Muoz v People 53 S 190 Carlet v CA 275 S 110 In re: Sotto 82 Phil 595 Facts: Atty.

Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in connection with his written statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality. Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one. Issue: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt. HELD: The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrowminded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by better qualified justices. Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact. It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct. Wicker v Arcangel 252 S 444 Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel G.R. No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444 PONENTE: Mendoza FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993, Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel from the case. Respondent judge found offense in the allegations on the motion for inhibition filed by complainants, and in an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993. HELD:The power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect without which the administration of justice will fail. Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case." Employees Compensation Commission 257 SCRA 723 New Pangasinan Review v NLRC 196 S 55 Santiago v Fojas 248 S 68 Facts: Complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." Attached in their Affidavit of Merit, they allege that because of the respondent s neglect and malpractice of law that they lost their case to Judge Capulong and their appeal in the Court of Appeals. Respondent: The unfavorable judgment by the Regional Trial Court in the case is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case. He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession. Issue: Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Ruling: It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility1. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Else wise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of

his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Uy Chico v Union Life 29 Phil 163 Uy Chico vs. The Union Life Assurance Society, LimitedG.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915 Facts:In 1897, petitioners father died. He continued the business still in the name of his father after buying the share of his brother in the said business. Petitioner filed a case seeking therecovery of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods that was destroyedin a fire. These policies were surrendered by the petitioners lawyer to the administrator of his fathers estate, who had compromised with the defendant for of the face value of theinsurance that was paid to the court. He alleged that said policies belong to him and that hewas not bound by the compromised agreement made by the administrator. The companyintroduced evidence showing that the petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policieswhen his lawyer surrendered the same to the estates administrator. Petitioner, on thewitness stand had been asked if he had any objection as to his lawyer testifying concerningthe surrender of the policies to which he negatively replied. Whereupon, the lawyer of the petitioner formally withdraw the waiver given by the petitioner and objected to thetestimony on the ground of privileged communication. Issue:Whether or not instruction of the client to be delivered to a third person is considered privilege Held: No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the same Act. It will be notedthat the evidence in question concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for theinformation of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising theclient as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistentwith the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such acommunication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is acommunication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupiesthe role of intermediary or agent. People v Sandiganbayan 527 S 505

Facts: Honrada was the clerk of court and acting stenographer of the First MCTC. Paredes was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan. Sansaet was the counsel of Paredes. It appears that Paredes applied for a free patent and Certificate of Title over a lot. It was initially approved, but the Director of lands subsequently filed for the cansellation of the patent and title on the ground that the land had been reserved as a school site. The lower court ruled to nullify the patent and title after finding out that Paredes obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations. An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. However, the fiscal directed the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription. After some time, Gelacio, the one who filed the perjury case, sent a letter to the OMB seeking the investigation of the 3 personalities for falsification of public documents. The alleged falsified documents were documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of the perjury charge. In a sudden turn of events, Atty. Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court . Atty. Sansaet was, in effect, asking to be a state witness against Paredes. However, the OMB denied the request of Atty. to be a state witness on the ground that the confession made by Paredes to Atty. was privileged communication. Issue: W/N the confession made by Paredes to Atty. is privileged communication. Held: The confession made by Paredes is not covered by privileged communication. This case is actually an exception to the rule. It can be assumed that there was confidential information made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the falsification case, because Sansaet was the counsel. A distinction must be made between communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. It is true that by now those crimes had already been committed. But for the application of the atty.-client privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the atty. In other words, if the client seeks the advice of the atty. with respect to a crime already committed at the time of the communication, it is privileged information. But if the client consults the atty. regarding a crime he is about to commit after the consultation, such is not privileged information. In the present case, the confession made by Paredes to Sansaet were in reference to a crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he later committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the atty.-client privilege.

Besides, for the rule to attach, the purpose of the consultation must be for a lawfule purpose. Without the lawful purpose, the privilege does not attach. Bautista vs Gonzales 182 scra 164 Facts: - Angel Bautista filed a complaint against Ramon Gonzales for the following acts: o Accepting a case where he agreed to pay all expenses for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in litigation; o Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in a case where Eugenio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Lopez in another case; o Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation, while the case was still pending; o Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him for the development of the land involved in a case into a residential subdivision, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction; o Submitting to the CFI falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant. Issue: - W/n Gonzales should be punished for these acts. Held: - Yes, SC suspends him for 6 months. - For the first allegation, the SC pointed out that a lawyer may indeed advance expenses of litigation but such payment should be subject to reimbursement. In this case, the contingent fee agreement between the Fortunados and Gonzales did not provide for such reimbursement. Such contract is against public policy because it gives undue leverage in favor of the lawyer. - Second, the Court found that Gonzales did not violate any law because the Fortunados consented to his appearance for Lopez. - Third act, the Court said that such is a violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, which prohibits a lawyer from buying/acquiring the property of his clients which is the subject of a pending case. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and

