the body and found that the cause of Josita Novelos death was [h]ypovolemic shock secondary to gunshot wounds and lacerated wound.22 Dr. Rolando C. Victoria, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, who also conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased, testified that the shotgun wound at the left side of the face of the victim caused her death.23 The medical certificate of Antonio Bea shows that the four stab wounds inflicted on him caused damage to his intestines.24

formal offer of evidence.25 On the 13 RTC April 2000, the 31 appellants demurrer 15, Rule May through and 119 2000, counsel filed the a Demurrer for on to

Evidence, without leave of court.26 In an order27 dated 17 May 2000, denied to On submitted of the appellants case Rules a decision Criminal for pursuant Section 1985

Procedure.28

filed

motion

reconsideration, praying that the order denying their Demurrer to Evidence be recalled and that they be allowed to present evidence. The RTC denied the said motion. Unfazed, appellants filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. This Court denied the petition in a Resolution dated 2 December 2002, which became final and executory on 5 February 2003.

Page

123

As a result, the case was submitted for decision without any evidence proffered by the defense. On 30 November 2004, the RTC rendered a decision finding appellants guilty of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 98-0258 and Criminal Case No. 98-0260 for murder and frustrated murder, respectively. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:

CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0258 For: MURDER WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime penalty victim, of of Murder, DEATH. P50,000.00 they are the as hereby also amount moral sentenced ordered of to to suffer the by the heirs way supreme of of the civil as They are pay

Josita

Novelo,

P75,000.00 and

_______________

indemnity,

damages

another

P50,000.00

exemplary damages. CRIM. CASE NO. 98-0260

25 Id., at p. 6. 26 Records, pp. 199-202. 27 Id., at pp. 204-205. 28 SEC. 15. Demurrer to evidence.After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court. If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. 684

For: FRUSTRATED MURDER WHEREFORE, finding accused EMELIO TOLENTINO y ESTRELLA and JESUS TRINIDAD y MARAVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime victim, of Frustrated Bea Murder, they the amount are of hereby sentenced as to civil suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay their Antonio P50,000.00 indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.29 The trial court, however, acquitted appellants of the crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed against Antonio Novelo in Criminal Case No. 98-0270. On 10 December 2004, appellants filed a Motion For New Trial on the ground that errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial.30 Appellants argued that in the interest of justice and equity, they should be given the opportunity to testify in their favor considering that they are meted out by the RTC the supreme penalty of death. In an Order31 dated 15 December 2004, the RTC denied appellants motion for new trial ratiocinating that the error of appellants counsel during the trial does not amount to error

124
Page

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino

_______________

addition, to pay the heirs of the victim Josita Fernandez Novelo the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity for her death; P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 representing exemplary damages.

29 Id., at pp. 806-807. 30 Id., at pp. 819-823. 31 Id., at p. 825. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 685 People vs. Tolentino of law or irregularity which constitutes a valid ground for the granting of a motion for new trial. It appears that appellants no longer questioned the denial of their motion for new trial. The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court. Thereafter, this Court ordered the referral of the case to the Court of Appeals conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo.32 The Court of Appeals, on 8 November 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the judgment of the trial court convicting the appellants, with modifications on the award of civil liabilities, thus: WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, of y Labo, Camarines and Norte finding y accusedMaravilla appellants Emelio Tolentino Estrella Jesus Trinidad

(2) In years of

Criminal prision to pay

Case mayor the

No.

98-0260, as

accused-appellants minimum, the to 14 of

are years

hereby and 8 as civil

sentenced each to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 8 (minimum), Antonio as months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum. Moreover, they are ordered victim P30,000 Bea moral amount P25,000 as temperate damages; damages, P30,000

indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages.33 Hence, the instant case. _______________

32 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640. 33 Rollo, p. 17. 686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino In their brief, the appellants assign the following errors: I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY BEYOND ERRED IN CONVICTING DOUBT OF THE THE

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal

125

Case No. 98-0258, and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications, to wit: (1) In Criminal each Case to No. 98-0258, penalty accused-appellants of reclusion are hereby and in

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CRIMES CHARGED. II

REASONABLE

Page

sentenced

suffer

the

perpetua

THE

COURT

QUO

GRAVELY TO

ERRED

IN

NOT

ALLOWING

THE

People vs. Tolentino of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence which was

ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

PRESENT

DEFENSE

EVIDENCE

AFTER

THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. III GRANTING QUO ARGUENDO IN THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY THE OF THE WERE OF TO

denied by the lower court. Since the issue of whether or not appellants may be allowed to adduce evidence despite their failure to file a prior leave pass of court had already been finally put to a rest, the same has attained finality and constitutes the law of the case. Any attempt to constitutes crass contravention of

GUILTY OF INFLICTING INJURY ON ANTONIO BEA, THE COURT A ERRED FINDING THEM CRIME FAILED FRUSTRATED MURDER ALTHOUGH PROSECUTION

upon

anew this

final ruling

elementary rules of procedure. Law of the case has More been defined it as the opinion that delivered is on a

PROVE THAT BEAS WOUNDS WERE MORTAL.34 Before proceeding to the first and third assignment of errors, the Court deems it proper to first deal with the second assignment. Appellants, as earlier mentioned, urge this Court to revisit the issue as to the propriety of the trial courts Order dated 17 May 2000 denying the Demurrer to Evidence and preventing them from presenting evidence due to their failure to seek leave of court prior to the filing of the demurrer to evidence. It must be pointed out that the issue on the validity of the trial courts order dated 17 May 2000 was elevated by appellants to this Court via petition for certiorari. This Court in a Resolution dated 2 December 2000, dismissed the said petition, and upheld the trial courts ruling that appellants are barred from presenting their evidence for failure to seek leave _______________

former

appeal.35

specifically,

means

whatever

already

irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.36 Indeed, courts must adhere thereto because public policy, judicial orderliness and economy require such stability in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.37 Besides, under Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, it is stated that when an accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, thus: SEC. 15. Demurrer evidence: (1) on to its evidence.After own initiative the after prosecution giving the has rested its an

case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of prosecution opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

126

34 CA Rollo, pp. 47-48. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 687

_______________

Page

35 Private Enterprise Corp. v. Magada, G.R. No. 149489, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 167, 180. 36 Id. 37 Id. 688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino If the Court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. The filing of a demurrer to evidence without leave of court is an

The filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of court and its subsequent denial results in the submission of the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence on had record. the Considering obligation to that the governing the same, rules on demurrer to evidence is a fundamental component of criminal procedure, respondent judge observe regardless of the gravity of the offense charged. It is not for him to grant concessions to the accused who failed to obtain prior leave of court. The rule is clear _______________

38 People v. Sayaboc, 464 Phil. 824, 844; 419 SCRA 659, 674 (2004). 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 689 People vs. Tolentino that upon the denial of the demurrer to evidence in this case, the

unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused.38 The rationale for this rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is negated.39 An accused cannot be allowed by espousing to wager on the outcome whenever of judicial dictated by proceedings inconsistent viewpoints

convenience.40 The purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the evidence and, after its denial thereof, the Thus, defense when would the then claim the right to the present evidence.41 trial court disallowed

accused, who failed to ask for leave of court, shall waive the right to present evidence in his behalf.42 Going back to the first issue, appellants take exception with the trial courts assessment of the evidence before it and in giving weight and credence maintain not have to the testimony the the of the prosecution witnesses. Appellants the that incident of the is that considering seen Josita clearly lateness faces Antoio of of the hour when his attackers according and to

appellants to present evidence on their behalf, it properly applied Section

127

15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Not even the gravity of the penalty for a particular offense can change this rule. As stressed by this Court:

took place, and the fact that it was dark, witness Antonio Bea could deceased Novelo. Bea, appellants,

Page

incompetent to testify on matters relating to what was done to the late Josita Novelo because he was tied from the waist down to the door outside the house, thus, he could not have seen what had happened inside the house where the deceased was brutally attacked. Well-entrenched declarations on is the rule witness that the is matter best of assigning most values to

A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: A certain Emelio Tolentino y Estrella, do you know a person with such name? A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: These persons that I made mention to you since when have you known them? A: For almost ten (10) years. Q: And because of that length of time mistaken as to their identity? A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: On August 29, 1997 at about 10:30 or 11:00 in the evening you could not possibly [be]

the

stand

and

competently

performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.43 Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the latter testimonies court had of witnesses, overlooked unless or it be manifestly arbitrarily shown the that facts the and disregarded

circumstances of significance in the case.44 In the instant case, prosecution witness Antonio Bea steadfastly pointed to appellants and their companions as the malefactors. Such identification was detailed as follows: _______________

42 Osumo v. Serrano, 429 Phil. 626, 632; 380 SCRA 110, 114 (2002). 43 People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24; 423 SCRA 617, 625 (2004). 44 People v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 838-839; 393 SCRA 488, 502-503 (2002). 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

thereof, do you recall of any unusual incident that happened? A: Yes, sir. Q: Will you please tell us what is that incident that you recalled? A: There was somebody that called me, sir. x x x x Q: When you heard somebody called you on that occasion, what did you do? A: I flash[ed] a light to the Prensa, sir.

128
Page

People vs. Tolentino Q: Mr. Witness, do you know a certain Jesus Trinidad y Maravilla?

x x x x Q: x x x [W]hat happened next? A: Somebody hold (sic) my hand sir. Q: Did you recognize who held your hand? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who? A: Emelio Tolentino. x x x x Q: Mr. Witness, what happened next after Emelio Tolentino held your hand? VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 691 People vs. Tolentino Q: And what happened next after you were pulled outside your house? A: I am (sic) telling him I have no fault. x x x x Q: Nang oras na iyon sino pa ang nakita mo kung mayroon man? A: Jesus Trinidad, sir.

A: He kicked me, sir. Q: Who kicked you in particular? A: Jesus Trinidad, sir.45 Cross-examination: Q: Who was the person who held you? A: Emelio Tolentino, sir. Q: How did you recognize him to be Emelio Tolentino? A: When I focused the light, I saw them because of the light, wearing bonnet and their faces were exposed to the light. Q: You said them, how many were they? A: Jesus Trinidad, Emelio Tolentino and Arnel Trinidad, sir.46 The identification of witness Antonio Bea of the perpetrators of the

crimes evinces factual truth of what really occurred on that fateful night. He could not have been mistaken as to the identity of the appellants since, at that time, he has known them personally for ten (10) years already. Their faces were illuminated by the flashlight when witness Antonio Bea focused the same in their direction. Also, Beas identification of the assailants was corroborated by Ricardo Basila and _______________

45 TSN, 10 August 1998, pp. 22-31. 46 TSN, 8 September 1998, p. 14. 692

129
Page

Q: Who else if any? A: Arnel Trinidad, sir. Q: What happened after you told them you have (sic) no fault?

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino Antionio Novelo who testified that they likewise suffered violent acts from the malefactors during the incident. Although Antonio Bea was tied at the door outside the house of Josita Novelo, he declared with clarity the circumstances leading to the killing of Josita and his near-death experience, viz.: Q: x x x Mr. Witness, where were you when you said you went out of the house lets go back to the situation wherein you entered the house of Josita Novelo in one door and then you exited on the other and there you said the other two, Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino saw Antonio Novelo, where you at that time? A: I was with them sir, because they are holding the other end of the rope. Q: And what did they do to you afterwards? A: They tied me at the door, sir. Q: That door where you exited? A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: From the place you were tied did you see Josita Novelo? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you know what were they asking? x x x x Q: Did you hear the reply of Josita Novelo, if any? A: I cannot hear the reply of Josita Novelo because they are mauling her or binubugbog nila. Q: Who in particular was mauling Josita Novelo? A: Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad, sir. Q: What about Emelio Tolentino, what was he doing? A: He is outside guarding me, sir. Q: What happened after Josita Novelo was mauled by these two you mentioned? VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 693 People vs. Tolentino A: Suddenly, Jesus Trinidad shot Josita Novelo. Q: Did you see where Josita Novelo was hit? A: Yes, sir. Q: Where was she hit, if you have seen? A: On the left cheek which exited at the back of her head. Q: After they have shot Josita Novelo, what did they do next? A: They get (sic) out, sir.

130
Page

Q: And while you were tied on that occasion what happened to Josita Novelo? A: They are asking Josita Novelo where was it placed?

x x x x Q: What about Emelio Tolentino, what did he do if any? A: Emelio Tolentino entered the house and then slashed the face of Josita Novelo. Court: Anong ginamit? Nakita mo? A: Jungle bolo. Q: Saan? Sa kanan o kaliwa? A: Sa kaliwa, po. x x x x Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you said that after Josita Novelo was shot by Jesus Trinidad, and Emelio Tolentino went inside the house and put an X mark on the face of that dead woman, what happened next? A: They untied me, sir. Q: And what did they do after untying you? A: They passed through the prensa and stabbed me, sir. Q: Mr. witness, you said you were untied is it (sic) not? A: Yes, sir, sa paa lang. x x x x Q: So in other words from the time you were untied you walked

A: Emelio Tolentino, sir. Q: Were your hands still tied? A: Yes, sir. 694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino Q: What about Tolentino who was ahead of you what was he doing? A: He has a jungle bolo sir, and stabbed me. x x x x Q: How many times were you stabbed on that occasion? A: Four times, sir.47 The foregoing testimony can only be told by a person who had really witnessed the incident and had been subjected to personal violence from the perpetrators, hence, such testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Furthermore, Beas testimony jibed with the physical evidence. The nature of the wound of the deceased was affirmed by the medical experts to be a result of a gunshot wound. The location of the wounds found on Josita Novelos face as described by witness Bea was consistent with the documentary evidence, i.e., photographs, autopsy result and the physical examination of the corpse of the victim. All these tend to dispel any doubt that witness Bea would have concocted the whole story. The prosecution successfully established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants and their cohorts killed Josita Novelo. Anent the third issue, appellants argue that in the stabbing of Antonio Bea, they should have been liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated murder since the prosecution failed to prove, due to its failure

131
Page

towards that prensa for about three (3) meters? A: Yes, sir. Q: When you walked, who was ahead of you, if any?

to present the attending physician, that the injury suffered by the victim was fatal. A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime.48 The offender crime.49 has passed the subjective crime is phase in the commission of the the Subjectively, the complete.50 Nothing interrupted

damage to the victims abdomen resulting in massive blood loss. The victim was hospitalized for two months because of these injuries.53 In fact, at the trial, the victim showed the scars in his abdomen. All these tend to show the seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim and which would have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical intervention. The trial court, in assessing the testimonial evidence of the prosecution, made this appropriate observation: In the instant Antonio the cases, Bea, the as corroborative Basila and perpetrators testimonies Antonio of the of prosecution positively satisfactorily

offender while passing _______________

witnesses, 47 TSN, 10 August 1998, pp. 51-76. 48 Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168827, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 176, 195. 49 Id. 50 Id. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 695 People vs. Tolentino through reason the of the subjective phase. of He causes did all that of is necessary the will of to the identifying

Ricardo the

Novelo, crime

accused

persuade the Court. x x x. x x x x Witness Antonio Bea testified that accused Jesus Trinidad and Emelio Tolentino are known to him for almost ten (10) years x x x. Likewise, witness Antonio Novelo, on cross-examination, testified that he recognized the accused because their voices are very familiar to him being neighbors and he had known the accused for a long time. x x x x The identification of an accused through his voice is acceptable,

particulary if the witness knows the accused personally. _______________

consummate the crime. However, the crime was not consummated by intervention independent offender.51 In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or

132

attendance.52 In the instant case, the prosecution established that Antonio Bea

51 Id. 52 Id. 53 Rollo, p. 16.

Page

sustained four stab wounds inflicted by Emelio Tolentino which caused

696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino The sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of

54 Records, pp. 803-804. 55 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 40, 50. 56 People (1999). 57 Id. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 697 People vs. Tolentino The RTC convicted the appellants of murder in Criminal Case No. 980258 the for the killing of Josita of Novelo and frustrated and murder for the assault of Antonio Bea in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 by appreciating qualifying circumstance treachery generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling. The Bea. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.58 execution Frontal of the attack attack can made be it treacherous impossible when for the it is sudden to and unexpected and the victim is unarmed.59 What is decisive is that the victim defend himself/herself or to retaliate.60 In the killing called of Josita her. Novelo, the the victim went was at her home when Jesus RTC is correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of v. Molina, 370 Phil. 546, 554-555; 311 SCRA 517, 526

identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.54 Worth stressing is that the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. The settled rule is that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.55 We find no cogent reason to veer away from their findings. In an effort to exculpate themselves of from the Bea charges, such as appellants the latters

identified

inconsistent

statements

witness

declaration that he was a friend of Jesus Trinidad which is contradictory to his earlier testimony the he got mad at Jesus Trinidad four months prior to the incident. They also make an issue of the statement of Bea during the cross-examination wherein he made mention that a gun was poked at him, which declaration is missing in the direct examination. These inconsistencies are very trivial and insignificant. Minor

treachery in the killing of Josita Novelo and in the stabbing of Antonio

inconsistencies do not warrant rejection of the entire testimony nor the reversal of judgment.56 Accuracy in accounts had never been applied as a standard to which the credibility of witnesses are tested since it is undeniable that human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions rather testimony. and the passage of for time.57 it Witness Beas of inconsistencies a rehearsed enhance truthfulness erases suspicion

133

_______________

someone

When

victim

outside,

suddenly

Trinidad held her. Thereafter, Jesus Trinidad and Arnel Trinidad mauled Josita Novelo. Without warning, Jesus Trinidad shot the helpless victim on the cheek. Said attack was so sudden and unexpected that the

Page

victim had not been given the opportunity to defend herself or repel the aggression. She was unarmed when she was attacked. Indeed, all these circumstances indicate that the assault on the victim was treacherous. The stabbing of Antonio Bea was also attended with treachery. While Bea, whose hands were tied behind his back, and the assailants were walking along the dike, Emelio Tolentino unexpectedly stabbed the victim four times. The vic_______________

Dwelling, however, cannot be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 98-0260 considering Section 9, that the Rule 10 same of was the not alleged Revised in the of information. Under Court, aggravating Rules

circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved otherwise; even if proved but not alleged in the information, the same shall not be considered by the Court in the imposition of the proper penalty on the accused.64 The aggravating circumstance of nighttime in both cases was improperly appreciated by the RTC. Nighttime is considered an aggravating circumstance only when it is sought to prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure their escape. There must be proof that this

58 People v. Belaro, 367 Phil. 90, 107; 307 SCRA 591, 607 (1999). 59 Id. 60 People v. Pidoy, 453 Phil. 221, 230; 405 SCRA 339, 348 (2003). 698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino tim could not put up a defense as the attack was swift and he was not in the position to repel the same since his hands were tied. Also affirmed is the ruling of the RTC appreciating the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling in Criminal Case No. 980258. Evidence shows that Josita Novelo was killed in her own house. When the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.61 Here, the crime was committed inside the house of the He deceased goes to victim. Dwelling house is to considered hurt him aggravating or do him primarily because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode.62 who anothers wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.63

was intentionally sought to ensure the commission of the crime and that the _______________

61 People v. Prades, 355 Phil. 150, 168; 293 SCRA 411, 429 (1998). 62 People (1999). 63 Id. 64 People v. Casitas, Jr., 445 (2003). VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 699 People vs. Tolentino perpetrators took advantage of it. Although the crime was committed at nighttime, there is no evidence that the appellants and their companions Phil. 407, 427; 397 SCRA 382, 398 v. Paraiso, 377 Phil. 445, 464; 319 SCRA 422, 438-439

Page

134

took advantage of nighttime or that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, in Criminal Case No. 980258, the it must of of be Josita borne in mind With no that this, the the prosecution crime successfully by the established the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in killing Novelo. and committed the appellants is murder in accordance with Article 248. With the aggravating circumstance dwelling mitigating circumstance, penalty imposed should be in its maximum, which is death.65 In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.66 Thus, the penalty imposed upon appellants in Criminal case No. 98-0258 should be reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility Law.67 As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.68 The RTC awarded P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo as civil indemnity. The Court of Appeals reduced the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Based _______________ of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence

66 People v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 659, 676. 67 Id. 68 People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006, 500

SCRA 727, 742. 700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino on current jurisprudence, the RTC award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 in favor of the heirs of Josita Novelo is in order.69 The RTC also correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of

P50,000.00 in view of the violent death of the victim. This does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs.70 Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case.71 To deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper. In Criminal Case No. 98-060, the RTC imposed upon the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Under Article 61, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of frustrated murder is one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.72 Reclusion temporal has a range of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime taking into account any

135
Page

65 People v. Paraiso, supra note 62 at p. 465; p. 440.

modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime.73 The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower than reclusion temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the frustrated murder, an _______________

loss. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 is in order.75 Moreover, Antonio is also entitled to moral damages which this Court hereby awards in the amount of P40,000.00. Although there was no testimony on the moral damages that he sustained, the medical sustained certificate issued by the hospital indicated that Antonio Bea

serious stab injuries inflicted by appellants. It is sufficient basis to award moral damages as ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that such wounds inflicted on Antonio Bea would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injury.76 Finally,

69 People v. Buban, G.R. No. 170471, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 118, 134. 70 People v. Caraig, G.R. No. 116224-27, 28 March 2003, 400 SCRA 67, 83. 71 People v. Buban, supra note 69 at p. 134. 72 Martinez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48. 73 Id. VOL. 546, FEBRUARY 26, 2008 701 People vs. Tolentino indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum74 may be considered reasonable for the frustrated murder under the facts of this case. As to the award of actual damages, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to substantiate Antonio Beas hospitalization expenses. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Antonio was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this Court deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that he suffered pecuniary

the award in the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is also in order considering of that the either kind crime a was attended is or is a by the an to qualifying with award serve of an of as circumstance aggravating New Civil to treachery. When crime committed

circumstance, Code.77 serious This

qualifying of damage and

generic, intended

P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the deterrent wrong-doings, as vindication undue

sufferings and wanton invasion of the _______________ v. Ibaez, 455 Phil. 133, 167-168; 407 SCRA 406, 431 (2003). 77 Id. 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tolentino rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous

conduct.78 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 08 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00880 finding appellants guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion

Page

136

perpetua in Criminal Case. No. 98-0258, is hereby AFFIRMED with the modifications: (1) and In Criminal Case No. 98-0258, appellants are ordered to pay jointly severally as the civil heirs of the victim the Josita of Novelo the amount as of indemnity, amount P50,000.00 moral 156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio G.R. No. 179477. February 6, 2008.* THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JIMMY TABIO,

P75,000.00

damages and P25,000.00 representing exemplary damages. (2) In Criminal Case No. 98-0260, for the crime of Frustrated Murder,

appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of of reclusion as temporal moral as maximum. In addition, as appellants civil as are ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim Antonio Bea the amount P40,000.00 as damages, damages P30,000.00 and indemnity, exemplary P20,000.00 damages. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed with modifications. Notes.A dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to temperate P25,000.00

appellant. Criminal Procedure; Right to be Informed; Pleadings and Practice; Both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information.Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information. Same; Same; Same; Failure of the accused to interpose an objection on the ground of duplicity of the offenses charged in the information constitutes waiver.The Court also observes that there is duplicity of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver. Criminal Law; Rape; Principles in the Prosecution of Rape.Our courts

evidence is not appealable as the accused would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. (Ong vs. People, 342 SCRA 372 [2000]) If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of

have

been

traditionally

guided

by

three

settled

principles

in

the

dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. (FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 386 SCRA 312 [2002])

prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. In a prosecution for rape, the complainants candor is the single most important issue. If a

137
Page

o0o _______________ [People vs. Tolentino, 546 SCRA 671(2008)]

complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof. Same; Same; Witnesses; Mental Retardates; Mental deficiency lends

every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.AAAs testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and lacked many specific details on how they were committed. Her bare statement that appellant repeated what he had done to her the first time is inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapes. Whether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine demonstrate perpetrated. based in on the the evidence the testimony offered. manner of by to AAA The the prosecution the effect crime that must was the sufficient detail which

greater credence to the victims testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could not speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.AAA never wavered in her asser_______________

Certainly,

appellant repeated what he did in the first rape would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed * SECOND DIVISION. 157 been committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than that. VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 157 People vs. Tabio tion that appellant raped her. AAAs testimony is distinctively clear, frank and definite without any pretension or hint of a concocted story despite her low intelligence as can be gleaned from her answers in the direct examination. credibility of The her fact of her mental testimony. retardation AAAs does as not impair the lends unequivocal mental deficiency Same; Same; Damages; Civil indemnity is awarded for each and every count of rape, such that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liable to pay P50,000.00 for each count, or P100,000.00 in all.The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00), and P50,000.00 for simple rape. This civil indemnity is awarded for each and every count of rape, such that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liable to pay P50,000.00 for each count, or P100,000.00 in all. 158

greater credence

to her testimony

for someone

feeble-minded and

guileless as her could not speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the

138

hands of the appellant. Same; Same; Same; The victims bare statement that accused repeated what he had done to her the first time is inadequate to establish beyond reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapeseach and

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio

Page

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. 1 Record, pp. 1-2. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for appellee. Public Attorneys Office for appellant. TINGA, J.: 2 The complete address of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419,425-426. 3 The real name of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. 4 Presided by Judge Corazon Soluren. 159 Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information,1 the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora2] the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, have carnal their knowledge house and of mentally during retarded AAA3 was by means of force advantage of and to intimidation three times all committed while the victim was alone inside nighttime which taken facilitate the commission of the crime. CONTRARY TO LAW. Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 159 People vs. Tabio sions again entered her home and repeated the same acts on her.5 Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAAs mental condition. A doctor6 who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had examined AAA and concluded that while she was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental age of a six-year old child.7 AAAs mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them.8 Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and offering as alibi that he was up in the mountain at the time of the rape.9 Appellants wife10 and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista,11 tried to corroborate his alibi through their own testimony.

Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.4 Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA testified that one night in June 2002, while she was alone in her home, appel-lant entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAAs breast, removed her clothing, fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a bed. He inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize the

139

appellant

as

her

house

was

lighted

with

gas

lamp.

AAA

further

testified that the appellant on two succeeding occa_______________

Page

On

25

November

2003,

the

RTC

handed

down

decision

finding

the Court issued a Resolution13 transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.14 The Court of Appeals15 affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court found appellant guilty civil indemnity to P50,000.00 of all three (3) as counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape. It also reduced the and added an award of P25,000.00 exemplary damages.16 The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appel-lant had assigned three (3) errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecutions failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information; whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of rape despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and whether the RTC erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. The for Court simple, of not Appeals qualified properly rape. resolved We quote the first error in the appellants appellate

appellant guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape, defined in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6 (10) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC also ordered appel-lant to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.12 The records of the case were thereafter forwarded to this Court on automatic review. On 7 June 2005, _______________

5 TSN, 17 December 2002, pp. 2-8. 6 Dr. Roman Balangue; TSN, 13 February 2003, pp. 3-8. 7 Id., at p. 10. 8 TSN, 17 December 2002, pp. 11-16; and TSN, 20 January 2003, pp. 3-7. 9 TSN 7 May 2003, pp. 2-6. 10 TSN 3 June 2003, pp. 2-6. 11 TSN 8 May 2003, pp. 2-5. 12 Records, p. 109. 160

favor. The information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only with approval court when it said: _______________

13 Pursuant to the case of People v. Efren Mateo, G.R. Nos. 14767887, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640, 656.

160

14 CA Rollo, p. 19-A. 15 Through the decision dated 23 January 2007 penned by Associate Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Reyes, Jr. and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

140
Page

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio

16 Rollo, p. 21. 161

The

death

penalty with

shall of

also the

be

imposed following

if

the

crime or

of

rape

is

committed

any

aggravating

qualifying

circumstances: x x x 10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 161 People vs. Tabio Under Article 266-B(10)17 of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty. Rule 11018 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure to be requires with both qualifying in and the aggravating information.19 In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded complainant. It does not state at that the appellant time of knew of the mental of the disability crime. It of the complainant the commission bears circumstances alleged specificity

and/or

physical

handicap

of

the

offended

party

at

the

time

of

the

commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied) 18 SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.The complaint or information

shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating reference punishing it. SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.The acts or omissions complaint of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. 19 People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 597, 615. 20 Rollo, pp. 8-9. 162 circumstances. be made If there is no designation of the offense, statute shall to the section or subsection of the

stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed.20 _______________

141

162 17 Art. 266-B. Penalties. x x x x SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio

Page

Rule

110

of

the

2000

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure

is

clear

and

23

Rule

117,

Sec.

9.

Failure

to

move

to

quash

or

to

allege

any

unequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information. The Court also observes that there is duplicity21 of the offenses

ground therefor.The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. 163

charged in the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash.22 Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver.23 We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty of simple rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively proven. The second and third rapes of which appellant was charged and found guilty, were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the prosecution of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic be nature of the with crime, utmost the testimony and of (3) the the complainant draw _______________ must scrutinized caution;

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 163 People vs. Tabio strength from for the weakness of the evidence of the defense.24 the complainants candor is the single In a most

prosecution

rape,

evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot

important issue. If a complainants testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof.25 We have thoroughly examined AAAs testimony and found nothing that would cast doubt on the credibility of her account of the first rape. We quote the pertinent portion of her testimony:

21

Rule

110, must

Sec.

13.

Duplicity only one

of

the

offense.A except

complaint the

or law

PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

information

charge

offense,

when

prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. 22 Rule 117, Sec. 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the x x x Q single Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house in June 2002?

142

complaint or information on any of the following grounds: x x x x (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a

Page

punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; x x x x

A Yes, Sir. Q What time was that? A Night time, Sir.

A He removed my dress, Sir.

x x x Q So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy removed your clothes. What did he do after removing your clothes? _______________

x x x Q You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he do there? A He fondled my breast, Sir. Q Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to your house? A Yes, sir.

24

People

v.

De

Guzman

Pascual,

388

Phil.

943,

952-953;

333

SCRA 269, 279 (2000), citing People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246 (1997). 25 Id., at p. 954; p. 280. 164

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio A

x x x

143

He placed himself on top of me. COURT: to the witness be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on. When Q

Q Dont

Page

Jimmy saw you what did he do with your clothes, if any?

Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you? A I was sitting, Sir. PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness Q When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed or nude? A He was naked, Sir. Q You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did Jimmy do while he was on top of you? A He pressed a knife on me. Q On what part of your body did he press the knife? A Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left breast) Q

Jimmy was in our house, Sir. Q Do you know what penis is? A Yes, Sir. Q Do you know what Jimmy did with his penis? A Yes, Sir. Q What did he do with his penis? A He placed his penis to my vagina. Q What did you feel when Jimmy did that? A I felt pain, Sir. Q

144

What breast? A

else

did

Jimmy

do

aside

from

pressing

the

knife

near

your

After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else did he do? A

Page

Nothing more, Sir. Q Did he move while he was on top of you? A Yes, Sir. Q Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top of you? A (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.) x x x PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness 165

COURT: to the witness Q Where? A In my vagina, Sir. PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness Q Why did you notice that? What did you do? A I watched my vagina, Sir. Q That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk? A

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 165 People vs. Tabio Q What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in your

Yes, Sir. Q Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house, is it not? A Yes, Sir. Q How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?

145
Page

vagina? A There was some kind of milk, Sir.

A I have a light, Sir. Q What kind of light was that? A Gas l[a]mp, Sir.26 (Emphasis supplied.) AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAAs testimony is distinctively clear, frank and definite without any pretension or hint of a concocted story despite her low intelligence as can be gleaned from her answers in the direct examination. The fact of her mental retardation AAAs does mental not impair the credibility greater of her unequivocal to her testimony. deficiency lends credence

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio Appellants of AAA. denials Alibi is and an alibi, which weak are merely self-serving it is evidence, easy to

cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony inherently defense because fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.28 We have meticulously reviewed the records and found no justification to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial court that Accuseds alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods during the period accused when took [AAA] the was witness raped stand, deserves he gave no an consideration. evasive, When the and confused

testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could not speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the appellant.27 _______________

vague account of his whereabouts at the time the crime was committed as well as with respect to the distance of his whereabouts from the locus criminis. Accuseds wife and his brother-in-law tried to corroborate his (accuseds) testimony that he was in the mountain during the commission of rape but to no avail. x x x In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused

26 TSN, 17 December 2002, pp. 2-6. 27 See People v. Toralba, 414 Phil. 793, 800; 362 SCRA 491, 497 (2001) citing People v. Ducta, G.R. No. 134608, 16 August 2000, 338 SCRA 272; People v. Lubong, 332 SCRA 672 (2000); People v. Cabingas, 329 SCRA 21 (2000); People v. Tipay, 329 SCRA 52 (2000) and People v. San Juan, G.R. No. 105556, 4 April 1997, 270 SCRA

allegedly was is less than half a kilometer (200 meters) which could be negotiated in less than an hour. x x x29 However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense e.g., carnal knowledge and force or intimidation. The only evidence presented to prove answers the to two two other leading charges questions were if AAAs monosyllabic affirmative appellant

146
Page

693. 166

repeated during the second and third times he was in her house what he had done during the first time. We quote that only portion of _______________

A Yes, Sir. Q How about the third time? What did he do?

28 See People v. Ejandra, G.R. No. 134203, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 364, 379. 29 Records, p. 107. 167

A He has a knife, Sir. Q Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 167 People vs. Tabio AAAs testimony relating to the second and third alleged rapes, to wit: PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness Q You said that Jimmy went to your house three times. What did he do during the second time? A He entered our house, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.30 (Emphasis supplied) AAAs testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and lacked time is many specific to details on how they were committed. doubt Her bare alleged statement that appellant repeated what he had done to her the first inadequate establish beyond reasonable the second and third rapes. Whether or not he raped her is the fact in issue which the court must determine31 based on the evidence offered. The prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of AAA to the effect that the appellant repeated what he did in the first rape would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that the second and third rape had indeed been committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven

beyond reasonable doubt. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than that. _______________

147
Page

Q Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did during the first time.

30 TSN, 17 December 2002, p.7. 31 FRANCISCO,RICARDO; EVIDENCE, 1996 ed., p. 348. 168

As

to

the

civil

liability

of appellant, as

we

affirm

the

reduction

by

the

appellate court of the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 only, as well as the additional award of P25,000.00 exemplary damages, but on rather different premises, considering our conclusion that he is only guilty of one, not three counts of rape. The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabio In the case of People v. Garcia,32 wherein the appellant was charged with 183 counts of rape, we held that: x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes in committed and in November, and on [sic] 16, 1990 1994 and as on July 21, in 1994 as testified to by complainant, and for the eight counts of rape committed May June July admitted appellants

less than seventy-five thousand pesos _______________

32 346 Phil. 475; 281 SCRA 463 (1997). 33 Id., at p. 497; pp. 481-482. 169

VOL. 544, FEBRUARY 6, 2008 169 People vs. Tabio (P75,000.00),34 and P50,000.00 for simple rape.35 This civil indemnity is awarded for each and every count of rape, such that one found guilty of two counts of simple rape would be liable to pay P50,000.00 for each count, or P100,000.00 in all. We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for all three counts of simple rape. Such award would have been improper for a conviction for three counts of simple rape.36 Still, because appellant is guilty of one count of simple rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as the appropriate amount of civil indemnity.

aforementioned letter of August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the defense, each and every charge of rape is a separate and that distinct crime so that raped each every of them is should be proven beyond and reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence complainant was week decidedly inadequate grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the required quantum of evidence. So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are uncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within this category.33 (Emphasis supplied)

148
Page

We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support conviction.

In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral damages are awarded without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.37 In this respect, we agree with the appellate court in the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages by way of public example is also proper.38 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01301 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. rape and Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE count of simple ACQUITTED of the 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as

exemplary damages. SO ORDERED. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. Judgment count of affirmed simple with rape modification, and acquitted appellant of the guilty other of two only (2) one counts (1) of

TWO other counts of qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as _______________

qualified rape. Notes.There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.

34 People v. Perez, 357 Phil. 17, 35; 296 SCRA 17, 36 (1998); People v. Bernaldez, 355 Phil. 740, 758; 294 SCRA 317, 335 (1998); People v. Victor, 354 Phil. 195, 209-210; 292 SCRA 186, 201 (1998). 35 See People v. Mendoza, 432 Phil. 666, 684; 383 SCRA 115-130 (2002). 36 See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 435-436. 37 People v. Pagsanjan, 442 Phil. 667, 687; 394 SCRA 414, 432

(People vs. Villar, 322 SCRA 393 [2000]) Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape, and it is not to be considered as moral damages, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in its sound discretion. (People vs. Bernaldez, 322 SCRA 462 [2000]) o0o [People vs. Tabio, 544 SCRA 156(2008)]

(2002).

149
Page

38 People v. De los Santos, 439 Phil. 630, 641; 391 SCRA 38, 48 (2002). 170

G.R. No. 177756.

March 3, 2008.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR NIETO y CABALSE @ ADOR, accused-appellant. Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The issue of

credibility has, time and again, been settled by the Court as a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.Sexual crimes where the culprit denies culpability is actually a test of credibility. The issue of credibility has, time and again, to the been settled of by the this trial Court court as a question of its best unique addressed province because

position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Absent any substantial reason which would findings, justify the the reversal when no of court the is trial generally facts courts bound and assessments by the circumstances and are conclusions, reviewing formers

particularly

significant

150

shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Page

Same; Same; Same; Same; The straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of appellant as the malefactor, sealed the case for the prosecution.As can be gleaned from the records of this case, this Court notes that the testimony given by AAA before the trial court can be characterized as categorical and straightforward. She was able to describe before the court a quo how she was ravished by the appellant on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000. She even demonstrated the sexual act by spreading her two legs and placing her finger to her vagina. And during her testimony, she positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on the aforesaid dates. The straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired,

is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration. And when the unwavering and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. which, In this to case, Dr. the Dr. Llamass could medical have findings, findings resulted together showed from that AAAs hymen had a day-old healed laceration at the 6 oclock position, according Thus, Llamas, said sexual the intercourse. medical with

straightforward testimony of AAA, even strengthen her claim of sexual violation by appellant. Same; Same; Same; Denials; A mere denial, without any strong

_______________

evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.In stark contrast to the simple but clear declarations of AAA, all that the appellant stresses in his defense are denial and alibi.

* THIRD DIVISION. 512

It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly, alibi and is the weakest to of all defenses, Unless because it by is easy clear to and concoct difficult disprove. substantiated

512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto accompanied malefactor, by sealed her the categorical case for identification the of appellant Further, it as was the not

convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene. 513 the unwavering and forthright

prosecution.

151

shown that she had been motivated by any ill desire that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Same; Same; Same; Same; When

Page

testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 513 People vs. Nieto Same; Same; Damages; Award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Thus, this Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity given by the trial court to the victim. Same; Same; to a Same; rape her Case victim to law requires need automatic of proof award because to moral of moral the

City,

Branch

46,

in

Criminal

Cases

No.

U-10586

and

No.

U-10587,

finding herein appellant Salvador Nieto y Cabalse @ Ador guilty beyond reasonable

_______________

1 Penned Justices

by Hakim

Associate S.

Justice

Andres and

B.

Reyes, P.

Jr.

with

Associate Castillo

Abdulwahid

Mariflor

Punzalan

concurring; Rollo, pp. 3-20. 2 Penned by Judge Modesto C. Juanson; CA Rollo, pp. 25-34. 514

damages injuries

without

from

nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered moral entitling such award.With respect damages, case law requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. This award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also automatically awards upon proof of the commission of the crime by the offender. Thus, this Court finds the award of moral damages by the appellate court in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape proper. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Wilfredo L. Cruz for accused-appellant.

