2012

Stability and Instability paradox

The Stability-Instability Paradox: South Asia and the Nuclear Future
Valuable estimation of Dr. krepon in the light of stability and instability paradox. Krepon throws light on the throbbing and pounding questions of Pak-India nuclear conduct. He also suggests the manners to maintain stable Pak-India relationship.

Subtain Shani International Relations (M.A- 3rd ) 12/3/2012

The Stability-Instability Paradox: South Asia and the Nuclear Future Is it possible to predict the behaviour of nuclear states, and what does the future hold for them? These were the questions that animated Dr. Krepon's talks and he used a theoretical point of departure to orient his response: deterrence theory's "stabilityinstability" paradox. What is the "Stability-Instability Paradox"? Nuclear weapons create both instability and stability in an adversarial relationship between two nuclear-armed states. Knowledge of the physical consequences of nuclear weapons use serves as a deterrent that prompts states to ensure that that threshold is not crossed. This creates a certain stability in the relationship between two nuclear states. Paradoxically, this stability destabilizes the relationship. Conviction that conflict with the other state cannot cross the nuclear threshold provides licence for rising tensions and unlimited coercive action short of that threshold. How does this theory apply to the India-Pakistan nuclear equation? Like many other theoretical constructions, the "Stability-Instability Paradox" is a product of the study of Cold War politics. Nuclear weapons have created both stability and instability in South Asia, going by the views of those Dr. Krepon describes as "deterrence optimists" and "deterrence pessimists." Deterrence optimists see a stable equation emerging as a result of both India and Pakistan becoming nuclear weapon states. Their optimism, according to Dr. Krepon, rests on three powerful premises. First, the nuclear threshold has not been breached in past crises between the two countries. Leaders on both sides are aware of the consequences of a nuclear war, and have been very responsible. Secondly, the national economic agenda, particularly in growth-oriented India, militates against a nuclear war on either side. Third, a nuclear crisis will surely be met by third party-namely, United States-intervention. Deterrence pessimists identify the ways in which the instability part of the paradox is in place in India-Pakistan relations. Dr. Krepon listed conditions that exacerbate this. First, growing conventional imbalance exacerbates nuclear instability. The conventional military balance is tipping in India's favour. India's purchasing power and procurement options are better than those of Pakistan, whose reliance on China is increasing. Secondly, miscalculations result when the two sides don't know each other's capabilities and in the absence of mutual inspections. These miscalculations are likely to trigger a nuclear crisis. Third, this extends to India and Pakistan's ability to read each other's postures. While the two countries are able to interpret conventional moves, they have little understanding of each other's nuclear postures and moves. This can have critical, even catastrophic, consequences. Fourth, as nuclear parity is lost in the long run and the nuclear balance too tips in India's favour, instability in the non-nuclear sphere could spread to the nuclear sphere as well. Fifth, the nuclear threshold is ambiguous and hard to pinpoint, and any of the above factors could trigger nuclear escalation to a point past that threshold. Finally, Dr. Krepon spoke of two vulnerabilities that contribute to

instability. While they were attributed to the early stages of the nuclear programmes, both seem to be a function of the differences in strategic depth between two states. The first vulnerability rests in the adversary's knowledge of where the other side's nuclear assets and delivery systems are located. Pakistan is more susceptible than India on this count and less likely, therefore, to give credence to a 'no first use' doctrine on India's part. The second vulnerability is to an attack aimed at destroying a state's top leadership. In its turn, India is more vulnerable to this possibility as its strategic depth places many targets outside Pakistan's reach. On balance, although elements of both stability and instability are present in the relationship between India and Pakistan, it is instability that is the dominant element. How might we alter the balance in favour of a stable India-Pakistan nuclear relationship? Dr. Krepon cited 10 key elements from the Western experience. 1. Do not change or try to change the territorial status quo in sensitive areas by the use of force or intimidation. 2. Avoid nuclear boasting. 3. Avoid dangerous military practices. 4. Put in place special reinforcing measures for nuclear weapons such as their movement, operations, etc. 5. Negotiate and implement nuclear risk reduction measures and confidence building measures (CBMs). 6. Agree on verification arrangements and intensive monitoring. This is because one cannot trust the other's rhetoric and proof will be required. 7. Establish reliable means of communication between political leaders and military leaders of both sides. Talk to each other all the time through regular summits, etc. 8. Establish reliable command and control as well as superior intelligence capabilities. 9. Keep working hard on all these measures and keep improving. 10. Hope for good luck, because even if one works hard on other points, things could go wrong.