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Humans and free will: All philosophers who see God as deeply involved in what happens have a problem

with human free will. Recall Malebranche. The problem Leibniz faces is not the same as the divine foreknowledge problem. Human freedom: concept of Adam and his substance eternally contain everything he does. So everything Adam does seems to be necessary. Examples: Adam sins, Caesar was a Roman dictator, crosses the Rubicon. But freedom requires that an action be contingent. Leibniz: freedom requires (1) intelligence (2) spontaneity (3) contingency. Solution: distinction between (1) absolute, geometric, metaphysical necessity: a denial is a contradiction. For instance: a married bachelor, a triangle with 4 sides. (2) hypothetical necessity: something is necessary only given a divine volition. But alternatives are per se possible, that is, possible in themselves. What Adam does is not necessary, his existence is not necessary. God could not have created him, could have created a different world. On the other hand, what he does is certain and happens infallibly. Adams choice: chooses also among several per se possible outcomes. Adam also chooses spontaneously: he himself initiates the choice: New System: each substance produces all its own states. He considers several options: intelligence. God and free will: Because God inevitably choose the best possible world, is he really free doing what he does? Doesnt his choice seem necessary? This would lead to Spinoza who held that everything happens necessarily. A big difference with Spinoza: Spinozas God does not choose, he is an abstract being from whose nature everything that happens necessarily follows. Leibniz: God will inevitably choose the best, but he does so for reasons vs Spinoza: blind necessity. Divine choice subject to moral necessity (what follows due to divine wisdom), not absolute necessity.

Leibniz: God considers a number of options, worlds, which are each in and of themselves possible. Contingency. And so he also uses intelligence. God himself produces the choice: spontaneity. So Leibniz argues that divine and human choices are not necessary in the sense of not absolutely necessary. And God could not choose the best possible world; its just that he would never do so. Nonetheless, choices happen inevitable, and are in some sense necessary and determined. Leibniz thinks that type of determination is compatible with free will: so he is a kind of compatibilist. Compatibilists hold that determinism is compatible with freewill, and the inability to act otherwise does not destroy freewill. Incompatibilists holds that in order to be free, we must be able to act otherwise.