514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto doubt of months, as civil the and crime of simple him in rape in both case cases to committed the against of the to

AAA,3 a mental retardate with a mental age of five years and three sentencing and each as of suffer penalty with reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify AAA in the amount of P50,000.00 indemnity for an P20,000.00 award exemplary moral damages modification P50,000.00. On 13 March 2000, appellant was charged in two separate Informations with the crime of rape, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,4 additional damages amounting

152

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: For review is the Decision1 dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02006, which affirmed the Decision2 dated 15 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta

Page

committed against AAA on 30

December 1999 and 3

January

2000,

515 People vs. Nieto Criminal Case No. U-10586

respectively. The two Informations read as follows:

_______________

The undersigned accuses SALVADO NIETO alias Ador, of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

3 This is pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto (G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419), wherein this Court resolved to withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and to use fictitious initials instead to represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the those personal of their circumstances immediate names of the or victims-survivors household or any other not be information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as family members, shall of their immediate disclosed. The of such victims, and family

That on or about [3 January 2000] at Brgy. xxx, [Municipality of] xxx, [Province of] XXX, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously mental have age of sexual five intercourse (5) years with and AAA, three a (3) mentally prejudice. CONTRARY 8353.5 Criminal Case No. U-10587 to Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. retardate with

months, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and

members other than the accused, shall appear as AAA, BBB, CCC, and so on. Addresses shall appear as XXX as in No. XXX Street, XXX District, City of XXX. The Supreme Court of took note of the legal mandate on the utmost and

confidentiality

proceedings

involving

violence

against

women

The undersigned accuses SALVADOR NIETO Y CABALSE, alias Ador, of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about [30 December 1999] at Brgy. XXX, [Municipality of] XXX, [Province of] XXX and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, brought and carried at the ricefield AAA, a mentally retardate with a mental age of five (5) years and three (3) months, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said AAA, without her consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY 8353.6 to Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.

children set forth in Sec. 29 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act; Sec. 44 of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004; and Sec. 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children effective November 15, 2004. 4 Otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Page

153

515

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008

When arraigned on 17 on the merits ensued. The pieces of evidence

April

2000, appellant, assisted by counsel

de

In her testimony, AAA stated that on the night of 30 December 1999, while she was alone at the house of her grandmother, who was in Malokiat, Pangasinan at that time, somebody entered their house. She then recognized also their that somebody According to be to AAA, the herein the appellant, who approached was her,

oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial

presented

by

the

prosecution

to

prove

its

allegations are the testimonies of the following wit-

neighbor.

appellant

fooled her and pulled her out of their house and brought her to the nearby farmland. In the farmland, the appellant removed all his clothes. He likewise undressed her. When they were both naked, the appellant

_______________

started to fondle her breasts. Thereafter, the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. As a part.9 result, she felt so much pain in her private

5 CA Rollo, p. 10. 6 Id., at pp. 11-12. 516

Again, on the night of 3 January 2000, while AAAs grandmother was in Manila, the appellant went to their house. Initially, appellant struck up a conversation with her. When the appellant learned that AAAs grandmother went to Manila and that only the two of them were in the said house, the appellant began to force her to have sexual intercourse with him. She resisted, but the appellant was much stronger than

516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto nesses: AAA, the victim; SPO3 Maximiano Balelo, Chief Investigator of the Pozorrubio Bell, Philippine of the National the Police (PNP); Dr. Francisco Llamas, Community the Hospital; and Mental Ruby Health at Philippine Medico-Legal Martinez Officer Pozorrubio 7 TSN, 24 May 2000, p. 3. 8 TSN, 23 May 2000, p. 4. 9 Id., at pp. 4-7. 517 _______________

psychologist

Association, Inc., Baguio-Benguet Chapter. AAA was already 24 years old when the alleged first rape incident

154

happened. Her parents BBB and CCC were already separated.7 Since the separation, she started to live with her grandmother in Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, up to the present. AAA only reached Grade II because of her illnesses.8 VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 517

Page

People vs. Nieto her; hence, despite her resistance, appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina.10 AAA revealed her harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant to her sister, DDD, and brother, EEE. Her brother cried when she told him about her ordeal; but, her sister was brave enough to tell their mother what had happened to AAA.11 AAA, accompanied by her sister and aunt, went to the police station to report the rape incidents that happened to her on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000. They was also went to the hospital by in Dr. Urdaneta, Francisco Pangasinan, Llamas.12 During her cross-examination, AAA disclosed that she had been where AAA physically examined 10 Id., at pp. 7-10. 11 Id., at pp. 10-13. 12 Id., at pp. 11-13. 13 TSN, 24 May 2000, p. 7. 14 TSN, 16 May 2000, pp. 2-5. 15 Records, pp. 5-6. 16 TSN, 16 May 2000, p. 4. 518

previously raped, five times, by one Arsenio Corpuz when she was still living in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.13 SPO3 Maximiano Balelo corroborated the testimony of AAA. He admitted that AAA was brought to him for investigation on 6 January 2000. He took the statements of AAA and those of AAAs sister and aunt. AAA told him that she was sexually abused by the appellant on two occasions. The first rape incident happened on 30 December 1999 and the second was on 3 January 2000.14 The statements15 of AAA, her sister and aunt were reduced into writing. He recorded the rape incidents report in the Police Blotter under Entry No. 02858.16 Dr. Francisco Llamas, the Medico-Legal Officer of Pozorrubio Community Hospital affirmed that he physically examined AAA on 6 January 2000. On the basis of such examination, he said that he did not find any 518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto head and neck. He noticed, however, that there were some hyperemic or red areas on AAAs breasts. AAA also had a healed laceration on her hymen penis, which at the was 6:00 oclock into position. He AAAs vagina. concluded He that the stated said that laceration could have been caused by a blunt object, possibly an erect inserted further AAAs healed laceration was already a day old.17 He also reduced his findings into writing as evidenced by the Medico-Legal Report.18 Ruby Martinez Bell, the psychologist who examined19 AAA to determine her mental condition, was also presented by the prosecution to prove the _______________ allegation that AAA is indeed a mental retardate. The said psychologist declared that she gave AAA a Stanford-Binet Test, Draw-aPerson Test, Bender-Gestalt Test and Vineyard Social Maturity Scale and

Page

155

physical injury on AAAs

she even attempted to give AAA a Sentence Completion Test, but AAA could not do it as she could not understand the same. Based on the result of the psychological tests, she concluded that AAA belonged to the severely mentally retarded category with an Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.) of 30 and an I.Q. level equivalent to that of a five-year-and-three-monthold child. She further stated that on the basis of the different tests she gave to AAA, she noticed that AAA was unable to comprehend those tests. Although she can recognize some common objects, she cannot, however, terms.20 On the part of the defense, it presented the testimony of the following witnesses to prove that it was impossible for the appellant to have raped AAA on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000, namely: Calixto Parocha; Ernesto Salvatierra; CCC, the father of the victim; Dominador Nieto, the brother of do much in terms of reasoning and definition of abstract

519 People vs. Nieto the appellant; Leticia Nieto, the sister-in-law of the appellant; and herein appellant. The testimonies of Calixto Parocha, Ernesto Salvatierra and CCC focused on the rape incident that happened to AAA while she was still in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, which was allegedly committed by Arsenio Corpuz. The aforesaid witnesses admitted that their statements before the trial court were given in connection with the rape incident that happened in Cuyapo, Nueva of Ecija, these and not on the matters insofar that as transpired this case in is Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX.21 Obviously, the testimonies concerned. According to Dominador Nieto, on the night of 30 December 1999, he was at the barangay dance party acting as a guard because he was a witnesses are irrelevant

_______________

member of the barangay Civilian Volunteers Organization. He claimed that the appellant was also at the said party because he was the barangay electrician and he was there to fix the lightings. Both of them went there at about 7:00 p.m. and they stayed there until 3:00 a.m. of 31 December 1999. And from that period, there was never an instance that the appellant left the dance party. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that the place where the dance party was held was only one kilometer away from the place where the rape incident happened.22 Leticia Nieto testified that she is the wife of Melecio Nieto, the brother of the appellant. She stated that on 3 January 2000, the appellant went to their house at around 6:00 p.m. in order to compute the cost of the materials for the construction of the terrace and main door of their house. The appellant also had dinner with them at around 8:00 p.m. and stayed there until 11:00 p.m. After that, the appellant went home. She likewise stated that their house was only 20 meters away

17 TSN, 15 May 2000, pp. 3-4. 18 Records, p. 7. 19 As evidenced by the Psychological Report prepared by Ruby Martinez Bell, id., at pp. 8-10. 20 TSN, 17 May 2000, pp. 4-6. 519

156
Page

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008

_______________

During his cross-examination, he affirmed that the dance hall where he was on 30 December 1999 was only a kilometer away from the house of the complainant. A tricycle could reach the said house as it was near the road. By walking, he could reach the said house in about an hour. Likewise, he admitted that the house of his brother was more than 100 meters away from the house of the complainant and the house of the latter was about 80 meters away from his house.25 After trial, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision on 15 September 2000, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape in both cases. The decretal portion of the aforesaid Decision reads, thus: _______________

21 TSN, 5 June 2000, pp. 3-6; TSN, 3-6; TSN, 19 June 2000, pp. 36. 22 TSN, 6 June 2000, pp. 7-9. 520

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto from the house of the appellant and 100 meters away from the house of the complainant.23 Appellant alibi. He was denied he was was the final witness seen with. AAA He presented on 30 by the defense. 1999 30 the The 3

23 TSN, 14 June 2000, pp. 2-8. 24 TSN, 14 August 2000, pp. 2-5. 25 Id., at pp. 5-6. 521

justification offered by him by way of exculpation was both denial and having charged at the December that on and January 2000; thus, it was impossible for him to have committed the offenses 1999, maintained dance hall. December barangay he barangay Being

electrician, he was designated to install the sound system and the lights to be used at the dance party. He went there at around 7:00 p.m. and stayed there until 3:00 a.m. of 31 December 1999. Further, on 3 January 2000, he testified that he was at his brothers house located about 20 meters away from his house. His brother is Melecio Nieto, the

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 521 People vs. Nieto WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond

157

husband of Leticia Nieto. He stated that he went to his brothers house at around 6:00 p.m. to talk about the cost of the materials to be used in constructing the terrace and main door of his brothers house. He even ate dinner there at around 8:00 p.m. He stayed there until 11:00 p.m. and then he went home.24

reasonable doubt SALVADOR NIETO of the crime of Simple Rape and the Court sentences him:

Page

1. CRIM.

CASE

NO.

U-10586,

to

suffer

the

penalty

of

Reclusion

27 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640. 28 CA Rollo, pp. 70. 29 Rollo, p. 20. 522

Perpetua; to indemnify AAA the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; 2. CRIM. CASE NO. U-10587, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion

Perpetua; to indemnify AAA the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay another sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.26 The records of this case were originally transmitted before this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,27 the records were transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. In his brief, the appellants lone assignment of error was, the court a quo gravely erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.28 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, taking into consideration the

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.30 In view thereof, the appellate court forwarded to this Court the records of this case. On 11 July 2007,31 this Court resolved to accept the present case and notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired. Both the Office of the Solicitor General and the appellant manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs dated 30 May 2002 and 24 January 2002, filed before the appellate court, respectively, as their supplemental briefs. After a meticulous review of the records of the present case, this Court finds no reason to reverse the judgment of the trial court and the appellate court. There appears to be no controversy that the victim in this case is a mental Martinez retardate. Bell, the condition, Such and fact by the was proven by the AAA testimony to she of Ruby her The psychologist who examined determine prepared.

assignment of error stated by the appellant in his Appellants Brief and after a thorough study of the records of the case, rendered a Decision on 31 October 2006, affirming the conviction of the appellant for two counts of simple rape with the modification for an additional award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, of Urdaneta City dated 15 September 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification P50,000.00 that an each in additional both award instances of moral is damages amounting to to the hereby awarded

complainant.29

158

_______________

mental a

psychological to the

report

series of psychological tests she gave to AAA revealed that the latter is mental retardate. AAA belonged child.32 severely only mentally issue left retarded for this category with an I.Q. of 30 and an I.Q. level equivalent to that of a five-year-and-three-month-old Thus, the

Page

26 CA Rollo, p. 34.

Courts resolution is the credibility of the victims testimony as regards the fact of sexual congress between her and the appellant. The appellant averred that the testimony of AAA should be disregarded, as there are serious and inexplicable discrepancies in material details in the said testimony; hence, there is doubt as to its credibility. The discrepancies referred to by the appellant were embodied in the following testimony of the victim during her cross-examination regarding an alleged prior rape incident with another person, thus:

A: The brother of the wife of my father fooled me also, sir. COURT: Who raped you? A: Jolin-jolin raped me, sir. Q: Who is Jolin-jolin? A: The husband of the sister of my father, sir. ATTY. FLORENDO: You are referring to Arsenio Corpuz, am I correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: In other words, Arsenio Corpuz raped you also while you were in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija?

_______________

30 Id., at p. 21. 31 Id., at p. 23. 32 Records, p. 9. 523

A: Yes, sir, he raped me. x x x x Q: How many times did Jolin-jolin or Arsenio Corpuz fuck you? A: Five times, your Honor. Q: That five times that Jolin-jolin or Arsenio Corpuz fucked you, was it

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 523 People vs. Nieto Q: Madam Witness, will you tell us of your experience while you were in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija?

on the same day or on different days? A: Different dates but successive nights, your Honor. Q: Did you mother come to know what Jolin-jolin did to you in

Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija? A: When I was already in [Brgy. xxx], sir. x x x x Q: [The appellant] is a relative of your father, am I correct?

159
Page

A: I lived in Cuyapo. What happened there is another thing. Q: You said that what happened there is another thing, will you tell us what is that another thing?

A: My grandparents are the relatives of [the appellant] and they are neighbors, sir. Q: And because of what Jolin-jolin did to you in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, you cannot forget that anymore? A: I always remember it, sir. Q: That is why whenever you see [the appellant] you remember what happened to you in Cuyapo? A: I can also remember what he did to me, sir. Q: Eventhough fucked correct? A: Yes, sir.33 (Emphases supplied.) The aforesaid argument raised by the appellant is untenable. Sexual crimes where the culprit denies culpability is actually a test of credibility. The issue of credibility has, time and again, been settled by this Court as a question best addressed to the province of the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case.34 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.35 you [the appellant] of what did not really to fuck you in you you said is he that

In the present case, no cogent reason can be appreciated to warrant a departure from the findings of the trial court with respect to the assessment of AAAs testimony. As can be gleaned from the records of this case, this Court notes that the testimony given by AAA before the trial court can be characterized as categorical and straightforward. She was able to describe before the court a quo how she was ravished by the appellant on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000. She even demonstrated the sexual act by spreading her

because

happened

Cuyapo,

_______________

33 TSN, 24 May 2000, pp. 6-9. 34 People v. Glabo, 423 Phil. 45, 50; 371 SCRA 567, 572 (2001). 35 People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, 12 February 2007, 515

SCRA 537, 547. 525

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 525 People vs. Nieto two legs and placing her finger to her vagina.36 And during her

160

testimony, she positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on the aforesaid dates.37 The straightforward narration of AAA of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of

Page

appellant Further, having it

as

the

malefactor, not shown age of

sealed that a she

the had

case been

for

the

prosecution.38 by child any ill

40 People v. Limio, G.R. Nos. 148804-06, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 597, 610. 526

was

motivated

desire that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Moreover, the mental five-year-and-three-month-old would even bolster her credibility as a witness considering that a victim at such tender age would not publicly admit that she had been criminally abused story of and ravished unless allow an that was the of truth. her For private no woman, and especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a defloration, examination parts thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished to avenge her honor and to condemn a grave injustice to her.39 More so, hymenal testimony there is lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are of a rape victim to is consistent a with the the best medical that the

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto Thus, the of said AAA, medical even findings, strengthen together her claim with of the sexual straightforward violation by

testimony appellant.

physical evidence of forcible defloration. And when the unwavering and forthright findings, sufficient basis warrant conclusion

The appellant cannot find protection in the discrepancies in the victims testimony during her cross-examination to relieve him from culpability. As the Court of Appeals opined in its Decision, thus: The Court notes case. The that the prior alleged rape, if it rape indeed is not relevant (sic), in the in

essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established.40 In this case, Dr. Llamass medical findings showed that AAAs hymen had a day-old healed laceration at the 6 oclock position, which, according to Dr. Llamas, could have resulted from sexual intercourse.

present

previous

occur

cannot

anyway prove that [appellant] did not rape AAA. Moreover, considering the mental age of the victim and the tenor of questions asked during _______________ the cross-examination, it is understandable why AAA gave the apparently conflicting examination, 36 TSN, 23 May 2000, p. 10. 37 Id., at pp. 4-5. answers. she What is that important [appellant] is had that during her direct with testified sexual intercourse

her.41 (Emphasis supplied.) It bears emphasis that in the victims testimony during her crossJolin-

examination, she admitted that Arsenio

Corpuz, also known as

161

38 People v. Macapal, Jr., G.R. No. 155335, 14 July 2005, 463 SCRA 387, 400. 39 People v. Agravante, 392 Phil. 543, 551; 338 SCRA 13, 20 (2000).

jolin, raped her five times at the time when she was still in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She also affirmed that Jolin-jolin was a relative of her father. She emphasized, though, that what happened in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, was another thing. On the other hand, when she testified as regards the rape incident that had happened to her in Brgy. XXX,

Page

Municipality

of

XXX,

province

of

XXX,

she

revealed

that

it

was

the

In stark contrast to the simple but clear declarations of AAA, all that the appellant stresses in his defense are denial and alibi. It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong the evidence to support to it, can The scarcely defense overcome of alibi the is positive likewise declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in crimes attributed him.42 unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and when convincing of is there a proof, any such in defense law.43 is of negative, alibi the self-serving, is by a and

appellant who had raped her twice. The first rape incident was on 30 December 1999 and the second rape incident happened on 3 January 2000. She also said that the appellant was a relative of her grandparents. With the said testimony of the victim, it cannot be said that she only filed a case against the appellant because of what had happened to her in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,

_______________

undeserving

weight

Secondly,

unacceptable credible

positive

identification

accused

witness.44 Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to 41 Rollo, pp. 16, 19. 527 prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown

_______________ VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 527 People vs. Nieto and that she was just confused as to the identity of her assailant. As this Court previously stated, AAA positively identified the appellant as the person who had raped her on 30 December 1999 and 3 January 2000. Her narration of the despite rape the incidents imagined was categorical in and her straightforward. Therefore, discrepancies

42 People v. Olaybar, 459 Phil. 114, 127; 412 SCRA 490, 501 (2003). 43 People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 141162-63, 11 July 2003, 384

SCRA 453, 463-464. 44 People v. Medios, G.R. Nos. 132066-67, 29 November 2001, 371 SCRA 120, 129. 528

testimony during her cross-examination, it is beyond cavil of doubt that

162

the appellant was the real perpetrator of the crime of rape against AAA. Hence, this Court agrees in the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the testimony of AAA was credible and deserves full faith and credit. 528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Page

People vs. Nieto that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.45 In the case at bar, the appellant denied that he had raped AAA. He avowed incident, that he on was the at 30 the December barangay 1999, dance the date of the first being rape the party because,

_______________

45 People v. Olaybar, supra note 42. 46 People (2003). 529 v. Opelia, 458 Phil. 1001, 1014; 412 SCRA 343, 354

barangay electrician, he was tasked to set up the sound system and the lightings. On 3 January 2000, the date of the second rape incident, he claimed to have been in the house of her brother to compute the cost of materials to be used in the construction of the terrace and main door in his brothers house. Such claims of the appellant were corroborated by other defense witnesses. This Court notes that the witnesses who corroborated the testimony of the appellant that he was somewhere else during the commission of the rapes were his brother, Dominador Nieto, and sister-in-law, Leticia Nieto. Because they were his close relatives, we cannot give credence to their testimonies. The testimonies of close relatives and friends are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the unequivocal declaration of the complaining witness.46 The appellant also failed for to to present be at convincing the locus proof that it was the

VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008 529 People vs. Nieto on 3 January 2000 was only more than 100 meters away from the house of the complainant and the house of the latter was only about 80 meters away establish by from his house.47 convincing Therefore, the evidence that appellant failed it was to clear and physically

impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In sum, the straightforward testimony of AAA, as well as her unwavering and positive identification of her defiler and tormentor, corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Francisco Llamas, was sufficient to convict the appellant. Besides, the appellants flimsy and self-serving defenses of denial and alibi were not able to destroy the truthfulness and the credibility of AAAs testimony. Thus, this Court is convinced that the trial court and the appellate court correctly convicted the appellant of the crime of simple rape48 in both cases, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.49 As to the damages. The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.50 Thus, this Court him criminis during

physically

impossible

aforementioned dates when the separate acts of rape were committed. Surprisingly, the appellant himself, as well as Dominador Nieto, admitted before the trial court that the place where the dance party was held on 30 December 1999 was only one kilometer away from the place where the rape incident happened. The appellant even affirmed that a tricycle could reach the said house as it was near the road. And by walking,

163
Page

he could reach the house in about an hour. He likewise admitted that the house of his brother where he stayed until 11:00 p.m.

affirms the award of P50,000.00 in each case as civil indemnity given by the trial court to the victim. As regards the award of exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. In this case, there being no aggravating circumstance that can be

considered, as it is not even alleged in the information, the award of _______________ exemplary damages by the lower courts would have to be deleted. With respect to moral damages, case law requires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof because from the 47 TSN, 14 August 2000, pp. 5-6. 48 ART. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed.Rape is committed: 1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: a) x x x; b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. This award is separate and distinct from proof civil of indemnity, the which case law crime also by automatically the awards Thus, upon this commission of the offender.51

Court finds the award of moral damages by the appellate court in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape proper. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02006 dated 31 October 2006 finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape committed against AAA, a mental retardate with a mental age equivalent to a five-year-and-three-month-old child, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is deleted for want of legal basis. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ.,

unconscious. (Revised Penal Code). 49 ART. 266-B. Penalties.Rape under paragraph 1 of the next

preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. (Id.) 50 People v. Alay-ay, 416 Phil. 80, 100-101; 363 SCRA 603, 619-620 (2001). 530

164

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Nieto

concur.

Page

_______________ [People vs. Nieto, 547 SCRA 511(2008)]

Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; The intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard-and-fast rule.This Court is not persuaded by appellants contention that the lack of outcry, lack of tenacious resistance, and delay in reporting the incidents signify that the sexual encounters were consensual. First, appellant exercised moral ascendancy over AAA, being AAAs uncle. Second, appel-lant had instilled fear upon AAAs young mind during the sexual assaults by using a knife and threatening to kill her. These circumstances have led AAA to keep her ordeals in secret until her mother learned of the incidents from AAAs cousin. This Court declared moral in People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997): is [R]ape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and this includes the kind of intimidation on the age, or coercion. Intimidation size and strength of the a relative and term, their depending parties,

relationship with each other. It can be addressed to the mind as well. VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 93 People vs. Malicsi G.R. No. 175833. January 29, 2008.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDWIN MALICSI, appellant. Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Denial; Denial is a negative, self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.AAAs testimony is entitled to great weight in contrast to appellants bare denials. Denial is a negative, self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative 94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Malicsi * SECOND DIVISION. 94 Moreover, the intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard-andfast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fearfear that if the victim does not yield to the lustful demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter. _______________

165

matters. Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence. Besides, neither AAA nor her family had any close relative. ill-motive to falsely testify and impute a serious crime against the appellant who is a

Page

Same;

Same;

Qualifying

Circumstances;

Relationship;

The

special

95

circumstance of relationship, that is, appellant is the victims uncle and they are related within the third civil degree of affinity, must be alleged in the Information.The appellate court was correct in finding appellant guilty of four counts of simple rape. We have ruled that the special circumstance of relationship, that is, appellant is the victims uncle and they are related within the third civil degree of affinity, must be alleged in the Information. The fact that such relationship was proved will not justify the imposition of the death penalty and appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape. Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the This is an appeal from the 18 August 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01368. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, finding appellant Edwin Malicsi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape. In four separate Informations dated 28 May 1998, the prosecution commission of the crime.We find that the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on appel-lant. The appellate court also correctly affirmed the award by the trial court of P200,000 in moral damages. Moral damages are automatically granted to the rape victim without presentation of further proof other than the commission of the crime. Civil Indemnity; Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 for each count of simple rape is automatically granted once the fact of rape is established.We reduce the award of civil indemnity from P300,000 to P200,000 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 for each count of simple rape is automatically granted once the fact of rape is established. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 95 People vs. Malicsi R E S O L U T I O N CARPIO, J.:

charged appellant with

raping AAA, who was then alleged to be 13

years old when she was raped for the first time and 15 years old during the succeeding rape incidents. Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. During the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses namely, AAA, AAAs mother, and Dr. Marlon dela Rosa (Dr. dela Rosa), the examining physician.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

166

AAA

testified

that

sometime

in

December

1996

at

oclock

in

the

The Solicitor General for appellee. Public Attorneys Office for appellant.

evening, her father asked her to buy wine from a store 10 meters away from their house. AAA was only 13 years old then. The house of AAAs family is some 20 meters away from appellants house. On her way home, AAA chanced upon appellant who is her uncle, her father

Page

being the brother of appellants wife. Appellant placed AAA on his lap. Appellant switched off AAAs flashlight and embraced her. Appellant ordered AAA to bend over. AAA acceded because appellant threatened to kill her. Appellant removed AAAs shorts and underwear. Appellant, while poking a knife at AAAs breast, succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. AAA felt pain. Appellant warned AAA not to say anything to her parents. _______________

AAA alleged that three days later, appellant caught up with her while she was gathering firewood. AAA was again forced to lie on the ground and to appellant her mother inserted that his penis inside her, her they vagina. went AAAs to the cousin police witnessed the incident and informed AAAs mother. When AAA confirmed appellant raped headquarters to file a complaint against appellant. AAA testified that she was thereafter brought to the doctor for physical examination. AAAs mother testified that appellant is her brother-in-law. Sometime in April 1998, her nephew informed her that he saw appellant rape AAA. Thereafter, AAA confirmed to her mother that appellant raped her on different occasions. AAAs mother discussed the matter with her husband and they decided to report the rape incidents to the police authorities. AAAs mother alleged that appellants wife offered to settle the case for P10,000 daughter. Dr. dela Rosa testified that he examined AAA and executed a Medical but she refused the offer because of the dishonor to her

Penned

by

Associate

Justice

Jose

C.

Reyes,

Jr.

with

Associate

Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring. 96

96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Malicsi AAA further testified that sometime in March 1998, her mother asked her to gather coconuts that have fallen off from the tree at the bamboo grove. Appellant followed her and grabbed one of the coconuts she was holding. AAA tried to retrieve the coconut but appellant forced her to lie on her back. Appellant removed her underwear and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA struggled to no avail. Appellant again threatened to kill her if she informed her parents about the incident.

Certificate with the following findings: 97

VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 97 People vs. Malicsi P.E. Vagina: nulliparous introitus with old hymenal lacerations at 1, 7 and 5 positions.2 Dr. dela Rosa added that based on his findings, AAA had lost her virginity. On cross-examination, Dr. dela Rosa stated that the hymenal lacerations were inflicted possibly by the insertion of a hard object.3

167
Page

AAA added that on 1 April 1998, appellant ordered AAA to meet him at a banana grove. Out of fear, AAA went there because she knew appellant always carried a knife. Again, appellant forced her to lie on the ground and inserted his penis inside her vagina.

The defense presented appellant as its only witness. Appellant denied the accusations of rape and alleged that he and AAA were sweethearts and they mutually agreed to engage in sexual intercourse. Appellant claimed that AAA visits their house about thrice a week when his wife is not at home. Appellant then recounted the incidents of his sexual intercourse with AAA. Appellant claimed that sometime in December 1996, he arrived home

98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Malicsi at the banana grove. He was urinating at the creek when he called her by on a the whistle. banana his AAA approached while her he him. He held himself while her on hands top of and her. AAA they He was embraced each other. Then, they removed their undergarments. AAA lay leaves placed and inserted penis inside vagina doing so,

from Manila and he told his wife to go to the market. After she left, he slept. Then, he sensed someone entering his house. Upon seeing that it was AAA, appellant asked her if she needed something but she replied negatively. Appellant then stood up, held her hands and kissed her. AAA told him that they might be seen by her mother as the door was not closed. Appellant and AAA then entered the room and he embraced and kissed her. AAA also embraced and kissed him. Then, he told her, maghubo ka ng panty (take off your un-derwear). While taking off her underwear, appellant also removed his briefs. While AAA was lying in bed face upward, she had no violent reaction but merely closed her eyes when he inserted his penis inside her vagina. After the sexual intercourse, AAA went home.4 Appellant contended that the second time they had sexual intercourse was in 1998 before AAAs graduation. It happened _______________

embracing him. Afterwards, she went home.5 Appellant alleged that the third sexual intercourse happened on 4 April 1998 at the banana plantation where they agreed to meet. AAA arrived while appellant was gathering puso ng saging. When she approached him, they embraced each other and removed their undergarments. AAA lay on the banana leaves while he placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA was merely looking at him while he was doing it. After the sexual act, she went home.6 Appellant also alleged they that in these three occasions, AAA gave her

consent since

were

sweethearts.

Appellant attested

that after he

learned about the rape charges, he did not have the opportunity to talk to AAA anymore. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses. The trial court took note of the fact that AAA was barely 13 2 Records IV, p. 6. 3 TSN, 8 September 1998, p. 5. years old when the first rape took place while appellant was in his early 30s.7 The trial court also noted that appellant was AAAs uncle, thus he exercised some sort of moral ascendancy over AAA.8 The trial court was not persuaded by appellants defense that AAA was his girlfriend and that the sexual encounters were done with her consent due to the lack of outcry, lack of tenacious resistance, and delay in reporting the rape charges to the authorities. The trial court disbelieved appellants testimony that they

168
Page

4 TSN, 15 November 1999, pp. 5-8. 98

_______________

The trial court acknowledged that there was delay in reporting the rape incidents. However, the trial court believed that the delay was due to the death force or threats made by that appel-lant would cause coupled the with to the victims for immaturity. The fact that ap-pellant was holding a knife is suggestive of the intimidation victim conceal sometime the violation on her honor.11 On 8 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision, finding

5 Id., at pp. 8-10. 6 Id., at pp. 10-11. 7 CA Rollo, p. 21. 8 Id. 99

appellant guilty of four counts of qualified rape. The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of death for each count of rape, and to pay AAA P300,000 as civil indemnity (P75,000 for each count), and P200,000 as moral damages (P50,000 for each count).12 On appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in giving weight

VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 99 People vs. Malicsi were sweethearts because there was no sufficient proof to substantiate the alleged love relationship. Appellant merely relied on his own uncorroborated testimony. The trial court added that a love affair is not a license for sexual intercourse.9 The trial court ruled that the lack of outcry and tenacious resistance did not make the sexual congress voluntary because being of tender age, AAA did not possess discernment and was incapable of giving an intelligent consent to the sexual act. Moreover, there is no standard form of human behavioral response to a startling or frightful experience such as rape being perpetrated by the victims uncle. Furthermore, the resistance on the part of the victim need not be carried out to the point of inviting death or physical injuries, it being sufficient that the coitus takes place against her will or that she yields to a genuine apprehension of great harm.10

and credence to the incredulous testimonies of the prosecution witnesses especially AAAs testimony. Appel_______________

9 Id., at p. 23. 10 Id., at pp. 21-22. 11 Id., at pp. 22-23. 12 Id., at p. 24. 100

169

100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Malicsi

Page

lant

alleged

that doubt.

the

prosecution also

failed

to

prove the

his

guilt of

beyond death

14 Id., at pp. 18-19. 101

reasonable

Appellant

questioned

imposition

penalty considering the attendant circumstances of the case. In its 18 August 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with modification, finding appellant guilty of four counts of simple rape instead of qualified rape and reducing the penalty imposed to reclusion per-petua. The Court of Appeals stated that AAA was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime and appellant was a family relative by affinity. The Court of Appeals believed that the family relationship made AAA subject to appellants moral ascendancy. Moreover, it was clearly established during the trial that AAA exerted efforts to free herself from appellant. AAA acceded to appellants sexual urges because appellant threatened to kill her and appellant actually poked a knife on her breast during the incidents. The appellate court added that these circumstances belie appellants claim that AAA did not offer tenacious resistance. AAAs fear for her life and safety made her conceal the fact that she was being molested by appellant.13 The Court of Appeals did not believe appellants sweet-heart defense because it was not supported by some documentary or other evidence of the relationship other than his bare assertions. Such claim obviously deserves scant consideration. Assuming arguendo that appellant and AAA were sweethearts, this relationship still does not, by itself, make their sexual intercourse voluntary because even a lover can be forced to engage in a sexual act against her will and consent.14 The Court of Appeals noted that from the time of the first rape

VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 101 People vs. Malicsi of a false accusation. The fact of AAAs failure to disclose for two years that appellant molested her was not unexplained. AAA had repeatedly testified during the trial that appellant warned her not to say anything to her parents and appellant threatened to kill her if she would tell them. The appellate court stated that it is even common for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue because of threats on their lives. The Court of Appeals upheld the finding of the trial court on AAAs credibility on the face of appel-lants bare denials, more especially that appellant had not adduced any evidence that AAA or her family had any ill-motive to testify against him.15 However, the Court of Appeals agreed with appellant that the trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer the death penalty on four counts of qualified rape and that he should only be convicted of simple rape. The minority of the victim and the offenders relationship to the victim, which constitute only one special qualifying circumstance, must be alleged in the Information and proved with certainty. In this case, the Informations filed against appellant merely stated that he is the uncle of AAA. This is not the sufficient allegation required by law because the Information must allege that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree and the same should be proven during the trial. The Court of Appeals further held that since Republic Act No. 934616 now prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed. This new law must be given retroactive

incident, there was a lapse of almost two years before AAA reported the rape incidents to the police authorities. The appellate court explained that this delay is not an indication

170
Page

_______________

13 Rollo, pp. 16-17.

application because it is favorable to the accused.

Hence, this appeal. We find the appeal without merit. The Court of Appeals was correct in affirming with modification the ruling of the _______________

had any ill-motive to falsely testify and impute a serious crime against the appellant who is a close relative. Appellants support documentary allegation he other or that they were to of sweethearts the is his barren claim The of by factual some

because

failed

substantiate

evidence

relationship.

sweetheart

defense appears to be a fabrication to exculpate himself from the rape he committed. Although appellant admitted having carnal knowledge with 15 Id., at pp. 17-19. 16 An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. 102 AAA in three separate occasions,19 he failed to discharge the burden of proving the affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence. This Court is not persuaded by appellants contention that the lack of outcry, lack of tenacious resistance, and delay in reporting the incidents signify that the sexual encounters were consensual.20 First, appellant exercised moral ascen102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Malicsi trial court that four counts of rape were clearly established by the 17 People v. Alarcon, G.R. No. 174199, 7 March 2007, 517 SCRA 778, 784. 18 People v. Fraga, 386 Phil. 884, 906; 330 SCRA 669, 688 (2000). 19 TSN, 15 November 1999, pp. 4-11. 20 CA Rollo, pp. 21-22. 103 _______________

prosecution witnesses. The findings and observations of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses are binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted,17 which is not true in the present case. Moreover, AAAs testimony is worthy of belief because she categorically pointed to appellant as the person who sexually abused her. AAAs testimony is entitled to great weight in contrast to appellants bare

171

denials. given

Denial greater

is

negative, than the

self-serving testimony

evidence of

which

cannot

be who

weight

credible

witnesses

VOL. 543, JANUARY 29, 2008 103 People vs. Malicsi

testified on affirmative matters. Between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.18 Besides, neither AAA nor her family

Page

dancy over AAA, being AAAs uncle. Second, appellant had instilled fear upon AAAs young mind during the sexual assaults by using a knife and threatening to kill her. These circumstances have led AAA to keep her ordeals in secret until her mother learned of the incidents from AAAs cousin. This Court declared in People v. Garcia:21 [R]ape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and this includes the moral kind of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other. It can be addressed to the mind as well. Moreover, the intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard-and-fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fearfear that if the victim does not yield to the lustful demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter. AAAs tender age and appellants moral ascendancy made AAA

22 People v. Sabredo, 387 Phil. 682, 692; 331 SCRA 663, 672 (2000). 104

104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Malicsi the death penalty and appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape.23 We find that the Court on of Appeals appellant. correctly imposed court rape the penalty of

reclusion Moral

perpetua are

The

appellate to the

also victim

correctly without

affirmed the award by the trial court of P200,000 in moral damages. damages automatically granted presentation of further proof other than the commission of the crime.24 However, we reduce the award of civil indemnity from P300,000 to

subservient to appellants sexual desires. This psychological predicament explains why AAA did not give any outcry or offer any resistance when appellant was raping her. Moreover, the physical differences between appellant, who was a man in his early 30s then, and AAA, a 13 and 15-year-old girl during the rape incidents, afforded appellant the greater advantage such that no amount of resistance from AAA could have overcome the coercive physical force of appellant. The appellate court was correct in finding appellant guilty of four counts of simple the rape. third We civil have degree ruled of that the special be circumstance alleged in of the relationship, that is, appellant is the victims uncle and they are related within affinity, must Information.22 The fact that such relationship was proved will not justify the imposition of

P200,000 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.25 Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 for each count of simple rape is automatically granted once the fact of rape is established.26 WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 August 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01368 finding appellant Edwin Malicsi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of simple rape with the MODIFICATION that the award of civil indemnity is reduced to P200,000. SO ORDERED. Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed with modification.

172
Page

_______________

21 346 Phil. 475, 493-494; 281 SCRA 463, 478 (1997).

Note.The

sweetheart

defense

does

not

necessarily

preclude

rape.

(People vs. Flores, 372 SCRA 421 [2001]) o0o [People vs. Malicsi, 543 SCRA 93(2008)]

G.R. No. 170141.

April 22, 2008.*

JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. JESUS SIMANGAN, respondent. Appeals; The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on substantial evidence; Exceptions.We are not a trier of facts. on We generally matter of rely the upon, lower and are bound by, the conclusions this courts, which are better

equipped and have better opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand, including the testimony of the witnesses. We have repeatedly held that the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on substantial evidence. We have no jurisdiction, as a rule, to reverse their findings. Among the exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. _______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

173

342

Page

342

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Common Carriers; Air Transportation; Where a passenger, despite his

carrier, ought to know the kind of valid

travel documents

respondent

carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, We find untenable JALs defense of verification of respondents documents in its breach of contract of carriage. It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an alien into 343

protestations and valid travel documents, was unceremoniously bumped off by the airlines, damage was already done when he was offered to fly the next day, which offer did not cure the airlines default.JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It informed respondent that there was a need to first check the As flight authenticity by of JAL, wait for his travel flight documents could it not gave with wait the for U.S. Mr. no Embassy. that the admitted could the

Simangan because it was ready to depart. Since JAL definitely declared not respondent, respondent choice but to be left behind. The latter was unceremoniously bumped off despite his protestations and valid travel documents and notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL. Damage had already been done when respondent was offered to fly the next day on July 30, 1992. Said offer did not cure JALs default. Same; Same; Novation; Since novation implies a waiver of the right the creditor behind had against the before his next the will, day. novation, he In could short, waiver such not he waiver have did must be express. to be Considering that respondent was forced to get out of the plane and left freely consented to It the rebooked before not be agree express. alleged be VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 343 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. Same; Same; Breach of Contract; Requisites.In an action for breach of contract the of carriage, failure to all that is the required of plaintiff safely to is to his prove the existence of such contract and its non-performance by the carrier through latters carry passenger destination. Respondent has complied with these twin requisites. Same; Same; Same; Damages; As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, except in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, and in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of the kind of valid fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220.As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are fact that respondents

novation. Since novation implies a waiver of the right the creditor had the novation, such must cannot supposed, without clear proof, that respondent had willingly done away with his right to fly on July 29, 1992. Moreover, the reason behind the bumping off incident, as found by the RTC and CA, was that JAL personnel imputed that respondent would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.

174

Same;

Same; a

common

carrier

ought

to

know the

documents

passenger

carries.Apart

from

Page

plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already passed the rigid immigration and security routines, JAL, as a common

recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220. The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad faith. As found by the RTC, JAL breached its contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and insolently ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was already settled in his assigned seat. He was ordered out of the plane under the alleged reason that the genuineness of his travel documents should be verified. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages.Clearly, JAL is liable for moral damages. It is firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, as in this case. Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are 344

the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit. Same; Same; Same; Same; Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to in permit its the such against courts to by reshape is behaviour negative liable also that for is socially or deleterious deterrents malevolent consequence creating incentives

against acts

behaviour.JAL respondent.

exemplary which are

damages as its above-mentioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and Exemplary damages, awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, may be recovered in contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating requiring standard diligence, negative which from incentives with in is, fact, or the deterrents standard of and the in against of highest creating such behaviour. diligence, degree In a of of compliance extraordinary possible a

that

common

carriers

presumption

negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human beings and their property. Same; Same; Same; Same; Passengers have a right to be treated by the carriers employees and are injurious an action and with entitled language, for are kindness, to be indignities respect, protected and courtesy against abuses have a and from right to due such be consideration misconduct, personal

344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan

employees.Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground due for damages. entitled Passengers to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and consideration protected and against personal such misconduct, employees. Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys Fees; Words and Phrases; In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages injurious language, indignities abuses from

175
Page

entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. What the law considers as bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would be bad faith in securing

ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless 345

respondents counsel. The amount is actually discretionary upon the Court so long as it passes the test of reasonableness. They may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when exemplary damages are awarded and whenever the court deems it just and equitable, as in this case.