constitutes malpractice. And although the Code of Professional Responsibility does not anymore contain Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," the Code still provides that a lawyer should follow the laws of the Phil. At all times. By acquiring the property in litigation, Gonzales has violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code and can be administratively punished for such violation. - The SC held that in withholding such information, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. - Lastly, the SC held that the original copies of the documents Gonzales submitted were false because they bore the signatures of the Fortunados when, in fact, they did not sign the original copy but only a photocopy of the original. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. Choa vs Tiongson 253 scra 371 Businos vs Ricafort 283 scra 413 Facts; Initial case of estafa was filed and subsequently dropped upon payment of the respondent of the amount allegedly owed to the complainant. However, the administrative case was pursued by the complainant claiming gross misconduct on the part of the respondent as to the delayed payment of debt even with repeated request in addition to the asking of P 2000 as bond in a case handled by him, which was was not even required. Issue; WON Atty. Francisco Ricafort be disbarred or suspended in his practice of law. Ruling; The Supreme Court found the recommendation of the IBP to suspend the respondent insufficient, therefore, ruled to DISBAR Atty. Francisco Ricafort in relation to his

palpable disregard of Sec 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,ule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, aggravated by a violation of Canon 11.\ Menzi v Bastida 63 phil 16 Bastida vs Menzi Facts: Bastida offered to assign to Menzi & Co. his contract with Phil Sugar Centrals Agency and to supervise the mixing of the fertilizer and to obtain other orders for 50 % of the net profit that Menzi & Co., Inc., might derive therefrom. J. M. Menzi (gen. manager of Menzi & Co.) accepted the offer. The agreement between the parties was verbal and was confirmed by the letter of Menzi to the plaintiff on January 10, 1922. Pursuant to the verbal agreement, the defendant corporation on April 27, 1922 entered into a written contract with the plaintiff, marked Exhibit A, which is the basis of the present action. Still, the fertilizer business as carried on in the same manner as it was prior to the written contract, but the net profit that the plaintiff herein shall get would only be 35%. The intervention of the plaintiff was limited to supervising the mixing of the fertilizers in the bodegas of Menzi. Prior to the expiration of the contract (April 27, 1927), the manager of Menzi notified the plaintiff that the contract for his services would not be renewed. Subsequently, when the contract expired, Menzi proceeded to liquidate the fertilizer business in question. The plaintiff refused to agree to this. It argued, among others, that the written contract entered into by the parties is a contract of general regular commercial partnership, wherein Menzi was the capitalist and the plaintiff the industrial partner. Issue: Is the relationship between the petitioner and Menzi that of partners? Held: The relationship established between the parties was not that of partners, but that of employer and employee, whereby the plaintiff was to receive 35% of the net profits of the fertilizer business of Menzi in compensation for his services for supervising the mixing of the fertilizers. Neither the provisions of the contract nor the conduct of the parties prior or subsequent to its execution justified the finding that it was a contract of copartnership. The written contract was, in fact, a continuation of the verbal agreement between the parties, whereby the plaintiff worked for the defendant corporation for one- half of the net profits derived by the corporation form certain fertilizer contracts. According to Art. 116 of the Code of Commerce, articles of association by which two or more persons obligate themselves to place in a common fund any property, industry, or any of these things, in order to obtain profit, shall be commercial, no matter what it class

may be, provided it has been established in accordance with the provisions of the Code. However in this case, there was no common fund. The business belonged to Menzi & Co. The plaintiff was working for Menzi, and instead of receiving a fixed salary, he was to receive 35% of the net profits as compensation for his services. The phrase in the written contract en sociedad con, which is used as a basis of the plaintiff to prove partnership in this case, merely means en reunion con or in association with. It is also important to note that although Menzi agreed to furnish the necessary financial aid for the fertilizer business, it did not obligate itself to contribute any fixed sum as capital or to defray at its own expense the cost of securing the necessary credit. Sesbreo vs ca 245 scra 30 Facts: Raul Sesbreo replaced Atty Pacquiao as counsel for 52 employees in a case against the Province of Cebu andGovernor Espina for reinstatement to work and backwages. 32 of the employees agreed that Sesbreno would be paid 30% of the backwages as attorneys fees and 20% forexpenses of litigation. RTC granted employees petition. CA affirmed. Judgment became final. Later on, a compromise was made between the employees and the Province of Cebu whereby said employeeswaived their right to reinstatement. Cebu released P2.3M (representing back salaries, terminal leave pay, gratuitypay) to Sesbreno for the employees as Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. 10 of the employees asserted that they only agreed to give 40% of their back salaries to Sesbreno. Lower courtagreed with them and fixed attorneys fees for Sesbreno at 40% plus the 20% expenses. Employees filed an MR asserting that there was inadvertence in placing 60% where it should only be 50%. Thiswas granted. Sesbreno was not satisfied by the decision so he went to the CA. And kawawang Sesbreno nabawasan pa lalo angbayadCA deemed the award of 20% of the back salaries as the fair, equitable, and reasonable amount forattorneys fees. Punta siya ngayon sa Padre FauraSupreme CourtIssue:Whether the court acted properly in reducing Sesbrenos attorneys fees despite a pre-existing contract between theparties.Held: Yes. It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorneys fees is always subject to judicial control.When the courts find the amount to be excessive or unreasonable, public policy demands that the contract be disregardedto protect the client. When a lawyer takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects hisprofessional fees to judicial control.A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the

amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, UNLESS the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable orunconscionable. Though generally, a much higher compensation is allowed in a contingent fee agreement (as in this case)in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. But contingent fee contracts are under thesupervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges. Its validity rests largely on thereasonableness of the stated fees under the circumstances of the case. An attorneys fee is unconscionable when it is sodisproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered. Nevertheless, the existence of an unreasonable fee (nomatter the degree) does not bar recovery. It is only that the courts will fix a reasonable amount.Quantum Meruit which means as much as he deserves is often the courts basis for determining the amount.Considering its a labor case, an award of 50% of back salaries is excessive. The 20% award is justified.