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 345 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan they as have actual agreed or and that the award damages court shall pertain to the lawyer as are

Interests; When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.The above liabilities of JAL in the total amount of P800,000.00 earn legal interest pursuant to the Courts ruling in Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Estrella, 501 SCRA 228 (2006) citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994) to wit: Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Ap346

additional compensation or as part thereofthe amount may be recovered compensatory whenever the when it exemplary just and damages awarded deems equitable.With

respect to attorneys fees, they may be awarded when defendants act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur (1997) expenses citing to protect his interest. Bank The Court, in Construction v. Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Estrella, 501 SCRA 228 Traders Royal Employees Union-Independent National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 733 (1997) elucidated thus: There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208,

346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan peals, that when an obligation, delicts regardless or of its source, is i.e., law, the

contracts,

quasi-contracts,

quasi-delicts

breached,

contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, subject to the following rules, to wit 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is

176

Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. It was therefore erroneous for the CA to delete the award of attorneys fees on the ground that the record is devoid of evidence to show the cost of the services of

Page

judicially demanded.

In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 347 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Same; Pleadings and Practice; When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. During the trial, however, JAL presented a witness who testified that JAL suffered further damages. Allegedly, respondent caused the publications of his subject complaint against JAL in the newspaper for which JAL suffered damages. Although these additional damages allegedly suffered by JAL were not incorporated in its Answer as they arose subsequent to its filing, JALs witness was able to testify on the same before the RTC. Hence, although these issues were not raised by the pleadings, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. As provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, (w)hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Freedom of Expression; Libel; The publication of a passengers complaint about his being bumped off involves matters about which the public has the right to be informed because they relate to a public issue and could not be the basis for a claim for damages.JAL is a common carrier. people JALs to business is mainly with the traveling and public. It invites avail themselves of the comforts advantages it offers.

shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. x x x 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted) Accordingly, in addition to the said total amount of P800,000.00, JAL is liable to pay respondent legal interest. Pursuant to the above ruling of the Court, the legal interest is 6% and it shall be reckoned from September 21, 2000 when the RTC rendered its judgment. From the time this Decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction. Actions; Counterclaims; Damages; Well-settled is the rule that the

commencement of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the action to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; If damages result from a partys exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.This compulsory counterclaim of JAL arising from the filing of the complaint may not be granted inasmuch as the complaint against it is obviously not malicious or unfounded. It was filed by respondent precisely to claim his right to damages against JAL. Well-settled is the rule that the commencement of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the action to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. We reiterate case law that if damages result from a partys exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. Lawful acts give rise to no injury. Walang perhuwisyong maaring idulot ang paggamit sa sariling karapatan.

Since JAL deals with the public, its bumping off of respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and generated a public issue. The publications involved matters about which the public has the right to be informed because they relate to a public issue. This public issue or concern is a legitimate topic of a public comment that may be validly published. Assuming that respondent, indeed, caused the publication of his complaint, he may not be held liable for damages for it. The

177
Page

347

constitutional

guarantee

of

freedom

of

the

speech

and

of

the

press

Edgardo V. Cruz for respondent. REYES, R.T., J.: WHEN an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a

includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest. Same; Same; Even though an airline is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it.Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public officials but extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office. Hence, pursuant to the Borjal case, 301 SCRA 1 348

particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage.1 The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by Japan Airlines (JAL).2 _______________

348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan (1999), there must be an actual malice in order that a discreditable imputation official to a be public person To in be his public capacity or to the a public libelous may actionable. considered malicious, 1 Yu Eng Cho v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. 123560, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 717, 735, citing Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77011, July 24, 1990, 187 SCRA 763, 770.

2 Japan Airlines v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 161730, January 28, 2005, 449 SCRA 544, 548. 349

statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. Considering that the published articles involve matters of public interest and that its expressed opinion is not malicious but based on established facts, the imputations against JAL are not actionable. Therefore, JAL may not claim damages for them. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 349 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan In this petition for review on certiorari,3 petitioner JAL appeals the: (1) Decision4 dated May 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) ordering it to pay respondent Jesus Simangan moral and exemplary damages; and

178
Page

Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Quisumbing, Torres for petitioner.

(2) Resolution5 of the same court dated September 28, 2005 denying JALs motion for reconsideration. The Facts

5 Id., at pp. 66-67. 6 Id., at pp. 126-127. 7 Id. 8 Id.

In 1991, respondent Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in UCLA School of Medicine in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. Upon request of UCLA, respondent undertook

350

a series of laboratory tests at the National Kidney Institute in Quezon City to verify whether his blood and tissue type are compatible with Loretos.6 Fortunately, said tests proved that respondents blood and tissue type were well-matched with Loretos.7 Respondent travel was to needed the United an to go to the United wrote by a the States letter to to complete the his 350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan pass.9 He was scheduled to a particular flight bound for Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.10 On July 29, 1992, the date of his flight, respondent went to Ninoy Aquino International Airport in the company of several relatives and friends.11 He was allowed to check-in at JALs counter.12 His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid immigration and security routines.13 After passing through said immigration and security procedures, respondent was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane.14 While 3 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition contains a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. 4 Rollo, pp. 58-65. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De inside the airplane, JALs airline crew suspected respondent of

preliminary work-up and donation surgery. Hence, to facilitate respondents States, UCLA U.S. American in Consulate in Manila to arrange for his visa. In due time, respondent issued emergency visa American Embassy Manila.8 Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner JAL for US$1,485.00 and was issued the corresponding boarding _______________

carrying a falsified travel document and imputed that he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.15 The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel documents. Shortly after, the stewardess along with a Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to stand up and leave the plane.16 Respondent protested, explaining that he was issued a U.S. visa. Just to allow him to board the plane, he pleaded with JAL to closely monitor his movements when the aircraft stops over in Narita.17 His pleas were ignored. He was then

179
Page

Leon, with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (now deceased) and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring.

constrained to go out of the plane.18 In a nutshell, respondent was bumped off the flight. Respondent went to JALs ground office and waited there for three

behind.19 Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were, indeed, ticket in less order.20 the sum Respondent of was refunded which the cost of his by plane JAL.21 US$500.00 was deducted

hours. Meanwhile, the plane took off and he was left _______________

Subsequently, respondents U.S. visa was cancelled.22 Displeased by the turn of events, respondent filed an action for

damages against JAL with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Valenzuela City, docketed as Civil Case No. 4195-V-93. He claimed he was not able to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible

Id., at pp. 59, 128.

embarrassment and mental anguish.23 He prayed that he be awarded P3 million as moral damages, P1.5 million as exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees.24 JAL denied the material allegations of the complaint. It argued, among others, that its failure due to to a allow need respondent for his to fly on his scheduled to be departure was travel documents

10 Id. 11 Id., at p. 127. 12 Id., at p. 59. 13 Id., at p. 62. 14 Id., at pp. 59, 128. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id., at p. 62. 18 Id., at pp. 62, 127-128. 351

authenticated by the United States Embassy25 because no one from JALs airport staff had encountered a parole visa before.26 It posited that the authentication required additional time; that respondent was advised to take the flight the following day, July 30, 1992. that respondent agreed to be rebooked on July 30, 1992.27 JAL also lodged institution a of counterclaim the complaint. anchored It on for respondents litigation alleged JAL alleged

wrongful

prayed

expenses,

exemplary damages and attorneys fees.28 _______________

19 Id., at pp. 59, 127.

180

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 351 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan

20 Id. 21 Id., at pp. 60, 127. 22 Id.

Page

23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id., at p. 85. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id., at pp. 86-87. 352

the flight, he suffered more wounded feelings and social humiliation for which the plaintiff was asking to be awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees. The reason given by the defendant that what prompted them to

investigate the genuineness of the travel documents of the plaintiff was that the plaintiff was not then carrying a regular visa but just a letter does not appear satisfactory. The defendant is engaged in transporting passengers by plane from country to country and is therefore conversant with the travel documents. The defendant should not be allowed to pretend, to the prejudice of the plaintiff not to know that the travel documents of the plaintiff are valid documents to allow him entry in the United States.

352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan On September 21, 2000, the RTC presided by Judge Floro P. Alejo rendered follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of P250,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the cost of suit.29 The RTC explained: In summarily and insolently ordering the plaintiff to disembark while the its decision in favor of respondent (plaintiff), disposing as

The foregoing act of the defendant in ordering the plaintiff to deplane while already settled in his assigned seat clearly demonstrated that the defendant breached its contract of carriage with the plaintiff as passenger in bad faith and as such the plaintiff is entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as to an award of attorneys fees.30 _______________

29 Id., at pp. 60, 129. 30 Id., at pp. 128-129. 353

181

latter was already settled in his assigned seat, the defendant violated the contract of carriage; that when the plaintiff was ordered out of the plane under the pretext that the genuineness of his travel documents would be verified it had caused him embarrassment and besmirched reputation; and that when the plaintiff was finally not allowed to take

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 353 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan

Page

Disagreeing with the RTC judgment, JAL appealed to the CA contending that it is not guilty of breach of contract of carriage, hence, not liable for damages.31 It posited that it is the one entitled to recover on its counterclaim.32 CA Ruling

33 Id., at pp. 58-65. 34 Id., at p. 65. 35 Id., at p. 62. 36 Id. 37 Id.

In a Decision33 dated May 31, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification in that it lowered the amount of moral and exemplary damages and deleted the award of attorneys fees. The fallo of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant JAPAN as AIR moral as LINES is ordered and Two to pay appellee Fifty of JESUS Thousand attorneys SIMANGAN the reduced sums, as follows: Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) Pesos damages, exemplary Hundred The (P250,000.00) damages. award

38 Id. 39 Id. 354

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan The CA ratiocinated: While the protection of passengers must take precedence over

fees is hereby DELETED.34 The CA elucidated that since JAL issued to respondent a round trip plane ticket for a lawful consideration, there arose a perfected contract between them.35 It found that respondent was haughtily ejected36 by JAL and that he was certainly embarrassed and humiliated37 when, in the presence of other passengers, JALs airline staff shouted at him to stand up and arrogantly asked him to produce his travel papers, without the least courtesy every human being is entitled to;38 and that he was compelled to deplane on the grounds that his papers were fake.39 _______________

convenience, the implementation of security measures must be attended by basic courtesies. In fact, breach of the contract of carriage creates against the carrier a presumption of liability, by a simple proof of injury, relieving the injured passenger of the duty to establish the fault of the carrier or of his employees; and placing on the carrier the burden to prove that it was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

182

31 Id., at p. 61. 32 Id.

That appellee possessed bogus travel documents and that he might stay illegally in Japan are allegations without substantiation. Also, appellants attempt to rebook appellee the following day was too late and did not

Page

relieve

it

from

liability.

The

damage

had

been

done.

Besides,

its

355 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan sustained as consequence of the defendants act. Being discretionary on the court, the amount, however, should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Here, the trial courts award of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages

belated theory of novation, i.e., that appellants original obligation to carry appellee to Narita and Los Angeles on July 29, 1992 was extinguished by novation when appellant agreed that appellee will instead take appellants flight to Narita on the following day, July 30, 1992, deserves little attention. It is inappropriate at bar. Questions not taken up during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.40 (Italics ours and citations were omitted) Citing Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,41 the CA declared that (i)n contracts of common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part which of the entitles carrier the resulting passengers in the to failure of the of passenger moral to be in accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud the award damages accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code.42 Nevertheless, the CA modified the damages awarded by the RTC. It explained: Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss _______________

appears to be overblown. No other proof of appellees social standing, profession, financial capabilities was presented except that he was single and a businessman. To Us, the sum of 500,000.00 is just and fair. For, moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Moreover, the grant of P500,000.00 as exemplary damages needs to be reduced designed to to to a reasonable permit the the level. courts acts The to of award mould the of exemplary that damages has the is behavior socially sum of

deleterious consequences and its imposition is required by public policy suppress wanton offender. Hence, P250,000.00 is adequate under the circumstances. The award of P250,000.00 as attorneys fees lacks factual basis.

40 Id., at p. 63. 41 G.R. No. L-28773, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 610. 42 Rollo, p. 63.

Appellee was definitely compelled to litigate in protecting his rights and in seeking relief from appellants misdeeds. Yet, the record is devoid of evidence to show the cost of the services of his counsel and/or the actual omitted) When JALs motion for reconsideration was denied, it resorted to the petition at bar. Issues expenses incurred in prosecuting his action.43 (Citations were

Page

183

355

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING JAL poses the following issues I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES, CONSIDERING THAT: _______________ THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CONSIDERING THAT: A. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE IN BREACH OF CONTRACT WANTON, CONDUCT. B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT JAL WAS GUILTY OF BREACH, JAL DID NOT ACT IN A WANTON FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS, OPPRESSIVE OR 43 Id., at p. 64. 356 MALEVOLENT MANNER AS TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan A. JAL WAS NOT GUILTY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT. B. MORAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES BAD ONLY WHEN THE BREACH ARGUENDO IS ATTENDED JAL BY FRAUD GUILTY OR OF 44 Id., at pp. 23-24. 357 FAITH. ASSUMING THAT WAS OF DAMAGES, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AWARD OF P750,000 IN DAMAGES WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED. IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT OF CARRIAGE UNLESS THE CARRIER IS GUILTY OF FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS, OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT

FINDING FOR JAL ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM.44 (Italics Ours) _______________

BREACH, JAL DID NOT ACT FRAUDULENTLY OR IN BAD FAITH AS TO ENTITLE RESPONDENT TO MORAL DAMAGES.

184

C. THE LAW DISTINGUISHES A CONTRACTUAL BREACH EFFECTED IN GOOD FAITH FROM ONE ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH. II. VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008

Page

357 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Basically, there are three (3) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not JAL is guilty of contract of carriage; (2) whether or not respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages; and (3) whether or not JAL is entitled to its counterclaim for damages. Our Ruling

45 Malaysian

Airline

System

v.

Court

of

Appeals,

G.R.

No.

L-78015,

December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 321, 323. 46 Id., citing Alsua-Betts v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46430-31,

July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332. 47 Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61418, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 211, 213, citing Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45645, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 99; Olango v. Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, G.R. No. L-55864, March 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 338.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Chiefly, the issues are factual. The RTC findings of facts were affirmed by the CA. The CA also gave its nod to the reasoning of the RTC except as to the awards of damages, which were reduced, and that of attorneys fees, which was deleted. We are not a trier of facts. We generally rely upon, and are bound by, the conclusions on this matter of the lower courts, which are better equipped and have better opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand, including the testimony of the witnesses.45 We have repeatedly held that the findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court provided they are based on substantial evidence.46 We have no jurisdiction, as a rule, to reverse their findings.47 Among the exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) where there is grave

358

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a

misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.48 The said exceptions, which are being invoked by JAL, are not found here. There is no indication that the findings of the CA are contrary to the evidence on record or that vital testimonies of JALs witnesses were disregarded. Neither did the CA commit misapprehension of facts nor did it fail to consider relevant facts. Likewise, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts or mistaken and absurd inferences. We thus sustain the coherent facts as established by the courts below, there being no sufficient showing that the said courts committed reversible error in reaching their conclusions.

Page

185

_______________

JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage. That respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass is uncontroverted.49 His plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid immigration and security procedure.50 After passing through said immigration and security procedure, he was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane to fly to Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.51 Concisely, there was a contract of carriage between JAL and respondent. _______________

JAL justifies its action by arguing that there was a need to verify the authenticity of respondents travel document.52 It alleged that no one from its airport staff had encountered a parole visa before.53 It further contended that respondent agreed to fly the next day so that it could first verify his travel document, hence, there was novation.54 It maintained that it was not guilty of breach of contract of carriage as respondent was not able to travel to the United States due to his own voluntary desistance.55 We cannot agree. JAL did not allow respondent to fly. It informed

respondent that there was a need to first check the authenticity of his travel documents with the U.S. Embassy.56 As admitted by JAL, the flight could not wait for Mr. Simangan because it was ready to depart.57

48 Malaysian Airline System v. Court of Appeals, supra note 45, at pp. 323-324, citing Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, February 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289. 49 Rollo, pp. 59, 128. 50 Id., at p. 62. 51 Id., at pp. 59, 128. 359

Since

JAL

definitely

declared

that

the

flight

could

not

wait

for

respondent, it gave respondent no choice but to be left behind. The latter was unceremoniously bumped off despite his protestations and valid travel documents and notwithstanding his contract of carriage with JAL. Damage had already been done when respondent was offered to fly the next day on July 30, 1992. Said offer did not cure JALs default. Considering that respondent was forced to get out of the plane and left behind against the his next will, day. he In could short, not he have did freely consented to the to be rebooked not agree alleged

novation. Since novation implies a waiver _______________

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 359 52 Id., at pp. 25, 85. 53 Id. JAL 54 Id., at pp. 25, 27.

186
Page

Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Nevertheless, JAL made respondent get off the plane on his scheduled departure on July 29, 1992. He was not allowed by JAL to fly. thus failed to comply with its obligation under the contract of carriage.

55 Id., at p. 24. 56 Id., at p. 85. 57 Id., at p. 27. 360

It bears repeating that the power to admit or not an alien into the country JAL.62 In an action for breach of contract of carriage, all that is required of plaintiff is to by safely prove the to the carrier his existence through destination.63 of the such contract failure has and to its carry nonthe with performance passenger latters is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by

Respondent

complied

these twin requisites. 360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan of the right the creditor had before the novation, such waiver must be express.58 It cannot be supposed, without clear proof, that respondent had willingly done away with his right to fly on July 29, 1992. Moreover, the reason behind the bumping off incident, as found by the RTC and CA, was that JAL personnel imputed that respondent would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan.59 Apart from the fact that respondents plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles already passed the rigid immigration and security routines,60 JAL, as a common carrier, ought to know the kind of valid travel documents respondent carried. As provided in Article 1755 of the New Civil Code: as far A as common human carrier care is bound foresight to carry the passengers safely and can provide, _______________

58 Garcia v. Llamas, G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 292, 302, citing Babst v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99398, January 26, 2001, 350 SCRA 341. 59 Rollo, pp. 59, 128. 60 Id., at p. 62. 61 Emphasis ours. 62 Japan Airlines v. Asuncion, supra note 2. 63 Tolentino, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 299; Aboitiz v. 361

using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.61 Thus, We find untenable JALs defense of

187

verification carriage.

of

respondents

documents

in

its

breach

of

contract

of

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 361 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan

Page

Respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees plus legal interest. With reference in by to moral ex or damages, contractu It JAL except is alleged only that when they the did are breach not is

64 Calalas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 356, 365, citing Flores v. Miranda, 105 Phil. 267 (1959). 65 Id., citing Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Esguerra, G.R. No. L31420, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 741; Sabena Belgian World Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82068, March 31, 1989, 171 SCRA 620; China Airlines, Ltd. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73835, January 17, 1989, 169 SCRA 226. 362

recoverable attended

actions

fraud

bad faith.

contended

that it

not act

fraudulently or in bad faith towards respondent, hence, it may not be held liable for moral damages. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated such under Article are 2219 of the (1) Civil in Code.64 in As an the exception, damages recoverable: cases which

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan x x x he was haughtily ejected by appellant. He was certainly

mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220.65 The acts committed by JAL against respondent amounts to bad faith. As found by the RTC, JAL breached its contract of carriage with respondent in bad faith. JAL personnel summarily and insolently ordered respondent to disembark while the latter was already settled in his assigned seat. He was ordered out of the plane under the alleged reason that the genuineness of his travel documents should be verified. These findings of facts were upheld by the CA, to wit: _______________

embarrassed and humiliated when, in the presence of other passengers, the appellants airline staff shouted at him to stand up and arrogantly asked him to produce his travel papers, without the least courtesy every human being is entitled to. Then, he was compelled to deplane on the grounds his that his papers the were fake. His protestation of having been issued a U.S. visa coupled with his plea to appellant to closely monitor movements when aircraft stops over in Narita, were ignored. Worse, he was made to wait for many hours at the office of appellant only to be told later that he has valid travel documents.66 (Italics ours) Clearly, JAL is liable for moral damages. It is firmly settled that moral damages are recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith, as in this case. Inattention to and lack of care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages. What the law considers as

188
Page

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84458, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 95, 105.

bad faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral damages would be bad faith in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit.67 JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its above-mentioned acts constitute wanton, oppressive and malevolent acts against respondent. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, may be recovered in contractual obligations, as in this case, if defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.68 _______________

requiring standard diligence,

compliance which from is,

with in

the

standard of and the in

of

extraordinary possible a creating

diligence, degree

a of of

fact,

that

highest

common

carriers

presumption

negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human beings and their property.69 Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration and are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.70 The assessment of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in and respondents he favor is, in suffered. This Our view, reasonable also serves as an and realistic. This award is reasonably sufficient to indemnify him for the humiliation embarrassment example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive acts. With respect to attorneys fees, they may be awarded when defendants act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.71 The Court, in Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Estrella,72 citing Traders Royal Bank Em_______________

66 Rollo, p. 62. 67 Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119641, May 17, 1996, 257 SCRA 33, 43. 68 Victory Liner v. Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 370, citing Yobido v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 1, 13; 281 SCRA 1, 12 (1997). 363

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 363

69 Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88052, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 83. 70 See note 63, citing Zulueta v. Pan-Am Airways, G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 397. 71 Singson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119995, November 18, 1997, 282 SCRA 149, 165.

189
Page

Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour. In

72 G.R. No. 147791, September 8, 2006, 501 SCRA 228, 243-244. 364

Considering

the

factual

backdrop

of

this

case,

attorneys

fees

in

the

amount of P200,000.00 is reasonably modest. The above liabilities of JAL in the total amount of P800,000.00 earn legal interest pursuant to the Courts ruling in Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines v. _______________

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan ployees Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission,73

73 G.R. No. 120592, March 14, 1997, 269 SCRA 733. 74 Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National Labor Relations Commission, id., at p. 740. 75 Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129132, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 124; Civil Code, Art. 2208. 365

elucidated thus: There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees, the socalled ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorneys fee is an indemnity for

damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.74 It was therefore erroneous for the CA to delete the award of attorneys fees on the ground that the record is devoid of evidence to show the cost of the services upon They of respondents counsel. The amount is Court may be so long as as it passes or the recovered actual actually test of

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 365 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Estrella,76 citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,77 to wit: Regarding the imposition of legal interest at the rate of 6% from the time of the filing of the complaint, we held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court i.e., of law, Appeals, contracts, that when an obligation, delicts regardless or of its is source, quasi-contracts, quasi-delicts

190

discretionary

the

reasonableness.

compensatory

Page

damages when exemplary damages are awarded and whenever the court deems it just and equitable,75 as in this case.

breached, the contravenor can be held liable for payment of interest in

the

concept

of

actual

and

compensatory

damages,

subject

to

the 366

following rules, to wit 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.78 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted) Accordingly, in addition to the said total amount of P800,000.00, JAL is liable to pay respondent legal interest. Pursuant to the above ruling of the Court, the legal interest is 6% and it shall be reckoned from September 21, 2000 when the RTC rendered its judgment. From the time this Decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction. JAL is not entitled to its counterclaim for damages. The counterclaim of JAL in its Answer79 is a compulsory counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees arising from the filing of the complaint. There is no mention of any other counter claims. This compulsory not counterclaim or of JAL arising It from the filing by of the

money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of _______________

191

complaint may not be granted inasmuch as the complaint against it is obviously 76 Supra note 72, at pp. 244-245. 77 G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78. malicious unfounded. was filed respondent precisely to claim his right to damages against JAL. Well-settled is the rule that the commencement of an action does not per se make the

Page

action wrongful and subject the action to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.80 _______________

although these issues were not raised by the pleadings, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. As provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, (w)hen

issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they 78 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id., at pp. 95-97. 79 Rollo, pp. 86-87. 80 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Basco, G.R. No. 142668, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 325, 344. 367 had been raised in the pleadings. Nevertheless, JALs counterclaim cannot be granted. JAL is a common carrier. JALs business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers.84 Since JAL deals with the public, its bumping off of respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and generated a public issue. The publications involved matters about which the public has the right to VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 367 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan We reiterate case law that if damages result from a partys exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.81 injury. Walang perhuwisyong maaring karapatan. During the trial, however, JAL presented a witness who testified that JAL suffered further damages. Allegedly, respondent caused the publications of his subject complaint against JAL in the newspaper for which JAL suffered damages.82 Lawful acts give rise to no ang paggamit sa sariling 81 Id., citing ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128690, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 572. 82 Rollo, pp. 60, 128. 83 Id., at pp. 60, 127-128. 84 Morris v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127957, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 428, 435. 368 idulot be informed because they relate to a public issue. This public issue or concern is a legitimate topic of a public comment that may be validly published. _______________

192

Although these additional damages allegedly suffered by JAL were not incorporated in its Answer as they arose subsequent to its filing, JALs witness was able to testify on the same before the RTC.83 Hence,

Page

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan Assuming complaint, that he respondent, may not of be indeed, held freedom of caused liable the for the publication for of and the of it. his The press

malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with _______________

damages

85 G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1. 86 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, id., at p. 23. 87 Baguio Midland Courier v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

constitutional

guarantee

speech

includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest. This is explained by the Court in Borjal v. Court of Appeals,85 to wit: To reiterate, and fair commentaries a valid on matters in of an public action interest for libel are or

107566, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 28. 369

privileged

constitute

defense is

slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.86 (Citations omitted and italics ours) Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged

VOL. 552, APRIL 22, 2008 369 Japan Airlines vs. Simangan the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not.88 Considering that the published articles involve matters of public interest and that its expressed opinion is not malicious but based on established facts, the imputations against JAL are not actionable. Therefore, JAL may not claim damages for them. WHEREFORE, Court of the petition is is DENIED. WITH The appealed Decision As of the

commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public officials but extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.87

Appeals

AFFIRMED

MODIFICATION.

modified,

193

Hence, pursuant to the Borjal case, there must be an actual malice in order that a discreditable imputation to a public person in his public capacity or to a public official may be actionable. To be considered

petitioner Japan Airlines is ordered to pay respondent Jesus Simangan the following: (1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; (2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (3) P200,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Page

The total amount adjudged shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of judgment of the Regional Trial Court on September 21, 2000 until the finality of this Decision. From the time this Decision becomes final and executory, the unpaid amount, if any, shall earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum until its satisfaction. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and

transported on that flight and on that date and it becomes the carriers obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination. (Japan Airlines vs. Asuncion, 449 SCRA 544 [2005]) o0o [Japan Airlines vs. Simangan, 552 SCRA 341(2008)]

Nachura, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment affirmed with modification. Notes.When purpose in a passenger that contracts for a must specific be flight, he has a

making

choice

which

respected.

(Singapore

Airlines Limited vs. Fernandez, 417 SCRA 474 [2004]) When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a

particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises and the passenger has every right to expect that he be _______________

88 Borjal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 85, at pp. 28-29. 370

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Japan Airlines vs. Simangan

Page

194

445 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom G.R. No. 143360.September 5, 2002.* EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUCITA SUYOM,

MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents. Civil quasi Law; Negligence; sustain Quasi-delict; a claim Requisites on to sustain delict, a the claim for

delict.To

based

quasi

following

requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Same; Same; Same; Offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to the ca_______________

* THIRD DIVISION. 446

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 veat same that act the or offended omission party cannot recover causes. damages Since twice these for two the civil

Page

195

or under

both

liabilities

are

distinct

and

independent

of

each

other,

the

failure

to

In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is solidarity liable for the injuries and damages caused by the negligence of the driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the Land Transportation Office, the salewhile valid and binding between the partiesdoes not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents involving the said transport equipment. Thus, in the 447

recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other. Same; Same; Same; Damages; Motor Vehicle Law; Petitioner held liable for the deaths and of the injuries made complained of a of, because vehicle, it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994; Regardless sales motor the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; In contemplation of law, the owner I operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994. The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, is it is directly and primarily driver, the responsible for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record the employer of the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent. The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 447 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom present case, petitioner, which is the registered owner, is liable for the acts of the driver employed by its former lessee who has become the owner of that vehicle by virtue of an unregistered Deed of Sale. Statement of the Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 12, 2000 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Santos, Pilapil & Associates for petitioner. Mercado, Lim & Associates Law Offices for private respondents.

(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55474. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision, dated May 5, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 9573522, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.3 On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 95-73522, the Regional Trial

Page

196

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 14) had earlier disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Equitable Leasing Corporation ordering said defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the following: A. TO MYRNA TAMAYO 1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Kernel Tamayo; 2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and 3. P56,000.00 for the damage to the store and its contents, and funeral expenses. B. TO FELIX OLEDAN 1. the sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Felmarie Oledan; _______________

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and 3. P30,000.00 for medical expenses, and funeral expenses. C. TO MARISSA ENANO 1. P7,000.00 as actual damages D. TO LUCITA SUYOM 1. The sum of P5,000.00 for the medical treatment of her two sons. The sum of P120,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.4 The Facts On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna Tamayo located at Pier 18, Vitas, Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed. Pinned to death under the engine of the tractor were Respondent Myrna Tamayos son, Reniel Oledan. Tamayo, Injured and were Respondent Respondent Felix Oledan Oledans himself, daughter, Respondent Felmarie Marissa

1 Rollo, pp. 21-31. 2 Third Division. Written by Justice B. A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and

Enano, and two sons of Respondent Lucita Suyom. Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence

concurred in by Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. (Division chairman) and Renato C. Dacudao (member). 3 Assailed Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 31. 448

resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 296094-SA, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12.5 Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, respondents were furnished a copy of Official Receipt No. 622041396 and Certificate of Registration No. 08262797,7 showing that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April

448

15,

1995,

respondents

filed

against

Raul

Tutor,

Ecatine

Corporation

197

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom

(Ecatine) and Equitable _______________

Page

4 RTC Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 57; penned by Judge Inocencio D. Maliaman. 5 See Annex E; Rollo, p. 38. 6 See Annex C; id., p. 35. 7 See Annex C-1; ibid. 449

Ruling of the Court of Appeals Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed the owner/operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had been the subject of a Deed of Sale in favor of Ecatine on December 9, 1992. The reason cited by the CA was that the Certificate of Registration on file with the LTO still remained in petitioners name.13 In order that a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle can bind third persons, it must be duly recorded in the LTO.14 The CA likewise upheld respondents claim for moral damages against petitioner because the appellate court considered Tutor,

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 449 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint8 for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 95-73522 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 14. The trial court, Raul upon Tutor, motion Ecatine of and plaintiffs Edwin counsel, Lim issued the an Order

_______________

8 Annex F; Rollo, p. 38. 9 Respondents Memorandum, p. 1; Rollo, p. 117. 10 Annex G; Rollo, p. 45; penned by Judge Lydia Querubin Layosa. 11 RTC Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 54. 12 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 11. 13 CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 27. 14 Id., pp. 9 & 29. 450

dropping

from

Complaint,

because they could not be located and served with summonses.9 On the other hand, in its Answer with Counterclaim,10 petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine. After trial to had on the merits, actual been the RTC rendered damages the its and Decision attorneys ordering fees to

petitioner

pay not

and

moral

198

respondents. It held that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine registered with Land Transportation Office (LTO), the legal owner was still Equitable.11 Thus, petitioner was liable to respondents.12 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Page

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom the driver of the tractor, to be an agent of the registered owner/

Petitioner contends that it should not be held liable for the damages sustained by respondents and that arose from the negligence of the driver of the Fuso Road Tractor, which it had already sold to Ecatine at the time of the accident. Not having employed Raul _______________

operator.15 Hence, this Petition.16 Issues In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration: I

15 Id., pp. 10 & 30. 16 The case by was deemed F. submitted Lira of for decision on December and 13,

2001, upon the Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum, which was signed Atty. Yolando Mercado Lira Associates. Petitioners Memorandum, filed on October 24, 2001, was signed by Atty.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when the they decided acts and of a held driver that petitioner who [was], [was] not liable for damages of the suffered by private respondents in an action based on quasi delict for negligent the employee petitioner. II

Sergio M. Ceniza of Santos Pilapil and Associates. 17 Page 7; Rollo, p. 101. Original in upper case. 451

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 451 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom Tutor, the driver of the vehicle, it could not have controlled or

Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred when they awarded moral damages to private respondents despite their failure to prove that the injuries they suffered were brought by petitioners wrongful act.17 This Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Liability for Wrongful Acts

supervised him.18 We are not persuaded. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1) Article 10019 of the Revised Penal Code, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 217620of the Civil Code, for civil liability ex quasi delicto.21

Page

199

Furthermore, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of the latters duties.22 This liability attaches when the employees who are convicted of crimes committed in the performance of their work are found to be insolvent and are thus unable to satisfy the civil liability adjudged.23 On the other hand, under Article 2176 in relation to Article 218024 of the Civil Code, an action predicated on quasi delict may _______________

24 This article provides: ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. x x x x x x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their as452

18 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 103. 19 This article provides: ART. 100. Civil Liability of a person guilty of felony.Every person

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom be instituted against the employer for an employees act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and

criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 20 This article provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.25 The enforcement of the judgment against the employer for an latter being action based on a Article 2176 joint does not To require the employee to be insolvent, since the liability of the former is solidarythe statutorily considered tortfeasor.26 sustain a claim based on quasi delict, the following requisites must be proven: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.27 These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed of, subject to the caveat28 that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.29 Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. 21 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, 329 SCRA 600, April 3, 2000; Casupanan and Capitulo v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002, 388 SCRA 28.

200
Page

22 Ibid. 23 Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 333, October 5, 1989.

each other, the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other.30 _______________

453 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom In the instant case, respondentshaving failed to recover anything in the criminal caseelected to file a separate civil action for damages, based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.31 The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries suffered by respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of the Fuso tractor.

signed tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. x x x x x x x x x

Dated

June

4,

1991,

the

Lease

Agreement32

between

petitioner

and

25 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People, supra. 26 Article 2194 Civil Code provides, Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. 27 FGU Insurance 23, 1998, Corporation citing v. Court of Appeals, 287 v. Intermediate Appellate SCRA 718, Court, 191

Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to enter into a FINANCE LEASE AGREEMENT.33 Under such scheme, ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the name of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.34 Further, in the Lease and Schedule,35 the term of the the monthly Lease rental was for the to tractor expire was on stipulated, scheduled

March

Andamo

December 4, 1992. After a few months, Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor.36 Thus, on December 9, 1992, a Deed of Sale37 over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO. We hold petitioner liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident on July 17, 1994.38 insofar The as the Court has consistently and third ruled that, are regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator public persons concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation.39 In contempla_______________

SCRA 195, November 6, 1990. 28 This caveat is found in Art. 2177 of the Civil Code which states: ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. 29 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, March 31, 1984;

Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, June 29, 1979; Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607, July 8, 1942. 30 Rafael Reyes Trucking Corpration v. People, supra.

201

453 31 Ibid. VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002

Page

32 Annex B; Rollo, p. 32. 33 Annex B-1; Rollo, p. 34. 34 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo, p. 8. 35 Annex B-1; Rollo, p. 34. 36 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 2; Rollo, p. 8. 37 Annex D; Rollo, p. 36. 38 Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, G.R. No. 128705, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 395. 39 MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10,

The finance-lease agreement between Equitable on the one hand and Lim or Ecatine on the other has already been superseded by the sale. In any event, it does not bind third persons. The rationale for this rule has been aptly explained in Erezo v. Jepte,43 which we quote hereunder: x x x. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.44 Further, petitioners insistence on FGU Insurance Corp. v. Court of

September 7, 1984, citing Vargas v. Langcay, 6 SCRA 174, September 29, 1962; Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia, 99 Phil. 506, July 11, 1956; Timbol v. 454

Appeals is misplaced.45 First, in FGU Insurance, the registered vehicle owner, which was engaged in a rent-a-car business, rented out the car. In this case, the registered owner of the truck, which is

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom tion of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.40 The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.41

_______________

Osias, 96 Phil. 989, April 30, 1955; Montoya v. Ignacio, 94 Phil. 182, December 29, 1953; Tamayo v. Aquino, et al., 105 Phil. 949, May 29, 1959. 40 First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 660, June 9, 1992. 41 BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715, November 13, 1992.

202
Page

Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.42

42 Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, supra. 43 102 Phil. 103, September 30, 1957, per Labrador, J. 44 Id., p. 108, per Labrador, J. 45 Maloles II v. Philips, 324 SCRA 172, January 31, 2000. 455

We must stress that the failure of Equitable and/or Ecatine to register the sale with the LTO should not prejudice respondents, who have the legal right to rely on the legal principle that the registered vehicle owner is liable for the damages caused by the negligence of the driver. Petitioner cannot hide behind its allegation that Tutor was the employee of Ecatine. This will effectively prevent respondents from recovering their losses on the basis of the inaction or fault of petitioner in failing to register the sale. The non-registration is the fault of petitioner, which should thus face the legal consequences thereof. _______________

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 455 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom engaged in the business of financing motor vehicle acquisitions, has

46 Id., p. 722. 47 First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 660, June 9, 1992. 48 Ibid. 456

actually sold the truck to Ecatine, which in turn employed Tutor. Second, in FGU Insurance, the registered owner of the vehicle was not held responsible for the negligent acts of the person who rented one of its cars, because Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable. We held that no vinculum juris as employer and employee existed between the owner and the driver.46 In this case, the registered owner of the tractor is considered under the law to be the employer of the driver, while the actual operator is deemed to be its agent.47 Thus, Equitable, the registered owner of the tractor, isfor purposes of the law on quasi delictthe employer of Raul Tutor, the driver of the tractor. Ecatine, Tutors actual employer, is deemed as merely an agent of Equitable.48 True, the LTO Certificate of Registration, dated 5/31/91, qualifies the name of and 9, the Lim 1992, registered has been owner overtaken petitioner as by EQUITABLE the Deed of LEASING Sale this on

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom Second Issue: Moral Damages Petitioner further claims that it is not liable for moral damages, because respondents failed to establish or show the causal connection or relation

203

CORPORATION/Leased to Edwin Lim. But the lease agreement between Equitable December between and Ecatine. While Deed

Page

does not affect respondents in this quasi delict suit, it definitely binds petitioner because, unlike them, it is a party to it.

between

the

factual

basis

of

their

claim

and

their

wrongful

act

or

54 Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

omission, if any.49 Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; x x x x x x x x x.

compensate50 and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person.51 Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.52 This is so because moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.53 Viewed as an action for quasi delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2),54 which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi delict.55 Having established the liability of petitioner as the registered owner of the vehicle,56 respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the _______________

55 Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 426, July 26, 1996. 56 BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra. 457

VOL. 388, SEPTEMBER 5, 2002 457 Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom factual basis for the award57 and its causal connection to the acts of

49 Petitioners Memorandum, p. 15; Rollo, p. 109. 50 Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp. v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713, November 25, 1986. 51 Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 141, June 25, 1999. 52 Philtranco Services Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA

Raul

Tutor,

who

is

deemed

as

petitioners

employee.58

Indeed,

the

damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the proximate result of petitioners tortious act or omission.59 Further, no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court.60 The evidence gives no ground for doubt that such discretion The was properly is in and judiciously exercised the by the that trial moral court.61 award fact consistent with rule

204

562, June 17, 1997. 53 Radio Communication v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899 February 28,

damages are not intended to enrich the injured party, but to alleviate the moral suffering undergone by that party by reason of the defendants culpable action.62

Page

1990; San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 21 SCRA 292, September 29, 1967.

WHEREFORE,

the

Petition

is

DENIED

and

the

assailed

Decision 458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hugo vs. Court of Appeals Note.The basis, for holding an employer solidarity responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 [1999]) o0o [Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Suyom, 388 SCRA 445(2002)]

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Puno (Chairman), Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave. Petition denied, judgment affirmed. _______________

57

ART.

2217.

Moral

damages

include

physical

suffering,

mental

anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. 58 Philippine Veterans Bank v. NLRC, 317 SCRA 510, October 26,

1999. 59 San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292, September 29, 1967; Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp v. Reyes, supra. 60 ART. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.

205
Page

61 Salao v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 493, January 22, 1998. 62 Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals, supra. 458

exercised process.

with

fairness

and

in

good

faith

and

after

observing

due

Appeals; Factual acquired expertise

findings of labor officials, who are deemed in matters within their respective

to have are

jurisdictions,

generally accorded not only respect but even finality.Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. However, the rule is not without exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion is based are not supported by substantial evidence. Another exception inferred is or when it is from perceived bare that far too in much is concluded, deduced facts adduced evidence.

Moreover, when the findings of the LA and the NLRC are inconsistent with that of the CA, as in the instant case, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts. The Court finds that the present case falls under the above-mentioned exceptions. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings, which must be complied with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees opportunity _______________ intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an

G.R. No. 165389.

October 17, 2008.*

NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and A/S VULCANUS OSLO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE I. ILAGAN, JR. and CONSTANTINO CO, JR., respondents. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer.It is a basic principle that in the dismissal of employees, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is not justified. This is in

* THIRD DIVISION. 415

206

consonance with the guarantee of security of tenure in the Constitution and in the Labor Code. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer. The determination of the existence and sufficiency of a just cause must be VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008

Page

415 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.While the Court agrees with petitioners that there is no evidence to prove that force, violence or intimidation was employed to effect the disembarkation of the Filipino seamen, the Court still sustains the finding of the CA that the dismissal of private respondents and their companions was done in bad faith, contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, arbitrary and oppressive to labor, thus entitling them to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was at416

Commission to present their own side on the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the managements decision to terminate.The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings, which must be complied with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present led their to the own side on the alleged offense or misconduct, which managements decision to terminate. To

meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Same; Same; Seafarers; It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.Explaining the notice requirements under Section 17, this Court held in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira, 392 SCRA 371 (2002), that: x x x under Section 17 of what is termed the Standard Format, the two-notice rule is indicated. An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Commission tended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. On and public the other hand, exemplary policy requires that these damages acts must are be proper when suppressed the and dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner, discouraged. In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondents and the other Filipino seamen were actually engaged in the performance of their assigned tasks aboard M/T Lady Helene and were even rendering overtime of the work when they were them, unceremoniously the opportunity directed to to disembark themselves from their vessel. Moreover, the total absence of any prior written notice charges against defend against such charges and a written notice of the subsequent decision of the Ship Master to terminate their employment establish the arbitrary and

Page

207

oppressive

character

of

the

dismissal

from

employment

of

private

VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 417 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

respondents and their companions. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ma. Fe Concepcion Guirnalda for petitioners. Capuyan & Quimpo for respondents. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the June 21, 2004 Decision1 and September 14, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78870. The facts of the case are as follows: Jose I. Ilagan, Jr. and Constantino Co, Jr. (private respondents) were among 21 Filipino seamen hired by herein petitioner NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. (NFD) to work on board the _______________

Commission chemical tanker M/T Lady Helene, a vessel owned and operated by

petitioner A/S Vulcanus Oslo (Vulcanus), NFDs foreign principal. On February 11, 1997, while M/T Lady Helene was at Island View Port, Durban, South Africa, Ship Master Captain Steiner Andersen dismissed the 21 Filipino seamen, including herein private respondents, from their employment. They were subsequently repatriated, arriving in the Philippines on February 15, 1997. On March 3, 1997, the NFD 21 in filed before the Adjudication (POEA), they desert October the 12, that to Office a were of the of and the by

Philippine complaint mutiny, POEA conspiracy.

Overseas against

Employment

Administration alleging

disciplinary guilty 1999, filed vessel

seamen an

insubordination, Subsequently, Adjudication

desertion/attempting Order3 the dismissed

dated

Office

disciplinary

complaint

NFD, ordering that the names of the 21 seamen be removed from the POEA watchlist. Meanwhile, filed with on the illegal May 6, 1997, Labor City, and private respondents, together with eight

(complainants) of the 21 seamen whose employments were terminated, 1 Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos with the concurrence of Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Arturo D. Brion (now both members of this Court), Rollo, p. 72. 2 417 CA Rollo, p. 341. National in dismissal Relations a damages Commission for against (NLRC), and National of Vulcanus, Capital contract, Region Quezon Complaint4 wrongful NFD breach

contending that: they were summarily dismissed from their employment without just and valid cause and in gross violation of the terms of their employment contracts; they were forcibly disembarked from the vessel; at the time of their discharge, and up to the filing of their complaint, they had not been paid their accrued salaries, guaranteed overtime pay and leave pay; for their summary dismissal, forcible disembarkation and subsequent repatriation, they seek recovery of their unpaid wages and

Page

208

other benefits as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. In their Position Paper,5 NFD and Vulcanus (petitioners) contended: The complainants were validly and lawfully dismissed _______________

to

any

of

the

amounts NFD

which for the

they

sought

to

recover, by

instead, the latter

they in

should

reimburse

expenses

incurred

connection with their valid dismissal and subsequent repatriation to the Philippines. In their Reply to Respondents Position Paper,6 complainants averred that no single specific act of insubordination, desertion or attempt to desert the vessel or refusal to sail with the vessel was attributed to them; the Filipino crewman who reportedly instigated the alleged mutiny was among

3 CA Rollo, p. 151. 4 Id., at pp. 21-29. 5 CA Rollo, pp. 68-83. 418

those absolved of any liability by petitioners in exchange for a waiver or quitclaim cases petitioners which to he may them have was had a against from the a latter; resorted the to disciplinary by for herein illegal filed against tactical move filing

preempt

complainants

complaint

dismissal; nothing was alleged and no evidence was presented to prove that complainants were accorded the benefit of due process before they were terminated from their employment. In their Rejoinder,7 private respondents contended that the Affidavit8 of

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Anselmo V. Rodriguez, NFD President and General Manager, contained several attachments proving the illegal acts of the complainants; that it was an act of desperation on the part of complainants to put color to the action of NFD in promptly reporting to _______________ employment to for desert their the in acts of mutiny, and trip insubordination, among to 6 Id., at pp. 84-94. 7 Id., at pp. 95-97. 8 Annex F, Rollo, p. 85. 419

Commission from their

desertion/attempting failing to join M/T

vessel its

conspiracy or

themselves together with the other Filipino seamen in refusing and or Lady Helene next destination Mauritius without just and valid cause; contrary to complainants claim, they were not forcibly disembarked from the vessel; four out of the ten complainants had already withdrawn their complaints; out of the remaining six complainants, and rejoin five it were in its given next the trip option to to return the to M/T of Lady the Helene Mauritius; filing

209
Page

complaint was merely an afterthought of the complainants after NFD filed cases for disciplinary action against them; complainants were not entitled VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008

419 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

_______________

Commission the POEA the illegal acts committed by the latter; that, on the contrary, the complaint for illegal dismissal, which was filed three months after their termination from employment took place, was the complainants belated move to serve as a smokescreen for their illegal acts. On January the 30, 1998, the on Labor the Arbiter that (LA) the rendered judgment were

See Labor Arbiters Decision, CA Rollo, pp. 98-113.

10 Id., at pp. 114-125. 11 Id., at pp. 163-186. 12 Id., at pp. 185-186. 13 Id., at pp. 188-201. 14 Id., at pp. 202-210. 15 CA Rollo, pp. 211-219. 16 Id., at pp. 220-221.

dismissing

Complaint

ground

complainants

lawfully dismissed for just cause.9 Complainants filed an appeal with the NLRC.10 On August 30, 2001, the NLRC promulgated a Decision,11 the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is set aside. The respondents

420

[herein petitioners] are directed to jointly and severally pay the appellants complainants[herein private respondents and their companions] their wages for the payment of the unexpired portion of their respective contracts, and unpaid wages including moral and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 each and ten percent (10%) attorneys fees of the total amount awarded. The complaint of Alcesar Baylosis is hereby dismissed in view of the settlement of the monetary claims effected on July 17, 1997. SO ORDERED.12 Herein petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.13 On April 9, 2002, the NLRC came up with the herein assailed Resolution14 which granted petitioners motion and reinstated the Decision dated January 30, 1998 of the LA in their favor. Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 but it was denied by the NLRC in its Order16 promulgated on June 16, 2003. 420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Commission Thereafter, five out of the ten original complainants, to wit: Jose I.

Ilagan, Jr. (herein private respondent), Reynaldo G. Digma, Francisco C. Octavio, Constantino D. Co, Jr. (herein private respondent) and Jesus G. Domingo filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the April 9, 2002 Resolution and the June 16, 2003 Order of the NLRC.17

Page

210

On September 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution18 denying due course to and dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that only one out of the five petitioners therein signed the verification and certificate showing against that such forum-shopping petitioner was attached duly to the petition to sign without for and any in authorized

20 Id., at p. 233. 21 CA Rollo, p. 297. 22 Id., at pp. 308-318. 421

behalf of the other petitioners. On October 3, 2002, herein private respondents filed a Motion for

Reconsideration with Motion to Exclude Reynaldo G. Digma, Francisco C. Octavio and Jesus G. Domingo as petitioners on the ground that the above-named seamen were still abroad by reason of their employment.19 In a Resolution20 dated October 16, 2003, the CA reinstated the petition insofar as herein private respondents were concerned. On June 21, 2004, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, NLRC are premises considered, and the SET petition ASIDE. is The GRANTED. NLRC The VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 421 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Commission Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of errors: I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN

resolution and order dated April 9, 2002 and June 16, 2003 of the hereby ANNULLED decision dated August 30, 2001 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.21 (Italics supplied) Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 but the CA denied it in its Resolution of September 14, 2004. _______________

DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, WHICH FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS THAT FAILED TO PRESENT WERE SUBSTANTIAL FOR EVIDENCE JUST AND PROVING RESPONDENTS DISMISSED

VALID CAUSE. 17 Id., at pp. 2-20. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PROVES THAT RESPONDENTS WERE GUILTY OF MUTINY, INSUBORDINATION, DESERTION/AT-TEMPT-ING TO DESERT THE VESSEL AND CONSPIRACY WITH THE OTHER FILIPINO SEAFARERS IN REFUSING AND/OR FAILING TO JOIN M/T LADY HELENE IN ITS NEXT TRIP OR DESTINATION.

211
Page

18 Id., at p. 224. 19 Id., at p. 225.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT [RESPONDENTS] TERMINATION WAS EFFECTED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. IV. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT [RESPONDENTS] TERMINATION WAS ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH OR DONE CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS OR PUBLIC POLICY.23 The petition has no merit. The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether private respondents termination from their employment was valid. There are two requisites which must be complied with by an employer for a valid dismissal of employees, to wit: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee _______________

must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.24 Anent the first requisite, it is a basic principle that in the dismissal of employees, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal is not justified.25 This is in consonance with the guarantee of security of tenure in the Constitution and in the Labor Code. A dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the charges leveled against him by his employer.26 The determination of the existence and sufficiency of a just cause must be exercised with fairness and in good faith and after observing due process.27 The Court is not persuaded by petitioners contentions in its first and second assigned errors that the CA should have accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact and conclusions of the LA as these are supported by substantial evidence; that petitioners, in fact, were able to present substantial evidence to prove that private respondents were guilty of mutiny, insubordination, desertion/attempt to desert their vessel and conspiracy with the other Filipino seamen in refusing to join said vessel in its next trip. Factual findings in of labor officials, who within their are deemed to have are acquired generally

23 Rollo, pp. 35-36. 422

expertise

matters

respective

jurisdictions,

accorded not only respect but even finality. However, the rule is not without exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact of the labor officials on which the conclusion is based _______________

422

212

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

24 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 639, 658.

Page

Commission

25 De Jesus v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 151158, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 489, 498; Ranises v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 111914, September 24, 1996, 262 SCRA 371, 376. 26 Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Carilla, G.R. No. 157975,

[Herein its next

petitioners] trip.

charged

[herein for

private the

respondents]

for

mutiny, Capt.

insubordination, desertion and conspiracy in refusing to join the vessel in However, except disagreement between Andersen and Engine Fitter Castillo, when the latter refused to resume his work in the Engine Room wherein the other Filipino crew sided with Castillo, there is no proof showing the alleged mutinous and concerted actions of the [private respondents] against Capt. Andersen. There is also the glaring absence of corroborative statements of other officers or crew on board attesting that [private respondents] participated directly or indirectly to any wrong doing, or even intervened in the quarrel between Andersen and Castillo. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of any threat, or any serious misconduct which would justify

June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 586, 594. 27 Id. 423

VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 423 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

[private respondents] dismissal.31 _______________

Commission are not supported by substantial evidence.28 Another exception is when it is perceived that far too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from bare facts adduced in evidence.29 Moreover, when the findings of the LA and the NLRC are inconsistent with that of the CA, as in the instant case, there is a need to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.30 The Court finds that the present case falls under the above-mentioned exceptions. After a review of the arguments and evidence of the parties, the Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CA, the same being in accord with the facts and law of the case.

28 Felix

v.

National

Labor

Relations

Commission,

G.R.

No.

148256,

November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA, 465, 477. 29 Felix v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 28, at p. 477. 30 Portuguez 169570, March v. 2, GSIS 2007, Family 517 Bank SCRA (Comsavings 309, 319; Bank), G.R. v. No.

Macahilig

National

Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158095, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 375, 383. 31 CA Rollo, p. 296. 424

213

The Court agrees with the following findings and conclusion of the CA, to wit: 424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Page

NFD

International

Manning

Agents

vs.

National

Labor

Relations

Indeed, there is no record in the logbook or journal of the ship to indicate that the 21 Filipino seamen, including herein private respondents who were terminated from their employment, threatened to cease and desist from working and to abandon their vessel _______________

Commission which affirmed the earlier finding of the NLRC in its August 30, 2001 Decision, thus: We also noted that [herein petitioners] various charges against the

[private respondents] were bereft of factual details showing the alleged mutinous and concerted actions of herein [private respondents] against the ship captain. The absence of competent evidence or corroborative statements of other officers or crew on board attesting to the fact that complainants have participated directly or indirectly, to any wrongdoing or intervened in the quarrel of the Ship Captain with Fitter Bautista32 deters us in considering the said charges with probity.33 Moreover, the above-quoted findings of the CA and the NLRC are 32 Should be Castillo per Records. 33 Id., at p. 180. 34 CA Rollo, pp. 156-157. 425

consistent with the findings of the POEA in its October 12, 1999 Order dismissing the disciplinary complaint filed by NFD against herein private respondents and their companions. Pertinent portions of the POEA Order reads: Aside from telexes and telefax messages exchanged between VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 425 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

complainant NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. and its principal AS Vulcanus which are all self-serving in nature, no other proof, such as official logbook extracts, was adduced in support of the complaint. Had respondents committed the offense charged, this should at least deserve attention, entry and/or proper documentation in the vessels logbook/journal. Inciting mutiny, being a serious offense, and punishable under the Table of Offense and Corresponding Administrative Penalties of the Standard Employment Contract Governing Employment of All Filipino Seamen on

Commission as a result of the misunderstanding that happened between the Ship Master and a Filipino crew member. Petitioners claim that private respondents and their fellow Filipino seamen were guilty of conspiracy in committing mutiny, insubordination, attempting to desert their by vessel and refusing to sail with from of the the NFD, the vessel is not supported and the substantial and was evidence. General presented was Aside Manager to communications, no competent against did not

214

Board Ocean Going Vessels for two to three year suspension, must be established by clear, strong, and incontrovertible pieces of evidence. In the absence of substantial evidence, such as in the instant case, the charge of inciting mutiny/refusal to sail cannot be given credence.34

through telex messages, sent by representatives of petitioner Vulcanus President proof documentary hearing or substantiate Moreover, charges

Page

private respondents and the other Filipino seamen. No record of any investigation presented. petitioners

present the Ship Master or any member of the ships crew in order to validate or verify the truth regarding the charge against the 21 Filipino seamen. All that were presented by petitioners were allegations which they claimed to have gathered from information provided by the Ship Master that herein private respondents and their fellow Filipino seamen were guilty of the various acts of which they were accused to have committed. Petitioners insist that the findings and conclusions of the LA should be respected. However, the Court finds that the LA failed to cite substantial evidence to support his conclusions. It is not enough for the LA to declare in his Decision that the established facts of the case, however, reveal that complainant[s] were lawfully dismissed for just cause; or that records show that complainants were discharged from their employment for committing acts of mutiny, insubordination and desertion and/or attempting to desert the vessel as well as conspiracy among themselves in refusing to join M/T Lady Helene in its next trip to Mauritius without just and valid cause x x x without specifying the evidence upon which he derived his conclusions. It is true that the LA cited documents consisting of the following: (1) telex message, dated February 11, 1997, sent by a certain Marianne D. Hovland indicated, whose connection NFD with or position had at Vulcanus no solution was to not their informing that there been

Castillo

has

not

left

the

vessel;

and

that

some

other

crew

have

communicated their intention to leave if Castillo would leave;35 (2) telex message, dated February 11, 1997, from the NFD President and General Manager addressed to all NFD officers and crew warning them of the possible consequences, should they decide to leave their vessel to accompany Castillo, and advising them to refrain from refusing to work and to treat their problem intelligently and not to involve others;36 (3) telex message, dated February 12, 1997, from a Captain Helge Grotle whose position at Vulcanus was also not indicated, informing NFD that the Ship Master of M/T Lady Helene decided to dismiss its crew for refusal to go to sea with the vessel, and that according to Grotle, the act of the crew constituted mutiny;37 (4) telex message, dated February 12, 1997, from Captain Andersen informing NFD of his decision to give 14 of the Filipino seamen, which included herein petitioners, the option to return to the vessel on the ground that these seamen were not involved in the alleged mutiny;38 (5) letter from the NFD President and General Manager, dated February 28, 1997, informing the POEA about the dismissal of the 21 Filipino seamen on grounds of mutiny and conspiracy for their concerted refusal to work and join the vessel in going to its next destination.39 However, these documents, standing alone and uncorroborated by any other competent evidence, do not constitute substantial proof that herein private proves respondents their from M/T are indeed First, guilty the of mutiny. of On the of and contrary, the NFD in it are these innocence. supposed Lady evidence consisting Vulcanus telex

problems; and that a Filipino crewman named 426

messages officer of

representatives The

hearsay because they did not come directly from the Ship Master or Helene. information contained communications were merely based on the alleged report or message

426

which came from the Ship Master. However, petitioners failed to present any telex message, testimony or _______________

215

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Page

Commission

35 CA Rollo, p. 273. 36 Id., at p. 274. 37 CA Rollo, p. 275. 38 Id., at p. 276. 39 Id., at p. 278. 427

The Court also finds that in their pleadings before the LA, the NLRC, the CA and this Court, petitioners failed to cite any direct and substantial evidence to support their claim that private respondents and their companions were guilty of mutiny and conspiracy. Hence, the CA was correct in reinstating the NLRC August 30, 2001 Decision finding that petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that the dismissal of private respondents was for a just and valid cause. The next question is whether there was compliance with the second

requisite of a valid dismissal which is due process. VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 427 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations The Court does not agree with petitioners asseverations in their third assigned error that in dismissing respondents from their employment, the Ship Master simply acted within his management of rights the in order to protect the safety of the vessel and its crew, which act, according to petitioners, is recognized under the provisions POEA Standard Employment Contract. The minimum requirement of due process in termination proceedings,

Commission even an affidavit of the Ship Master or any other crew member or officer of the subject vessel to prove that private respondents and their companions were guilty of the acts with which they were charged. Second, the telex message dated February 12, 1997 which came from the Ship Master himself established that private respondents and 12 of their companions were not guilty of mutiny as, in fact, they were given the option to return to the vessel if they wished to. Third, the lettercomplaint filed by NFD with the POEA was later found baseless as the POEA, in its Order dated October 12, 1999, dismissed the complaint of NFD. Even the of NLRC, herein and in its subsequent wherein LAs it the Resolution set aside did dated its not April 9, 30, 2002, 2001 specific

which must be complied with even with respect to seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side on the alleged offense or misconduct, which led to 428

428 petition, August cite SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

216

subject Decision

reinstated

Decision,

any

evidence as basis for adopting the factual findings of the LA.

Page

Commission

the managements decision to terminate.40 To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due hearing which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.41 Petitioner maintains that the Ship Master is allowed to dismiss an erring seafarer without notice under Section 17, paragraph D of the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels42 issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Section 17 sets forth the disciplinary procedures against erring seafarers, to wit: Section 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an erring seafarer: A. The Master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the following: 1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract. 2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges

_______________

40 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, supra note 24, at p. 663. 41 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad, supra note 24, at p. 663. 42 POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 made effective on January 1, 1997. 429

VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 429 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Commission notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, with copies furnished to the Philippine agent. D. Dismissal furnishing the for just cause with may a be effected of by the if Master doing without so will

seafarer

notice

dismissal

prejudice the safety of the crew or the vessel. This information shall be entered in the ships logbook. The Master shall send a complete report to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in support thereof. (Emphasis supplied) Under paragraph D, Section 17 of the Revised Standard Employment

against the seafarer concerned. B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the

investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer the opportunity to explain or

217

defend himself against the charges. An entry on the investigation shall be entered into the ships logbook. C. If, after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master shall issue a written

Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, the Ship Master is excused from furnishing a seafarer with the required notice of dismissal if doing so will prejudice the safety of the crew and the vessel, as in cases of mutiny.

Page

Explaining the notice requirements under Section 17, this Court held in Skippers Pacific, Inc. v. Mira,43 that: x x x under Section 17 of what is termed the Standard Format, the two-notice rule is indicated. An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the the safety of the crew or vessel that the required notices are dispensed manning agency, supported by substantial evidence of the findings.44

NFD

International

Manning

Agents

vs.

National

Labor

Relations

Commission it was essential that his decision to dismiss the Filipino seamen should have been entered in the ships logbook; and that a complete report, substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in support thereof, duly sent to the manning agency. The record of this case is bereft of any such entry in the ships logbook or journal and of any report and supporting documents. Instead, respondents and the other Filipino seamen were verbally ordered to disembark from the vessel and were repatriated to the Philippines without being given written notice of the reasons why. There being no mutiny, petitioners should have complied with Section 17A quoted above. The records reveal that Section 17A was not complied with by the Ship Master. Petitioners and failed to present evidence were to prove that private notices respondents their fellow complainants served written

(Emphasis supplied) However, in the instant case, petitioners failed to establish that private respondents and their companions were guilty of mutiny or that, in any other manner, they posed a clear and present danger to the vessel and its crew which would have justified the Ship Master in dispensing with the required notices. Even if the Ship Master was justified in dispensing with the notice requirements, still, _______________

stating the particular acts or omissions constituting the grounds for their termination. Neither was there evidence to show that private respondents and their companions were given opportunity to answer the charges against them. Thus, the Court sustains the findings of the CA that private respondents and the other complainants were not given the benefit of procedural due process before they were terminated from their employment. Anent the last assigned error. While the Court agrees with petitioners that there is no evidence to prove that force, violence or intimidation was employed to effect the disembarkation of the Filipino seamen, the Court still sustains the finding of the CA that the dismissal of private

43 G.R. No. 144314, November 21, 2002, 392 SCRA 371. 44 Id., at p. 382. 430

218

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

respondents and their companions was done in bad faith, contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, arbitrary and oppressive to labor, thus Moral entitling them are to the award of moral the and exemplary of the damages. employee damages recoverable where dismissal

Page

was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.45 On the _______________

WHEREFORE,

the

instant

Petition

is

DENIED

for

lack

of

merit.

The

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2004 and September 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78870 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales,** Chico-Nazario and

45 De 167701, Machine 431

Guzman

v.

National 12, 2007,

Labor 540

Relations SCRA 21,

Commission, 37; Aguilar

G.R. v.

No.

Nachura, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. Note.The ships logbook is the official record of a ships voyage which its captain is obligated by law to keepthe entries made in the ships logbook by a person performing duty required by law are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Sadagnot vs. Reiner Pacific International Shipping, Inc., 529 SCRA 413 [2007]) o0o [NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 569 SCRA 414(2008)]

December

Burger

VOL. 569, OCTOBER 17, 2008 431 NFD International Manning Agents vs. National Labor Relations

Commission other hand, exemplary damages are proper when the dismissal was

effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner, and public policy requires that these acts must be suppressed and discouraged.46 In the instant case, it is seamen were undisputed engaged that respondents and in the performance the other Filipino of their assigned actually

tasks aboard M/T Lady Helene and were even rendering overtime work when they were unceremoniously directed to disembark from their vessel. Moreover, the total absence of any prior written notice of the charges against them, the opportunity to defend themselves against such charges and a written notice of the subsequent decision of the Ship Master to

219

terminate

their

employment

establish

the

arbitrary

and

oppressive

character of the dismissal from employment of private respondents and their companions.

Page

VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 6, 1991 547 Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 72121. February 6, 1991.* RAFAEL PAGSUYUIN and PEREGRINA PAGSUYUIN-SUBIDO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SALUD PAGSUYUIN, respondents. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parol Evidence; The rule making a

made out a case of fraud by evidence clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a fundamental rule in criminal as well as of in civil cases by the that in the matter of credibility it is of witnesses that the the findings of the trial court are given great weight and the highest degree respect appellate court.Moreover, axiomatic factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals are entitled to _______________

writing the exclusive evidence of the agreement therein stated is not applicable when the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute.As can be clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the rule making a writing the exclusive evidence of the agreement therein stated, is not applicable when the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute. A contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties was procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence or undue influence (Art. 1330, New Civil Code). In fact, as early as 1919 in the case of Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, this Court laid down the rule that where the validity of the agreement is the issue, parol evidence may be introduced to establish illegality or fraud. Same; Same; Same; Same; No Instrument is so sacred when tainted with fraud as to place it beyond the scrutiny of extrinsic evidence.While the place writing it itself beyond may the have been of accompanied extrinsic by the most This solemn evidence formalities, no instrument is so sacred when tainted with fraud as to scrutiny evidence. overcomes the known presumption fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda.

* SECOND DIVISION. 548

548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court great respect (Vda. de Roxas v. IAC, 143 SCRA 77 [1987]), that it is a fundamental rule in criminal as well as in civil cases that in the matter of credibility of witnesses the findings of the trial court are given great weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court (People v. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125 [1985]), unquestionably because the trial judge is in a superior position to gauge the credibility of those who take the witness seat before him. He has the opportunity to size up the appearance, the demeanor, the manner of testifying, the probability or improbability of the testimony, of the witnesses. Indeed, the trial court has a first hand advantage to assess the value to be given the testimony of a witness.

220

Same; out a merely

Same; Same; case of fraud her

Same; Private by evidence

respondents clear, of

evidence and have

have more not

made than Salud been

convincing private which

preponderant.The and two rebutted by

testimonies instrumental the petitioners

respondent

Page

Pagsuyuin satisfactorily

witnesses Rafael

Pagsuyuin, et al. have

Civil Law; Damages; For moral damages to be awarded, it is essential that the claimant must have satisfactorily proved during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection with adverse partys acts.As shown in the records of the case, the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals are in unison as to the findings of the former that a sufficient cause of action had been proved by overwhelming be awarded, during preponderance it is the essential trial the of evidence the of the private must respondent as against the petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. For moral damages to that claimant of the have satisfactorily of the proved existence factual basis

1 Penned by Justice Bienvenido Ejercito, concurred in by Justices Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa and Floreliana Castro-Bartolome. 549

VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 6, 1991 549 Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. CV-67019 entitled Salud Pagsuyuin vs. Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. affirming with modification the decision2 of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Zambales, Branch I in Civil Case No. 2139-0 entitled Salud Pagsuyuin v. Rafael Pagsuyuin et al. for annulment of document, damages with preliminary injunction. Records show that private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin and petitioners Peregrina Pagsuyuin-Subido and Rafael Pagsuyuin are first cousins.

damages and its causal connection with adverse partys acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court. Ejercito, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. R.G. Carlos & Associates Law Offices for petitioners. Aurea Aragon-Casiano for private respondent. PARAS, J.:

Sometime resident Salud a of

in

August, Olongapo was

1974, City able

one and to

Mrs. an

Gregoria a

B. of

Schlander, private in the

then

a of

acquintance loan

respondent amount

Pagsuyuin

secure

P165,000.00 with the Manila Banking Corporation at Olongapo City upon security of a real estate mortgage of property belonging to Salud Pagsuyuin consisting of two (2) two-storey buildings: the first two-storey building has an area of 114 square meters and the second two-storey building has an area of 98 square meters, as well as the commercial

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated June 6, 1985 in AC _______________

lot (Lot 3114, TS-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision) with an area of 339 square meters upon which these two (2) two-storey buildings are erected, which loan was obtained by the said Mrs. Gregoria B. Schlander upon a forged power of attorney allegedly signed by Salud Pagsuyuin (Rollo, Annex D, Amended Record on Appeal, p. 54; pp. 67).

Page

221

On

December 1975, Salud Pagsuyuin

was

informed

that her property

The

three cousins, namely Peregrina, Rafael and Banking Corporation to inquire about

Salud, went to possibility of

the an

had been mortgaged by Mrs. Gregoria B. Schlander in favor of said bank and she immediately went to verify the accuracy of the information which she found to be true, but then Mrs. Schlander had already absconded and left for the United States (Rollo, Ibid., p. 46). As the loan indicated hereinabove was not paid at maturity, the Manila Banking Corporation at Olongapo City started to foreclose the mortgaged properties extrajudicially (Rollo, Ibid., p. 7). To protect, her interest on her property, Salud Pagsuyuin filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City, Branch III, Civil Case No. 1918-0 against the Manila Banking _______________

Manila

the

amicable settlement of the loan, and it was at this juncture that the petitioners told Salud Pagsuyuin that they would help her in settling her mortgage loan if petitioner Peregrina Pagsuyuin-Subido will stay free of charge whatever in the leased will premises be and that by Salud Pagsuyuin to will Salud repay with amount advanced the petitioners

interest (Rollo, Ibid., p. 48). Consequently, two (2) documents were allegedly executed involving the transfer of the properties of Salud Pagsuyuin to Peregrina PagsuyuinSubido and Rafael Pagsuyuin. These documents were: 1) Deed of Assignment (morning version) stating that Salud Pagsuyuin allegedly amount delivered transferred of to Salud her properties and that for the and amount in of consideration P30,000.00 of will the be P256,362.95,

Pagsuyuin upon signing

the instrument, which was

2 Penned by Judge Regino T. Veridiano II. 550

allegedly signed in the morning of September 13, 1976 (Rollo, Petition, pp. 13-16); 2) Deed of Assignment (afternoon version) stating that Salud Pagsuyuin allegedly transferred of her properties for and was in consideration signed of in the the amount of P256,362.96 but there was no indication that there will be a down payment P30,000.00, which allegedly afternoon of September 13, 1976 (Rollo, Petition, pp. 17-19). The two (2) documents (Deeds of Assignment) were notarized by Notary Public Edmundo Tubio allegedly on the 13th of September, 1976 in the presence of witnesses Marietta Javier and Federico Javier (Rollo, Petition, pp. 16; 18). Salud Pagsuyuin and her witnesses denied having executed 551

550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court Corporation, Mrs. Gregoria B. Schlander and her husband Mr. Schlander, including the City Sheriff of Olongapo City, to annul the said real estate mortgage with a prayer for preliminary injunction (Rollo, Ibid., p. 8).

222
Page

Petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin and Peregrina Pagsuyuin-Subido, brother and sister and first cousins of Salud Pagsuyuin, offered to the latter to settle the bank loan so as to keep her peace of mind and to retain the ownership of her mortgaged properties (Rollo, Ibid., p. 47).

VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 6, 1991 551 Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court the above deeds of assignment on September 13, 1976 as she was on that date at Alitagtag, Batangas while her instrumental witnesses Federico Javier was working at the U.S. Naval Base, while his wife Marietta Javier was at Olongapo City. Consequently, on March 1, 1977, an amended complaint was filed by Salud Pagsuyuin before the Court of First Instance of Zambales for the annulment of documents, damages with preliminary injunction, alleging among others, that the signature of private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin and her witnesses, namely; Marietta Pagsuyuin-Javier and Federico Javier in the Deeds of Assignment were obtained thru fraud and trickery perpetrated by the petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin and Peregrina PagsuyuinSubido (Rollo, Annex D, Amended Record on Appeal, p. 54; pp. 5-19). On March 24, 1977, petitioners filed an answer claiming by way of

b) If there was payment of indebtedness in the amount of P226,362.96 to the Manila Bank, the plaintiff is hereby directed to refund the same amount to the defendants with legal interest; c) Ordering all other payments made by the defendants offsetting the plaintiffs indebtedness such as made to Felix Makalintal, Theodore Ilagan, and Irene de Leon, refunded by the plaintiff to the defendants with legal interest; d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages; and e) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the amount of

P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. Defendants counterclaim are hereby denied. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex H; Amended Record on Appeal, p. 552

special defense that it was the private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin who proposed to the petitioners the transfer of all the properties covered by a Real Estate Mortgage (Rollo, Annex D, Amended Record on Appeal, p. 54; pp. 23-32). On March 21, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff 552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 54; pp. 69-70). On Appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court in its decision dated June 6, 1985, ruled: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is

(Salud) and against the defendants (herein petitioners) as follows: a) Declaring the Deeds of Assignment (Exhs. A and B) as null and void;

223

affirmed but with the modification of paragraphs b, d, and e of the dispositive portion of the decision to read as follows:

Page

b.) Ordering plaintiff to pay defendants the amount of P226,362.96 with legal interest from dates of said payment and expenses paid by the defendants to the Manila Bank; d.) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and e.) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the amount of

553

VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 6, 1991 553 Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (b) xxxx xxx (Sec. 7, Rule 130).

P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. With costs against the defendants. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex A, Decision, pp. 50-51). A motion for reconsideration was filed on June 25, 1985, however, it was denied (Rollo, Annex B, p. 52). Hence, this petition. The main issue in the instant case is whether or not parol evidence is admissible to annul the deed of assignment on the ground of fraud. Petitioners evidence document Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. contend that both lower courts

As can be clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the rule making a writing the exclusive evidence of the agreement therein stated, is not applicable when the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute. A contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties was procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence or undue influence (Art. 1330, New Civil Code). In fact, as early as 1919 in the case of Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, this Court laid down the rule that where the validity of the agreement is the issue, parol evidence may be introduced to establish illegality or fraud. In the case at bar, petitioners of the Deeds of relied heavily on the fact of notarial Assignment by Notary Public the Edmundo deflect the presence of

gravely erred in voiding the Deeds of Assignment based upon extrinsic of alleged reduced to vitiated consent of the writing is deemed to assignor-private have contained respondent all such Salud Pagsuyuin in defiance of the settled rule of parol evidence that a terms and conditions as contemplated by the parties and there can be, between the said parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing itself. The contention is untenable.

certification witnesses

Tubio allegedly on the 13th of September, 1976 in Marietta Pagsuyuin-Javier and Federico admissibility of parol evidence.

Javier to

On the other hand, private respondents evidence clearly shows that on September International returned Then on to 7, 1976 a document she in the at was brought that of 6:00 to her at the Manila she and Airport, her which signed same evening (when

house)

presence around

witnesses a.m.,

Federico

224

The rule on parol evidence recognizes the following exceptions: (a) where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to

Marietta Javier but they were not given copies thereof (Rollo, pp. 72-76). September 8, 1976 Rafael Pagsuyuin went to the house of the private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin with more documents for signature. Relying on the assurances of petitioner Rafael that the same were additional copies of the documents they had signed

Page

express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

in the evening of September 7, 1976 (TSN, Hearing of May 9, 1978, pp. 9-13; Rollo, pp. 73-74), Salud and her witnesses signed without reading as petitioner Rafael was in a hurry (TSN, Hearing of January 31, 1978; Rollo, pp. 74-75) and he only showed them the latter portion and refused to show the contents of the documents (TSN, Hearing of October 13, 1977; Rollo, the pp. house 75-76). of After he had obtained leaving their any signatures, Rafael left Salud again without

The trial court continued: The person who could have enlightened this court as to the disputed facts is none other than Rafael Pagsuyuin himself, but said witness developed cold feet and discontinued declaring against the plaintiff, most probably because of deep-rooted fear of being discovered falsifying the truth and experiencing the fangs of guilty conscience, he broke completely down in court and could not continue his declaration against his cousin the herein plaintiff, so that his counsel withdrew him as a witness and his entire testimony was disregarded by this court. Judging from his demeanor and attitude, the court had very well observed that he could not explain the dubious circumstances that characterized the transfer of the property between him and the plaintiff. The failure of defendant Rafael Pagsuyuin to give testimony was a fatal defect that torpedoed the efforts of the defendants and witnesses to prove the defense that there was a valid transfer of the properties. (C.A. Decision, Rollo, pp. 40-51). While the writing itself may have been accompanied by the most solemn formalities, no instrument is so sacred when tainted with fraud as to place it beyond the scrutiny of extrinsic evidence. This evidence overcomes the known presumption fraus est odiosa et non praesumenda (Yturralde v. Vagilidad, 28 SCRA 393 [1969]). The testimonies of private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin and her two

copy of the document (TSN, Hearing of January 31, 1978, Ibid.). As it turned out, the documents were denominated as Deeds of Assignment, contrary to the intent of private respondent. These testimonies were never satisfactorily rebutted by the petition554

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court ers. At this juncture, the findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the appellate court are quoted with approval: x x x the instruments of sale (Exh. A and B) lacked the valid consent of the transferor Salud Pagsuyuin as there was fraud enlisted in making plaintiff sign the documents without understanding the contents thereof. The authenticity and genuineness of the documents were attacked because . . . . . defendants vitiated consent in the preparation

instrumental witnesses which have not been satisfactorily rebutted by the petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. have 555

225

and execution of said documents as plaintiff was misled into believing the same is a deed of mortgage instead of a deed of assignment. The evidence had proven that plaintiff was tricked and deceived into signing two (2) deeds of assignment which was not her intention to do so (sic).

VOL. 193, FEBRUARY 6, 1991 555 Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Page

made out a case of fraud by evidence clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Moreover, it is axiomatic that the factual findings of the trial Court and Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect (Vda. de Roxas v. IAC, 143 SCRA 77 [1987]), that it is a fundamental rule in criminal as well as of in civil cases by the that in the matter of credibility v. Sarol, of witnesses SCRA the 125 findings of the trial court are given great weight and the highest degree respect appellate court (People 139 [1985]), unquestionably because the trial judge is in a superior position to gauge the credibility of those who take the witness seat before him. He has the opportunity to size up the appearance, the demeanor, the manner of testifying, the probability or improbability of the testimony, of the witnesses. Indeed, the trial court has a first hand advantage to assess the value to be given the testimony of a witness (Yturralde v. Vagilidad, supra). Petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin, et. al., also assign as error the grant of moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees in favor of private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin. As shown in the records of the case, the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals are in unison as to the findings of the former that a sufficient cause of of action of had the been private proved respondent by as overwhelming against the preponderance evidence

The wrongful act attributable to the petitionersthe employment of fraudd is the proximate cause of the mental anguish suffered by private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate

Court dated June 6, 1985 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and Re556

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sucaldito vs. Montejo galado, JJ., concur. Decision affirmed. Note.Admission of parol testimony to prove that a deed, absolute in form, was in fact given and accepted as a mortgage does not violate the rule against admission of oral evidence to vary or contradict the terms of a written instrument. (Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635.) [Pagsuyuin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 547(1991)]

petitioners Rafael Pagsuyuin, et al. For moral damages to be awarded, it is essential that the claimant must have satisfactorily proved during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection with adverse partys acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Makabili v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 253 [1988]).

Page

226

Misconduct; not a mere

We

have in

defined

misconduct have

as

any

forbidden misconduct

act as

or any

dereliction of duty. It is willful in character and implies a wrongful intent, error judgment.We defined forbidden act or dereliction of duty. It is willful in character and implies a wrongful intent, not a mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious, must be grave and not merely trivial. Labor Law; Illegal Dismissal; Alipio was illegally dismissed because

petitioners failed on both counts to comply with the twin requisites for a valid termination.Alipio was illegally dismissed because petitioners failed on both counts to comply with the twin requisites for a valid termination. She is thus entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other Should benefits, or was their be monetary up no to to equivalent the month time feasible, pay computed of for actual Alipio her is from the entitled year time to of compensation separation pay withheld reinstatement. every

reinstatement

longer one

equivalent

service in lieu of reinstatement. Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are recoverable where the

dismissal of the employee was attended with bad faith or was done in G.R. No. 167310. June 17, 2008.* a manner contrary to good customsexemplary damages _______________

THE PENINSULA MANILA, ROLF PFISTERER AND BENILDA QUEVEDOSANTOS, petitioners, vs. ELAINE M. ALIPIO, respondent. Labor Law; Regular Employees; An employment is deemed regular when the activities in performed the usual when by the the employee of the are usually by the necessary employment employee or is are desirable deemed business employer.An

* SECOND DIVISION. 551

regular

activities

performed

usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer.

227

However, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, even though intermittent, is deemed regular with respect to the activity performed and while such activity actually exists.

VOL. 554, JUNE 17, 2008 551 The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio

Page

may

also

be

awarded

if

the

dismissal

is

effected

in

wanton, 1 Rollo, pp. 34-52. Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate concurring. 2 Id., at pp. 53-57. Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Santiago Javier Ranada

oppressive or malevolent manner.Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended with bad faith or was done in a manner contrary to good customs. Exemplary damages may also be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. Damages; Attorneys Fees; The award of attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the and total thus monetary ought to award be is consistent with of prevailing jurisprudence affirmed.The award

3 Id., at pp. 74-82. 4 Id., at pp. 62-72 (Dated March 15, 2000). 552

attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award is consistent with prevailing jurisprudence and thus ought to be affirmed. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Inocentes, De Leon, Leogardo, Atienza, Magnaye & Azucena (IDLAMA) Law Offices for petitioners. Levy Edwin C. Ang for respondent Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN). QUISUMBING, J.:

552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio missal against herein petitioners, but awarding respondent herein

separation pay amounting to P20,000. The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner, The Peninsula Manila, is a corporation engaged in the hotel business. Co-petitioners Rolf Pfisterer and Benilda Quevedo-Santos were the general manager and human resources manager, respectively, of the

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated August 23, 2004 and Resolution2 dated March 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67007, which reversed the Decision3 dated December 29, 2000 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 023890-00. The NLRC had earlier affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiters Decision,4 dismissing the complaint for illegal dis_______________

hotel at the time of the controversy. The hotel operates a clinic 24 hours a day and employs three regular nurses who work eight hours each day on three separate shifts. The hotel also engages the services of reliever nurses who substitute for the regular nurses who are either off-duty or absent. Respondent Elaine M. Alipio was hired merely as a reliever nurse.

Page

228

However, she had been performing the usual tasks and functions of a

regular nurse since the start of her employment on December 11, 1993. Hence, after about four years of employment in the hotel, she inquired why she was not receiving her 13th month pay. In response, petitioners required her to submit a summary of her tour of duty for 1997. After she had submitted the said summary, Alipio was paid P8,000 as her 13th month pay for 1997. Alipio likewise requested for the payment of her 13th month pay for 1993 to 1996, but her request was denied. On December 18, 1998, Alipio was informed by a fellow nurse that she can only report for work after meeting up with petitioner Santos. When Alipio met with Santos on December 21, 1998, Alipio was asked regarding her payslip vouchers. She told Santos that she made copies of her payslip vouchers because Peninsula does not give her copies of the same. Santos was peeved with Alipios response because the latter was allegedly not entitled to get copies of her payslip vouchers. Santos likewise directed Alipio not to report for work anymore. 553

that complainant had served as reliever for respondent hotel for a long period, the respondent hotel is ordered to give her separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of complainants reliever service, in the total amount of P20,000.00 based on an average monthly pay of P8,000.00. SO ORDERED.5 On appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiters

decision, to wit: WHEREFORE, the appeal of the complainant is dismissed for lack of merit. Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification that the award of separation pay is hereby deleted. SO ORDERED.6 Upon further review, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC after ascertaining that the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Alipio is not an employee of Peninsula and that she was validly dismissed is not supported by the evidence on record.7 The dispositive portion of the Decision dated August 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals reads:

VOL. 554, JUNE 17, 2008 553 The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio Aggrieved, petitioners. After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack Alipio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the

_______________

5 Id., at p. 72. 6 Id., at p. 81. 7 Id., at p. 40. 554

229
Page

of merit, but directed that Peninsula pay Alipio separation pay amounting to P20,000. The Labor Arbiter held, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint for lack of merit. However, considering

554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated

II. IN DECLARING THE RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL TO BE ILLEGAL AND ORDERING HER REINSTATEMENT WITH FULL BACK WAGES, TOGETHER WITH PAYMENT OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.9 _______________

December 29, 2000 and the Order dated June 29, 2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents The Peninsula Manila and Benilda Quevedo-Santos are ordered to reinstate petitioner Elaine M. Alipio as regular staff nurse without loss of seniority rights; to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, full backwages and all the benefits to which she is entitled under the Labor Code from December 12, 1994 up to the time of her actual reinstatement; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000[.]00, and attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total monetary award. Let this case be remanded to the Labor Arbitration Branch, National

8 Id., at p. 50. 9 Id., at pp. 139-140. 555

VOL. 554, JUNE 17, 2008 555 The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should have accorded the unanimous findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC due respect and finality as the conclusion reached by the two bodies is supported by substantial evidence on record. Petitioners insist Alipio was terminated for a just cause and with due process. Petitioners likewise argue that Alipio cannot be reinstated as a regular staff nurse because (1) she never served in that capacity; and (2) there is no vacancy for the said

Labor Relations Commission for the computation of the monetary claims of petitioner. SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari contending that the Court of Appeals seriously erred: I. IN GIVING DUE COURSE WAS TO THE RESPONDENTS BASED ON BY PETITION THE BY FOR OF

CERTIORARI

WHICH FACTUAL

MAINLY

ALLEGATIONS

position or any equivalent position to which she may be reinstated. Alipio, for her part, counters that the NLRC decision, affirming that of the Labor Arbiter, is not beyond the scope of judicial review because palpable mistake was committed in disregarding evidence showing (1) her status as a regular employee of Peninsula; and (2) petitioners failure to

230

SUPPOSED FINDINGS

ERRORS WHICH

COMMITTED

NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND IN REVERSING THE LATTERS OF FACT WERE SUPPORTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD; AND

Page

observe substantive and procedural due process. She points out that a Certification dated April 22, 1997 issued by the hotel proves she was a regular staff nurse until at her the illegal dismissal. City She stresses Center that does her not supposed employment Quezon Medical

ART. 280. agreement

Regular to the

and

Casual

Employment.The and

provisions of

of

written oral

contrary

notwithstanding

regardless

the

agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding at or paragraph: least one broken, shall Provided, year be of That, service, considered any a employee such regular who service has is with rendered continuous whether

negate the fact that she also worked as a regular nurse of the hotel. Additionally, she contends that obtaining copies of her own payslips does not indicate a perverse attitude justifying dismissal for serious misconduct or willful disobedience. She adds, there is no showing that her refusal to return copies of her payslips caused material damage to petitioners. She further claims that bad faith attended her dismissal. After carefully weighing the parties arguments, we resolve to deny the petition. It is doctrinal that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded respect and finality if such are supported by substantial evidence. In some instances, however, the Court may be compelled to deviate from this general rule if the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC misappreciated the facts, thereby resulting in the impairment 556

employee

respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, an employment is deemed regular when the activities performed by the employee are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer. However, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, even

556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio of the workers constitutional and statutory right to security of tenure.10 The conclusions reached by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, that Alipio

_______________

10 Trendline

Employees

Association-Southern

Philippines

Federation

of

Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112923, May 5, 1997, 272 SCRA 172, 179. 557

231

was

not a

regular employee

of

the

hotel

and

that

she

was

validly VOL. 554, JUNE 17, 2008

dismissed, are not supported by law and evidence on record. Article 280 of the Labor Code provides:

Page

557 The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio though intermittent, is deemed regular with respect to the activity

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the

performed and while such activity actually exists.11 In this case, records show that Alipios services were engaged by the hotel intermittently from 1993 up to 1998. Her services as a reliever nurse were undoubtedly necessary and desirable in the hotels business of providing comfortable accommodation to its guests. In any case, since she had rendered more than one year of intermittent service as a reliever nurse at the hotel, she had become a regular employee as early as December 12, 1994. Lastly, per the hotels own Certification dated April 22, 1997, she was already a regular staff nurse until her dismissal. Being a regular employee, Alipio enjoys security of tenure. Her services may be terminated only upon compliance with the substantive and procedural requisites for a valid dismissal: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 28212 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.13 _______________

person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. 13 Voyeur Visage Studio, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144939, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 721, 729. 558

558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio Did Alipio commit serious misconduct when she obtained copies of her payslips? We have defined misconduct as any forbidden act or dereliction of duty. It is willful in character and implies a wrongful intent, not a mere error

11 De Leon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 70705, August 21, 1989, 176 SCRA 615, 621. 12 ART. 282. Termination by employer.An employer may terminate an

in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious, must be grave and not merely trivial.14 In this case, Alipios act of obtaining copies of her payslips cannot be characterized as a misconduct, much less a grave misconduct. On the contrary, we find it absurd that she had to resort to her own resourcefulness to get hold of these documents since it was incumbent upon Peninsula, as her employer, to give her copies of her payslips as

232
Page

employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the

lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

a matter of course. We are thus convinced that Alipios dismissal was not based on a just cause. Was Alipio afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend herself? When Santos had a meeting with Alipio on December 21, 1998, she was not informed that the hotel was contemplating her dismissal. Neither was she informed of the ground for which her dismissal was sought. She was simply thereby told right Alipio there no was and likewise then for that her she to of be was already and due dismissed, defend process. Clearly, Alipio was illegally dismissed because petitioners failed on both counts to comply with the twin requisites for a valid termination. She is thus entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits, or their monetary equivalent computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.15 _______________ affording opportunity heard

The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio Should reinstatement pay be no to longer one feasible, pay Alipio for her is entitled year to of

separation

equivalent

month

every

service in lieu of reinstatement.16 Furthermore, as a rule, moral damages are recoverable where the

dismissal of the employee was attended with bad faith or was done in a manner contrary to good customs.17 Exemplary damages may also be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.18 In this case, while the petitioners issued a Certification dated April 22, 1997 and recognized Alipio as a regular employee, they deprived her of copies of her own payslips. Moreover, her dismissal was effected in a manner whereby she was deprived of due process. Under these circumstances, she is also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P15,000 and exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000. Lastly, the award of attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award is consistent with prevailing jurisprudence19 and thus ought to be affirmed. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated August 23, 2004 and Resolution _______________

herself.

Thus,

deprived

procedural

14 Lakpue Drug, Inc. v. Belga, G.R. No. 166379, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 617, 623. 15 Labor Code, the ART. 279. Security employer shall not of Tenure.In terminate the cases of regular of an

employment,

services

employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this 559

Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

233
Page

VOL. 554, JUNE 17, 2008 559

16 P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158758, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 784, 799, citing Gaco v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104690, February 23, 1994, 230 SCRA 260, 268. 17 Mayon Hotel & Restaurant v. Adana, G.R. No. 157634, May 16,

loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Big AA Manufacturer vs. Antonio, 484 SCRA 33 [2006]) Instances (Poseidon when the employee vs. must be deemed a regular employee. 482

2005, 458 SCRA 609, 639. 18 Kay Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162472, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 544, 559. 19 Micro Sales Operation Network v. National Labor Relations

Fishing,

Inc.

National

Labor

Relations

Commission,

SCRA 717 [2006]) o0o [The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio, 554 SCRA 550(2008)]

Commission, G.R. No. 155279, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 328, 331. 560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Peninsula Manila vs. Alipio dated March 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67007 are hereby AFFIRMED as MODIFIED, such that the amount of moral damages is reduced to only P15,000 and the exemplary damages to only P10,000. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Tinga, Reyes,** Leonardo-De Castro*** and Brion, JJ., concur. Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed with modification. Notes.Article 279 of the Labor Code, provides that a regular employee who is unjustly dismissed from work is entitled to reinstatement without

Page

234

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 301 People vs. Tabuelog G.R. No. 178059. January 22, 2008.* PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER

TABUELOG y CLAOR, appellant. Criminal Law; Murder; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements; In self-defense, elements of whether justifying complete or incomplete, invoking the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the circumstance.In self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;

235

(b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; the and (c) lack of of his sufficient provocation on the part the of the person of the defending himself. The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on strength own evidence and not on weakness

Page

prosecutions evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has _______________

findings of the trial court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself. Nevertheless, mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.

* THIRD DIVISION. 302

Same; Same; Evidence; Quantum of Evidence; Treachery must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him. In the instant case, there was no proof that appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for self-defense evidence after alibi, the is with sufficient and convincing weak, it the be easily homicide, not murder. Same; Same; Damages; Current jurisprudence allows the grant of if the like of the accused a prosecution were himself had which can

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog the could killing. burden not be of proving

evidence, for even Self-defense,

disbelieved

admitted

defense

P25,000.00 as temperate damages when it appears that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss but the award thereof cannot be 303

concocted. If the accuseds evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail. Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Unlawful aggression,

presupposes not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which and imperils ones unexpected life or limb.Unlawful aggression presupposes not or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden attack VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 303 People vs. Tabuelog established with certainty.The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence. However, we cannot sustain the trial courts award for with the

236
Page

ones life or limb. It is the first and primordial element of self-defense. Without it, the justifying circumstance cannot be invoked. Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.We cannot agree

actual damages in the amount of P113,776.00. While the victims mother, Marqueza Badinas, testified on the civil aspect of the case, she only presented a list of expenses without submitting the corresponding receipts. The trial court awarded the same noting that it was agreed upon during trial. This is not allowed. The award of actual damages is proper only if the actual amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. It should be supported by receipts. Thus, actual or compensatory appears that damages the heirs cannot of the be victim awarded. suffered Current pecuniary jurisprudence, loss but the however, allows the grant of P25,000.00 as temperate damages when it

1 Rollo, pp. 2-14; penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. 2 CA Rollo, pp. 64-73; penned by Judge Conrado A. Ragucos. 304

304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog On October 14, 2002, an Information3 was filed charging appellant with

award thereof cannot be established with certainty. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

murder committed as follows: That on or about the 12th day of October, 2002, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed there death. accused, with wilfully, treachery and and with intent to stabbed kill, did then and unlawfully feloniously from behind Clinton

Badinas on the left side of his body that resulted to his instantaneous

Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 01038 1 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16 in Crim. Case No. 10408-162 finding appellant Christopher Tabuelog guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CONTRARY TO LAW. Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 25, 2002.4 During pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts, to wit: That the defense admits that whenever prosecution witnesses mentioned the name Christopher Tabuelog they would be referring to the accused who is charged and arraigned under the Information;

Page

237

_______________

That

on

October

12,

2002

accused

was

student

of

Abra

Valley

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: The witnesses for the prosecution were Jay-arr Martinez, Dr. Rodrigo Catcatan of the Laoag City General Hospital and the mother of the deceased who testified on the civil aspect. Jay-arr Martinez testified that: On October 12, 2002, the students of Abra Valley College has a field trip in to an Fort Ilocandia, jeep Brgy. 37, at Calayab, the Laoag at City. 9:30 He went in with the Great Ceasar Martinez, Banie Mosilet, Clinton Badinas and Tom Tejada owner-type arriving place oclock morning. As the jeep was parked near one of the cottages in the area, the victim was conversing with a (former) teacher inside a cottage about two (2) meters away, while Great Ceasar Martinez, Tom Tejada, Jay-Arr Martinez and Banie Mosilet were at the jeep. Suddenly, Roger Domingo came and shouted to Great Ceasar Martinez You are fooling; I am from Bangued (Abra)! The latter was allegedly mad and drunk at that instance. The victim came to pacify Roger Domingo by placing his arm over his shoulder and saying pacencia ka ta nabartek. The victim eventually led Domingo away. At that juncture, the accused came behind the victim and Domingo, and when near, drew a knife. Using his left hand, he stabbed the left side of the body of the victim. Immediately, the accused ran towards the mini-bus (presumably their vehicle for the field trip) eighty (80) meters away, chased by the victim, Banie Mosilet and Great Ceasar Martinez. They were not able to catch the accused though because the victim pleaded to be rushed to the hospital. Using the jeep, the victim was brought to the Laoag City General Hospital where he was pronounced dead. According to Dr. Rodrigo Catcatan the victim sustained the following

Colleges, Bangued, Abra; That said accused joined a field trip in Calayab Beach, Laoag City; That his group was at the Calayab Beach at 4:00 oclock in the

afternoon; That the accused admits that he stabbed Clinton Badinas on or about that time on said place and as a consequence of the wound he sustained Clinton Badinas died. The prosecution and defense agreed into the following issues: Whether or not the stabbing of Clinton Badinas by the accused was attended by treachery and whether or not the accused acted in self defense in stabbing Clinton Badinas.5 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. _______________

3 Records, p. 1. 4 Id., at p. 22. 5 Id., at p. 27. 305

238

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 305 People vs. Tabuelog

wounds: Stab wound, 3-4 centimeters, level 6-7 Intercostal Space (ICS), left. The penetration could have damaged the heart and lungs of the victim, which caused his death and the assailant could have been southwest of the victim.

Page

The other

defense,

on

the

other of

hand, the

presented Valley

different at

scenario. the Fort

sliding accused

back

to

avoid

the

attack.

While

doing

so,

the

victim

was

According to the accused, they were on a field trip together with the Criminology students Abra College Ilocandia Beach Resort (Calayab Beach), Brgy. Calayab, Laoag City. After hearing a lecture on Police Photography, they had a drinking session inside one of the cottages, together with Roger Domingo, Adrian Benabese and others. The victim, Great Ceasar Martinez and 306

continuously assaulting him with the broken bottle he was holding. The consequently threw a water pitcher hitting the breast of the victim, and likewise continued to wiggle backwards and attempted to hold a knife used in chopping ice. However, the victim still tried to stab him by going on top of him when accused was sitting on his buttocks and wiggled away with his two hands. The victim pushed him on his breast while holding the broken bottle and accused was leaning backward, supporting himself with his two hands. In that position, the accused was able to grasp the knife and swayed it upward with his right hand. The knife hit the area below the armpit of the victim. The accused then

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog Jay-Arr Martinez likewise participated in the drinking session. About five together with Great Ceasar Martinez and Jay-Arr Martinez used in joining the field trip. It was after the group finished drinking at about three to four oclock in the afternoon that the accused heard Roger Domingo and Great Ceasar Martinez quarreling in front of the cottage. Next, he heard Great Ceasar shouted Uncle Clinton, come here! Clinton Badinas then appeared in front of the cottage coming from the back, and in the process picked up a bottle and broke it (by using) a post. Afterwards, the victim chased Domingo around the jeep. The accused, seeing the circumstances unfolding, shouted for Roger to stop, to which the victim reacted by next facing the accused. At a distance of one to

took this opportunity to run at the parked mini bus.6 The court trial court found a the version finding of the prosecution guilty of credible murder, thus the

rejecting appellants theory of self-defense. On May 6, 2005, the trial rendered Decision appellant dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the accused to prove self-defense, complete or incomplete, and the fact that the _______________

6 Id., at pp. 122-125. 307

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 307 People vs. Tabuelog

239
Page

two (1-2) meters away from each other, the victim tried to stab the chest of the accused, reason for which the latter moved backwards in an attempt to evade the stabbing act. Unfortunately, he fell down to the ground as result. The victim allegedly continued going near the accused, stopping to stab him, to which the latter responded by wiggling and

prosecution was able to prove the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery beyond reasonable doubt in the killing of CLINTON BADINAS, the accused CHRISTOPHER TABUELOG is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua will all its accessory penalties is imposed upon him. He is also Ordered to pay the heirs of CLINTON BADINAS Fifty

_______________

7 Id., at pp. 129-130. 8 People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 169060, February 6, 2007, 514

SCRA 660. 308

Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Six Pesos (P113,776.00) as actual damages being the amount agreed upon during the trial; and the Costs. SO ORDERED.7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. Appellant alleges that the justifying circumstance of selfdefense was not properly considered in his favor; that assuming the killing was committed not in self-defense, still the courts below erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The petition is partly meritorious. In invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus

308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog alleged sufficient criminal and act. One who admits for the even infliction if the of injuries which of the

caused the death of another has the burden of proving self-defense with convincing the evidence, evidence prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted killing. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accuseds evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.9 We agree with the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the defense miserably failed to establish the elements of self-defense namely: a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression presupposes not merely a threatening or an

probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.8 The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence since he admits the commission of the

240

Page

intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils ones life or limb. It is the first

and

primordial

element

of

selfdefense.

Without

it,

the

justifying

Further,

if

Domingo

stopped

as

narrated

by

appellant,

then

it

is

circumstance cannot be invoked.10 In the instant case, appellant failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of the As victim; correctly victim, moreover, observed position it is of his by the narration the trial appellant that of the events the was the unbelievable. alleged assault from court, considering and appellant

inconceivable that he was not harmed by his alleged pursuer. The testimony did of not Roger help Domingo or who was the presented defenses as a defense In fact,

witness

strengthen

theory.

Domingos testimony was full of inconsistencies and improbabilities that it deserves no credence at all. Prosecution witness Jay-arr Martinez, as well as the appellant, testified that the stabbing incident was precipitated by an argument between Great Ceasar Martinez and Roger Domingo, to wit: Testimony of Jay-arr Martinez: q After Roger Domingo went near the passenger seat in front of the

disadvantageous the

relentless remained

surprising

unscathed. The presence of a pitcher and a knife conveniently within the reach of appellant was highly suspect and coincidental. As noted by the trial court, the presence of a pitcher of water which the accused picked up to repel the attack of the deceased and the knife which the accused was able to grasp and swung it to the _______________

owner jeep, what happened again? 9 Id. 10 Id. 309 a I heard him uttered, you are fooling, I am from Bangued. q And to whom did Roger Domingo addressed? VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 309 People vs. Tabuelog (victim) hitting him near the left armpit seems to suggest that pitchers a Great Ceasar Martinez, madam. q At the time what did you observe with this Roger Domingo? a He was mad.12 Testimony of appellant Christopher Tabuelog:

241

and knives are scattered around Fort Ilocandia.11 Moreover, if it were true that the victim was pursuing Roger Domingo with a broken bottle, then it is preposterous for the appellant to shout at and order Domingo, instead of the victim, to stop, thus putting Domingos life at risk.

Page

q While you were there inside the cottage, what happened? a I heard somebody quarelling, sir. q And do you recognized who are those persons quarelling? a Yes, sir. q And, who are they, Mr. Witness? a Roger Romindo (Domingo) and Great Cesar Martinez, sir. _______________

People vs. Tabuelog q Where were they quarelling in relation to you inside the cottage? a Infront of the cottage where I stayed, sir. q And what did you hear while they were quarelling? a Roger Domingo prohibits Great Cesar Martinez to make the niece of Roger Domingo as his girlfriend, sir. q While they were quarelling, what happened? a I heard Great Cesar Martinez shouted, sir. q What did you hear as he shouted? a Uncle Clinton, come here!

11 Records, p. 126. 12 TSN, January 31, 2003, p. 5. 310

242

310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

q How far were you when you heard the shout of Great Cesar Martinez? a

Page

Five (5) meters away, sir. q And after Great Ceasar Martinez shouted, Uncle Clinton, come here!, do you recall whether there was a person appeared? a Yes, sir. q And who was that person who appeared responding that call? a Clinton Badinas, sir.13 However, when Roger Domingo was placed on the witness stand, he denied meeting or talking with the victim, Clinton Badinas, and Great Ceasar thus: q You remember encountering the group of the deceased in this case Martinez. He also disavowed witnessing the stabbing incident,

Martines talk to each other on October 12, 2002 at about 4:00 in the afternoon, what can you say as to that? _______________

13 TSN, January 11, 2005, pp. 9-10. 311

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 311 People vs. Tabuelog a I dont know, sir. q Do you mean to say Mr. Witness, you never saw Great Cesar

Martinez? a I dont know that person, sir q But do you remember talking to a man whose name you do not know? a None, sir.

Clinton Badinas? a No, sir. q

243
Page

When the witness of the prosecution JR Martinez came to court he told the Honorable Court and we are referring now to the sworn statement of the witness that Roger Domingo referring to you and Great Cesar

q You did not talk to anybody aside from Christopher Tabuelog on May we pray, your honor, that the police blotter is not our evidence. Atty. Barba

October 12, 2002 at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon? a None, sir. q When JR Martinez with Great came Cesar to court he and also you said said that in you the has an

Its a form part of the record, your honor. Atty. Barba Martinez vernacular Lines 12, 13 and 14. Atty. Barba q During which the victim has heated altercation meaning Clinton Badinas heated altercation to a fellow criminology student Roger Domingo of Clinton he Badinas it came near na you ni Roger Roger Domingo Domingo, in do the you Bangued, Abra? 312

argument

luklukuen nak sa met taga Bangued dak? a I did not say that remark, sir. q And during that conversation, Im still referring to the testimony of JR Martinez vernacular described ginabbay

remember that instance? a None, sir. q Mr. Witness, in the were police named blotter herein which as mark a as exhibit for in the a

312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog a None, sir. q

prosecution

you

having

participation

244
Page

heated altercation with the victim Clinton Badinas we are referring to the exact copy of the police blotter? Fiscal Frez

Why are you here in court today Mr. Witness, can you tell us? a Because of the subpoena sent to me, sir. q Do you remember coming to the Public Attorneys Office on July 7, that was a Monday 2003? a Yes, sir. q And do you remember talking to me, Mr. Witness? a Yes, sir. q Do you remember saying to me that you do not want to come to court to testify in this case? a Yes, sir. q Can you tell us why initially you did not want to come to court to testify in this case? a Because I dont witness what happened, sir.

q And do you remember what was my advised to you regarding your honoring the subpoena? a Yes, sir. q Do you remember that you told at the Public Attorneys Office? a Tell the truth, sir. q Do you remember me asking you what you witnessed during the field trip on October 12, 2002? a I did not see any crime, sir.14 However, after disavowing any knowledge about the stabbing incident,

Roger Domingo completely reversed himself by stating, to wit: q Do you remember telling me that you were drank at that time you saw Clinton Badinas the victim in this case armed with a broken bottle? a Yes, sir. _______________

Page

245

I dont know, he just holding the broken bottle, sir. 14 TSN, July 16, 2003, pp. 7-10. 313 q Was he approaching anybody with the broken bottle? Fiscal Frez VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 313 People vs. Tabuelog q So you did see the victim Clinton Badinas on October 12, 2002? a I saw him but I dont see how he was killed, sir. q My question, is, did you see Clinton Badinas armed with a broken bottle on October 12, 2002 at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon? a Yes, sir. q Your Honor, the witness said he saw the victim Clinton Badinas holding a broken bottle but he do not know the purpose of that possession. Atty. Barba Your Honor, we have it declared this witness as reluctant witness and that we be allowed to ask leading questions because initially he was very consistent in saying he did not know anything even saying he did not even see Clinton Badinas the victim in this case but for now he changed his mind and he is now saying he did see him armed with broken bottle. Fiscal Frez Sustain. Atty. Barba Leading, your honor. Court

246
Page

What was Clinton Badinas doing with a broken bottle? a

Thats why I want to ask leading questions, now, your honor. Court

a Clinton Badinas chased me, sir, I thought I was running. q

Did he execute any affidavit? Atty. Barba

Why do you say you thought you were running you mean to say you did not move at all, Mr. Witness? Fiscal Frez

The court is not yet satisfied, counsel. Atty. Barba Leading your honor. Atty. Barba q What do you mean, I thought I was running? a I thought I was running but my classmates told me I was standing, sir. q So you have the urge to run? 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog a That is my plan, sir. q Why did you plan to run, Mr. Witness? place where you were standing while you viewed Clinton Badinas armed with broken bottle? a Clinton Badinas wanted to hit me with a broken bottle, sir.

May we then proceed, your honor. q Do you remember telling me at the Public Attorneys Office that you were in a stopper and you were glued to the 314

Page

247

Atty. Barba

What about the other member of the Cesar Martinez? Fiscal Frez

group

by

the

name of Great

May we have the word kursonada remain on the record, your honor. q What do you mean by the word kursonada, can you tell us? a I was just the subject of their trip, pinagtripandak. Fiscal Frez

Already answered, your honor. Atty. Barba 315

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 315 People vs. Tabuelog q What about JR Martinez did you have altercation? a None, sir. q There is another person in that group of Great Cesar Martinez by the name of Boni Mosilet, do you have any misunderstanding with him? a None, sir. q

May we put on record the word pinagtrippandak, your honor. Court

Put that on record. Atty. Barba q Did you have other altercation with Clinton Badinas prior to the armed of broken bottle? a

248
Page

None, sir. q

So, when you said that you tried to run did you see if Clinton Badinas was able to approach you? Fiscal Frez

I dont know, sir. q But you were still looking at him, is it not? a

Objection, your honor, he did not say that he wanted to run he thought he was running but he is standing according to the witness. Atty. Barba

They were 4 and Im 2 meters away from them so I turned around and I wanted to run, sir. q Did you sustain any injury on October 12, 2002?

We will reform, your honor. Court

a No, sir. q

Reform. Atty. Barba q You said you thought you were running but you stayed glued in your post was Clinton Badinas able to reach you? a No, sir. q

What bottle? a

about

the

other

companions

of

Christopher

Badinas

do

you

remember how they acted when Clinton Badinas was armed with broken

The 3 at the same time approach me, sir. q Were the other 3 armed with other weapon? a I dont know, sir. 316

249
Page

Can you tell us why he was not able to reach you, what happened why he was not able to reach you? a

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog q You said that you see how Clinton Badinas was stabbed to death but you are sure it is Christopher Tabuelog, is that correct? a I did not say that, I just heard it, sir. q So when did you first heard that Clinton Badinas was already dead? a The following morning when they told me that he died,sir.15 Clearly, the testimony of defense witness Roger Domingo was full of inconsistencies and improbabilities that it deserves scant consideration. It was inconsistent with the narration of the appellant that there was an altercation stabbing. between Appellants Domingo testimony and that Great the Ceasar victim Martinez was prior to the pursuing Domingo

However, treachery

we

cannot

agree the

with

the

findings of the

of

the

trial The

court trial

that court

attended

commission

crime.

appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the attack by the accused upon the victim was sudden and coming from behind, thus, precluding any possible way for the victim to defend himself.17 Nevertheless, treachery. _______________ mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to

15 Id., at pp. 10-15. 16 Pelonia v. People, G.R. No. 168997, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 207. 17 CA Rollo, p. 72. 317

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 317 People vs. Tabuelog The only prosecution evidence on the matter was the testimony of Jayarr Martinez that while the victim and Roger Domingo were walking, the appellant stabbed the victim from behind, thus: q You said that Clinton Badinas led Roger Domingo away from the jeep, to what direction did he lead Roger Domingo? a

likewise contradicted Domingos version that he was rooted to the ground and was not moving while the victim was pursuing him. In fine, the trial court correctly held that the defense failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There being no unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss whether the means employed to repel the attack was reasonable or whether appellant sufficiently provoked the victim into attacking him.16

Page

250

They went southward, madam. q How far away south in relation to the jeep? a Around three to four meters, madam. q From the place where you were sitting, please point a distance to show a distance why you estimate three to four meters away? a From my seat to the electric fan, madam.

q How far away from you from Clinton Badinas and Roger Domingo? a Also three to four meters, madam. q Why did you go there? a I observed what will happen, madam. q As you were observing the two, what happened next if any? a

(witness estimating a distance of about three to four meters). q When they reached the distance that you were pointing, where were Clinton Badinas and Roger Domingo facing? a They were facing north, madam. q About you, what did you do? a I went to join them, madam.

Christopher Tabuelog came, madam. q Where did Christopher Tabuelog go? a Behind Clinton and Roger, madam. q You said that Roger Domingo and Clinton Badinas were facing north, who was in the east of the two? a Clinton, madam.

Page

251

318

A knife, madam. q

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog q How far away was Clinton to Roger Domingo? a They were near each other, madam. q You said that Christopher Tabuelog went behind them, what did

Will you describe to this Court his knife? a It was a pointed instrument, madam. q After you saw Christopher Tabuelog drew a knife, what did he do with it? a He stabbed it, madam. q Whom did he stab? a Clinton Badinas, madam. q When Christopher Tabuelog stabbed Clinton Badinas with the knife,

Christopher Tabuelog do after he was near the two? a He drew something, madam. q Did you see what Christopher Tabuelog drew? a Yes, madam.

where was Clinton Badinas facing at the time? a He was facing north, madam. q

252
Page

q Will you tell the Court what that something is? a

Immediately there any Tabuelog? Atty. Grande:

before heated

Christopher words

Tabuelog

stabbed

Clinton

Badinas,

was

319 People vs. Tabuelog q What hand did Christopher Tabuelog used in stabbing Clinton Badinas?

between

Clinton

Badinas

and

Christopher

We object. Leading. Court:

a His left hand, madam. q

Sustained. Fiscal: q Before the stabbing was made by Christopher Tabuelog, what

What part of the body of Clinton Badinas was stabbed that you saw? a Left side of his body, madam. q How long after Christopher Tabuelog went near the two Roger Domingo and Clinton Badinas that Christopher Tabuelog drew a knife and stabbed Clinton Badinas? a Short time, madam. q How short it is, is it two seconds? three seconds? a Two seconds, madam. q

immediately transpired before that? a None, he was defending him. q Who was defending? a Clinton Badinas defending Roger Domingo.

253
Page

319

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008

After Clinton Badinas was stabbed, what happened next if any? a Clinton Badinas shouted, madam. q Will you tell what the shout was? a He shouted, I was hit, madam. q What did you do then? a I pointed to the one who stabbed him, Christopher Tabuelog, madam. q When Clinton Badinas shouted, I was hit, where did Christopher

Fiscal: q He went backward, how far Clinton Badinas go? a Around two meters, madam. q After he went backward two meters away from Clinton Badinas, what did Christopher Tabuelog do? a He ran away, madam. q To what direction did he run to? a Northeast, madam. 320

Tabuelog go, if any? a He went backward, madam. q And what was the action, if any?

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Tabuelog q

254
Page

Atty. Grande:

Already answered. He went backward.

Did you see him went?

a Yes, madam. q Where did he go? a At the mini bus, madam.18 It bears stressing that treachery cannot be presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. The fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery. The prosecution has the burden to prove that to by at the time of the attack, that the the victim was not in a position employed defend him.19 himself, In the and offender there was consciously no proof and that

However, we cannot sustain the trial courts award for actual damages in the amount of P113,776.00. While the victims mother, Marqueza Badinas, _______________

18 TSN, January 31, 2003, pp. 7-10. 19 People v. Concepcion, supra note 8. 321

VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008 321 People vs. Tabuelog testified on the civil aspect of the case, she only presented a list of

deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack instant case, appellant consciously adopted the mode of attack, hence he may only be held liable for homicide, not murder. The the penalty maximum for homicide is reclusion is temporal. There in being its neither medium

expenses without submitting the corresponding receipts.20 The trial court awarded the same noting that it was agreed upon during trial.21 This is It not allowed. The award of actual should be supported by receipts.22 damages Thus, is proper only or if the actual amount of loss was proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. actual compensatory damages cannot be awarded. Current pecuniary certainty.23 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY jurisprudence, loss but however, the award allows thereof the grant of be P25,000.00 established as with

mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, imposable penalty reclusion temporal period, pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the range of which is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty is prision mayor the range of which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment that should be imposed up on to appellant 17 years should and be 4 10 years of of prision mayor, as as minimum, maximum. The trial court as correctly moral awarded in P50,000.00 line with as civil indemnity and months reclusion temporal,

temperate damages when it appears that the heirs of the victim suffered cannot

255

Page

GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 30, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 01038 finding appellant guilty of murder is

P50,000.00

damages

prevailing

jurisprudence.

MODIFIED.

We

find

appellant

guilty

of

Homicide

and

is

hereby

Notes.If no unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. (People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621 [1996]) Unlawful threatening aggression or presupposes attitude an is actual, not sudden sufficient. and unexpected vs. De

sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Clinton Badinas the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. SO ORDERED. Austria-Martinez, Corona,** Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur. Petition partially granted. _______________

attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a persona mere intimidating (People Gracia, 264 SCRA 200 [1996]) Self-defense as a justifying circumstance on must the on part satisfy of the following (2)

requirements(1) and (3) lack of

unlawful

aggression

the of

victim,

reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, sufficient provocation the part the accused. (People vs. Dorado, 303 SCRA 61 [1999]) o0o [People vs. Tabuelog, 542 SCRA 301(2008)]

20 TSN, March 11, 2003, p. 6. 21 Records, p. 130. 22 People v. Abesamis, G.R. No. 140985, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 300. 23 Id. ** In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484 dated January 11, 2008. 322

322

256
Page

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Vargas vs. Primo

[No. L-14333. 28 January 1961] OSCAR VENTANILLA, plaintiff and appellant vs. GREGORIO CENTENO, defendant and appellee. 1.DAMAGES; ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY; EXTENT OF PROOF OF RECOVERY.He establish and who prove claims by actual or compensatory actual damages pecuniary must loss competent evidence

(Malonzo vs. Galang, 109 Phil., 16; 60 Off. Gaz., [52] 8593.) 2.ID.; anxiety, MORAL DAMAGES WHEN RECOVERABLE.Moral feelings, proximate lascivious moral result acts, damages shock, of a are

recoverable only when physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious besmirched and reputation, injury rape, wounded are or the other social criminal or humiliation, seduction, similar

offense resulting in physical injuries quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, abduction, adultery concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference with funerals, violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to property.

257

3.ID.; DEATH OF PASSENGER THRU MISHAP.Where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being transported by a common carrier the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased

Page

passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death. 4.ID.; entitled AWARD OR actual to OF or NOMINAL DAMAGES damages PRECLUDES the has but RECOVERY is not awarded

This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant's neglect in perfecting within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 18833, attorney's fees and costs (civil No. 2063, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija). After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are raised. The defendant did not appeal. The facts, as found by the trial court, are:

TEMPERATE

MODERATE

DAMAGES.When

claimant been

compensatory

nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages. 812

812 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Ventanilla vs. Centeno 5.ID.; EXEMPLARY AS OR OF CORRECTIVE BUT AT DAMAGES, MAY OF NOT BE

In civil case No. 18833 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs. Edilberto Alejandrino and Aida G. Alejandrino, plaintiff retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to represent him and prosecute the case. Civil Case No. 18833 was an action for the recovery of P4,000.00 together with damages. Decision unfavorable to the plaintiff was received by Atty. Gregorio Centeno on July 21, 1955, and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno on July 25, 1955. On July 30, 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter, Exhibit A, enclosing copies of the decision and that notice of appeal, and stating that he was not conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to file the notice of appeal. 813

RECOVERED right and the

RIGHT will

DISCRETION or not

COURT. should be

Exemplary or corrective damages cannot be recovered as a matter of Court decide acted whether in a they adjudicated, if the defendants wanton, fraudulent, reckless,

oppressive or malevolent manner. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. Leuterio, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Espinosa & Ventanilla for appellant.

VOL. 110, JANUARY 28, 1961 813 Ventanilla vs. Centeno Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla after receiving the letter and copy of the

258
Page

Artemio R. Pascual for appellee. PADILLA, J.:

decision went to see Atty. Centeno in his Office in Manila about August

5, 1955. Atty. Centeno informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff, however, did not have with Atty. Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond. About the middle of August 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. The plaintiff Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and because of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal bond, decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00. He went to the office of Atty. Centeno at about 4 o'clock on August 18, 1955, but was informed by the clerk, Leonardo Sanchez, that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna campaigning for his candidacy as member of the Provincial Board. Plaintiff then issued the check Exhibit 1, for P60.00 as appeal bond, and delivered the same to Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty. Centeno upon his arrival. The Court does not believe plaintiff's testimony that Sanchez had contacted Atty. Centeno by telephone and that he issued the check upon instruction of Atty. Centeno. Leonardo Sanchez had informed the plaintiff that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna, and if he were in Manila, Sanchez could not have known the whereabouts of Atty. Centeno. It was, therefore improbable that he could contact Atty. Centeno that afternoon. On August 17, Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, Exhibit D, which was filed only on August 20, 1955. Atty. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his office at about 10 o'clock in the morning of August 22. He cashed the check, Exhibit 1, with the Marvel Building Corporation, and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal bond. According to Atty. Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired. The Court does not likewise believe the testimony of Atty. Centeno. Neither the Clerk of Court, or any of the employees had the 'right to refuse an appeal bond that is being filed, for it is not in his power to determine whether or not the appeal bond

had

not

in

fact

filed

any

appeal

bond.

The

record

on

appeal

was

disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff. (pp. 33-36, rec. on app.) 814

814 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Ventanilla vs. Centeno The appellant to claims pay him that the trial or court erred in not ordering temperate the or

appellee

actual

compensatory,

moral,

moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in not ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee. Article 2199 of the new Civil Code provides: Except he has as provided proved. by law or by stipulation, is one is to entitled as to an or

adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as duly Such compensation referred actual compensatory damages. He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and

prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss. 1 The appellant's bare allegation that by reason of the appellee's indifference, negligence and failure to perfect within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered in civil case No. 18833, by not paying the appeal bond of P60, he lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which he could have recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected, indicates

259
Page

has been filed within the time prescribed by law. In fact the record on appeal was accepted and filed on September 5, 1955, but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty. Centeno

that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative. Hence he is not entitled to such damages. The appellant claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not been perf ected within the reglementary period due to the appellee's had won he negligence; by a serious anxiety upon learning that his for and adversary open mere entitled failure technicality; to to collect remain The besmirched the sum of reputation P4,000

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in article 309; (10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,

losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in court that was damages from the defendants in civil case No. 18833; and wounded feelings worthy for the of his appellee's trust and faithful to his client and of the new Civil confidence. provisions

Code on moral damages state: ______________

1 Malonzo vs. Galang 109 Phil., 16. 815

34, and 35. The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the

VOL. 110, JANUARY 28, 1961 815 Ventanilla vs. Centeno ART. 2217. Moral fright, shock, serious social damages include besmirched and physical reputation, injury. suffering, mental wounded Though anguish, moral of

action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. feelings, Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering, mental

anxiety,

humiliation,

similar

incapable

anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury are the proximate result of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, or libel, seduction, or abduction, or any other rape, form or of other lascivious or arrest, acts, illegal adultery search, concubinage, slander illegal arbitrary detention

260

pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

Page

analogous cases:

defamation,

malicious

prosecution, disrespect for the dead or wrongful interference with funerals, violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to property. To this we may 816

trial

court

did

not

err

in

refusing

to

award

temperate

or

moderate

damages to the appellant. As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the

appellant, since it cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide whether or not they _______________

816 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Ventanilla vs. Centeno add that where a mishap occurs resulting in the death of a passenger being transported by a common carrier, the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger are entitled to demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death.2 In Malonzo vs. Galang, supra, this Court categorically stated that * * * Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical

2 Necesito vs. Pars, (104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023), resolution on motion for reconsideration, 11 September 1958; Fores vs. Miranda, (105 Phil., 266; 57 Off. Gaz., [44] 7938); Rex Taxicab vs. Bautista, 109 Phil., 714. 3 See also Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 108 Phil., 414. 4 In view of the provision of article 2224, new Civil Code, which

provides that "Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty." 817

injuries," as an instance when moral damages may be allowed. thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, 96 Phil., 321) excepting of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art, 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).3 Since the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated, the trial court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him. Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the appellant,

VOL. 110, JANUARY 28, 1961 817 Ventanilla vs. Centeno should be adjudicated, 5 if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner,6 the trial court has judiciously, wisely and correctly exercised its discretion in not awarding them to the appellant.

261
Page

considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages,4 and so the

Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides: Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. 7 Considering the circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the degree of negligence committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which brought about the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to the appellant considering as nominal that damages may seem are exiguous. not for Nevertheless, nominal damages

7 Article 2216, same Code; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero, 108 Phil., 985. 818

818 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Edralin vs. Edralin new Civil Code, the appellee may not be compelled to satisfy it. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutirrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed. __________ [Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 110 Phil. 811(1961)] VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 215 Ventanilla vs. Centeno

indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been the duly perfected, of P2,000 it was not an assurance to that the as the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, nominal amount is the appellant seeks recover all damages excessive. After weighing carefully

considerations, the amount awarded to the appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed. As regards attorney's fees, since the appellant's claim does not fall

under any of those enumerated in article 2208, _______________

No. L-14333. January 28, 1961. OSCAR VENTANILLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GREGORIO CENTENO,

defendant-appellee. Attorneys; Damages; Effect of lawyer's failure to perfect appeal.The

262

5 Article 2233, new Civil Code. 6 Article 2232, same Code.

claim of a client for damages against a lawyer, who failed to perfect the client's appeal from a judgment, was considered highly speculative. The claim was based on the theory that, because the appeal was not

Page

perfected,

the

client

was

not

able

to

recover

on

appeal

moral

and

Same; Damages due from lawyer who was negligent in not perfecting client's appeal.The award of P200 as nominal damages to a client who sued his lawyer for damages by reason of the latter's negligence in not perfecting the client's appeal, was considered sufficient under the facts of the instant case. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

actual damages "from the adverse party. Same: When moral damages are recoverable.Moral damages may be recovered in the cases mentioned in article 2219 of the New Civil Code and in the case of the death of a passenger being transported by a common carrier. No moral damages may be recovered for quasi-delicts not causing physical injuries. Moral damages cannot be recovered in an action by the client 216

The facts are -stated in the opinion of the Court. Espinosa & Ventanilla for plaintiff-appellant. Artemio R. Pascual for defendant-appellee.

216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Ventanilla vs. Centeno against a lawyer who was negligent in not perfecting the client's appeal from a judgment. Same; Temperate damages.Moderate damages cannot be recovered in case no actual damages, but only nominal damages, were awarded. Same; Exemplary damages.Corrective damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. They can be recovered, in the discretion of the court, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an action to recover damages claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff due to the defendant's neglect in perfecting within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case No. 18833, attorney's fees and costs (civil No. 2063, Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija). After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this Court on the ground that only questions of law are raised. The defendant did not appeal. The facts, as found by the trial court, are: In Civil Case No. 18833 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,

263

Same; Nominal damages.The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. They are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded.

entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs. Edilberto Alejandrino and 217

Page

known the whereabouts of Atty, Centeno. It was, therefore improbable VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 217 Ventanilla vs. Centeno Aida G. Alejandrino, plaintiff retained the service of Atty. Gregorio damages. Gregorio that he could contact Atty. Centeno that afternoon. On August 17, Atty. Centeno prepared the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal, Exhibit D, which was filed only on August 20, 1955. Atty. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his office at about 10 o'clock in the morning of August 22. He cashed the check, Exhibit 1, with the Marvel Building Corporation, and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal bond. According to Atty. Centeno it was not accepted because the period of appeal had already expired, and that it was only at that time he came to know that the period of appeal had expired. The Court does not likewise believe the testimony of Atty. Centeno. Neither the Clerk of Court, or any of the employees had the right to refuse an appeal bond that is being filed power to determine whether 218 for it is not in his

Centeno to represent him and prosecute the case. Civil Case No. 18833 was an action Decision for the to recovery the of P4,000.00 was together with by Atty. unfavorable plaintiff received

Centeno on July 21, 1955, and a notice of appeal was filed by Atty. Centeno on July 25, 1955. On July 30, 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote to the plaintiff the letter, Exhibit A, enclosing copies of the decision and that notice of appeal, and stating that he was not conformable to the decision and had not hesitated to file the notice of appeal. Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla after receiving the letter and copy of the decision went to see Atty. Centeno in his Office in Manila about August 5, 1955. Atty. Centeno informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff, however, did not leave with Atty. Centeno at that time the amount for the appeal bond. About the middle of Aug. 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. The plaintiff Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and because of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal bond, decided to file a cash appeal bond of P60.00. He went to the office of Atty. Centeno at about 4 o'clock on August 18, 1955, but was informed by the clerk, Leonardo Sanchez, that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna campaigning for his candidacy as member of the Provincial Board. Plaintiff then issued the check Exhibit 1, for P60.00 as appeal bond, and delivered the same to Leonardo Sanchez with instruction to give the same to Atty. Centeno upon his arrival, The Court does not believe plaintiff's testimony that Sanchez had contacted Atty. Centeno by telephone and that he issued the check upon instruction of Atty. Centeno. Leonardo Sanchez had informed the plaintiff that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna, and if he were in Manila, Sanchez could not have

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Ventanilla vs. Centeno or not the appeal bond has been filed within the time prescribed by law. In fact the record on appeal was accepted and filed on September 5, 1955, but no appeal bond has been filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out, of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the plaintiff. (pp. 33-36, rec. on app.) The appellant to claims pay him that the trial or court erred in not ordering temperate the or

264

appellee

actual

compensatory,

moral,

Page

moderate, and exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the appellee to pay the appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal

damages; and in not ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as attorney's fee. Article 2199 of the new Civil Code provides: Except he has as provided proved. by law or by stipulation, is one is to entitled as to an or

VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 219 Ventanilla vs. Centeno sum of P4.000 and damages from the defendants in civil case No.

adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as duly Such compensation referred actual compensatory damages. He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and

18833; and wounded feelings for the appellee's failure to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and confidence. The provisions of the new Civil Code on moral damages state: Art. fright, shocks, 2217. Moral damages include and physical reputation, similar suffering, wounded Though mental anguish, moral of

prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.1 The appellant's bare allegation that by reason of the appellee's indifference, negligence and failure to perfect within the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered in civil case No. 18833, by not paying the appeal bond of P60, he lost his chance to recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and moral and actual damages, which he could have recovered if the appeal had duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative. Hence he is not entitled to such damages. The appellant claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period due to the appellee's had negligence; won by a serious mere anxiety upon learning that his for adversary technicality; besmirched reputation

serious social

anxiety,

besmirched

feelings,

humiliation,

injury.

incapable

pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and

analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to collect the _______________

265

1 Malonzo vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-13851, 27 July 1960. 219

(8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

Page

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages. The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may

demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the passenger's death.2 that x x x Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical In Malonzo vs. Galang, supra, this Court categorically stated

injuries," as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).3 Since the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is

bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Moral moral result damages shocks, of a are social recoverable humiliation, offense only and when similar in physical injury suffering, are the mental

not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated, the trial court did not err in declining to award moral damages to him. Concerning temperate or moderate damages claimed by the appellant,

anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, proximate criminal resulting physical injuries, quasi-delicts

causing physical injuries, seduction, abduction, rape, or. other lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or 220

considering that he is not entitled to actual or compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages,4 and so the trial court did not err in re- fusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the appellant. _______________

220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Ventanilla vs. Centeno arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel, slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution, disrespect for the dead or 2 Necesito vs. Paras, G.R. No. L-10605-06, resolution on motion 11 September 1958; Fores vs. Miranda, G.R. No. for L-

reconsideration, September 1960.

12163, 4 March 1959; Rex Taxicab vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-15382, 30

266

wrongful interference with funerals, violation of specific provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to property. To this we may add that where a mishap by occurs a resulting in the death the of a passenger being transported common carrier, spouse,

3 See also Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-14342, 80 May 1960. 4 In view of the provision of article 2224, damages, new Civil Code, more which than

Page

descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger are entitled to

provides

that "temperate

or moderate

which

are

nominal but less than compensatory damages. may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved With certainty." 221

court

to

the

appellant considering

as

nominal that

damages

may

seem are

exiguous. not for

Nevertheless,

nominal

damages

indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been the duly perfected, of P2,000 it was not an assurance to that the as the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, amount is the appellant seeks recover all

VOL. 1, JANUARY 28, 1961 221 Ventanilla vs. Centeno As regards exemplary or corrective damages also claimed by the

nominal

damages

excessive.

After

weighing

carefully

considerations, the amount awarded to the appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed. As regards attorney's fees, since the appellant's claim does not fall

under any of those enumerated in article _______________

appellant. since it cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the court will decide defendant acted whether or not they should be adjudicated,5 in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, if the or oppressive

malevolent manner,6 the trial court has judiciously, wisely and correctly exercised its discretion in not awarding them to the appellant. Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides: "Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according by to the circumstances lawyer, of in the not case.7 Considering on time the the circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the degree of negligence

5 Article 2233, new Civil Code. 6 Article 2232, same Code. 7 Article 2216, same Code; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero, G.R. No. L-11994, 26 July 1960. 222

222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Edralin vs. Edralin 2208, new Civil Code, the appellee may not be compelled to satisfy it.

267

committed

the

appellee, a

depositing

appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted by the court, which. brought about the refusal by the trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial

Page

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista, Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur. Concepcion, J., took no part. Judgment affirmed. Note.See Heredia vs. Salinas, 10 Phil. 157, which involves also action for damages filed by a client against a lawyer who failed to perfect an appeal. [Ventanilla vs. Centeno, 1 SCRA 215(1961)] G.R. No. 179278. PEOPLE OF THE March 28, 2008.* PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHARLIE VILLA,

JR., accused-appellant. Criminal Law; Murder; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Requisites. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may exempt an accused from criminal liability when the following requisites are met, namely: (1) there was an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was reasonably necessary; and (3) the person defending himself had not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression. The burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified is on the accused. In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. _______________

268

Page

* THIRD DIVISION. 481

Nurturing that ill feeling, appellant immediately went after the victim as VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 481 People vs. Villa, Jr. Same; Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently can performed weigh by the trial judge in who, light of unlike the appellate magistrates, such testimony the latter was leaving. Not suspecting that the appellant harbored rancor, the victim walked on his way home, thereby exposing his back to the attack of the appellant. With the brass knuckle around his right fist, and without warning, appellant poured his anger towards the victim by punching the latters nape until he fell unconscious. When he came to his senses, appellant realized what he had done. Feeling responsible for it, he fled. With this evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants posture can hardly succeed. He was the aggressor. Appellants behavior right after the incident runs contrary to his avowed innocence. His act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident 482

declarants demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations performed can conduct weigh and on by the the witness trial to stand in light is of best unlike the and most competently magistrates, demeanor, judge who, appellate declarants truth and

such

testimony

position

discriminate

between

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. to the police authorities are circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self-defense. Same; victim Same; unable Aggravating and Circumstances; to defend Treachery; himself by Elements.The reason of the

falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. This is especially true when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate courts court, had because said or findings are generally arbitrarily A scrutiny conclusive the of facts the and and binding upon this Court unless it be manifestly shown that the lower overlooked of disregarded in the case. circumstances significance records

shows that no such error was committed by either the RTC or the Court of Appeals. Same; Same; Same; Same; Flight; The act of the accused of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the police authorities are circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self-defense.From the testimonies of the prosecution

essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the unprepared suddenness and severity of the attack. It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of the person to murder. Two essential elements are required of in order means, who that treachery or no can be of appreciated: execution for be (1) the employment offended manner methods has, thus, manner that would or the

269

witnesses, it is readily clear that the first requisite of self-defense is wanting. The unlawful aggression did not originate from the victim but from the appellant himself. Appellant was offended when the victim reprimanded him by telling him not to make fun of the sleeping child.

ensure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the party, of opportunity must self-defense alleged in retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or execution. Moreover, treachery information and proved during the trial.

Page

Same;

Same;

Damages; of

Temperate actual

damages was

are

awarded in

where the

no trial

an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorneys Office for accused-appellant. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: For review is the Decision1 dated 13 March 2007 of the Court of

documentary

evidence

damages

presented

because it is reasonable to presume that, when death occurs, the family of the victim incurred expenses for the wake and funeral.Although the prosecution receipts damages presented evidence The where that award no the of heirs incurred expenses, in no the were are presented. awarded temperate damages, of

amount of P25,000.00, to the heirs of the victim is justified. Temperate documentary evidence actual damages was presented in the trial because it is reasonable to presume that, when death occurs, the family of the victim incurred expenses for the wake and funeral. Same; Same; Same; When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, exemplary Codeto either as qualifying is a justified deterrent or generic, under to an award 2230 of of 25,000.00 the New and as as Civil a damages serve Article serious

Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00859 which affirmed the Decision2

dated 9 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 35, finding appellant Charlie Villa, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In an Information dated 6 October 1997, appellant Charlie Villa, Jr. was charged before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal with the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads: That sometime on or about 18 July 1997 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a brass knuckle, and acting with treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault one Rodolfo Arevalo y Gamboa by punching him on the left nape with the use of the hand where he

wrongdoings

vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.In addition to these damages, exemplary damages should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. When a crime is committed with an aggravating New Civil circumstance, Code. This either kind of qualifying damage is or generic, intended to an award as of a P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the serve deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of 483

270

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 483 People vs. Villa, Jr.

_______________

Page

1 Penned Justices

by Martin

Associate S.

Justice

Rosmari Jr. and

D.

Carandang P.

with

Associate Castillo,

at all.5

He

then

turned his

direction

to a

sleeping boy

and started

Villarama,

Mariflor

Punzalan

putting some biscuits into the boys mouth.6 This caught the attention of Rodolfo who advised appellant not to disturb the boy and said, Huwag mo pagtripan ang batang natutulog.7 Appellant reacted and said, Anong pakialam mo?8 Soon after, Rodolfo left the wake and headed for home. Appellant, who was wearing a brass knuckle wrapped in a handkerchief, followed Rodolfo and punched the latter three

concurring; Rollo, pp. 4-16. 2 Penned by Judge Mauricio M. Rivera; CA Rollo, pp. 19-25. 484

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. was wearing the brass knuckle thereby resulting in a skull fracture which caused the death of said Rodolfo Arevalo y Gamboa.3 During his arraignment on 26 November 1998, appellant, with the

_______________

3 Records, p. 1. 4 Id., at p. 21. 5 TSN, 23 March 1999, p. 4. 6 Id., at p. 5. 7 Id., at p. 6. 8 Id. 485

assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a not guilty plea.4 Thereafter, trial ensued. At the trial, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the three eyewitnesses to the incident, namely: (1) Orly Arevalo (Orly), the son of the deceased-victim who saw the events prior to, during and after the killing of his father; (2) Marlo Rellosa (Marlo), the person at the wake who was hit by appellant and who was present when the punching of the victim took place; and (3) Roger Herrera (Roger), who corroborated the testimony of Orly. Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, testified on the cause of death of the same.

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 485

271

On

18

July

1997,

wake

was

held at

in

house

close

to San

that

of

People vs. Villa, Jr. to fives times, hitting him on the nape.9 Rodolfo fell to the ground. Some people tried to help Rodolfo and carried him to the house of his sister nearby.10 They asked appellant to help them carry Rodolfo, but

Rodolfo 3:00

Arevalo of

(Rodolfo) same

located day,

Zone

10,

Barangay was also

Roque, the

Antipolo City. Rodolfo was there at the wake drinking coffee. At around a.m. the appellant, who attending wake, suddenly boxed the face of a certain Marlo Rellosa for no reason

Page

appellant Appellant

merely then

smiled crossed

and the

told street

them and

that

Rodolfo a

just

fainted.11 going to

13 Id., at p. 11. 14 Records, p. 143. 15 TSN, 1 June 1999, pp. 8-9. 486

boarded

jeepney

Manila.12 Rodolfo was rushed to Unciano Hospital in Antipolo City but the staff there refused to accept him since they felt they could not handle his severe injury. Rodolfo was then transferred to a community hospital in the city, but the hospital staff also refused to accept him for the same reason. Finally, it was at the Amang Rodriguez Hospital in Marikina City that Rodolfo was accepted and treated. Unfortunately, at 3:00 p.m. of the same day, Rodolfo passed away.13 Per autopsy report, the cause of death of the victim is Intracranial

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. sell food to the FX drivers near the Cathedral of Antipolo City.16 At around 2:30 in the morning of 18 July 1997, they went home. After asking money from his mother, he proceeded to the wake. There he played cards with his friends. Near the table where they were playing was a little boy. Appellant made fun of this boy by feeding him with biscuits. Rodolfo berated appellant when he saw what the latter was doing with the boy and asked him why he was forcibly feeding the boy. Appellant answered Rodolfo to mind his own business. This reply of the appellant angered Rodolfo who picked up a stone and was about to hit the head of the appellant when the latters friends prevented Rodolfo.17 The people in the wake asked both appellant and Rodolfo to leave the place. But before Rodolfo left, he uttered to the accused, Antayin mo ako, babalikan kita.18 Appellant went home. While he was walking, the victim came back and, armed with a club, hit the former. It

Hemorrhage Secondary to Skull Fracture.14 Medico-legal Officer Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra found four external injuries on the cadaver of the victim, all of which were contusions. She said that the three injuries were at the head and the other one was in the trunk. According to her, the fracture in the right parietal occipital region could have been caused by a hard blunt object.15 The defense, on the other hand, invoked self-defense. To prove this, the testimonies of the appellant, Randy Jose Gonzales, a friend of appellant, and Walter Villa, appellants younger brother, were presented. Appellant testified that on the afternoon of 17 July 1997 until 1:00 a.m. of 18 July 1997, he was assisting his mother _______________

9 TSN, 21 January 1999, p. 8. 10 TSN, 23 March 1999, p. 10. 11 Id., at p. 11. 12 TSN, 21 January 1999, p. 9.

was then that appellant boxed the victim on the nape once, causing the latter to fall down. Defense witness Randy Jose Gonzales, testified that at exactly 3:00 a.m. of the date in question, he was there at the wake watching appellant gambling with some persons. He then saw Rodolfo hit the hands of the appellant for forcibly feeding a little boy.19 Appellant just stood up and

Page

272

left the place to avoid Rodolfo. Armed with a dos por dos, Rodolfo ran after appellant until he went past the latter. Having been cornered, appellant was forced to face his attacker. A fistfight ensued which ended with Rodolfo being floored face down.20 Walter Villa declared on the witness stand that he arrived at the scene after the incident had happened. The hitting incident was only recounted to him by a lad. He went along _______________

also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and another P50,000.00 as temperate damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Charlie Villa, Jr. is hereby found to as pay guilty the beyond heirs of reasonable Rodolfo The doubt Arevalo as y charged Gamboa which credited and the the in is hereby of had in sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Said accused is hereby further ordered amount accused his favor Php50,000.00 as death indemnity and another amount of Php50,000.00 temperate damages. period during be undergone preventive imprisonment shall

serving the foregoing sentence.23 16 TSN, 8 March 2001, p. 3. 17 Id., at p. 7. 18 Id. 19 TSN, 7 December 2000, p. 7 20 TSN, 9 December 2000, p. 9. 487 On 6 November 2002, appellant filed a notice of appeal.24 The trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to this Court. This Court, however, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review, conformably to the ruling in People v. Mateo.25 The Court of Appeals, on 13 March 2007, promulgated its Decision

affirming the decision of the RTC in all respects, except the award of temperate damages which it reduced from the amount of P50,000.00 to P25,000.00. The Court of Appeals decreed: _______________

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 487 People vs. Villa, Jr. with the victim when the latter was brought to the hospital.21 At around 21 TSN, 25 January 2001, pp. 5-6. 22 Id., at p. 6. 23 CA Rollo, pp. 24-25. 24 Records, p. 134. 25 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640. 488

273
Page

7:00 a.m. he went home.22 Unconvinced that appellant killed the victim in self-defense, the RTC in its decision dated 9 October 2002, convicted the appellant of murder, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant was

appellant to an imminent and actual danger to his life. Appellant insists 488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73 of Antipolo City dated October 9, 2002 finding accused-appellant Charlie Villa, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. The award of temperate damages is hereby reduced to P25,000.00.26 Hence, the instant case. In his brief, the appellant assigns a single error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED OF IN NOT CONSIDERING INTERPOSED THE BY VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 489 People vs. Villa, Jr. Appellant likewise asserts that he was able to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim since he initiated the attack by clobbering appellant. Having established all elements of selfdefense, appellant argues he deserves acquittal. The Office of that the the Solicitor of General, wounds however, and the differs. put nature up of It is the of the prove by this, competent evidence all he states that there the was 26 Rollo, p. 15. 489 that when he boxed the victim, he was merely employing reasonable means to repel the attack carried out by the victim. _______________

JUSTIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE

SELF-DEFENSE

THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT. Appellant takes exception to the trial courts verdict convicting him and maintains elements that he of was able to To self-defense. support

unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Rodolfo Arevalo, when the latter hit him with a club or a piece wood. It was fortunate that appellant was able to evade the first swing, but eventually he was hit by the second. Before appellant could further harm him and put his life on the verge of danger, appellant instinctively retaliated by boxing the victim on his nape, which he did not know would result in Rodolfos demise. Appellant claims he hit the victim only once, but because the latter was drunk, he lost his balance and fell down. According to appellant, the act of punching the victim was commensurate with the onslaught initiated and continued by the latter, thereby exposing

conviction considering

appellant number

cannot

successfully

self-defense, injuries

sustained by the victim, especially that fatal wound at the back. It avers that the failure of appellant to surrender to authorities after the incident and to report the same indicates he was not acting in self-defense. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance may exempt an accused from criminal liability when the following requisites are met, namely: (1) there was an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was reasonably necessary; and (3) the person defending himself had not provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.27 The burden of proving by clear and

Page

274

convincing evidence that the killing was justified is on the accused. In doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. The varying accounts of the prosecution and of the defense as to who initiated the aggression was resolved by the RTC which gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over those of the defense, thus: In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, the Court finds the narrations of the sequence of events by the accused decidedly unconvincing. x x x x _______________

his skull and eventually caused his death. These facts, in addition to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who did not show any motive to falsely testify and implicate or point on erring finger at the accused inside the courtroom as the perpetrator of the crime, established that the accuseds act was not an act of self-defense but a determined effort to kill his victim.28 The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, was convinced of the veracity of the prosecution witnesses testimonies and not that of appellants. We find no reason to reverse or alter the evaluation of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The time-tested on doctrine the is that the is matter best of assigning most values to

declarations

witness

stand

and

competently

performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct and position 27 People (2001). 490 v. Cabansay, 406 Phil. 247, 257; 353 SCRA 686, 693 to discriminate between truth and falsehood.29 Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses.30 This is especially true when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court unless it be manifestly shown that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded 490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. Be that as it may, self-defense on the part of the accused is further 28 CA Rollo, p. 24. 29 People v. Matito, 468 Phil. 14, 24; 423 SCRA 617, 625 (2004). 30 People (2002). v. Piedad, 441 Phil. 818, 838-839; 393 SCRA 488, 502 arbitrarily the _______________

275
Page

negated by the physical evidence in the case. The wound located at the back of the head of the victim indicates that the accused indeed followed the victim when he left the wake and punched him with a hard blunt object. Such wound, according to the medico-legal officer, was the most fatal one among those sustained by the victim as it fractured

491

Q: Did you wake up from your sleep? A: Yes, sir.

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 491 People vs. Villa, Jr. facts and circumstances of significance in the case.31 A scrutiny of the records shows that no such error was committed by either the RTC or the Court of Appeals. An assiduous evaluation of the transcript of stenographic notes indicates that the three agree prosecution on witnessesMarlo, points, Orly in and a Rogerwhose candid and accounts material testified

Q: Around what time did you wake up? A: 3:00 a.m. Q: Was there any particular reason why you woke up from your sleep? A: I was box (sic) by Hapon. Q: What is the full name of this Hapon you are referring to? A: Charlie Villa, Jr. _______________

straightforward manner as to what had really transpired on that fateful day. Marlo declared on the witness stand the incident prior to the killing of the victim, and also his own experience at the hands of the 31 People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 40, 50. 492 appellant: Q: Mr. Witness, do you recall where you were on July 18, 1997 at 3:00 oclock in the morning? A: Yes, sir. I was attending a wake, sir. Q: Where was that, in what place? A: Barangay San Roque, Antipolo. Q: You said you were attending a wake, where were you, inside or out where the wake was held?

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. Q: In what part of your body were you boxed by this Charlie Villa, Jr. A: In my face. Q: Did you find out the reason why you were boxed by Charlie Villa, Jr.?

276
Page

A: I was near the place. Q: What were you doing that time? A: I was sleeping.

A: Pinag-tripan po ako. Q: When you woke up when you were boxed by Charlie Villa, Jr. in the face, what happened next? A: He also took a fancy to my friend. Q: Who is this friend you are referring to? A: Buboy. Q: What is his full name? A: I dont know, we just call him Buboy. Q: In what way did Charlie Villa took a fancy to your friend? A: He fed him with biscuit. Q: By the way, how old is this Buboy? A: Still young. Q: When Charlie Villa was putting biscuit in the mouth of this Buboy, what was Buboy doing then? A: He was sleeping. Q: How far away was Buboy when you saw this? A: About four meters away. Q: While Charlie Villa was putting biscuit on the mouth of Buboy while sleeping, what happened?

Q: Up to now you do not know the name of this Mang Loloy? A: Yes, sir. Q: Then what happened next? A: Mang Loloy went to Charlie Villa and said, Huwag mong pagtripan ang batang natutulog. Q: What was the reaction of Charlie Villa if any? A: Charlie said, anong pakialam mo. 493

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 493 People vs. Villa, Jr. Q: How far was Charlie Villa from Mang Loloy when he answered that way? A: About a meter away. Q: After Charlie Villa told Mang Loloy to mind his own business, what happened next? A: Mang Loloy stood up and walked away and Charlie Villa followed him and boxed him and he fell to the ground. Q: Did you see what part of the body of Mang Loloy was boxed by Charlie? A: On his nape.32

277
Page

A: Mang Loloy tried to prevent him. Q: What is the complete name of this Mang Loloy? A: I dont know.

Witness wearing

Orly a

testified brass

that

when

appellant by

boxed a

the

victim,

he He

was also 494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. Q: After he drank coffee, what happened next? A: Charlie Villa arrived and he fed a child with biscuit and he was prevented by my father. Q: That child which Charlie Villa fed biscuit, what was the child doing prior to the time he was fed biscuit? A: He was sleeping. Q: After Charlie Villa fed the child who was sleeping with biscuit, what happened next? A: He sleeping. Q: After your father told that to Charlie Villa, what happened next? A: Charlie Villa said, huwag mo akong pakialaman. Q: After Charlie Villa responded by saying, huwag mo akong was accosted by my father not to disturb the child who is

knuckle

wrapped

handkerchief.

corroborated what Marlon stated: Q: Where were you on the date the incident happened? A: I was at the other street corner. I just could not get near them immediately because Charlie Villa immediately rode on a jeep. Q: When did this incident happen? A: On the night of the 18th at past 2:00 in the morning. Q: July 18? A: Yes, sir. x x x x Q: Can you tell the Court why you were there in that area on that particular date and time? A: Because there was a wake at the house nearby. x x x x Q: You said there was a wake that time near your house, what about your father Rodolfo Arevalo, what was he doing prior to the incident wherein he was punched by accused Charlie Villa? A: He was drinking coffee at the wake. _______________

pakialaman, what happened next? A: My father left. Q: To what direction did your father go when he left? A: To the direction of our house.

278

32 TSN dated 23 March 1999, pp. 3-6. 494

Page

Q: So, he was leaving the wake?

A: Yes, sir. Q: When your father left the wake, what happened next? A: Charlie followed him. Q: After Charlie followed your father when he left the wake, what

Q: Where was he hit? A: On his nape. Q: How many times did Charlie Villa hit your father? A: About three to five times. Q: In that three to five times that Charlie Villa hit your father, was your father hit? A: Yes, sir. Q: And in those three to five times that Charlie Villa punched your father, where was he hit in those three times? A: All in his nape. Q: After your father was hit in the nape by the several punches made by Charlie Villa, what happened next? A: He fell down unconscious. Q: How did he fall down? A: Face first. Q: After your father fell down face first, what did you see Charlie Villa do? A: He crossed the street and suddenly rode a jeep.33 Roger narrated a similar story, thus: Q: Do you recall where you were on July 20, 1997 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning? A: Yes, sir.

happened next? A: That was the time when I saw that he punched my father. Q: What hand did Charlie Villa use in punching your father? A: His right fist. Q: What, if anything, did you notice at the hand of Charlie Villa which he used in punching your father? A: His fist was wrapped with a handkerchief that covered the metal knuckle. Q: Did you see the metal knuckle? A: Yes, sir, because it is bulging. x x x x 495

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 495

279
Page

People vs. Villa, Jr. Q: Was your father hit when he was punched by Charlie Villa? A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you on that date and on that particular time? A: I was attending a wake, sir. x x x x Q: Now, did you come to see the person of Rodolfo Arevalo on 20 July 1997 at that place? A: Yes, sir. _______________

A: He said goodbye, and he said he will go home. Q: Was he able to go home? A: No, sir. Q: Why did you know that he was not able to go home? A: Because we saw him [fell] down on the ground at the store of Aling Helen. Q: How far was the place you saw him lying down on the ground from the place where the wake was being held? A: Five (5) meters, sir. Q: How did you see him lying on the ground? A: Because when a vehicle passed by the light of the vehicle fell on the body of this Rodolfo Arevalo, thats why we saw him.

33 TSN, 21 January 1999, pp. 4-9. 496

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. x x x x Q: Now, where did Rodolfo Arevalo go after you saw him for the

x x x x Q: Do you know the reason why Rodolfo Arevalo was lying on the ground? A: Yes, sir. Q: What was the reason? A: He was punched by using metal knuckle on his nape, sir. Q: Who was this person who punched him who used metal knuckle? A: Charlie Villa, Jr., sir.34 From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it is readily clear that the first requisite of self-defense is wanting. The unlawful aggression did not originate from the victim but

period of 1/2 hour at that wake? A: He went home. Q: Did you see him going home? A: Yes, sir. Q: How did you know that he was going home?

Page

280

_______________

that the victim sustained four injuries, three of which were at the head near the nape and one at the trunk. It is also inconceivable how he could have hit the victim at the back of the latters head when, as he claimed, they were facing each other and appellant was just defending himself. Furthermore, why should appellant wear a brass knuckle if he had no intention to kill the victim? Another troubling account of the defense is the conflicting version of

34 TSN, 10 August 1999, pp. 5-11. 497

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 497 People vs. Villa, Jr. from the appellant himself. Appellant was offended when the victim

both defense witnesses. Witness Randy Jose Gonzales declared it was the appellant who first left the wake and was subsequently chased by the victim with a dos por dos. _______________

reprimanded him by telling him not to make fun of the sleeping child. Nurturing that ill feeling, appellant immediately went after the victim as the latter was leaving. Not suspecting that the appellant harbored rancor, the victim walked on his way home, thereby exposing his back to the attack of the appellant. With the brass knuckle around his right fist, and without warning, appellant poured his anger towards the victim by punching the latters nape until he fell unconscious. When he came to his senses, appellant realized what he had done. Feeling responsible for it, he fled. With this evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants posture can hardly succeed. He was the aggressor. Appellants behavior right after the incident runs contrary to his avowed innocence. His act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the police authorities are circumstances highly indicative of guilt and negate his claim of self-defense.35 The version of the defense detailing the manner in which he supposedly

35 People v. Macuha, 369 Phil. 257, 267; 310 SCRA 14, 23 (1999). 498

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. Appellant, on the other hand, bared that it was the victim who first left the wake and went home. When the victim returned, he was already holding a club. These diverging statements of the defense tend to support the RTC opinion that, indeed, the defense interposed by the appellant was merely an afterthought. The nature and number of injuries likewise make appellants defense

281

defended himself from the assault of the victim is hard to believe. He claims that he boxed the victim on his nape only once. The autopsy report, however, belies appellants assertion. The autopsy report revealed

Page

highly suspect. If appellant punched the victim just to defend himself, it defies logic why he had to deliver several blows on the head of the

victim.

If

indeed

the

victim

was

drunk,

one

blow

from

the

appellant

499 People vs. Villa, Jr. treachery must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The prosecution sufficiently proved treachery. In the instant case, the

would have been sufficient to repel the alleged attack coming from the victim. But appellant could not contain his fury for being humiliated by the victim. In order to gratify himself he had to box the victim until the latter became unconscious. It has been held in this regard that the location and presence of several injuries on the body of the victim is physical evidence that eloquently refutes appellants allegations of selfdefense.36 The RTC appreciated the presence of treachery qualifying the killing of Rodolfo to murder. The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness circumstance essential appreciated: and that (1) severity qualifies are the of the the killing in of attack.37 of the order means, It that is an to or aggravating murder. can manner Two be of person methods

prosecution established that the victim was punched from behind while on his way home. While there may have been an exchange of words between the appellant and the victim prior to the killing, the latter did not have the slightest idea that he was about to be attacked by the former, since the victim thought he was just giving a constructive advice. No heated argument or a physical contest had occurred prior to the punching incident. Unwary that appellant had taken badly his piece of advice, brass the victim was walking him to when fall. the appellant could behind not suddenly put up a punched him three times at the back of his head with the use of a knuckle, causing The victim defense, as the attack was swift and he was not in the position to repel the same, since the onslaught was from behind. Also affirmed upon is the the ruling appellant under to death. of the 248 the is RTC of and of the that the Court of Appeals The is nor the 63, Code

elements

required

treachery

employment

execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus, no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Moreover, _______________

imposing penalty reclusion imposition

the

penalty

reclusion Revised neither of

perpetua. Penal the to mitigating crime, Article

for murder perpetua of

Article attended

Considering

aggravating

circumstances reclusion

commission proper

perpetua

pursuant

36 People v. Saragina, 332 SCRA 219 (2000). 37 People v. Abatayo, G.R. No. 139456, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 562, 578.

paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.38 As to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. The award of moral damages does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied.39 Civil indemnity

282

499

Page

VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008

_______________

undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as 38 People v. Malejana, G.R. No. 145002, 24 January 2006, 479 SCRA 610, 627. 39 People v. Caraig, 448 Phil. 78, 98; 400 SCRA 67, 85 (2003). 500 a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.44 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 March 2007 convicting appellant Charlie Villa, Jr. of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS with _______________ 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Villa, Jr. is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the RTC award of civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim is in order.40 Although in the prosecution presented evidence that the heirs incurred 40 People (2004). 41 Id. 42 People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 642, 663. 43 Id. 44 Id. 501 v. Guillermo, 465 Phil. 248, 274; 420 SCRA 326, 347

expenses, no receipts were presented. The award of temperate damages, the amount of P25,000.00, to damages that, when are awarded occurs, the heirs of the where the no victim is justified. evidence of Temperate presume documentary of the

actual damages was presented in the trial because it is reasonable to death family victim incurred expenses for the wake and funeral.41 However, in addition to these damages, exemplary damages should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution.42 When a crime is VOL. 550, MARCH 28, 2008 501 People vs. Villa, Jr. respect to the award of damages. Appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Rodolfo Arevalo the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and another P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Costs against appellant.

283
Page

committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.43 This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as a vindication of

SO ORDERED. Austria-Martinez concur. Judgment affirmed with modifications. Notes.Self-defense is not credible in the face of the flight of the (Actg. Chairperson), Tinga,** Nachura and Reyes, JJ.,

accused from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities about the incident. (Sullon vs. People, 461 SCRA 248 [2005]) Our based laws on on self-defense we should are supposed to approximate impulses persons in the the natural face when of he

human responses to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient textbook which acclimatize to our perilit would be wrong to compel the accused to have discerned the appropriate calibrated response another kicking himself was staring at the evil eye of danger. (Soplente vs. People, 465 SCRA 267 [2005]) o0o _______________ [People vs. Villa, Jr., 550 SCRA 480(2008)]

Page

284

our jurisprudence, only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review to under Rule observe 45. The trial court, the having demeanor had of the the opportunity personally and analyze

witnesses while testifying, is in a better position to pass judgment on their credibility. More importantly, factual findings of the trial court, when amply supported by evidence on record and affirmed by the appellate court, are binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. While there are exceptional circumstances when these findings may be set aside, none of them is present in this case. Actions; Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; Factors. Although no hard and fast rule can be accurately laid down under which the juridical personality of a corporate entity may be disregarded, the following probative factors of identity justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction in this case: (1) San Juan and his wife own the bulk of shares of ASJ Corp.; (2) The lot where the hatchery plant is located is owned by the San Juan spouses; (3) ASJ Corp. had no the other properties it is or assets, except for is the in hatchery plant and lot where located; (4) San Juan

complete control of the corporation; (5) There is no bona fide intention to treat ASJ Corp. as a different entity from San Juan; and (6) The 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista G.R. No. 158086. February 14, 2008.* ASJ CORPORATION and ANTONIO SAN JUAN, petitioners, vs. SPS. corporate himself fiction from of the justify ASJ wrong, Corp. was claims used of by and San Juan a to insulate public legitimate respondents, evade defeat

convenience,

defend

crime,

corporations

subsidiary liability for damages. These findings, being purely one of fact, should be respected. We need not assess and evaluate the evidence all over again where the findings of both courts on these matters coincide. _______________

EFREN & MAURA EVANGELISTA, respondents.

285

Certiorari;

Appeals;

Pleadings

and

Practice;

Only

errors

of

law

are

* SECOND DIVISION. 301

reviewable by the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.Petitioners seek to establish a set of facts contrary to the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. However, as well established in

Page

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 301 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista Obligations and Contracts; Application of Payment; Under Article 1248 of the Civil Code, the creditor to the cannot be compelled the of chicks to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect.Petitioners corresponds respondents to obligation three dates: on deliver date and the by-products hatching, but delivery/pick-up tolerated

party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other party begins. Abuse of Rights; Elements; Even if a party has the right to do

something, he has no right to engage in high-handed and oppressive acts.San Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) 302

date and the date of respondents payment. On several setting reports, made delays their payments, petitioners such delay. When respondents accounts accumulated because of their successive failure to pay on several setting reports, petitioners opted to demand precedent the to full the settlement delivery. of respondents accounts were as a condition to fully However, respondents unable

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring the another. Here, while and petitioners had of the right to withhold as aptly delivery, high-handed oppressive acts petitioners,

settle their accounts. Respondents offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 1248 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. More so, respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and by-products they expect to derive because it is necessary that all the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character. Needless to say, there was no valid application of payment in this case. Same; that Reciprocal obligations of the are is those which arise upon was from the the same

found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence all over again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal. Same; Damages; Where it was established that a person suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on another persons abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages although are the recoverable.Since it was established that respondents ascertained, suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on petitioners abuse of rights, exact amount of actual damages cannot be

cause, wherein each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such the performance delay by one other conditioned begins.It simultaneous who fulfillment of the otherfrom the moment one of the parties fulfills his

286

obligation,

party

respondents

violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to petitioners right of retention. This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each

Page

temperate damages are recoverable. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages of P408,852.10, which is equivalent to the value of the chicks and by-products, which respondents, on the average, are expected to derive, this Court was guided by the following factors: (a) award of temperate damages will cover only Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113 since the threats started only on February 10 and 11, 1993, which are the pick-up dates for Setting Report Nos. 109 and 110; the rates of (b) 41% and (c) 17%, representing the average rates of conversion of broiler eggs into hatched chicks and egg by-products as tabulated by the trial court based on available statistical data which was unrebutted by petitioners; (d) 68,784 eggs, or the total number of broiler eggs under Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113; and (e) P14.00 and (f) P1.20, or the then unit market price of the chicks and by-products, respectively. Same; society, Same; it Where the a persons award of conduct moral flouts and the norms of civil For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56082, which had affirmed the Decision2 Appeals, dated after July 8, 1996 the of the of Regional piercing Trial the Court veil of (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 in Civil Case No. 745-M-93. The Court of applying doctrine corporate fiction, held petitioners ASJ Corporation (ASJ Corp.) and Antonio San Juan solidarily liable to respondents Efren and Maura Evangelista for the unjustified retention of the chicks and egg by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113.3 The pertinent facts, as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are as follows: Respondents, engaged them, eggs, VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 303 Bulacan in and and under the selling Nueva the their availed name and style of (chicks) hatchery of and R.M. broiler egg of and Sy Chicks, are in a The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. E.G. Ferry Law Offices for petitioner. Venustiano S. Roxas & Associates Law Office for respondents. QUISUMBING, J.:

justifies

exemplary

damagesas

enshrined in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere (To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due).We agree that petitioners conduct flouts the norms of civil society and justifies the award of moral and exemplary damages. As enshrined in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. Since exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees are also proper. 303

large-scale Ecija.

business For of the

buying

eggs,

hatching of these

hatchlings the

by-products4 ASJ Corp.,

incubation

hatching

respondents

services

corporation duly registered in the name of San Juan and his family. _______________

287
Page

ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

1 Rollo, pp. 28-42. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner, with Associate Justices Eliezer R. De Los Santos and Regalado E. Maambong concurring. 2 Id., at pp. 79-97. Penned by Judge D. Roy A. Masadao, Jr. 3 Id., at pp. 64-66. 4 Id., at p. 30. Such as balut, penoy and exploders. 304

Date Set SR Number No. of eggs delivered Date hatched/ Pick-up date 1/13/1993 SR 108

304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista Sometime in 1991, respondents delivered to petitioners various quantities of eggs at an agreed service fee of 80 centavos per egg, whether successfully hatched or not. Each delivery was reflected in a Setting Report indicating the following: the number of eggs delivered; the date of setting or the date the eggs were delivered and laid out in the incubators; the date of candling or the date the eggs, through a lighting system, were inspected and determined if viable or capable of being hatched into chicks; and the date of hatching, which is also the date respondents would pick-up the chicks and by-products. Initially, the service fees were paid upon release of the eggs and by-products to respondents. But as their business went along, respondents delays on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the balance, as there may be, into the next delivery, out of keeping

32,566 eggs February 3, 1993 1/20/1993 SR 109 21,485 eggs February 10, 1993 1/22/1993 SR 110 7,213 eggs February 12, 1993 1/28/1993 SR 111 to 14,495 eggs

288

goodwill with respondents. From January 13 to February 3, 1993, respondents had delivered

Page

San Juan a total of 101,3[50]5 eggs, detailed as follows:6

February 18, 1993 1/30/1993 SR 112 15,346 eggs February 20, 1993 2/3/1993 SR 113 10,24[5]7 eggs February 24, 1993 TOTAL

305

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 305 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista setting reports starting from Setting Report No. 90. Nevertheless, San Juan accepted from Efren 10,245 eggs covered by Setting Report No. 113 and P15,000.008 in cash as partial payment for the accrued service fees. On February 10, 1993, Efren returned to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 109, but San Juan again refused to release the same unless respondents fully settle their accounts. In the afternoon of the same day, respondent Maura, with her son Anselmo, tendered P15,000.009 to San Juan, and tried to claim the chicks and by-products. She explained that she was unable to pay their balance Juan because accepted she the was hospitalized but for an undisclosed on the full ailment. San P15,000.00, insisted

101,350 eggs

settlement of respondents accounts before releasing the chicks and byOn February 3, 1993, respondent Efren went to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 108, but San Juan refused to release the same due to respondents failure to settle accrued service fees on several _______________ products. Believing firmly that the total value of the eggs delivered was more than sufficient to cover the outstanding balance, Maura promised to settle their accounts only upon Juan detain disliked them the at idea the and hatchery proper accounting by San Juan. San to if impound they their should vehicle come and back compound threatened

unprepared to fully settle their accounts with him. On February 11, 1993, respondents directed their errand boy, Allan

289

5 101,347 in other parts of the Records. 6 Rollo, pp. 64-66, 81. 7 10,242 in other parts of the Records.

Blanco, to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report No. 110 and also to ascertain if San Juan was still willing to settle amicably their differences. Unfortunately, San Juan was firm in his refusal and reiterated his threats on respondents. Fearing San Juans

Page

threats, respondents never went back to the hatchery.

The

parties

tried

to

settle

amicably

their

differences

before

police

ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, unto the plaintiffs the amounts under of P529,644.80, Reports representing Nos. 108 to the value of the hatched legal chicks and by-products which the plaintiffs on the average expected to derive Setting from 113, inclusive, with interest thereon the date of this judgment until the same shall

authorities, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed with the RTC an action for damages based on petitioners _______________

have been fully paid, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit. 8 Rollo, p. 67. 9 Id. 306 SO ORDERED.14 Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents prayed for an additional award of P76,139.00 as actual damages for the cost of other while 306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista retention of the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113. On July 8, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and made the following findings: (1) as of Setting Report No. 107, respondents owed petitioners (3) the P102,336.80;10 retention by of the (2) petitioners and withheld the was release of the and RTC chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108-113;11 and chicks by-products on unjustified The accompanied threats and intimidations respondents.12 10 Id., at pp. 88-92. 11 Id., at pp. 87-88. 12 Id., at pp. 92-93. 13 Id., at pp. 93-94. 14 Id., at pp. 96-97. 307 unreturned petitioners by-products prayed for and the P1,727,687.52 reversal of as the unrealized trial courts profits, entire

decision. _______________

disregarded the corporate fiction of ASJ Corp.,13 and held it and San Juan solidarily liable to respondents for P529,644.80 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus

290

interests and costs of suit. The decretal portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, laws/jurisprudence based on the evidence on is record hereby and the

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 307 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista

Page

applicable

thereon,

judgment

rendered

On April 30, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied both appeals for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts decision, with the slight modification of including an award of exemplary damages of P10,000.00 in favor of respondents. The Court of Appeals, applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, considered ASJ Corp. and San Juan as one entity, after finding that there was no bona fide intention to treat the corporation as separate and distinct from San Juan and his wife Iluminada. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the slight modification that exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 are awarded to plaintiffs. Costs against defendants. SO ORDERED.15 Hence, the instant petition, assigning the following errors: I.

III.

THE QUO,

HONORABLE ERRED IN

COURT NOT

OF

APPEALS, THAT

AS

DID

THE

COURT FAILED

A TO

FINDING

RESPONDENTS

RETURN TO THE PLANT TO GET THE CHICKS AND BY _______________

15 Id., at pp. 41-42. 308

308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista

THE

HONORABLE AS

COURT THE

OF

APPEALS A

GRIEVOUSLY THAT

ERRED

IN

PRODUCTS AND 113. IV.

COVERED

BY

SETTING

REPORT

NOS.

110,

111,

112

HOLDING,

DID

COURT

QUO,

PETITIONERS

WITHHELD/OR FAILED TO RELEASE THE CHICKS AND BYPRODUCTS COVERED BY SETTING REPORT NOS. 108 AND 109. II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING, AS DID THE THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING THE COURT A QUO, THAT AND THE PIERCING OF THE VEIL TO OF PAY CORPORATE ENTITY IS JUSTIFIED, AND CONSEQUENTLY HOLDING PETITIONERS JOINTLY SEVERALLY LIABLE RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF P529,644.[80]. V.

291

HEARSAY ITS RELEASE

TESTIMONY THAT CHICKS THE

OF

MAURA

EVANGELISTA

SUPPORTIVE FAILED

OF TO

FINDINGS

PETITIONERS AND

WITHHELD/OR

BYPRODUCTS

COVERED BY

SETTING

Page

REPORT NOS. 108 AND 109.

309 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ART. 19 OF AWARDING HAVE THE MORAL VIOLATED NEW CIVIL THE PRINCIPLES AND EXEMPLARY ENUNCIATED DAMAGES IN IN AND CODE CONSEQUENTLY VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 309 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista courts. However, as well established in our jurisprudence, only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review under Rule THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT AWARDING PETITIONERS COUNTERCLAIM.16 Plainly, the issues submitted for resolution are: First, did the Court of Appeals err when (a) it ruled that petitioners withheld or failed to release the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 and 109; (b) it admitted the testimony of Maura; (c) it did not find that it was respondents who failed to return to the hatchery to pick up the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report Nos. 110 to 113; and (d) it pierced San the Juan veil as of corporate one entity? fiction Second, and held it ASJ Corp. to and hold Antonio was proper 45.17 The trial court, having had the opportunity to personally observe and analyze the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, is in a better position to pass judgment on their credibility.18 More importantly, factual findings of the trial court, when amply supported by evidence on record and affirmed by the appellate court, are binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal.19 While there are exceptional circumstances20 when these findings may be set aside, none of them is present in this case. Based on the records, as well to as the parties for own admissions, as the

DAMAGES,

ATTORNEYS FEES. VI.

following facts were uncontroverted: (1) As of Setting Report No. 107, respondents were indebted petitioners P102,336.80 accrued service fees for Setting Report Nos. 90 to 107;21 (2) Petitioners, based on San Juans own admission,22 did not release the chicks and byproducts cov_______________

petitioners solidarily liable to respondents for the payment of P529,644.80 and other damages? In our view, there are two sets of issues that the petitioners have

raised. The first set is factual. Petitioners seek to establish a set of facts

contrary to the factual findings of the trial and appellate _______________ 17 Estate of Salvador Serra Serra v. Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez, G.R. No. 142913, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 120, 128-129. 18 People v. Galam, G.R. No. 114740, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 16 Id., at pp. 12-13. 489, 497.

Page

292

19 MOF Company, Inc. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 149280, May 9, 2002, 382 SCRA 248, 252. 20 Union Refinery Corporation v. Tolentino, Sr., G.R. No. 155653,

ered by Setting Report Nos. 108 and 109 for failure of respondents to fully settle their previous accounts; and (3) Due to San Juans threats, respondents never returned to the hatchery to pick up those covered by Setting Report Nos. 110 to 113.23 Furthermore, although no hard and fast rule can be accurately laid down under which the the juridical following personality probative of a corporate of entity may be the disregarded, factors identity justify

September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 613, 618-619. 21 Rollo, pp. 89-91. See Tabulation of Payments and Balances. 22 TSN, August 16, 1995, pp. 22-23. ATTY. FERRY x x x x Q: Now, according to the plaintiff[,] the chicks and spoiled eggs

application of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction24 in this case: (1) San Juan and his wife own the bulk of shares of ASJ Corp.; (2) The lot where the hatchery plant is located is owned by the San Juan spouses; (3) ASJ Corp. had no other properties or assets, except for the hatchery plant and the lot where it is located; (4) San Juan is in complete control of the corporation; (5) There is no bona fide intention to treat ASJ Corp. as a different entity from San Juan; and (6) The corporate fiction of ASJ Corp. was used by San Juan to insulate himself from the legitimate claims of respondents, defeat public convenience, fact,26 evidence should all justify be wrong, respected. defend We crime, need and evade a corporations evaluate on the subsidiary liability for damages.25 These findings, being purely one of not assess of both and over again where the findings courts these

corresponding to Setting Report Nos. 108 up to 113 were not released by your plant because your company refused to release them because of the fact that no payment was made, what can you say to that? x x x x WITNESS A: That is true, sir. 310

matters coincide. On the second set of issues, petitioners contend that the retention was justified and did not constitute an abuse of rights since it was respondents who failed to comply with their obligation. Respondents, for their part, aver that all the elements on abuse of rights were present. They further state that despite their offer to partially satisfy the accrued service fees,

310

_______________

293

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista 23 Rollo, pp. 195-196.

Page

24

See

Concept

Builders,

Inc.

v.

National

Labor

Relations

precedent

to

the

delivery.

However,

respondents

were

unable

to

fully

Commission,G.R. No. 108734, May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 149, 158. 25 See Rollo, pp. 34-37. 26 China Banking Corporation v. Dyne-Sem Electronics Corporation, G.R. No. 149237, July 11, 2006, 494 SCRA 493, 499. 311

settle their accounts. Respondents offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish their obligation. Under Article 124827 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect. More so, respondents cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the chicks and byproducts they expect to derive because it is necessary that all

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 311 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista and the fact that the value of the chicks and by-products was more than sufficient to cover their unpaid obligations, petitioners still chose to withhold the delivery. The crux of the controversy, in our considered view, is simple enough. Was petitioners retention of the chicks and byproducts on account of respondents While the failure trial and act of to pay the corresponding had chicks the and service fees unjustified? on the appellate withholding courts the same decisions by-products is

_______________

27 ART. 1248.Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the prestations in which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to make partial payments. x x x x 312

312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista the debts be for the same kind, generally of a monetary character.

matter, suffice it to say that a modification is proper. Worth stressing, petitioners entirely different from petitioners unjustifiable acts of threatening respondents. The retention had legal basis; the threats had none. To begin with, petitioners obligation to deliver the chicks and by-products corresponds to three dates: on the date of hatching, but the delivery/pick-up tolerated

Needless to say, there was no valid application of payment in this case. Furthermore, retention. it was case respondents is clearly who one violated among the the very essence of of

294

date and the date of respondents payment. On several setting reports, respondents made delays their payments, petitioners such delay. When respondents accounts accumulated because of their successive failure to pay on several setting reports, petitioners opted to demand the full settlement of respondents accounts as a condition

reciprocity in contracts, consequently giving rise to petitioners right of This species nonperformance of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a debtor and

Page

a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other.28 From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other party begins.29 Since respondents they are are guilty liable of to delay pay in the performance actual of their of VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 313 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista another.32 Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We need not weigh Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents the corresponding pieces of evidence all over again because factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal.33 Since it was established that respondents suffered some pecuniary loss anchored on petitioners abuse of rights, although the exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages are recoverable. In arriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages of P408,852.10, which is equivalent to the value of the products, which 28 Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126083, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 570, 576. 29 CIVIL CODE, Art. 1169, last paragraph. 30 Service Fees for Setting Report Nos. 108-113 = Total No. of Eggs Delivered X P0.80 per egg. P81,080.00 = 101,350 eggs X P0.80 per egg. 31 ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in damages will respondents, on only Setting chicks and byto derive, since the the average, are expected Report Nos. 109 to 113

obligations,

petitioners

damages

P183,416.80, computed as follows: From respondents outstanding balance of P102,336.80, as of Setting Report No. 107, we add the corresponding services fees of P81,080.0030 for Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113 which had remain unpaid. Nonetheless, San

should not remain among those treated with impunity. Under Article 1931 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring _______________

this Court was guided by the following factors: (a) award of temperate cover threats started only on February 10 and 11, 1993, which are the pickup dates for Setting Report Nos. 109 and 110; the rates of (b) 41% and court (c) 17%, representing the average based on available statistical rates of conversion which was of broiler by eggs into hatched chicks and egg by-products as tabulated by the trial data unrebutted petitioners; (d) 68,784 eggs,34 or the total number of broiler eggs under Setting Report Nos. 109 to 113; and (e) P14.00 and (f) _______________

295

the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. 313 32 Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 372, 382.

Page

33 Estate of Salvador Serra Serra v. Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez, supra note 17, at p. 128. 34 Setting Report No. No. of eggs delivered SR No. 109 21,485 eggs SR No. 110 7,213 eggs SR No. 111 4,495 eggs SR No. 112 15,346 eggs SR No. 113 10,245 eggs TOTAL 68,784 eggs 314

ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista P1.20, or the then unit market price of the chicks and byproducts,

respectively. Thus, the temperate damages of P408,852.10 is computed as follows: [b X (d X e) + c X (d X f)] = Temperate Damages 41% X (68,784 eggs X P14) = P394,820.16 17% X (68,784 eggs X P1.20) = P 14,031.94 [P394,820.16 + P14,031.94] = P408,852.10 At bottom, we agree that petitioners conduct flouts the norms of civil society and justifies the award of moral and exemplary damages. As enshrined in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due.35 Since exemplary damages are awarded,

296

314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

attorneys fees are also proper. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that:

Page

In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; x x x x WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 56082 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: a. Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners P183,416.80 as actual damages, with interest of 6% from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid, plus legal interest of 12% from the finality of this decision until fully paid. _______________

c. The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees of P100,000.00, P10,000.00, P50,000.00, respectively, in favor of respondents is hereby AFFIRMED. d. All other claims are hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. Petition partly granted, judgment modified. Notes.The principle of abuse of rights stated in Article 19 of the Civil Code departs from the classical theory that he who uses a right injures no onethe is an modern abuse of tendency rights, is even to depart the from act the is classical not illicit. and (Sea traditional theory, and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there when Commercial Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 210 [1999]) Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is commonly

35 Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 172, 173. 315

referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the object of the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. (Nikko Hotel

VOL. 545, FEBRUARY 14, 2008 315 ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista b. The award of actual damages of P529,644.80 in favor of respondents

Manila Garden vs. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 [2005]) [ASJ Corporation vs. Evangelista, 545 SCRA 300(2008)]

297
Page

is hereby REDUCED to P408,852.10, with legal interest of 12% from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

NATIONAL

POWER

CORPORATION, CORPORATION

plaintiff-appellant, and DOMESTIC

vs.

NATIONAL INSURANCE

MERCHANDISING

COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellants. Contracts; not carry barne the Damages; out by Defendant's the and in terms that of contention the that it is not liable that of for the its

damages in case of non-availability of a steamer to deliver the sulfur is contract.They acted of within sale. contend the The delivery of the sulfur was conditioned on the availability of a vessel to shipment as agent Namerco the scope authority signing contract documentary

evidence belies these contentions. The invitation to bid issued by the NPC provides that nonavailability of a steamer to transport the sulfur is not a ground for nonpayment of the liquidated damages in case of nonperformance by the seller. Same; Same; Same.Namerco's bid or offer is even more explicit. It provides that it was "responsible for the availability of bottom or vessel" and that it "guarantees the availability of bottom or vessel to ship the quantity of sulfur within the time specified in this bid" (Exh. B, p. 22, Defendants' Record on Appeal). In the contract of sale itself item 15 of the invitation to bid is reproduced in Article 9 which provides that "it is clearly understood that in no event shall the seller be entitled to an extension of time or be exempt from the payment of liquidated damages herein specified for reason of lack of bottom or vessel" (Exh. E, p. 36, Record on Appeal). Same; Same; Agency; An agent which person principal VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 789 wishing told to purchase cable crude it via that it should does from not disclose its to a that third the

sulfur

principal, the sales

not sign

contract

unless it wish to assume sole responsibility for the shipment, exceeds the limits of its authority in subsequently signing the contract.We ________________

298
Page

National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. Nos. L-33819 and L-33897. October 23, 1982.*

* SECOND DIVISION.

790

its authority, and, in effect, it acted in its own name. As observed by Castan Tobeas, an agent "que haya traspasado los limites del mandato, lo que equivale a obrar sin mandato" (4 Derecho Civil Espaol, 8th Ed., 1956, p. 520). Same; Same; Same; An agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for damages.Manresa says that the agent who exceeds the limits of his authority is personally liable "porque realmente obra sin poderes" and the third person who contracts with the agent in such a case would be defrauded if he would not be allowed to sue the agent (11 Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., 1972, p. 725). Same; Same; Same; The rule in Art. 1403 of the Civil Code that a contract entered into by an agent beyond his authority is unenforceable does not apply where the contract is being enforced as to 791

790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. agree with the trial court that Namerco is liable for damages because under article 1897 of the Civil Code the agent who exceeds the limits of his authority without giving the party with whom he contracts sufficient notice of his powers is personally liable to such party. The truth is that even before the contract of sale was signed Namerco was already aware that its principal was having difficulties in booking shipping space. In a cable dated October 16, 1956, or one day before the contract of sale was signed, the New York supplier advised Namerco that the latter should not sign the contract unless it (Namerco) wished to assume sole responsibility for the shipment (Exh. T). Same; Same; Same; Same.Sycip, Namerco's but to finalize the contract of sale because president, replied the NPC would in his

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 791 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. damages against the agent itself for doing what it did without authority. We hold that defendants' contention is untenable because article 1403 refers to the unenforceability of the contract against the principal. In the instant case, the contract containing the stipulation for liquidated damages is not being enforced against its principal but against the agent and its surety. Same; Same; Same; Same.It is being enforced against the agent

letter to the seller dated also October 16, 1956, that he had no choice forfeit Namerco's bidder's bond in the sum of P45,100 posted by the Domestic Insurance Company if the contract was not formalized (Exh. 14, 14-A and Exh. V). Three days later, or on October 19, the New York firm cabled contract Namerco of sale that and the that firm did not consider the itself bound on by its the own Namerco signed contract

responsibility. Same; Same; Same; The rule that a person dealing with an agent must

299

inquire into the limits of the agent's authority does not apply where the agent is being held directly responsible for taking chances in exceeding its authority.That is not so in this case. Here, it is the agent that is sought to be held liable on a contract of sale which was expressly repudiated by the principal because the agent took chances, it exceeded

because article 1897 implies that the agent who acts in excess of his authority is personally liable to the party with whom he contracted. And that rule is complemented by article 1898 of the Civil Code which

Page

provides the

that

"if it

the shall

agent be

contracts void if the

in

the party

name with

of

the

principal, the agent

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. of the person who executes an obligation as the agent or representative of the principal will not, as a general rule, affect the surety's liability thereon, especially in the absence of fraud, even though the obligation is not binding on the principal" (72 C.J.S. 525). Contracts; Damages; Interest; Imposition of interest on principal as of the time rate 1957, the complaint was the of filed is not from just the ago, the where litigation prolonged in is has through no fault of defendant.With respect to the imposition of the legal of interest on or a damages a filing of the defendants' of complaint contention this case quarter century that

exceeding the scope of his authority, and the principal does not ratify contract, whom contracted is aware of the limits of the powers granted by the principal". Same; Same; Same; An agent must disclose the limits of its authority to For avoid that personal reason bound liability and by for ultra vires contracts.Namerco the limits never of is its not disclosed to the NPC the cabled or written instructions of its principal. because the Namerco of exceeded which, authority, it virtually acted in its own name and not as agent and it is, therefore, contract sale however, enforceable against its principal. If, as contemplated in articles 1897 and 1898, Namerco is bound under the contract of sale, then it follows that it is bound by the stipulation for liquidated damages in that contract. Agency; Bonds; Contracts; A surety company which guaranteed

meritorious. It would be manifestly inequitable to collect interest on the damages especially considering disposition been considerably delayed due to no fault of the defendants. Same; Same; Where liquidated damages are agreed upon the same

performance of foreign principal of a domestic agent is liable on its guarantee to the party with which the local agent dealt with in excess of its authority, as of said the agent virtually is acted that as the its own principal. Insurance Another contention defendants Domestic

should be enforced instead of awarding only nominal damages.No proof of pecuniary loss is required for the recovery of liquidated damages. The stipulation for liquidated damages is intended to obviate controversy on the amount of by it for damages. reason might of be of There the can be no of question the the they that the NPC parties of suffered damages because its production of fertilizer was disrupted or diminished foresaw damages nondelivery to sulfur. sulfur. exact the fixed The that difficult the ascertain So, amount

Company is not liable to the NPC because its bond was posted, not for Namerco, the agent, but for the New York firm which is not liable on the contract of sale. That contention cannot be sustained because it was Namerco that actually solicited the bond from the Domestic Insurance Company and, as explained already, Namerco is being held liable under the contract of sale because it virtually acted in its own name. It became the principal in the performance bond. In the last analysis, the Domestic Insurance Company acted as surety for Namerco. Same; Same; Same; Same.The rule is that "want of authority 792

nondelivery

liquidated

damages to be paid as indemnity to the NPC. On the other hand, nominal damages are damages in name only or are in fact the same as no damages (25 C.J.S. 466). It would not be correct to hold in this case that the NPC suffered damages in name only or that the breach of contract was merely technical in character. Same; Same; Liquidated damages agreed upon may be equitably

300

Page

792

reduced.These contentions have already been resolved in the preceding discussion. We find no sanction or justification for NPC's claim that it is

entitled to the full payment of the liquidated damages computed by its official. A painstaking evaluation of the equities of the case in the light of the arguments of the parties as expounded in their five briefs leads to the conclusion that the damages due from the defendants should be further reduced to P45,100 which is equivalent to their bidder's bond or to about ten percent of the selling price of the sulfur. 793

P72,114.56 plus legal, rate of interest from the filing of the complaint and the costs (Civil Case No. 33114). The two defendants appealed from the same decision allegedly because it is contrary to law and the evidence. As the amount originally involved is P360,572.80 and defendants' appeal is tied up with plaintiff's appeal on questions of law, defendants' appeal can be entertained under Republic Act No. 2613 which amended section 17 of the Judiciary Law. On October 17, 1956, of the National Power Corporation and National of 11

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 793 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Merchandising Corporation (Namerco) of 3111 Nagtahan Street, Manila, as the representative the International Commodities Corporation Mercer Street, New York City (Exh. C), executed in Manila a contract for the purchase by the NPC from the New York firm of four thousand long tons of crude sulfur for its Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant in Iligan City at a total price of (450,716 (Exh. E). On that same date, a performance bond in the sum of P90,143.20 was executed by the Domestic Insurance Company in favor of the NPC to guarantee the seller's obligations (Exh. 794

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano for defendants-appellants. AQUINO, J.:

794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. It was stipulated in the contract of sale that the seller would deliver the sulfur at Iligan City within sixty days from notice of the establishment in its favor of a letter of credit for $212,120 and that failure to effect delivery would subject the seller and its surety to the payment of liquidated damages at the rate of two-fifth of one percent of the full contract price for the first thirty days of default and four-fifth of one

This case is about the recovery of liquidated damages from a seller's agent that allegedly exceeded its authority in negotiating the sale.

301

Plaintiff National Power Corporation appealed on questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated October 10, 1966, ordering defendants National Merchandising Corporation and Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines to pay solidarity to the National Power Corporation reduced liquidated damages in the sum of

Page

percent for every day thereafter until complete delivery is made (Art. 8, p. 111, Defendants' Record on Appeal). In a letter dated November 12, 1956, the NPC advised John Z. Sycip, the president of Namerco, of the opening on November 8 of a letter of credit for $212,120 in favor of International Commodities Corporation which would expire on January 31, 1957 (Exh. I). Notice of that letter of credit was received by cable by the New York firm on November 15, 1956 (Exh. 80-Wallick). Thus, the deadline for the delivery of the sulfur was January 15, 1957. The New York supplier was not able to deliver the sulfur due to its inability to secure shipping space. During the period from January 20 to 26, 1957 there was a shutdown of the NPC's fertilizer plant because there was no sulfur. No fertilizer was produced (Exh. K). In a letter dated February 27, 1957, the general manager of the NPC advised Namerco and the Domestic Insurance Company that under Article 9 of the contract of sale "nonavailability of bottom or vessel" was not a fortuitous event that would excuse nonperformance and that the NPC would resort to legal remedies to enforce its rights (Exh. L and M). The Government Corporate Counsel in his letter to Sycip dated May 8, 1957 rescinded the contract of sale due to the New York supplier's nonperformance of its obligations (Exh. G). letter of June 8, 1957 demanded from The same counsel in his Namerco the payment of

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 795 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. Namerco was notified of the rescission of the contract, or P54,085.92 for the first thirty days and P306,486.88 for the remaining eighty-five days. Total: P360,572.80. On November 5, 1957, the NPC sued the New York firm, Namerco and the Domestic Insurance Company for the recovery of the stipulated liquidated damages (Civil Case No. 33114). The trial court in its order of January 17, 1958 dismissed the case as to the New York firm for lack of jurisdiction because it was not doing business in the Philippines (p. 60, Defendants' Record on Appeal). On the other hand, Melvin Wallick, as the assignee of the New York corporation and after the latter was dropped as a defendant in Civil Case No. 33114, sued Namerco for damages in connection with the same sulfur transaction (Civil Case No. 37019). The two cases, both filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, were consolidated. A joint trial was held. The lower court rendered separate decisions in the two cases on the same date. In Civil Case No. 37019, the trial court dismissed Wallick's action for damages against Namerco because the assignment in favor of Wallick was champertous in character. Wallick appealed to this Court. The appeal was dismissed because the record on appeal did not disclose that the appeal was perfected on time (Res. of July 11, 1972 in L33893). In this Civil Case No. 33114, although the records on appeal were

P360,572.80 as liquidated damages. He explained that time was of the essence of the contract. A similar demand was made upon the surety (Exh. H and H-1). The liquidated damages were computed on the basis of the 115-day period between January 15, 1957, the deadline for the delivery of the

302

sulfur at Iligan City, and May 9, 1957 when 795

approved in 1967, inexplicably, they were elevated to this Court in 1971. That anomaly initially contributed to the delay in the adjudication of this case.

Page

Defendants' appeal, L-33819.They contend that the delivery of the sulfur was conditioned on the availability of a vessel to carry the shipment and that Namerco acted within the scope of its authority as agent in signing the contract of sale. The documentary evidence belies these contentions. The invitation to bid issued by the NPC provides that nonavailability of a steamer to transport the sulfur is not a ground for non796

in

no

event

shall

the herein

Contractor specified

be for

exempt reason

from of

the of

payment bottom

of or

liquidated

damages

lack

vessel. Lack of bottom or nonavailability of vessel shall, in no case, be considered as a ground for extension of time. x x x." Namerco's bid or offer is even more explicit. It provides that it was "responsible for the availability of bottom or vessel" and that it "guarantees the availability of bottom or vessel to ship the quantity of sulfur within the time specified in this bid" (Exh. B, p. 22, Defendants' Record on Appeal). In the contract of sale itself item 15 of the invitation to bid is

796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. payment of the liquidated damages in case of nonperformance by the seller. "4. Responsibility for availability of vessel.The availability of vessel to transport the quantity of sulfur within the time specified in item 14 of this specification shall be the responsibility of the bidder. In case of award of contract, failure to ship on time allegedly due to nonavailability of vessels shall not exempt the Contractor from payment of liquidated damages provided in item 15 of this specification." "15. Liquidated damages.xxx xxx xxx "Availability of vessel being a responsibility of the Contractor as specified in item 4 of this specification, the terms 'unforeseeable causes beyond

reproduced in Article 9 which provides that "it is clearly understood that in no event shall the seller be entitled to an extension of time or be exempt from the payment of liquidated damages herein specified for reason of lack of bottom or vessel" (Exh. E, p. 36, Record on Appeal). It is true that the New York corporation in its cable to Namerco dated August 9, 1956 stated that the sale was subject to availability of a steamer (Exh. N). However, Namerco did not disclose that cable to the NPC and, contrary to its principal's instruction, it agreed that nonavailability of a steamer 797

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 797 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. was not a justification for nonpayment of the liquidated damages. The trial court rightly concluded that Namerco acted beyond the bounds of its authority because it violated its principal's cabled instructions (1) that the delivery of the sulfur should be "C & F Manila", not "C & F

303

the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor' and 'force to majeure' his as bid, used a herein bidder shall shall not have be deemed to embrace or include lack or nonavailability of bottom or vessel. It is agreed that prior making made previous arrangements regarding shipments within the required time. It is clearly understood that

Page

Iligan City"; (2) that the sale be subject to the availability of a steamer and (3) that the seller should be allowed to withdraw right away the full amount of the letter of credit and not merely eighty percent thereof (pp. 123-124, Record on Appeal). The defendants argue that it was incumbent upon the NPC to inquire into the extent of the agent's authority and, for its failure to do so, it could not claim any liquidated damages which, according to the defendants, were provided for merely to make the seller more diligent in looking for a steamer to transport the sulfur. The NPC counter-argues that Namerco should have advised the NPC of the limitations on its authority to negotiate the sale. We the agree limits with of the trial court that Namerco giving is the is liable for damages whom to he such 798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. cabled contract Namerco of sale that and the that firm did not consider the itself bound on by its the own

Namerco

signed

contract

responsibility (Exh. W). In its letters dated November 8 and 19, 1956, the New York corporation informed Namerco that since the latter acted contrary to the former's cabled instructions, the former disclaimed Y-1). The letters of the New York firm dated November 26 and December 11, 1956 were even more revealing. It bluntly told Namerco that the latter was never authorized to enter into the contract and that it acted contrary to the repeated instructions of the former (Exh. U and Z). Said the vice-president of the New York firm to Namerco: "As we have pointed out to you before, you have acted strictly contrary to our repeated instructions and, however regretfully, you have no one but yourselves to blame." The rule relied upon by the defendants-appellants that every person responsibility for the contract and that the responsibility for the sale rested on Namerco (Exh. Y and

because under article 1897 of the Civil Code the agent who exceeds his authority notice of without his party with liable contracts party. The truth is that even before the contract of sale was signed Namerco was already aware that its principal was having difficulties in booking shipping space. In a cable dated October 16, 1956, or one day before the contract of sale was signed, the New York supplier advised Namerco that the latter should not sign the contract unless it (Namerco) wished to assume sole responsibility for the shipment (Exh. T). Sycip, Namerco's president, replied in his letter to the seller dated also October 16, 1956, that he had no choice but to finalize the contract of sale because the NPC would forfeit Namerco's bidder's bond in the sum of P45,100 posted by the Domestic Insurance Company if the contract was not formalized (Exh. 14, 14-A and Exh. V). sufficient powers personally

dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent would apply in this case if the principal is sought to be held liable on the contract entered into by the agent. That is not so in this case. Here, it is the agent that it sought to be held liable on a contract of sale which was expressly repudiated by the principal because the agent took chances, it exceeded its authority, and, in effect, it acted in its own name.

304
Page

Three days later, or on October 19, the New York firm 798

As observed by Castan Tobeas, an agent "que haya traspasado los limites dew mandato, lo que equivale a obrar sin mandato" (4 Derecho Civil Espaol, 8th Ed., 1956, p. 520). As opined by Olivieri, "si el mandante contesta o impugna el negocio juridico concluido por el mandatario con el tercero, aduciendo el exceso de los limites impuestos, es justo que el mandatario, que ha tratado con engao al tercero, sea responsable personalmente respecto de el des las consecuencias de tal falta de aceptacion por parte del mandate. Tal responsabilidad del mandatario se informa en el principio de la falta de garantia de la existencia del mandato y de la cualidad de mandatario, 799

The defendants also contend that the trial court erred in holding as enforceable the stipulation for liquidated damages despite its finding that the contract was executed by the agent in excess of its authority and is, therefore, allegedly unenforceable. In support of that contention, the defendants cite article 1403 of the Civil Code which provides that a contract entered into in the name of another person by one who has acted beyond his powers is unenforceable. We hold that defendants' contention is untenable because article 1403 refers to the unenforceability of the contract against the principal. In the instant case, the contract containing the stipulation for liquidated damages is not being enforced against its principal but against the agent and its surety. It is being enforced against the agent because article 1897 implies that the agent who acts in excess of his authority is personally liable to the party with whom he contracted. And that rule is complemented by article 1898 of the Civil Code which provides that "if it the shall agent be contracts void if the in the party name with of the principal, the agent exceeding the scope of his authority, and the principal does not ratify the contract, whom contracted is aware of the limits of the powers granted by the principal". 800

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 799 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. garantia impuesta coactivamente por la ley, que quiere que aquel que contrata como mandatario este obligado a garantizar al tercero la efectiva existencia de los poderes que afirma se halla investido, siempre que el tercero mismo sea de buena fe. Efecto de tal garantia es el resarcimiento de los daos causados al tercero como consecuencia de la negativa del mandante a reconocer lo actuado por el mandatario." (26, part II, Scaevola, Codigo Civil, 1951, pp. 358-9). Manresa says that the agent who exceeds the limits of his authority is

800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp.

305

personally person

liable

"porque

realmente the

obra

sin in

poderes" such a

and case

the would

third be

who

contracts

with

agent

defrauded if he would not be allowed to sue the agent (11 Codigo Civil, 6th Ed., 1972, p. 725).

Page

It is being enforced against the agent because article 1897 implies that the agent who acts in excess of his authority is personally liable to the party with whom he contracted. And that rule is complemented by article 1898 of the Civil Code which provides the that "if it the shall agent be contracts void if the in the party name with of the principal, the agent exceeding the scope of his authority, and the principal does not ratify contract, whom contracted is aware of the limits of the powers granted by the principal". As priorly discussed, Namerco, as agent, exceeded the limits of its

Holton,

149

N.E.

38,

42

ALR

1307,

is

not

well-taken.

As

correctly

argued by the NPC, it would be unjust and inequitable for Namerco to escape liability after it had deceived the NPC. 801

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 801 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. Another contention of the defendants is that the Domestic Insurance

authority in contracting with the NPC in the name of its principal. The NPC was unaware of the limitations on the powers granted by the New York firm to Namerco. The New York corporation in its letter of April 26, 1956 said: "We hereby certify that National Merchandising Corporation x x x are our exclusive representatives in the Philippines for the sale of our products. "Furthermore, we certify that they are empowered to present our offers in our behalf in accordance with our cabled or written instructions." (Exh. C). Namerco never disclosed to the NPC the cabled or written instructions of its principal. For that reason and because Namerco exceeded the limits of its authority, it virtually acted in its own name and not as agent and it is, therefore, bound by the contract of sale which, however, is not enforceable against its principal. If, as contemplated in articles 1897 and 1898, Namerco is bound under

Company is not liable to the NPC because its bond was posted, not for Namerco, the agent, but for the New York firm which is not liable on the contract of sale. That contention cannot be sustained because it was Namerco that

actually solicited the bond from the Domestic Insurance Company and, as explained already, Namerco is being held liable under the contract of sale because it virtually acted in its own name. It became the principal in the performance bond. In the last analysis, the Domestic Insurance Company acted as surety for Namerco. The rule is that "want of authority of the person who ex-ecutes an obligation as the agent or representative of the principal will not, as a general rule, affect the surety's liability thereon, especially in the absence of fraud, even though the obligation is not binding on the principal" (72 C.J.S. 525). Defendants' other contentions are that they should be held liable only for nominal damages, that interest should not be collected on the amount of damages and that the damages should be computed on the basis of a forty-five-day period and not for a period of one hundred fifteen days. cases, like Mendelsohn vs.

306
Page

the contract of sale, then it follows that it is bound by the stipulation for liquidated damages in that contract. Defendants' contention that Namerco's liability should be based on tort or quasi-delict, as held in some American

With

respect

to

the

imposition

of

the

legal

rate

of

interest

on

the

correct to hold in this case that the NPC suffered damages in name only or that the breach of contract was merely technical in character. As to the of contention forty-five of our that the the damages period the should be by computed a vessel on the

damages from the filing of the complaint in 1957, or a quarter of a century ago, defendants' contention is meritorious. It would be manifestly inequitable to collect interest on the damages especially considering that the disposition of this case has been considerably delayed due to no fault of the defendants. The contention that only nominal damages should be adjudged is

basis in

days,

required liquidated

leaving be

Galveston, Texas to reach Iligan City, that point need not be resolved view conclusion that damages should equivalent to the amount of the bidder's bond posted by Namerco. NPC's appeal, L-33897.The trial court reduced the liquidated damages to twenty percent of the stipulated amount. The NPC contends that it is entitled to the full amount of liquidated damages in the sum of P360,572.80. In reducing the liquidated damages, the trial court relied on article 2227 of the Civil Code which provides that "liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable". Apparently, the trial court regarded as an equitable consideration the

contrary to the intention of the parties (NPC, Namerco and its surety) because it is clearly provided that liquidated damages are recoverable for delay in the delivery of the sulfur and, with more reason, for nondelivery. No proof of pecuniary loss is required for the recovery of liquidated damages. The stipulation for liquidated damages is intended to obviate controversy on the amount of damages. There can be no question that the NPC suffered damages 802

persistent efforts of Namerco and its principal to charter a steamer and 802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. because its production of fertilizer was disrupted or diminished by reason of the nondelivery of the sulfur. The parties foresaw that it might be difficult to ascertain the exact that the failure of the New York firm to secure shipping space was not attributable to its fault or negligence. The trial court also took into account the fact that the selling price of the sulfur was P450,716 and that to award as liquidated damages more than eighty percent of the price would not be altogether reasonable. The NPC contends it should that be Namerco responsible was for an all obligor in bad which faith could and, be

therefore,

damages

reasonably attributed to its nonperformance of the obligation as provided in article 2201 of the Civil Code. 803

amount of damages for nondelivery of the sulfur. So, they fixed the

307
Page

liquidated damages to be paid as indemnity to the NPC. On the other hand, nominal damages are damages in name only or are in fact the same as no damages (25 C.J.S. 466). It would not be

VOL. 117, OCTOBER 23, 1982 803 National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp. On the other hand, the defendants argue that Namerco having acted as a mere agent, was not liable for the liquidated damages stipulated in the alleged liability should be based on tort or quasi-delict and not on the contract of sale; that if Namerco is not liable, then the insurance company, its surety, is likewise not liable; that the NPC is entitled only to nominal of of damages sale; that, because as it was able to secure the unenforceable sulfur from that 804 contract award already is and noted, highly that the Namerco's iniquitous, NPC did

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur. Judgment modified. Notes.A debtor should not be made to pay liquidated damages when his denial to pay the balance of the account is not due to bad faith. (Lawyers Cooperative vs. Tabora, 13 SCRA 762). 804

another source (58-59 tsn November 10, 1960) and that the reduced stipulated acted in damages faith considering not Namerco good suffer any

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Meralco Securities Corporation vs. Savellano

actual damages. These contentions have already been resolved in the preceding

An

agreement

for

the

payment

of

liquidated

damages

in

the

same

discussion. We find no sanction or justification for NPC's claim that it is entitled to the full payment of the liquidated damages computed by its official. Ruling on the amount of damages.A painstaking evaluation of the

amount as the earnest money to be returned cannot be assailed on the ground of its being iniquitous or unconscionable. (Limjoco vs. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 663). [National Power Corp. vs. National Merchandising Corp., 117 SCRA 789(1982)]

equities of the case in the light of the arguments of the parties as expounded in their five briefs leads to the conclusion that the damages due from the defendants should be further reduced to P45,100 which is equivalent to their bidder's bond or to about ten percent of the selling price of the sulfur. WHEREFORE, the are lower court's to judgment pay is modified to the and defendants Power

National Merchandising Corporation and Domestic Insurance Company of

308

the

Philippines

ordered

solidarity

National

Corporation the sum of P45,100.00 as liquidated damages. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Page

Criminal elements: to detain

Law; (1) a

Kidnapping; the offender (2)

Elements.The is he a private or

crime individual; detains

has not

the either or

following of in the any

parents of the victim or a public officer who has a duty under the law person; kidnaps another, manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following for circumstances more than is present: days; (b) (a) it the is kidnapping committed or by detention lasts three

simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official. Same; Same; The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it; If the victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential.If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. _______________

* EN BANC. 299 VOL. 560, July 28, 2008 G.R. No. 174659. July 28, 2008.*

309

299 People vs. Mamantak

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK, accused-appellants.

Page

The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the the Revised intent of of Penal the a Code is present. to but effect also the The it. essence It of the not his crime only liberty of the in kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with accused person includes of imprisonment deprivation

sentences point of

to law.

reclusion While

perpetua the penalty

without for

eligibility kidnapping

for for

parole.One the purpose

final of

extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is death, RA 9346 has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we 300 300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mamantak reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion

whatever form and for whatever length of time. And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his Godgiven faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible courts witness but must ruled be that credible the in itself. of The trial and and appellate correctly statements Taurak

perpetua, without eligibility for parole. Same; Same; Damages; When the crime of kidnapping is attended by a demand award of for ransom, civil by way of example proper. the or correction, to of P100,000 People v. exemplary damages is proper.In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the P50,000 to indemnity was Pursuant minority Garalde, 521 SCRA 327 (2007), the award of P50,000 moral damages is increased P200,000 considering Christopher. to P100,000 Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled exemplary damages. APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Rashid A. Saber, Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida

Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Same; that that the Same; Words him him and from from as Phrases; Ransom means means money, money, of price price ransom for or or is the is

consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person will will release release is captivity.Ransom captivity. a No consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person specific chip in form required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as ransom intended The bargaining of and exchange the victims freedom. amount purpose for ransom

immaterial.

310

Same; Same; Penalties; Death Penalty Law (RA No. 7659); While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is death, Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty has banned the death penalty and reduced all death

Taurak for accused-appellants. CORONA, J.:

Page

information. There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or

Despite

the

publicity,

however,

Teresa

received

no

word

about Christophers whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating her misery. On February like 25, a 2001, muslim. Teresa The received caller a call from to a woman custody who of

compassion for others. Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was. Justice law. At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing

sounded

claimed

have

Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy. On March 27, Teresa 2001, to the a same recent muslim-sounding photo of her woman son from called the and Jalal

instructed

get

Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresas niece. Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place. _______________

separation of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the

Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. 301 VOL. 560, July 28, 2008 301 People vs. Mamantak Barely had Christopher gone from his mothers sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As

1 In some parts of the records, PO2. 302

311

their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment. The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to

Page

inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and

302

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mamantak At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she showed the photo to received in Jalal Restaurant in who stated that she Manila. She knew Bato. Mamantak

303 VOL. 560, July 28, 2008 303 People vs. Mamantak Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to

forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for

Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher. Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher. Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with Taurak as surname. Mamantak money. Palafox. and Taurak interrupted that her under and Teresa niece PO3 and it demanded and boarded eyes. the a ransom to PO3 the jeepney

ransom under the following Information: That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario in said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil Code. CONTRARY TO LAW. Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence. In was defense, Mamantak wares and in Taurak Divisoria denied market, the charges against she them. saw

She was

answered parked

had

pointed

Thereafter,

Mamantak outside,

Palafox

312

which

Tauraks

watchful

Inside

Taurak testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she peddling Manila. When Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She took the boy under her care and waited

jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.

Page

for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo. The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim him. 304 304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mamantak On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for Christophers picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that Teresa was the boys mother did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent. There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest. Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitangs Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When Teresa arrived later, Taurak

She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no warrant for her arrest. After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision2 on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA _______________

2 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Amor A. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43. Court of Appeals Records, pp. 23-39. 305 VOL. 560, July 28, 2008 305 People vs. Mamantak [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused. Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the pendency of this case. SO ORDERED.3

313
Page

talked to her and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m.

Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision4 dated erred Thus, to March in not 31, 2006, the the appellate demand affirmed Section court for the ruled that as of as court the a trial court for and by the considering P30,000 conviction 124 demand Taurak amended certified

People vs. Mamantak other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of

ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. the appellate Pursuant Matter court to No. Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua death.5 13, Rule Administrative 00-5-03-SC, the appellate

reclusion perpetua to death. 1. If days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three

case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.6 We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty. Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659: ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any _______________

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

3 Id. 4 Penned concurred by in Associate by Mario Justice L. Roberto III A. and Barrios Santiago (deceased) Javier and

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim7 or a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person;8 (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; _______________ Guaria Ranada

(retired) of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 2-20. 5 Id. 6 Id. 306

314
Page

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

7 When the victim is a minor and the accused is any of the parents, the crime is defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Article 271 of the Revised Penal Code. 8 A public officer (such as policeman) who has a duty under the law to detain a person but detains a person without legal ground is liable for arbitrary detention defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, a public officer who has no legal duty to detain a person may be prosecuted for illegal detention and kidnapping. 307

includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.12 The and two-year-old was (both Christopher only them of suddenly almost disappeared 16 months in Binondo, from Manila and del

recovered

after private

Taurak Lanao

Mamantak

individuals) in

Kapatagan,

Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly _______________

VOL. 560, July 28, 2008 307 People vs. Mamantak (3) (4) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances 9 People v. Jatulan, G.R. No. 171653, 24 April 2007, 522 SCRA 174.

10 Id. 11 Id. 12 See Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919). 308 308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mamantak deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave appellants custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.

is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official. If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death

315
Page

even if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is present.9 The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it.10 It

Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded P30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantaks actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence. Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and Developments social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to each other? Similarly, Mamantaks account that she was at Pitangs Carinderia only by coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. on her and clearly The role in unequivocal arranging the testimonies for the of the of prosecution of Teresa witnesses and The payment

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.13 The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve its credence. assessment thereof, Moreover, of are the factual credibility findings of the if of not the trial court, the value including probative witnesses and

weight

accorded

great,

conclusive,

when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.14 The Court of Appeals considered the demand the for P30,000 of the as a

qualifying

circumstance

which

necessitated

imposition

death

penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for board-and-lodging.) Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity.15 No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial. In this case, the payment of P30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom. One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other _______________

ransom and the release of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity demanding evidence receiving ransom that money) showed was a otherwise. established Mamantak

principal in the kidnapping of Christopher. 309 VOL. 560, July 28, 2008

316

309 People vs. Mamantak

Page

13 People v. Alba, 326 Phil. 519; 256 SCRA 505 (1996).

14 People v. Garalde, G.R. No. 173055, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 327. 15 People v. Jatulan, supra. 16 Id. 310 310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Mamantak person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. In line with prevailing damages jurisprudence, is increased the to award of P50,000 considering civil the

_______________

17 As amended by RA 7659. 18 An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. 19 See People v. Solangon, G.R. No. 172693, 21 November 2007, 537 SCRA 746; People v. Yambot, 397 Phil. 23; 343 SCRA 20 (2000). 20 Supra note 12. 21 See People v. Solangon, supra; People v. Baldogo, 444 Phil. 35, 66; 396 SCRA 31, 61 (2003); People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 194; 373 SCRA 134, 161 (2002). 22 Id. 311

indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant to People v. Garalde,20 the award of P50,00021 moral P200,000 minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to P100,000 exemplary damages.22 WHEREFORE, decision of the the appeal is hereby in DENIED. The March 31, 2006 is VOL. 560, July 28, 2008 311 People vs. Mamantak SO ORDERED. Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, CarpioMorales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro and Brion, JJ., concur. Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., On Official Leave. Nachura, J., No part.

Court of Appeals

CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They

317

are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P50,000 civil indemnity, P200,000 moral damages and P100,000 exemplary damages to their young victim Christopher Basario. Costs against appellants.

Page

Reyes, J., On Leave. Appeal denied, judgment affirmed with modification. Notes.The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Ransom, as employed in the law, is meaning, detained a sum paid a of or consideration so used in its common or that other for releases thing from of of redemption or ordinary sense, value, a price, (People or or vs. kidnapped money

demanded

person,

payment

captivity.

Ejandra, 429 SCRA 364 [2006]) The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is the actual

confinement or restraint of the victim, or the deprivation of his liberty. In kidnapping, the victim need not be taken by the accused forcibly or against his willwhat is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. (People vs. Deduyo, 414 SCRA 146 [2003]) [People vs. Mamantak, 560 SCRA 298(2008)]

Page

318

80 VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 79 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126850. April 28, 2004.* THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., petitioner, vs. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the

issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Civil Law; Contracts; It is a cardinal rule in contract interpretation that the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties is to be discharged by looking to the words they used to project that intention in their contract, that is, all the words, not just a particular word or two, and words in context, not words standing alone.It is a cardinal rule in contract interpretation that the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties is to be discharged by looking to the words they used to project that intention in their contract, that is, all the words, not just a particular word or two, and words in context, not words standing alone. to Furthermore, Article 1374 of the Civil Code requires all that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing the doubtful ones that sense which may result from of them taken jointly. Conformably, to ascertain the true meaning or import of the

COURT OF APPEALS and SUN BROTHERS & COMPANY, respondents. Remedial Law; Appeals; Rule that in the exercise of the Supreme

Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties is a during settled the rule trial that of in the the case recognized of the several Supreme exceptions.It exercise

Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) _______________

319

* SECOND DIVISION. 80

disputed option to renew clause in the contract of lease, the entirety of the contract must be considered; not merely the clause relating to the option to renew.

Page

Same; Same; When the language of the contract is explicit leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. When the language of the contract is explicit leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. The Court would be rewriting the contract of lease between Insular and Sun Brothers under the guise of construction were we to interpret the option to renew clause as Sun Brothers propounds it, despite the express provision in the acts. original As contract Court of has lease held and in the contracting Filipina, parties Inc. vs. subsequent Court of the Riviera

wounded feelings or moral shock or social humiliation, which can be suffered only by one having a nervous system. Same; Same; In contracts if or the a the and quasi-contracts, acted in manner.As award the a to court wanton, Insulars may award for the or

exemplary reckless, and

damages oppressive

defendant

fraudulent, plea if

malevolent court may

exemplary damages, the Court finds the same meritorious. In contracts quasi-contracts, acted in exemplary reckless, of the damages defendant course wanton, fraudulent, renewal oppressive,

malevolent manner. Sun Brothers was in evident bad faith when in the of negotiations for the third lease contract in 1992, it wantonly and oppressively insisted that it had a unilateral right to renew to lease thereby resulting in an impasse between the parties and which Sun Brothers took advantage of and used as a basis for instituting the proceedings for declaratory relief, although its prior actions since January 29, 1958 when the original contract of lease was executed, spanning more than three decades, indicated that it was wellaware of the contractual stipulation that after a twenty-year period of lease, the right to renew the lease was subject to such terms and conditions that the parties may mutually agree upon at the time, as expressly provided for in the original contract of lease.

Appeals, a court, even the Supreme Court, has no right to make new contracts for the parties or ignore those already made by them, simply to avoid seeming hardships. justifies Neither abstract of a justice contract nor for the the rule of liberal construction the creation parties

which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obligation not assumed. 81

VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 81 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals Same; Damages; Moral damages can not be granted in favor of a

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Balane, Tamase Alampay Law Offices for petitioner. Posadas Law Firm for respondents. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

corporation.As to moral damages, Insulars prayer that moral damages not less than P5 Million be awarded because its name and reputation has been defamed by Sun Brothers, is not tenable. The rule is that

320

moral damages can not be granted in favor of a corporation. Being an artificial person and having suffering, existence mental only in legal fright, contemplation, serious a corporation has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; it cannot, therefore, experience physical anguish, anxiety,

Page

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision,1 dated May 20, 1996, of the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity) in CA_______________

that the lease was renewable at the option of the tenant, Sun Brothers, for an additional five years, provided the exercise of the option to renew the lease shall be made by the tenant in writing to The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular for brevity) at least ninety days before the expiration of the period. The contract further provided for monthly rental of P50,000.00 for the first year and an increase of 10% per annum for the succeeding years, exclusive of real estate taxes and

1 Penned by Justice Antonio M. Martinez and concurred in by Justices Ricardo P. Galvez and Portia A. Hormachuelos. 82

insurance premiums which are for the account of Sun Brothers.4 Sun Brothers alleged that since the lease contract does not contain any provision as to the rental or any provision for any new or additional terms or conditions in case of renewal, the terms and conditions of the renewal of lease should be the same and the monthly rental should remain at P73,205.00. It prayed that judgment be rendered: (a) declaring that renewal under the contract of lease be for an additional period of five years under the same terms and conditions and the monthly rental should be P73,205.00; and, (b) ordering Insular to pay Sun Brothers P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.5

82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. CV No. 46987 affirming the Decision,2 dated April 25, 1994,

_______________

rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 150), Makati City (RTC for brevity) in Civil Case No. 92-27754 extending the lease contract subject of the petition for declaratory relief and ordering petitioner to pay attorneys fees and costs. The factual antecedents are as follows: On September 24, 1992, Sun Brothers & Company (Sun Brothers for brevity) filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC seeking judicial interpretation of the option to renew clause under a Contract of Lease dated September 20, 1988.3 2 Penned by Judge Erna Falloran Aliposa. 3 Original Record, p. 1. 4 Id., pp. 198-199. 5 Id., p. 1. 83

321

Under the contract, Sun Brothers leased for a period of five years from December 1, 1987 until November 30, 1992, a parcel of land, with an approximate area of 4,215 square meters, and the building constructed thereon, located in Makati (then a Municipality). The contract stipulated VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 83

Page

The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals On November 6, 1992, Insular filed its Answer6 claiming that while the lease contract grants Sun Brothers the option to renew the lease by giving notice thereof to Insular at least ninety days before the expiration of the period, it has always been the agreement of the parties that Sun Brothers does not have the right to impose, on its sole will, a renewal of the lease as to the period or the rentals;7 that despite the presence of the renewal clause in the previous contracts of lease, the parties still negotiated, as a matter of course, for the renewal of the lease in 1977 and 1987; that negotiation was the usual norm between the parties, clearing up as it did vague portions of the previous contracts. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its decision, dated April 25, 1994, ruling as follows: The wording of and the need x x no x provisions of the contract The be is clear, herein to

the contract if, indeed, such was not the intention of the parties. It could have provided therein that any renewal of the lease would be by mutual agreement of the parties or had specifically limited the period of the lease.8 The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: _______________

6 Id., p. 15. 7 Id., pp. 16-17. 8 Rollo, pp. 63-64. 84

unambiguous lease on

further that

interpretation. the same

tenant,

petitioner, is vested solely with the option to renew the said contract of the only condition made known respondent in writing at least 90 days before its expiration. Petitioner, in its letter to respondent dated May 22, 1993 (Exh. D), expressed its desire to exercise the option granted in the contract, since there is no mention of any change or increase in the amount of monthly rental, petitioner understood it to mean that the renewal will be under the same terms and conditions. Respondents claim that the lease contract (Exh. C) does not contain the true intent of the parties deserves scant consideration. It must be noted, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, that all the contracts of lease between the parties and the repeated renewals thereof were 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: a) declaring that the contract of lease dated 30 September 1988 be renewed for another 5 years starting from 30 November 1992 and up to 1 December 1997; b) declaring that the monthly rental on the leased premises be

322

entirely drafted, finalized and notarized by respondent and is, thus, a contract of adhesion. Being a contract of adhesion, petitioners only role was for its general manager, Amancio L. Sun to sign the same. The respondent could have easily deleted this questioned renewal clause in

P100,000.00 exclusive of real estate taxes and insurance premiums, less any amounts that petitioner may have paid respondent in the meantime;

Page

c)

ordering

the

respondent

to

pay

herein

petitioner

the

amount

of

12 Court of Appeals (CA), Rollo, p. 19. 13 Rollo, p. 108. 14 121 SCRA 794 (1983). 15 151 SCRA 484 (151). 16 166 SCRA 577 (1988). 85

P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and d) to pay the cost. SO ORDERED.9 On June 1, 1994, Insular filed a motion for reconsideration10 which the RTC denied in its Order dated July 18, 1994.11 Dissatisfied, Insular appealed to the CA.12 In a Decision dated May 20, 1996, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.13 It reasoned that since the renewal clause to in the the terms latest and contract of Insular of the and Sun Brothers is silent as conditions subsequent

contract, such subsequent contract should follow the terms and conditions of the original contract, applying the doctrine laid down in the cases of Ledesma vs. Javellana,14 Millare vs. Hernando,15 and Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals.16 As regards the monthly rental, the CA held that there was no merit to Insulars testimony allegation of that the trial court acted month arbitrarily in fixing by the the Sun amount of the rent at P100,000.00 a witness that since it considered introduced

VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 85 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals on the building and paid real estate taxes as well as insurance

premiums thereon.17 Insular filed a motion for reconsideration18 which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated October 10, 1996.19 Hence, the present petition for review anchored on the following grounds: A. THE EXERCISE ACTUAL AND TO OF JUDICIAL POWER OF ISSUES ENTAILS LEGALLY THE DUTY BY TO THE

Insulars

improvements

Brothers still have an appraised value, which value is considered by the CA in favor of Sun Brothers in the determination of the terms of the extended lease. The CA added that the trial court arrived at the amount of P100,000.00 after considering that Sun Brothers had shouldered the maintenance expenses _______________

SETTLE RIGHTS PARTIES.

CONTROVERSIES DECIDE UPON

DEMANDABLE

SUBMITTED

B. WHERE A PARTY PUTS IN ISSUE IN HIS PLEADING THAT THE

323

9 Id., p. 65. 10 Original Record, p. 397. 11 Id., p. 445.

CONTRACT PARTIES,

FAILS

TO

EXPRESS COURT IS

THE

TRUE

INTENT TO

OF

THE THE

THE

LOWER

MANDATED

CONSIDER

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND THEN DECIDE WHAT THE TRUE INTENT IS; BY THE VERY NATURE OF THIS CHALLENGE, IT IS A JUDICIAL ABDICATION OF DUTY TO SIMPLY AND MERELY

Page

RULE THAT THE CONTRACT IS CLEAR AND MUST BE INTERPRETED AS SUCH. C. THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE RENT IS DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED. D. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF MORAL AND

86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court.21 However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners (10) absence main when of and the reply findings and briefs of are fact not are by disputed premised the by on the the on respondent; supposed

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.20 Succinctly, the issue herein is the real nature of the option to renew the lease under the contractual agreement of the parties. Insular insists that the option to renew is a bilateral agreement subject to the terms and conditions the parties may agree upon. Sun Brothers, on the other hand, posits that the option to renew is its unilateral right effectively exercised by mere notice to Insular of the intention to extend the lease, at least ninety days before the expiration of the period, without qualification as to monthly rental or term of the lease. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by _______________

evidence

contradicted

evidence

record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.22 Exceptions (4), (10) and (11) are

17 Rollo, pp. 113-114. 18 CA Rollo, p. 118. 19 Id., p. 159. 20 Rollo, pp. 22-23.

present in this case. It is a cardinal rule in contract interpretation that the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties is to be discharged by looking to the words they used to project that intention in their contract, that is, all the words, not just a particular word or two, and words in context, not words standing alone.23 Furthermore, Article 1374 of the Civil Code requires that the various _______________

324
Page

86

21 Pestao vs. Sumayang, 346 SCRA 870, 879 (2000); Baas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259, 271 (2000); Borromeo vs. Sun, 317 SCRA 176, 182 (1999); Lagrosa vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 298, 310 (1999); Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Triumph Lumber and Construction Corporation, 301 SCRA 537, 548 (1999). 22 Langkaan Realty Development, Inc. vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, 347 SCRA 542, 336 549 SCRA (2000); 97, Nokom 110 vs. National Labor of Relations Internal Commission, (2000); Commissioner

between renewal provide: I

the

parties The

but,

in

fact,

the

third

contract

or all

the

second on

contract.

parties

lessor-lessee

relationship

started

January 29, 1958, with the original contract of lease,24 portions of which

Revenue vs. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc., 305 SCRA 70, 74 (1999); Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 351, 357 (1998). 23 Limson vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 209, 216 (2001); China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 327, 338 (1996); Heirs of Severo Legaspi, Sr. vs. Vda. de Dayot, 188 SCRA 508, 514 (1990); Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 577, 587 (1988). 87

INSULAR does hereby lease the abovementioned land and building unto the TENANT and the TENANT does hereby accept in lease from INSULAR the said land and building, for a period of TEN (10) YEARS from the date provided for in Clause IX hereof, renewable at the option of the TENANT for an additional period of TEN (10) YEARS; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the exercise of the options to renew the lease as herein stated shall be made by the TENANT in writing to INSULAR at least NINETY (90) DAYS before the expiration of the periods herein mentioned. All renewals shall be under the same terms and conditions hereinstated. . . . . . . . . .

VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 87 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful jointly. ones that sense to which may the result true from all or of them taken of the Conformably, ascertain meaning import

III

INSULAR expressly covenants that if on or before the expiration of the period of TWENTY (20) YEARS (covered by the original TEN (10) years period of the lease and the renewal still period to of TEN (10) the years hereinabove stipulated) TENANT desires occupy building,

disputed option to renew clause in the contract of lease, the entirety

INSULAR shall give the TENANT first priority to lease the building at the monthly rental and under such other terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties at that time. 25 (Emphasis supplied) The first renewal of the lease contract was made on January 20, 1978 for a period of another 10 years, from December 1, 1977 until

325
Page

of the contract must be considered; not merely the clause relating to the option to renew. After a careful examination of the records of the case, the Court finds it significant that the disputed contract of lease is not the first contract

November 30, 1987, which by that time had added up to twenty years of lease. The parties agreed that the lease was renewable at _______________

for a period of five (5) years using the current value of the leased property as base, which current value is hereby agreed upon by the parties as follows: Land ......................................................... P 3,793,500.00 Improvements......................................... 697,100.00 Total Current Value ................................ P 4,490,600.00 On the basis of the above current value, the monthly rental for the 2nd Five (5) years of the said 10-year period is estimated to be P30,002.00 exclusive of real estate taxes, other assessments and insurance premiums for the leased properties. 3) Except for the foregoing modification/amendment, all the other terms and conditions of the Contract of Lease dated 29 January 1958 remain in full force and effect.27 (Emphasis supplied) Thereafter, prior to the expiration of the foregoing contract in November 1987, an exchange of letters ensued between the contracting parties, as follows: 1. SUN BROTHERS, in a letter dated July 15, 1987, expressed its

24 Original Record, p. 188. 25 Id., pp. 188-189. 88

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals the option of the Sun Brothers for an additional period of five years with the proviso that the exercise of the option to renew the lease shall be made by the tenant in writing to Insular at least ninety days before the that: 2) For the use and occupancy of the leased premises TENANT shall, during the first (5) years of the above 10-year period, pay in advance at the office of INSULAR, within the first five (5) days of every month a monthly rental of P24,325.00 (All real exclusive estate of real other estate taxes and and insurance premiums. taxes, assessments expiration of the period provided.26 The contract further provided

intention to renew the lease for a period of five years.28 2. On July 31, 1987, INSULAR informed SUN BROTHERS that it was agreeable to the renewal of the lease subject to the following terms: (a) lease period from 01 December 1987 to 30 November 1992; (b) basic monthly rental of P60,000.00; (c) annual escalation rate of 10%; and, (d) _______________

insurance premiums of the leased properties shall be for the account of

326
Page

the TENANT). Thereafter, the rental shall be adjusted beginning on the sixth year of this lease with an effective increase equivalent to 6.5% per annum of the imputed value increment on the land compounded at 5% annually

5. On November 27, 1987, SUN BROTHERS requested reconsideration 26 Id., p. 195. 27 Id., p. 196. 28 Id., p. 258. 89 and accept its new offer of P50,000.00 monthly rental and yearly increase of 5%.33 6. On December 10, 1987, INSULAR informed SUN BROTHERS that it was agreeable to renewal of the lease subject to the following terms: (a) lease period from 01 December 1987 to 30 November 1992; (b) basic monthly rental of P50,000.00; (c) annual escalation rate of 10%; and, (d) insurance premiums, realty taxes, other government assessments if any, shall be for the account of SUN BROTHERS.34 VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 89 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals insurance premiums, realty taxes, other government assessments if any, shall be for the account of SUN BROTHERS.29 3. SUN BROTHERS acceded to the terms of INSULAR30 but The foregoing exchange of communications ultimately led to the Contract of Lease dated September 20, 1988, which is the second renewed Contract of Lease or third contract of lease between the parties. The contract again stipulated that the lease was renewable at the option of the tenant for an additional five years provided the exercise of the option to renew the lease shall be made by the tenant in writing to Insular at least ninety days before the expiration of the period. The lease was for a period of five years, from December 1, 1987 until November 30, 1992, with a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for the first year, and an increase of 10% per annum for _______________

subsequently found the said terms to be quite heavy, hence in a letter dated October 5, 1987, it offered the following compromise term: (a) basic monthly rental increase of 50% over the present monthly rental of P30,000.00, thereby making the new monthly rental to P45,000.00; and, (b) annual escalation rate of 5% which is a new condition not in the old contract, in addition to the insurance premiums, realty taxes, other government assessments if any, which shall be for the account of SUN BROTHERS.31 4. On November 20, 1987 INSULAR informed SUN BROTHERS that it was not amenable to the foregoing compromise terms. It reasoned that the new basic rental rate of P60,000.00 is fair and reasonable in the

29 Id., p. 259. 30 Ibid. 31 Id., p. 260. 32 Id., p. 261. 33 Id., p. 262. 34 Id., p. 263.

327

considering

the present market value

rates of other properties

immediate vicinity.32

Page

90

4.

On

September to

1,

1992,

INSULAR

replied

to

the

foregoing

letter, the

explaining that the contract of lease granted SUN BROTHERS only the option 90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals the succeeding which years, are exclusive for the of real of estate Sun taxes and insurance Again, the renew the lease contract and not the right to dictate terms and conditions of the renewed contract, especially on the amount of rentals to be paid.40 5. On September 5, 1992, SUN BROTHERS reiterated its position that it has validly exercised the option to renew the lease contract under the same terms and conditions by giving notice to INSULAR as provided in the lease contract.41 which apparently brought about an impasse by reason of which Sun

premiums

account

Brothers.35

contract provided that except for the foregoing modification/amendment, all the other terms and conditions of the Contract of Lease dated 29 January 1958 remain in full force and effect.36 Prior to the expiration of the second renewal Contract of Lease in 1992, an exchange of letters once more transpired between the parties, thus: 1. On May 22, 1992, SUN BROTHERS communicated to INSULAR its intention to renew the lease contract, quoting P100,000.00 as monthly rental.37 2. In response a lease thereto period in a of letter one dated year June at a 10, 1992, INSULAR rental of

Brothers filed the petition for declaratory relief with the RTC. _______________

35 Id., pp. 198-199. 36 Id., p. 199. 37 Id., p. 200. 38 Id., p. 265. 39 Id., p. 266. 40 Id., p. 168. 41 Id., p. 202. 91

offered

monthly

P500,000.00.38 3. More than a month later, SUN BROTHERS, in a letter dated August 5, 1992, expressed that, under the provisions of the contract of lease, SUN BROTHERS has the right to renew the lease for another period of five (5) years the without of any written condition notice for at the exercise ninety of the days option, before except giving least (90)

November 30, 1992 and that the rental due INSULAR is the current

328

rental. Thus, SUN BROTHERS insisted that INSULARs consent is not necessary to the renewal of the lease and the monthly rental due is the current rental paid by it.39 VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 91

Page

The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals Clearly, in this case, the original contract of lease dictates the

The

cases

of

Ledesma

vs.

Javellana,

Millare

vs.

Hernando

and

Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals, relied upon by the lower courts, find no application in the present case since the 1977 and 1987 _______________

interpretation of the renewal clause. Under the original contract of lease, the option to renew clause means simply that after the 20-year period of lease, or after the second contract of lease which was to expire November 30, 1987, the lessee, Sun Brothers, is given first priority to lease the building at the monthly rental and under such other terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the parties at that time. The renewal contracts of 1978 and 1987 each contained the stipulation that except for the modification or amendment relating to the monthly rental and term of of the Lease lease, dated all 29 the other terms and conditions in full of the and Contract January 1958 remain force

42 Id., pp. 196, 199. 92

effect,42 and, therefore, in pursuance thereof, the monthly rentals and other terms and conditions of the proposed renewal contract were agreed upon by the parties in said 1978 and 1987 renewed contracts of lease. Consequently, Sun Brothers interpretation based solely on the renewal

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals renewal contracts explicitly adopted all the other provisions of the original contract of lease dated January term of the lease. When the language of the contract is explicit leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import.43 The Court would be rewriting the the guise contract of lease of construction Sun the Brothers Court as As between we propounds held in Insular and to interpret it, despite Sun the the Brothers to express Inc. vs. under renew were option 29, 1958, including the provision on contract renewals, except those that relate to the monthly rental and the

clause under scrutiny completely ignoring the original contract of lease, is not plausible. The contracting parties intent as can be gleaned from the original contract of lease and confirmed by their subsequent acts in the 1977 and 1987 renewal contracts, was to constitute the renewal of the lease subject to terms and conditions to be agreed upon by the parties at the time of each renewal. Furthermore, the subsequent acts of the parties, option to evidenced to renew the by the is 1977 exchange that and which in of is letters between the in two the and contenders, clearly show that their understanding and interpretation of the clause in explicitly a provided of original contract of lease. Thus, after Sun Brothers signified its intention renew lease 1987, series offers counter-offers on the monthly rental and the term of lease followed until the parties reached an agreement thereon. Sun Brothers complied with

clause acts.

provision in the original contract of lease and the contracting parties subsequent has Riviera Filipina, Court of Appeals,44 a court, even the Supreme Court, has no right to make new contracts for the parties or ignore those already made by them, simply to avoid seeming hardships. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a contract for the

329

the terms of the original contract of lease on the option to renew until 1992 when, midway through the negotiations in the face of a P500,000.00 monthly rental pegged by Insular, Sun Brothers did a volte face and suddenly insisted that it had a unilateral right to renew.

Page

parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obligation not assumed.45 The Court will now discuss the merit of Insulars claim for monthly

VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 93 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals In addition, Insular presented the Contract of Lease it entered into with Winsome Development Corporation dated March 30, 8,200 subject square leased meter property and which is almost located twice in property likewise 1993 involving an the size of the the Makati, where

rental and damages. Insular pleads that the Court should fix the monthly rental at

P500,000.00. Sun Brothers alleges that the said amount is unreasonable, if not, unconscionable. However, no evidence, other than its self-serving assertion, was offered by Sun Brothers to substantiate its contention. On the other hand, Insular submitted in evidence the Appraisal Report which estimated the fair rental value of the subject leased property at P700,000.00 as of October 30, 1991.46 The testimony of the appraiser, Executive Vice President, Engr. Oliver Morales, of the Cuervo Appraisers, Inc.47 was not proven by Sun Brothers to be biased and partial on their estimation of the fair rental value of the subject leased property. _______________

monthly rental for the first year, starting December 1992, was fixed at P600,000.00.48 Sun Brothers failed to demonstrate that this contract has been assailed in court or that the agreed monthly rental was found to be unconscionable. Suffice it to state that courts may take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of lease contract renewals much more with business establishments,49 especially in this case where the subject leased property covers a 4,215 square meter prime property centrally located in a well-developed commercial district of the City of Makati.50 Based thereon, the Court finds the amount of P500,000.00 as reasonable monthly rental.

43

German

Marine

Agencies,

Inc.

vs.

National

Labor

Relations

Commission, 350 SCRA 629, 641 (2001); Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239, 252 (1998). 44 380 SCRA 245 (2002). 45 Id., p. 263, citing Collins vs. Northwest Casualty Co., 180 Wash 347, 39 P2d 986, 97 ALR 1235. 46 Original Record, p. 287. 47 TSN, October 6, 1992.

However, the Court cannot validly impose said amount on Sun Brothers as monthly rental since it was not agreed upon by the parties. It is not the province of the Court to make a contract for the parties or bind parties to one when no consensual agreement was entered into.51 But the amount of P500,000.00 a month since 1992 or P6 Million a year, can be considered actual or compensatory damages representing reasonable rental value or unrealized monthly income for Sun Brothers continued occupation and en_______________

330

93

48 The contract of Winsome Development Corporation provided for the following monthly rental scheme:

Page

P600,000.0001 Dec. 1992 to 30 Nov. 1993 P660,000.0001 Dec. 1993 to 30 Nov. 1997 P759,000.0001 Dec. 1997 to 30 Nov. 1998 P853,875.0001 Dec. 1998 to 30 Nov. 2000 P939,263.0001 Dec. 2000 to 30 Nov. 2002 (Original Record, p. 303). 49 Catungal vs. Hao, 355 SCRA 29, 41 (2001). 50 The Municipality of Makati was converted into the City of Makati by virtue of Republic Act No. 7854, otherwise known as The Charter of the City of Makati, which was approved on July 19, 1994. 51 Barrera vs. Lorenzo, 389 SCRA 329, 333 (2002); Pascual vs.

. . . There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses, and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him x x x. In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, are frequently not or to referred be but as rather ganacias on by the frustradas basis of to or lucrum cessans, granted mere some

speculation,

conjecture,

surmise,

reference

reasonably definite standard such as market value, established experience, or direct inference from known circumstances.53 In addition, records disclose that in an Order dated April 30, 1993 the trial court authorized Sun Brothers to make a consignation of its monthly rentals of P69,544.75 starting the month of December 1992 while the case pends in the be trial court.54 The the to amount total Insular. the date of monthly of rentals or such this in consigned55 compensatory rate of 12% until should deducted herein from amount actual

Ramos, 384 SCRA 105, 115 (2002); LL and Company Development and Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Huang Chao Chun, 378 SCRA 612, 622 (2002); Sabio vs. International Corporate Book, Inc., 364 SCRA 385, 404 (2001); Ramnani vs. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 645, 656 (2001); Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 356, 364 (1999); Cuizon vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 645, 667 (1996). 94

damages per full

granted

Furthermore, of finality of

actual or compensatory damages due shall earn interest at the legal annum computed would from have decision payment actually been made,

accordance with the ruling of this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,56 to wit: I. be When held an obligation, for the regardless The govern of its source, i.e., law, Title the contracts, XVIII on of

quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can liable of damages. Civil Code provisions in under 94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals Damages determining measure

recoverable damages. II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the _______________

331
Page

joyment of the leased property. This is in consonance with Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals 52 wherein the Court had enunciated the kinds of actual damages, thus:

claim 52 365 SCRA 326 (2001). 53 Id., p. 337, citing Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc., 247 SCRA 361, 381 (1995). 54 Original Record, p. 107. 55 As of May 13, 1993, Sun Brothers has consigned P417,268.50 for monthly rentals from December 1992 to May 1993, Id., pp. 115-118. 56 234 SCRA 78 (1994). 95

is

made

judicially

or

extrajudicially

(Art.

1169,

Civil

Code)

but

when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3.When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. (Emphasis supplied)57 Moreover, the Court takes exception from the CAs opinion that the

VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 95 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, when shall or be adjudged the on unliquidated can be claims or with damages except until demand established

improvements introduced by Sun Brothers should be considered in the latters favor in considering the terms of the rent. The fact that Sun Brothers had shouldered maintenance expenses on the building and paid real estate taxes as well as insurance premiums is inconsequential and immaterial in it the later in fixing the of rent. the The improvements rental one in the introduced contracts and of when the lease Sun payment of expenses, taxes and premiums have always been excluded determination becomes monthly to between the parties. The Court cannot disregard this fact simply because disadvantageous party, especially Brothers voluntarily assumed the obligation in the original contract. _______________

57 Id., pp. 95-97. 96

332
Page

reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the

96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals As to moral damages, Insulars prayer that moral damages not less than P5 Million by can person be awarded not and be because is granted in its name tenable. favor of only and The a in reputation rule is corporation. legal fright, has that been moral an a defamed damages artificial Sun Brothers, having suffering, not

Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be awarded not only when exemplary damages is awarded but also when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect _______________

58 National Power Corporation vs. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc., 369 SCRA 629, 649 (2001); Hanil Development Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 1, 14 (2001); Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 714, 722 (1996); LBC Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602, 607 (1994). 59 Article 2232, Civil Code. 97

Being

existence mental

contemplation, serious

corporation has no feelings, no emotions, no senses; it cannot, therefore, experience physical anguish, anxiety, wounded feelings or moral shock or social humiliation, which can be suffered only by one having a nervous system.58 As to Insulars plea for exemplary damages, the Court finds the same meritorious. exemplary reckless, evident renewal in an In contracts if or when and quasi-contracts, acted of it in manner.59 1992, the a Sun court wanton, Brothers for and may award was the in damages oppressive, bad of faith the lease the in defendant the in fraudulent, third

malevolent

course

negotiations wantonly which

VOL. 428, APRIL 28, 2004 97 The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals its interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.60 In the present case, Insular was constrained to engage the services of counsel and to incur expenses of litigation in order to protect its interest to the subject property against Sun Brothers utterly unfounded insistence on an alleged unilateral right to renew the lease. The award of P250,000.00 is reasonable in view of the time it has taken this case to be resolved.61 WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision, dated May 20, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46987 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered ordering respondent Sun Brothers and Company to pay petitioner Insular Life

contract the

oppressively took

insisted that it had a unilateral right to renew to lease thereby resulting impasse between parties and Sun Brothers advantage of and used as a basis for instituting the proceedings for declaratory relief, although its prior actions since January 29, 1958 when the original contract of lease was executed, spanning more than three decades, indicated that it was well-aware of the contractual stipulation that after a twenty-year period of lease, the right to renew the lease was subject to such terms and conditions that the parties may mutually agree upon at the time, as expressly provided for in the original contract of lease. Consequently, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 is in order by way of example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by others.

Page

333

_______________

In

all

cases,

the

attorneys

fees

and

expenses

of litigation

must be

reasonable. 61 United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Teofilo C. Ramos, G.R. No.

60

ART.

2208. of

In

the

absence than

of

stipulation, costs,

attorneys cannot be

fees

and

expenses except:

litigation,

other

judicial

recovered,

147800, November 11, 2003, 415 SCRA 596; Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 762, 773 (1999). 98

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where to the defendant the acted s in gross plainly and valid, evident just bad faith in

98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Layugan Assurance Hundred unrealized amount of Company, Thousand monthly monthly such Ltd. Pesos income rentals actual or until and the actual of damages or with in P6 the the amount a court due of year shall shall Five the from be earn private Pesos Fifty

(P500,000.00) petitioner

monthly,

representing

refusing claim;

satisfy

plaintiff

and

demandable

Million trial

December 1, 1992 until respondent vacates the leased premises. The consigned deducted from the total amount of actual or compensatory damages due. Furthermore, finality indemnity under workmens compensation and of compensatory full payment is Five the of in damages thereof. ordered Hundred of sum In to Two interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum computed from the date of this Sun decision Brothers in addition, pay Thousand Hundred respondent exemplary Company fees petitioner

(6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In actions for

employers liability laws; (9) In crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a

damages and

amount

(P500,000.00);

attorneys

Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00). Double costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED. Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur. Judgment reversed and set aside.

Page

334

Note.In the construction and interpretation of a contract, the intention of the parties must be sought. (University Physicians Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 52 [2000]) [The Insular Life Assurance

Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79(2004)]

Page

335

Page

336